Updated-case-digests-for-finals.doc

MANILA LAW COLLEGE CASE OUTLINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I Judge Ma. Socorro A. Vista First Semester 2019 – 2020

VI. Structure and Powers of Government A. The Legislative Branch

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Article VI, Philippine Constitution Macias vs Comelec, 3 SCRA 1 Banat vs Comelec, GR 179271, April 21, 2009 Ang Ladlad vs Comelec, GR 190582, April 8, 2010 Walden Bello vs Comelec GR 191998, December 7, 2010 Atong Paglaum vs Comelec, GR 203766, April 2, 2013 Aquino vs Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995) Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona, G.R. 134577, November 18, 1998 Avelino vs Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949) De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130240, February 5, 2002 Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 732 (1991) Codilla vs De Venecia, G.R. 150605, December 10, 2002 Cunanan vs Tan, 5 SCRA 1 (1962) Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 Belgica vs Ochoa, G.R. 208566, November 19, 2013 ABAKADA Guro vs Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 Tan vs Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000) Lung Center vs QC, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, G.R. 115455, October 30, 1995 Bengzon vs Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 Senate vs Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006 Neri vs Senate Committee GR 180643, September 4, 2008 Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

C. Executive Department

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Article VII, Philippine Constitution Republic vs Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, July 15, 2003 Estrada vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 Dela Cruz vs COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001 Marcos vs Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760 Soriano vs Lista GR 153881, March 24, 2003 Pimentel vs Ermita, GR 164978, October 13, 2005

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Constantino vs Cuisia, GR No. 106064, October 13, 2005 Gudani vs Senga, GR No 170165, August 15, 2006 Gloria vs CA, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000 Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 Saguisag vs Ochoa, GR No. 212426, January 12, 2016 Lagman vs Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 Lagman vs Senate President GR No. 235935, February 6, 2018

D. The Judicial Department

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Republic vs Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 Miranda vs Aguirre, G.R. No 133064, September 16, 1999 MMDA vs Jancom, GR 147465, April 10, 2002 Tirol vs COA, GR No. 133954, August 3, 2000 Cruz vs DENR, GR 135385, December 6, 2000 Martinez vs CA, GR 123547, May 21, 2001 Aguirre vs Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036 (2003) In RE: IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (1989) De La Llana vs Alba 122 SCRA 291

E. Constitutional Commissions

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Cayetano vs Monsod, GR 100113, September 3, 1991 Gaminde vs COA, GR No. 140335, December 13, 2000 Brillantes vs Yorac, GR No. 93867, December 18, 1990 CSC vs DBM, GR 158791, July 22, 2005 Sarmiento vs COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307 Ambil vs Comelec GR No. 143398, October 25, 2000

1. The CSC

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Camporedondo vs NLRC, GR No. 129049, August 6, 1999

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Vistan vs Nicolas 201 SCRA 524

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General vs Roco, GR No. 143366, January 29, 2001 CSC vs Salas, GR 123708, June 19, 1997 Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC, GR No. 159940, February 16, 2005 Domingo vs Zamora, GR 142283, February 6, 2003 Office of the President vs. Buenaobra, GR 170021, September 8, 2006 Central Bank vs CSC, G.R. No. 80455-456, April 10, 1989 (171 SCRA 744)

2. The COMELEC

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Brillantes vs Comelec, GR 163193, June 15, 2004 Sandoval vs Comelec, GR 133842, January 26, 2000 Al Haj vs Comelec, GR No. 151046, February 5, 2002

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Guevarra vs Comelec, 104 Phil 269 Jaramilla vs Comelec, GR No, 155717, October 23, 2003 Baytan vs Comelec, GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003 Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. COMELEC, GR 222731, March 8, 2016

3. The COA

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DBP vs COA, 231 SCRA 202 Bustamante vs COA, 216 SCRA 164 DBP vs COA, GR No. 88435, January 16, 2002

4. Sandiganbayan  PD 1606  Nunez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 5. Ombudsman

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Roxas vs Vasquez, GR No. 114944, June 19, 2001 People vs Velez, GR No. 138093, February 19, 2003 Ledesma vs CA GR No. 161629, July 29, 2005 Ombudsman vs Madriaga, GR No. 164316, September 27, 2006

6. Office of the Special Prosecutor  Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988  Vicente Orap vs Sandiganbayan, L-50508-11, October 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 252 7. National Commissions  Carino vs CHR, GR 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483  Canonizado vs Aguirre, GR No. 133132, February 15, 2001 _______________________________

A. The Legislative Branch

 Article VI, Philippine Constitution  Macias vs Comelec, 3 SCRA 1  Banat vs Comelec, GR 179271, April 21, 2009  Ang Ladlad vs Comelec, GR 190582, April 8, 2010 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the rules of Court, files by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party against the resolutions of the COMELEC dated November 11, 2009. The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit ang ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-list System Act. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as Lesbian’s as Lesbian, Hays, Bisexuals of Transgendered individuals. Ang ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 which was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In August 2009, the aboved-mentioned party again filed a petition for

registration with the COMELEC. On November 2009 afteradmittingthe oetitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC, 2nd Division dismissed the petition on moral grounds, stating that the LGBT sector makes it ckear that the petitioner tolerate immorality which offends religious beliefs, even siting bible verses from the book of Genesis about the fall of soddom and Gamorah. Apparently they tolerate acts against legal provisions such as Art. 695 of the Civil Code and the immoral doctrines of the Revised Penal Code. On January 2010, ang ladlad filed another petition, praying that the Court annul the assailed resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant ang ladlad’s application for accreditation. ISSUE: Whether or not Ang Ladlad party should be accredited as party—list organization.

RULING: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 are hereby SETASIDE. The Commission on Elections was directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

 Walden Bello vs Comelec GR 191998, December 7, 2010  Atong Paglaum vs Comelec, GR 203766, April 2, 2013  Aquino vs Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)  Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona, G.R. 134577, November 18, 1998  Avelino vs Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)  De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130240, February 5, 2002  Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 732 (1991)  Codilla vs De Venecia, G.R. 150605, December 10, 2002 FACTS :  Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. (Petitioner) was the mayor of Ormoc City, while Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (Respondent) was the incumbent Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte;  Codilla and Locsin were both candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte on the 2001, May 14 elections.  On May 8, 2001, a certain JOSEPHINE DELA CRUZ, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte FILED directly with the COMELEC Main Office a Petition for Disqualification against Codilla.  At the day of elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director (RED) HAD YET TO HEAR the disqualification case. Codilla was included in the list of candidates for District Representative and even WON the candidacy.  On May 16, 2001, a “Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation” was filed by Locsin, wherein, a copy of Motion was allegedly served to

Codilla by registered mail but NO REGISTRY RECEIPT was attached. Followed by a “Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation” on May 18. 2001.  On May 18, 2001, COMELEC 2ND Division issued an Ex Parte Order directing Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to SUSPEND THE PROCLAMATION of Codilla.  On May 24, 2001, Codilla was able to file an ANSWER to the Petition for his Disqualification with the RED, alleging that: a. He has not received the summons together with the copy of petition; a. He became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by COMELEC 2nd Div. informing him that a petition was filed against him; b. He obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance; and c. That the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads of the municipality of MATAG-OB and KANANGA alleged by JOSEPHINE DELA CRUZ were UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT HIS CONSENT  On May 25, 2001, Codilla filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.  On June 15, 2001, Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th Leg. District of Leyte. On June 18, she took Oath, and on June 30, She assumed office.  On June 20, 2001, Codilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Div. which ordered his disqualification.  On August 29, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a “Vote and Opinion and Summary of Votes” reversing the resolution of the 2nd Division and declaring the proclamation of Locsin as NULL and VOID.  Locsin relied on the opinion of the HOR Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III, that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of Locsin for she had taken her oath, leaving it to under the authority of the HRET.  On September 4, 2001, Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the HOR during its regular session, DECLARING “That she will not only DISREGARD but will openly DEFY the COMELEC En Banc Resolution ordering her to vacate her position.”  On September 12, 2001, Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as duly elected Representative and took his Oath of Office.  On September 20, 2001, A copy of COMELEC En Banc resolution was received by the HOR, yet, “NO ACTION WAS TAKEN”  On October 30, 2001, Speaker JDV, then recognized the finality of the COMELEC en banc decision, however, considering the stand of Locsin deters the house’s liberty to take action. And it would be best if it would be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. ISSUES: i. Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC 2nd Division is valid; ii. Whether said proclamation of Locsin divested the COMELEC En Banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and iii. Whether or not it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize Codillo as the legal elected representative of the 4th Legislative District of Leyte.

RULING: i. The proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void: 1. Codillo was denied due process during the entire proceedings; 2. The votes cast in favor of the Codillo cannot be considered “Stray” and Locsin cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. ii.

There is no merit in this contentions. 1. The validity of Locsin’s proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. a. Citing that the COMELEC 2nd Division erred in its decision b. COMELEC En Banc was NOT DIVESTED of jurisdiction. The said order of the 2nd Division was yet UNENFORCEABLE as it has not attained finality. 2. It is HRET which has NO jurisdiction in the instant case. a. The issue on the validity of the resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC En Banc. b. The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of Locsin.

iii.

The administration of Oath and Registration of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the HOR is NO LONGER a matter of discretion on the part of the Respondents, facts were already settled: 1. Codillo garnered 71,350 while Locsin got 53,447 votes; 2. COMELEC En Banc set aside the order of the 2nd Division and ordered the proclamation of Codillo; 3. COMELEC En Banc, being a Constitutional body has jurisdiction on the matter.

 Cunanan vs Tan, 5 SCRA 1 (1962) PER CURIAM: Gentlemen: For your information and guidance, the resolution of this Court on even date is quoted below: In Civil Case G.R. No. L-19721 "Carlos Cunanan vs. Jorge Tan, Jr." the  facts are: Petitioner Carlos Cunanan — who claims to be a career employee, with more than thirty (30) years in the government service — was, on June 6 or 8, 1961, appointed by the President of the Philippines as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thereupon, he qualified and assumed the duties and functions of said office. On November 6, 1961, the President extended to him an ad interim  appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On April 3, 1962, six (6) Senators and seven (7) members of the House of Representatives, purporting to act as the Commission on Appointments, rejected said ad interim appointment. On April 11, 1962, respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was designated by the President as Acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and performed the function of said office, without the consent of petitioner

herein. Hence, soon thereafter, or on April 27, 1962, petitioner commenced the present quo warranto proceeding against respondent, contending that the latter's designation is invalid, the office of Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not being vacant when he was designated thereto, because the aforesaid rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment is invalid for several reasons. When the first session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines opened on January 22, 1962, the members of the Senate were evenly divided into two (2) groups: there were twelve (12) Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, on the one hand, and on the other were twelve (12) Senators affiliated with the Nacionalista Party and Nationalist-Citizens' Party. Hence, the Senate has been unable to elect a new Senate President, and Senator Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., who was President of the Senate during the immediately preceding Congress, continued to hold said office in an acting capacity. The House of Representatives, consisting of seventy-two (72) members affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, twenty-nine (29) affiliated with the Liberal Party and one (1) not affiliated with any political party, elected Congressman Daniel F. Romualdez as Speaker of said chamber. In due course, the Commission on Appointments was constituted pursuant to the Constitution, on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties in each House of Congress, as follows: On the Part of the Senate Nacionalista Party Hon. Alejandro Almendras Hon. Fernando Lopez Hon. Genaro Magsaysay Hon. Cipriano Primicias Hon. Jose Roy Hon. Gil J. Puyat

Liberal Party Hon. Eulogio Balao Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco Hon. Ferdinand Marcos Hon. Camilo Osias Hon. Francisco (Soc) Rodrigo Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa

On the Part of the House of Representatives Nacionalista Party Hon. Jose M. Aldeguer Hon. Wenceslao R. Lagumbay Hon. Felix A. Fuentebella Hon. Rodolfo Ganzon Hon. Agustin Gatuslao Hon. Rasid Lucman Hon. Apolonio V. Marasigan Hon. Maximo Noel

Liberal Party Hon. Eladio T. Balite Hon. Manuel T. Cases Hon. Floro Crisologo Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas

On March 21, 1962, by the vote of twenty-nine (29) Congressmen affiliated with the Liberal Party and twenty-five (25) Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, forming what is commonly known as the "Allied Majority," declared vacant the seats of the twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in the Commission of Appointments and re-elected, as members thereof for said Chamber, its former representatives in said Commission, except

Congressmen Ganzon, Lucman and Lagumbay, in lieu of whom said "Allied Majority" elected Congressmen Jose Alberto, Reynaldo Honrado and Jose Cojuangco, Jr. although still affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, these three (3) Congressmen form part of the "Allied Majority". The members of Congress who took part in the alleged session of the Commission on Appointments on April 3, 1962, and rejected the ad interim appointment of petitioner herein were: (a) Six (6) Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, namely: Hon. Eulogio Balao, Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco, Hon. Ferdinand Marcos, Hon. Camilo Osias, Hon. Francisco (Soc) Rodrigo, Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa; (b) Four (4) Congressmen affiliated with the same party, to wit: Hon. Eladio T. Balite, Hon. Manuel T. Cases, Hon. Floro Crisologo, and Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas; and (c) Three (3) Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, but identified with the 'Allied Majority': Hon. Jose Alberto, Hon. Reynaldo Honrado and Hon. Jose Cojuangco Jr. Was the rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment by the aforementioned thirteen (13) members of Congress, purporting to act as the Commission on Appointments, valid or not? The determination of this issue depends upon: (1) the legality of the resolution of the House of Representatives of March 21, 1962, declaring the seats of its twelve (12) members in the Commission on Appointments vacant; and (2) the legality of the action of the House of Representatives in reconstituting the membership of the Commission on Appointments for said House. In view of the conclusion we have reached with respect to the first question, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the second question. With respect to the first question, we hold that the same should be resolved in the negative. The Commission on Appointments is it creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. In order that the members of the Commission could properly discharge their duties as such, it is essential that their tenure therein be provided with a certain measure of stability to insure the necessary freedom of action.1äwphï1.ñët Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN", necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but, also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

One thing, however, is to take these measures owing to changes of permanent character in the representation of the political parties in the House, and another thing for some members thereof affiliated with a political party to make common cause in certain matters with members of the House belonging to another political party. In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority", does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise, the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress. We are aware of the statements made on the floor of our Constitutional Convention indicating the opinion of some officers thereof or delegates thereto that members of the Commission on Appointments were to serve at the pleasure of the legislature. It should be noted, however, that said statements were made with reference to the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature under our original Constitution. The statements did not refer and do not necessarily apply to the Commission on Appointments under the present Constitution, as amended, for we now have a bicameral Congress, both Houses of which are represented in the Commission on Appointments. If a House of Congress were free, at any time, to declare vacant the position of its members in the Commission on Appointments, such House could, in effect, paralyze the entire Commission, without the consent of the other House. Such possibility could not have been countenanced by the Constitutional Convention. In his amended petition petitioner alleges that on April 27, 1962, his ad interim appointment was confirmed by the "legitimate" Commission on Appointments, in a meeting said to have been presided over by its chairman ex oficio, Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., and attended by six (6) Senators — namely. Senators Almendras, Lopez, Magsaysay, Primicias, Roy and Puyat — and eight (8) Congressmen — namely, Congressmen Aldeguer, Lagumbay, Fuentebella, Ganzon, Gatuslao, Lucman, Marasigan and Noel. Respondent has denied such allegation, but this cannot affect our foregoing view. Without prejudice to an extended decision later on, the Court holds, therefore, that the resolution of the House of Representatives of March 21, 1962, declining vacant the seats of the twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and appointing others in lieu of some of them, as well as the rejection of the ad interim  appointment of petitioner by thirteen (13) alleged members of the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized, and the designation of respondent Jorge Tan, Jr., as Acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on April 16, 1962, when said office was not vacant, are null and void; that petitioner is entitled to hold said office; and that respondent should vacate the same and turn it over to petitioner, with costs against said respondent. Mr. Justice Padilla voted to dismiss the petition, upon the ground that the effectivity of petitioner's ad interim appointment expired on December 30, 1961, for the reasons given in his concurring opinion in Aytona vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L18313 (January 19, 1962). Yours truly,

(SGD.) PAULINO S. MARQUEZ Clerk of Court

 Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 FACTS: Senator Jinggoy Estrada in his privilege speech revealed that some senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 million as “incentive” for voting in favour of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Secretary Florencio Abad then made a public statement in response, explaining that the funds released to the Senators were part of the Disbursement Acceleration program (DAP). The Department od Budget Management released the sources of the DAP and its legal bases that includes: (1) Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; (2) Section 49 and 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Executive Order No. 292; and (3) General Appropriation Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013. Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP were filed to the Supreme Court questioning the validity of DAP. ISSUES: 1. Whether DAP violates Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 2. Whether DAP, NBC No. 541 and all other executive issuances implementing the DAP violate Sec, 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution RULING: 1. The DAP does not violate Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed with the OSG’s position, that no law was necessaryfor the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizingspending and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of authority of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully served. 2. However, the DAP, NBC No. 541 and related executive issuances violate the Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (a)

(b)

(c)

The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts.



Belgica vs Ochoa, G.R. 208566, November 19, 2013

 ABAKADA Guro vs Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%). Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Section 28 (2) of the Constitution. RULING: No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of the law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power, but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

 Tan vs Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000) FACTS: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the simplified income taxation scheme under Articles 26 and 28 and III (1). The SNIT contained changes in the tax schedules and different treatment in the professionals which petitioners assail as unconstitutional for being isolative of the equal protection clause in the constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is meritorious RULING: No. Uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal protection, merely require that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both privileges and liabilities. Uniformity, does not offend classification as long as it rest on substantial distinctions, it is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and maintain the present global treatment on taxable corporations. This classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate.

 Lung Center vs QC, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004  Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, G.R. 115455, October 30, 1995 FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of R.A. 7716 because it does not exclusively came from the House of Representatives. In addition, the petitioner contends that Senate Bill 1630 (when R.A. 7716 was still a bill) passed its second and third readings on the same day, which in fact, it should be passed in separate days. ISSUE: Whether R.A. 7716 is unconstitutional because of the above mentioned grounds. RULING: No, “exclusively” came from the House of Representative only falls under revenue bill, not on revenue law like the R.A. 7716. In addition, the president certified the passing of Senate Bill 1630 as urgent, that is why it can be passed even on the same day.

 Bengzon vs Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767  Senate vs Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006 FACTS: On September 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, and on the issues of “Gloriagate,” Wire-tapping of the President, Electoral fraud, as was shown in the respective privileged speeches of the Senators. On September 27 & 28 2005, after being invited most of those “resource persons” were not able to make it due to prior commitments (i.e. military officials), while on 27 September then Senate President Drilon, received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing (re: Northrail). On September 28, 2005 the president issued E.O 464, and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President, informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons from the executive dept would not be able to attend w/o the consent of the president. With regard to the hearing on the wire-tapping of the President, Col.

Balutan and Gen. Gudani were relieved from their military posts and faced court martial proceedings for testifying w/o the president’s approval. ISSUE: IS

E.O.

464

VALID?

- The congress has the power of inquiry that is expressly recognized by ART 6.21 of the Constitution, where congress may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation - Since congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be inconsistent to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on the executive operations, although there are exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege” (the power of the government to withhold info from the public, the courts, the congress) it is only recognized in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character, and it is inclined heavily against secrecy and in favor of disclosure. - The power of congress to compel the appearance of exec officials under sec 21 and the lack of it under sec 22 find their basis in the principle of Separation of Powers. While the exec branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of congress to legislate by refusing to comply w/ its demands for info. - Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch, whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. RULING: PETITIONS ARE PARTLY GRANTED, Sec(s) 2(b) &3 of E.O. 464 ARE DECLARED VOID. Sec(s) 1&2(a) ARE HOWEVER, VALID.

 Neri vs Senate Committee GR 180643, September 4, 2008 FACTS: On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (NBN Project), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo) of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,  and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to

respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. Respondent Committees thereafter issued show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory and issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and (2) Whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. RULING: Respondent Committees failed to show that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions. The presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need  for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege. Respondent Committees argued that the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption. They intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation. The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. There is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. During the Oral Argument, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all. The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President.  While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for truth," which in respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for persons responsible for "anomalies" in government contracts.

Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. The deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. The contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said date because not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding.

 Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018 FACTS: On October 18, 2017 Arvin R. Balag was cited in contempt by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee for his contumacious attitude and evasiveness to answer questions raised by Senators Poe, Lacson, Villanueva and other members of the Committee. Balag was called as resource person on the hearing due to his alleged ascendancy of Aegis Juris fraternity to which a UST Civil Law student Horacio Thomas “Acio” Castillo III allegedly died due to hazing initiated by AJ fraternity. Hence, Balag was held at the office of the Senate Sgt-at-Arms. Balag filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin the implementation of the October 18, 2017 Order of Contempt. ISSUE: WoN respondent Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting legislative inquiry and citing the petitioner in contempt. HELD: The petition is denied. The Senate did not acted with grave abuse of discretion. It is a constitutional mandate upon the Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. As regards with the inherent power of contempt of the Senate, the period of imprisonment should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry in aid of legislation.

C. Executive Department

 Article VII, Philippine Constitution  Republic vs Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, July 15, 2003  Estrada vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001  Dela Cruz vs COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001 FACTS: On September 19, 1997, COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038, disallowing payments of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions. It also was also stated that Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistant to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J, Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061. Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors, appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No.98-3818 denying petitioners' appeal. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners is allowed to receive such compensations. RULING: Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio  members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals. We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.

 Marcos vs Manglapus,178 SCRA 760 FACTS: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

ISSUE: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?  RULING: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

 Soriano vs Lista GR 153881, March 24, 2003  Pimentel vs Ermita, GR 164978, October 13, 2005  Constantino vs Cuisia, GR No. 106064, October 13, 2005  Gudani vs Senga, GR No 170165, August 15, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria MacapagalArroyo1 enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive. On September 26, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano also known as the “Hello Garci” Controversy.

Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not to testify before said Committee.  On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation.  The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-ininterest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.  ISSUE: Whether or not can a President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry. RULING: Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice.  The ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents’ ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the

Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have been achieved without offending constitutional principles. The petition is DENIED.

 Gloria vs CA, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000  Araullo vs Aquino, GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 FACTS: Senator Jinggoy Estrada in his privilege speech revealed that some senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 million as “incentive” for voting in favour of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Secretary Florencio Abad then made a public statement in response, explaining that the funds released to the Senators were part of the Disbursement Acceleration program (DAP). The Department od Budget Management released the sources of the DAP and its legal bases that includes: (1) Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; (2) Section 49 and 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Executive Order No. 292; and (3) General Appropriation Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013. Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP were filed to the Supreme Court questioning the validity of DAP. ISSUES: 1. Whether DAP violates Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 2.Whether DAP, NBC No. 541 and all other executive issuances implementing the DAP violate Sec, 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution RULING: 1.The DAP does not violate Sec. 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed with the OSG’s position, that no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizingspending and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of authority of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully served. 2.However, the DAP, NBC No. 541 and related executive issuances violate the Section 25 (5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (d)

(e)

The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and

(f)

The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Acts.

 Saguisag vs Ochoa, GR No. 212426, January 12, 2016 FACTS: EDCA or Enchanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the military forces to access to or conduct activities within certain agreed location the country. After eight rounds of negotiation for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S ambassador to the Philippines signed an agreement on April 28, 2016. President Benigno Aquino III ratified EDCA on June 6, 2016, it was not transmitted to the Senate for executive’s understanding that to do was no longer necessary. Senator’s file Senate Resolution No. (SR 105). The resolution strongly sense that for EDCA to be valid and effective, it must be submitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence. ISSUES: 1. Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops or facilities. 2. Whether the provision under EDCA are consistent with the constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaty. RULING: 1. EDCA is constitutional in its arrangement as an executive agreement. 2. It remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement. The manner of the President’s execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President may take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. It is the Presidents’ prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine Defense interests. (Commander-in-chief Powers) EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through the Presidents without the need of Senatorial votes for its execution. Petitioners contend that for EDCA must be in the form of treaty duly concurred by Senate. They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions: Section 21, Art. VII. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all members of the Senate. Section 25, Art. XVIII. x x x Military bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in the Senate x x x. The President however may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops or facilities, if (a) it is not an instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. The VFA is a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1991- already allowed the return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose and framework of Mutual Defense

Treaty and VFA. The practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals with the presence of foreign military forces is not at all unusual to jurisdiction. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm, as an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement. WHEREFORE, petition dismissed.

 Lagman vs Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding sixty days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The President then explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayaf Group and Maute Group was conducted. Through these groups’ armed siege and acts of violence towards civilians and government authorities, institutions, and establishments were able to take control of Marawi Ciy. The unfolding of these events as well as classified reports received by the President, it led him to conclude that these activities constitute not only simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the group’s seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao. There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area, defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed and remove his supervisory powers over local governments. After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 388 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 “ to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law. In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found no compelling reason to revoke the same. The Senate’s counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. Likewise the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050 “EXPRESSING FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED ‘DECLARING STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO”. ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 is valid RULING:

The Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao. The Court ruled that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires that the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. There is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, “lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;” there is also the plan to establish wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege in Marawi. Considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events that happened during the Davao City bombings, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Basilan among others. The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances.

 Lagman vs Senate President GR No. 235935, February 6, 2018 FACTS: These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018. On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same. On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.

In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security assessment.” On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other likeminded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao.” Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine. On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. ISSUE: PROCEDURAL: 1.

Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions. 2. Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. 3. Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions. 4. Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. 5. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. 6. Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. 7. Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 8. Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. 9. Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. 10. Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. HELD: FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to their petitions. NO.

The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress, the they can take judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative department without the introduction of evidence.  Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their Consolidated Comment.   SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. YES. The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent considering that he enjoys the presidential immunity from suit. The Court reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit: It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.   THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions. YES. The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of sufficient factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable party thereto. The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the approval of the President’s request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the subject matter of these cases.   FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. NO. The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of issues between the Lagman and Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case at bar. Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the relitigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits. In order to successfully apply in a succeeding litigation the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required.

The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court already settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion which would trigger the President’s initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in the case at bar refers to the persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which would justify the extension of martial law. The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by the transitory nature of the Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the factual basis for a declaration of martial law. Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The gravity and scope of rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be reexamined, in order to make a justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify an extension of a state of martial law. FIFTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO. The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW Congressional check on martial law Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus consists of: 1.

The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is

made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President. 2. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it. Joint executive and legislative act When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment”         between the President and the Congress.   SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. NO. The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution. Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or publication. Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to the consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of Congress did not review and study the President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted for deliberation was too short.   SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.” Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such extension.   EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension. Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks. AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah. Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to other places in Mindanao. Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general public. The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the Executive Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”

The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its “briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified official documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the same presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus presented has not been challenged or questioned as regards its reliability. The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for the further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.   NINTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. NO. The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review, as provided under Section 18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military powers should be exercised.   TENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. NO. By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on respondents’ gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended the martial law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that petitioner Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the extension or martial law in Mindanao “which would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast critic of the Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military forces”. The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the grant of injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged violations are directly attributable to the imposition of martial law. They likewise failed to establish the nexus between the President’s exercise of his martial law powers and their unfounded apprehension that the imposition “will target civilians who have no participation at all in any armed uprising or struggle”. Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the “civil liberties” specifically refer to, and how the extension of martial law in Mindanao would threaten these “civil liberties” in derogation of the rule of law. Evidently, petitioners’ right is doubtful or

disputed, and can hardly be considered a clear legal right, sufficient for the grant of an injunctive writ. This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive writ cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the procedural rules of admissibility and proof. Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports petitioners’ theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be utilized as ground either to enjoin the President from exercising the power to declare martial law, or the Congress in extending the same. To sanction petitioners’ plea would result into judicial activism, thereby going against the principle of separation of powers. As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such transgressions can be addressed in a separate and independent court action. Hence, petitioners can lodge a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office or file a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against erring parties.

D. The Judicial Department

 Republic vs Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018  Miranda vs Aguirre, G.R. No 133064, September 16, 1999  MMDA vs Jancom, GR 147465, April 10, 2002 FACTS: The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the decision dated January 30, 2002 affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, declaring that there is a valid and perfected waste management contract between the RP and JANCOM Env’l Corp and dismissing the petition filed by MMDA for lack of merit. The petitioner reiterates its arguments that (1) resort to a petition for certiorari was proper; (2) that the waste management contract never got through the negotiation stage; (3) that the signature of the President is necessary for the perfection of the contract in question; and (4) that the contract could be unilaterally cancelled by the Government since incineration is prohibited by the Clean Air Act. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision dated January 30, 2002 on the issues mentioned may be reversed. RULING: The motion for reconsideration is denied and its denial is final. First, the petitioner claims that a garbage crisis was imminent due to the trial Courts decision to prohibit and enjoin MMDA from conducting a bidding for the establishment and operation of a new sanitary landfill that impelled them to file a petition for certiorari rather than a regular appeal. Petitioner claims, however, that while appeal was available, the same was an inadequate remedy under

circumstances, stating that availability of appeal is not sufficient to preclude a petition for certiorari. The court argued that the decision is not immediately executor as it is not a judgment in action for injunction, receivership, accounting & support and such other judgments, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. Since the decision is not immediately executor, appeal would have stayed in execution. Consequently, the adverse effects of said decision will not visit upon petitioners during the appeal. In other words, appeal is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Second, the petitioner claims that the waste management contract never got through the negotiation stage since the notice sent by their MMDA Chairperson Prospero Oreta, informing JANCOM that it was the winning bidder specifically provided that the same was “subject to negotiation and mutual approval of the terms & conditions of the contract of award.” The argument is misleading since it deceivingly overlooks the fact that after said letter was sent, a contract was prepared and signed by JANCOM and the Philippine Government. The signing and execution of the contract by the parties clearly show that, as between the parties, there was a concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the material details of the contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the contract. Third, the claim that the signature of the President is necessary for the validity of the contract which points out that the Memorandum Order no. 202 (Memo Order Creating an Executive Committee to Oversee the BOT Implementation of Solid Waste Management projects for waste disposal in Carmona & San Mateo) only gives the Executive Committee and that the same is not valid that it glosses over the fact that the Secretary signed the contract not as a member of executive committee but as a chairman of the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste. Lastly, petitioner argued that the incineration technology provided in the contract is prohibited by law, citing the Clean Air Act in support thereof. The appellant court pointed out that the Section 20 of the Clean Air Act does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal; rather only those burning processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes are banned. As defined under Section 5, Article II of the said Act, poisonous and toxic fumes means any emissions & fumes which are beyond internationally accepted standard, including but not limited to World Health Organization (WHO) guideline values.

 Tirol vs COA, GR No. 133954, August 3, 2000 FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under R.A. 6770 Sec. 27, (Ombudsman Act 1989). The petitioner is the incumbent Regional Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region VIII. During his capacity, he approved the purchase of overpriced school equipment for the Lalawigan National Highschool. COA investigated the transaction and the petitioner was found guilty for malversation of public funds. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a question of law and therefore may be reviewed by the Supreme court. RULING:

The court does not interefere with the discretion of the Ombudsman. The rule is based upon respect for investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and practicality. Another reason for the dismissal of the petition, it is under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The court has declared Section 27, unconstitional in Fabian v. Desierto for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent. In Addition, the petitioner’s and his counsel’s acts manifest a scheme to frustrate the ends of justice by using court procedures to delay the resolution of a pending case.  WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DENIED and the Resolution of 20 March 1997 and Order of 5 March 1998 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are AFFIRMED.

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Cruz vs DENR, GR 135385, December 6, 2000 Martinez vs CA, GR 123547, May 21, 2001 Aguirre vs Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036 (2003) In RE: IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (1989) De La Llana vs Alba 122 SCRA 291

E. Constitutional Commissions

 Cayetano vs Monsod, GR 100113, September 3, 1991  Gaminde vs COA, GR No. 140335, December 13, 2000 FACTS: On Jun e11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, Ad Interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commisioner. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. The Commission on Appointment confirmed the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the office. In reply to her request, the chief Presidential Legal counsel, in a letter dated April 7, 1998 opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 2, 2000, not on February 2, 1999. Relying on the said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 2, 1999. On February 4, 1999, Chairmen Corazon Alma G. De Leon, wrote the commission (COA) requesting opinion on whether or not Commission Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries not withstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General counsel, COA, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC resident auditor Floritas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101(99) disallowing in audith the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 2, 1999.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commssion, to which she appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her. RULING: Accordingly, the court Reversed the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 2, 1999, with February 2, 2000. Ther decision is effective immediately.

 Brillantes vs Yorac, GR No. 93867, December 18, 1990 FACTS: Sixto Brillantes is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat attempt. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this court , where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation mode by the President violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC? RULING: Yes, Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme court ruled although essentially executivein nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the function of the COMELEC. In the choice of the acting chairman, the members of the commission on elections would most likely have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the president to make. To emphasize the importance of the COMELEC’s constitutionality guaranteed independence, the court said that the choice of a temporary Chairman is an internal matter which comes under the discretion of the Commission a body and that such discretion cannot be exercised for the Commission by anybody else.

But even though the president’s appointment of yorac as acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman. What is that the members should elect their acting chairman pursuant to principles that Constitutional. Commissions are guaranteed by the constitution as an independent body.

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CSC vs DBM, GR 158791, July 22, 2005 Sarmiento vs COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307 Ambil vs Comelec GR No. 143398, October 25, 2000

8. The CSC

 Camporedondo vs NLRC, GR No. 129049, August 6, 1999  General vs Roco, GR No. 143366, January 29, 2001  CSC vs Salas, GR 123708, June 19, 1997  Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC, GR No. 159940, February 16, 2005

FACTS:  Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner.  Civil Service Commission, respondent.  On July 31, 2002, Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente and Jose Tereso U. De Jesus Jr were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the petitioner. The CSC approved the appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must obtain CES or CSE eligibility which is governed by the CESB.  On January 2, 2003 letter to the CSC, the Ombudsman requested for the change of status, from temporary to permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente and De Jesus effective December 18, 2002.  Carandang and Clemente were conferred with CSE Eligibility dated June 6, 2003.  On August 28, 2003, CSC changed the status of Carandang’s and Clemente’s appointments to permanent status effective June 6, 2003, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he “has not met the eligibility requirements”. ISSUE: i. Whether or not the respondent curtailed on the discretionary power of appointment of the petitioner. RULING: i. Yes, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that the appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority.

 Vistan vs Nicolas 201 SCRA 524 FACTS:

Complainant Leonila A. Vistan filed on March 16, 1987 an AM No. MTJ 87-79, charging the Respondent as then the MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and immorality. However, it was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Upon Respondent’s manifestation and after verification with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that the Respondent had resigned from the service when he became a congressional candidate in the 1987 election. However, such reconsideration sought by the complainant and again confirmed by the OCA. Respondent Judge was then re-appointed to the service on February 9, 1989 as the MTC Judge of Pandi, Bulacan. Accordingly, the AM No. MTC-89-79 was reinstated and the other case AC No. 3040 for disbarment of Respondent was filed on May 15, 1987. The charges set forth ate basically the same with AM No. MTC-87-79. ISSUE: - Whether or not Respondent Judge Nicolas engaged in electioneering while still an MTC Judge RULING: The Court ruled that the Respondent acted improperly and for having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, Respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy demeaned the stature of his office, and must pronounce guilty of gross misconduct. The Court also denied the prayer for disbarment and order the dismissal of the Respondent from the service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency, or any instrumentality of the government including GOCCs and with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits and leave credits.

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Domingo vs Zamora, GR 142283, February 6, 2003 Office of the President vs. Buenaobra, GR 170021, September 8, 2006

 Central Bank vs CSC, G.R. No. 80455-456, April 10, 1989 (171 SCRA 744) FACTS: On October 3, 1984, the Promotions Board of the Central Bank, with a representative of the Civil Service Commission in attendance, deliberated on the filling up of the vacant position of Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Salary Grade 22). It found Dr. Jordan, who then had the rank of Coordinating Assistant (Salary Grade 20) as the only next-in-rank employee. After considering further the qualifications of Dr. Jordan, said Board certified her for promotion to the position of Assistant Bank Physician and submitted the proposal to the Office of the Governor of the Central Bank. On January 2, 1985, the promotion of Dr. Jordan to Assistant Bank Physician was approved by the Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank under Personnel Action No. 001, Series of 1985. 4 On January 10, 1985, Dr. Jordan was designated to act as Assistant Bank Physician. On January 30, 1985, she was issued an appointment as Assistant Bank Physician to take effect January 2, 1985. On February 15, 1985, Dr. Borja, the private

respondent contested Dr. Jordan's appointment claiming that he was the next-inrank employee and that he was more qualified than she. Then, the Bank dismissed the protest on the grounds that the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period; that protestant is not the next in-rank employee as regards the contested position and, as such, he was no legal personality to file the protest; and, that the protestee aside from being the next-in-rank employee, met the requirements for promotion. Private respondent appealed to the Merit Systems Board (MSB for short). In its decision dated October 28, 1986, the MSB found the appeal meritorious and ruled that private respondent should have been the one appointed as Assistant Bank Physician. On March 5, 1987, private respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission on the grounds that he was denied due process of law inasmuch as he was not furnished a copy of the motion for reconsideration filed by the Bank, and that the decision of the MSB dated January 28, 1987 is contrary to the merit and fitness principles enshrined in the Civil Service Law and the Constitution. On May 26, 1987, the Commission issued Resolution No. 87-156 setting aside the decision of the MSB dated January 28, 1987 and directing the appointment of private respondent to the contested position. On June 10, 1987, the petitioner Central Bank filed a petition for reconsideration that the department head enjoys wide latitude of discretion as regards the appointment of department personnel and that question as to who is more competent is of no consequence since private respondent was not yet an employee of the Central Bank at the time Dr. Jordan was considered for promotion. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in revoking the appointment of Dr. Jordan in favor or Dr. Borja. RULING: Yes, the Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in revoking the appointment of Dr. Jordan and granting the position of Assistant Bank Physician in favor of the private respondent, Dr. Borja.s Under the law, when the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirement are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest the appointment under Civil Service Laws. The CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It has no authority to revoke an appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess qualifications required by law. 9. The COMELEC

FACTS:

 Brillantes vs Comelec, GR 163193, June 15, 2004  Sandoval vs Comelec, GR 133842, January 26, 2000  Al Haj vs Comelec, GR No. 151046, February 5, 2002

Tawantawan M. Caturongan Al Haj and Naseer Manalao are candidates for Municipal Mayor and Vice mayor. They filed a petition to COMELEC to declare a failure of elections in Municipality of Munai, Lanao Del Norte on the following grounds:

1. 2. 3. 4.

Massive vote buying. Illegal assignment of Rakim Paute as Election Inspectors. Appointment of disqualified Board of Election Inspectors. Shoot out on the eve of election between unidentified armed men and members of the Philippine Army escorting election forms and paraphernalia in Barangay Cadulawan. 5. Transfer of polling places without notice. 6. Absence of voting booths in Barangay Tambo and Cadulawan. 7. Non-signing of voter’s registration form. ISSUE: Whether the grounds enumerated by Al Haj and Manalao to declare failure of elections are valid. RULING: Petition must fail. There are only three instances where a failure of election may be declared, those are: 1. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed because of force, majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. 2. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting on account of force, majeure, terrorism, and other analogous causes. 3. After voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, the election results in a failure to elect on account of force, majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, and other analogous causes. The irregularities pointed by the petitioner such as vote buying, fraud, and terrorism are grounds for an election contest and may not be invoked to declare failure of election.

 Guevarra vs Comelec, 104 Phil 269  Jaramilla vs Comelec, GR No, 155717, October 23, 2003 FACTS: Respondent Suyat and petitioner Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the eight (8) winning members of the Sangguniang Bayan, with petitioner Jaramilla as No. 7 and respondent Suyat as No. 9. Respondent Suyat reviewed the votes and discovered that petitioner Jaramilla was credited with only twenty three (23) votes per Election Return from Precinct No. 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct, petitioner Jaramilla was credited with seventy three (73) votes or fifty (50) votes more than what he actually obtained. Respondent Suyat filed before COMELEC en banc, which granted the Petition and annulled Jaramilla’s proclamation. ISSUES:

Whether or not COMELEC en banc may took cognizance of the petition for correction despite its having been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary, its lack of certification against forum-shopping and respondent’s failure to pay filing fee on time RULING: Yes. Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules expressly provides that COMELEC has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of the cases before it. COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of nonpayment of filing fees. Section 18, Rule 40 the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states: Sec 18. Nonpayment of Prescribed Fees If the fees above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. The use of the word "may" in the aforecited provision readily shows that the COMELEC is conferred the discretion whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees.

 Baytan vs Comelec, GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003 FACTS: Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A Barangay 18. Upon realizing that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew. Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter to former COMELC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, for evaluation, who subsequently, recommended filing information for double registration against petitioners. The COMELEC affirmed Ravanzo’s resolution. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied by comelec en banc. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration. RULING: No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without cancelling their previous registration. Since “double registration” is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. This letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official. Moreover, petitioners’ claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the Election Codes requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation. The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a wellgrounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

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Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. COMELEC, GR 222731, March 8, 2016

10. The COA

 DBP vs COA, 231 SCRA 202 FACTS: In 1986, the Philippine government obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of US$310 million, which was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy during that time of financial crisis. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine government to rehabilitate the DBP which was then saddled with huge nonperforming loans. Accordingly, the government made a policy entitled Policy Statement for the Development Bank of the Philippines which stated in part: Furthermore, like all financial institutions under Central Bank supervision, DBP will now be required to have a private external audit, and its Board of Directors will now be opened to adequate private sector representation. It is hoped that with these commitments, DBP can avoid the difficulties of the past and can function as a competitive and viable financial institution within the Philippine financial system." Pursuant to said Policy, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending the Central Bank's Manual of Regulations for Banks and other Financial Intermediaries, in line with the government's commitment to the World Bank to require a private external auditor for DBP. Thus, on December 5, 1986, the Central Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124, providing that: "SECTION 1. Subsection 1165.5 (Book I) is amended to read as follows: 1165.5 Financial Audit. - Each Bank, whether Government-owned or controlled or private, shall cause an annual financial audit to be conducted by an external

independent auditor not later than thirty (30) days after the close of the calendar year or the fiscal year adopted by the bank. x x x. The Audit of a Government-owned or controlled bank by an external independent auditor shall be in addition to and without prejudice to that conducted by the Commission on Audit in the discharge of its mandate under existing law. x x x. Former COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona Jr. did not object said provisions and new regulations imposed. So, DBP hired Joaquin Cunanan & Co. as its external auditor for calendar year 1986. However, during a change of its leadership, the new COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo, wrote the Central Bank Governor protesting the Central Bank's issuance of said Circular No. 1124 which allegedly encroached upon the COA's constitutional and statutory power to audit government agencies. Hence, he issued a Memorandum disallowing payments to said auditing firm saying that the services rendered were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. DBP sought consideration of COA Chairman’s Memorandum but was denied. Likewise, in a COA en banc decision, the same was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Constitution vests in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any circumstance RULING: The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, including the DBP. The COA contends this is similar to its sole and exclusive authority, under the second paragraph of the same Section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COA's power under the first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph is expressly declared "exclusive." The qualifying word "exclusive" in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated, and not to a phrase distantly located in another paragraph or subsection.26 Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it appears, without the word "exclusive", signifying that non-COA auditors can also examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the word "exclusive" in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.

The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The letter-decision of the Chairman of the Commission on Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the letterdecision promulgated by the Commission on Audit en banc dated May 20, 1989, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the temporary restraining order issued by the court enjoining respondent Commission on Audit from enforcing the said decisions is hereby made PERMANENT.

 Bustamante vs COA, 216 SCRA 164  DBP vs COA, GR No. 88435, January 16, 2002 FACTS: In 1986, the Philippine government, under the administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino, obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan ("ERL" for brevity) in the amount of US$310 million. The ERL was intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at that time suffering severely from the financial crisis that hit the country during the latter part of the Marcos regime. Former COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. did not object said provisions and new regulations imposed by the Central Bank Circular No.1124. So, DBP hired Joaquin Cunanan & Co., as its external auditor for calendar year 1986. However, a change in the leadership of the COA suddenly reversed the course of events. On May 13, 1987, after learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing firm for calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan & Co., signed four months earlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought the COA's concurrence to the contract. During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for concurrence, the DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487, 321.14 despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued

a Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following persons personally liable for such payment. On June 14, 1989 the DBP filed this petition for review with prayer for a temporary restraining order, assailing the two COA letter-decisions for being contrary to the Constitution and existing laws. ISSUE: Does the Constitution vest in the COA the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any circumstance? RULING: The DBP's petition is meritorious and hereby GRANTED. The letter-decision of the Chairman of the Commission on Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the letterdecision promulgated by the Commission on Audit en banc dated May 20, 1989, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the temporary restraining order issued by the court enjoining respondent Commission on Audit from enforcing the said decisions is hereby made PERMANENT. The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2,Article IX-D, the COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies, including the DBP. The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while nonexclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that: "Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit."

11. Sandiganbayan  PD 1606  Nunez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 12. Ombudsman



Roxas vs Vasquez, GR No. 114944, June 19, 2001

 People vs Velez, GR No. 138093, February 19, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner filed an affidavit-criminal complaint with the office of the Ombudsman against respondents of violation 3(g) of R.A.3019. After finding probable cause, Ombudsman recommended the filing of information against the malefactors. Respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan a joint motion for reconsideration which was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated Sec.27 of R.A.6770 HELD: No. When the office of the Ombudsman approved the resolution prepared by the Graft Investigator, the information was filed prematurely against the respondents.

 

Ledesma vs CA GR No. 161629, July 29, 2005 Ombudsman vs Madriaga, GR No. 164316, September 27, 2006

13. Office of the Special Prosecutor  Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988  Vicente Orap vs Sandiganbayan, L-50508-11, October 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 252 14. National Commissions  Carino vs CHR, GR 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483  Canonizado vs Aguirre, GR No. 133132, February 15, 2001