Statcon Chapter 3 Digests

STATCON CHAPTER III – case digests (all from the internet) 1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aids a. Title CITY OF BAGUIO V MARCOS FACTS: On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of the cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the land here involved was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922. Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his name. On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. The petitioners questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen. ISSUE: Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40 year period preceding the approval of Republic Act 931. HELD: Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931 authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself.” R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it should receive blessings of liberal construction. The court says that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period. EBARLE V SUCALDITO FACTS: The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," preliminary to their criminal recourses. ISSUE: Whether

or

not

EO

264

is

applicable

in

the

case

at

bar.

HELD: No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure. b. Preamble PEOPLE V PURISIMA FACTS: These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9. HELD: No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall

within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, “whereas" clauses. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. c. Context of Whole Text ABOITIZ V CITY OF CEBU FACTS: Ordinance No. 207 was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board on August 14, 1956 and approved by the City Mayor on the following August 27 where plaintiffs were made to pa wharfage charges under protest since September 1, 1956 and on May 8, 1957. The plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to have the said void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and ordinance declared other landing places belonging to the National Government were concerned, and all the amounts thus far collected by defendants refunded to them. Appellee’s allege that the Municipal Board's authority to pass the ordinance is claimed by them under section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, which grants them the legislative power “To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.” ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Cebu, under its charter, may provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from vessels that dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government. HELD: No. The right to collect the wharfage belongs to the National Government. It is unreasonable to conclude that the legislature, simply because it employed the term "public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the wharves involved. The National Government did not surrender such ownership to the city; and there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the obligation of paying twice for the same purpose. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a limited application if viewed together with other provisions. Hence, Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to appellants all amounts collected thereunder and to refrain from making such collection. d. Punctuation Marks FLORENTINO V PNB

FACTS: The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent. ISSUE: Whether or not the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879. HELD: No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record that the amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government. Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304. Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897. e. Capitalization of Letters, Headnotes on Epigraphs, Lingual Text UNABIA V CITY MAYOR (NONE ) INRE ESTATE OF JOHNSON Brief Fact Summary. Arnold H. Johnson created a will on a standard blank will form where certain provisions were already in print writing and other parts were left blank. Johnson filled in the blank portions with his own handwriting. The trial court held the form did not qualify as a holographic will because the material provisions were not in Johnson’s own handwriting.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An instrument may not be probated as a holographic will if there are words essential to the testamentary disposition that are not in the testator’s handwriting. Facts. Johnson created a will using a standard blank will form. The only provisions in his own handwriting that were, his name and addresses, the beneficiaries’ names and addresses, and the phrase “To John M. Johnson 1/8 of my Estate.” The trial court held that the form did not qualify as a holographic will. Issue. Whether an instrument constitutes a valid holographic will if the words essential to proving testamentary intent are not in the testator’s own handwriting. Held. No. The handwritten portions of the will without the printed words did not express testamentary intent because the handwritten words alone did not require that a disposition be made at death. Though the testator used the word, “estate”, the definition of that word refers to the extent of one’s interest in land or property or it can also signify the assets and liabilities left by a person at death. Discussion. A document may not be admitted to probate as a holographic will if the handwritten portions alone do not express intent to have property distributed at death. The fact that the printed words may express testamentary intent is not enough to probate a holographic will. PEOPLE V ABILONG (NONE PERO THIS IS IN CRIM NA! BAKA MAY NAKABASA NA SA ATIN ) TRADERS INSURANCE AND SURETY CO V GOLANGCO FACTS: Tomas Lianco and the Archbishop entered into a contract of lease on a parcel of landowned by church As lessee, Lianco erected a building on the leased portion of the church’s land. Lianco transferred ownership of this building to Kaw Eng Si,who later transferred the same to Golangco. Transfers were made without the consent of the Archbishop The Archbishop filed an ejectment case against Lianco, who appears to be occupants of the premises building with others paying rent to Golangco. The right of Golangco to receive rent on the building was judicially recognized in a case decided between Lianco and others occupying the premises pursuant to a compromise agreement. The Archbishop did not exercise his option to question Golangco’s rights as lessee April 7,1949: Golangco applied for fire insurance with Trader’s Insurance and Surety Co. fire insurance policy states: "that all insurancecovered under said policy, includes the 'rent or othersubject matter of insurance in respect of or inconnection with any building or any property contained in any building" June 5, 1949: the building premises was burned so Golangco requested Trader’s Insurance to pay the insurance amount of 10,000 including the amount of rent P1,100 monthly. Trader’s insurance refused to pay the insurance for the rent averring that Golangco has no insurable interest ISSUE: W/N Golangco has insurable interest on the rent of the building premises which may lawfully/validly be subject of insurance?

HELD: YES. Sec. 13 of the Insurance Code

Every interest in the property, whether real or personal, or any relation thereto, or liability in respect thereof of such nature that a contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured, is an insurable interest. Both at the time of the issuance of the policy and at the time of the fire, Golangco was in legal possession of the premises, collecting rentals from its occupant. The argument of Trader’s Insurance that a policy of insurance must specify the interest of the insured in the property insured, if he is not the absolute owner thereof, is not meritorious because it was the Trader’s, not Golangco, who prepared that policy, and it cannot take advantage of its own acts to plaintiff's detriment; and, in any case, this provisionwas substantially complied with by Golangco when he made a full and clear statement of his interests to Trader's manager. The contract between Lianco and the Archbishop only forbade Lianco from transferring 'his rights as LESSEE but the contracts Lianco made in favor of Kaw Eng Siand plaintiff Golangco did not transfer such rights; hence no written consent thereto was necessary. At worst, the contract would be voidable, but not a void contract, at the option of the Archbishop and it does not appear that it was ever exercised f.

Intent or Spirit of Law

MANILA LODGE V COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of theLuneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation. Policy of the Law ADONG V CHEONG SENG GEE Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the

Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia. Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and recognizable in the Philippines. Whether or not the mohammedan marriage is valid. Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that “All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands.” To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same. Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.” Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain. We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion. g. Purpose of Law or Mischief to Suppress

PHIL SUGAR CENTRAL AGENCY V COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (NONE) h. Dictionaries ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails the RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),as amended by RA 7659 on the grounds that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague. HELD: No. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conducts and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The court discerns nothing in the law that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. As regards the assailed statutory definition of the terms ”combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in the law, the court ruled that a statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. A facial challenge does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. 2. Legislative History a. History of Statistics COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V ZAMORA

FACTS: • Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora, Manila, filed his income tax returns the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. The collector required him to pay the sums of P43,758.50 and P7,625.00, as deficiency income tax for the years 1951 and 1952. • On appeal by Zamora, the Court of Tax Appeals modified the decision appealed from and ordered him to pay the reduced total sum of P30,258.00 (P22,980.00 and P7,278.00, as deficiency income tax for the years 1951 and 1952. • Having failed to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, Mariano Zamora appealed alleging that the Court of Tax Appeals erred (amongst other things, this being the only relevant to the topic) in disallowing P10,478.50, as promotion expenses incurred by his wife for the promotion of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora (which is ½ of P20,957.00, supposed business expenses). • Note: He contends that the whole amount of P20,957.00 as promotion expenses in his 1951 income tax returns, should be allowed and not merely one-half of it or P10,478.50, on the ground that, while not all the itemized expenses are supported by receipts, the absence of some supporting receipts has been sufficiently and satisfactorily established. For, as alleged, the said amount of P20,957.00 was spent by Mrs. Esperanza A. Zamora (wife of Mariano), during her travel to Japan and the United States to purchase machinery for a new Tiki-Tiki plant, and to observe hotel management in modern hotels. The CTA, however, found that for said trip Mrs. Zamora obtained only the sum of P5,000.00 from the Central Bank and that in her application for dollar allocation, she stated that she was going abroad on a combined medical and business trip, which facts were not denied by Mariano Zamora. No evidence had been submitted as to where Mariano had obtained the amount in excess of P5,000.00 given to his wife which she spent abroad. No explanation had been made either that the statement contained in Mrs. Zamora's application for dollar allocation that she was going abroad on a combined medical and business trip, was not correct. The alleged expenses were not supported by receipts. Mrs. Zamora could not even remember how much money she had when she left abroad in 1951, and how the alleged amount of P20,957.00 was spent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA erred in disallowing P10,478.50 as promotion expenses incurred by his wife for the promotion of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora in the absence of receipts proving the same. HELD: NO • Section 30, of the Tax Code, provides that in computing net income, there shall be allowed as deductions all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year, in carrying on any trade or business. Since promotion expenses constitute one of the deductions in conducting a business, same must testify these requirements. Claim for the deduction of promotion expenses or entertainment

expenses must also be substantiated or supported by record showing in detail the amount and nature of the expenses incurred (N.H. Van Socklan, Jr. v. Comm. of Int. Rev.; 33 BTA 544). Considering, as heretofore stated, that the application of Mrs. Zamora for dollar allocation shows that she went abroad on a combined medical and business trip, not all of her expenses came under the category of ordinary and necessary expenses; part thereof constituted her personal expenses. There having been no means by which to ascertain which expense was incurred by her in connection with the business of Mariano Zamora and which was incurred for her personal benefit, the Collector and the CTA in their decisions, considered 50% of the said amount of P20,957.00 as business expenses and the other 50%, as her personal expenses. We hold that said allocation is very fair to Mariano Zamora, there having been no receipt whatsoever, submitted to explain the alleged business expenses, or proof of the connection which said expenses had to the business or the reasonableness of the said amount of P20,957.00. While in situations like the present, absolute certainty is usually not possible, the CTA should make as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily, if it chooses, upon the taxpayer whose inexactness is of his own making. • In the case of Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. v. Collector of Int. Rev, it was declared that representation expenses fall under the category of business expenses which are allowable deductions from gross income, if they meet the conditions prescribed by law, particularly section 30 (a) [1], of the Tax Code; that to be deductible, said business expenses must be ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business; that those expenses must also meet the further test of reasonableness in amount; that when some of the representation expenses claimed by the taxpayer were evidenced by vouchers or chits, but others were without vouchers or chits, documents or supporting papers; that there is no more than oral proof to the effect that payments have been made for representation expenses allegedly made by the taxpayer and about the general nature of such alleged expenses; that accordingly, it is not possible to determine the actual amount covered by supporting papers and the amount without supporting papers, the court should determine from all available data, the amount properly deductible as representation expenses. b. President’s Message c. Legislative Debates, Views and Deliberations CASCO PHIL CHEMICAL CO V GIMENES Facts

of

the

Case:

Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609. Issue of the Case: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee. Held:

No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner. Reports of Commission, Prior Law from Which Statute is Based ESCALANTE V SANTOS (NONE) PEOPLE V MANANTAN Facts: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54. Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.". Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation. Issue: Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code? Held: Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges. A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendantappellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words

"justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge". The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace". d. Change in Phraseology by Amendments, Amendments by Deletion GLORIA V COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public schoolteachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them). ISSUE Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated. HELD YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On

the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

e. Adopted Statues REPUBLIC V MERALCO Facts: MERALCO filed with petitioner ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an average increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that should the COA thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision. MRs were denied. Issue: Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid. Ruling: YES. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.

f. Principles of Common Law, Conditions at the Tie of Enactment, History of the Times 3. Contemporary Construction a. Three Types of Contemporary Construction b. Weight Accorded to Contemporary Construction PHIL SUGAR CENTRAL AGENCY V COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (NONE) VERA V CUEVAS

Facts: Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members. CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words. The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products. Issue: Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code. Held: No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute. The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk." Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law. CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V OPLE FACTS:On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association instituted a complaint with the Department of Labor against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974. Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the

petitioner's claim for lack of merit basing its decision on the provisions of Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor acted contrary to law and abused his discretion in denying the claim of petitioners HELD:While it is true that the respondent Minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Any slight doubts must be resolved in favor of the workers. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and affording protection to labor.. c. Reenactment COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V AMERICAN EXPRESS Facts: Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with servicing a unit of AMEX-Hongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK receivables from card members situated in the Philippines and payment to service establishments in the Philippines. It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section 110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section 112.” In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines, your service income is automatically zero rated xxx” Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against the claimant as they partake of the nature of tax exemption. CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines” and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of BSP. Issue: W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund Held: Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. Section 102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0% rate: (1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside the Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP;

(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by hotels and other service establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP, are zerorated. Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero rating. As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Thus, exports are zero-rated, while imports are taxed. In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization of consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines, the consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to its foreign client the drafts and bulls it has gathered from service establishments here, and are therefore, services also consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle, such service is subject to 10% VAT. However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following requirements for exemption, and thus should be zero-rated: (1) Service be performed in the Philippines (2) The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code (3) It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.

d. Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere ASSOCIATED SUGAR INC V COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AQUINO, J.: This case is about the legality of wharfage dues in the sum of P904,236.38 collected by the Commissioner of Customs from the five petitioners in connection with their exportation of sugar which was shipped from two private wharves. There is no dispute as to the facts. On various dates between 1959 and 1966 the petitioners shipped raw sugar to the United States on board ocean-going vessels. The shipments were loaded at the Sto. Niño Wharf located in Bacolod City and the wharf of the Philippine Bulk Corporation at Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The wharves were of private ownership. No government port facilities were utilized. The Collector of Customs for the Port of Iloilo levied and collected on the said shipments wharfage dues in the sum of P904,236.38 pursuant to sections 2801 and 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The petitioners paid the wharfage dues under protest. The Collector of Customs dismissed their protest. The petitioners appealed. The Commissioner of Customs affirmed the Collector's decision. On February 16, 1967, the petitioners filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner answered the petition.

Later, he filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of cause of action. The Tax Court in its order of December 28, 1968 dismissed the case. The petitioners appealed to this Court.[*] The petitioners contend that the Tax Court erred in rendering summary judgment on a motion to dismiss and in applying the ruling that wharfage dues are collectible on shipments of cargoes which are loaded in a harbor for exportation without the use of any government facilities (Procter and Gamble PMC vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-22819, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 883, 63 O.G. 10602; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. CTA, 124 Phil. 1013; Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Auditor General, 116 Phil. 1139). The appellants assail the wharfage fees in question on the theory that wharfage is a charge or rent for the use of a wharf or for the use of government facilities in a port. Since in exporting their sugar they used private wharves and did not use any government facilities, they contend that they should not be held liable for wharfage dues. That theory is not tenable under sections 2801 and 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code, Republic Act No. 1937, as amended. The ordinary connotation of wharfage is that it is a charge assessed for the use of a wharf for freight handling or ship dockage. Thus, wharfage has been defined as money paid for landing goods upon or loading them from a wharf (Old Dominion S.S. Co. vs. City of New York, D.C.N.Y., 286 Fed. 155, 156). But that is not the meaning of wharfage under the Tariff and Customs Code. Wharfage is used in a different sense in that Code. It can be inferred from sections 2801 and 2802 of the Code, as amended, that wharfage dues can be collected even if no wharf is used in the loading or unloading of exported of imported cargoes, such as when the loading or unloading takes place offshore or in midstream by using lighters (meaning at shipside). In City of Sacramento vs. The New World, 4 Cal. 41, 44, cited in 45 Words and Phrases, Per. Ed., p. 51, it was held that the definition of wharfage is not to be confined to the charge for landing at a wharf. The term "wharfage" is generally applied to a charge for landing the goods, whether upon an artificial erection or a natural landing. The Tariff and Customs Code provides: "SEC. 2801. Definition.- Wharfage due is the amount assessed against the cargo of a vessel engaged in foreign or coastwise trade, based on the quantity, weight or measure received and/or discharged by such vessel. The owner or consignee of the article, or agent of either, is the person liable for such charge." (As amended by P.D. Nos. 34 and 441.) "SEC. 2802.- Schedule of Dues.- There shall be levied, collected and paid as wharfage dues, on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, a charge of eight (P8.00) pesos per gross metric ton; on articles exported from the Philippines, a charge of four (P4.00) pesos per gross metric ton and on domestic articles transported at national ports, a charge of one (P1.00) peso per gross metric ton: x x x xx x x x x. "Provided, further, That in case the articles imported into or exported from or transported within the Philippines are loaded or unloaded offshore, in midstream, or in private wharves where no loading or unloading facilities are owned and maintained by the government, the wharfage fees shall be fifty (50%) percent of the rates provided for herein. (As amended by P.D. Nos. 34 and 441.) That same definition in section 2801 is found in section 3(p-1) of the Local Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 231, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 426, which provides that wharfage is a fee assessed

against the cargo of a vessel engaged in u based on the quantity, weight or measure received and/or discharged by such vessel. As thus defined, a wharfage fee may be collected even if no wharf is used. It is a charge against the cargo and not for the use of a wharf. In that sense, the term "wharfage" is a misnomer. The appropriate term would be cargo fees or charges. The said definition is a repudiation or abandonment of the meaning of wharfage as "a charge or rent for the temporary use of a wharf" (8 Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, p. 7435; Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs. City of Cebu, 121 Phil. 425, 428), or of the statement of Justice Johnson that wharfage is a payment for services rendered by a wharf (51 Phil. 154). The Tariff and Customs Code abrogated the provision in section 3 of Republic Act No. 1371 that exempted from the wharfage fee all imported articles unloaded on private wharves (Com. of Customs vs. Superior Gas and Equipment Co. and Court of Tax Appeals, 108 Phil. 225). It is evident that the concept of wharfage dues in section 2801 was taken from the decision of this Court in 1927 in Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, which is almost identical to this case. In that Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency case, the plaintiff shipped at the port of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental centrifugal sugar consigned to the United States. As in this case, the sugar in that case was loaded from the private wharf of the Ma-ao Sugar Central. The Collector of Customs assessed and collected wharfage dues on the said sugar. The plaintiff paid the wharfage dues under protest. It filed an action for the recovery of the wharfage dues. The law in force at that time was the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 which imposed on all articles exported through ports of entry of the Philippines, or shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of one thousand kilos as a charge for wharfage. This Court upheld the legality of the wharfage dues even though the sugar was shipped from a private wharf. It noted that since 1901 a charge for wharfage was collected on exports although there were no piers or wharves and export cargoes were brought to the sides of the vessels by means of lighters. That ruling was reiterated in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Auditor General, 116 Phil. 1139, a case decided under section 3 of Republic Act No. 1371 and in two Procter and Gamble cases, infra, and also in Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-23359, Caltex (Phil.), Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs, L-23679 and Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, L25400, all decided on October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 60. So, that is a settled matter. We have to follow it because of the rule of stare decisis et non qudeta movere. Wharfage fees are collectible on export or import cargoes even if a private wharf is used or even if the loading or unloading takes place at shipside because the "said cargoes should also share the cost of providing and keeping a safe port". They partake of the nature of a tax which is collected by the Government to support its operation of the customs service. (Procter and Gamble PMC vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-22819, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 883.) Wharfage dues are charged, not for the use of any wharf but for a special fund known as the Port Works Fund, as provided in Act No. 3592, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 130 and Republic Acts Nos. 1216 and 2695 (Procter and Gamble PMC vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-24173, May 23, 1968, 23 SCRA 691, 698).

It is noteworthy that berthing fees are collectible even if the tugboats and barges are moored at a privately owned pier in a port of entry because as long as they are moored inside the port they enjoy the facilities thereof (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. CTA, 124 Phil. 1013). Appellants' contention, that to collect wharfage charges from an exporter for the use of his own private wharf amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law, is not correct. It is incorrect because it is premised on the erroneous assumption that under the Tariff and Customs Code a wharfage fee is a compensation for the use of a wharf. As shown above, that common acceptation of wharfage is not used in this jurisdiction. Here, wharfage is a charge against the cargo which is loaded or unloaded in the safety and security of the port. That concept of wharfage has prevailed in this country since 1901 as shown by Justice Johns in the Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency case. The Tax Court erroneously categorized its dismissal resolution as a summary judgment. Actually, it was a judgment on the pleadings. The Commissioner admitted the ultimate facts alleged in appellants' petition for review. Only a purely legal issue was raised. And that issue had been set at rest in the cases already cited. We find no merit in petitioners' appeal. The Tax Court's dismissal resolution is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur. Guerrero, J., on leave.

TUNG CHIN HUI V RODRIGUEZ PANGANIBAN, J.: Provisions that were not reproduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are deemed repealed. Hence, having been omitted from the 1997 Rules, deemed already repealed is Section 18, Rule 41 of the pre1997 Rules of Court, which had theretofore provided for a 48-hour reglementary period within which to appeal habeas corpus cases. Accordingly, the period for perfecting appeals in said cases and ordinary civil actions is now uniform -- 15 days from notice of the judgment or order. The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 2, 1999 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 26) in Special Proceedings No. 98-92014. The challenged Order reads in full as follows:[2] "For resolution is a Motion For Reconsideration filed by petitioner thru counsel with comment/opposition thereto filed by respondents thru counsel. "After careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by both parties, this Court finds for the respondents. The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondents is actually fo[r] the Court Decision dated January 7, 1999 and not for [the] Court Order dated January 29, 1999.

"In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. "Meanwhile, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to immediately transmit the record of the instant case to the Honorable Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from today." The Facts From the records and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts appear undisputed. After obtaining a visa at the Philippine Embassy in Singapore, petitioner, a "Taiwanese citizen,"[3] arrived in this country on November 5, 1998. On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by several policemen, who subsequently turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Thereafter, on November 25, 1998, the BID Board of Commissioners, after finding him guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier canceled by Taiwanese authorities, ordered his summary deportation. On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. After respondents filed a Return of Writ controverting his claim, the trial court issued a Decision dated January 7, 1999, granting his Petition and ordering his release from custody. On January 11, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated January 29, 1999. Respondents then filed a "[N]otice of [A]ppeal from the judgment of the Honorable Court in the abovestated case, dated January 29, 1999, a copy of which was received by the Bureau on February 11, 1999 and was received by the undersigned counsel on February 15, 1999 x x x."[4] Dated February 15, 1999, it was received by the RTC on February 16, 1999 at 9:45 a.m. Petitioner filed an "Opposition," claiming that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Although respondents alleged that they had received the said Order on February 15, 1999, petitioner contended that they had in fact received it on February 11, 1999, "as evidenced by the receipt of the service thereof and by the Sheriff's Return."[5] In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected petitioner's contention and granted due course to the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing this time that the Notice should be rejected because it had referred not to the RTC Decision but to the January 29, 1999 Order denying reconsideration. In its assailed March 2, 1999 Order, the trial court denied his Motion. Hence, this Petition raising pure questions of law.[6] In a Resolution dated March 22, 1999, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order "directing the respondents to cease and desist from deporting

the

petitioner

x

x

x

until

further

orders."[7]

The Issues Petitioner

submits

the

following

issues

for

our

consideration:[8]

"(a) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] now 15 days from notice of judgment as contended by [the] lower court? "(b) Is the reglementary period to appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] still 48 hours from notice of judgment as provided for in Section 18, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court? or "(c) Is the provision of Sec. 1, sub-paragraph (a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure -prohibiting appeal from an Order denying a motion for reconsideration - mandatory or merely discretionary on the part of the lower courts? "(d) Are petitions for writs of habeas corpus already brought down to the level of ordinary cases despite the fact that in habeas corpus the liberty of persons illegally detained is involved?" In the main, the Court will resolve whether the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed. In the process, it will determine the applicable reglementary period for filing an appeal in habeas corpus cases. The Court's Ruling The Main Reglementary Habeas Corpus Cases

Petition

is

Period

not

for

meritorious. Issue: Appealing

Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal was late because respondents filed it only on February 16, 1999, five days after they had received the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on February 11, 1999.[9] He argues that the reglementary period for filing an appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in Section 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court, which reads as follows: "SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. - An appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals therefrom." The argument is devoid of merit, because the foregoing provision was omitted from and thereby repealed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, which completely replaced Rules 1 to 71. The well-settled rule of statutory construction is that provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision thereof covering the same subject are deemed repealed and discarded.[10] The omission shows the intention of the rule-making body, the Supreme Court in this case,[11] "to abrogate those provisions

of

the

old

laws

that

are

not

reproduced

in

the

revised

statute

or

code."[12]

Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions[13] and is governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides: "SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. "The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed." In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed within the 15-day reglementary period. Stare

Decisis

Petitioner insists, however, that the "application of Section 18, Rule 41 under the Revised Rules of Court must be maintained under the doctrine of stare decisis."[14] , Thus he urges the Court to apply precedents that held that the 48-hour period for perfecting an appeal was mandatory and jurisdictional. He specifically cites Saulo v. Cruz,[15] Garcia v. Echiverri[16] and Elepante v. Madayag.[17] The principle cited by petitioner is an abbreviated form of the maxim "Stare decisis, et non quieta movere."[18] That is, "When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same."[19] This principle assures certainty and stability in our legal system.[20] It should be stressed that stare decisis presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same. In this case, there is one crucial difference. All the incidents of the present controversy occurred when the 1997 Revised Rules of Court was already in effect. On the other hand, all the cited precedents had been resolved under the pre-1997 Rules. Accordingly, stare decisis cannot compel this Court to apply to the present case the alleged precedents decided during the regime of the pre-1997 Rules. The cited cases applied a specific provision of the Rules in effect at the time. But because that provision had already been repealed when the facts under present consideration occurred, the Court can no longer rely on those cases. Indeed, to rule otherwise is to bar the effectivity of the 1997 amendments, which conflict with jurisprudence decided under an old and repealed rule. Verily, petitioner's contention effectively precludes changes and freezes our procedural rules. Subject

of

the

Notice

of

Appeal

As earlier observed, the Notice of Appeal referred to the "judgment of the Honorable Court in the above-stated case, dated January 29, 1999." Petitioner now argues that the Notice was improper because it referred to the Order denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, not the Decision itself which was dated January 7, 1999. He cites Section 1 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides that an order denying a motion for a new trial or a reconsideration may not be appealed.[21]

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that because the Notice of Appeal contained the word "judgment," their clear intent was to appeal the Decision. We agree with respondents. In referring to the trial court's "judgment," respondents were clearly appealing the January 7, 1999 Decision. Had they thought otherwise, they would have referred to the "Order." Indeed, "judgment" is normally synonymous with "decision."[22] Furthermore, the wrong date of the appealed judgment may be attributed merely to inadvertence. Such error should not, by itself, deprive respondents of their right to appeal. Time and time again, it has been held that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this right.[23] They are encouraged to hear the merits of appealed cases; hence, the dismissal of an appeal on grounds of technicality is generally frowned upon.[24] Indeed, the postulates of justice and fairness demand that all litigants be afforded the opportunity for a full disposition of their disputes, free as much as legally possible from the constraints of technicalities.[25] To rule otherwise is to let technicality triumph over substantial justice. Indeed, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality."[26] Other

Matters

Petitioner insists that the Order deporting him is invalid, as he was not given notice or hearing.[27] We reject this argument because it properly pertains to the appeal before the CA, not in these proceedings instituted merely to determine the timeliness of the Notice of Appeal. Likewise, we reject the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that the promulgation of the CA Decision resolving the appeal rendered the present case moot and academic.[28] It should be stressed that the validity of the proceedings before the appellate court ultimately hinges on the issue before us: whether the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is hereby immediately LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.