Updates In Jurisprudence: Prof. Elmer T. Rabuya (bar 2017)

UPDATES IN JURISPRUDENCE PROF. ELMER T. RABUYA (BAR 2017)

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title Based on Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, an applicant for land registration must comply with the following requirements: 1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessorin interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application; 2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious; 3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and 5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain. [La Tondena, Inc. v. Republic, 765 SCRA 265 (2015)]

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title ** The case of Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2009) clarified that the June 12, 1945 reckoning point refers to date of possession and not to date of land classification as alienable and disposable. **The court held that "the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.''

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2009) Applicable rules for application for original registration under Sec. 14 (2), Property Registration Decree, PD 1529: 1. Applicable period is 30 years, as required for extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. 2. Under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, only patrimonial properties of the State can be acquired by way of acquisitive prescription.

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2009) 3. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2009) 4.

There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2013) Classification of Lands Based on Ownership Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. • Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. • Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. • Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2013) Classification of Lands Based on Alienability • The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. • Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (2013) Classification of Lands Based on Alienability • Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. • Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.

Caravan Travel & Tours Int’l, Inc. v. Abejar (2016) The Court harmonizes the requirements of Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the so-called registered-owner rule and prior conflicting rulings. Recall that these rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. • Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. • On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.

Caravan Travel & Tours Int’l, Inc. v. Abejar (2016) • In Caravan, it was held that the appropriate approach in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, is that the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. • As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, it is now up to defendant to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. • This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it has no employment relationship with the driver; second, that the driver acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan (2014) • While a hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se but only a nuisance per accidens because it was build in the no build zone, nonetheless, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition because it failed to comply with the legal requirements prior to construction. • Under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, mayors are empowered to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. Given the presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether the building constituted a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens becomes immaterial.

Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc. (2016) • A basketball ring is not a nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. At most, it is a nuisance per accidens. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing

Pilar Development Corp. v. Dumadag (2013) •

The banks or rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. (Easements For Public Use)

•

When the developer of a subdivision filed an action for recovery of possession against the occupants of a property designated as open space of the subdivision, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the property is within the 3-meter legal easement of Mahabang Ilog Creek. The Court ruled that the 3meter strip/zone is public land. As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, the Court ruled that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local government, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).

Calimoso v. Roullo (2016) • Whenever there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, the Court have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion. • As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. [Quintanilla v. Abangan (2009)] • As between a right of way that would destroy the wire fence and a house and another right of way which although longer will only traverse two vacant lots, the second alternative should be preferred. [Calimoso v. Roullo (2016)]

Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc. (2012) The water facility on a certain lot in a subdivision, which is an encumbrance for the benefit of the community, is continuous and apparent easement, because it is used incessantly without human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public. Since the facility was continuously used for more than 30 years as the residents’ sole source of water, it was held that an easement of water facility has already been acquired through prescription.

Quintos v. Nicolas (2014) The co-owners filed an action for partition which was dismissed by the trial court for failure of the parties and counsel to appear. The judgment of dismissal became final. Subsequently, some of the co-owners filed an action against the other co-owners for quieting of title alleging exclusion ownership thereof by prescription. The defendants in the action for quieting of title filed a counter-claim for partition. The parties who filed the action for quieting of title alleged that the counter-claim for partition is already barred by res judicata because the dismissal of the action for partition was with prejudice.

Quintos v. Nicolas (2014) On the issue of partition, the Court ruled that while the dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, such dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. The Court explained that between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Article 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.

Vda. de Figuracion v. FiguracionGerilla (2013) The act of some co-owners in effecting the registration of the land only in their names did not effectively repudiate the co-ownership when they allowed the other co-owner to build her house on the subject property without any opposition from them. Such act constitutes an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn negates the presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the ousted co-owner.

Sale of a concrete portion by coowner • As held in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong that the fact that an agreement purported to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property does not render the sale void, for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. . “Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.” (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have). Consequently, whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion of the co-owned property, the sale remains validly executed. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation. [Cited in Vagilidad v. Vagilidad, Jr., 507 SCRA 94 (2006) and Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 742 SCRA 646 (2014)]

• NOTE: The ruling in Cabrera v. Ysaac (2014), that a contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio, is an aberration.

Arambulo v. Nolasco (2014) • A co-owner cannot abe forced to sell his share in the co-ownership by invoking Article 491 of the Civil Code. While alienation of the thing by sale of the property is an act of strict dominion and, therefore, an act of alteration, it does not mean that a sale of commonly owned real property is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491, such that if a co–owner withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear prejudice to the common interest, may, as adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld consent. • Instead, the applicable law is Article 493 of the Civil Code, which clearly establishes that each co–owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits. That part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their co–owners. Insofar as the sale of co–owned properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co–owners refuse to sell the co–owned property.

Cruz v. Catapang (2008) The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. As such, when only one of the co-owners gave his consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property, the other co-owners can successfully maintain an action for ejectment and the consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder.

Redemption of co-owned property • The one who redeemed the co-owned proeprty had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due. [Cabales v. CA, 531 SCRA 691 (2007) ] • The failure of the other co-owners to reimburse the amounts advanced by the one who redeemed in payment of the loan does not entitle the latter to claim full ownership of the co-owned property. It only gives him the right to claim reimbursement for the amounts he advanced in behalf of the co-ownership. Such advance payments are in the nature of necessary expenses for the preservation of the co-ownership. Article 488 of the Civil Code provides that necessary expenses may be incurred by one coowner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. Until reimbursed, he holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount he advanced. [Taghoy v. Tigol, Jr., 626 SCRA 341 (2010)

Basbas v. Sayson (2011) The Court pointed out that even just one of the coowners, by himself alone, can bring an action for the recovery of the co-owned property, even through an action for revival of judgment, because the enforcement of the judgment would result in such recovery of property. Thus, it is not necessary in said action that all of the parties, in whose favor the case for partition was adjudged, be made plaintiffs to the action for revival of judgment. Any which one of said prevailing parties, who had an interest in the enforcement of the decision, may file the complaint for revival of judgment, even just by himself.

Requisites of Article 461, NCC If indeed a property was the former bed of a river or creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant (owner whose land is occupied by the new course), then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by the claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven that the river or creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the river or creek, (2) the new course of the river or creek, and (3) the change of course of the river or creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence. [Galang v. Reyes (2012)]

Second option Under Art. 448, NCC • In the event that the seller elects to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the “prevailing market value.” The reckoning period for valuing the property in case the landowner exercised his rights in accordance with Article 448 shall be at the time the landowner elected his choice. [Department of Education v. Casibang (2016); Vda. de Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc., 692 SCRA 578 (2013), Tuatis v. Escol (2009)]

Art. 448; Rosales v. Castelltort (2005) From the time the good faith of the possessor ceases, the payment of reasonable rent should accordingly commence at that time since he can no longer avail of the rights provided under the law for builders in good faith.

• The payment of rentals should continue until the landowner serves notice of its option upon the builder and the court; that is, if such option is for the landowner to appropriate the improvements and/or structures. • If the option chosen by petitioners is compulsory sale, however, the payment of rent should continue up to the actual transfer of ownership.

Art. 448; Landowner must choose Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. [Torbela v. Rosario, 661 SCRA 633 (2011); Benedicto v. Flores, 632 SCRA 446 (2010); Arangote v. Maglunob, 579 SCRA 620 (2009)]

Narvaez v. Alciso (2009) • Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase; it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter. If for example, the vendee a retro introduced improvements on the subject property prior to the repurchase, Article 448 will not apply because it will be absurd to compel him to buy the land which he owns.

• In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles 1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448. Under Article 1616, the vendor a retro may exercise his right of redemption by paying the vendee a retro (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. Useful expenses include improvements which augment the value of the land.

Art. 448 and possessor by mere tolerance • In the recent case Department of Education v. Casibang (2016), the Court considered the Department of Education a builder in good faith despite being a mere possessor by tolerance because the landowner permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on his property. • In Feliciano v. Zaldivar (2006), the Court applied Article 448 even if the possession by the builder was by mere tolerance because the Court found the parties mutually in bad faith considering that the landowner did not lift a finger to prevent the construction of the house despite knowledge thereof.

Community Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol (2012) • As a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties. But in Communities Cagayan, Inc. case, where there exists a contract to sell between the parties, the Court also applied Article 448 even if the builders do not have a claim of title over the property since ownership still remains with the seller. • In said case, the Court ruled that respondent-spouses were builders in good faith because no evidence was presented to show that petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses. The Court further ruled that the petitioner could be presumed to have consented to the improvements being constructed because being a subdivision developer, petitioner must have given the respondent-spouses permits to commence and undertake the construction.

Expanded concept of builder in good faith In some special cases, the Court applied Article 448 of the Civil Code beyond the recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases where the builders knew that they were not the owners of the land but they constructed improvements on the land of another with the consent of the owner. In those cases, the Court found that the owners knew and approved of the construction of improvements on the property. Hence, the ruled therein that the structures were built in good faith, even though the builders knew that they were constructing the improvement on land owned by another. [Aquino v. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444 (2015) and Community Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 (2012); see also Automat Realty and Development Corp. v. Dela Cruz, Sr., 737 SCRA 395 (2014) and Department of Education v. Casibang, 782 SCRA 326 (2016)]

Art. 437; Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc (2012) In an expropriation case, the Court uphold the CA ruling which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation because there is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties. The Court, citing Article 437 of the Civil Code and the case of National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim (2007), explained that in the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land and that just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses

Manila Electric Company v. The City Assessor (2015); Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas (2016) • As between the Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations, and the Local Government Code, a special law granting local government units the power to impose real property tax, the latter prevails for the purpose of determining which property is subject to real property tax. • Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines which this Court has recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, as "no longer exempted from real property tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code.

Morales v. Olondriz (2016) On preterition: • The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.

Morales v. Olondriz (2016) On conduct of probate:

• The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will's formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.

Morales v. Olondriz (2016) The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much less grave abuse of discretion - on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.

Hacbang v. Alo (2015) • Ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the decedent's ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.

Hacbang v. Alo (2015) • For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the estate even though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and devisees granted specific properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs.

Lee v. Tambago (2008) • A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

Samaniego-Celada v. Abena (2008) Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate.

Samaniego-Celada v. Abena (2008) • While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code

Lopez v. Lopez (2012) • While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

Echavez v. Dozen Construction and Development Corp. (2010) • As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present case.

Echavez v. Dozen Construction and Development Corp. (2010) • Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement. That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.

Seangio v. Reyes (2006) • Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. • Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect. [

Testate Estate of Late AlipioAbada v. Abaja (2005) • There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.

Heirs of Policarpio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta (2011) • Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.

Palaganas v. Palaganas (2011) • Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

Del Rosario v. Ferrer (2010) • The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of the donors subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property. The Court has held before that the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute

Orendain, Jr. v. Trusteeship of the Estate of Dona Margarita Rodriguez (2009)

• The creation of a perpetual trust for the administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries is not invalid. • The trust is upheld, but only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned. The perpetual prohibition against alienation was valid only for twenty (20) years.

Arado v. Alcoran (2015) • As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court [182 SCRA427,438 (1990)], the right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc. (2007) CIR vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc (2010) Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products (2014)

• Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book I, 1987 Administrative Code impliedly repeals Art. 13, NCC with respect to meaning of “years.” • A “year” now means 12 calendar months.

Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki (2014)

• Doctrine of processual presumption is also referred to as “doctrine of presumed identity approach” in private international law. • All matters affecting real property, including legal capacity to acquire, is governed by lex rei sitae. • Property relations is governed by the national law of the spouses.

Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem (2014) • Issue of obligation to give support by alien father is governed by national law of the father. • But even if the national law of the father neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, said foreign law cannot be applied in the Philippines because it is contrary to a sound and established policy of the forum.

Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp. (2014) • Concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 of the NCC is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. • In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful.

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montano (2010)

• If issue is not the right of “unborn child,” no need to determine the civil personality of conceived child, like when the issue is the right of parent under the CBA with employer. • Civil Code did not define death. • Death simply means cessation of life. • Legitimacy attaches from the moment of conception.

Determination capacity)

of

“sex”

(legal

Silverio v. Republic (2007)  Sex is determined at birth by visual examination of genitals.  No law recognizing effects of sex reassignment. Republic v. Cagandahan (2008)  But if doubt in genitals is due to abnormality in body, choice of individual governs.

Effect of absence of love in marriage Republic v. Albios (2013)  Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love is not the only valid cause for marriage. Republic v. Romero II (2016)  The fact that the husband married his wife not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated.

Instances where “no marriage to speak of” Morigo v. People (2004)  If what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the parties, without the presence of the solemnizing officer.  Court acquitted accused of bigamy and ruled that Article 40, FC does not apply. Republic v. Olaybar (2013)  Involving a case of identity theft, the Court allowed the correction of an entry in the civil registry by cancelling the wife portion in the subject marriage contract without need of a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage, on the ground that there was no marriage to speak of.

Requisites of Marriage Ceremony

Ronulo v. People (2014)  The minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

3 Basic Legal Premises on Divorce: Bayot v. CA (2008) • Divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.

• Reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. • Absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.

ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC

Republic v. Orbecido III (2005)  In applying the provision of the second paragraph of Article 26, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)  Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code while the alien spouse can claim no right under said provision. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.  The registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC Garcia v. Recio (2001) and Amor-Catalan v. CA (2006)  Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (2010)  The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.

ART. 26, PAR. 2, FC Dacasin v. Dacasin (2010)  Philippine courts will recognize the validity of an absolute divorce obtained abroad, insofar as the foreign spouse is concerned irrespective of who obtained the divorce, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. San Luis v. San Luis (2007)  There is no need to retroactively apply the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code because there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to apply the rule embodied in said law to absolute divorces obtained by the foreign spouse prior to the effecivity of the Family Code.

ART. 34, FC. Republic v. Dayot (2008) and De Castro v. AssidaoDe Castro (2008)  Falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.  The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.

ART. 34, FC. Santiago v. People (2015)  The falsity of an affidavit of cohabitation CANNOT be used as a defense in the crime of bigamy, for it will be the height of absurdity for the Court to allow the accused to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

Petition for Nullity vs. Rule 108 Barza v. City Civil Registrar, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental (2009)  Court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Republic v. Olaybar (2013)  In case of identity theft, Court allowed the correction of the certificate of marriage by cancelling the name of the respondent in the wife portion thereof under Rule 108. It was held that the respondent did not seek the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of.

Personality to File Petition for Nullity Juliano-Llave v. Republic (2011) and Fujiki v. Marinay (2013)  The rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.  Or better yet, the rule refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage because the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.

ART. 36, FC Suazo v. Suazo (2010); Agraviador v. Agraviador (2010) and Ting v. Velez-Ting (2009)  The case of Ngo Te v. Yu Te did not abandon the Molina guidelines.  It simply suggested for the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Tenebro v. CA (2004)  Even if 2nd marriage is void under Art. 36, crime of bigamy is still committed because there is recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

Art. 40, FC Antone v. Beronilla (2010)  Morigo v. People did not abandon Mercado v. Tan. Mercado is still good law. Jarillo v. People (2010) and Montanez v. Cipriano (2012)  Where 1st marriage is declared void under Art. 36, Court still applied Art. 40 even if 2nd marriage was before FC. Court explained that Art. 40 may be applied retroactively because it is a mere rule of procedure.

Art. 41, FC SSS v. Vda. De Bailon (2006)  There are two ways of terminating the subsequent marriage, to wit: (1) by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance; or (2) by a judicial declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.  Mere reappearance of absentee spouse does not terminate marriage.

Art. 41, FC Santos v. Santos (2014)  If the presumptively dead spouse has not really been absent and the judicial declaration of presumptive death was obtained by fraud, the second is marriage is void for being bigamous.  A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, does not terminate the first marriage because it lacks the requirement of a wellfounded belief that the spouse is already dead. Hence, the second marriage is void for being bigamous.

Santos v. Santos (2014)  If the presumptively dead spouse has not really been absent and the judicial declaration of presumptive death was obtained by fraud, the remedy is not the filing of an affidavit of reappearance but an action to annul the judgment declaring him/her presumptively dead.

Santos v. Santos (2014) The Court reasoned out that if the presumptively dead spouse is to be limited to the filing of an affidavit of reappearance as his/her remedy, such remedy is not sufficient because: (1) it carries with it an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead; (2) if the subsequent marriage is terminated by mere recording of the affidavit of reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate; (3) the property relations of the spouse in the subsequent marriage will be the same as in valid marriages; and (4) a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.

Art. 41, FC Manuel v. People (2005)  Article 41 of the FC was enacted to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the RPC and to put to rest the confusion spawned by the previous rulings of the Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership Hapitan v. Lagradilla (2016)  When a husband waives a court decision declaring sale of conjugal property as void w/o wife’s consent, waiver is invalid under Art. 89. Flores v. Lindo (2011)  When wife mortgaged conjugal property w/o husband consent, mortgage is void. But subsequent execution of SPA by husband authorizing wife to mortgage the same is perfection of the continuing offer.

Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership: Art. 103 and 130, FC Domingo v. Molina (2016)  Where death and sale took place prior to FC, Art. 130 cannot be applied retroactively because vested rights will be prejudiced. Sale is valid but will only affect the ideal share of selling co-owner. Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servacio (2011) ** Bersamin  Where death was prior to FC but sale was during effectivity of FC, Court ruled that sale is not void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. . Sale is valid but will only affect the ideal share of selling co-owner.

Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. (2012)  Property of regime of a marriage celebrated under the Civil Code w/o marriage settlement is conjugal partnership. And said regime is not automatically converted into absolute community upon effectivity of FC. Article 75 does not apply retroactively even if no vested rights are prejudiced.

Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership: Presumption of Conjugality Dela Pena v. Avila (2012)  When the property is registered in the name of only one spouse and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by same spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to the said spouse.  If the property is registered in the name of one of the spouses, with a description that he or she “is married to” the other spouse, the same is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.

Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership: Presumption of Conjugality

Matthews v. Taylor (2009)  Even if the property was acquired during the marriage, the presumption in favor of conjugality cannot be applied with respect to private lands if one of the spouses is an alien for this will be in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits aliens from acquiring private lands in the Philippines.

Absolute Community/Conjugal Obligations

Partnership:

Dewara v. Lamela (2011) and Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. (2012)  Article 122 of the Family Code allows payment of criminal indemnities even prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, so long as the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 have been covered. The Court explained that such is not altogether unfair since Article 122 of the Family Code states that “at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such (offending) spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.”

Absolute Community/Conjugal Good Faith of Buyer

Partnership:

Bautista v. Silva (2006); Ravina v. Villa-Abrille (2009) and Aggabao v. Parulan (2010)* * Bersamin case.  The buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.

Property Regime of Void Marriages

1) Property regime of a void marriage under Art. 36 is that provided in Article 147. [Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr (2003) and Dino v. Dino (2011). 2) Property regime of void marriage under Art. 40 is either absolute community, conjugal partnership, or even complete separation. [Dino v. Dino (2011)]

Property Regime of Void Marriages Dino v. Dino (2011)  If the subsequent marriage is void by reason of non-compliance with Article 40 (but the prior marriage is indeed void ab initio), the property relations of the parties to the subsequent marriage may either absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. 

Sec. 19(1) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which requires the liquidation, partition and distribution of properties prior to the issuance of decree of nullity of the marriage applies only to a void marriage under Article 40 of the Family Code when said rule mentions of “decree of absolute nullity” and not to a marriage declared void by reason of psychological incapacity.

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In the latter case, since the applicable property regime is that provided in Article 147 of the Family Code, the declaration of nullity can already be made even without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties because it is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Family Home Eulogio v. Bell, Sr. (2015)  If the increase in value is by reason of an involuntary improvement, like the conversion into a residential area or the establishment of roads and other facilities, the one establishing the family home should not be punished by making his home liable to creditors.  To warrant, therefore, the execution sale of the family home under Article 160, the following facts are required to be established: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.

Family Home Cabang v. Basay (2009)  It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the latter. If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only on his or her own property. Arriola v. Arriola (2008)  Even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.

Paternity and Filiation Concepcion v. CA (2005)  Court applied presumption of legitimacy to a child of the bigamous marriage, that it is presumed legitimate child of the valid marriage. Branza v. City Civil Registrar, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental (2009)  Issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

Paternity and Filiation Arado v. Alcoran (2015) ** Bersamin Case  When there is a showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, as when he was the one caused the registration the child’s birth certificate, the same is competent evidence even if not signed by the father.

Paternity and Filiation Dela Cruz v. Gracia (2009) and Aguilar v. Siasat (2015) If there is admission of filiation in the handwritten instrument but the same was not signed by the alleged parent, rules are: • Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and • Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Paternity and Filiation Perla v. Baring (2012)  The child offered the following testimony to prove his illegitimate filiation with the putative father: (1) that during their first encounter in 1994, the child called the alleged father as “Papa” and kissed his hand while the alleged father hugged him and promised to support him; and (2) that his alleged Aunt treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place. The Court ruled that such acts cannot be considered as indications of child’s open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.

Paternity and Filiation Grande v. Antonio (2014)  Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255, gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. Hence, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

Adoption Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian (2006)  Since adoption is essentially a juridical act, a ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial adoption), is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir . IRR OF RA 9523: Any of the following adoption proceedings in court does not require a Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption: (1) adoption of an illegitimate child by any of his/her biological parent; (2) adoption of a child by his/her step-parent; or (3) adoption of a child by a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.

Adoption In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim (2009)  The requirement of joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. According to the Court, the use of the word “shall” in Section 7 of the DAA means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory.

Adoption Castro v. Gregorio (2014)  In the adoption by a spouse of his illegitimate child, the consent of other spouse is mandatory.  The other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons and it is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service; otherwise, the court does not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings and the decision of the court is null and void.  The remedy of other spouse is annulment of adoption decree.

Adoption Foster Care Act of 2012  In case of adoption of the foster child by the designated foster parents, the trial custody period may be partially waived to the extent of the period equivalent to the period in which the foster child has been under the foster care of the foster parents; provided, that a harmonious relationship exists between the foster child, the foster parents, and, where applicable, the foster family.

Adoption Bartolome v. SSS (2014)  When the adopter dies during the time that the adopted is still a minor or incapacitated, the parental authority of the biological parent is deemed to have been restored. Considering that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by adoption, there shall be no one left to care for minor adopted child if the adopter passed away, hence, the parental authority of the biological parent should be deemed to have been restored, applying by analogy the provisions of Section 20 of the DAA.

Support Lim v. Lim (2009)  the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.  The second option of giving support may not be availed of when the wife and the minor children left the house of the in-laws where they were then living when she caught her husband in a “very compromising situation” with the in-house midwife of the mother-in-law. It amounts to moral obstacle.

Support Mangonon v. CA (2006)  The second option may not be availed of when the relations between the parties were already strained brought about by the filing of the suit for declaration of legitimacy and support and the denial by the grandfather of familial relationship with the grandchildren, which amounted to legal and moral obstacle for the availment of the second option according to the Court. Lam v. Chua (2004)  Any judgment granting support never becomes final and is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and capabilities of the parents to give support.

Parental Authority Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (2005) and GamboaHirsch v. CA (2007)  The rule that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother is called the “tender-age presumption.” Dacasin v. Dacasin (2010)  The statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code is mandatory and any agreement to the contrary is void.

Parental Authority Becket v. Sarmiento, Jr. (2013)  Custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not permanent.  Thus, in a very real sense, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.

Funeral Valino v. Adriano (2014)  The wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not, however, absolute, as said wishes are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. Thus, if the husband was cohabiting with another woman at the time of his death and expressly wished that he be buried in the family mausoleum of the paramour against the wishes of his legitimate family, said wish cannot prevail over the right and duty of the loved ones under Article 305 of the Civil Code to make the proper arrangements.