Specpro Digest

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

1. General Provisions/Preliminary Matters RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents. Facts: Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002, the respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-ininterest. The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction,". In the complaint, the respondents alleged six(6) causes of action: that (1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth certificated merely simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and prior to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the formers estate and illegally transferred to his name the titles to Antonios properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into surrendering to him a Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramon’s name; (4) Ramon illegally transferred to his own name through a forged document 40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation; (5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents; and (6) Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his representatives from disposing or selling any property that belongs to the estate of Antonio; (2) that Ramon be declared as disqualified from inheriting from Antonio Ching; and (3) declaring null the unauthorized transfers made by Ramon. The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction 1

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary court. Issue: Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss as the issues could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action Held: NO. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed. Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction. The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs. It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their 2

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction. In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding. 2. Rule 72- Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER Facts: Private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court n the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the 3

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent. The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005. The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference. Hence, this Petition Issue: WON the Complaint filed by the respondents before the Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action Held: NO. The complaint filed by the respondents in the Shari’a District Court for the settlement of the estate is a special proceeding. The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private 4

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner, vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent. Facts: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties. The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally. Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the 5

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner. Issue: WON rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct. Held: Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable. The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents. Facts: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, there 6

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate. The Manila RTC denied the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The CA likewise dismissed the petition. Issue 1: WON the creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have the right to participate in the settlement proceedings by way of intervention under Rule 119 of the Rules of Court Issue 2: WON the creditors petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of the deceased person, are entitled to copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

Held: Issue 1: Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant." Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Issue 2: In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1 Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as 8

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

"interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners. Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners, vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.

Facts: Case Filed: Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado. Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for them to vacate the same. In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan 9

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-ininterest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches. Issue: WON the determination of the legal heirs of the deceased person be made in special proceedings Held: YES. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS, vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS. Facts: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso). In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno's collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.[9] Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno's lawful heirs. The RTC ruled for Gaudioso. It held that while the petitioners had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of a letter of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Issue: WON heirship may be determined in an ordinary suit Ruling: NO. In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x: 11

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereonor when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.[24] In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246. Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.[25] Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso's heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect. _________________________________________________ _________ JOSE S. MATUTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division) and MATIAS S. MATUTE, respondents. Facts: August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in special proceeding 25876 (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos') appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that "for a period of more than two years 12

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

from the date of his appointment (on May 29, 1963), said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his administration," and that he "is not only incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas on account of a criminal charge for murder filed against him which is occupying most of his time." The Court removed co-administrator, Matias S. Matute, as such coadministrator of the estate and orders him to submit a final accounting of his administration together with his past administration accounts which have not been approved. Issue: WON the removal of Matias S. Matute was proper Ruling: NO. The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly expressed in one case, 3 "The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court." Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. 4 In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order of removal because it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the respondent from his trust without affording him the full benefit of a day in court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due process. It appears that shortly after the reception of evidence for the movants Carlos Matute and the Candelario-Matute heirs, the respondent filed on January 8, 1966a verified objection to the admission in evidence of the movants' exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never properly identified nor produced in court. Four days later, or on January 12, 1966, the respondent filed with leave of court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence". Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. We are of the view that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of 13

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

discretion which dooms his improvident order as a nullity. In fact, even without the respondent's reservation, it was the bounden duty of the probate judge to schedule the presentation and reception of the respondent's evidence before disposing of the case on the merits because only the movants at that time had presented their evidence. This duty is projected into bolder relief if we consider, which we must, that the aforesaid motion is in form as well as in substance a demurrer to evidence allowed by Rule 35, by virtue of which the defendant does not lose his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is denied. Said Rule states: After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. (emphasis supplied) The application of the abovecited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the "absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents._ Facts: On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed. On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court. On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.

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The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas. In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution. In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors. The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim. The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings. In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth Division held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court 15

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing. On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition. Issue: WON liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action or a special proceeding Ruling: Special Proceeding §1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. §2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding. Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11 Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship. Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. 16

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

3. Rule 73- Subject Estate of Deceased Persons AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON FACTS: Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Quizaon by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. It was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000 and personal properties worth P2,100,000. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate. Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate. The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA and held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence in Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, 17

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

CA upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: Whether or not Eliseo Quiazon was a resident of Las PiÑas and therefore, the petition for Letter's of Administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las PiÑas. RULING: YES We find the petition bereft of merit. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city. G.R. No. 95536

March 23, 1992

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., MARIA SALVACION SALUDO, LEOPOLDO G. SALUDO and SATURNINO G. SALUDO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. 18

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(no relevance to Rule 73) GR No. L-33929

September 02, 1983

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. GREGORIO T. LANTIN (no relevance to Rule 73) G.R. No. L-57848

June 19, 1982

RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA (no relevance to Rule 73) FACTS: Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. ISSUE: Was Bernardo preterited? HELD: In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court. G.R. No. L-3039

December 29, 1949 19

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

VICTORIA REYNOSO and JUAN REYNOSO vs. VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, PIA REYNOSO, AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON PALABRICA, LEONCIO CADIZ, ET AL. no relevance to Rule 73 (applies Rules 79, 87) G.R. No. 174489

April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO vs. LORENZO LAXA no relevance to Rule 73, (applies Rules 75, 76) FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof. Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence. Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. 20

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio. RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate. RULING: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act. The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.” G.R. Nos. 140371-72

November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO vs.HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO -no relevance to Rule 73 (applies Rule 76) FACTS: 21

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is entitled as: “Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana” ISSUE: Whether or not there is preterition in the case at bar RULING: The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976 VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976 22

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA FACTS: On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed in the proper court with jurisdiction considering the residence of the decedent. RULING: NO. We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual 23

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. G.R. No. 128314

May 29, 2002

RODOLFO V. JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO FACTS: Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively.The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties. On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents. Rodolfo moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of improper venue. He argued that their parents did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. Their actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, and moved to Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for medical treatment and hospitalization purposes. Perico countered that their parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document. The RTC denied Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss. The CA affirmed the RTC’s order. ISSUE: Whether or not the proper venue for the settlement proceedings should be held in Quezon City. RULING: YES. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.

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There is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s. The decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. This unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent. InGarcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that the term “resides” means “the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.” In addition, there is no distinction between venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings. They have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence”, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. G.R. No. L-6379

September 29, 1954

In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of the Philippine. WILFRED UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES no relevance to Rule 73 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950, with the degree of Bachelor of Science. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the 25

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. RULING: NO. Immediately after the filing of his application — and notwithstanding the explicit promise therein made by him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951. There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another." "Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means necessarily as, since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. Petitioner has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor. VALERA vs OFILADA, G.R. No. L-27526, Sep. 12, 1974 FACTS: Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Valera. Virgilio Valera was the administrator of the estate, He died on March 21, 1961. He was survived by his widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera and their ten (10) children, named Amanda, Oscar, Dionisio, Benito, Felixberto, Eva, Lita, Toniette, Vicenta and Teresita, all petitioners herein, except Vicenta and Teresita, who were abroad. Later, Adoracion Valera Bringas, who claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera, was appointed administratrix. She filed on April 16, 1964 in the intestate proceeding a petition to 26

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require "Celso Valera and family and Angelita de Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the one-third pro-indiviso portion of the Valera residence located in Bangued, Abra. Celso Valera interposed an opposition to it on the ground that Francisco Valera had no interest in the Valera residence, that the property was never leased and that the remedy of Mrs. Bringas was "in a appropriate remedy and/or procedure" and not in the intestate proceeding. The lower court subsequently granted the petition. The said heirs, through Atty. Angel V. Colet, a son-in-law of Mrs. Valera, filed a motion for the reconsideration of that order. They contended that the Valera residence "should be excluded from the inventory," because that was their "absolute property of which they have been in complete possession and occupation". Mrs. Bringas replied that Francisco Valera's estate had "already consolidated" its ownership over that one-third partition "through the submission of the inventory and its approval" by the probate court. In an order dated April 15, 1966, respondent Judge Macario M. Ofilada denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera and granted the motion of Mrs. Bringas for execution and for the delivery of certain funds and properties. In this present case, petitioners assail the brief, three-sentence order of July 10, 1964 on the following grounds: (a) that it decided the issue of ownership as to the one-third pro-indiviso share of Francisco Valera in the Valera residence, an issue, which according to them, is beyond the court's probate jurisdiction; (b) that it was issued without the benefit of a trial on the merits and without hearing all the parties involved; (c) that it does not contain findings of fact and law; (d) that it is a judgment for a money claim which should have been filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor, Virgilio Valera, and (e) that the order has no basis in substantive law. The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order of April 15, 1966 on the following grounds: (a) that, as a probate judge, he had no jurisdiction to require the heirs of Virgilio Valera to account for the fruits of the six parcels of land administered by him and that a separate action should be filed or the proper claim should be made against his estate; (b) that he had no jurisdiction to order the heirs of Virgilio Valera to deliver to Mrs. Bringas the sum of P4,784.98 as "insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera"; (c) that Section 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court contemplates that "double the value of the fruits and monies" should be recovered in an "action" and not in an intestate proceeding, and (d) that the order was issued without any trial on the merits and it does not contain findings of fact and law. ISSUE: Whether the lower court, sitting as a probate court in the intestate proceeding for the estate of Francisco Valera, could hold the heirs of Virgilio Valera answerable for certain 27

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supposed monetary liabilities of the latter to the estate and enforce said liabilities against the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera. HELD: We hold that the trial court, as a probate court, erred in adjudging in the said intestate proceeding the monetary liabilities of the late Virgilio Valera to the estate of Francisco Valera and in issuing a writ of execution against his properties to enforce the supposed liabilities. There is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment enforceable by execution. The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution (a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (e) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution. The record reveals that there is a dispute between Mrs. Bringas and the heirs of Virgilio Valera as to whether one-third of the Valera residence and the six parcels of land listed in the "Amended Incomplete Inventory, etc." dated August 31, 1965 belong to the estate of Francisco Valera. The tax declarations for those properties are in the name of the deceased Virgilio Valera. Their inclusion in the inventory is not conclusive as to the ownership. "Questions on title to real property cannot be determined in testate or intestate proceedings. It has, however, been held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to he instituted between the parties." MACIAS vs UY KIM, G.R. No. L-31174, May 30, 1972 FACTS: Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for review by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance. It 28

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appearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in Branch VIII of this Court Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson. That the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary title of her estate. It being unquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a deceased person and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the court or branch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement (Branch VIII) in this case. The orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in his complaint against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII of the same court. The Petitoner filed a separate civil case in Branch X, seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate of the decedent Rosina. ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance can legally interfere with, or pass upon the validity of said orders of the Judge of Branch VIII, as the probate court. HELD: No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue thereof. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending. The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to two or more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay. The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is unduly burdening the courts. VALERA vs INSERTO, G.R. No. L-56504, May 17, 1987 FACTS: 29

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Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18hectare fishpond in Iloilo by the government to last during his lifetime. He transferred it by “fictitious sale” to his daughter Teresa to support her children with the agreement that when the children finishes schooling, the fishpond will be returned to him. Valera and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child Teresa died. The heirs of Teresa- her husband Jose Garin and their children bought the fishpond from the government, acquiring title thereto. The administrators of the spouses Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa claim that the fishpond should be returned to the spouses’ estates. The Probate Court presided by Judge Adil held that there has been an implied trust created, therefore the fishpond should be restored to the estate of the spouses pursuant to Arts. 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code .Pursuant thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforcere conveyance of the fishpond to the estate. The fishpond was leased by the Garin Heirs to Fabiana, who although willingly surrendered it to the sheriff, later filed a complaint-in-intervention. This was dismissed so he instituted a separate action for injunction and damages. Court of Appeals reversed (fishpond to be returned to Garin Heirs and their lessee Fabiana) saying that: (1) Probate Court had no jurisdiction; (2) that the Title of the Garin Heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the presumption that the estate owns the fishpond; and (3) that assuming the Probate Court had competence toresolve ownership, a separate action has to be filed. Issue: WON Probate Court had authority to order reconveyance of the fishpond? Held: NO. Ratio: The CFI (now RTC), acting as Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby 30

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prejudiced. This is issue is not a jurisdictional, but procedural, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, the fishpond cannot be the subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others. A separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property. Decision of the CA AFFIRMED. CUIZON vs RAMOLETE, G.R. No. L-51291, May 29, 1984 FACTS: As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R. Case No. N179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al. Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978. During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the 1971 31

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deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rights and interests and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners. In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu. Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The Cebu CFI granted the same. ISSUE: Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels of have been? HELD: No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.” Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. Doctrine: Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties.

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REYES vs YSIP, G.R. No. L-7516, May 12, 1955 FACTS: This is a petition for a writ to compel the judge of the CFI of Bulcan to permit and allow petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that she is a natural daughter of the deceased, Juan Reyes Panlilio. Probate of the last will and testament of decedent was filed in the CFI. Leonor P. Reyes, herein petitioner filed an opposition. The special administratix, who had presented the will for probate, object to the personality and right of the petitioner herein to contest the will and asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before the hearing thereon. The Honorable Judge held that only the probate of the will was at issue and that the question of the presentation of evidence as to the filiation of the oppositor, petitioner herein was out of place. Counsel for petitioner made attempts to have the court reconsider its order but the court refused to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not the natural child is allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the probate of the will. HELD: In distribution proceedings where a will is sought to be admitted to probate, a person who can have no interest in the succession cannot be allowed to intervene and oppose such probate. A person intervening in the proceedings should be required to show interest in the will or the property affected thereby. For such purpose, it is sufficient that he shows or produces prima facie evidence of his or her relationship to the testator. The court did not amount to a prohibition to take part in the hearing for the probate of the will and was motivated by desire to avoid multiplicity of the issues and the limitation thereof to the execution of the will. The court did not therefore deprive the petitioner of any right which she is entitled to under the rules of law. GAAS ET AL vs FORTICH, G.R. No. L-31454, December 28, 1929 FACTS: On January 23, 1926, Francisco Arquiza, of Cebu, made his last will and testament in which, subject to certain devises, he bequeathed all of his property to Pilar Fortich his then wife. Later, upon his death, this will was admitted to probate as his last will and testament. Pending the adminisrration of his estate, Isidra Gaas filed a petition alleging among others that he was previously married to Federico Arquiza during the year 1908 and as a result of said marriage there were born to said Federico Arquiza and this petitioner three children namely Felicisimo Arquiza, Dioscoro Arquiza deceased, and Soledad Arquiza.; That the deceased Francisco Arquiza is survived by his widow, Pilar Fortich but left no legitimate children or descendants nor did the said deceased leave legitimate parents or ascendants; and 33

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that the minors, Felicisimo Arquiza and Soledad Arquiza are therefore the legitimate children of the deceased, Federico Arquiza and the petitioner herein, Isidra Gaas and as such are by representation the duly constituted legal heirs of the deceased Don Francisco Arquiza as provided by the Civil Code. Isidra as natural guardian of the minors, Felicisimo Arquiza and Soledad Arquiza, respectfully prays this honorable court to declare said minors to be the legal heirs of the deceased Francisco Arquiza and for such other and further relief to which they may be entitled. To which the executrix made a general and specific denial, and alleged the following special defences: 1. That the petitioners Soledad and Felicisimo, surnamed Arquiza, alleged acknowledged natural children of the deceased Francisco Arquiza, represented by their guardian ad litem Isidra Gaas, have no right to succeed in the properties of the herein deceased Francisco Arquiza; 2. That assuming that there is merit in the petition which is objected to by this pleading, the action to acknowledge the aforesaid minors Soledad and Felicisimo, surnamed Arquiza, as natural children, has prescribed. The lower court sustained the petition and found that all of the legal rights of Federico Arquiza was vested in the petitioners, who were his legitimate children, and that, as such, they were entitled to one-third of the estate left by Francisco Arquiza. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring them entitled to one-third of the estate left by Francisco Arquiza, and in not dismissing the petition of the appellees. HELD: As to the fifth assignment of error, the lower court cites and relies upon the case of Larena and Larena vs. Rubio (43 Phil., 1017), and says: This is not an action to compel the recognition of Federico Arquiza under the provisions of the Civil Code. Such an action is barred. This is a proceeding to obtain a declaration of the rights of the petitioners as the legitimate children of Federico Arquiza to inherit in representation of their father from their grandfather. It was not necessary for Federico Arquiza to bring an action for recognition because he had acquired the status of a recognized natural child under Law 11 of Toro by the tacit recognition of his father. His vested rights were transmitted to his legitimate children, and they had no need to bring an action against Francisco Arquiza or his heirs to compel the recognition of their father, Federico Arquiza, as the natural son of Francisco Arquiza. If Federico Arquiza were still living, he could intervene in these proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his natural father, 34

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without the necessity of a proceeding to compel his recognition, as is required by the Civil Code; and Francisco Arquiza having left no legitimate descendants, or ascendants, Federico Arquiza, if he had survived his father, would have been entitled to one-third of the latter's estate. Article 842 of the Civil Code provides: If the testator leaves no legitimate ascendants or descendants, the acknowledged natural children shall be entitled to a third of the estate. And article 843 provides: The rights granted natural children by the preceding articles are transmitted on their death to their legitimate descendants. The facts found by the trial court and sustained by the evidence bring the appellees within those provisions. In the matter of administration of the estate of Tan Po PicTORRES vs JAVIER, G.R. No. L-10560, March 24, 1916 FACTS: This is an appeal in proceeding to appoint an administrator of the estate of Tan Po Pic, deceased. The trial court refused to appoint Marta Torres who claimed to be the lawful wife of the deceased, and, instead, appointed Juan L. Javier administrator. The appeal is taken by Marta Torres from that order of appointment. It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic, deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng New. Marta Torres objected to the appointment of any one except herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the probate court was correct. HELD: We are of the opinion that the decision of the probate court is so far correct that it must be affirmed. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as the court may appoint. 35

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The first error assigned is that the court erred in allowing Tan Y. Soc to appear in the proceeding. It appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed administrator of the said Tan Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the misapprehension that Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of Manila at the time of his death. After it had been ascertained that the deceased was a resident of the Province of Rizal, the Court of First Instance of Manila transferred the case to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In that court, as we have already seen, the appointment by the Court of First Instance of Manila was disregarded the proceedings were begun for the appointment of an administrator by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo appeared in those proceedings, apparently representing the interests of Yu Teng New, the alleged Chinese wife of the deceased. Messrs. Crossfield & O'Brien, attorneys for the appellee in this case, appeared for the alleged Chinese wife and acted in conjunction with Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo in protecting her interests. The second error assigned is that the court erred in taking into consideration the claim that Tan Po Pic, deceased, had a Chinese wife in China. It must be remembered that the probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a third person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the part of this court. The third error assigned is to the effect that the trial court erred in not finding that Marta Torres was the lawful wife of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do not believe the court erred in this respect. The court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time. BOROMEO-HERERA VS BOROMEO ET. AL. JULY 23, 1987 FACTS: Vito Boromeo, a widower died without forced heirs. Jose Junquera filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916R. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. After due trial, 36

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the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery. On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the will was affirmed. The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs. Respondent Fortunato Boromeo, who was originally one of the heirs in the will, filed a motion to be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased, alleging that he is an illegitimate child and that he was omitted in the declared heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he asserts that he is entitled to 4/5 of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. The court dismissed the motion. He then filed a motion for reconsideration changing the basis for his claims to the portion on the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights. In the waiver, 5 of the 9 heirs relinquished their shares to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The trial court concluding that the five heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their shares to Fortunato Boromeo has lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the decedent. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Waiver of Hereditary Rights executed is valid to entitle Fortunato to the estate of Vito Borromeo. 2. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver. RULING: 1. In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. 2. The trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or 37

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petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. There is no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate. Republic v. Cantor G.R. No. 184621; December 10, 2013 FACTS: Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: 1. Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with Article 41 of the Family Code?

2. Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper. HELD: 1. No. A “well-founded belief” that his or her spouse is dead depends on the unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in determining the same. Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded” belief arose when: 1) Jerry’s relatives and friends could not give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerry’s name in the patient’s directory whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was not intentional or planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of presumptive death should have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis. 2. Yes. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the 38

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declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco FACTS: Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982. After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983. He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet. RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. RULING: No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.

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Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a "wellfounded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005. FACTS: On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton. At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore. Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail. 40

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Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid Ruling: No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded 41

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belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

REPUBLIC V. GRANADA G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012] DOCTRINE: Even if the RTC erred in ruling that the respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.” FACTS: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. BermudezLorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive 42

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death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45. ISSUES: 1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal. 2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented. HELD: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is fina land immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed. RATIO: 1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. 43

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In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 2. Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a wellfounded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.) Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate 44

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Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions. The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.

ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH, represented in this suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG vs MARIA SANTOS BUSH May 31, 1969 FACTS: On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born of the common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941. John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of the plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to marry each other; that they lived with their alleged father during his lifetime and were considered and treated by him as his acknowledge natural children and at the time of his death left several real and personal properties. Defendant falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. She submitted to the court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will whereby he bequeathed his estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger. Defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962.

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Petitioners prayed that the partition be annulled; submit a complete inventory and accounting of all the properties left by the deceased and another project of partition adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of all or part of the estate, that she be ordered to pay them the market value thereof. The defendant moved to dismiss the case, alleging lack of jurisdiction, res judicata, and statute of limitations. However, said motion was denied by the trial court. When the case was set foe hearing, defendant then filed another motion to dismiss challenging the jurisdiction of court stating that since the action was one to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal. Issues: 1. Whether or not an action may be dismissed based on the grounds not alleged in a motion to dismiss. Ruling: 1. In dismissing a complaint upon a ground not relied upon by the defendant in the motion to dismiss, the lower court in effect did so motu proprio without offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point, without any arguments or evidences on the question. This the court cannot do. The only instance on which the court may dismiss upon the court’s own motion an action is when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any other order of the court. Ratio: Sec 1, Rule 73 of Rules of Court fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA 46

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17 SCRA 41 FACTS: In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other. ISSUE: Which proceeding should be preferred? RULING: As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred. The will should be probated. The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator must be given such preference first. Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind.

If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly executed, then you go to intestate proceeding. But first you go to testate. CUENCO VS. CA G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973 The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. FACTS: This is a Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent CA in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R and its subsequent Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu 47

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and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition; (2) Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings. RULING: (1) Yes. The Supreme Court found that the CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish for the following considerations: 1. The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the 48

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estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may, upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. 2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue. 3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. 4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision. In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings. It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last 49

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will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. (2) On Venue and Jurisdiction under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the 50

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Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the CA ordered dismissed. DE SANDOVAL VS. SANTIAGO, G.R. No. L1723 May 30, 1949 FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari filed by the petitioner against the respondent Judge Hon. Vicente Santiago. Petitioner instituted a special proceeding in the CFI of Quezon Province for then probate of the will and codicil executed by the deceased Daniel Marquez in which she was designated as executrix. The will and codicil were allowed and the petitioner was appointed as executrix in accordance with the will. But before the petitioner qualified as executrix, the three heirs instituted in the will made an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of the deceased on October 5, 1946 and entered into the possession of their respective share without the authority and approval of the court. One year after the probate of the will and appointment of the petitioner as executrix, the respondent judge required the petitioner to qualify as such and file a bond of P5,000. In response thereto the petitioner informed the respondent judge that it was not necessary for her to qualify because the heirs had already made an extrajudicial partition in accordance with the will as shown by the copy of the said partition which she submitted to the court. In view of the answer of the petitioner the respondent judge ordered the executrix to qualify as such within forty-eight hours and declared the extrajudicial agreement of partition entered into by the heirs null and void, on the ground that the probate proceedings having been commenced judicially it must also be terminated judicially. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner and denied by the court hence, the filing of the present petition for certiorari.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI Judge of Quezon Province, wherein the deceased was residing at the time of his death has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the estate of the deceased. RULING: The court ruled that the respondent Judge of Court CFI Quezon Province, wherein the deceased was residing at the time of his death, has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the testate estate of the deceased Daniel Marquez and over the heirs and other person interested in the estate of the deceased from the moment the application for the probate of the decedent's will was filed with the said court and the publication required by law were made; and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the CFI of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves. An extrajudicial partition of the estate of a deceased by the heirs becomes a judicial partition after its approval by the court which had previously acquired jurisdiction of the estate by the filing of an application for the probate of the decedent's will; but as the testate proceeding is terminated in such case without the necessary publication of notices to creditors and other persons interested in the estate required ina required in a regular judicial administration, the effect of such judicial partition would be the same as if it had been effected extrajudicially without the intervention of the court under the provisions of section1,of Rule 74, that is, subject to the claims against the distributees by persons mentioned in sections 4 and 5, of the same rule. Thus, the petition for certiorari is denied with costs against the petitioner, because the respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in not giving the deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition of the estate of the deceased the effect of terminating the testate proceeding over which the court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction since said partition was not submitted to said court for approval. BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL. VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963 FACTS: This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the CA affirming that of the CFI Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein. Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died in 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his 52

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estate was instituted in the CFI of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on that same year disposing of his properties in favor of his widow and his cousins all surnamed Capili and Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died in 1959. Upon petition of Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs all surnamed Reyes and four others all surnamed Isidoro. In 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. These relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. The probate court set the two projects of partition for hearing. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action. The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will. The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the 53

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instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960. On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule. (2) Whether or not the trial court as well as the CA erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein. RULING: (1) In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings "except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232). (2) As has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of CFI. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It 54

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affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners cannot be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto, they cannot thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. They cannot be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants 55

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require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will. Thus, the decision of the CA being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant, vs. LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS FYI: March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.*This case is lengthy. Court admitted several times that it was clueless as to some facts so it copied into the decision entire pleadings. Plus, PCIB raised 78 assignment of errors. FACTS: Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years. Before her 56

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death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Should Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s place. When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor, then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the family business, as per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other necessary transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate. Charles named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as his heirs but the order admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roy’s name included. As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return in 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered “None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges.” It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid. Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s estate, which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles’). Magno was appointed, but later Davies (representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration were issued to Hodges and Mirasol. At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced that the parties representing both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw which, however, went awry, with more and more heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and Lawyers filing their respective claims for retainer fees. Later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s death. Magno naturally opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the Higdons) would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as administrator. For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee 57

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of Charles’ estate, to which she responded by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estate’s properties. PCIB’s Claims Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions. Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the provision in Mrs. Hodges’ will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. (2) Whether or not a Special Proceeding for the settlement of Mrs. Hodges estate should already be closed, based on the December 1957 Court Order allegedly adjudicating Mr. Hodges as the sole heir? RULING: (1) NO. The court overruled PCIB’S contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges’ will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. The Court ruled that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodge’s death. In other words, whereas they are not only to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent. The provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition, the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-inlaw, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law. Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment to this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.) Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIB’s claims that he had adjudicated to himself all of Linnie’s estate. While he may have used language like ―herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated… there is no other person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice, he would’ve known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. 58

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(2) NO. No final distribution yet made to all parties concerned to the estate. After the residue has been assigned to the parties entitled to it, the Special Proceeding is deemed ready for Final Closure. a) Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate among those entitled. b) Debts such as funeral expenses, taxes, widow allowance, etc. should be paid already. Until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL. BENJAMINA SEBIAL VS. ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL. G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975 Matters affecting property under the administration may be taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided that the interest of third persons are not prejudiced. However, the third person to whom the decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in court and may be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession of the decedent's assets but a separate action is necessary to recover said assets. FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano. Benjamina Sebial filed a petition for settlement and prayed that she be appointed administratrix thereof. Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children and that, if an administration proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta Sebial, a resident of Guimbawian, a remote mountain barrio of Pinamungajan, where the decedent's estate was supposedly located, should be the one appointed administratrix and not Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at Talisay, Cebu which is about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan. In a supplemental opposition the children of the first marriage contended that the remedy of Benjamina Sebial was an action to rescind the partition. The lower court appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that the descedent left an estate consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one hectares, valued at more than six thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the decedent's estate was invalid and ineffective. The oppositors moved for the reconsideration of the order appointing Benjamina Sebial as 59

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administratrix. They insisted that the decedent's estate had been partitioned on August 29, 1945. On April 27, 1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land. The oppositors registered their opposition to the inventory on the ground that the seven parcels of land enumerated in the inventory no longer formed part of the decedent's estate. On May 6, 1961, the administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her the parcels of land. The lower court required the administratrix to furnish the court with another inventory. The administratrix reproduced her earlier inventory but added two houses allegedly received by the children of the first marriage. An opposition was interposed to the said inventory. Oppositors-appellants appealed from the two orders of the probate court both dated December 11, 1961, one approving the amended inventory of the decedent's estate filed by the duly appointed administratrix and the other directing the heirs or persons in possession of certain properties of the estate to deliver them to the administratrix. Oppositors- appellants claim, among many points, that the valuation of the inventoried properties were fake, fictitious and fantastic; that the inventory is not supported by documentary evidence; and that an ordinary civil action is necessary to recover the lands in possession of third persons. ISSUE: Whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an administration proceeding is the proper remedy, considering oppositors' allegation that the estate of Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in 1945 and that some of his heirs had already sold their respective shares RULING: The probate court should ascertain what assets constituted the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to those assets and whether the children of the second marriage (the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and the principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still have a share, howsoever small, in the decedent's estate. The said order is erroneous and should be set aside because the probate court failed to receive evidence as to the ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They are third persons. The rule is that matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the intestate proceeding provided that the interests of third persons are not prejudiced. However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in court and be examined under oath as to how they came into the 60

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possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover the said assets. The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets. The probate court should require the parties to present further proofs on the ownership of the seven parcels of land and the materials of the two houses enumerated in the amended inventory of November 17, 1961, on the alleged partition effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors' inventory dated November 7, 1961. Probate court’s order set aside. Case remanded for further proceedings. G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978 Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINANYAMUTA, namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, VS. GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978 FILOMENO COCA VS. CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children FACTS: The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental. The spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pangilinan and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. A Special Proceeding in CFI of Misamis Occidental was instituted for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. The administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927 were partitioned. It was also provided in the project of partition that the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs and that Prima 61

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Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan opposed that project of partition. They contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed. The lower court directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action. The lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan the amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover any amount due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special administrator. The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate. proceeding. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. ISSUE: Whether or not the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. RULING: As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule 62

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has qualifications convenience.

or

exceptions

justified

by

expediency

and

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra). Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action. Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory .The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding. Thus, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe. The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set forth. MORALES VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BR. V, ATTY. ROLANDO DIAZ, in his capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of SIMONA PAMUTI, ROBERTO MELGAR and FELISA JARDIN G.R. No. L-47125 December 29, 1986 As gleaned from the pleadings together with the annexes filed by the parties to this petition, the property is a salt bed fishpond located at Bacoor, Cavite, Simona Pamuti mortgaged the property in favor of petitioner Princesita Santero Morales in consideration of the sum of P15,000.00. The property, following extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was sold at public auction to Princesita. FACTS: Simona Pamuti was the spouse of Pascual Santero with whom she begot a son named Pablo Santero. During the lifetime of Pablo, he cohabited and had children with three women, namely, Adela, Anselma and Feliberta. Pablo had a child with Adela, seven children with Anselma and five with Feliberta. The petitioner 63

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Princesita Santero Morales is Pablo's eldest natural child with Feliberta. Simona survived both her husband Pascual and son Pablo. Petitions for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Pascual and Pablo Santero, Special Proceedings Nos. N-2061 and N-2062 were filed by Juanito Santero, Pablo's eldest natural child with Anselma as petitioner. Princesita was an oppositor in these proceedings whereas the respondent Clerk of Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz, was appointed, first, as special administrator and later as regular administrator. During the pendency of the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estates of Pascual and Pablo, Juanito filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of Simona Pamuti. ln this guardianship proceeding, the respondent Clerk of Court was appointed legal guardian of Simona Pamuti. As such guardian, he filed a motion to use the funds of the estates of Pascual and Pablo to redeem Simona's property that had been sold at auction to petitioner Princesita.. Princesita opposed the motion on the ground that the funds that are in the possession of the respondent Clerk of Court in his capacity as administrator are held by him in trust for the benefit of Pascual's and Pablo's heirs who "have not yet been judicially determined". In 1976, Simona Pamuti died intestate. In the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Simona, where one Felisa PamutiJardin who claimed to be Simona's sole surviving heir was the petitioner, the herein petitioner Princesita was allowed to intervene not as heir but as "creditors of the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti, or as co-owners, together with said intestate estates, of certain properties as the interests of said oppositors may appear". The respondent Clerk of Court in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti, filed a "Motion to Order the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite To Issue Certificate of Redemption" alleging that before the expiration of the redemption period on August 4, 1975, payment of the redemption amount had been tendered and accepted by the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite; that upon request of the sheriff, another amount was tendered and accepted by the sheriff's deputy and that the sheriff, having received the full redemption price, is duty bound to issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona. The provincial sheriff was the only party furnished with a copy of the motion. In 1977, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that the respondent probate court does not have jurisdiction to resolve the validity of the redemption of the property in question; that there was no valid redemption and that the motion was resolved without giving the herein petitioners a chance to be heard.

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The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. The respondent Court reiterated the facts mentioned in its January 13, 1977 Order, and justified its order for the issuance of the certificate of redemption as within its power "to inquire regarding the proper implementation" of the previous order of August 4, 1975 requiring the immediate redemption of the property. This Court, sitting as a probate court was acting upon a mere incident of redemption that arose in the settlement of the estates under reference and that, as such, this Court did not rule categorically as to which party is the rightful owner of the property in question as the right of ownership could and should be ruled upon in case of any dispute in a separate action before the proper court. ISSUE: The instant petition was filed questioning the validity of the Orders of January 13, 1977, May 17, 1977 and June 16, 1977 on the principal ground that the issue regarding the validity of the redemption involves a question of ownership which is outside the jurisdiction of the respondent court as a probate court and that the petitioners may be deprived of possession of the property only through a separate civil action. RULING: The petition is meritorious. As stated in Cuizon vs. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495, 499 - It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. In the case at bar, the question regarding the validity of the redemption which was supposed to have been made by the respondent clerk of court as guardian and then later as administrator of the estate of Simona Pamuti, is determinative of the ownership of the property in question. The Order wherein the validity of the redemption was upheld is effectively a judgment that the property is owned by the estate of Simona Pamuti. At that time, the petitioners had already asserted ownership having executed the affidavit of consolidation on August 8, 1975, and the administrator of Simona's 65

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estate, on the other hand had likewise asserted his redemption of the property, having deposited with the sheriff the check in the amount which was believed to be the proper redemption price. Since the sheriff did not issue a final deed in favor of the petitioners, and neither did he issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona, there was, then, a clearly existing ownership contest between the parties. According to settled jurisprudence, such controversy is outside the jurisdiction of the probate court. Parenthetically, it must be mentioned that the respondent court itself had, at that time, already determined that the petitioners are intervenors in the settlement proceedings of Simona's estate not as heirs but as "co-owners" with the intestate estates, and the respondent court in fact would later state in the January 13, 1977 order that the petitioners have "not been called to participate in the proceedings." The petitioners, are, therefore, outside parties claiming title to property included in the inventory of properties under administration. To use the language of Bolisay vs. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213, it does appear strange that the respondent court, after saying that it "did not rule categorically as to which party is the rightful owner of the property in question", proceeded to Order thereafter that the possession should be surrendered by the petitioners. Such latter Order clearly indicated that the respondent court stated the opposite of what it meant. Thus, the questioned Orders are declared VOID for having been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court. G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013 HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG and SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG, namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, EDGAR A. MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION CHONA A. MAGLASANG, GLENDA A. MAGLASANG-ARNAIZ, LERMA A. MAGLASANG, FELMA A. · MAGLASANG, FE DORIS A. MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A. MAGLASANG,MA. MILALIE A. MAGLASANG, SALUD A. MAGLASANG, and MA. FLASALIE A. MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING THE ESTATES OF THEIR AFORENAMEDDECEASED PARENTS VS. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC. FSAMI, DOCTRINE: There are 3 remedies/options by secured creditor under Sec. 7, Rule 86: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. These may be ALTERNATIVELY adopted for the satisfaction of his 66

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indebtedness. However, these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually EXCLUSIVE from each other; the election of one effectively BARS the exercise of the others.

FACTS: On June 16, 1975, Sps. Flaviano and Salud Maglasang obtained a credit line from Manila Banking Corp. for P350,000 which was secured by a real estate mortgage executed over 7 of their properties in Ormoc City and Kananga, Leyte. They availed of their credit line by securing two loans both due and demandable within 1 year with interest at 12% per annum and additional 4% penalty charged upon default. When Flaviano Maglasang died, his son Edgar was appointed as Atty-in-fact by Flaviano’s heirs. He filed a petition for letters of administration of Flaviano’s intestate estate w/c the probate court granted. Court issued a Notice to Creditors for filing of money claims against the estate. MBC notified the court of its claim. When the Court terminated the proceedings and executed an extrajudicial partition over the properties, the loan obligations owed to MBC remained unsatisfied though the court recognized the rights of MBC to foreclose the mortgage. During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able to obtain several loans from Manila Banking Corp, secured by promissory notes which they signed. MBC extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage; however, after auction sale, a deficiency remained on Maglasangs’ obligation. Thus, it filed a suit to recover the deficiency. RTC-former probate court directed the Maglasangs to pay Manila Banking Corp. jointly and severally, P434,742.36 representing the deficiency of the former’s total loan obligation to the latter after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the REM with interest at the rate of 12% p.a., plus a 4% penalty charge, reckoned from Sept. 5, 1984 until fully paid + attys. fees (10% of the outstanding obligation). The Maglasangs appealed to CA contending that under Remedies available to Manila Banking Corp. under Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC are alternative and exclusive, such that the election of one operates as a waiver of the others and since MBC filed a claim in the probate court, it has abandoned its right to foreclose the property and is barred from recovering any deficiency. CA denied the appeal and contended that Act. 3135 applies w/c allows MBC to extrajudicially foreclose and recover the deficiency. Maglasang’s MR was subsequently denied; hence, this petition for review on certiorari by Heirs of Sps. Maglasang contending that it is not Act No. 3135 but Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC which applies in this case. The extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void, not having been conducted in the capital of the Province of Leyte in violation of the stipulations in the real estate mortgage contract. 67

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ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s award of the deficiency amount in favor of Manila Banking Corporation? (YES) [corollarily, Whether Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC and not Act. 3135 applies in this case? (Both apply concordantly)] 2) Whether extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null and void? (NO) RULING: The petition is partly meritorious. (1) Both Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC and Act. 3135 apply complementarily in the case at bar. Foreclosure under the 3rd remedy in Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC includes extrajudicial foreclosure under Act. 3135. However, upon choosing said remedy, creditor waives his right to recover the deficiency. Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules, Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate. Sec. 7, Rule 86 of ROC: Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and PROSECUTE his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; OR he may FORECLOSE his mortgage or realize upon his security, by ACTION in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may CLAIM HIS DEFICIENCY judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; OR he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and FORECLOSE the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made. The application of the procedure under Act No. 3135 must be concordant with Sec. 7, Rule 86 as the latter is a special rule applicable to claims against the estate. At the same time, since Sec. 7, Rule 86 does not detail the procedure for extra-judicial foreclosures, the formalities governing the manner of availing of the 3rd option – such as the place where the application for extra-judicial foreclosure is filed, the requirements of publication and posting and the place of sale – must be governed by Act No. 3135. 68

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Hence, Extra-judicial foreclosure subject of this case was properly conducted in accordance with the formalities of Act No. 3135. The same was a valid exercise of Manila Banking's third option under Section 7, Rule 86. Manila Banking cannot, however, file any suit to recover any deficiency amount since it effectively waived its right thereto when it chose to avail of extra-judicial foreclosure as jurisprudence instructs. DISPOSITIVE: Petition PARTLY GRANTED. The complaint for the recovery of the deficiency amount after extrajudicial foreclosure. ROBERTS VS. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984 FACTS: Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Pete and Linda and by Juanita and Ethel his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce. He executed in 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said: “I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property.” The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm in Utah. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel. In its order, the Third Judicial District Court of Utah admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil. Maxine and her two children as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita and their mother as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by the lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm. In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate. It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila. The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable 69

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estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm. It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties. At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days after Grimm's death, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers filed with Branch 20 of the Manila CFI intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix. The second wife, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. The intestate court noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record. The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation. Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Molina adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children. Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition. Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case). 70

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On September 8, 1980, Atty. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine. Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate. ISSUE: The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court). RULING: YES. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed". The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. Hence, the respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case. WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs. SO ORDERED. 71

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URIARTE VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970 FACTS: On November 6, 1961, Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI Negros a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte alleging therein that as a natural son of the latter, he was the sole heir and that during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in CFI Negros for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son CFI Negros appointed the PNB as special administrator and later set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, PNB never actually qualified as special administrator. On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to the petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte who had executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to the court upon receipt and further questioning Vicente’s capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona commenced a special proceeding in CFI Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte and filed with CFI Negros a Motion to Dismiss on these grounds:  As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis to proceed with the intestate proceedings  Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate the intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. Vicente opposed the Motion to Dismiss contending that, as CFI Negros was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same. CFI Negros granted Juan Uriarte Zamacona’s Motion and dismissed the proceeding before it. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. He filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. The administrator appointed by CFI Manila objected to the approval of the record on appeal. While this was pending, Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Therefore, the CFI of Negros disapproved the record on appeal to give way to the certiorari. Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila asking for leave to intervene therein, for the dismissal of the petition and for the annulment of the proceedings had in the special proceeding therein but the Motion was denied. It appears from the records that Vicente had filed a civil case in the CFI of Negros during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgement as his natural child. It is likewise clear that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced 72

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the petition for settlement of estate, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte. The record further discloses that the special proceeding before CFI Negros has not gone further than the appointment of PNB as special administrator (who failed to qualify). On the other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the document submitted to it, as the last will of Juan Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. ISSUE: Whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte with CFI Negros or was entitled to commenced the corresponding separate proceedings in CFI Manila. RULING: Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. The deceased Juan Uriarte was a non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in provinces where he left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceedings for the settlement of his estate. Vicente argues that when CFI Negros took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the special proceeding. It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. These facts support the view that Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have submitted the will for probate in CFI Negros either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion in the already pending special proceeding: 1. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. 2. When Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente’s petition for the issuance of letters of sdministration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to CFI Negros. 73

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When Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed his MTD in CFI Negros, he had submitted there a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in CFi negros for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and in the light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, Vicente has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. He knew of the existence of the will since 1961 when Higinio Urirate opposed the initial petition in CFI Negros. He was also served with notice of the alleged will and of the filing of petition for its probate when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed an MTD in CFI Negros on 1962. He only filed the omnibus motion in the Manila Court on April 1963. By then, The Manila Court had already appointed an administrator and had admitted the will to probate. Toa llow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila court and the validity of all the proceedings therein would put a premium on his negligence. SC is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. DISPOSITIVE petition dismissed. Codoy v. Calugay 312 SCRA 333 FACTS: On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978. Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured. Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence. The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased. The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available. 74

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The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure. The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine. Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate. ISSUE: 1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory. 2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s holographic will. HELD: 1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. 2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer available. The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive. 75

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Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document. The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. (As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.) A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.” The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. Gerilla v. Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et. al., G.R. No.154322, August 22, 2006; Facts: Spouses Leandro and Carolina Figuracion, now both deceased, had six children: the petitioner and respondents herein. Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children. When Leandro died, he left behind two parcels of land, a portion of Lot 2299 and 705 in Urdaneta, both of which he inherited from his deceased parents. Another parcel of land, Lot 707, was inherited by Carolina and her half-sister Agripina when their father Eulalio Adviento died. Agripina then executed a quitclaim over the one-half eastern portion of the lot in favor of petitioner, Emilia, who died single and without any issue. Before her half-sister’s death, however, Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipe and Hilaria. Petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. When she returned, she built a 76

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house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. Sometime later, petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in common by her and respondents. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, upon a complaint filed by petitioner, rendered judgment nullifying Carolina’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that reliefs prayed for cannot be granted without any prior settlement proceedings. The CA upheld the dismissal of petitioner’s action for partition for being premature but reversed the decision with respect to the nullification and the deed of absolute sale. Hence, this present petition. Issue: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate (that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses and liabilities and taxes, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed Ruling: Yes. Partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate. Although petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and respondents are the only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, with respect to Lot 2299, the heirs have to submit their father’s estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition. The heirs or distributees, however, may take possession of the estate even before the settlement of accounts as long as they file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate’s obligations.With respect to the partition of Lot 705, partition was deemed premature since ownershipof the lot is still in dispute. As regards Lot 707, the Court made no ruling on the validity of Carolina’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale since a separate case is still pending in the same Division of the Court. RULE 74 G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014 AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners, vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,Respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio who died intestate. On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City. 77

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two documents by her daughter Emelinda and her son-in-law Domingo, respondents in this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents. Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale. After trial, RTC held the annulment of the subject documents. CA reversed RTC’s decision. CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must be raised in a separate administration or intestate proceedings. RULING: No. The Court ruled that this case falls under the exception of the rule on separate intestate proceedings. The general rule is that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, the Court also ruled that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. Similar to the case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. MARIA vs.

SOCORRO

AVELINO,

petitioner, 78

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino. The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro. Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate. On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed. Trial Court ruled that the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993. Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. ISSUE: w/n respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper. RULING: When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746 The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. 79

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The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order. G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008 SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOSBENATIRO substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents, vs. HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents. FACTS: Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante. On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten, filed before the CFI a petition 4 for Letters of Administration. The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray. In the hearing, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. Both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. Hence, Atty Taneo was appointed. In Atty Taneo’s Commissioner's Report, he stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present 80

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resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting. Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order ruling that the compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. Respondents, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation16 of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order of the CFI under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate. ISSUE: whether the heirs were notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at. Ruling: No In Cua v. Vargas, in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held: The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned36 (Emphasis supplied) Nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the 81

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conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process. Utulo v. Pasion vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 303 Facts: Juan Sanchez died intestate leaving his widow and 3 children as heirs. His widow, Vda. de Garcia was appointed administratix. One of their children Luz, died leaving her spouse Pablo Utulo and her mother as forced heirs. Utulo commenced the judicial administration of her properties where Vda. de Garcia opposed arguing that there is no need for judicial administration and in case it should be granted by court that she be appointed administratix. The CFI appointed Utulo as judicial administrator hence this appeal. Issue: W/N there was need of judicial administration Held: NO The general rule as provided for in Sec. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that that “if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted”. However this is subject to 2 exceptions provided by Secs. 596 and 597 of the same Code. Sec. 596 provides that when all the heirs are of lawful age, and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. Sec. 597 provides that if the property left does not exceed P6,000, the heirs may apply to the competent court to proceed with the summary partition without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. Rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death hence his heirs succeed immediately to all the property of the deceased. It is at their option if they want to enter upon the administration of the property or if they want to partition it. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is no need for the intervention of an administrator. Delgado vs. Heirs of Damian Facts: On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively). 82

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Such letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the deceased. Issue: Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate Ruling: No The petitioners are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code. Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate: SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied) FERNANDEZ, ET AL V. DIMAGIBA, L-23638, OCTOBER 12, 1967

83

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes. Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court ruled in favor of probate. Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary period. They argued that they were entitled to await the other grounds for opposition before appealing. ISSUE: appeal

Whether the probate of the will become final for lack of

HELD: Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As such, probate order is final and appealable. They do not have to await the resolution of its other oppositions since the Rules of Court enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

MUNSAYAC-DE VILLA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 414 SCRA 436 FACTS: DE VILLA, SUNGA and ROY, three of the five children of the late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC filed for a petition for letters of administration nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. DE VILLA’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children namely MUNSAYAC, JR. and VISPERAS, who nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac Couple’s intestate estate. "MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to respondent Judge’s Order thus, replacing Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion as special administrator of the said intestate estate. Subsequently, DE VILLA and SUNGA filed for a Request to Inhibit Respondent Judge. Barely a week after such request and before respondent Judge could act on it, DE VILLA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning respondent Judge’s Order in directing/ordering him (DE VILLA) to produce certain bank time deposit certificates/documents; and the order of arrest for failure to produce the said bank certificates/documents. Pending the resolution, DE VILLA filed an administrative case before the Supreme Court, which prayed for respondent Judge’s suspension and his permanent removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct and serious inefficiency. 84

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Acting on the Omnibus Motion which was filed by the administrator of the intestate estate, respondent Judge issued the Order to surrender, under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planter’s Bank, Baguio City (‘UCPB’) worth P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not disclosed by the petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the surrender of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the ‘freeze order’ with the China Banking Corporation. For their failure to comply with the Order the petitioners DE VILLA, SUNGA and ROY were arrested and were likewise ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis amount of P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest. A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed before the CA. CA nullified the arrest order only. Hence this petition, arguing that the inhibition is still needed as the issue on withdrawal/release of the money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of the freeze order on certain jewelry is pending. ISSUE: Whether properties in custodia legis must be released. YES HELD: The Court ordered the TC to lift the freeze order and cause the return of property or money still in custodia legis. The inhibition of the respondent judge became moot and academic. It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was the "final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac." As such, any and all incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated. When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special proceedings. Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. 85

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only provisional -- not conclusive -- in character and subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court that has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and that the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heirs. In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end. To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis. In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. To achieve that end and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge to lift the freeze order and release the property deposited with the court becomes indispensable.

FELIX AZUELO V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 122880, APRIL 12, 2006 86

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS LLB 3 2017-2018 Atty. Maru Ali G. Sanchez

FACTS: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code. HELD: Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. ANG V. LEE, GR NO. 176831, JANUARY 5, 2010 FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so 87

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without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent. HELD: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although 88

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objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent 89

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Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. BALANAY, JR. V. MARTINEZ, ET AL, L- 39247, JUNE 27, 1975 FACTS: Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate childrenincluding herein petitioner Felix Balanay Jr. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of respect for his wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their 6 children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for illegally claiming the conjugal lands while David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to the conjugal assets as compromising the future legitimes. The lower Court ruled that the will was void and converted to intestate proceedings. Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order on the ground that Atty. Montaña had NO authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will but the lower court denied and clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments. ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

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HELD: No. The SC are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate. Ratio: The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made". "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso. But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal, it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected. Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

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It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory. WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808. ACAIN V. IAC, ET AL., GR NO. 72706, OCTOBER 27, 1987 FACTS: On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Acain of letters testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo pre-deceases Nemesio, Segundo’s children would then succeed. 92

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After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopted daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was denied. After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio. His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review of IAC’s decision. ISSUES: 1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. No for the widow, yes for Fernandez. 2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No. **3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority. No. HELD: 1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no preterition, for she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Neither can it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will. 2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and must then be dismissed. **3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the 93

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requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents. The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. NEPOMUCENO V. CA, ET AL., GR NO. 62952, OCTOBER 9, 1985 FACTS: Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void. ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision. HELD: No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the 94

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probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid) The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. 4. Rule 74 – SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982 FACTS: Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will. The will states that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang and her family whose family the testatrix has lived with continuously for 30 years. The will further stated that she is troubled with her nephews and that she did not consider Bernardo as her adopted son for letting her do acts against her will. Maninag filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will while the adopted son instituted intestate proceedings. Bernardo filed a Motion to Dismiss the testate case on the ground that as the only compulsory heir, he was preterited in the holographic will. The testate proceeding was dismissed by the trial court following the court’s reasoning that the adopted son was preterited and intestacy should ensue. Maninag filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the court’s findings should be limited to the extrinsic validity of the will and not the intrinsic validity. Issue: Whether or not the trial court judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the testate case. Ruling: YES. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory. Unless the will is probated and notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his properties by will may be rendered nugatory. 95

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Moreover, the probate of the will, normally, does not look into its intrinsic validity. Opposition to the validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in a probate proceeding; its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. However, by way of exception, the intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon even before probate because of “practical considerations”. Such considerations include those enunciated in the cases of Nuguid vs Nuguid and Balanay vs Hon. Martinez relied upon by Bernardo in his argument which was favored by the trial court. The Supreme Court, however, stated that the aforementioned cases provide for the exception rather than the rule. For instance, in the Nuiguid case, the will was found to be intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the testator’s parents. In the case at hand, the crucial issue to be resolved first is whether under the terms of the decedent’s will, Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited. By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case by the trial court judge, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The Court gathered from the order of the trial court which concluded that Bernardo had been preterited. As for the Court, such conclusion is not indubitable. Therefore, in ordering the dismissal of the testate case, the trial court has acted in grave abuse of its discretion in excess of its jurisdiction. DELGADO VS HEIRS OF MARCIANA 480 SCRA 334 Facts: On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the deceased. Issue: Whether or not Dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting that Josefa and Guillermo did not contract marriage. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that through the testimonies of the of the witnesses, that marriage between Josefa and Guillermo never took place. Although it is presumed that a man and a woman departing themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail. Since no marriage had occurred between the two, the estate must be settled in different 96

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proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of the deceased. In this case, the Court also ruled that in the appointment of administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-adminstrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates. SAMPIO V. CA. 103 Phil 71 RE: Raising an Objection to an Extrajudicial Partition After the Expiration of Two (2) Year Prescriptive Period There are two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two (2) years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision who may seek to remedy the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. On the other hand, as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision that is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not take part nor had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to 97

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persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. There is nothing in Section 4 of Rule 74, or in its source (Section 596 of Act 190), which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third persons. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not parties thereto. 5. Rule 75 – PRODUCTION OF WILL; ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY EMILIO PACIOLES V. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING Question of Title of Ownership; YES, for the purpose of inventory, that is incidental and provisional. Facts: Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her huband, Emilio Pacioles, herein petitioner, and two minor children. Emilio filed a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. Miguelita’s mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of letters of administration; contending that the bulk of the estate is composed of paraphernal properties. She also said that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to the deceased on condition that they would undertake a business endeavor as partners. The mother asked that one Emmanuel be appointed. The trial court, acting as an intestate court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as joint-administrator. No claims were filed. Thereafter, Emilio filed an inventory; meanwhile, Emmanuel failed to file one. The court declared Emilio and his children as the only compulsory heirs of the deceased. Emilio then petitioned the court for the payment of estate tax and the partition and distribution of the estate. The trial court denied the petition as to the partition and distribution; the Court of Appeals affirmed the same. Issue: Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate. Ruling: NO. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extrataneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to 98

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resolve title. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. However, the Supreme Court finds that such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court. First, the inventory was not disputed. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties. Second, Emmanuel did not file an inventory. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding there from those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a handsoff stance on the matter. It is well- settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Jurisprudence states that: probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate. MANAHAN V. MANAHAN 58 Phil. 4448, 45 99

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Facts: Tiburcia Manahan, the niece of testatrix Donata and her named executrix, instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased. The will was admitted to probate. One year and seven months later, Engracia, the sister of Donata, filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial praying that the order to probate be vacated and the will be declared null and void ab initio. Trial Court denied the motions. Engracia, under the pretext of appealing the last order, likewise appealed from the judgement admitting the will to probate. She assigns the following errors: 1. That she was an interested party and as such, was entitled to be notified of the probate of the will; 2. That the court did not really probate but merely authenticated the will; and 3. That the will is null and void as the external formalities have not been complied with. Issue: Whether or not Engarcia’s contentions are meritorious? Held: NO. First contention is untenable. The appellant was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right. Second contention is puerile. There is no essential difference between the authentication of the will and the probate thereof. Once the will has been admitted to probate, questions as to its validity can no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and cannot be impugned, except on the ground of fraud. Moreover, proceedings in a testamentary case are in rem, hence it is binding upon her. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law. The decree admitting a will to probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of a fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding. The proceedings followed in a 100

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testamentary case being in rem, the decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant could not appeal from the trial court’s order denying the motion for reconsideration and a new trial in view of the fact that said order was interlocutory in character. PASTOR V. CA, G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983 (122 SCRA 85) Facts: When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, his two legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination of the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death. A Probate Order was issued on December 5, 1972 by the probate court. The said order held that private respondent is entitled to the payment of his legacy pursuant to the will of the deceased. However, there had been no liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife. Hence, there was no prior definitive determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. Although there was an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved. In addition, there are properties allegedly owned, but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. The reconveyance or recovery of those properties was still being litigated in another court. There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate as well. Issue: Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate Ruling: As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons; it does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. 101

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On the other hand, a well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The main consideration is the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property must be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased. IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON 39 Phil. 156 Facts: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will by which he disposed of an estate valued at Php 231,800. This document is a holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of the Philippines. Thereafter a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila for the probate of the said will on the ground that Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. Three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in the Philippines. She, therefore, moved to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father. 102

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Issue: W/N the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. Ruling: NO. The court finds that it was impossible for the testator, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of the Philippines because there is no law in force at that time by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized Filipino citizen. Although he remained in the Philippines for some time after he came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands, there was no evidence adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile. This being true, it is to be presumed that he retained his his status as a citizen of the United States The Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. Furthermore, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines. In paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate." In this case, the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the order, probating the will in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent. Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed

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FERNANDEZ V. DIMAGIBA G.R. No. L-23638, October 12, 1967 Facts: Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate of purported will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez, et. al. filed opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent, laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale. The Court of First Instance found will genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic validity will be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedicta’s will was unrevoked by deeds of sale. The court ruled in favor of probate. Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary period. The Court of Appeals admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of opportune appeal. Accordingly, it was appealable independently of issue of revocation, affirmed CFI. They argued that they were entitled to await the other grounds for opposition before appealing. Issue: Whether the probate of the will become final for lack of appeal. Ruling: Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As such, probate order is final and appealable. They do not have to await the resolution of its other oppositions since the Rules of Court enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings. MUNSAYAC DE VILLA V CA G.R. No. 148597, October 24, 2003 Facts: Three of the five children of the deceased Spouses Gelacio and Vicenta Munsayac filed for a petition for letters of administration nominating De Villa as administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. De Villa’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children namely Munsayac, Jr. and Visperas, who nominated Munsayac, Jr. as administrator of the late Munsayac Couple’s intestate estate. Munsayac, Jr. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to respondent Judge’s order. Acting on the Omnibus Motion which was filed by the administrator of the intestate estate, respondent Judge issued the Order to surrender, under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planter’s Bank, Baguio City (‘UCPB’), and which amount was not disclosed by the petitioners in the estate 104

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return tax, (b) as well as the surrender of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the ‘freeze order’ with the China Banking Corporation. For their failure to comply with the Order the petitioners De Villa, Sunga and ROY were arrested and were likewise ordered to surrender in custodia legis amount of P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest. Issue: Whether or not a probate court may decide on a question of title or ownership. Ruling: In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end. To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis. In view of the above ruling, the Supreme Court directed Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.

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PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. CA G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984 Facts: Nicolai Drepin died testate on August 23, 1972. He left behind threeparcels of titled land. Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin’s will nine offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM Management Phils through its President Honor P. Moslares. Moslares alleged that on October 9,1970, Despin executed a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in hisfavor. He also alleged that on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement" where it was agreed that Drepin shall be the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential subdivision. However before the agreement could be implemented, Drepin died. Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings, Moslares informed the Judicial Administrator that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal. On September 25,1979, with the court’s permission, a Deed of Undertaking was entered into by respondent Moslares and the Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed provided for the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow. Moslares failed to pay as agreed. Thus, the administrator reported the matter to the probate court which approved the sale of the property to Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. The deed of sale was duly registered. Mosrales filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was not acted by the probate court. Under the theory of Moslares, it is insisted that the probate court has no authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to buy. On May 18, 1981, Pio Barreto Realty filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the CFI of Rizal to determine title and ownership over the Drepin lands. A petition for certiorari was filed by respondent Moslares before the Court of Appeals. Issues: (1) Can the probate court order the execution of the deed of sale with Pio Barreto? Ruling: YES. The actions of the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate. Thus, by estoppel, respondent bound himself under an agreement with the court 106

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separate and distinct from that which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court. We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled and liquidated because even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the Drepin lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale with decedent that had been invalidated but rather the administrator's authority to sell to respondent. Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of ownership is proper and meritorious. Since the probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles and ownership. ONGSINGCO vs. TAN Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja 97 Phil. 330 Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco. After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties. Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out elsewhere and not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with the harvest. The CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana. Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja? 107

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HELD: No. In Franco vs. O’Brien, it was held that “the question of ownership is one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings”[1] or stating the rule more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings”.[2] Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the other. Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction. POMPILLO VALERA and CABADO vs. HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO Nos. L-59867-68 May 7, 1987 The fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to Rafael Valera in his lifetime. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin; but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she might use the property to provide for her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Teresa Garin's Children; and with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of Title issued in their favor. In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa 1 — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators 2 — the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, 108

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be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, 4 so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included in any inventory of the estate The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question * * to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question * * to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor G.R. No. 56504 Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13742 and assigned to Branch I of the Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding. The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the temporary restraining order, averring that the action was barred by the Probate Court's prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had already been accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff G.R. Nos. 59867-68 In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring 109

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the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond, These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the petitions ISSUE: WON Probate the fishpond?

Court

had

authority

to

order reconveyance of

HELD : As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, 28 and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory.Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge. Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this Court has 110

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already had occasion to rule Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined in a separate action, 36 the actual firing of such a separate action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledge judgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006 Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore “the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will…with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes.” According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-title, “Patunay Ng Mga Saksi,” comprised the attestation clause and the acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose of identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that “the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause” is merely directory, rather than mandatory, 111

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and thus susceptible to what he termed as “the substantial compliance rule.” ISSUE: Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and, hence, should be admitted to probate HELD: The petition is DENIED. A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal requirements of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant therefrom is the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section 618. Article 809 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the “substantial compliance rule.” However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule “must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized...But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.” The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781): “the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.” The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase or decrease in the pages. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. In this case, however, there could 112

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have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in. The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal. The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.” By no manner of contemplation can these words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be “acknowledged”, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making 113

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the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will. UY KIAO vs NIXON LEE GR NO. 176831 January 15, 2010 Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible. ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent. HELD: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is 114

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a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent 115

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Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

BALUYOT v. PANIO (1976) Soltero Baluyut died on January 6, 1975 at the age of 86, leaving an estate valued at not less than Php2M. A few weeks later, his nephew Alfredo Baluyut filed before the CFI of Quezon City a verified petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor, alleging that Encarnacion Lopez Baluyut, Soltero’s widow, was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent’s estate. Believing that Soltero executed a will, Alfredo prayed that he be appointed as special administrator in the meantime. The CFI granted Alfredo’s petition. Mrs. Baluyut filed an opposition to the appointment. She claimed that the allegation as to her mental incapacity was libelous, and that she was unaware that her husband executed a will. Finding that Mrs. Baluyut was mentally qualified, the CFI cancelled Alfredo’s appointment. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration, Alfredo’s appointment was again appointed as special administrator, together with Jose Espino, an acknowledged natural child of Soltero. Mrs. Baluyut again countered, arguing that Jose effectively rid Alfredo of any interest in the estate of Soltero by exclusion, he being a collateral relative. Alfredo naturally opposed, arguing that Jose was not a natural child of the decedent, at the same time insisting that Mrs. Baluyut was incapable of becoming an administratrix, as declared by another court in a separate guardianship proceeding. Based on the testimony of Mrs. Baluyut herself, the probate court terminated the appointment of Jose and Alfredo as adminstrators and ordered that the former be appointed as administratrix, due to her preferential right to be appointed as such. Letters of administration 116

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were issued in her favor after posting a Php20,000.00 bond. In appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix, the court proceeded upon the assumption that as a collateral relative, Alfredo had no interest in the estate of Soltero. Aggrieved, Alfredo elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a special civil action for certiorari. During the course of the proceedings, the alleged will of the decedent was apparently discovered and presented to the court. Although the decision did not dwell on the contents of the will and the manner through which it was discovered, the decision did mention that Alfredo was named a legatee therein, giving him standing to question the qualifications of the administratrix. ISSUES: 1. W/N the court erred in finding Mrs. Baluyut mentally capable of becoming an administratrix on the basis of her testimony 2. W/N the proceeding in the lower court must be converted into a testamentary proceeding after the alleged will has been presented HELD: 1. Yes. A hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition. Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. 2. Yes. It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted. BALTAZAR vs. LAXA G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012 Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, 117

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executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof. Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin. More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence. Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio. RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate. HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the 118

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presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act. The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.” COCA vs. PANGILINAN G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978 These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land. Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution. Spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba had 3 children named: 1. Concepcion (deceased) has 3 children Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta 2. Prima 3. Francisco (deceased) married to Guadalupe Pizarras has 7 children named Francis, Algeran, Benjamin, Perla, Francisco Jr. and Helen (deceased) with children named Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza The spouses died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possess a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Misamis Occidental. 1st parcel has an area of 3.9791 hectares in the name of Juan Pangilinan, 2nd parcel has an area of 18.0291 hectares in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pangilinan, represented by Concepcion P. de Yamuta. According to Guadalupe Pizarras , a 3rd parcel with an area of 8 hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion P and which adjoins the 1st and 2nd lot Special Proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. 119

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The administrator presented a project of partition for lot 1 and 2. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed. CFI ordered - partitioned the properties: 1. Giving atty’s fees to Crispin Borromeo 2. Without taking into consideration ownership of a 12-hec land claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan, of a 6 hec land claimed by Crispin Borromeo and a. ) Debt to Concepcion’s estate b. ) If Prima sold her share to Francisco WON Prima was excluded as an heir. CFI ordered that a separate ordinary action is needed to determine ownership of theland in dispute. Later on, they approved the project of partition but excluded the 12 ha and did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and WON Prima had a share in that remainder. CA sustained CFI. ISSUE: Whether or not separate proceedings should be filed to determine ownership. HELD: No, the case is an exception. The probate court may provisionally pass upon the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its finaldetermination in a separate action. The general rule is that Probate Court may not pass upon ownership. Except: If the interested parties are all heirs, (case at bar)-or if the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court, and the rights of 3rd parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.The appellees belong to the poor 120

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stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses by bringing a separate action to determine ownership of the 12 hectare portion. EMILIO B. PACIOLES, Jr. et. al. vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCOCHING G.R. No. 12790 [DATE] August 9, 2005 On 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5M, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54M, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband (Petitioner) and their 2 minor children. Consequently, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs. Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching (Respondent) filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of “paraphernal properties.” Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix. Petitioner’s allegations: That the resp. had no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law. Respondent’s contentions: That she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.” In her omnibus motion, she nominated her son Emmanuel to act as special administrator. The RTC appointed petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond. No claims were filed against the estate within the period set. Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

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The RTC declared petitioner and his 2 minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees. The intestate court partially allowed the motion. It denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is “premature.” The intestate court ratiocinated as follows: The Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing is necessary to determine, whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.‟ Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order and Resolution. (CA dismissed) ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court (acting as an intestate court) can hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate? HELD: No, the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. (Petition GRANTED. CA Reversed) The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. 122

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The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court. Respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a handsoff stance on the matter. It is well settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Jurisprudence teaches us that: A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita’s estate. Doctrine: When a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. Sanchez vs CA GR No 108947 Facts: “[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of [herein private respondent] Rosalia. 123

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[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement (Annex ‘D’, Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez. This compromise agreement was not approved by the probate court. Issue: Is the Compromise Agreement partitioning the property of the estate without approval of the probate court valid? Held: Yes. Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all minors represented only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus. These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners’ argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals,] where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled: “It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361).” (Italics found in the original.) In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was executed 124

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only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a “court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise.” In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court’s approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their compromise. This Court has consistently ruled that “a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.”By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Heirs of Reyes vs Reyes GR No. 139587 2000 Facts: Leoncia Reyes and three out of four children decided to execute a deed denominated Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, where they sold land to the Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco (Spouses Francia) for P500.00, subject to the vendors right to repurchase for the same amount sa oras na sila'y makinabang. Leoncia and her children did not repay the amount of P500.00. Alejandro Reyes, one Leoncia’ grandchildren, repaid the P500.00 from the Spouses Francia. By virtue of his payment, Alejandro executed a Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari, wherein he declared that he had acquired all the rights and interests of the heirs of the Spouses Francia, including the ownership of the property, after the vendors had failed to repurchase within the given period. Nevertheless, Alejandro, Leoncia, and his father Jose, Sr. executed an additional document Magkakalakip na Salaysay, by which Alejandro acknowledged the right of Leoncia, Jose, Jr., and Jose, Sr. to repurchase the property at any time for the same amount of P500.00. After Alejandro’s death, Amanda Reyes, the wife of Alejandro Reyes, asked his deceased husband’s cousins to vacate the property because she and her children already needed it. Respondents alleged that their predecessor Alejandro had acquired ownership of the property 125

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by virtue of the deed Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; that on the basis of such deed of assignment, Alejandro had consolidated his ownership of the property via his Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari; and that under the Magkasanib na Salaysay, Alejandro had granted to Leoncia, his father Jose, Sr., and his uncles, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. the right to repurchase the property, but they had failed to do so. The petitioners averred that the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale; that the mortgagors had retained ownership of the property; that the heirs of the Spouses Francia could not have validly sold the property to Alejandro through the Pagsasaayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; that Alejandros right was only to seek reimbursement of the P500.00 he had paid from the co-owners. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents declaring that Alejandro had acquired ownership of the property in 1965 by operation of law upon the failure of the petitioners predecessors to repurchase the property; that the joint affidavit executed by Alejandro, Leoncia and Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr., to extend the period of redemption was inefficacious, because there was no more period to extend due to the redemption period having long lapsed by the time of its execution. The CA reversed the finding of the trial court and ruled that that the transaction covered by the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was not a pacto de retro sale but an equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil Code; that even after the deeds execution, Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and their families had remained in possession of the property and continued paying realty taxes for the property; that the purported vendees had not declared the property for taxation purposes under their own names; and that such circumstances proved that the parties envisaged an equitable mortgage in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are now barred from claiming that the transaction under the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage by their failure to redeem the property for a long period of time? Held: No, considering that sa oras na silay makinabang, the period of redemption stated in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, signified that no definite period had been stated, the period to redeem should be ten years from the execution of the contract, pursuant to Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil Cod. The acceptance of the payments even beyond the 10-year period of redemption estopped the mortgagees heirs from insisting that the period to redeem the property had already expired. Their actions impliedly recognized the continued existence of the equitable mortgage. The conduct of the original parties as well as of their successors-ininterest manifested that the parties to the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to be an equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale. 126

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ALABAN VS. CA

G.R. NO. 156021, SEPT. 23, 2005

DOCTRINE: Extrinsic Fraud. – An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining no to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. FACTS: 1. Respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad ProvidoElevencionado (decedent), who died on Oct. 26, 2000 in Janjuay, Iloilo. Respondent that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. The RTC allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. 2. More than 4 months later or on Oct. 4, 2001, petitioners filed a motion for reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent. As well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. On Jan. 11, 2002, RTC issued an order denying the petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious. Moreover, the RTC’s decision was already final and executory even before petitioner’s filing of the motion to reopen. 3. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC’s Decision and Order. They argued that the RTC decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. 4. CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own. Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners’ claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was denied.

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5. Petitioner maintains that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondent’s offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s judgment. HELD: Petition is devoid of merit. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud only lies if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. In the present case, to sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondent’s deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent’s offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate. The Court is not convinced. According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of 128

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the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court. SUMILANG V. RAMAGOSA

21 SCRA 1369

FACTS Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for theprobate of a document alleged to be thelast will and testament of HilarionRamagosa. Said document institutesMariano as the sole heir of the testator.The petition was opposed by two SaturninaRamagosa, et. al, who questioned the dueexecution of the document, claiming thatit was made under duress and was notreally intended by the deceased to be hislast will and testament. Saturnino andSantiago Ramagosa also claimed thatthey, instead of Mariano, were entitled toinherit the estate of the deceased.After Mariano presented evidence andrested his case, oppositors moved for thedismissal of the petition on the ground thatdecedent revoked his will by implication oflaw six years before his death by selling theparcels of land to Mariano Sumilang andhis brother Mario so that at the time of thetestator's death, the titles to said landswere no longer in his name.On the other hand, Mariano moved tostrike out oppositors pleadings on theground that the oppositors have no interestin the probate of the will as they have norelationship with the decedent within thefifth degree. The lower court ruled in favor of Mariano stating that the allegations ofthe oppositors go to the very intrinsic valueof the will and since the oppositors have nostanding to oppose the probate of the willas they are strangers, their pleadings areordered stricken out from the record. ISSUE Whether the probate court should passupon the intrinsic validity of the will. HELD The petition being for the probate of a will,the court's area of inquiry is limited to theextrinsic validity only. The testator'stestamentary 129

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capacity and thecompliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the onlyquestions presented for the resolution ofthe court. Any inquiry into the intrinsicvalidity or efficacy of the provisions of thewill or the legality of any devise or legacy ispremature (Nuguid vs. Nuguid).To establish conclusively as againsteveryone and once for all, the facts that awill was executed with the formalitiesrequired by law and that the testator wasin a condition to make a will, is the onlypurpose of the proceedings . . . for theprobate of a will. The judgment in suchproceedings determines and candetermine nothing more. (Alemany, et al.vs. CFI of Manila)True or not, the alleged sale is no groundfor the dismissal of the petition for probate.Probate is one thing the validity of thetestamentary provisions is another. The firstdecides the execution of the documentand the testamentary capacity of thetestator; the second relates to descentand distributionThe revocation invoked by the oppositors isnot an express one, but merely impliedfrom subsequent acts of the testatrixallegedly evidencing an abandonment ofthe original intention to bequeath or devisethe properties concerned. As such, therevocation would not affect the will itself,but merely the particular devise or legacy Guevara v. Guevara Digest

98 Phil 249

Facts: 1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter. 2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her. 3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded. 4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory. Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with 130

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RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. Cuenco vs. CA G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973 FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon. ISSUEs:  Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition  Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as 131

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executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish. On Venue and Jurisdiction Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. SALAZAR vs. CFI OF LAGUNA AND RIVERA, 64 PHIL 78 (1937) FACTS:

Crispin Oben instituted special proceeding and prayed for the probate of the will allegedly made by his deceased mother on May 13, 1924. The petition was opposed by Sabina Rivera and prayed for the probate of the will of the deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930, copy of which was attached thereto, and for the issuance, to that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof and directing such publications as required by law. The court denied the motion for publication and ordered the Rivera to institute another proceeding and apply separately for the probate of the alleged will. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and the court, on March 31, 19937, issued an order setting aside the former one and directing that the will presented by the respondent be set for hearing, that the publications required by law be made and that said will be heard jointly with the will presented by the petitioner in the same proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court ordered that the expenses for the publications made in the newspapers be defrayed by the respondent. The petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration which were denied and, finally, instituted this certiorari proceeding. In order that the hearing and publications ordered by the court may be carried out, the respondent, on July 20, 1937, deposited P24 and filed the original of the will the probate of which had been sought by her. ISSUE/S:

Whether the court acquired no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-petition for the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing of said will to be held in the same proceeding jointly with the first will, on the ground that the respondent had not previously filed her pleading nor paid the fees of the clerk of court. 132

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YES. Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by evidence before it: (1) That a person has died leaving a will; (2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the province where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in the province where the court is situated, and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the court and is in the possession thereof. According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, in view of the presence of all the jurisdictional facts abovestated. The respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be considered as a petition for the probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her on July 20, 1937. The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be rendered by him in connection with the probate of the second will and for the successive proceedings to be conducted and others to be issued is not jurisdiction in the sense that its omission does not deprive the court of its authority to proceed with the probate of a will IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS VS. ERNESTO PALAGANAS G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011 FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. 133

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Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed. HELD: Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. 134

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Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.

G.R. No. L-9633 January 29, 1957 EMILIO SORIANO, vs. ANTONIO ASI, Facts: On April 22, 1952, Emilio Soriano filed a petition to vacate the order admitting his aunt's will to probate, on the ground that, because of the omission of his name as detailed above, and because of his unfamiliarity with Spanish, petitioner had been deprived of his day in court, and of opportunity to object to the probate; and that he learned of the questioned proceedings only on April 4, 1952, through a communication from the lawyer of Antonio Asi. Now appellant first alleges that, notwithstanding the lack of personal notice, the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction over the case, by virtue of the newspaper publication, probate proceedings being proceedings in rem. The objection is improperly raised, because Emilio Soriano does not question the jurisdiction of the probate court; his petition for relief on the ground of fraud precisely assumes that the Court had jurisdiction to issue the order complained of. Without jurisdiction, said order would be a total nullity, and no petition for relief would be required. Because of the facts aforesaid, Judge Edilberto Soriano, then of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, overruled the objections of Antonio Asi, and vacated the probate order complained of as obtained through extrinsic fraud to the detriment of Emilio Soriano. It is next averred that the petition for relief was filed out of time, because the order admitting the will to probate was rendered on October 10, 1951, while the petition for relief only six (6) months and twelve (12) days afterward, on April 22, 1952. Issue: Whether or not the petition filed out of time? Held: No, the petition was not filed out of time. The period of six months is incorrectly computed by the appellant from the rendition of the judgment or order complained of; it should be counted from the entry of such judgment or order. This is evident from section 3 of Rule 38: SEC. 3. When petition filed; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty days after the petition learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or order was entered, or such 135

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proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be, which he may prove if his petition be granted. Under Rule 35, section 2, a judgment or order is entered by the clerk after expiration of the period for appeal or motion for new trial, i.e., after thirty days (Rule 37 and 41). This means that the probate order of October 10, 1951, could be entered, at the earliest, on November 9, 1951; wherefore, the petition for relief, filed on April 22, 1952, was within the six months allowed by law. EMBODO Maloles II vs. Philips

GR No. 129505

FACTS: In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in duress when he signed his last will and testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last will and testament on February 16, 1996. Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for the issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but later on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65. Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61 claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as the administrator of the estate and that he is an heir. Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by Pacita to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then it should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch 61 however refused to consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the case per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by Octavio. ISSUE: Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding. HELD: No. The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in Branch 61 has already terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with Branch 65, the same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the now concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no reason for 136

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Branch 65 to refer back the case to Branch 61 as it initially did. Further even if the probate was terminated, under Rule 73 of the Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement of estates, it is provided that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not an heir. Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies intestate. In this case, Arturo left a valid will which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee and devisee of his estate. Tan vs Gedorio

G.R. No. 166520

March 14, 2008

FACTS: Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the respondents can be appointed since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the respondent were illegitmate children). However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection of a special administrator. RULING: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator.

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G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010 DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., vs. RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089. The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents. After long side by side filing of motions, petitions and oppositions, Renato and Erlinda were appointed as special administrators but refused to give an inventory of properties as petitioned by herein petitioners until after the court ruled in their petition for exemption in posting a bond. Meanwhile, petitioners subsequently learned that respondents has disposed of real properties for P2,700,000.00 saying it was only for P1,500,000.00 then move the court through a petition in removing the respondents as administrators and proceed to partitioning the estate. The RTC ruled in the affirmative and appointed Melinda as regular administrator conditioned with the posting of P200,000.00 as bond which the later complied. The respondents appealed in the CA and they received a favorable decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether the court should have acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and 138

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Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators and in appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00. RULING: The court ruled that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of the respondents as special administrators and otherwise in appointing Melinda as regular administrator opining and ordering that she should instead be appointed as special administration as according to the rules. A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedents estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his 139

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possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration. G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special administrator-appellee, vs. MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant. FACTS: Appellant Manuela Ruiz (Mrs. Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2) children. Having been informed by her son that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence. She instituted, against Carlos Gurrea, Civil Case No. 5820 of the CFI of Negros Occidental, for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife. Said court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which was reduced by the Court of Appeals to P1,000.00. Carlos Gurrea died leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 , for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro. Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion praying that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final determination of the case. This motion was denied. Mrs. Gurrea moved for a reconsideration. She further moved 140

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for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. But the same was denied. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as administratrix (for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.) RULING: Said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable. Co vs Rosario G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner Luis Co and Vicente Yu were appointed by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on March 4, 1998, as special coadministrators of the estate of petitioner's father. However, upon motion of other heirs, petitioner's appointment was set aside, whereby petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co, in his place, which was granted by the court. Four years later, however, the RTC, upon motion of one the heirs, revoked the appointment of Alvin in view of the several criminal cases filed against the latter. Petitioner files petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in revoking Alvin Co's appointment as special co-administrator. RULING: The trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular 141

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administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement. G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011 DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner, vs. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREÑO, Respondents. FACTS: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Florentino Manungas died intestate.Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, and a Ramon Manungas, an acknowledged natural child. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs. The RTC Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt. Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado Manungas for illegal detainer and damages. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that 1he was not a Manungas, that 2he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, 3he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that 4he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas by virtue of the illegal detainer case. Thus, RTC issued an Order appointing Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas.

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Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas’ death. The RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator. Parreño and Loreto appealed to the CA. CA: RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: W/N The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator. RULING: Yes. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it was stated that: It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. The role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. There is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is the illegitimate child of the 143

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late Florentino Manangus. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. Vicente Uriarte vs. CFI Negros Occidental, CFI Manila, Juan UriarteZamanoca and HiginioUriarte ;May 29, 1970 SIEFACTS: November 6, 1961 – Vicente filed with CFI Negros a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte alleging therein that as a natural son of the latter, he was the sole heir and that during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in CFI Negros for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son CFI Negros appointed the PNB as special administrator and later set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, PNB never actually qualified as special administrator. December 19, 1961 – HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to the petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte who had executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to the court upon receipt and further questioning Vicente’s capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. August 28, 1962 – Juan UriarteZamacona commenced a special proceeding in CFI Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte and filed with CFI Negros a Motion to Dismiss on these grounds:  As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis to proceed with the intestate proceedings  Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate the intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. Vicente opposed the MTD contending that, as CFI Negros was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same. CFI Negros granted Juan UriarteZamacona’s MTD and dismissed the proceeding before it. MR denied. He filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. The administrator appointed by CFI Manila objected to the approval of the record on appeal. While this was pending, Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Therefore, CFI Negros disapproved the record on appeal to give way to the certiorari. Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila asking for leave to intervene therein, for the dismissal of the petition and for the 144

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annulment of the proceedings had in the special proceeding therein. Motion was denied. It appears from the records that Vicente had filed a civil case in CFi Negros during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgement as his natural child. It is likewise clear that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the petition for settlement of estate, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte. The record further discloses that the special proceeding before CFI Negros has not gone further than the appointment of PNB as special administrator (who failed to qualify). On the other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the document submitted to it, as thelast will of Juan Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. ISSUE: Whether Juan UriarteZamacona should have filed the petition for probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte with CFI Negros or was entitled to commenced the corresponding separate proceedings in CFI Manila RULING: Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. The deceased Juan Uriarte was a non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in provinces where he left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceedings for the settlement of his estate. Vicente argues that when CFI Negros took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the special proceeding. It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final 145

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account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. These facts support the view that Juan UriarteZamacona should have submitted the will for probate in CFI Negros either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion in the already pending special proceeding: 1. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. 2. When HiginioUriarte filed an opposition to Vicente’s petition for the issuance of letters of sdministration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to CFI Negros. When Juan UriarteZamacona filed his MTD in CFI Negros, he had submitted there a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in CFinegros for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and in the light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, Vicente has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. He knew of the existence of the will since 1961 when HiginioUrirate opposed the initial petition in CFI Negros. He was also served with notice of the alleged will and of the filing of petition for its probate when Juan UriarteZamacona filed an MTD in CFI Negros on 1962. He only filed the omnibus motion in the Manila Court on April 1963. By then, The Manila Court had already appointed an administrator and had admitted the will to probate. Toa llow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila court and the validity of all the proceedings therein would put a premium on his negligence. SC is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. DISPOITIVE petition dismissed. Luzon Surety v Quebrar & Kilayko G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984 FACTS: Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves solidarily 146

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after executing an indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed to pay the premiums every year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums and the documnetary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year when the court granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff file a case in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in force and effect from the filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on questions of law. ISSUE: Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962? RULING: YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of COurt, the administrator is required to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned uponthe faithful performance of the administrator's trust. Hence, the surety is then liable udner the administrator's bond. Even after the approved project of partitio, Quebrar as administrator still had something to do. The administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and the distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and the payment of all debts and expenses. it appears that there are still deblts and expenses to be paid after 1957. Moreover, the bond stipulationdd not provide that it will terminate at the end of the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does not necessariy extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the coutner bond in the absence of an express stipualtion to this effect. As such, as long as the defendant remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive with the administrator. COTIA VS JIMENEZ, 104 PHIL 966 FACTS: Elena Cotia was appointed administratrix of the estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia. Failing to submit an account of her administration, she was ordered by the lower court to submit said accounting. During the hearing of the statement of accounts subsequently presented by Elena Cotia, it was established that she spent for family expenses and attorney’s fees the total sum of P64,650 without prior judicial authority. The oppositors-appellees therefore filed a motion for her removal as administratrix not only because she neglected to submit the accounting required by the Rules and to settle the estate, but because she had made unauthorized disbursements.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Elena Cotia should be removed as an administrator of the subject estate? RULE: Yes, Elena Cotia should be removed as an administrator of the estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia. Under Section 2, Rule 83, of the Rules of Court, the court may remove an administrator who neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law. As the administratrix herein not only neglected to submit an accounting of her administration and settle the estate according to law but also had made unauthorized disbursements in violation of Section 3, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in removing her. COBARRUBIAS VS DIZON, 76 PHIL 209 (full text written in Spanish but found a digest in English. sorry) The petitioner Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion, alleging that the deceased Pilar Leyba had deposited an amount worth P4,500 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands; That said bank notified all interested parties that they withdraw the contents of their section within the shortest possible time, so she asked to be appointed special administrator and that she was authorized to withdraw said jewelry from the bank. In her application Magdalena Cobarrubias stated that she was the only forced heiress of the late Pilar Leyba. Accepting as good these allegations, the Honorable Judge Dizon on the same date, July 5, 1945, appointed Magdalena Cobarrubias special administrator on bail of P200. The petitioner filed a brief alleging that since the Court "has rescinded its order dated 5 of said month and year," requested that the Court order the cancellation of the bond of P200 and its return to the lawyer of the applicant. Issue: Whether or not appointed special administrator can be revoked? Held: Yes. Revoking the appointment of the appellant as special administrator and revoking the order authorizing her to withdraw the deposited jewels, the Court does not abuse its discretion, nor work outside its jurisdiction. The power of the Court of First Instance to render ineffective the appointment of an administrator, when the appointment has been obtained through false or incorrect representations, is indisputable. When the Court appointed the appellant special administrator with authorization to withdraw from the bank jewels valued at P4,500 under a P200 bond, it took into account its essential claim that "it was the sole forced heiress of the 148

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deceased." There was no danger of possible embezzlement. They could even name it without bail. But upon receiving a report that this allegation was inaccurate. Which was confirmed by the motion of the same petitioner who requested the "suspension of publication and postponement of the hearing" because he wished to "have time to arrange an extrajudicial partition with his co-heirs," the court had ample grounds to revoke those orders even without notification to the administrator: the intestate is not initiated for the benefit of the administrators but of the heirs. The court should act immediately and not put in danger. With his indifference, the jewels. If he allowed a few hours to pass, without taking drastic action, the jewels valued at P4,500 could be withdrawn by the special administrator who was only secured in P200 to the detriment of the interests of the minors. The zeal shown by the court was well founded. The position of special administrator is one of trust. As soon as it lost its confidence in the integrity of the applicant, the Court was fully justified in revoking its appointment as special administrator and withdrawing its authorization to remove the jewels from the bank. GARCIA VS. VASQUEZ, 32 SCRA 490 FACTS: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario and for her appointment as special administratrix of the latter’s estate pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof. The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs who invariably charged that the instrument was not intended by the deceased to be her true will. Oppositor Lucio V. Garcia, who also presented for probate the 1956 will of the deceased registered opposition to the appointment of petitioner Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix, on the ground that the latter possesses interest adverse to the estate. The probate court granted petitioner Consuelo’s prayer and appointed her special administratrix. Said oppositors petitioned the court for the immediate removal of the special administratrix. It was their claim that the special administratrix and her deceased husband, Alfonso Precilla, had caused Gliceria A. del Rosario to execute a simulated and fraudulent deed of absolute sale dated allegedly conveying unto said spouses for the paltry sum of P30,000.00 ownership of 3 parcels of land and the improvements. Oppositors contended that since it is the duty of the administrator to protect and conserve the properties of the estate, and it may become necessary that, an action for the annulment of the deed of sale and for recovery of the aforementioned 149

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parcels of land be filed against the special administratrix, as wife and heir of Alfonso Precilla, the removal of the said administratrix was imperative. ISSUE: Whether or not the Elena should be removed as special administratrix for annulment of the deed of sale and for recovery of the subject parcels of land? RULE: Yes, Elena should be removed as special administratrix for annulment of the deed of sale and for recovery of the same. The alleged deed of sale having been executed by Gliceria del Rosario, when she was already practically blind; and that the consideration of P30,000.00 seems to be unconscionably small for properties with a total assessed value of P334,050.00, there was likelihood that a case for annulment might indeed be filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the administratrix, being the widow and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in an action to recover property that may turn out to belong to the estate. Not only this, but the conduct of the special administratrix in securing new copies of the owner’s duplicates of TCT Nos. 66201, 66202, and 66204, without the court’s knowledge or authority, and on the pretext that she needed them in the preparation of the inventory of the estate, when she must have already known by then that the properties covered therein were already "conveyed" to her husband by the deceased, being the latter’s successor, and having the contract bind the land through issuance of new titles in her husband’s name cannot but expose her to the charge of unfitness or unsuitableness to discharge the trust, justifying her removal from the administration of the estate. _______________________________________________________ ______

DE BORJA VS. TAN, 93 PHIL 167 FACTS: Petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. One of the heirs who is now one of the respondents herein Jose de Borja appealed the case to the Court of Appeals but later his motion for dismissal of the appeal was granted. Due to Francisco's physical inability to fully administer the estate he being quite weak and unable to see, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as co-administrator. Crisanto qualified as coadministrator. 150

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Trial court appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator. Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose de Borja. The heirs of Jose, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed De Borja, revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator and directed administrator Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja. An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. On the other hand, according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that a co-administrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake those of a special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not De Borja is a special administrator, thus, his appointment not appealable? RULE: No, Jose De Borja is a co-administrator. A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. Further taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one only in name due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole administrator there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular or general administrator. Such appointment is appealable. On the other hand, the powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81, section 1, a special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of the estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. _______________________________________________________ ______ BORROMEO VS BORROMEO, 97 PHIL 549, 551

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FACTS: Dr. Maximo Borromeo died without ascendants or descendants, but leaving his widow Johanna Hofer Borromeo, and a will wherein he designated the Borromeo Bros. Estate Inc. as his sole heir, even as he named his brother Canuto O. Borromeo as the executor. The said corporation is owned entirely by the deceased and his brothers and sisters. Proceedings having been instituted, the court of first instance of that province probated the will in due course, and granted letters testamentary to Canuto O. Borromeo, who duly qualified as such executor. The attorneys for the widow submitted an "Urgent Motion" whereby they prayed for the removal of the executor on the grounds of negligence in the performance of his duties and unfitness to continue discharging the powers of the office. However, taking advantage of the postponement and after a subpoena had been served on the Bank of the Philippine Islands seeking information on the cash deposits therein of the deceased Maximo Borromeo, the executor withdrew, without authority from the court, the total amount of P23,930.39 from a joint current account, in said Bank, of Canuto Borromeo and Maximo Borromeo, and then deposited portion of the sum thus withdrawn in the joint account of said Canuto Borromeo and his brother Exequiel. In time the petition was heard, and voluminous evidence, oral and documentary, was submitted. The Judge, for several reasons, one of them the above withdrawal of funds, decreed the removal of the executor. On motion for reconsideration the executor’s attorney prayed that the order be revoked. ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient ground to remove Canuto O. Borromeo as the executor? RULE: Yes, there is sufficient ground for the removal of Canuto O. Borromeo as the executor. An executor or administrator should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, but a mere hostile feeling towards persons interested in the estate is not ground for removal unless it prevents the management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence. He claims, in effect, that the money deposited was his at the time he withdrew it. But would the Bank have allowed him to withdraw the whole amount if he were not the executor? He got it then as 152

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executor, and should have kept it in his account as executor. Instead, he deposited it in a joint account with his brother Exequiel, thereby placing it at the latter’s disposal, and hiding it from the widow. Another reason is that the executor claimed as his own certain shares of the Interisland Gas Service, in the name of Maximo Borromeo. Conflict between the interest of the executor and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal or resignation of the former, who was thereby become unsuitable to discharge the trust. (Section 2, Rule 83.) An executor will be removed where it appears that he asserts claims against the estate of the testator to the extent of two thirds of the value of the estate, and such claims are disputed by the beneficiary under the will. ARANAS VS MERCADO FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children which includes petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma). Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in to Mervir Realty. Thelma filed a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094– CEB) which the RTC granted. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio and indicated therein the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties”. Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted. Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory. RTC ordered finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. Teresita sought the reconsideration of the order on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.Thelma opposed the motion. 153

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ISSUE: Whether or not the real property sold by the decedent herein to Mervir Realty Corporation be included in the inventory of the estate? RULE: Yes, the subject property must be included in the inventory of the estate. The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz: Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance. The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity. The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and 154

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appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.”23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate.

HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG V. SY FACTS: Sy Bang died intestate in leaving behind real and personal properties, including several businesses. Respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy. Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan. Herein petitioners and respondents agreed that the income of the three cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain to respondents for their support and sustenance and the income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year 1980, private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of the operation and management of the three cinema houses, with the income derived therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and maintenance. The Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the Compromise Agreement. Petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for 155

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Inhibition, alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the case. Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bang’s death in 1971 until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widow’s allowance as provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in possession and control of her husband’s estate, or her share in the conjugal partnership. Petitioners argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the same is granted only "during the settlement of the estate" of the decedent, and this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from the "common mass of property" during the liquidation of the inventoried properties. The Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita ₱25,000.00 as the widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang. Petitioners informed the Court that Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present and future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to the case. Petitioners said that the trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction, had no authority to enforce payment of widow’s allowance. The payment of widow’s allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present because the estate of Sy Bang – the source from which payment is to be taken – has not been determined with finality. ISSUE: Whether or not allowance of the widow Rosita is chargeable to the estate of the deceased? RULE: Yes, allowance of the widow Rosita is chargeable to the estate of the deceased despite having not determined with finality yet. Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. – The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states: Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the provision of the law that the widow’s allowance is to be 156

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taken from the common mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent. Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts. It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widow’s allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly complying only upon threat of incarceration. We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with whatever the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order. The widow’s allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bang’s estate. That the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying with this Court’s order. Properties of the estate have been identified – i.e., those in the names of petitioners – thus, these properties should be made to answer for the widow’s allowance of Rosita. In any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate. ESTATE OF RUIZ VS. CA, 118671, 252 SCRA 541 FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. The probate court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three 157

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granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be withdrawn. Edmond assails the order of the CA disallowing him, as executor, to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not Edmond, as the executor, has the absolute right in the possession and administration of the real and personal properties of the deceased? RULE: No, the right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides: Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.28 When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor. It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds. Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the 158

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obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness. _______________________________________________________ ___ MANANQUIL V. ATTY. VILLEGAS, A.M. No. 2430 FACTS: Atty. Villegas was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate estate of one Felomina Zerna. LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several lots included in Zerna’s estate. The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth. It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estate’s administrator. ISSUE: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease? RULING: NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval. Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto. However, the Court sustains the Solicitor General's holding that there is no sufficient evidence on record to warrant a finding that respondent allowed the properties of the estate of Filomena Zerna involved herein to be leased to his family partnership at very low rental payments. At any rate, it is a matter for the court presiding 159

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over Special Proceedings No. 460 to determine whether or not the agreed rental payments made by respondent's family partnership is reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the estate properties. Considering thus the nature of the acts of misconduct committed by respondent, and the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds sufficient grounds to suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. RULE 85 – ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

COMPENSATION

OF

3. MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR. vs. ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR G.R. No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, PAREDES, J. FACTS: On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity was judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of the Sp. Proc. stated above, leased one of the properties of the estate (a fishpond identified as Lot No. 1617 of the cadastral survey of Kabankaban, Negros Occidental), to Pedro Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was for three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to expire on May 1, 1963, the transaction having been done, admittedly, without previous authority or approval of the Court where the proceedings was pending. On January 17, 1961, Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and one Sofronio Campillanos was appointed in his stead. On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein, Moises San Diego, Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00. Nombre, the deposed administrator, presented a written opposition to the motion of Campillanos on April 11, 1964, pointing out that the fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years, the period of which was going to expire on May 1, 1963. ISSUE: 1. Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval. 2. Whether the provisions of the New Civil Code on Agency should apply to judicial administrators. 160

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RULING: 1. YES. We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and approval. The Rules of Court provide that — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules). Lease has been considered an act of administration (Jocson v. Nava; Gamboa v. Gamboa; Rodriguez v. Borromeo; Ferraris v. Rodas, supra). 2. NO. While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua Tan v. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court. 4. LUZ CARO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA LAHORRA VDA. DE BENITO, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARIO BENITO G.R. No. L-4600, March 25, 1982, GUERRERO, J. FACTS: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 of the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed in Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint administrators of Mario's estate. 161

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On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro, for the sum of P10,000.00. Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as shown in their affidavits both dated September 15, 1960, Exhibits G and F respectively, a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over Lot I-C, under T.C.T. No. T-4978. Sometime in the month of May, 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito learned from an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 508 that the latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. Private respondent, thus, filed the present case as an independent one and in the trial sought to prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito exercise the right of legal redemption with respect to the lots in question. RULING: NO. The fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property. Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-third portion to petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of redemption was not within the powers of administration, in the same manner, private respondent as co-administrator has no power exercise the right of redemption — the very power which the Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of administration. While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased 162

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(Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526). 5. ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented by JOSE S. MATUTE, Judicial Co-Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, Court of First Instance of Manila vs. HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Davao, Davao City; SOUTHWEST AGRICULTURAL MARKETING CORPORATION also known as (SAMCO); CARLOS V. MATUTE, as another Administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876 CFI, Manila; and MATIAS S. MATUTE, as former CoAdministrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876, CFI, Manila G.R. No. L-29407, July 29, 1983, RELOVA, J. FACTS: The petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of 293,578 square meters, situated in sitio Tibambam, barrio Tibambam, municipality of Sigaboy (now Governor Generoso), province of Davao. In April 1965 herein private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO), as plaintiff, filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the respondent Court of First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02. On October 20, 1967, the parties (plaintiff and defendants) in Civil Case No. 4623 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, submitted to the respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim. The said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not submitted to and approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings.

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That on November 10, 1967, respondent court, despite the opposition of the other parties who sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 4623 and despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court decision which, in effect, ceded the property covered by OCT No. 0-27, containing an area of 293,578 square meters and with an assessed value of P31,700.00 to SAMCO in payment of its claim for only P19,952.11. Made to answer, herein respondent SAMCO and respondent judge, among others, contend that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, "the same having been entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank. ISSUE: Whether the administrator can enter into an amicable settlement involving the estate of the decedent without prior approval of the probate court. RULING: NO. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; ..." The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court). The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased. It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the deceased Amadeo 164

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Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." (Emphasis supplied). The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court. 6. SOCIEDAD DE LIZARRAGA HERMANOS vs. FELICISIMA ABADA, ET AL. G.R. No. 13910, September 17, 1919, MOIR, J. FACTS: Francisco Caponong died in October, 1906, owing the plaintiffs a sum of money which was then less than the amount allowed by the commissioners. His widow, Felicisima Abada, was appointed administratrix of the estate, commissioners to appraise the estate and to pass on the claims against the estate were duly appointed, and plaintiffs presented their claim which was allowed by the commissioners in the sum of P12,783.74. The commissioner's report was dated in February, 1909. The administratrix leased the hacienda [farm] known as "Coronacion" to Hilario Zayco for a term of years, but afterwards she married Vicente Alvarez, one of the defendants, and the lease was transferred to Alvarez by Zayco, October 2, 1908. On the 11th of April, 1913, nearly seven years after the death of Caponong, the plaintiffs herein filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros against Felicisima Abada personally and as administratrix of the estate of Francisco Caponong, alleging that Francisco Caponong owed plaintiffs P12,783.74, and that Felicisima Abada in her own name and as administratrix, had been receiving from the plaintiffs money and effects from 1908 to 1912 which money and effects were used by the defendant in "the expense of cultivation and the exploitation of the Hacienda 'Coronacion,' "and that defendant had delivered to plaintiffs the sugar produced until the last crop which she refused to deliver to them. On the 25th of August, 1914, the parties, including the guardian of the minors, presented a motion in court stating that they had made 165

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an amicable settlement of the litigation, and prayed the court to dismiss the action, which was done. The settlement agreed upon was, briefly, that the defendants, including the guardian of the minor children, "recognized that the deceased Francisco Caponong's estate was indebted to the plaintiffs, according to a liquidation of the accounts on the 30th of June, 1913, in the sum of P68,611.01, which was to be paid with 10 per cent interest in seven equal annual installments;" and to secure this debt, the defendants agreed to give plaintiffs a first mortgage on all the property of Francisco Caponong, except the growing sugar cane, and on all the property belonging exclusively to Felicisima Abada, and the defendants agreed to secure judicial approval of the settlement. The defendants also agreed to mortgage the carabaos then on the hacienda to plaintiffs. ISSUE: Whether the court in approving the compromise intended to hold the defendant estate liable only for the original debt, which was only P12,783.74. RULING: YES. The law declares that commissioners shall pass upon all claims against the estate. They had done so in this case. The law fixed the limit of the estate's liability. The court could not charge it with debts that were never owed by it. The administratrix could only charge the estate with the reasonable and proper expenses of administration. The estate owed plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this has been paid, and there was a balance due plaintiffs of P8,555.78 at the time of the trial, plus interest. The plaintiffs, after their claim had been presented and allowed by the commissioners, made advances to the administratrix till their claim was more than P68,000. It is urged that the major part of this debt of P68,000 is administration expenses, and as such is chargeable against the assets of the estate. No reason is given why the expense of administration should be so great, and the evidence fails to sustain this position. The administration expense would be the necessary expenses of handling the property, of protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and possibly producing a crop, but if plaintiffs, holding a claim originally for less than P13,000 against the estate, let the administratrix have money and effects till their claim grow to P68,000 they cannot be permitted to charge this amount as expense of administration. They might be allowed to charge it against the current revenue from the hacienda or the net proceeds of the "exploitation of 166

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the hacienda" for which it was obtained and used, as plaintiffs allege, but it cannot relate back to the presenting of their claim to the commissioners, and be a charge against the inheritance of the heirs, or even a claim to prorate with other creditors' claims allowed by the commissioners. By expense of administration we understand to be the reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the property and managing it till the debts are paid, as provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as to partition it and deliver to the heirs. The court could not approve a settlement saddling upon the estate debts it never owed, and if it did, its approval would be a nullity. To give effect to the compromise as written would result in great wrong, and destroy every chance the minor children had to participate in the inheritance of their father. That the mortgage given at the same time and as a result of the agreement was without legal warrant is equally clear. No mortgage can be placed by an administrator on the estate of a descendant, unless it is specifically authorized by statute. 7. Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN vs. CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA G.R. No. L-29276, May 18, 1978, AQUINO, J. FACTS: The deceased testator was survived by eight children named Victorino, Librada, Severino, Margarita, Josefina, Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will was duly probated. Letters of administration were issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman. One of the properties left by the dent was a residential house located in the poblacion. In conformity with his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each being given a one-eighth proindiviso share in the project of partition dated March 19, 1966, which was signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order of April 14, 1967 but without prejudice to the final outcome of the accounting. The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from June 16, 1964 to September, 1967. Three heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48: I. Expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent's residential house. 1. Construction of fence — P3,082.07 2. Renovation of bathroom — P1,389.52 3. Repair of terrace and interior of house — P5,928.00 — P10,399.59 167

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II. Living expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the family home without paying rent: 1. For house helper — P1,170.00 2. Light bills — 227.41 3. Water bills — 150.80 4. Gas oil, floor wax and switch nail — 54.90 — P 1,603.11 III. Other expenses: 1. Lawyer's subsistence — P 19.30 2. Gratuity pay in lieu of medical fee — 144.00 3. For stenographic notes — 100.00 4. For food served on decedent's first death anniversary — 166.65 5. Cost of publication of death anniversary of decedent — 102.00 6. Representation expenses — 26.25 — P558.20 IV. Irrigation fee P1.049.58 TOTAL P13,610.48 ISSUE: Whether the above-mentioned expenses allowed as items for legitimate expenses of administration. RULING: An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal estate as long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is accountable for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court). One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he should render a true and just account of his administration to the court. As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those which are necessary for the management of the estate, for protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the production of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and its management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue among the persons entitled thereto.

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It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned proindiviso among the decedent's eight children. Each one of them was given a one-eighth share in conformity with the testator's will. Five of the eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social standing in the community. Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the coowners. They were necessary for the preservation and use of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the three oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort, convenience and security. We are of the opinion that those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de Guzman, inuring only to her benefit. Those expenses, not being reasonable administration expenses incurred by the administrator, should not be charged against the income of the estate. Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net income of the estate. She occupied the house without paying rent. She should use her income for her living expenses while occupying the family residence. Among these expenses is the sum of P100 for stenographic notes which, as admitted by the administrator on page 24 of his brief, should be disallowed. Another item, "representation expenses" in the sum of P26.25 (2nd accounting), was not explained. It should likewise be disallowed. The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of ad. administration the sum of P268.65 which was incurred during the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased. Those expenses are disallowed because they have no connection with the care, management and settlement of the decedent's estate (Nicolas vs. Nicolas 63 Phil 332). The other expenses, namely, P19.30 for the lawyer's subsistence and P144 as the cost of the gift to the physician who attended to the testator during his last s are allowable expenses. The explanation is not quite clear but it was not disputed by the appellants. The fact is that the said sum of P1,049.58 was paid by the administrator to the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in Official Receipt No. 3596378 dated April 28, 1967. It was included in his accounting as part of the farming expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a legitimate expense of administration. 8. TEODORICO UY TIOCO vs. CARLOS IMPERIAL, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and ALEJANDRO M. PANIS G.R. No. L-29414, July 17, 1928, OSTRAND, J. 169

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FACTS: Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of said estate and that he on October 31, 1927, before the final settlement of accounts, presented a motion in the probate proceedings for the allowance of attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000. On December 5, 1927, the respondent judge, over the objections in writing presented by the administrator, granted the motion and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. The administrator, the herein petitioner, did not appeal from the order of the court, but on February 8, 1928, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until a few days before the filing of there motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether the allowance of attorney’s fees be directly charged to the estate. RULING: The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing the payment of the attorney's fees abovementioned until the appeal taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has been passed upon by this court or dismissed. 9. HUGO P. RODRIGUEZ vs. JOSE YNZA 97 Phil 1003, 1955 (unreported; cannot find a full text of this case online) FACTS: 170

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CFI Iloilo authorized the payment for Atty Tirol's legal services. Ynza opposed and appealed arguing that Atty Tirol's service was rendered to a trustee and admin of the estate and NOT the estate itself. ISSUE: Whether the payment for Atty Tirol's services is chargeable to the estate. RULING: YES. In this case, Atty Tirol was counsel for the trustee in 8 cases all of which involved estate property. Atty Tirol's success in those 8 cases undoubtedly benefited the estate. 10. GAVINO ALDAMIZ, as administrator of the estate of the deceased Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa vs. THE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MINDORO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF MINDORO and JUAN L. LUNA G.R. No. L-2360, December 29, 1949, MORAN, C.J. FACTS: Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, the decedent was a Spaniard and member of the commercial partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." The other members were the brothers, Gavino and Jose, surnamed Aldamiz. Santiago Rementeria died in Spain in 1937, and probate proceeding No. 705 was instituted in the same year in the Court of First Instance of Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna. Gavino Aldamiz was appointed administrator and as such was represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna up to January 21, 1947, when the order complained for was issued. In that order it is said that "said attorney is the one who instituted this testate proceeding ten years ago and has from its incipiency to the present stage of the proceedings actively intervened in the same. On January 15, 1947, After ten years from the date of his appointment, Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator, through his attorney, Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts for the years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a project of partition with a view to closing the proceedings. On said date, the court approved the accounts by refused to approve the project of partition unless all debts including attorney's fees be first paid. In the project of partition, it was expressly stated that attorney's fees, debts and incidental expenses would be 171

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proportionately paid by the beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings, but the court refused to sanction this clause of the project. It is for this reason that right then and there, Attorney Luna, to comply with the wishes of the court, without previously preparing and filing a written petition to have his professional fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of his services and professional standing so that the court might fix the amount of his compensation and the administrator may make payment thereof. This failure to file a written claim and to notify the interested parties thereof was not due to bad faith or fraudulent purpose but to an honest belief on the part of the respondent attorney that such requirements were not necessary under the circumstance. At the time respondent's evidence was submitted to the court, the interested parties who were residing in the Philippines were Gavino Aldamiz and his brother Jose Aldamiz. The others were then residing in Spain. No written claim had ever been filed for respondent's fees, and the interested parties had not been notified thereof nor of the hearing, not even Gavino Aldamiz who did not know when he was called to testify that he would testify in connection with respondent's fees. The Court, after considering the whole evidence presented, issued its order of January 21, 1947, awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in payment of his professional services, an aggregate sum of P28,000. The Court ordered payment of these amounts within thirty days. Petitioner Gavino Aldamiz received copy of this order on February 21,1948. Out of the total amount of P28,000, petitioner was able to pay P5,000 only, and upon his failure to pay the balance of P23,000 after several demands made upon him by respondent attorney, the latter on April 17, 1948, filed an ex-parte motion for execution which was granted by the respondent Court on April 19,1948. ISSUE: Whether the procedure of fixing the amount of respondent attorney’s fees is proper. RULING: NO. We believe and so hold that the order of the respondent court issued on January 21,1948, fixing the amount of respondent attorney's fees is null and void. The correct procedure for the collection of attorney's fees, is for the counsel to request the administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail to pay (Palileo vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 47106, 40 Off. Gaz. [8th Supp.], 132.) 172

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If the judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. (Uy Tioco vs. Imperial, 53 Phil., 802.) The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action, file a [petition in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration." (Emphasis ours.) (Escueta vs. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405.) In the instant case, as above stated, no written petition for the payment of attorney's fees has ever been filed by the respondent attorney and the interested parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the court. Consequently, the order issued by the respondent court on January 21, 1947, and all subsequent orders implementing it, are null and void, as having been issued on excess of jurisdiction. We also hold that the order of execution issued on April 19,1948, is null and void, not only because it was intended to implement the order of January 21, 1947, which in itself was null and void, but because a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of the Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale of mortgaged of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 89, section 6; see also Rule 74, section 4; Emphasis ours). And this is not the instant case. 11. ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009, TINGA, J. 173

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FACTS: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate. On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these 174

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were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. RULING: Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant." Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, 18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings." We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims. However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death. Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings.

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In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners. Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners. Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate. RULE 86 – CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE 1. SUILIONG & CO., as liquidators of The Yek Tong Lim Fire, Marine, and Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. SILVINA CHIOTAYSAN, FRANCISCA JOSE G.R. No. L-4777, November 11, 1908, CARSON, J. FACTS: 176

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Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, which was duly inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan, but no entry touching the transaction was noted in the land registry. Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysan, the defendant in this action, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known, under the system of civil procedure in existence prior to the adoption of the present code, as an "action for the declaration of heirship" and on the 5th day of August, 1903, the following order declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased. On the 26th day of May, 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co., of which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security for the repayment of the loan. Thereafter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special proceedings under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, for the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, and on the 16th day of October, 1905, he was, in accordance with his petition, appointed administrator; and thereupon, submitted as such administrator, an inventory of the property of the estate, in which was included the land in question. On the 28th of November, 1905, Francisca Jose, the intervener in this action, submitted her claim to the commissioner appointed in these proceedings, for the sum of 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, loaned the deceased, as above set out, on the 28th day of March, 1904, which claim was duly approved on the 31st of August, 1906. ISSUE: Whether the claim of intervenor, Francisca Jose, against the estate prosper. RULING: YES. The prayer of her complaint in intervention, however, is merely for the rescission and annulment of the mortgage contract between the loan company and the defendant and of the inscription in the land registry of the title of the defendant, and a declaration that as a creditor of the estate she has a superior right to that of the plaintiff company in the proceeds of any sale of the land in question. She does not seek to enforce her claim and recover her debt in this proceeding, but merely to prevent the plaintiff from securing a judgment in this action which would take out of the estate property 177

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which she believes to be subject to her claim set up in the administration proceedings. If her contentions are well founded, and if the estate of the deceased is subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased in such form that the heirs of the deceased could not alienate this land free of the claims of the creditors of the deceased against the land, for the payment of their claims against the deceased, the intervener is clearly entitled to at least so much of the relief she seeks in this action as will have the effect of preventing the sale of this land under the plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings, free of the claims of creditors of the deceased, because, if the plaintiffs in this action were permitted to foreclosure their mortgage and to recover their debt from the sale of the land in question, it might well be that there would not be sufficient property in the estate to pay the amount of the claim of the intervener against the estate. It appears also from an examination of these provisions that the legislature has provided no machinery whereby an absolute right on the part of the heir to succeed by the mere fact of death to all the rights and property of the deceased may be enforced, without previous payment or provision of the payment of the debts. It has provided machinery for the enforcement of the debts and other obligations of the deceased, not as debts or obligations of the heir, but as debt or obligations of the deceased, to the payment of which the property of the deceased may be subjected wherever it be found. The new Code of Procedure furnishing no remedy whereby the provisions of article 661 of the of the Civil Code may be enforced, in so far as they impose upon the heredero (heir) the duty of assuming as a personal obligation all the debts of the deceased, at least to the extent of the value of the property received from the estate; or in so far as they give to the heredero the reciprocal right to receive the property of the deceased, without such property being specifically subjected to the payment of the debts to the deceased by the very fact of his deceased, these provisions of article 661 may properly be held to have been abrogated; and the new code having provided a remedy whereby the property of the deceased may always be subjected to the payment of his debts in whatever hands it may be found, the right of a creditor to a lien upon the property of the deceased, for the payment of the debts of the deceased, created by the mere fact of his death, may be said to be recognized and created by the provisions of the new code. (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. Rep., 70). It is evident that her death created a lien upon her property in favor of the intervener Francisca Jose, for the payment of the debt contracted by her during her lifetime, and that this lien ought to have and has priority to any lien created upon this property by the heir of the deceased; that the judicial declaration of heirship in favor of Silvina Chio-Taysan, could not and did not furnish a basis for an entry in the land registry of the name of Silvina Chio-Taysan as the 178

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absolute owner of the property of Avelina Caballero; that such entry, improperly made, could not and did not prejudice the lien of the intervener, Francisca Jose, for the debt due her by the deceased (Mortgage Law, art. 33); and that the mortgage of the property of the deceased by her heir, Silvina Chio-Taysan, was subject to the prior lien of the intervener, Francisca Jose, for the payment of her debt.

SUILIONG & CO. vs. SILVINA CHIO-TAYSAN FACTS: Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, which was duly inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan, but no entry touching the transaction was noted in the land registry. Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysan (daughter of deceased), the defendant in this action, instituted in the Court of First Instance for the declaration of heirship" and on the 5th day of August, 1903, the following order declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased, was issued in that proceeding. On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the city of Manila by virtue of this order entered inscription in the land registry whereby Silvina Chio-Taysan is made to appear as the owner of the land in question: On the 26th day of May, 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co., of which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security for the repayment of the loan. Thereafter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special proceedings under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, for the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, and on the 16th day of October, 1905; and on the 28th of November, 1905, Francisca Jose, the intervener in this action, submitted her claim to the commissioner appointed in these proceedings, for the sum of 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, loaned the deceased, as above set out, on the 28th day of March, 1904, which claim was duly approved on the 31st of August, 1906. On the 10th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff in this action filed its complaint against the defendant, Silvina Chio-Taysan, praying for judgment for the amount loaned her as above set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the land. On the 30th of October, 179

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1907, Francisca Jose was permitted to intervene and file her separate "complaint in intervention" wherein she set out the facts touching the loan made by her to Avelina Caballero, deceased, and prayed that the court declare the mortgage executed by Silvina Chio-Taysan rescinded and of no effect; and further that it annul the inscription in the land registry of the title of Silvina Chio-Taysan to the land in question; and declare this land subject to her claim against the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both the defendant and the intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint, and the intervener brings that judgment before this court for review upon her bill of exceptions duly signed and certified. ISSUE: whether or not the relief sought by Jose must be denied HELD: NO. We do not think that the judgment of the trial court can be sustained in so far as it wholly denies relief to the intervener, Francisca Jose. The trial judge denied the relief prayed for by the intervener, on the ground that her intervention in this action was for the purpose of the written title deeds on the land, and that, since she admitted that she had admitted her claim against the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, to the committee appointed in the administration proceedings, she must be taken to have abandoned, whatever lien she may have held as security therefor, in accordance with the provisions of section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The prayer of her complaint in intervention, however, is merely for the rescission and annulment of the mortgage contract between the loan company and the defendant and of the inscription in the land registry of the title of the defendant, and a declaration that as a creditor of the estate she has a superior right to that of the plaintiff company in the proceeds of any sale of the land in question. She does not seek to enforce her claim and recover her debt in this proceeding, but merely to prevent the plaintiff from securing a judgment in this action which would take out of the estate property which she believes to be subject to her claim set up in the administration proceedings. If her contentions are well founded, and if the estate of the deceased is subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased in such form that the heirs of the deceased could not alienate this land free of the claims of the creditors of the deceased against the land, for the payment of their claims against the deceased, the intervener is clearly entitled to at least so much of the relief she seeks in this action as will have the effect of preventing the sale of this land under the plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings, free of the claims of creditors of the deceased, because, if the plaintiffs in this action were permitted to foreclosure their mortgage and to recover their debt from the sale of the land in question, it might well 180

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be that there would not be sufficient property in the estate to pay the amount of the claim of the intervener against the estate. FRANCISCO QUISUMBING vs. MARIANO GUISON FACTS: The deceased, Consuelo Syyap, during her life time executed a promissory note dated November 9, 1940 for P3,000 in favor of Leonardo Guison payable sixty (60) days from the date thereof, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The debtor Consuelo Syyap died on November 30, 1940. On December 5 of the same year, intestate proceedings were instituted and notice given to creditors to file their claim within six (6) months, which period for filing claims expired on August 31, 1941. In the inventory filed on April 30, 1941, by the administrator of the estate of the deceased, the said obligation of P3,000 was acknowledged as one of the liabilities of the decedent. The creditor Leonardo Guison died on December 31, 1941, and his son Mariano Guison, who was appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of his deceased father, filed the claim of P3,000 against the estate on March 9, 1943. The attorney for the claimant, in his reply to the answer of the attorney for the administrator of the estate of Consuelo Syyap, stated that the claimant believed in good faith that he was relieved of the obligation to file a claim with the court, because said administrator had assured him that he should not worry about it, since the debt was in the inventory and he would pay it as soon as he was authorized by the court to do so, and that the same administrator had been paying the interest due on the note up to January, 1943. The lower court taking into consideration that the appellant administrator did not deny in his answer to the claim the existence if the debt, that the latter was admitted in the inventory submitted by said administrator to the court, and that the appellant had been paying interest on the debt up to January, 1943, allowed the appellees claim and ordered the appellant to pay the claimant the sum of P3,000 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from February 1, 1943. ISSUE: (1) whether the claim filed by the claimant may be allowed by the court after hearing both parties, without necessity on the part of the claimant to file a previous application for, and on the part of the court to grant, an extension of time not exceeding one month within which the claim may be filed; and (2) whether cause was shown by the claimant why he did not file the claim within the time previously limited.. HELD: 181

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While it is true that under section 5 of Rule 87, "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, ... must be filed within the time limited in the notice," it is also true that, under section 2 of the same Rule, "at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor, who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month.". (1) the claim filed by the appellee may be considered as implying an application for time within which to file said claim, and the order of the lower court allowing such claim impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim. It would have been a waste of time on the part of the court and the parties in this case, if the court had dismissed the claim and required the appellee to file, first, an application for a period not exceeding one month within which to file his claim, and then to file his claim within the time granted by the court, when the latter would allow the claim after all. Strict compliance with the said requirement of section 2 of Rule 87 would be necessary if a claim had to be presented to and passed upon by the committee on claims according to the old law; but now as it is to be filed with and passed upon by the court itself, no harm would be caused to the adverse party by such a procedure as was followed in the present case. Moreover, the appellant, in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee, did not object to it on the ground that the former had not previously applied for an extension of time not exceeding one month within which to present his claim. It is to be presumed that both the attorneys for the appellant as well as for the appellee knew that the claim was being filed under the provisions of section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court, because the time previously limited had then already expired, and had appellant objected to the claim on the above-mentioned ground and the court considered it necessary for the appellee to do so, the latter would have complied literally with the law. Section 2, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court contains a more liberal provision regarding the time for the filing of a claim by a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, than section 690 of the old Code of Civil Procedure on which the rulings in the cases quoted by the appellant are based. Under said section 690, the court may, on application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, renew the commission and allow further time not exceeding one month for the committee to examine such claim if the application is filed within six months after the time previously limited had expired, or if the committee has failed to give the notice required by law, provided that such application be presented before the final settlement of the estate. So, although the estate has not yet been finally settled, if such application is filed after 182

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six months from the expiration of the time previously limited, or if the committee has not failed to give the notice required by law, the court has no power to renew the commission and allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing and examination by the committee of such claim, whatever might be the cause for such failure to file the claim in time. While, under section 2 of Rule 87, there is no limitation as to the time within which a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, may file an application for extension of time within which to file his claim, and the court may for cause shown grant such application fixing a period not exceeding one month for that purpose, provided that the application is presented before an order of distribution has been entered.. (2) The last sentence of section 2, Rule 87, provides that the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month. As it does not state what cause shall be considered sufficient for the purpose, it is clear that it is left to the discretion of the court to determine the sufficiency thereof; and when the court allows a claim to be filed for cause or causes which it considers as sufficient, on appeal this court can not reverse or set aside the action of the court below unless the latter has abused its discretion, which has not been shown by the appellant in this case. . . . .Whether the period fixed by law for the presentation of claims may be extended is within the sound discretion of the court, and the decision of the trial judge in this regard should not be disturbed until it is clearly shown that he abused such discretion. That nothing is more equitable than what was done by the lower court in this case, is evident. Appellant does not only acknowledge in the inventory the existence of the debt, but does not deny it in his answer to the claim filed by the appellee in the court below, and had been paying interest due thereon up to January, 1943, that is, two months before the filing of the claim. Attorney for appellant, in opposing the claim and appealing to this court from the decision of the court below, relies only on the technicality that no previous application for extension of time has been filed by the claimantappellee. VILLANUEVA vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual Villanueva, the widow Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Agusan, for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for hearing and Notice thereof was published. The name of Atty. Teodulo R. 183

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Ricaforte, suggested as administrator and all the parties agreed. After the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his duties. Under date of November 9, 1950 the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued a Notice to Creditors requiring them to file their claims with the clerk of court within six but not beyond twelve months after date of the first publication of this notice, serving copies of such claims upon administrator, the said Teodulo R. Ricaforte. On July 20, 1953, the defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor's Claim. Original amount thru Agusan Agency on ........................................................ P600.00

Dec.

20,

To int. at 10%: on P600.00 fr. 12-20-39 to ...................................................................... 747.45

1939 6-5-53

Total due as of June 5, 1953 (Daily int. of P0.1644 after June 5, 1953) .......................... P1,347.45 That the said obligation has been due demandable since Dec. 20, 1940; that the same is true and just claim and that it is still unpaid without any set-off. On October 12, 1954, the Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for Admission of claim. The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein. As special defenses, he interposed — That the same indebtedness, if it existed, has already been paid; That the caused action for the recovery of the aforesaid amount of P1,847.45 is barred by the statute of limitations, for more than ten (10) Years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued up to present time; That the said claim is barred forever on the ground that notice to creditors having been published in the MORNING TIMES of Cebu City, a newspaper of general circulation in on November 16, 23 and 30, 1950, ... the Philippine National Bank failed to file its claim within the time limited in the notice, .... The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the claim presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation. 184

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ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may still be allowed to institute its claim HELD: NO The important issue presented is whether or not the in question is already barred. Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court, within which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan. It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by the administrator Of the estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). The deposit was made on December 1, 1951, inspite of which the appellant Bank only filed its claim on July 20, 1953. It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within Which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be granted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed. Having reached the above conclusions, We deem it necessary to determine the question as to whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the prescriptive period for filing of the claim under consideration METROPOLITAN BANK & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

TRUST

COMPANY v. ABSOLUTE

FACTS: On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMCs General Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, 8 and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. This 185

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proceeding was pending at the time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.9 SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chuas death, for allegedly undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these transactions could not be found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were all payable to AMC and were crossed or "for payees account only." In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint, AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chuas transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI. In the meantime, Metrobank filed a motion to dismiss 14 against AMC on the ground that the latter engaged in prohibited forum shopping. According to Metrobank, AMCs claim against it is the same claim that it raised against Chuas estate in Special Proceedings. In its answer23 dated December 1, 2003, Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly done with the knowledge and consent of AMC. According to Metrobank, Chua then gave the assurance that the arrangement for the handling of the checks carried AMCs consent. Chua also submitted documents showing his position and interest in AMC. These documents, as well as AMCs admission in its answer that it allowed Chua to manage AMC with a relative free hand, show that it knew of Chuas arrangement with Metrobank. Further, Chuas records show that the proceeds of the checks were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore now claim that it did not receive these proceeds. Metrobank also raised the defense of estoppel. According to Metrobank, AMC had knowledge of its arrangements with Chua for several years. Despite this arrangement, AMC did not object to nor did it call the attention of Metrobank about Chuas alleged lack of authority to deposit the checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account. At this point, AMC is already estopped from questioning Chuas authority to deposit these checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account. Lastly, Metrobank asserted that AMC gave Chua unbridled control in managing AMCs affairs. This measure of control amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the loss that AMC must now bear. Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourthparty complaint24 against Chuas estate. It alleged that Chuas estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC. ISSUE: 186

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are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court? Second, if so, is Metrobanks claim against the Estate of Jose Chua based on a quasi-contract? HELD: Quasi-contracts are included inbclaims that should be filed under Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court Metrobanks fourth-party complaint is based on quasi-contract Both the RTC and the CA described Metrobanks claim against Chuas estate as one based on quasi-contract. A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that the law creates on the basis of certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a person, to avoid unjust enrichment.42 The Civil Code provides an enumeration of quasicontracts,43 but the list is not exhaustive and merely provides examples.44?r?l1 According to the CA, Metrobanks fourth-party complaint falls under the quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code.45 Article 2154 embodies the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake.46?r?l1 Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, has two indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered through mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no right to demand it.47?r?l1 In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chuas estate should reimburse it if it becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account upon Chuas instructions. This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account; because of Chuas control over AMCs operations, Metrobank assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardwares account. Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand and receive the checks that were deposited to its account; despite Chuas control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot be deposited in the account of the other. This disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the amount of these checks to Metrobank. The Court notes, however, that its description of Metrobanks fourthparty complaint as a claimclosely analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the validity of the lower courts orders denying it. It is not an adjudication determining the liability of Chuas estate against Metrobank. The appropriate trial court should still determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim against Chuas estate based on quasicontract. 187

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Metrobanks fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within theclaims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court A distinctive character of Metrobanks fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:cralawlibrary Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice. [italics ours] Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply because it impleaded Chuas estate for reimbursement in the same transaction upon which it has been sued by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the conclusion of the CA, to wit:cralawlibrary Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x x x must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.48?r?l1 We read with approval the CAs use of the statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 ofthe Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily.49?r?l1 In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Comi and, as such, should have been so filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023. 188

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STRONGHOLD INSURANCE vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION,

COMPANY,

INC.,

FACTS: "On May 24, 1989, [respondent] Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract with x x x Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City, where [respondent] was to pay x x x JDS five million three hundred thousand pesos (P5,300,000.00) inclusive of value added tax for said construction, which was supposed to be completed within a period of two hundred forty (240) days beginning May 8, 1989. In order ‘to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings’ x x x JDS, shall post a performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P795,000.00). x x x JDS executed, jointly and severally with [petitioner] Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) Performance Bond. "On May 23, 1989, [respondent] paid to x x x JDS seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P795,000.00) by way of downpayment. "Several times prior to November of 1989, [respondent’s] engineers called the attention of x x x JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by x x x JDS. "On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by x x x JDS, [respondent] Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract pursuant to Article XIII of said contract, and wrote a letter to x x x JDS informing the latter of such rescission. Such rescission, according to Article XV of the contract shall not be construed as a waiver of [respondent’s] right to recover damages from x x x JDS and the latter’s sureties. "[Respondent] alleged that, as a result of x x x JDS’s failure to comply with the provisions of the contract, which resulted in the said contract’s rescission, it had to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an additional expense of three million two hundred fifty six thousand, eight hundred seventy four pesos (P3,256,874.00). "On January 6, 1990, [respondent] sent a letter to [petitioner] SICI filing its claim under the bond for not less than P795,000.00. On March 22, 1991, [respondent] again sent another letter reiterating its demand for payment under the aforementioned bond. Both letters allegedly went unheeded. "[Respondent] then filed [a] complaint against x x x JDS and SICI. It sought from x x x JDS payment of P3,256,874.00 representing the additional expenses incurred by [respondent] for the completion of the project using another contractor, and from x x x JDS and SICI, jointly and severally, payment of P750,000.00 as damages in 189

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accordance with the performance bond; exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of at least P100,000.00. "On July 10, 1991, [petitioner] SICI filed its answer, alleging that the [respondent’s] money claims against [petitioner and JDS] have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if this were not the case, [petitioner] SICI had been released from its liability under the performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or involvement, pursuant to procedural due process, of herein surety and contractor Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence, there was no ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond. ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation is extinguished HELD: As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.8 Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. 9 Only obligations that are personal10 or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.11 Section 5 of Rule 8612 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished.13 What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.14 In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate.15 Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond. The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance bond worded as follows: "KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: "That we, JDS CONSTRUCTION of 208-A San Buena Building, contractor, of Shaw Blvd., Pasig, MM Philippines, as principal and the STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with head office at Makati, as Surety, are held and firmly bound unto the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION and to any 190

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individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the principal with labor or materials in the penal sum of SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00), Philippine Currency, for the payment of which sum, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. "The CONDITIONS OF THIS OBLIGATION are as follows; "WHEREAS the above bounden principal on the ___ day of __________, 19__ entered into a contract with the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION represented by _________________, to fully and faithfully. Comply with the site preparation works road and drainage system of Philippine Float Plant at Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila. "WHEREAS, the liability of the Surety Company under this bond shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00) Philippine Currency, inclusive of interest, attorney’s fee, and other damages, and shall not be liable for any advances of the obligee to the principal. "WHEREAS, said contract requires the said principal to give a good and sufficient bond in the above-stated sum to secure the full and faithfull performance on its part of said contract, and the satisfaction of obligations for materials used and labor employed upon the work; "NOW THEREFORE, if the principal shall perform well and truly and fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract during the original term of said contract and any extension thereof that may be granted by the obligee, with notice to the surety and during the life of any guaranty required under the contract, and shall also perform well and truly and fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of any and all duly authorized modifications of said contract that may hereinafter be made, without notice to the surety except when such modifications increase the contract price; and such principal contractor or his or its sub-contractors shall promptly make payment to any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the principal of its sub-contractors with labor and materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in the said contract, then, this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. Any extension of the period of time which may be granted by the obligee to the contractor shall be considered as given, and any modifications of said contract shall be considered as authorized, with the express consent of the Surety. "The right of any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the contractor with labor or materials for the prosecution of the work hereinbefore stated, to institute action on the penal bond, pursuant to the provision of Act No. 3688, is hereby acknowledge and confirmed."16

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BIENVENIDO vs. SYLVINA C. LAYA, ET AL.

P.

BUAN

FACTS; On December 15, 1953, petitioners herein filed a contingent claim for more than P500,000 against the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that on August 3, 1952, a Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the deceased spouses Buan, collided with a car in which Juan C. Laya, Rodolfo Escosa, Jose S. Palma, and Juan de Leon, were riding. The heirs of Juan C. Laya, petitioners herein, reserved the civil action for damages, and on October 12, 1953, they filed an independent civil action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the administrator of the deceased spouses Buan. The petition for the admission of a contingent claim was accompanied with a copy of the complaint filed in the civil case above-mentioned and a sentence in the criminal case filed against Ernesto Triguero, driver of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. When the administrators learned of the filing of the contingent claim in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, they filed an opposition thereto on the ground that the same was not filed before the death of the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan, which took place on January 3, 1953, and that it was also not filed within the period prescribed by Rule 89, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac admitted the claim in an order dated December 16, 1953, but denied the prayer that a portion of the estate be set aside to respond for the amount of the contingent. In the meantime and on January 7, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, on a motion for reconsideration filed by the administrators dated January 2, 1954, set aside its previous order of December 16, 1953, admitting the contingent claim of petitioners. The reason for the admission of the claim, according to the court, had ceased to exist and even the plaintiffs had filed the amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same has not yet been acted upon by the said court. A motion to reconsider this order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac having been denied, petitioners have prosecuted this appeal to Us. ISSUE: Whether or not the claim should be dismissed. HELD: NO. A contingent claim is one which, by its nature, is necessarily dependent upon an uncertain event for its existence or validity. It may or may not develop into a valid and enforceable claim, and its validity and enforceability depending upon an uncertain event. 192

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A 'contingent claim' against an estate within the statute providing for the settlement hereof, as one where the absolute liability depends on some future event which may never happen, and which therefore renders such liability uncertain and indeterminable. . . It is where the liability depends on some future event after the debtor's death which may or may not happen, and therefore makes Words and Phrases, p. 113.). A 'contingent claim' against an estate is one in which liability depends on some future event which may or may not occur, so that duty to pay may never become absolute. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the action brought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the claim presented in the administration proceedings depends. While the said action has not yet been finally decided or determined to the effect that the petitioners herein, heirs of the deceased Juan C. Laya, have no right of action against the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, the contingent claim that petitioners have filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in the proceedings for the administration of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, may not be dismissed. The order of the court dismissing the claim and declaring that the same may again be entertained if another valid complaint by the petitioners herein is filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, is inconsistent with the nature and character of a contingent claim. A contingent claim does not follow the temporary orders of dismissal of an action upon which it is based; it awaits the final outcome thereof and only said final result can cause its termination. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court should then be informed that the claim had already matured. (Secs. 5. 9, Rule 87.) The order of the court subject of the appeal should, therefore, be set aside. The first order of the court admitted the claim but denied the petition for the setting aside of a certain amount from the estate to respond therefor. The validity of the contingent claim is apparent; as the driver of the bus belonging to the deceased spouses, Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, was found guilty of negligence, as a result of which Juan C. Laya died, the said deceased spouses—the employers of the driver—can be made responsible, as masters of a servant, for damages for the death of the petitioner's father. A portion of the estate should therefore, be set aside to respond for such damages as petitioners herein may subsequently recover in the action they have brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila. This amount should be fixed in the court below.

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THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK vs. SILVIO CHENG TAN alias SILVIO CHENG PAN

OF

NEW

YORK

FACTS: On July 2, 1947 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage — ordering the defendants therein, — Silvio Cheng Tan alias Silvio Cheng Pan amongst them — to pay, jointly and severally, The First National City Bank of New York the sum of P142,000.56, with the stipulated interest on the sum of P129,361.13, plus costs, and providing that in case of default of payment within the period of time therein given, the properties mortgaged by said defendants be sold at Public auction to satisfy the judgment. After the sale of the mortgaged properties a deficiency judgment was rendered on March 25, 1950 for P98,256.13. After the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution and the sale of two parcels of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan, there remained unsatisfied the sum of P38,090.06, with the 7% stipulated interest thereon from October 3, 1941, until paid. As the other defendants in the case had died or could nowhere be found, and the five-year period for the enforcement of the deficiency judgment by mere motion had elapsed without the same having been satisfied, on June 26, 1957 The First National City Bank of New York instituted the present action against Silvio Cheng Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila to revive the judgment aforesaid. During the pendency of the case Cheng Tan died and was substituted by his legal representative, Serafin Cheng, who filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that under Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, plaintiff should file its claim in the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal since February 27, 1958, an administrator having been appointed by said court on April 7, 1958. ISSUE: Whether or not the claim must be filed against the estate. HELD: We have heretofore held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Concepcion e Hijos, 53 Phil. 806, and Government, etc. vs. Concuya et al., G.R. No. L-45994, promulgated on January 20, 1944, that deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed for the filing of claims. On the other hand, Section, 5 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that, among others, judgments for money against the decedent whose estate is in the process of judicial settlement must be filed with the private court within the time limited in the notice given for that purpose, otherwise they will be deemed barred forever, 194

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except that they may be set forth as counterclaim in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the judgment creditor. It is true that a judgment rendered in a civil action remaining unsatisfied after 5 years from its date of entry, is reduced to the condition of a mere right of action, but this, in our opinion, does not argue against the proposition that it should be filed with the probate court for corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted as a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is pending. Even reasons of expediency militate in favor of our conclusion. Were the present preceedings allowed to continue, they could end with nothing more than a judgment reviving the one subject matter of the action. Thus revived said judgment could not be enforced except through the probate court because the judgment debtor died before execution could be actually levied upon any of his properties (Section 7, Rule 39, Rules of Court). There is, therefore, no need to prosecute the present action the herein plaintiff-appellee having the right to go directly to the probate court to file his claim based on the deficiency judgment mentioned heretofore.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA FACTS: The spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-142 and registered in their names. Upon Antonios death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan M. Chua, special administrator of Antonios intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation of five hundred fifty thousand (P550,000.00) pesos from petitioner Philippine National Bank to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of land. On June 29, 1989, Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00 from petitioner PNB evidenced by a promissory note, payable on June 29, 1990, with interest at 18.8 percent per annum. To secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land. On December 27, 1990, for failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage, through the ExOfficio Sheriff, who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged 195

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property pursuant to the authority provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder with a bid price P306,360.00. Since PNBs total claim as of the date of the auction sale was P679,185.63, the loan had a payable balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC, against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his capacity as special administrator of his fathers intestate estate. Despite summons duly served, private respondents did not answer the complaint. The trial court declared them in default and received evidence ex parte. Petitioner contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor.[5] It also contends that Act 3135, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages, is the law applicable to this case of foreclosure sale and not Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court [6] as held by the Court of Appeals.[7] Private respondents argue that having chosen the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property of the deceased, petitioner is precluded from pursuing its deficiency claim against the estate of Antonio M. Chua. This they say is pursuant to Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: whether or not petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same. HELD: NO Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part: Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations: xxx (f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which 196

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shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime. In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand. Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them: (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.[9] In Perez v. Philippine Ravina,[11] we held:

National

Bank,[10] reversing Pasno

vs.

The ruling in Pasno vs. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we have carefully reexamined the same, and after mature deliberation have reached the conclusion that the dissenting opinion is more in conformity with reason and law. Of the three alternative courses that section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative. The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.[12] Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim. The dissent in Pasno, as adopted in Perez, supports this conclusion, thus: When account is further taken of the fact that a creditor who elects to foreclose by extrajudicial sale waives all right to recover against the estate of the deceased debtor for any deficiency remaining unpaid after the sale it will be readily seen that the decision in this case (referring to the majority opinion) will impose a burden upon the estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged real property for the security of debts, without any compensatory advantage. 197

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Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgagecreditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chuas estate.

Heirs of Maglasang vs Manila Banking Corp Facts: The spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit line from respondent in the amount of ₱350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage executed over seven of their properties. They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of ₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on October 24, 1975 and March 15, 1976, respectively, both of which becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate, his widow Salud Maglasang (Salud) and their surviving children, herein petitioners appointed their brother petitioner Edgar Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-fact. Edgar filed a verified petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the then Court of First Instance. The probate court, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims against Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified the probate court of its claim in the amount of ₱382,753.19. During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory notes which they signed. In an order, the probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano’s estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however, remained unsatisfied due to respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s account was undergoing a restructuring. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps. 198

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Maglasang, specifically, its "right to foreclose the same within the statutory period." In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to respondent. Thus respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of ₱250,601.05 as of May 31, 1981 against the estate of Flaviano. The RTC decided in favor of the respondent. The petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal, contending, inter alia, that the remedies available to respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court (Rules) are alternative and exclusive, such that the election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the others. Thus, when respondent filed its claim against the estate of Flaviano in the proceedings before the probate court, it effectively abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage. The CA denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Issue: Whether or not, after the respondent foreclosed the mortgage, the respondent may still file a claim against the estate? (No) Held: Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate: SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security 199

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alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made. As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that the aforementioned section covers all secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.4118.

In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed. Union Bank of the Philippines vs Ariola 200

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Facts: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural AllPurpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. In 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.

Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the loan. Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement. The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. 201

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Issue: 1st issue: Whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid? (No) 2nd Issue: whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased (No) Held: 1st Issue: In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. 2nd Issue: The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.

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The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides: Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner.

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Saligumba vs Palanog

Facts: Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs), filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC decided in favor of the spouses Palanogs. Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision. Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother Ernesto who was out of the country, filed an Answer, contending that the spouses Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no order of substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null and void. Issue: Whether or not the respondent may file a claim against the petitioners? (Yes) Held: Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the procedure, thus: Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)

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Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 16 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court17 provides for the procedure, thus: Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied) Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased. It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving the death of the spouses, except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial court’s orders which were returned unserved. Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir to appear arises only "upon proper notice." The notation "Party-Deceased" on the unserved notices could not be the "proper notice" contemplated by the rule. As the trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of a party 205

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without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no showing that the court’s proceedings were tainted with irregularities.

Rivera vs Ramirez Facts: The spouses Adolfo Ramirez (Adolfo) and Rosita Rivera (Rosita) owned the Sta. Teresita General Hospital and other properties. Rosita died in September 1990, followed by her husband Adolfo. In 1995 petitioner Eleuterio P. Rivera (Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) covering the estate of Rosita, who allegedly died without a will and with no direct ascendants or descendants.Eleuterio claimed that he was Rosita’s nephew. Eleuterio submitted to the intestate court a list of the names of the decedent’s other nephews and nieces all of whom expressed conformity to Eleuterio’s appointment as administrator of her estate.

In 1995 the RTC issued letters of administration appointing Eleuterio as Rosita’s estate administrator.In 1996 he filed in his capacity as administrator a motion with the court to compel the examination and production of documents relating to properties believed to be a part of her estate, foremost of which was the Sta. Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert Ramirez (Robert) had been managing.Robert claims, together with Raymond Ramirez (Raymond) and Lydia Ramirez (Lydia), that they were children of Adolfo by another woman. Robert opposed the issuance of the subpoena.

Subsequently, Robert filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC for allowing the production and examination of the subject documents and for not inhibiting Atty. Pacheo from the case. Essentially, the CA ruled that Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives were not her heirs since she had an adopted child in Raymond and that, consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to request production of the hospital’s documents or to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate.

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Issue: Whether or not Eleuterio had a legal standing to subpoena the documents in Robert’s possession? (Yes)

Held: As for the right of the administrator of Rosita’s estate to the production and examination of the specified documents believed to be in Robert’s possession, Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that these can be allowed based on the administrator’s belief that the person named in the request for subpoena has documents in his possession that tend to show the decedent’s right to real or personal property. Thus: Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. – If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods or chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the last will and testament of the deceased, the Court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk’s office. (Emphasis supplied) The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the intestate court has no authority to decide who the decedent’s heirs are in connection with such incident which is confined to the examination of documents which may aid the administrator in determining properties believed to belong to the decedent’s estate. What is more, that court has no authority to decide the question of whether certain properties belong to the estate or to the person sought to be examined. In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the person examined is in possession of properties that belong to the deceased, the administrator cannot detain the property. He has to file an ordinary action for recovery of the properties.The purpose of the production and examination of documents is to elicit information 207

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or secure evidence from persons suspected of having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to the estate of the deceased. The procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an economical and efficient mode of discovering properties of the estate.

Lopez vs Olbes Facts: On October 13, 1908, Ricardo Lopez et al. brought suit against Adolfo Olbes, the testamentary executor of the deceased Martina Lopez (the mother of Ricardo and grandmother of the other plaintiffs), alleging in their complaint that Martina executed a public instrument whereby she donated to plaintiffs a parcel of hemp land situated at the place called Ali, in the pueblo of Guinobatan, Albay and that the said Olbes, as executor, claimed to have rights of ownership and possession to the said land adverse to those then held by the plaintiffs, inasmuch as the said estate still continued to belong to the deceased Martina Lopez and was then in charge of a trustee by virtue of an agreement had between the attorneys of the executor and the plaintiff Ricardo, and of the order issued by the court in the aforesaid probate proceedings. The complaint concluded by asking that judgment be rendered in the latter’s favor and against the defendant for the ownership and possession of the said land. The defendant filed a demurrer in writing alleging that the plaintiffs, as the heirs or donees could not maintain any suit against the testamentary executor to recover the title or possession of the land so long as the court had not adjudicated the estate to them or until the time allowed for paying the debts should have expired, unless they be given possession of the said land by the executor. The trial court sustained the demurrer of the defendant and dismissed the case. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs have the right of ownership and possession over the parcel of hemp land? Held: 208

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Yes. The action exercised by Ricardo et al is based on the rights which as such donees had acquired by virtue of the donation inter vivos made by Martina Lopez during her lifetime on favor of plaintiffs by an instrument the donor, a donation expressly accepted on the same date by the donees and of which acceptance the donor was also informed on the same date; wherefore, these requirements of the law having been complied with, it is unquestionable that the dominion over the land donated was properly transmitted to the donees who in fact and by operation of law acquired the ownership of the property, as customarily occurs in all contracts of transfer of dominion. Property of the testate estate of the deceased Martina Lopez is not here concerned. During her lifetime she gave away the land mentioned, in the exercise pertained to her as owner. By virtue of the said donation the sole and true owners of the land donated are the plaintiffs, so long as said donation is not proven null, inefficacious, or irregular. All the questions which by reason of the same are raised by the interested parties must be heard in a regular trial and decided by a final judgment absolutely independent of the probate proceedings concerning the estate of the deceased, who was the previous owner of the land concerned; and therefore the complaint of the donees should not have been dismissed, but the trial should have been proceeded with to final judgment. Rioferio vs CA

Facts:

Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada. and with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. 209

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Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage with Damages against petitioners. Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.The petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing. The lower court denied the motion in its Order dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. Issue: Whether or not the heirs may bring a suit involving the estate of the deceased pending the appointment of an administrator? (Yes) Held: Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28 this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus: The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a 210

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suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of31 and he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself. All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE RELATIVE TO SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 28 PENDING AT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF HIMAMAYLAN, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 55, PRESIDED BY JUDGE JOSE Y. AGUIRRE, JR. Facts:

The complainant Constancia Amar requested assistance relative to Special Proceedings No. 28, entitled "Intestate Estate of Spouses Dioscoro & Emperatriz Rubin," assigned to Judge Jose Y. Aguirre. Complainant states that she obtained a favorable decision for wage differentials in a labor case. A writ of execution was issued by the NLRC against the Estate of Spouses Rubin. In relation thereto, in Special Proceedings No. 28, respondent judge issued an order directing the judicial administrator of the Estate of Spouses Rubin to settle Amar's claim. Subsequently the complainant filed a motion for the issuance of an order of contempt against the judicial administrator, Feliciano Rubin, for not heeding the court order. Respondent judge failed to resolve the motion for more than three years. Suspecting a possible collusion between respondent judge and the judicial administrator, complainant sought the assistance of the Office of the Court Administrator. 211

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Respondent judge, in his letter, explained that the court could not direct the sheriff to sell the property of the estate for being inconsistent with Section 3, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court. The OCA ruled stating that Judge Aguirre is correct when he said that Amar's motion to order the sheriff to sell in public auction or to mortgage the properties of the estate is contrary to law. The motion contravenes Section 3, Rule 88 of the Revised Rules of Court which specifically provides that it is only the executor or administrator of the estate whom the court may authorize to dispose of the properties of the estate so that the proceeds of the sale or mortgage may be applied to its obligations. However, Judge Aguirre still has the duty to resolve the motion within the 90-day reglementary period. What he should have done was simply to deny the motion on the ground that it is contrary to law.

Issue: Whether or not the act of Judge Aguirre in failing to resolve the motion by virtue of Sec 3, Rule 88 is valid? (No) Held: The motion to cite the judicial administrator for contempt was never resolved by respondent judge. The explanation that he could not grant the motion because the judicial administrator was sickly certainly is no excuse. The motion to require the sheriff to sell or mortgage the real properties of the estate was also not resolved by respondent judge, stating that to grant the motion would be contrary to Section 3, Rule 88, of the Revised Rules of Court. If respondent judge indeed felt so, then he should have forthwith issued an order denying the motion instead of allowing the motion to remain unresolved. WHEREFORE, for his failure to timely resolve the two pending incidents in Special Proceedings No. 28, Judge Jose Y. Aguirre of the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch 55 is meted a FINE

Pahamotang vs PNB Facts:

Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their eight (8) children.Agustin filed with 212

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the then Court of First Instance of Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife.In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian.The intestate court issued an order granting Agustin’s petition.

Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Agustin executed an Amendment of Real and Chattel Mortgages with Assumption of Obligation. It appears that earlier, or on December 14, 1972, the intestate court approved the mortgage to PNB of certain assets of the estate to secure an obligation. Agustin signed the document in behalf of the estate of Melitona. Meanwhile, the obligation secured by mortgages on the subject properties of the estate was never satisfied hence mortgagor PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister Susana, filed their complaint for Nullification of Mortgage Contracts and Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages against Agustin and PNB. It is petitioners’ posture that the mortgage contracts entered into by Agustin with respondent PNB, as well as his subsequent sale of estate properties to PLEI and Arguna are void because they [petitioners] never consented thereto. They assert that as heirs of their mother Melitona, they are entitled to notice of Agustin's several petitions in the intestate court seeking authority to mortgage and sell estate properties. Without such notice,which the 4 orders that allowed Agustin to mortgage and sell estate properties, are void on account of Agustin’s noncompliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not petitioners can obtain relief from the effects of contracts of sale and mortgage entered into by Agustin without first initiating a direct action against the orders of the intestate court authorizing the challenged contracts.(Yes) Held: The action filed by the petitioners before the trial court is for the annulment of several contracts entered into by Agustin for and in behalf of the estate of Melitona, namely: (a) contract of mortgage in favor of respondent PNB, (b) contract of sale in 213

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favor of Arguna involving seven (7) parcels of land; and (c) contract of sale of a parcel of land in favor of PLEI. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case upon the allegations in the complaint that said contracts were entered into despite lack of notices to the heirs of the petition for the approval of those contracts by the intestate court. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the trial court made a factual finding in its decision that petitioners were, in fact, not notified by their father Agustin of the filing of his petitions for permission to mortgage/sell the estate properties. The trial court made the correct conclusion of law that the challenged orders of the intestate court granting Agustin’s petitions were null and void for lack of compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 2, 4, 7 thereof, which respectively read: "Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies through personalty not exhausted. - When the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such personal estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber so much as may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the circumstances". "Sec. 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or administrator and 214

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on written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions". "Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. - The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate; in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations: (a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial; (b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper; (Emphasis supplied)". xxx xxx xxx Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale or encumbrance of real property was issued by the testate or intestate court without previous notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules, it is not only the contract itself which is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the same.

Silverio vs CA and Silverio-Dee

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Facts:

The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.

During the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate.The RTC subsequently issued an order against private respondent to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.Private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction). The CA granted the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.

Issue: Whether or not the occupancy of private respondent Nelia Silverio-Dee is valid, despite without any authority from the intestate court? (No)

Held:

The alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. SilverioDee to occupy the property is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90. In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration. With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of settling the estate’s legitimate obligations. 216

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Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court. Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court. In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park. UY ESCHEAT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY JULY 16, 2008 J. CARPIO SUMMARY: The Republic filed for reversion of title against the heirs of a Chinese citizen, since aliens were disqualified by the Constitution to own real property in the Philippines. Court ruled that reversion could no longer prosper. Although the sale of the lot to the Chinese citizen violated the constitutional prohibition on aliens acquiring land, the lot had already been acquired by Elizabeth and Pacita through succession. The transfer of Lot No. 398 to Elizabeth and Pacita, who are Filipino citizens qualified to acquire lands, can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is deemed valid considering that the objective of the constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved. FACTS: In 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 (1,574 sq. m. located at the corner of Roxas Ave. and Pavia St. in Roxas City) from the Dinglasans. Subsequently, Lee Liong died intestate and was survived by his widow and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. 217

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The heirs extrajudicially settled the estate and partitioned among themselves the lot. When the sons of Lee Liong died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee (Elizabeth) and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita). The sellers Dingalasans wanted to recover the lot on the ground that Lee Liong was an alien; thus, their sale to him was void. In the 1956 case Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, the Court held that even if the sale of the property was null and void for violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien, still the doctrine of in pari delicto barred the sellers from recovering the title to the property. 11 years later, in Lee Bun Ting v. Judge Aligaen, the Court ordered the trial court to dismiss the complaint of the Dinglasans for recovery. Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the Court held that the case was a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged with finality in the Dinglasan case, involving the same parties or their privies and concerning the same subject matter. In 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita (Lee Liong’s daughters-in-law) filed a petition for reconstitution of title of the lot because the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. Court held that the reconstitution was void for lack of factual support because it was based merely on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. In 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City a Complaint for Reversion of Title against Elizabeth, Pacita, and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying that the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void ab initio; andLot No. 398 be reverted to the public domain for the State’s disposal in accordance with law. Pacita and Elizabeth invoked as affirmative defenses: prescription; private ownership of Lot No. 398; and Lee Liong’s being a buyer in good faith and for value. Furthermore, they claimed that as Filipino citizens, they are qualified to acquire Lot No. 398 by succession. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the reversion of the lot to the State. It held that Elizabeth and Pacita could not have acquired a valid title over the lot because the sale of the lot to their predecessorin-interest Lee Liong was null and void. Being an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value did not cure Lee Liong’s disqualification as an alien who is prohibited from acquiring land under the Constitution.

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Lastly, Prescription cannot be invoked against the State as regards an action for reversion or reconveyance of land to the State. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and declared Elizabeth and Pacita as the absolute and lawful owners of Lot No. 398. It reasoned that it is true that the State is not barred by prescription. However, reversion was still not proper. Although the sale of the lot to Lee Liong violated the constitutional prohibition on aliens acquiring land, the lot had already been acquired by Elizabeth and Pacita through succession. The transfer of Lot No. 398 to Elizabeth and Pacita, who are Filipino citizens qualified to acquire lands, can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is deemed valid considering that the objective of the constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved. The Republic moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: Are Elizabeth and Pacita the absolute and lawful owners and possessors of Lot No. 398, considering that their predecessor-ininterest Lee Liong, an alien constitutionally prohibited to own real property in the Philippines, acquired no right or title over the lot which he could have transmitted by succession? RULING: YES. The Republic argues that since the sale of the lot to Lee Liong was void, Lot No. 398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liong’s estate. Hence, Lot No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liong’s surviving heirs and eventually to Elizabeth and Pacita. This position cannot be sustained. De Castro v. Teng Queen Tan: A residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien vendee, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased and the subject land was transferred to a son who was a naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the Court sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.

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Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a Chinese citizen, his widow and two sons extrajudicially settled his estate, including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to their respective spouses Elizabeth and Pacita who are Filipino citizens. ISSUE: Are reversion proceedings still viable considering that Lot 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens? NO. RULING: In Lee v. Republic of the Philippines involving Lot No. 398, the Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was already transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, thus: Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth. In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, Elizabeth and Pacita. They are Filipino citizens, a fact not disputed. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40 years from the promulgation of the court that the sale was null and void for violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If Republic had commenced reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still in the hands of the original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, then reversion of the land to the State would undoubtedly be allowed. However, this is not the case here. When Republic instituted the action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot No. 398 had already been transferred by succession to private respondents who are Filipino citizens. 220

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Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured. As held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority: Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred Elizabeth and Pacita who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens. Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, Petitioner, vs.Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa, Respondents. June 13, 2012 SERENO, J.: FACTS: Luz and Manuel Bakunawa are registered owners of 6 parcels of land. Sometime in 1990,Teresita Millan offered to buy said lots for P 6, 724,085.71 with a promise that she will take care of clearing whatever preliminary obstacles to effect completion of sale. Millan failed to comply with the condition. Spouses Bakunawa rescinded the sale and filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-10719 against Millan to return the copies of Transfer of Certificate Titles and ordered to receive the Manager’s check of P 1,019,514.29 for the down payment made by the latter. Upon advice of their counsel, the spouses retained the custody of the check and are refrained from negotiating and canceling it. Millan was informed that it was available for her withdrawal. On January 31, 2003, during pendency of the above mentioned case and without the knowledge of Hi tri, RCBC reported P 1,019,514.29credit existing in favor “Rosmil” to Bureau of Treasury as among its unclaimed balances. On December 14, 2006, OSG filed in the RTC for escheat proceedings. On April 30, 2008,Bakunawa and Millan settled amicably, the former agreed to pay Rosmil and Millan P 3,000,000.00 inclusive of the P 1,019,514.29. However when Bakunawa inquired 221

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from RCBC the availability of P1,019,514.29 the amount was already subject for escheat proceedings. On May 19, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision pursuant to PD 679 declaring the amount as subject for escheat proceedings and ordered the amount to be deposited in favor of the Republic. Consequently, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion seeking partial reconsideration contending that the said amount was subject to an ongoing dispute and that they be include as party defendants allowed to intervene. Motion was denied. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of RTC and ruled that the bank’s failure to notify respondents deprived them of an opportunity to intervene in the escheat proceedings and to present evidence to substantiate their claim, in violation of their right to due process. Furthermore, the CA pronounced that the Makati City RTC Clerk of Court failed to issue individual notices directed to all persons claiming interest in the unclaimed balances, as well as to require them to appear after publication and show cause why the unclaimed balances should not be deposited with the Treasurer of the Philippines. Thus, herein a petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the allocated funds may be escheated in favor of the Republic RULING: Petitioner asserts that the CA committed a reversible error when it required RCBC to send prior notices to respondents about the forthcoming escheat proceedings involving the funds allocated for the payment of the Manager’s Check. It explains that, pursuant to the law, only those "whose favor such unclaimed balances stand" are entitled to receive notices. Petitioner argues that, since the funds represented by the Manager’s Check were deemed transferred to the credit of the payee upon issuance of the check, the proper party entitled to the notices was the payee – Rosmil – and not respondents. Petitioner then contends that, in any event, it is not liable for failing to send a separate notice to the payee, because it did not have the address of Rosmil. Petitioner avers that it was not under any obligation to record the address of the payee of a Manager’s Check. In contrast, respondents Hi-Tri and Bakunawa allege that they have a legal interest in the fund allocated for the payment of the Manager’s Check. They reason that, since the funds were part of the Compromise Agreement between respondents and Rosmil in a separate civil case, the approval and eventual execution of the agreement effectively reverted the fund to the credit of respondents. Respondents further posit that their ownership of the funds was evidenced by their continued custody of the Manager’s Check. 222

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An ordinary check refers to a bill of exchange drawn by a depositor (drawer) on a bank (drawee), requesting the latter to pay a person named therein (payee) or to the order of the payee or to the bearer, a named sum of money. The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer. Here, the bank becomes liable only after it accepts or certifies the check. After the check is accepted for payment, the bank would then debit the amount to be paid to the holder of the check from the account of the depositor-drawer. There are checks of a special type called manager’s or cashier’s checks. These are bills of exchange drawn by the bank’s manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself. Typically, a manager’s or a cashier’s check is procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of funds to be debited from the depositor’s account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the value of the check to be drawn. Since the bank issues the check in its name, with itself as the drawee, the check is deemed accepted in advance. Ordinarily, the check becomes the primary obligation of the issuing bank and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. Nevertheless, the mere issuance of a manager’s check does not ipso facto work as an automatic transfer of funds to the account of the payee. In case the procurer of the manager’s or cashier’s check retains custody of the instrument, does not tender it to the intended payee, or fails to make an effective delivery, we find the following provision on undelivered instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Law applicable: Sec. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner acknowledges that the Manager’s Check was procured by respondents, and that the amount to be paid for the check would be sourced from the deposit account of Hi-Tri. When Rosmil did not accept the Manager’s Check offered by respondents, the latter retained custody of the instrument instead of cancelling it. As the 223

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Manager’s Check neither went to the hands of Rosmil nor was it further negotiated to other persons, the instrument remained undelivered. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that respondents retained custody of the instrument. Since there was no delivery, presentment of the check to the bank for payment did not occur. An order to debit the account of respondents was never made. In fact, petitioner confirms that the Manager’s Check was never negotiated or presented for payment to its Ermita Branch, and that the allocated fund is still held by the bank. As a result, the assigned fund is deemed to remain part of the account of Hi-Tri, which procured the Manager’s Check. The doctrine that the deposit represented by a manager’s check automatically passes to the payee is inapplicable, because the instrument – although accepted in advance – remains undelivered. Hence, respondents should have been informed that the deposit had been left inactive for more than 10 years, and that it may be subjected to escheat proceedings if left unclaimed.1âwphi1 After a careful review of the RTC records, we find that it is no longer necessary to remand the case for hearing to determine whether the claim of respondents was valid. There was no contention that they were the procurers of the Manager’s Check. It is undisputed that there was no effective delivery of the check, rendering the instrument incomplete. In addition, we have already settled that respondents retained ownership of the funds. As it is obvious from their foregoing actions that they have not abandoned their claim over the fund, we rule that the allocated deposit, subject of the Manager’s Check, should be excluded from the escheat proceedings. We reiterate our pronouncement that the objective of escheat proceedings is state forfeiture of unclaimed balances. We further note that there is nothing in the records that would show that the OSG appealed the assailed CA judgments. We take this failure to appeal as an indication of disinterest in pursuing the escheat proceedings in favor of the Republic. Petition is DENIED. The 26 November 2009 Decision and 27 May 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107261 are hereby AFFIRMED.

LUIS B. MANESE, ANTONIA ELLA, HEIRS OF ROSARIO M. ORDOñEZ, represented by CESAR ORDOñEZ, SESINANDO PINEDA and AURORA CASTRO, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES DIOSCORO VELASCO and GLICERIA SULIT, MILDRED CHRISTINE L. FLORES TANTOCO and SYLVIA L. FLORES, Respondents January 29, 2009 224

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FACTS: Dioscoro Velasco was granted a property which is a foreshore land based on Homestead Patent. Velaco sold the property and it had a series of transfers through the subsequent buyers. Manese and his co-petitioners or the Manese group filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages against Velasco and the subsequent buyers alleging that the issuance of the homestead patent and the series of transfers of the same property were null and void. They claimed that they were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and use of said foreshore land. Velasco et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Manese group does not have the legal personality to file the complaint since the property forms part of the public domain and only the Solicitor General could bring any action which may have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the patent. ISSUE: WON Manese group are real parties in interest with authority to file a complaint for annulment of title of foreshore land. RULING: NO. It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of controversy is foreshore land which is a part of the public domain. Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that in all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. As the Manese group is not the real party in interest in this case, it is only proper to dismiss the case pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Civil Procedure. And Section 2, Rule 3 of Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. ON CONTENTION OF EQUITY: As to petitioners’ contention that they should be deemed real parties in interest based on the principle of equity, we rule otherwise. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem. 225

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CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG v. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPTION D. ALCARAZ AND RAMONA ALCARAZ G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010 FACTS: The Coronel brothers executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down payment” in favor of Ramona Alcaraz upon the receiving P50,000.00 as a down payment for the sale of their inherited house and lot in Quezon City. In the agreement with Ramona, they will execute a deed of absolute sale immediately upon the transfer of the TCT to the name of the brothers Coronel because the same was named to their father. On Feb.18, 1985, they sold the same property to petitioner herein for a higher contract price than that of Ramona. For this reason, Coronel rescinded the first agreement with Ramona by depositing to her the down payment of P50, 000.00. Consequently, respondents filed a case for specific performance and caused the annotation of lis pendens over the property. On June 5, 1985, TCT 351382 was issued in the name of petitioner herein. RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein ordering the cancellation of the TCT in the name of petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the registration by the Registry of Deeds of the DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE despite the lack of indication of citizenship of the buyer. RULING: The High Court ruled that it should be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge Ramona’s qualification to acquire land. Only the Government through the Solicitor General has the personality to file the case challenging the capacity of person to acquire or own land based on non-citizenship. The limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State and not against individual. And that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or individual. It will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner, instead the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State according to BP Blg. 185.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND ROMEO SOLANO, RESPONDENTS. JANUARY 31, 2002 BELLOSILLO , J. FACTS: Private respondent Amada Solano, for more than 3 decades, served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. Because of Solano’s faithfulness and dedication, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor 2 deeds of donation involving 2 parcels of land (TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808) Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found. Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Hankins before the RTC of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa. But on June 24, 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question.” Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. The Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones in the name of Pasay City, by virtue of the decision of the trial court. 227

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In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this development, respondent Solano filed on January 28, 1997 a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. CONTENTIONS: The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to the petitioner, did not and could not form part of her estate when she died on1985. Consequently, they could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government; Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of escheat proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm for escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The property should have been escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on March 1997, representing public respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds (petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals, on November 1998, issued the assailed Resolution upholding the theory of respondent Solano. CA’S RULING: Petitioner (Solano) invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings because the parcels of land have been earlier donated to herein petitioner prior to the death of said Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat of said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines x x x The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of annulment filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 228

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Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts. The issues presented in the petition can only be resolved only after a full blown trial. It is for the same reason that respondent’s espousal of the statute of limitations against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper at this stage of the proceedings. Sec 4, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court which provides for the period for filing claim in escheat proceeding (5 years) is not applicable. Petitioner (Solano) is not claiming anything from the estate of the deceased at the time of her death; rather she is claiming that the subject parcels of land should not have been included as part of the estate of the said decedent as she is the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her favor. Petitioner is claiming ownership of the properties in question and the consequent reconveyance thereof in her favor which cause of action prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990. Therefore, the petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997. The CA likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents. Petitioner contends that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the matter. Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court as set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in. ISSUES:

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1. Whether or not private respondent Solano, allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. 2. Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment filed by private respondent is barred by prescription. RULING: In the case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc. “In a special proceeding for escheat the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.” Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers.“ Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever.“ The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as June 1989 but it was only on January 230

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1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery. In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously donated. The certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to Solano, the same still remained part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. DISPOSITION: Petition is granted, the CA’s resolutions are SET ASIDE and the RTC’s decision is REINSTATED.

VENUE MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners, vs. ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO, respondents. G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972 DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and, LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO, petitioners, vs. MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents. G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972 FERNANDO, J. FACTS:

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Bienvenida de la Isla (“Bienvenida”), the guardian of her minor children sold a parcel of land to Spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon (hereafter, the “Spouses”). The validity of the sale was however challenged by her two elderly children on the ground that they were not informed of such a move notwithstanding the order issued by the court. Moreover, they contended that the guardianship proceeding was heard without them being notified although. In the said case the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question filed an intervetion. The lower court ruled that it acquired no jurisdiction over the guardianship proceedings of the minors over 14 years of age who were not notified of the proceedings and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly authorized its sale. Petitioner spouses elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals which decided the case in its insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned and declared the intervenors as owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. Dissatisfied, both parties instituted the petitions for review to this Court. ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the guardianship proceeding RULING: NO. The CA is not correct in ignoring the jurisdictional defects that tainted the guardianship proceeding. Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian. The failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the children of Leoncio as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be maintained. 232

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“When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given."

LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal Guardian of the Incompetent SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ, respondents. G.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982 DE CASTRO, J.: FACTS: The Judge of CFI Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag authorized and approved, upon motion of Francisco Rodriguez Jr, guardian of Soledad Rodriguez, the sale to spouses Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista 3 parcels of land to answer for the medical expenses of the ward Rodriguez. Almost a year and five months later, the guardian of Rodriguez filed a petition in the CFI invoking Sec. 6 Rule 96, praying that an order be issued requiring the couple Parco and Bautista to appear before the court so that they can be examined as regards to the 3 lots which are allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed, and embezzled and upon failure to do so or to comply with any order that may be issued in relation therewith. The guardian alleges that the transaction was in fact a loan to be paid in 3 months but upon the expiration of the period thereof, the couple refused to sell back such property of the ward. CFI judge, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Sec 6 Rule 96 ruled in favor of the of the guardian and ordered the reconveyance and delivery of the property to the ward. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the CFI judge, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a guardianship court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of ownership and order the reconveyance and delivery of the property to the ward? RULING: NO. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, as in this case, the determination of said title or right whether in favour of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed properties. This, the Court believes, requires the determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a separate ordinary action not in a guardianship proceeding. ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUTvs. HON. JUDGE LEONOR INES LUCIANO, G.R. No. L-42215. July 13, 1976 FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, probate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Sotero Baluyut was instituted by his alleged nephew, Alfredo Baluyut claiming mental incapacity of the surviving widow, Encarnacion vda. de Baluyut, to administer her affairs and that of the decedent's estate. He prayed for appointment as administrator. However, upon a counter petition, the widow was appointed administratrix and qualified as such. This appointment, was set aside by the Supreme Court in Baluyut vs. Judge Paño, etc., G.R. L-42088, May 7, 1976, because the persons contesting her capacity to act were not given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. 234

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Meantime, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, two successive petitions were filed to declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to place her under guardianship. The first petition, which was filed by Alfredo Baluyut, was dismissed. The second, which was filed by her sisters, were given due course. Acting on the latter petition, the court summarily declared the widow as incompetent on the basis of a report of a psychiatrist who was not cross-examined, and without hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut. The court denied a motion for reconsideration of the order making such declaration. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the administration proceeding (pending in the probate court) of the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix. 2. Whether Mrs. Baluyot was denied due process of law when the guardianship court summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency notwithstanding that her lawyer had not crossexamined the psychiatrist. Ruling: 1. Yes. In consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the Charter of Quezon City which divests the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court of jurisdiction or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, the guardianship proceeding should be suspended and should await the jurisdiction of the issue of petitioner's competency to act as administratrix pending with the probate court. 2. Yes. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence (Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190). That kind of proof has not yet been presented to the guardianship court to justify its precipitate conclusion that Mrs. Baluyut is an incompetent. In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist's report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and premature pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process.

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Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93).

FELICIANO FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L57438 January 31, 1984 FACTS: Feliciano Francisco (“Feliciano”) is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro (“Estefania”) in Special Proceedings No. 532 of CFI Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 Pelagio Francisco (“Pelagio”), claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania, petitioned the court for the removal of Feliciano and for the appointment in his stead. Among other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and to render an accounting. The respondent judge found the claim to be true, ordered the retirement on the ground of old age. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his ward but the court denied the motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in ordering the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age. RULING: YES. In determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee, as well as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he 236

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becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a return. There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a controlling criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI vs. ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008 FACTS: A handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between Sesinando M Fernando (“Fernando”) and Nelly S. Nave (“Nave”) involving a piece of land in Calamba, Laguna. However, Nave reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down payment because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore. Thereafter, Fernando filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages before RTC Laguna. Nave filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of Fernando because she repudiated the contract and besides she already sold the property in good faith to the Pabale siblings before she received a copy of the complaint. Subsequently, the Pabale siblings filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property. Unfortunately, the trial court denied Nave’s Motion to Dismiss. Unsatisfied, Nave and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo (“Atty. Gesmundo”) filed another motion, this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo. Temporarily, the proceedings in this case 237

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was suspended in view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of Nave with the RTC, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna with Atty. Gesmundo as the petitioner. Subsequently, a decision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, finding Nave an incompetent placing her and her estate under guardianship. Accordingly, Atty. Leonardo C. Paner (“Atty. Paner”) is appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders from the Court. On December 9, 1992, Nave died. Upon her death, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, Nave’s sole heir, executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from Nave. In this connection, Atty. Gesmundo filed an issuance of a writ of execution of the petition for guardianship. The Pabale siblings filed their Opposition on the grounds that they were not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision and that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale was never raised in the guardianship case. Surprisingly, out of nowhere, Lolita R. Alamayri (“Alamayri”) filed a motion for substitution alleging that the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Gesmundo. In his answer, Atty. Gesmundo refuted by stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale and the same was already revoked. Subsequently, the trial court rendered its Decision recognizing Alamayri as the owner of the property. Fernando filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. CA, granted the appeals and uphold the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo sought reconsideration of the Decision of the appellate court but were denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings rendering the said sale void. RULING: NO, Nave was not incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. Hence, the significance of the twoyear gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period. Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the 238

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moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986 and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do. Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void.

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001 FACTS: Reeder Vancil, the father of the minors Valerie (6 yrs. Old) and Vincent (2 yrs old) died as a US navy serviceman. Bonfacia Vancil, the mother of Reeder and the grandmother of the minors, filed guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of the said minors consisting of proceeds from their fathers pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00 in the RTC of Cebu City. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minors, opposed to the guardianship proceedings asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors in Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. She further alleged that Bonifacia Vancil is a naturalized American citizen and a resident of Colorado, USA. The trial court rejected the opposition and appointed the grandmother as the guardian of the minors. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision. Hence, this present petition alleging that Helen is unfit to be a guardian of the minors considering that Valerie was raped seven times by the mother’s live-in partner while under her custody. 239

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ISSUE: Who between the biological mother and the grandmother should be appointed guardian of the minors. RULING: As to Valerie, the issue has become moot since she has attained the age of majority. As to Vincent, respondent being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the Family Code provide that the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Indeed, being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of the same minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Art. 214 of the Family Code, which is only available in case of parent’s death, absence or unsuitability. In the case at bar, petitioner did not show proof that Helen is an unsuitable guardian for the minor Vincent. Further, notwithstanding the fact that there is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians those who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

SALVACION LOPEZ vs. JOSE TEODORO, SR EULALIO LOPEZ, JR., and JESUS JALBUENA G.R. No. L-3071. May 29, 1950 FACTS: Eulalio Lopez Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez Jr. was the exclusive and absolute owner of a 100hectare land in Silay, Negros Occidental. Acting upon the motions filed in the proceedings for guardianship, the court ordered the guardian to pay the movants the loans properly authorized by the court for the support and maintenance of the incapacitated. In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the only property of the incapacitated to Jesus Jalbuena. However, in authorizing the said sale, the court did not follow the requirement of Sec. 2 of Rule 96 240

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that the court shall direct the next of kin of the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear at a reasonable time and place to show cause why the prayer for the sale should not be granted. Although Lopez Jr. was the judicial guardian, the incapacitated was and is under the actual care and custody of his sister, Salvacion Lopez. Believing the sale is prejudicial to her brother’s interest, Salvacion filed a petition for certiorari/mandamus praying that the sale be revoked after the motion for recon was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the property should be declared null and void. RULING: The guardianship court where the proceeding was pending had the jurisdiction to order the questioned sale. It was also undisputed that the outstanding indebtedness of the guardianship was property and legally incurred for the support and maintenance of the incapacitated. Petitioner has no legal interest in the complaint. The incapacitated has children, all of age, one of whom is the judicial guardian, while the petitioner is only the ward’s sister. Not being the ward’s forced heir, she was not prejudiced by the sale she seeks to impugn. Petitioner is wrong in asserting that she is “next of kin”. “Next of Kin” within the meaning of Rule 96 are relatives whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.

VICENTE G. SINCO, PILAR G. SINCO vs. AGAPITO LONGA and AGUEDA LONGA. G.R. No. 27962. February 14, 1928 FACTS: Hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don Rafael Sinco y Librado, the plaintiff’s great grandfather, from whom it is passed to his son Escolastic Sinco who died during the Spanish regime. The latter left a widow, Saturnina Lopez and 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz and Coloma all surnamed Sinco. Of these, Sergio and Maria Paz are still living, but Coloma died leaving 3 children who are the plaintiffs in this case, namely Vicente, Pilar and Desemparados. The estate of Escolastico appears to have been encumbered with debts and in order to liquidate this indebtedness, the widow and 241

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three children leased the property. The lease was continually extended until Saturnina died in 1904. After the death of the mother, Sergio was hard pressed for money to sustain numerous family and sold his undivided 1/3 share in the hacienda. The buyer, Longa insisted in acquiring the whole property and subsequently the 1/3 share of Maria Paz was included in the sale. In order to accomplish the said end, Emilio Tevez, the guardian of the then minor plaintiffs petitioned for the approval of the sale alleging that the estate was heavily encumbered and that the minors had no cash assets to meet their subsistence and education. Subsequently, the court issued its order authorizing the guardian to make the sale as requested. After the minors attained majority age, they instituted this petition seeking to annul the said sale pertaining to their 1/3 undivided interest in the hacienda alleging that the subject sale was attended with fraud. Emilio Tevez, the guardian, was anxious for the sale to obtain money for his own uses. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale should be annulled. RULING: In passing upon controversies involving charges of fraud alleged to have been committed many years before the litigation was begun, the proof of such fraud, to be accepted by the court, should be full and convincing. Experience teaches the danger of lightly accepting charges of fraud made many years after the transaction which is the subject of question was accomplished, when death may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes affected by time may have given a totally different color to the questioned transaction.In this case, the participants to the alleged fraud such as the guardian Emilio Tevez, were already dead. As to the irregularity in the guardianship proceedings, the jurisdiction of the court to authorize the sale of the property of minors rests upon the averments of the petition and adequate publication or appearance of the parties interested. The fact that the statements of the petition may be untrue with respect to the existence of encumbrances on the property and necessity of the sale, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, which rests upon the averments and not upon the truth of those averments.

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J. ANTONIO ARANETA vs. ANTONIO PEREZ G.R. No. L-18872 July 15, 1966 FACTS: A trust was established pursuant to the will of the late Angela S. Tuason. J. Antonio Araneta was appointed trustee and he qualified when he took his oath of office. The beneficiaries of the trust are Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all surnamed Perez y Tuason, the last two being represented by appellant Antonio Perez, who is their father and judicial guardian. In the order appealed from the lower court approved, upon petition of the trustee, a deed of donation executed by him in favor of the City of Manila covering a lot pertaining to the trusteeship. Such approval was given over the opposition of appellant Antonio Perez. On the lot in question the trustee had been paying an annual realty tax. Appellant does not deny the beneficial aspects of the donation. But he maintains that it is invalid on the ground that under Article 736 of the Civil Code "guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them". ISSUE: Whether guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them. RULING: In this case, the guardian may donate the properties entrusted to him. Although Article 736, New Civil Code provides that, "guardians and trustees cannot donate the properties entrusted to them", the same cannot be applied considering that the aforecited provision only took effect on August 30, 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) and does not apply retroactively to the testamentary trust established upon the death of Angela S. Tuason on March 20, 1948. There being nothing in the old Civil Code which prohibits a trustee from donating properties under trusteeship, and considering that the powers given to herein appellee as trustee are of a plenary character, subject only to the limitation that they should be permissible under the law; considering further that when the testatrix conferred such powers she must have had in mind the law that was in force at the time; and considering finally that after all a trust is created for the

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benefit of the cestuis que trust and that in this particular case the acts of the trustee are subject to the supervision of the Court. Tonog vs CA Facts: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos. Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-yearold widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody. The Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD of Tarlac submitted a Child Study Report, recommending that Elain, Elma and & Eugene are eligible for adoption.The petitioner, however, failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

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The RTC granted the petition for adoption. The OSG, appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling. Issue: WON the CA erred when it reversed the RTC’s ruling. Held: NO. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents “complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.” Neither does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a father’s sense of loss when he is separated from his child. For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.

Pablo-Gualberto vs Gualberto Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendent lite of their almost 4 year old

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son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him. The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations. Court of Appeals - The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother. Held: Yes, Crisanto did not present sufficient evidence against the fitness of the mother that will compel the court to rule against the mandatory character of Art. 213 Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.” No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads: Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.” 246

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Order of the RTC only temporary custody Provisional & subject to change as circumstance may warrant 213 mandatory in character

Art.

No evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities (lesbian) or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result. Caniza v. CA Facts: Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent because of her advanced age, so her niece, Amparo Evangelista, was appointed her legal guardian. Pursuant to her authority, Amparo commenced an ejectment suit against Spouses Estrada who were occupying a house belonging to Carmen. The Spouses argued that they have been occupying the house in consideration of their faithfully service to Carmen, and that, in fact, Carmen had already executed a will bequeathing to them the disputed property. When the case reached the CA, it ruled in favor of the Spouses, holding that though not yet probated, the will was indicative of intent and desire on Carmen’s part that the Spouses were to remain and continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Carmen’s supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in Amparo, her guardian, the right/authority to drive them out. Issue: Whether or not the holographic will, though not yet probated, vested title to the Spouses Estrada. Ruling:No. Under law, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In this case, that there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

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The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.

Neri vs Heirs of Uy FACTS: Anunciacion Neri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely: Eutropia and Victoria and second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties located inSamal, Davao del Norte. In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor childrenRosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate withAbsolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000.00. In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage. RTC RULING: Rendered the sale void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. CA RULING: Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid. While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to

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question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time. ISSUES: Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, has the power to dispose or encumber the property of the minor? Held: All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages and consequently, they are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them. While the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares. With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother. Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.

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O’ Laco vs Co Cho Chit Breach of Trust; Half-Sisters; Resulting and Constructive Trusts. Facts: Emila is the half-sister of O Lay Kia who is, as is her husband Co Cho Chit, a Chinese nationaland cannot own property in the Philippines. O lay kia bought a piece of land and had it named under her sister, Emilia. Emilia on the other hand sold the property to the Church without the knowledge of her sister. When O Lay Kia found out, they immediately filed a case for breach of contract. Issue: WON there was a trust relationship between the sisters. Held: Yes. ”… trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super induced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation of law. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.” In this case, the court cited five instances that prove a trust relationship. First, sps O Lay Kia were in possession of all the pertinent documents of the sale from the beginning until the end of the transaction. Second, 250

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there is a previous case of similar facts involving O lay kia and her brother on a different parcel of land decided in her favor. Third, the circumstances leading to Emilia acquiring a title to the landwas dubius. Fourth, until the sale to the church, Emilia actually recognized the trust (by promising to take care of the transfer to the actual owners as soon as she is able.) A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a)the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust ; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing. And finally, fifth, Emilia actually had no source of income to show how it was possible for her to purchase the land.

Ceniza vs CA FACTS: This is a petition for review dismissing the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of their shares in co-ownership property and reversing the decision of the trial court in their favor. Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel Ceniza while the private respondents are the descendants of his sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia Ceniza was childless but she had an adopted daughter named Flaviana Ceniza, who begot a daughter named Marced Ceniza and who in turn had a daughter named Marcelina (or Marcela) Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private respondents are the children of this marriage and they are the great-great-grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza. On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two sons, Santiago and Jose Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a certain Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children and the great-grandchildren of Manuel Ceniza. The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale to the occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon, who were residing in the hacienda, jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience, to have the land registered in the name of Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions of the land, declared the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes on their respective shares, and made their respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. 251

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The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. In their answer to the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance in June 1967, they alleged that the petitioners' right of action had already prescribed. Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-owners, hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible. ISSUE: whether the registration of the title of the land in the name of one of the co-owner, constituted a repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription. HELD: The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist between the predecessors- ininterest of both petitioners and private respondents, prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except from the time that they repudiated the co-ownership and made the repudiation known to the other co-owners, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza. The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances: a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to the ouster of the cestui que trust; b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/ coowners have not been ousted from the land. They continue to possess their respective shares of Lot 627 and they have been paying the realty taxes thereon. Restituto's house stands on his portion of the Land. Assuming that the private respondents' rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition of the land was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when the petitioners instituted the present action for reconveyance. These circumstances were overlooked by the Court of Appeals. 252

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In this case, since the statutory period of limitation within which to file an action for reconveyance, after the defendants had repudiated the co-ownership in 1961, had not yet run its course when the petitioners filed said action in 1967, the action was not barred by prescription. WHEREFORE. the decision of the Court of appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE Lazatin vs Campos Facts: Margarita de Asis, widow of Dr. Mariano Lazatin, died leaving a holographic will providing for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondents Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. During her lifetime, the deceased kept a safety deposit box at the bank that could only be opened by her and her adopted daughter, respondent Nora de Leon. Five days after her death, Nora opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents. After learning of this, petitioners filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will and demanded for its production. Petitioner Lazatin filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother-in-law of the deceased, that the petitioner was an illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. Renato failed to present a decree of adoption. Instead, he attempted to prove that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; that he was formerly known as “Renato Lazatin” before he was forced to change his surname to “Renato Sta. Clara”; that he and his wife are staying at the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, which is owned by the deceased spouses.

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Issue: WON Renato has established his status as an adopted child. Held: NO. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner’s evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child—which statuts of an admitted illegitimate child was the very basis of his petition for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.

Republic vs CA and Bobiles Facts: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it hadmrequired for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.

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The RTC ruled that Jason was to be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner. The CA affirmed such ruling. Issue: WON the Family Code can be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption by Zenaida Bobiles. Held: NO. When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule. We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.

Republic vs Vergara Facts: On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. 255

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They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption. The trial court granted the petition, granting Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. The RTC disregarded the 16-year age gap requirement of the law. The spouses were only 15 years and 3mos and 15 years and 9mos older than Maricel Due, respectively. The court’s reason for doing is that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statues, namely to promote the welfare of the child. The republic filed the petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the Spouses Dye are not qualifed to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. Issue: WON the Republic’s contention is meritorious. Held: YES. The main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the SC is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.

Landingin vs Republic Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the 256

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minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother. Held: NO. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

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