2017 Case Digests - Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW

CRIMINAL LAW I. REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC) BOOK I A.FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW 1. DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL LAW i. MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHELLE DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 214500, June 28, 2017, PERALTA, J.: It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. FACTS: The accused was charged with Illegal Recruitment in large scale and 3 counts of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. 3 complainants were presented as witnesses. According to the first witness, she was enticed to work in South Korea with a prospective salary of 50,000 to 80,000. She gave the accused a total amount of 200,000 for the expenses on her visa and documents. However, after waiting for several months, the accused failed to give them their visa and upon inquiry, they were given stubs allegedly for the Embassy of South Korea, which all turned out to be fake. The third witness was also duped in the same manner and gave a total amount of 82,000 plus US$272. The accused for her defense claimed that she never promised them deployment abroad and that she merely assisted them in accomplishing their required documents. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged. RULING: YES. The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of overseas employment, appellant received monies from private complainants. Such acts were accurately described in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We can conclude that all three elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are present in the instant case. To recapitulate: First, appellant engaged in recruitment when she represented herself to be capable of deploying workers to South Korea upon submission of the pertinent documents and payment of the required fees; Second, all three (3) private complainants positively identified appellant as the person who promised them employment as domestic helpers in Korea for a fee; and Third, Rosalina Rosales of the Licensing Division of the POEA, testified that as per Certification issued by Noriel Devanadera, Page 1 of 233

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Director IV, Licensing and Regulation Office, appellant is not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution. Furthermore, we agree with the court a quo that the same pieces of evidence which establish appellant's liability for illegal recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her culpability for estafa. In the instant case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded private complainants by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send them to South Korea for work as domestic helpers, even as she does not have a license or authority for the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private complainants delivered various amounts for purportedly travel expenses and visa assistance to appellant.Clearly, private complainants would not have parted with their money wereit not for such enticement by appellant. As a consequence of appellant's false pretenses, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the money they paid were never recovered. All these representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellant must be made liable under par. 2 (a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. APPLICABILITY AND EFFECTIVITY OF THE PENAL CODE i. TERRITORIALITY GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v.JUAN ANTONIO MUNOZ G.R. No. 207342, November 07, 2017, En Banc, BERSAMIN, J. Under the rule of specialty in international law, a requested state shall surrender to a requesting state a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of extradition. FACTS: Petitioner filed an MR seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court where it held that respondent Munoz could only be extradited to and tried by the HK SR for 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, but not for the other crime of accepting an advantage as an agent. The Court reasoned that is because the former was a public sector offense while the latter dealt with private sector bribery, this the dual criminality rule embodied in the treaty of extradition between the HK SAR and the Philippines has not been met. Petitioner argues on the basis of a decision supposedly handed down by the Court of Final Appeal of the HK SAR that Section 9 of HK SAR’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance also covered public servants in other jurisdictions. The extradition treaty between the two states also provide in Article 2 that surrender of the extradite shall only be for an offense coming within any of the descriptions of the offense therein listed insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws of both parties. ISSUE: Whether or not Munoz may be tried in HK for accepting advantage as an agent.

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RULING: The Court cannot take judicial notice of the decision handed down by the HK SAR’s Court of Final appeal. Moreover, during proceedings in the lower courts, experts in Hong Kong law were of the opinion that accepting advantage as an agent is a private sector offense. This, the Philippines is not bound to surrender Munoz for trial for this offense as it falls outside the coverage of Article 2, and the dual criminality rule embodied in the extradition treaty between Hongkong SAR and the Philippines.

B. FELONIES 1. CRIMINAL LIABILITIES AND FELONIES i. CONTINUING CRIMES NOEL NAVAJA v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO G.R. No. 180969. September 11, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. A delito continuado consists of several crimes, but in reality, there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator. FACTS: The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana Navaja of the crime of falsification of a Private Document. In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms. Magsigay, a material witness for DKT, was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing before the OPP-Bohol on March 15, 2004 in order to shed light on the official receipt allegedly falsified by Ana Navaja.On March 9, 2004, petitioner, who is Ana Navaja’s husband, allegedly went to Ms. Magsigay’s workplace in Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and told her that as per instruction from Ana Navaja’s lawyer, Atty. Bonghanoy, her attendance in the scheduled hearing is no longer needed. Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing where petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and notarized by a certain Atty. Grapa in Cebu City, supporting Ana Navaja’s counter-affidavit. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations of PD 1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same law allegedly committed during the pendency of a single proceeding. RULING: NO. In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated September 22, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 before the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing; and (b) an Information dated August 27, 2004 charging him of Page 3 of 233

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violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit. While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse – that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol. The foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.In Santiago v. Garchitorena,the Court explained the principle of delito continuado as follows: Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152). Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

ii. COMPLEX CRIMES AND COMPOSITE CRIMES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDY DOMINGO G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.: There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary objective of the accused is to commit rape. FACTS: The accused was charged with Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by AAA. According to her, the accused worked in a fish stall market, and on the day of the rape, she was approached by the former and suggested to accompany her to her house. Since her cousin has not arrived, she agreed. When they boarded the tricycle the accused pointed a knife on her waist and brought her to a house where he had carnal knowledge with her. The abuse happened 3 more times during the time she was with the accused. The accused on the other hand, claims that AAA was his girlfriend. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of forcible abduction with rape. RULING: YES. We affirm the CA's decision with modification of the characterization of the crime committed.Under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of forcible abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented. Page 4 of 233

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Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the appellant should be convicted only of rape. His forcible abduction of AAA was absorbed by the rape considering that his real objective in abducting her was to commit the rape. Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted only of rape. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON BELMONTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 220889. July 5, 2017 TIJAM, J. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. FACTS: In the evening of August 31, 2007, Hiroshi celebrated his 17th birthday with his friends in the house of his aunt Teodora and uncle Robert Dela Cruz in Pasig City. When it was already 12:00 midnight, Jolly, one of Hiroshi's friends who was present at the celebration, left the group to buy some beer from a nearby store. At the store, Jolly met Enrile, who asked him if he could join them in the drinking spree at Hiroshi's place. Enrile then helped Jolly carry the half case of beer and joined in the drinking spree at Hiroshi's house. At around 2:00 a.m. of September 1, 2007, Jolly left the group and was followed by Enrile, but the latter soon returned to the party and was accompanied by accused-appellant and his brother Marvin, and Noel. Armed with guns and a knife,the three men approached and suddenly boxed Enrile, then tied the hands of all the persons inside the house and ordered them to lie down on the floor as they took their personal belongings. Meanwhile, the maids of spouses Teodora and Robert, namely, AAA and Rhea Brioso, were awakened inside their quarters by the presence of two men, later identified as accused-appellant and Noel. Upon Noel's order, AAA was left inside the room. Noel immediately locked the door, and at gunpoint, ordered AAA to remove her pants. He told AAA to lie down, then he inserted his penis into her vagina.Thereafter, Noel and Marvin entered the room of spouses Teodora and Robert through the window. Teodora was awakened and was surprised, hence, she shouted which prompted Robert to get up from bed. At gunpoint, Noel and Marvin ordered the spouses to lie on the bed while they searched the room; then they took away some pieces of jewelry, laptop, ATM card, cash amounting to PhP 6,700 and 23 pieces of Yen.Teodora recognized the faces of Noel and Marvin since the room was illuminated by light coming from a lamp shade. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a crime of Robbery with Rape in this case. RULING: YES. The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. Page 5 of 233

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The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. As stated above, once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, as in the present case, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape.The immediately preceding condition is absent in this case. The factual finding of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is already irreversible holding that while accused-appellant did not rape AAA, he, however, did not endeavor to stop Noel despite an opportunity.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY i. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NESTOR M. BUGARIN G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017, PERALTA, J.: Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. Having admitted the shooting of the victims, the burden shifted to accused to prove that he indeed acted in self-defense by establishing the following with clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. FACTS: Pontanars and the Bugarins had been harboring ill-feelings towards each other. On the evening of May 30, 2008, the spouses Esmeraldo and Maria Glen Pontanars were on their way to the house of their father, which was likewise near the house of the Bugarins. When they were close to the house of the Bugarins, Esmeraldo's sister, Anecita, then started throwing gravel and sand at them. Esmeraldo asked her to stop but she refused to listen. Thereafter, Nestor Bugarin (Bugarin), Anecita' s husband, came out of their house and suddenly shot Esmeraldo several times. Esmeraldo sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the back and one (1) in his left side, which later took his life. Maria Glen immediately ran and hid behind a parked car to save herself. She then saw her fatherin-law, Cristito, running out of his house towards Esmeraldo's direction. Cristito raised his hands and begged Bugarin to stop shooting. But Bugarin also shot him, causing his death. Bugarin then looked for Maria Glen and when he finally found her, he also shot her. Fortunately, Maria Glen was only hit in her thigh. Informations were filed charging Bugarin with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of attempted murder. Bugarin contended that what he had done was merely an act of selfdefense.

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The RTC and CA found Bugarin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder and attempted murder with the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm in all three (3) cases. ISSUE: Whether or not Bugarin is guilty of the crimes charged. RULING: YES. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. Having admitted the shooting of the victims, the burden shifted to Bugarin to prove that he indeed acted in self-defense by establishing the following with clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Bugarin, however, miserably failed to discharge this burden. One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving the aforementioned elements. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. Contrary to his claims, the evidence of the case shows that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. Murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. The trial court aptly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the crimes to murder and attempted murder because the attack was sudden and unexpected. NICOLAS VELASQUEZ and VICTOR VELASQUEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017, LEONEN, J.: An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability. However, he asserts that he is justified in committing the acts. In the process of proving a justifying circumstance, the accused risks admitting the imputed acts, which may justify the existence of an offense were it not for the exculpating facts. Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying circumstances. FACTS: The spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep in their nipa hut. Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo (Nora) in the midst of having sex. Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo (Jesus) shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away. Jesus decided Page 7 of 233

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to pursue Ampong and Nora. Jesus went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora was there. He began making his way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused. Without provocation, accused Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone. accused Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone. Accused Felix did the same, hitting Jesus above his left ear. Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo, hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder. Ampong punched Jesus on his left cheek. The accused then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then got up and staggered his way back to their house. Jesus was found to have sustained a crack in his skull. In an Information, the accused were charged with attempted murder. Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of themselves, and also in defense of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother. Thus, they invoke the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence: first, to prove that justifying circumstances existed, and second, to convict the petitioners. RULING: NO. It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. In the case at bar, there is no unlawful aggression. The accused offered nothing more than a selfserving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent and credible proof to back up their assertions. Thus, there is no justifying circumstance. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO RAYTOS G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.: Page 8 of 233

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Time and again, this Court has held that when an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting defense of one's self. FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of murder of David Arraza. According to the accused, the victim while in a party, asked who was brave enough while wielding a knife. The accused then tried to escape his attacks and was able to grab the victim’s hand, get hold of the knife and stabbed the latter multiple times. The prosecution on the other hand alleged that the accused approached the victim while he was dancing at the party. While the victim had his back from the accused, the latter stabbed him multiple times. Both the RTC and the CA found the accused guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder. RULING: YES. A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime; accordingly, the onus probandi falls on the accused to prove that such killing was justified - failure to discharge which renders the act punishable. Thus, to exonerate himself, the accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; (ii) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (iii) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part.After poring over the records of this case, the Court is convinced that Raytos failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, David Araza (Araza). Necessarily, Raytos' claim of self-defense has no more leg to stand on. Here, it is difficult to imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was suddenly able to grab hold of Araza's hand and after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded to stab him multiple times in quick succession. Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger - not merely a threatening or intimidating action. In People v. Escarlos, the Court ruled that the mere drawing of a knife by the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression, whether actual or imminent, as the peril sought to be avoided by the accused was both premature and speculative. Treachery or alevosia, is present when the offender adopts means, methods, or forms in the execution of the felony that ensure its commission without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.To stress, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were unwavering as to the manner of killing - that Raytos suddenly stabbed Araza from the back while holding the latter's shoulder. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GODOFREDO MACARAIG G.R. No. 219848, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.:

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Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. FACTS: The accused was charged with the Murder of Joven Celeste. The victim was with his friends in a basketball court for a dance. On their way home, the accused was seen following them. The accused then approached the victim from the back, placed his left hand over his shoulder then suddenly stabbed the victim. The victim was even managed to go home and tell his parents that he was stabbed by the accused. The accused raised self-defense as a justifying circumstance. The RTC found him guilty of Murder as affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Murder. RULING: When the accused, however, admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC, viz.: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of all the burdens the accused-appellant carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to selfdefense. We do not see the credibility of accused-appellant's theory of self-defense. Suffice it to state that his version of what transpired, specifically that the victim and his companions mauled him, is vague, and too implausible to merit any weight. At the outset, accused-appellant was uncertain as to who were the men who assaulted him and whether the victim was one of those men who allegedly attempted to stab him. Further, accused-appellant claims that it was not him but the victim's companion who ended up stabbing him since accused-appellant was able to evade the blows. Evidently, without a clear showing that the victim attacked or tried to attack accused-appellant, we find that unlawful aggression cannot be deemed to have occurred. ANTONIO A. SOMBILON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177246, September 25, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.: Page 10 of 233

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The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. FACTS: This is a case for homicide. Petitioner Sombillon, then the barangay chairman, was creating a commotion in the house of one Nelson Andres by firing gunshots, shouting, and even pointing the gun at Andres. When SPO3 Gerardo Amerilla came to know about this, he went to Andres’ house. According to Andres, Amerilla, upon arriving at his house, asked the petitioner what his problem was all about, but the latter instantly fired his gun twice at Amerilla and the latter fell face down to the ground. Amerilla crawled towards the gate of Andres' house seeking his help, but no one could approach him because the petitioner stayed around for about 25 meters and prevented others from going to the victim's aid. Amerilla died on the spot. Petitioner invoked self-defense. Petitioner alleged that he visited Andres to talk about the selective lighting done by the electric cooperative having charge of their locality. Petitioner further alleged that as he was about to leave Andres’ house, he saw a person airming and firing a gun at him. Fearing for his life, petitioner had drawn his .45 caliber gun and fired twice at his assailant, which turned out to be Amerilla. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner acted in self-defense in fatally shooting Amerilla. RULING: NO. The petitioner had to prove that the following elements of self-defense were present, namely: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim's aggression. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. The petitioner manifestly did not discharge his burden. He did not persuasively show that Amerilla had committed unlawful aggression against him as to endanger his life and limb. The petitioner's insistence that Amerilla had been the first to aim and fire his gun remained uncorroborated, Verily, the claim of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was also weak due mainly to the failure to recover the victim's alleged gun in the place where the shooting happened during the ensuing investigation. The defense was rendered improbable by his immediately running away from the scene of the shooting and fleeing towards his house instead of going towards the victim whom he professed not to have then recognized. The improbability rested on his being the incumbent barangay chairman of the place, and, as such, had the heavy responsibility of keeping the peace and maintaining order thereat. More telling was the established fact that even before Amerilla came around the petitioner Page 11 of 233

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had already been firing his gun in order to scare Andres. The very reason for Amerilla's going to the house of Andres was to try to pacify the troublemaking of the petitioner. The belligerent conduct of the petitioner manifested a predisposition for aggressiveness on his part instead of on the part of the victim. DANILO REMEGIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 196945, September 27, 2017, MARTIRES, J.: Under the law, a person does not incur any criminal liability if the act committed is in defense of his person. Thus, all the elements of self-defense having been established in this case, petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide of Sumugat. Petitioner invoked self-defense. It was uncontested that petitioner was the caretaker of his brother-in-law’s land. The said land was planted with various trees such as ipil-ipil. Petitioner saw the victim Sumugat cutting the ipil-ipil tree on the land taken care of by petitioner. Petitioner approached Sumugat. At this point, the version of the defense and the prosecution differ. According to the defense, petitioner told Sumugat to cut only the branches of the ipil-ipil tree and not its trunk as it would be placed in the warehouse because his in-laws would be arriving from the United States. Sumugat became infuriated and shouted, "You have nothing to do with this. You are only an in-law. I will kill you.”Sumugat then drew a revolver from his waist and aimed it at petitioner. Petitioner raised both of his hands and told Sumugat that he would not fight him, but Sumugat repeated that he would kill him. Fearing for his life, petitioner grappled with Sumugat for possession of the gun. He successfully took the gun from Sumugat but the latter picked up the chainsaw, turned it on, and advanced towards petitioner. Petitioner stepped back and shot at the ground to warn Sumugat, but the latter continued thrusting the chainsaw at him. Petitioner parried the chainsaw blade with his left hand, but he lost his balance and accidentally pressed the gun's trigger, thus firing a shot which hit Sumugat in the chest. However, the prosecution said that petitioner threatened to shoot Sumugat if the latter would not desist from cutting the tree. Sumugat then answered that the tree was obstructing his way. Petitioner thus drew his gun and fired at Sumugat's direction, but he missed. Sumugat turned on the chainsaw, which provoked petitioner to shoot him on the left foot. Infuriated, Sumugat continued to brandish the chainsaw, but petitioner shot him in the chest. The RTC convicted petitioner as charged. It ruled that there was sufficient provocation on petitioner’s part. The CA affirmed the conviction. However, it ruled that there was unlawful aggression on Sumugat’s part. Nevertheless, the CA held that the way petitioner killed Sumugat was not a mean reasonably necessary to repel the unlawful aggression. It disagreed with the RTC that there was sufficient provocation on petitioner’s part. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can successfully invoke self-defense. RULING: Page 12 of 233

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YES. For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements as provided under the first paragraph, Article 11 of the RPC: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. [Unlawful aggession is present.] Doubtless, the utterance of Sumugat to kill petitioner coupled by his act of aiming a gun at him, and his continued thrusting of the chainsaw that hit petitioner's palm constitute unlawful aggression. [Reasonable necessity of the means employed is present.] First, it must be noted that the gun which petitioner grabbed from the victim was the only weapon available to him and that the victim was continuing to thrust the chainsaw towards him. The chainsaw was switched on when the victim was thrusting it towards petitioner. Hence, the danger that petitioner would be cut into pieces by the chainsaw was very real. Certainly, it would have been different if the victim assaulted petitioner using a blunt object for in that case, the use of a gun to repel such attack would undoubtedly be unreasonable. Second, the fact that the victim was older than petitioner is not an accurate gauge to declare that the former was weaker than the latter. Youth is not tantamount to strength as advanced age does not connote frailty. In this case, the victim, despite being 62 years ofage at the time ofthe incident, was certainly not feeble considering that he was able to operate the chainsaw to cut the uprooted tree. Further, even if the victim's left foot was wounded by the first shot fired, it is not entirely impossible that he continued to assault petitioner using the chainsaw. Third, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as an important indicia. It is worthy to note that petitioner did not immediately shoot the victim when he successfully took possession of the gun. He shot Sumugat only when the latter continued to attack him with the chainsaw. In addition, petitioner's first shot wounded the victim on the left foot. It was only when he was slashed by the chainsaw on his left hand that petitioner fired the fatal shot. [Lack of sufficient provocation is present.] When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, it requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to the act committed and that it be adequate to arouse one to its commission. It is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. Petitioner’s act of telling the victim not to cut the trunk of the uprooted tree could hardly be considered provocative act be unreasonable or annoying provocation. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GIO COSGAFA, ET AL. G.R. No. 218250. July 10, 2017 TIJAM, J. Self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense for it is easy to fabricate.Thus, it must be proven by satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.The following elements must thus be proved by clear and convincing evidence, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

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FACTS: At around 6:30 p.m. brothers Ronald and Rosbill, Panfilo, a certain Joseph and Bryan were at the victim's house for the fiesta. After dinner, they finished half a gallon of Bahalina, an aged native coco-wine. At around 1:00 a.m. the following day, the group decided to go to the disco held at a nearby school. On their way thereto, the group stopped by a sari-sari store owned by a retired police officer Lapiz to talk to a certain person who called the victim. While waiting, Rosbill, Joseph, and Panfilo proceeded to the bridge, about seven meters away, and sat on the railings. When they got there, accused-appellants were already sitting on the railings across them. Suddenly, Gio approached Rosbill and tried to box him but he did not connect. Rosbill, Joseph, and Panfilo then ran back to where they left the rest of the group and told them what happened. Upon learning what happened, the victim proceeded to the bridge to confront Gio. When he got there, accusedappellants took turns in holding and stabbing the victim. When the victim fell on the ground, the accused-appellants ran away. Seeing that the accused-appellants had deadly weapons and they had none, the victim's group failed to come to his rescue.The victim was then brought to the hospital but was declared dead therein. ISSUE: Whether or not Gio and Jimmy may properly invoke self-defense. RULING: NO. It bears stressing that self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense for it is easy to fabricate.Thus, it must be proven by satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.The following elements must thus be proved by clear and convincing evidence, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. After a careful review of this case, the Court ruled that the above-enumerated elements are not present in this case. In this case, accused-appellants' self-serving assertion that the victim was the aggressor when the latter, without provocation on their part, chased them and held Jimmy's shirt and kicked him until he fell on the ground, cannot prevail over the positive and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, found credible by the RTC and the CA, as to what actually transpired. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense, the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. From the foregoing, Gio and Jimmy's self-defense plea necessarily fails. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AUGUTO F. GALLANOSA, JR. G.R. No. 219885. July 17, 2017 CARPIO, ACTING C.J. Page 14 of 233

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There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused claiming self-defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and imminent threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense. FACTS: This is an appeal from the CA’s decision convicting appellant of two counts of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 1631 and 1632. In Criminal Case No. 1631, the victim, Nonilon, was stabbed by appellant 5 times which caused Nonilon's death. When appellant started attacking Nonilon, the latter was already in a kneeling position with his hands raised, indicating a position of surrender. However, appellant still hacked Nonilon, hitting him on his left forearm. Thereafter, appellant stabbed Nonilon four more times on the right and left chest. In Criminal Case No. 1632, appellant claimed that Dante was about to attack his father with a knife when he arrived at the crime scene. When Dante faced him and tried to stab him, appellant accidentally stabbed Dante. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant was able to prove self-defense to acquit him in the two counts of murder RULING: NO. In Criminal Case No. 1631, even if there might be unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon at the start, it already ceased at the moment of his stabbing. At that moment, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon which amounts to actual or imminent threat to the life of appellant. Thus, the first element of unlawful aggression is already lacking in this case. In Criminal Case No. 1632, Appellant's testimony that he "accidentally stabbed" Dante is incongruent with his claim of self-defense. Unlawful aggression, as an essential and primary element of self-defense, must be real and imminent and not merely speculative. Moreover, the defense failed to prove that Dante tried to stab appellant and his father. There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused claiming self-defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and imminent threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONATHAN TICA Y EPANTO G.R. No. 222561. August 30, 2017 PERALTA, J.

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Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of selfdefense; if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis. FACTS: Accused-appellant Jonathan Tica y Epanto (Tica) was indicted for Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. That the accused, Tica passed by, holding a knife and proceeding towards Intia. When he went near him, the latter tried to stand up and run away, but he fell down to the sea face up. He was immediately stabbed about six times while Tica was on top of him. Many people approached and watched the incident. After that, Tica went home, while Intia was brought to the hospital, where he was -declared dead on arrival. Subsequently, Tica was arrested by the barangay tanods and was brought to Puerto police station. ISSUE: Whether or not self-defense may be invoked in this case. RULING: NO, self-defense may not be invoked. The essential elements of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense; if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of selfdefense will have no basis. What actually transpired in the present case is not an act of self-defense but an act of retaliation on the part of Tica. These two concepts are not the same. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. Undoubtedly, Tica went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries to Intia, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased the night before. Hence, the accused’s acts did not constitute self-defense. ||| SOMBILON v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 177246, September 25, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J. Page 16 of 233

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The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. FACTS: An information charged Sombilon with homicide for the death of Gerardo Amerilla, whom Sombilon shot. Sombilon pointed a gun at Nelson Andres and forced to be let inside his house, where Sombilon caused a commotion, randomly shooting. Amerilla, one of the policemen who arrived at the scene, asked petitioner what was happening but was instead shot twice. Before dying, Amerilla pointed to Sombilon when asked as to who shot him. Sombilon, a barangay chairman of Lanas, San Jose, Romblon, admitted to shooting Amerilla but interposed self-defense. On November 18, 1997, several of his constituents complained about the selective lighting by the Tablas Island Electric Cooperative (TIELCO), and that as chairman, he assured he would be talking to Andres, President of the Barangay Power Association. When he was about to exit the house of Andres, he saw Amerilla firing a gun at him. He fired back and ran home. After arriving home, he asked a kagawad to help him bring the assailant to the hospital. The RTC found Sombilon guilty of homicide and dismissed his plea of self-defense because the gun the victim supposedly fired at him had not been recovered. It was contrary to human experience that Sombilon ran home instead of checking who his assailant was. The CA upheld the judgment of the RTC because petitioner did not establish unlawful aggression. ISSUE: Whether or not Sombilon proved having acted in self-defense. RULING: To successfully prove a plea of self-defense, the following must be present: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself. There must be (a) a physical attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or at least imminent; and (c) the attack of assault must be unlawful. The petitioner did not discharge this burden. He did not persuasively show Amerilla had committed unlawful aggression against him as to endanger his life and limb. REMEGIO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 196945, September 27, 2017, Third Division, MARTIRES, J. Page 17 of 233

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Under the law, a person does not incur any criminal liability if the act committed is in defense of his person. FACTS: An information charged Remegio with homicide for fatally shooting Felix Sumugat. Remegio, a caretaker of his brother-in-law’s property, approached Sumugat to tell him to stop cutting an ipilipil tree with a chainsaw, but the latter told Remegio “You have nothing to do with this. You are only an in-law. I will kill you”. Sumugat continued to cut the tree despite Remegio’s instruction to just cut off the branches, prompting the latter to wrest a gun from the former to shoot him in the chest. Before dying, Sumugat swung the chainsaw, hitting petitioner in the palm and causing the latter to throw the gun to a canal. Petitioner interposes self-defense as he had to shoot him because Sumugat swung the chainsaw. The RTC found him guilty as it found his act of telling the victim to stop cutting the tree was provocation on his part. The CA affirmed the conviction, finding the element of unlawful aggression present. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense RULING: For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements as provided under the first paragraph, Article 11 of the RPC: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There was unlawful aggression on the part of Sumugat when the latter told Remegio he was merely an in-law and that Sumugat would kill him. Sumugat also aimed a gun at him and continued to thrust the chainsaw at Remegio. The means employed was reasonable, as petitioner had only the gun available to him while Sumugat continuously swung the chainsaw at him. Further, Remegio only shot Sumugat when the latter continued to attack him with the chainsaw. Petitioner’s act of telling the victim not to cut the trunk of the uprooted tree did not amount to sufficient provocation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPIPNES v. LORETO DAGSIL G.R. No. 218945, December 13, 2017, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. Insanity as a defense must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. An accused’s testimony which vividly paints the events that transpired the day the crime was committed could not be the basis of a defense of insanity. Page 18 of 233

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FACTS: The accused in this case was charged with murder. Evidence for the prosecution showed that he stabbed the victim which caused her eventual death. The defense of the accused was that he was in a state of insanity at the time of the killing. He claimed that he was confused, lost hist mind, and could not remember the events that transpired. The RTC convicted the accused, and the CA affirmed this ruling ISSUE: Whether or not accused can avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity. RULING: Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. In this case, the court was not convinced that the accused was insane. His answers to the questions propounded to him by his counsel were intelligent, responsive, and straightforward; they were not the answers of an unintelligent person or nitwit that he says he is. In fact, his testimony was filled with vivid details and he clearly remembers the events that happened before and after the commission of the crime. Against this factual backdrop, which convincingly showed that he is an intelligent, cognitive, rational and thinking person at the time of the stabbing, the plea of insanity must be rejected because it has no leg to stand on. PO1 CELSO TABOBO III v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 220977, June 19, 2017, REYES, J.: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased, it was incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. FACTS: In 2005, Manuel Escudero (Escudero) was killed by a riding in tandem along P. Ocampo St. in Manila. The incident was immediately reported to MPD Station 9 resulting to the arrest of the suspects Victor Martin (Martin) and Leopoldo Villanueva. While being interrogated, Martin asked a police officer to remove his handcuffs to answer the call of nature. However, the former grabbed the latter’s service firearm resulting to a scuffle and the gun went off. Petitioner who was then downstairs, heard the gunshot and immediately went to see his colleague. When he saw the other police officer subdued by Martin, he fired 2 shots hitting the latter on his chest causing his death. Consequently, he was charged with the crime of Homicide. The Petitioner raised defense of a stranger as a justifying circumstance. ISSUE: Page 19 of 233

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Whether or not the accused is guilty of Homicide. RULING: The Court observes that the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the killing during arraignment and invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self-defense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repelit; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. However, the petitioner was deprived of such opportunity to effectively present his evidence and to defend himself due to the gross and palpable negligence and incompetence of his counsel. Such deprivation amounts to a denial of the petitioner's due process, vitiating the integrity of the proceedings before the trial court. The Court notes that the petitioner's counsel failed to attend the hearings set on September 21, 2011, October 17, 2011, November 16, 2011, November 5, 2012, November 26, 2012, and March 18, 2013 despite notice, all of which were crucial for the defense. As a result, the RTC ordered the initial testimony of P02 De Leon, the sole witness to the shooting, to be stricken-off the records and to consider the presentation of the defense's evidence waived.It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault ornegligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefsalready lost by the operation of law. The only exception would be where the lawyer’s gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. The Court finds that the exception applies in this case. Furthermore, in Reyes v. CA, the Court held that in cases where the counsel is grossly negligent as to deprive the accused of his constitutional right to be heard, the conviction should not be based solely on the evidence of the prosecution.Hence, in accordance with the Court’s pronouncement in Reyes, and in view of the irregularitiesprejudicial to the rights of the petitioner that attended the trial, the case callsfor a new trial pursuant to Section 243 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. The case should be remanded to the trial court to enable the petitioner to effectively defend himself and present evidence.

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ii. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017, VELASCO, JR., J.: In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted committing the crime. This Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim. FACTS: Accused Christopher Roa is known to have suffered a mental disoder as a result of being struck in the head by some teenager. Some claim that the disorder was due to illegal drug use. One day, the accused was unusually silent and he suddenly stabbed and killed another person. When arraigned, accused pleaded not guilty but signed his name as "Amado M. Tetangco" in the certificate of arraignment. He also interposed the defense of insanity. The RTC and the CA convicted accused. The CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense witnesses that purport to support the claim of insanity are based on assumptions, and are too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural to be convincing. To the CA, their observation that accused-appellant exhibited unusual behavior is not sufficient proof of his insanity, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. On the contrary, the CA found that the circumstances of the attack bear indicia that the killing was done voluntarily, to wit: (1) the use of a long bolo locally known as ginunting, (2) the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of accused-appellant to flee from the scene of the crime, and (4) his subsequent surrender upon being called by the police authorities. ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of insanity can properly be invoked by accused. RULING: NO. In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted committing the crime. This Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim. Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. Page 21 of 233

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Here, the testimonies presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster. First, the testimony of Dr. Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the accused in 2012, or about five years after the crime was committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was committed is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was also insane when he committed the offense. While it may be said that the 2012 diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her testimony that the accused was also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as she had no personal participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of her testimony is admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her testimony merely provides basis for accused-appellant's mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or simultaneous to the commission of the offense in 2007. Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the offense in 2007. His testimony merely demonstrated the possible underlying reasons behind accused-appellant's mental condition, but similar to Dr. Laguidao's testimony, it failed to shed light on accusedappellant's mental condition immediately prior to, during, and immediately after accusedappellant stabbed the victim without any apparent provocation. Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be applied in his case, because of the rule that a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane is presumed to continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while accused-appellant was confined in a mental institution in 2001, he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge from his confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors would not have allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILSON CACHO Y SONGCO G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017, TIJAM, J.: When the accused raised the defense of insanity, he is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted committing the crime. FACTS: Accused-appellant Cacho was charged of murder and destructive arson. Accused-appellant’s brother Willy Cacho reported to the police that there was fire in Sitio Catmon, Rodriguez, Rizal. Upon arriving thereat, the police officers saw a burned house, which was owned by a Mario Balbao. Upon investigation, they discovered a burned body of a headless Balbao underneath an iron sheet. Willy Cacho informed the police officers that it was his brother, accused-appellant, who killed Balbao. Accused-appellant’s wife likewise told the police officers that her husband was a patient of the National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring mental illness. The police officers then saw accused-appellant in his backyard. Upon introducing themselves as police officers, accusedappellant acted strangely and exhibited signs of mental illness. According to SPO4 Tavas, accusedappellant admitted killing Balbao and burning the latter’s house but did not say why he did it. When they tried to arrest him, accused-appellant became wild. The police officers sought help from other people to subdue accused- appellant and to place him inside the mobile car. The defense Page 22 of 233

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pleaded insanity. However, the RTC still convicted accused-appellant as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant successfully proved the defense of insanity. RULING: NO. For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he can be held guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. Here, while Dr. Sagun testified that accused-appellant was confined at the NCMH in 1996 and that accused-appellant was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis which progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia, no other evidence was presented to show that accused-appellant was insane immediately prior to or at the very moment that the crime was committed. Mere prior confinement into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate the accused-appellant from criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing that accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. If at all, there is no evidence showing that the mental illness of the accused-appellant, as narrated by Dr. Sagun, constitutes insanity, in that, there is complete deprivation of his intelligence in committing the act. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO G.R. No. 224886. September 4, 2017 PERALTA, J. "Diminished capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment." Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. FACTS: Around 4 o'clock in the morning, "trisikad" drivers were lining up to pick passengers along Lopez St. at Sitio Alseca in Cebu City. While the "trisikad" drivers were waiting for passengers, Racal spoke in a loud voice, telling the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor. Francisco, who was then holding a plastic container in one hand and a bread in another, and was eating, retorted and asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife, hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body. Francisco, then, fell to the pavement. Immediately thereafter, Racal stepped backwards and upon reaching a dark portion of the street, he hailed a "trisikad" and sped away. Thereafter, one of the "trisikad" drivers called the barangay tanod, but by the time they arrived, Francisco was already Page 23 of 233

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dead. Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco. However, he raised the defense of insanity. ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of insanity is meritorious. RULING: NO. The defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The testimonies of Dr. Gilboy and Dr. Gerong, as the defense's qualified expert witnesses, failed to support appellant's claim of insanity. As correctly observed by the CA, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and four years after the crime was committed on April 19, 2006. In People v. So, which is a case of recent vintage, this Court ruled that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and testified to by the defense witnesses, may not be relied upon to prove appellant's mental condition at the time of his commission of the crime. In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years up to the time that appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian of his sister's children. He took care of their welfare and safety, and he was the one who sends them to and brings them home from school. Certainly, these acts are not manifestations of an insane mind. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified, on direct examination, that he found appellant to have "diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime." "Diminished capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment." Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Thus, on the basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that appellant acted without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete absence of intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to ensure the killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his commission of the crime and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence points to the fact that appellant was not suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to, and even right after the commission of the crime. PEOPLE v. ROGER RACAL G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. For a defense of insanity to prosper, a complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment must be shown. A diminished capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the the time of the commission of the crime will not suffice. FACTS:

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On April 19, 2016, Roger Racal approached trisikad drivers who were lined up and accused Jose Francisco a traitor in front of the other drivers. Holding a plastic container with bread, Francisco asked Racal why he was being accused of such but Racal fatally stabbed him in the chest. Racal ran to a dark portion of the street and hailed a trisikad to escape. Racal did not deny stabbing Francisco but raised the defense of insanity, presenting expert witnesses who said Racal had the predisposition to snap into “episodes” where he loses reason and acts compulsively and involuntarily. Because Racal was unable to distinguish right from wrong, there was no mental intent at the time he stabbed Francisco. The trial court convicted Racal of murder and sentenced him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, ruling the evidence for the defense is insufficient to convince the court Racal was deprived of mind and reason at the time because his depression and psychotic features are not the kind of insanity contemplated by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling. It held the prosecution proved the elements of the crime. It affirmed the presence of treachery, ruled out evident premeditation, and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness. ISSUE: Whether or not Racal’s defense of insanity warrants his exemption from criminal liability. RULING: Criminal law presumes a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him, owing to the classical theory that the basis of criminal liability is human free will. The law likewise presumes sanity, and he who invoked insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. In People v. Estrada, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. The accused must be “so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent”. The defense failed to overcome the presumption of insanity. The evaluations of experts were taken in June 2009 and July 2010 while the crime was committed in April 2006. An inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or after or at the very moment the felony is committed. The expert evaluations revealed prior to the commission of the crime, Racal had custody and served as guardian of his sister’s children. Though he had a diminished capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the crime, it is not the same as “complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment”. ||| PEOPLE v. CACHO G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017, First Division, TIJAM, J. Mere prior confinement into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate an accused from criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing he was completely deprived of reason immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. FACTS: Page 25 of 233

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Cacho was charged with murder for the death of Mario Balbao and was also charged with Destructive Arson. Willy Cacho, respondent’s brother, reported to the police that his brother had beheaded Balbao and burned his house. Upon arriving at respondent’s house, they saw a shallow pit with a steel peg standing at the center which was probably used to burn a head because there were ashes and a human skull on top of the heap of charcoal. Respondent admitted to killing Balbao but did not say why he did it, showing signs of mental illness. The RTC and CA both found accused guilty of the crime after trying him on the issue of insanity alone. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was able to prove his defense of insanity. RULING: For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. He must successfully show that (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. Accused appellant having invoked the defense of insanity, he is deemed to have admitted the commission of the crime. He is bound to establish with certainty he is completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness. He alleges he was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis in 1996 for which he was admitted at the National Center for Mental Health for two months. He was again admitted eight years after. While his physician testified of his condition and his previous hospitalizations, no other evidence was presented to show he was insane immediately prior to or at the very moment the crime was committed. Mere prior confinement into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate him from criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing he was completely deprived of reason immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO DELECTOR G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J. The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime. FACTS: The late Vicente Delector was talking with his brother, Antolin, near his residence in Barangay Diaz in Gandara, Samar when the accused, another brother, shot him twice. Vicente was rushed to the Gandara District Hospital where he was attended to by Dr. Leonida Taningco, but he was later on transferred to the Samar Provincial Hospital where he succumbed to his gunshot wounds. Vicente's son, Amel, identified his uncle, the accused, as his father's assailant. Corroborating Amel's Page 26 of 233

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identification was Raymond Reyes, who had happened to be along after having come from his school. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar charged the accused with murder in the RTC through the following information, viz.:That on or about the 8th day of August, 1997, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Diaz, Municipality of Gandara, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm (revolver), which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector. In his defense, the accused insisted that the shooting had been by accident. His own son corroborated his insistence. RTC found the accused guilty of murder; the CA affirmed the conviction for murder subject to an increase of the moral damages to ₱50,000. The State, through the OSG, submitted its appellee’s brief maintaining that the evidence of guilt was sufficient, but recommending that the crime for which the accused should be held guilty of was homicide, not murder, considering that the records did not support the holding that he had deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack that would insure the death of the victim; and that evident premeditation was not also shown to be attendant. ISSUE: Whether or not the exempting circumstance of “accident” should be appreciated in favor of the accused. RULING: We affirm the decision of the CA that accident could not be appreciated in favor of the accused, but we must find and declare that, indeed, the crime committed was homicide, not murder. Lower courts did not err in giving more credence to the testimonies of the Prosecution's witnesses instead of to the testimony of the accused and his son.The testimonies of Raymond and Dr. Taningco are preferred to the self-serving and exculpatory declarations of the accused and his son. Secondly, RTC and the CA both observed that the exempting circumstance of accident was highly improbable because the accused grappled with the victim for control of the gun. We see no reason to overturn the observations of the lower courts. Article 12, paragraph 4, of the RPC exempts from criminal liability "(a)ny person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it." The elements of this exempting circumstance are, therefore, that the accused: (1) is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) causes injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The gun was a revolver that would not fire unless there was considerable pressure applied on its trigger, or its hammer was pulled back and released. The assertion of accident could have been Page 27 of 233

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accorded greater credence had there been only a single shot fired. Yet, the revolver fired twice, which we think eliminated accident. Nonetheless, the Court cannot uphold the judgments of the CA and the RTC and convict the accused for murder. A reading of the information indicates that murder had not been charged against him. The usage of the terms treachery and evident premeditation, without anything more, did not suffice considering that such terms were in the nature of conclusions of law, not factual averments. The sufficiency of the information is to be judged by the rule under which the information against the accused was filed. In this case, that rule was Section 9, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which required that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated "in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense." As such, the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information, and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime. If the standards of sufficiency defined and set by the applicable rule of procedure were not followed, the consequences would be dire for the State, for the accused could be found and declared guilty only of the crime properly charged in the information. For treachery to be appreciated, two elements must concur, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted, that is, the means, method or form of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. Treachery, which the CA and the RTC ruled to be attendant, always included basic constitutive elements whose existence could not be assumed. Yet, the information nowhere made any factual averment about the accused having deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act - setting forth such means, methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged - that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense which the offended party might make. As a consequence, the accused could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code.

iii. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES MARLON BACERRA Y TABONES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 204544; 03 July 2017 LEONEN, J.

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The probative value of direct evidence is generally not superior to circumstantial evidence. The same quantum of evidence is still required by the court, which is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a qualitative test and not quantitative. FACTS: Petitioner was charged with simple arson before the RTC of Pangasinan, and was eventually convicted. He appealed to the CA, arguing that he was not positively identified as the person who burned the nipa hut. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s MR was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC, alleging that the CA erred in upholding his conviction based on circumstantial evidence as it is only based on conjecture and falls short of proof beyond reasonable doubt. No direct evidence was presented to prove petitioner actually set fire to the hut. Petitioner further argued that his intoxication and voluntary surrender despite the absence of warrant of arrest should have been appreciated as mitigating circumstances. Lastly, he argued that temperate damages should not have been awarded as the private complainant could have proven actual damages in trial. On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that an accused may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence as long as the combination of circumstances leads to the conclusion that accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, intoxication must be shown to not be habitual in order to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, while voluntary surrender shall only be considered if it shown to have been spontaneous. The temperate damages were properly awarded as the burning of the hut led to pecuniary loss of the private complainant. ISSUES: Whether or notthe petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the circumstantial evidence during trial. (YES) Whether or notthe mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary surrender should be appreciated.(NO) RULING: The probative value of direct evidence is generally not superior to circumstantial evidence. The same quantum of evidence is still required by the court, which is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a qualitative test and not quantitative. There is no requirement that only direct evidence can be used to convict. In fact, Sec. 4 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court enumerates the 3 requisites in order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, namely: [i] there is more than 1 circumstance; [ii] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and [iii] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Page 29 of 233

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The commission of the crime, identity of the perpetrator, and finding of guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence. In this case, none of the witnesses actually saw the accused start the fire, but the accused had motive and previously had attempted to set the complainant’s house on fire. He was also present at the scene of the crime before and after the fire occurred, and was in fact seen throwing stones at the complainant’s house before the fire and even threatened to burn the complainant, which was heard by other persons. The stoning incident and the fire cannot be taken as separate incidents. As to the circumstance of intoxication, such should not be habitual but should be enough that the mental faculties of the accused are impaired. The alleged intoxication of the accused was not substantiated, and also, there was a considerable amount of time between the accused’s drinking spree and the burning of the hut, meaning he could have gained control of his faculties. Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated as well, as it requires an element of spontaneity. Here, there is no indication that the accused surrendered after acknowledging his guilt. As for the temperate damages, these were properly awarded because the complainant suffered pecuniary loss but failed to substantiate the actual damages suffered.

iv. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC G.R. No. 213224,January 16, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.: There is treachery when a victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as when the accused attacks the victim from behind, or when the attack is sudden and unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, or is, in any event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. FACTS: Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero (Basilio), were walking home after attending a wedding celebration when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the back four (4) times, successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because the place was well lit and he was just about ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter fired his gun. For fear of his life, Alex an away from the place of incident and he then reported the incident. ISSUE: Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Basillio. RULING: YES. All elements of the crime of murder have been established in this case beyond reasonable doubt.

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Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the crime, it was established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who had killed him. As to the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court sustains the CA's finding that treachery attended the killing of Basilio. There is treachery when a victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as when the accused attacks the victim from behind, or when the attack is sudden and unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, or is, in any event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind, was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a firearm showed deliberate intent to kill Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him defenseless and incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was evident in the case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder. Penalty, Civil Indemnity and Damages Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder qualified by treachery is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that, apart from treachery, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and illegal possession of firearms, as alleged in the Information, were not duly proven, the RTC correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. As to the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to modify the CA's award pursuant to the Court's recent ruling in People v. Jugueta.46Therefore, in addition to the amount of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable actual expenses for the wake and burial and the costs of suit, the victim's heirs are entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.GREGORIO QUITA alias “GREG” G.R. No. 212818, January 25, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J:. There is treachery when ‘the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.’ FACTS: Gregorio and Fleno were indicted for the Murder of the victim Roberto before the RTC. Paquito, the victim’s father, testified that he was about to fetch his son who was having a drinking session nearby. While on his way, he saw three persons fighting and when he went near the trio, he saw Gregorio holding Roberto’s hand at the back while Roberto was being stabbed by Fleno. When he shouted, his son’s assailants took to their heels. He ran after them, but when the two reached a dark alley he no longer pursued them. Roberto was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival. The RTC convicted Gregorio as charged. The CA affirmed and held that the positive identification of an accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the Page 31 of 233

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eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of Gregorio whose testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Gregorio failed to show any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness to falsely accuse him of the crime. He tried to discredit the eyewitness’s testimony because he was the victim’s father but the same would not hold. The CA also held that Paquito’s positive, straightforward, and unequivocal manner of recounting what he witnessed on the date of the incident led the trial court to find his testimony to be worthy of belief. The rule is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. The presence of treachery was also established. According to the CA, there is treachery when ‘the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.’ These means or methods are made in the form of a swift, deliberate and unexpected attack, without any warning and affording the victim, which is usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to resist or escape the impending attack. Holding the hands of the victim to his back while he was being stabbed rendered him defenseless against the perpetrators thereby insuring the execution of the crime without risk to the offenders of any defense that the victim might make. ISSUE: Whether or not Gregorio is guilty of murder. RULING: YES. Gregorio’s appeal before this Court is predicated essentially upon the self-same lone assignment of error set forth in his Brief with the CA. Since the factual findings by the CA are binding upon this Court, especially when the CA’s findings unite with the RTC’s factual findings, as in this case, this Court is not at liberty to reject or disturb the factual findings of both lower courts. Indeed, this Court is satisfied that the factual findings of both lower courts are in accord with the evidence on record. However, with reference to the civil liability, the same must be modified to conform strictly to the teachings of recent jurisprudence. Thus, the award of ₱15,000.00 as actual damages is deleted and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is awarded; the awards of moral damages and exemplary damages are increased to ₱75,000.00 each; and the award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity is maintained. Finally, all damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO D. CALINA WAN A.K.A MEO G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017, MENDOZA, J.: The suddenness or unexpectedness alone, however, of the attack is insufficient to support the finding of treachery. Treachery could not be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. FACTS: At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan (Marigor), Janice's seven (7)-year old daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen. Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan Nevado (Jonathan), Janice's brother and neighbor, was awakened by shouts coming from his sister's house. He rushed to her house and saw her children crying. After bringing her children to his house, he went looking for Janice whom he saw outside a neighbor's house pleading for help. Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her, and she answered it was Calinawan who did it. Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When Darwin Silan, Janice's husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who stabbed her and she reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three (3) days, Janice died in spite of the medical treatment at the hospital. For his defense, Calinawan denied allegation. He was charged and convicted with Murder. The trial court found that the killing of Janice was attended by treachery. It stressed that the killing was carried out during nighttime when Janice was defenseless. Thus, the RTC concluded that given the circumstances surrounding the stabbing, Calinawan consciously adopted the method and form of attack to insure its execution. ISSUE: Whether or not the killing was attended with treachery. RULING: NO, there was no treachery. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." The following elements must be established before the existence of treachery may be appreciated: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The suddenness or unexpectedness alone, however, of the attack is insufficient to support the finding of treachery. In People v. Silva, the Court ruled that treachery could not be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself, to wit: The trial court erred when it presumed that the killing was qualified by treachery although the record shows that the witness did not see the commencement of the assault. No other logical conclusion then could be drawn but that the attack was sudden and unexpected. But this is not that simple. Where all indicia tend to support the conclusion that the attack was Page 33 of 233

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sudden and unexpected but there are no precise data on this point, treachery cannot be taken into account. It can in no way be established from mere suppositions, drawn from the circumstances prior to the moment of the aggression, that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery. In short, the evidence of the prosecution must be able to present the whole scenario to establish to exact manner of the killing, for treachery to be appreciated. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.RODRIGO MACASPAC y ISIP G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017, BERSAMIN, J:. The attack, even if it was sudden, did not constitute treachery. He did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back "to sweep them" had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault. FACTS: Rodrigo Macaspac was having drinks with Jebulan and their other friends. In the course of their drinking, an argument ensued between Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the group: “Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo”, and then left. After around three minutes Macaspac returned wielding a kitchen knife. He confronted and taunted Jebulan, saying: Ano? Jebulan simply replied: Tama na. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the lower right area of his chest, and ran away. The badly wounded Jebulan was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. The Office of the City Prosecutor charged Macaspac with murder. The Regional Trial Court found Macaspac guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA rejected his claim of self-defense by highlighting the fact that Jebulan had not engaged in any unlawful aggression against him. Instead, the CA observed that Jebulan was already running away from the scene when Macaspac stabbed him. Both the RTC and the CA concluded that Macaspac had suddenly attacked the completely unarmed and defenseless Jebulan; and that Macaspac did not thereby give Jebulan the opportunity to retaliate, or to defend himself, or to take flight, or to avoid the deadly assault. ISSUE: Whether or not Macaspac is guilty of murder. RULING: NO.Without the Prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of Jebulan. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which·give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. Page 34 of 233

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Macaspac and Jebulan were out drinking along with others when they had an argument that soon became heated, causing the former to leave the group and punctuating his leaving with the warning that he would be back "to sweep them," the vernacular for killing the others. Shortly thereafter, Macaspac returned to the group wielding the knife, immediately confronted and directly taunted Jebulan and quickly stabbed the latter on the chest, and then fled. The attack, even if it was sudden, did not constitute treachery. He did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back "to sweep them" had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault. With regard to evident premeditation, its requisites are: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Macaspac's having suddenly left the group and his utterance of Hintayin n’yo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo marked the time of his resolve to commit the crime. His returning to the group with the knife manifested his clinging to his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others. The first and second elements of evident premeditation were thereby established. But it is the essence of this circumstance that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. By quickly returning to the group with the knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately followed the resolve to commit the crime. As such, the third requisite was absent. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CYRUS VILLANUEVA y ISO RENA alias "Tutoy" and AL VIN SAYSON y ESPONCILLA alias "Alvin Talangka" G.R. No. 226475, March 13, 2017, REYES, J.: Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. FACTS: Bañaga was selling tapsilog to a group of persons playing cara y cruz at the comer of an alley in Summitville, Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Thereupon, Bafiaga saw the Villanueva, Sayson (accused) and Valencia arrive and ask the group if they know Enrico Enriquez (Enrico), to which they answered in the negative. Thereupon, the accused and Valencia went to the tricycle terminal, where they saw Enrico. They then simultaneously attacked Enrico. Villanueva punched Enrico on the face twice while Sayson hit the latter at the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt. Page 35 of 233

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Valencia then stabbed Enrico on the left side of his armpit twice. Enrico tried to fight back to no avail. The assailants thereafter fled. However, Villanueva was caught by men aboard a pursuing tricycle. Enrico was brought to the Muntinlupa Medical Center, but he was declared dead on arrival. The accused were charged of the crime of murder. The RTC and CA convicted the accused of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of murder. RULING: NO. Accused are guilty only of the crime of homicide. To warrant a conviction for the crime of murder, the following essential elements must be present: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. One of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, which qualifies the killing of the victim to murder, is abuse of superior strength. The Court is convinced that the evidence presented by the prosecution amply demonstrate that Enrico was killed and that it was the accused-appellants and Valencia who killed him. Prosecution eyewitness Bañaga was able to identify the accused-appellants and Valencia who killed Enrico. He actually witnessed what exactly happened on that fateful day and was able to narrate the individual participation of each of the accused. Nevertheless, the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. In this case, the prosecution failed to present evidence as regards the relative disparity in age, size, strength or force between the accused, on one hand, and Enrico, on the other. Indeed, the lower courts merely inferred the existence of qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength on the facts that Enrico was attacked by three assailants, the accused-appellants and Valencia, who were armed with a knife and a stone. However, mere superiority in numbers does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee v. TIRSO SIBBU, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.: Page 36 of 233

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Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." FACTS: Bryan Julian (Bryan), the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 11722 and a common witness to all the cases, testified that between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, he was with his threeyear old daughter, Trisha May Julian (Trisha), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11721; his mother Ofelia Julian (Ofelia), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11723; and his father, Warlito Julian (Warlito), the victim in Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his parents' house in Barangay Elizabeth, Marcos, llocos Norte when he saw from a distance of about five meters a person in camouflage unifo1m with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head. When the armed man inched closer to the house, he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the armed man because there were Christmas lights hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the appellant. Brian also saw two men in crouching position at a distance of three meters away from the appellant. Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Appellant then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito. Bryan ran inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito Julian, Jr. (Warlito Jr.) coming out of the bathroom. Bryan then proceeded to the pigpen at the back of the house to hide. Accused was charged and convicted for three counts of murder and attempted murder. Before the Supreme Court, he argued, among others, that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dwelling, and use of disguise were not sufficiently established. ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery, dweling and use of disguise were sufficiently established. RULING: YES. Treachery was correctly appreciated as qualifying circumstance in the instant case. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha, and Bryan were at the porch of their house totally unaware of the impending attack. In addition, they were all unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and his cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims. Appellant, in particular, wore camouflage uniform to avoid detection. Although Bryan was able to warn his family about the impending attack, it was too late for the victims to scamper for safety or to defend themselves. At the time Bryan became aware of appellant's presence, the latter was already in the vicinity of about five meters. In fine, appellant employed deliberate means to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose of killing his victims with Page 37 of 233

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minimal risk to his safety. There can be no other conclusion than that the appellant's attack was treacherous. Dwelling was also correctly appreciated. the victims were at their azotea in their house when accused Tirso Sibbu fired shots at them. Tirso Sibbu was outside the house of the victims. Under these circumstances, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against Tirso Sibbu. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled: “The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without” The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live ir1 the same barangay and are familiar with each other. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMBROSIO OHAYAS, ET.AL. G.R. No. 207516, June 19, 2017, TIJAM, J.: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. FACTS: Ambrosio Ohayas, one of the accused, was charged with the others of Murder for the death of Armando Kyamko. According to the prosecution, the 12 year old victim was with his friends in a Kalachuchi tree, while several other people, including his father was just on the other side of the road. Suddenly, the accused was seen with 2 other men, him carrying a shotgun and the others carrying torches. When he was just a few meters away from the victim, he fired the gun, shooting the victim on his right abdomen. The victim immediately died on the same day. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder. RULING: YES. The elements of the crime of murder are: (I) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. In this case, these requisites have been established by the prosecution. As to the presence of treachery, we find that the prosecution sufficiently established its existence in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to Page 38 of 233

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directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. That alevosia or treachery attended the killing of the victim was apparent from the suddenness of the attack. Armando, Jr., the 12-year old victim, who was merely talking to his friends, was suddenly shot by the accused-appellant. The shooting in this case was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying the victim the opportunity to protect or defend himself. He was unarmed and unaware of the harm about to happen to him. In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) Armando, Jr. was shot and killed; (2) the accused-appellant was the person who killed him; (3) Armando, Jr.'s killing was attended by the qualifying· circumstance of treachery; and (4) the killing of Armando, Jr. was neither parricide nor infanticide. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEMETRIO SABIDA G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017, TIJAM, J.: There was treachery not only because of the suddenness of the attack but also because of the absence of an opportunity on the victim's part to repel the attack. FACTS: The accused was charged of Murder for the death of Macarthur Mawac. The victim was on his way to work as a guard on duty at the Transco Tower at the foot of the mountain. Suddenly, the accused jumped out of nowhere and repeatedly stabbed the victim, prompting his companion to runaway to tell the police of the incident. The accused was subsequently arrested with the bolo that he used to kill the victim. For his part, the accused admitted to the killing of the victim but invoked selfdefense. He alleged that on his way to work, he heard the victim with his companion talking about killing him, which made him confront the victim and eventually defend himself. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder. RULING: NO. In attempting to escape liability, Sabida invokes self-defense. Upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Sabida assumed the burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. However, based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties, it is indisputable that Sabida failed to show that Mawac exhibited unlawful aggression against him. Being the party initiating the attack and armed with a deadly weapon, Sabida cannot successfully claim that therewas unlawful aggression. Sabida's self-serving claim of self-defense coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any injury from his supposed attacker fails to support any claim of unlawful aggression.The trial court aptly noted that there was no clear and credible evidence that Mawac was the one whoinstigated the fight and that Sabida was merely fending off an attack.

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The qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was correctly appreciated by the CA. In this case, treachery is evident from the fact that the victim could not have been aware of the imminent peril to his life. Mawac was obviously caught off-guard, unprepared for the sudden, unexpected and unprovoked attack on his person when Sabida surprisingly emerged from the road and hacked him with a bolo. The sudden and unexpected attack adopted by Sabida deprived the victim of any chance to defend himself or to retaliate. He had no foreboding of any danger, threat or harm upon his life at the said time, place and occasion. There was treachery not only because of the suddenness of the attack but also because of the absence of an opportunity on the victim's part to repel the attack. Without a doubt, the killing was attended by treachery. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEDRITO ORDONA, G.R. No. 227863, September 20, 2017,LEONEN, J.: To qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, evident premeditation must be proven with certainty. Facts regarding "how and when the plan to kill was hatched" are the requirement of deliberate planning should not be based merely on inferences and presumptions but on clear evidence. FACTS: Ordona was charged of murder of Ireneo Hubay. The Information alleged evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength as qualifying circumstances. Ordona was seen to be loitering at the corner of Hubay’s house. While Hubay emerged from the house, holding some food, Ordona approached him with a stainless knife, called his attentions and suddenly stabbed him in the left shoulder. Hubay managed to ran away but Ordona chased him. The latter caught up with the former. Ordona, despite Hubay’s pleas for mercy, stabbed him in the left torso. Hubay died upon arrival at the hospital. Ordona invoked denial and alibi as defenses. The RTC convicted Ordona. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not evident premeditation was proven beyond reasonable doubt as to qualify the killing to murder. RULING: NO. For evident premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the following must be established by the prosecution with equal certainty as the criminal act itself: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of the time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is indispensable for the prosecution to establish "how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In this regard, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in the present case. The prosecution failed to establish the time when accused-appellant to kill Hubay. There is no evidence on record to show the moment accused-appellant hatched his plan. AccusedPage 40 of 233

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appellant’s act of lurking outside the house can hardly be considered as an overt act indicating his resolution to kill Hubay. However, accused-appellant is still liable for murder. The killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of treachery was then unarmed, was casually outside of his residence when accusedappellant suddenly stabbed him. There was no opportunity for Hubay to retaliate or to parry accused-appellant's attack. The facts also establish that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack. Accused-appellant lurked outside Hubay's residence and waited for him to appear. When he emerged from the house, accused-appellant called him while walking towards him with a bladed weapon and immediately stabbed him. Although the attack was frontal, it was done suddenly and unexpectedly. A frontal attack, when made suddenly, leaving the victim without any means of is treacherous. The second stabbing also indicates treachery. At that time, Hubay was already wounded and was unprepared to put up a defense. PEOPLE v. GERALDO SANTILLAN G.R. No. 227878. August 9, 2017 MENDOZA, J. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. FACTS: Geraldo and 4 John Does were charged with the crime of murder. That on or about the 28 th day of March 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro-Manila the accused, conspiring together and mutually aiding with one another, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with a bladed weapon one ERNESTO GARCIA Y MARIANG, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries, which caused his instantaneous death. ISSUE: Whether or not abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. RULING: NO. The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was improperly appreciated; Geraldo and Eugene could only be convicted of the crime of homicide. Although the Court entertains no doubt that Geraldo and Eugene are responsible for Ernesto's death, the lower tribunals erred when it appreciated abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to murder. The courts a quo commonly concluded that the assailants' number and weapons gave them significant advantage in ensuring the death of Ernesto. Such reasoning, however, is incorrect and fails to muster the standards set by jurisprudence on the proper appreciation of the qualifying Page 41 of 233

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circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In People v. Beduya (Beduya) the Court explained the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength as follows: Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. As pointed out in the appellant's brief, only the fact that there were two (2) persons chasing Ernesto, Ramil and Geraldo, can be ascertained from Michael's testimony. In line with Beduya, the sole fact that there were two (2) persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength. Moreover, as can be gleaned from Michael's testimony, the respective attacks thrown by Ramil and Geraldo occurred alternately, one after the other. It is settled that when the attack was made on the victim alternately, there is no abuse of superior strength.Besides, the Court notes that Eugene was not even a participant in the chase Michael witnessed. Neither will Ernesto's dying declaration suffice to establish abuse of superior strength. The ante mortem statement, as relayed to Julie Ann, revolved solely on the identification of the assailants Dodong, Eugene, Ramil, and a certain "Palaka." There was no account on how the assault transpired or a narration to the effect that the aggressors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime with impunity. Aside from naming his assailants, Ernesto's ante mortem statement is bereft of any indicia that will convince the Court that the perpetrators espoused a deliberate design to utilize the advantage of number and weapons. Thus, the dearth in the prosecution's evidence impels a downgrading of the nature of the offense committed from murder to homicide. PEOPLE v. ORDONA G.R. No. 227863, September 20, 2017, Third Division, LEONEN, J. To qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, evident premeditation must be proven with reasonable certainty. Facts regarding “how, and when the plan to kill was hatched” are indispensable. The requirement of deliberate planning should not be based merely on inferences and presumptions but clear evidence. FACTS: An information charged Ordona of murder after he was fatally stabbed Iereneo Hubay on the trunk with a bladed weapon. Samuel Cartagenas, prosecution witness, and his wife were talking at the doorway of their house and saw Ordona loitering by the corner of their house, waiting for someone. After Hubay emerged from the house, Ordona stabbed him in the left shoulder. Hubay ran away but Ordona chased him and stabbed him in the left torso.

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Ordona testified he was at the house of his mother-in-law to fetch his wife. He met a Cornelio de Leon who was running amok. After five days, he was arrested by authorities but failed to recover a bladed weapon from him. The RTC found Ordona guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Ordona appealed his conviction and alternatively the presence of evident premeditation and treachery. The Office of the Solicitor General asserted the inconsistencies did not pertain to the fact murder was committed and that evident premeditation attended the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordona is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. RULING: The alleged inconsistencies were only minor and did not relate to the essential elements of the crime of murder. Slight variances in the testimony of witnesses, especially if immaterial to the crime charged, do not affect a witness’ credibility. What is material in this case is the act of stabbing. None of the inconsistencies of the witnesses negate the killing of Hubay. For evident premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the following must be established by the prosecution with equal certainty as the crime itself: (a) the time the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) the act manifestly indicating the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. The prosecution failed to establish the time Ordona resolved to kill Hubay. There is no evidence on the record to show the moment Ordona hatched his plan. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERSON DASMARINAS Y GONZALES G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J. The failure of the information supposedly charging murder to aver the factual basis for the attendant circumstance of treachery forbids the appreciation of the circumstance as qualifying the killing; hence, the accused can only be found guilty of homicide. To merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is not enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of law. FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged Dasmariñas and Polo with murder, the accusatory portion of the information dated January 25, 2008 being as follows: That on or about the l 6 th day of June 2007, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding each other without justifiable motive, with intent to kill and with treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premiditation (sic), Page 43 of 233

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did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one PO2 MARLON N. ANOYA, by then and there shooting him twice on his head, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which directly caused her (sic) death. The killing of the aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premiditation (sic). Mr. Perias, a sign art vendor, disclosed that in June 2007 he used to sell com in front of N arra Beerhouse. He recalled that last 16 June 2007, at around 2:00 in the morning, he was beside the Sabnarra Beerhouse along Naga Road, Las Pinas City which is near his residence. According to him, while the victim was standing in front of the beerhouse still drunk 2 men came from his right side and shot him. He recognized one of the men as accused Dasmariñas while the other person was then wearing a cap. The victim was then brought by him and Capt. Alex Nase to the hospital but he was declared dead on arrival. When he went to the San Juan City Jail he then saw the accused. Later on, it was Police Officer Abraham who brought him to the Quezon City Jail where he identified accused Dasmariñas and pointed to him as the suspect while behind a tinted glass. On crossexamination he mentioned that he first saw accused Dasmariñas during the time of the incident last 16 June 2007. At the time, he does not know the name of the said accused. Accused Dasmariñas denied killing victim PO2 Marlon Anoya together with accused Polo. According to him, at around 9:00 in the evening last 15 June 2007 he was at the house of his live-in partner Erica Camille Pascua at Vicencio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, San Juan. When she testified Ms. Pascua confirmed that accused Dasmariñas is her live-in partner. They live together with her parents' house inside a compound. On the night of 15 June 2007 she alleged that she was with accused Dasmariñas, 2 of her aunts Ria Salvador and Sally Salvador and her grandfather Carlos Salvador. She recalled that they then slept at around 10:30 in the evening and she woke up at around 6:00 in the morning the following day. RTC found Dasmariñas guilty of murder but acquitted Polo. CA affirmed the conviction with modification by declaring that Dasmariñas would not be eligible for parole, and by revising the civil liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder. RULING: The appeal lacks merit, but the Court holds that the conviction of Dasmariñas for murder cannot be upheld. He is properly liable only for homicide. Accused-appellant contends, inter alia, that: the procedure conducted by the police officers in identifying the perpetrator of the crime is seriously flawed and gravely violated his right to due process, as it denied him his right to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions; beforehand, the police officers have already fixed in the mind of the witness Perias that accused-appellant was the assailant; the procedure of bringing a suspect alone to the witness, for the purpose of identification, is seriously flawed; only accused-appellant was brought before Perias for possible identification of the Page 44 of 233

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perpetrator; the narration of Perias failed the totality of circumstances test; Perias described the height of assailant as about 5'6 to 5'7" but accused-appellant is only 5'4"; Perias' position at the time of the incident does not demonstrate, with moral certainty, that he had an opportunity to view the face of the assailant; Perias identified accused-appellant only on 25 July 2007, thus, there was a sufficient lapse of time from the time the crime occurred up to the time of accused-appellant's purported identification; and the police investigators also suggested the identity of accusedappellant when it was only he who was showed to Perias. SC: The out-of-court identification of Dasmariñas by Perias as one of the two assailants did not result from any impermissible suggestion by the police or other external source; and that it could not have been influenced unfairly against Dasmariñas. It is notable that Perias repeated his identification in court during the trial. The reliability of the identification was based on Perias' having witnessed the shooting from the short distance of only two meters away. We cannot sustain the finding of the CA that the killing was attended by treachery. The mere usage of the term treachery in the information, without anything more, did not suffice for such term was a conclusion of law, not a factual averment. The sufficiency of the information is judged by the rule applicable at the time of its filing. In this case, that rule is Section 9, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated "in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances." The facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime. Dasmariñas was presumed innocent of wrongdoing, and thus was unaware of having committed anything wrong in relation to the accusation. Hence, the information must sufficiently give him the knowledge of what he had allegedly committed. The consequences are dire for the State if the standards of sufficiency defined by Section 9, supra, are not followed because the accused should be found and declared guilty only of the crime properly and sufficiently charged in the information. Treachery, which both the CA and the RTC ruled to be attendant, has basic constitutive elements. For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, two elements must be alleged and proved, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted,that is, the means, methods or forms of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. The information herein did not make any factual averment on how Dasmariñas had deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act - setting forth such means, methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged - that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make. As earlier indicated, to merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is not enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of law. Page 45 of 233

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Consequently, Dasmariñas could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of homicide, which is defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRESENOO CAMPIT AND EMILIO MACA WILI G.R. No. 225794, December 06, 2017, Third Division, MARTIRES, J. Superiority in number does not always equate to abuse of superior strength. For this qualifying circumstance to be properly appreciated, evidence must show that the assailants had intended to use this advantage. FACTS: Accused were charged with murder with abuse of superior strength. Evidence for the prosecution showed that both the accused went to the house of the victim to borrow money. Leon refused the two. It was then that Campit stabbed the victim. Wili stabbed the victim while he was running away from Campit. Campit’s defense is that only Wili stabbed the victim. ISSUE: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was properly appreciated. RULING: The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that superiority in number does not necessarily amount to abuse of superior strength. It must be shown that aggressors combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in strength and it must be proven that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. After all, to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In this case, there was not abuse of superior strength as Wili only stabbed the victim while the latter was running away from Capit. There was also no evident premeditation as the stabbing happened only during the quarrel over the loan. Thus in the absence of any qualifying circumstances, the crime committed was homicide.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDILBERTO NORADA, AGUSTIN SEVA, AND EUGENE VILLANUEVA G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength must be proven as certainly as the crime itself. FACTS: In the afternoon of February 12, 2004, PI Gotas received a report that a dead person was recovered in a sugarcane field. The deceased was identified as Reggie Pacil. The victim was found to have died from injuries which could have been caused by a blunt instrument. In the course of the investigation, PI Gotas was informed that the victim was killed at the Taculing Court Apartelle. He was informed that the accused spent some time at Room 106 of the hotel. When PI Gotas inspected the room, he saw bloodstains splattered on the floor and across the walls. Days after, the three accused were arrested. Villanueva’s claimed self-defense. Norada, on the other hand, admitted that they intended to kidnap the victim and that he was killed when he attempted to struggle against his would-be captors. The RTC convicted the accused of attempted kidnapping with murder and the CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of the crime of attempted kidnapping with murder. RULING: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. In this case, the totality of the prosecution's evidence failed to sufficiently establish the offense of kidnapping in this case. There was no concrete evidence whatsoever to establish, or from which it can be inferred that appel1ant and his cohorts intended to actually deprive the victim of his liberty for some time and for some purpose. As to Villanueva’s claim of self-defense, the court found that he failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The court also held that treachery was absent in the killing of the victim. Treachery cannot be presumed and must be proven indubitably as the crime itself. The records are bereft of any evidence that the three accused made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself. The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength also cannot be appreciated as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was committed.

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The court held that there was conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among them. In this case, the prosecution was able to show that the acts of the accused during and after the killing indubitably show that the three had acted in concert for a joint purpose and a community of interest in killing the victim. However, as none of the alleged qualifying circumstances were proven, Villanueva can only be convicted of the crime of homicide.

3. PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION i. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL AQUILINA B. GRANADA, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 184092, February 22, 2017, LEONEN, J.: Conspiracy does not have to be established by direct evidence since it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused taken collectively. However, it is necessary that a conspirator directly or indirectly contributes to the execution of the crime committed through the performance of an overt act. FACTS: The Sandiganbayan found petitioners Aquilina Granada, et al. of the Department of Education guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Special Audit Report of the Commission on Audit disclosed that the various school forms and construction materials purchased by the Department of Education were priced above the prevailing market prices. The disbursement voucher and purchase order for such were approved and signed by Granada, et al. in their respective official positions. The purchase orders certified by Granada and approved by Nava, were found to be grossly inadequate to substantiate the payments made through the disbursement vouchers approved by Nava and Cabahug. The Sandiganbayan found that there was a common design among the Granada, et al. to make it appear that bidding took place to effect the release of funds for the purchase of overpriced construction supplies and materials ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy was sufficiently proven by the prosecution RULING: YES. Conspiracy between Granada, et al was duly established as their collective and individual acts demonstrated a common design, to award the contract to Geomiche without a public bidding. Their actions then led to the purchase of overpriced construction materials to the disadvantage of the government.

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Conspiracy happens "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Furthermore, conspiracy does not have to be established by direct evidence since it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused taken collectively. However, it is necessary that a conspirator directly or indirectly contributes to the execution of the crime committed through the performance of an overt act. The prosecution, through testimonial and documentary evidence, sufficiently proved the connivance between the public officers, who entered into and facilitated the grossly disadvantageous transactions on behalf of the government with Dela Cruz's Geomiche as the beneficiary. Undoubtedly, the collective and individual acts of petitioners showed a common design of purchasing the overpriced construction materials from Dela Cruz to the disadvantage of the government. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BILLIE GHER TUBALLAS G.R. No. 218572, June 19, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. FACTS: The accused, a certain Bryan Florencio and ZZZ (at large) were charged with 2 counts of rape, however, the case against Florencio was dismissed due to his death. According to the victim, she was drinking with the accused at the house of ZZZ and when she became drunk, she dozed off. She was awakened when she felt somebody touching her breasts and saw ZZZ inside her and doing a pumping movement while Bryan was standing at the side of the bed taking a video of the incident with his phone. ZZZ was replaced by another man whom AAA did not know. The next day, she told her teacher of what happened and subsequently reported the same to the police. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape. RULING: YES. The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. In this case, AAA was clearly in an inebriated condition when ZZZ and Florencio raped her, since AAA consumed five shots of hard liquor which she was not used to. When a woman, especially a minor, alleges rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial Page 49 of 233

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where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. To establish the existence of conspiracy, direct proof is not essential. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to andare indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. With the finding that conspiracy exists between ZZZ, Florencio and accused-appellant, the latter is liable as a co-principal to the two counts of rape. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO JESALVA ALIAS “ROBERT SANTOS” G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017, JARDALEZA, J.: We stress that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or purpose. FACTS: The accused was charged with the Murder of Arnel Ortigosa (Ortigosa). According to the prosecution, Ortigosa with his cousins decided to buy cigarettes and on their way to the store, they saw the accused staring at them from the corner of the store. Later, the accused re-appeared with 2 companions and followed them at the store. When they were already in front of Ortigosa, one of the companions of the accused proceeded to stab the accused twice with an ice pick while the other pointed a sumpak at the victim and at his group. The accused on the other hand, denied the crime and claimed that he saw a commotion while waiting for his sister on the corner of the street. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Murder. RULING: NO. In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw in committing the crime of murder. Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime. It is not sufficient, however, that the attack be joint and simultaneous for Page 50 of 233

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simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. It is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. In the absence of strong motives on their part to kill the deceased, it cannot safely be concluded that they conspired to commit the crime. Likewise, there is no evidence showing that accusedappellant was purposely waiting for Ortigosa at the time and place of the incident and that Menieva and Ilaw were on standby, awaiting for accused-appellant's signal. During and after the stabbing incident, Flores testified that what accused-appellant did during the stabbing was to point at them before walking away. On cross, Flores admitted that accused-apellant did not inflict any injury on Ortigosa. Accused-appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act which shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with his co-accused to cause the death of Ortigosa. We stress that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or purpose. Likewise, where the only act attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening intoan overt act, there is no conspiracy. In this case, while accused-appellant'spresence and act of pointing at the victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was ready to assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no conspiracy. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTRILLO ESCOBAL AND MELVIN ABANO G.R. No. 206292, October 11, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J. Mere passive presence at the scene of the crime does not implicate one who is not shown to have conspired with another in killing the victim. FACTS: The accused in this case were charged with murder for the killing of the late Fernando Gaabucayan. Cesario Auxtero, witness for the prosecution, testified that he saw the victim meet and talk with Escobal while Abano was urinating behind Escobal. Seconds later, Auxtero heard 3 gunshots. When he looked at the direction of the gunshots, he saw the victim lying flat on the ground face up while Escobal was standing at the footside of the victim holding a gun pointed at the latter. He also saw Abano standing beside Escobal facing the left shoulder of Gaabucayan in a position of pointing a gun. Auxtero saw the victim raise his hand and plead Escobal to stop, saying "stop it partner" but he heard another twos shots fired. The victim died and Escobal and Abano were later apprehended. Escobal raised the justifying circumstance of self defense and claims that it was the victim who first shot at them. He then grabbed the service firearm of Abano and fired at the direction where the shots were coming from. Abano corroborated the former’s testimony in all its material points. The RTC convicted the two of murder holding that the killing was attended with treachery and conspiracy. It further held that even if there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, such ceased to exist the moment he was already lying helpless on the ground. Moreover, the RTC held Page 51 of 233

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that Abano had done nothing to prevent the shooting. The CA affirmed the conviction and likewise rejected the claim of self defense. ISSUES: Whether or not Escobal acted in self defense. Whether or not Abano can be held guilty for having done nothing to prevent the killing. RULING: Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is an indispensable requirement for the claim of self defense to prosper. There must be a showing that the victim posed a real peril on the life or personal safety of the person defending himself, like Escobal. In this case, the fact that four shells were recovered from the crime scene does not warrant the inference the the victim fired his gun nor did he commit any act of unlawful aggression. Moreover, Auxtero even saw that gun of the victim holstered at his hip. Without this indispensable requirement, the claim of self defense cannot prosper. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. As to the liability of Abano, the court held that his mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not constitute proof of concerted action between him and Escobal. Moreover, knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

C. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES 1. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PALA TOUKYO y PADEP G.R. No. 225593, March 20, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." FACTS: Agent Ryan Peralta (Agent Peralta) of the PDEA-CAR received information from a civilian informant regarding the illegal drug selling activities of Toukyo. After confirming via text message that Toukyo was indeed selling a brick of marijuana for ₱2,000.00, the PDEA-CAR sent a buy-bust team to entrap Toukyo. Near a restaurant located at Burnham Park, Agent Peralta and the informant met with Toukyo. After Toukyo showed Agent Peralta the brick of marijuana, Agent Peralta executed the pre-arranged signal, leading to Toukyo's arrest. Agents Kay-an and Awichen immediately marked the seized marijuana at the place of arrest, and thereafter, Agent Peralta took the marijuana as well as the backpack where it is placed. Upon reaching the PDEA-CAR field office, Page 52 of 233

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Agent Peralta turned over the backpack containing the seized marijuana to Agent Dick Dayao (Agent Dayao), who in tum, executed the proper documentation and delivered the seized item to the Crime Laboratory. A qualitative examination reveals that the backpack indeed contains one (1) kilogram/1,000 grams of marijuana. An Information was filed before the RTC charging Toukyo of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Article 5 of RA 9165. The RTC found Toukyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA on the other hand, found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11 of RA 9165. ISSUE: Whether or not Toukyo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11 of RA 9165. RULING: NO. At the outset, it appears from the records that in a letter, Director General Atty. Benjamin C. De Los Santos of the Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that Toukyo had already died . Therefore, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the instant appeal, is hereby dismissed. Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PORFERIO CULAS G.R. No. 211166, June 5, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. FACTS: Before the entry of judgement of the decision of the court in a case finding the Respondent guilty of Statutory Rape, the Court received a letter informing them of the death of the former. Page 53 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal action should be dismissed. RULING: YES. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit: Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; xx xx Upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN JAO AND ROGELIO CATIGTIG G.R. No. 225634, June 7, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: "The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." FACTS: The accused were charged with 4 counts of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. A buy bust operation was conducted by a group of police officers in Negros Occidental where an informant/poseur-buyer transacted with Allan Jao (Jao). The accused gave the informant a sachet of shabu and was thereafter apprehended by the police when the informant made his signal. 6 more sachets of shabu were taken from the accused. As his defense, Jao claims that he was working when he received a call asking him to go to a motel as there was a woman waiting there for him. However, when he arrived at the motel, he was allegedly mauled by 2 armed men. Catigtig, one of the accused, had died while the case is pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty as charged. RULING: Page 54 of 233

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YES. For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be proven that the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law; and that the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration.In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution had established Jao's criminal liability for the aforesaid crimes, considering that: (a) Jao himself delivered a plastic sachet containing O.Olgram of shabu to the informant during a legitimate buy-bust operation;and (b) upon his arrest, the arresting officers searched Jao and found six (6) more plastic sachets containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.06 gram. While Jao's criminal liability remains, the same conclusion cannot be made with respect to Catigtig in view of his supervening death pending appeal. Thus, upon Catigtig's death pending appeal of his conviction, his criminal liability is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. As such, the criminal cases against him should be dismissed and declared closed and terminated. P/C SUPT. EDWIN PFLEIDER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 208001, June 19, 2017, PERALTA, J.: The criminal action against the deceased should just be dismissed, and deemed closed and terminated inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. FACTS: The accused with a certain Ryan Bautista, were charged with the Murder of Manuel Granados. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause, but the CA ordered the reinstatement of the information upon petition for certiorari of the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause to file the information. RULING: Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. However, a close examination of the arguments presented by both parties would show that the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Furthermore, in this case, this Court is once again confronted with the often raised issue of the difference between the determination of Page 55 of 233

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probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the other. In this case, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of probable cause, outrightly dismissed the case. Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court finds it appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a proper determination of probable cause based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. However, in view of the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider on April 15, 2017, which effectively extinguished his criminal liability, this case had been rendered moot and academic. Thus, the criminal action against him should just be dismissed, and deemed closed and terminated inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AGAPITO DIMAALA Y ARELA G.R. No. 225054. July 17, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The death of accused prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. However, his civil liability based on sources other than the subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused. FACTS: The RTC found accused-appellant Agapito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the killing of Rodrigo Marasigan. Agapito was likewise ordered to pay the family of Rodrigo Marasigan civil indemnity, moral damages, actual damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages. CA affirmed the RTC's decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged but deleted the award of temperate damages. Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from the CA's Decision, but later on decided not to pursue his appeal. Thus, he filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of Entry of Judgment, which the Court granted in its Resolution dated September 21, 2016. Following the closure and termination of the case, the Court declared the finality of the aforesaid Resolution and issued an Entry of Judgment. Meanwhile, the Court received a Letter dated February 23, 2017 from the Bureau of Corrections informing it that accused-appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death. ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused are extinguished by his death. RULING: Only the criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto, is ipso facto extinguished.

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It is settled that the death of accused-appellant prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused. However, accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources other than the subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPIPNES v. DIONISIO DE CHAVEZ G.R. No. 229722, December 13, 2017, First Division, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. The death of the accused, pending appeal, extinguishes his criminal liability and any civil liability based solely thereon. FACTS: The accused in this case was charged and convicted of murder by the RTC. While his appeal was pending, however, the accused died as was evidenced by a certified copy of his death certificate. ISSUE: Whether or not accused the deceased accused’s criminal and civil liability has been extinguished RULING: The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed. Civil liability may survive if it can be predicated on a source of obligation other than the crime. If such liability survives, the proper recourse is to institute a separate civil action. In this case, the criminal liability of the accused is extinguished due his death. His civil liability based on his crime is also deemed extinguished. The heirs of his victim, however, may still file a separate civil action against his estate for any civil liability based on other sources of obligations.

2.CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES AMBASSADOR HOTEL, INC. v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM G.R. No. 194137, June 21, 2017, MENDOZA, J.: To acquire jurisdiction over the corporation in a criminal case, its head, directors or partners must be served with a warrant of arrest. FACTS: Ambassador Hotel’s President, Yolanda, was criminally charged in that capacity for the hotel’s failure to remit SSS contributions; thus, violating the SSS Law (R.A. No. 8282). The RTC acquitted Yolanda since, although she was the president on paper, some other person was actually managing the hotel. The RTC, however, said that Yolanda’s acquittal does not extinguish Ambassador Hotel’s civil liabilitiy (payment of the SSS contributions). CA affirmed the RTC decision. Ambassador Page 57 of 233

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Hotel now argues that it cannot be held civilly liable since the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it and it has a separate personality from Yolanda. ISSUE: Whether or not Ambassador Hotel is civilly liable. RULING: YES. Under Section 8(c) of R.A. No. 8282, an employer is defined as “any person, natural or juridical, x x x, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, x x x.” Ambassador Hotel, as a juridical entity, is still bound by the provisions of R.A. No. 8282. Even when the employer is a corporation, it shall still be held liable for the non-remittance of SSS contributions. It is, however, the head, directors or officers that shall suffer the personal criminal liability. Although a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it, the corporate veil is pierced when a director, trustee or officer is made personally liable by specific provision of law. In this regard, Section 28 (f) of R.A. No. 8282 explicitly provides that "[i]f the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.” Thus, a corporation cannot invoke its separate judicial entity to escape its liability for non-payment of SSS contributions. To acquire jurisdiction over the corporation in a criminal case, its head, directors or partners must be served with a warrant of arrest. Naturally, a juridical entity cannot be the subject of an arrest because it is a mere fiction of law; thus, an arrest on its representative is sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over it. To reiterate, the law specifically disregards the separate personality between the corporation and its officers with respect to violations of R.A. No. 8282; thus, an arrest on its officers binds the corporation. Further, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When Yolanda was acquitted in the criminal case because it was proven that she did not perform the functions of the president from June 1999 to March 2001, it did not result in the dismissal of the civil case against Ambassador Hotel. The RTC did not declare in its judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil action, deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case, remains. Thus, the civil action, deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case, remains.

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II. REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK II) A. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER NESTOR GUELLOS, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 177000, June 19, 2017, REYES, J.: It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. FACTS: Two separate informations were filed against the Petitioners for Direct Assault with Homicide committed against P/Chief Inspector Rolando Camacho and SPO2 Estelito Andaya. The 2 together with other police officers, were conducting their routine in Tanauan Batangas. They went to a certain barangay in order to join a religious procession and monitor those who will indiscriminately discharge their firearms. When they heard that shots were fired, they immediately went to the house of Silveria Guellos. At the house, they saw around 15 men who were drinking alcohol and when they were verifying who fired the armalite, nobody answered. When a police officer followed Camacho’s order to pick up the empty shells of armalite on the ground, one of the accused hit the former on his nape causing him to drop his armalite and when he tried to pick it up, someone hit his hand. Camacho on the other hand was held by the accused and was shot causing his death while SPO2 Andaya was also shot. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty with Direct Assault with Homicide. RULING: NO. The petitioners are being charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the RPC. While the elements constituting the crime of Homicide were properly alleged in the two Informations and were duly established in the trial, the said Informations, however, failed to allege all the elements constitutive of the applicable form of direct assault. To be more specific, the Informations do not allege that the offenders/petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a person in authority, in the exercise of their duty. In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently established the foregoing allegations including the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority, as the latter introduced themselves to be members of the PNP.Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the Informations that such fact was known to the Page 59 of 233

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accused which renders the same defective. In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance under paragraph 3 ofArticle 14 of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of an increased penalty against the petitioners. "The Constitution mandates that the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. From this fundamental precept proceeds the rule that the accused may be convicted only of the crime with which he is charged. "This right is accorded by the Constitution so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating on his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded.Accordingly, a Complaint orInformation which does not contain all the elements constituting the crimecharged cannot serve as a means by which said constitutional requirement is satisfied. Corollarily, the fact that all the elements of the crime were dulyproven in trial cannot cure the defect of a Complaint or Information to serve its constitutional purpose.

B. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST DR. MALABANAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 186329/G.R. No. 186584-86/G.R. No. 198598. August 2, 2017 SERENO, C.J. The accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged, although proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof. In other words, variance between the allegation contained in the Information and the conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction for either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the other. FACTS: Alid obtained a cash advance of P10,496 to defray his expenses for official travel. He was supposed to attend the turnover ceremony of the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of the DA and to follow up funds intended for the GMA Rice Program. The turnover ceremony did not push through, however, and Alid's trip was deferred. Alid took PAL Flight from Cotabato City to Manila. He attended the turnover ceremony at the DA Central Office in Quezon City. The following day, he took a flight from Manila to Cotabato City per another ticket issued in exchange for the PAL Ticket. Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the necessary papers to liquidate the cash advance. During post-audit, discrepancies in the supporting documents were found and investigated. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Alid and Malabanan before the Sandiganbayan with falsification of public documents. In SB-07-CRM-0072, Alid was indicted for falsifying his Post Travel Report. In SB-07-CRM-0073, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor charged Alid with falsifying the PAL Ticket. In SB-07-CRM-0074, Alid and Malabanan were charged with falsifying the Certificate of Appearance that the former attached as a supporting document for the Post Travel Report. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Alid of the crime of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING: YES. In G.R. No. 198598, the Sandiganbayan convicted Alid of falsification of a private document for altering the PAL Ticket. We disagree with that conviction for two reasons. First, a conviction for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 violates the right of Alid to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him given that his Information charged him only with falsification of documents committed by a public officer under Article 171. Second, for falsifying a commercial document, the penal provision allegedly violated by Alid was paragraph 1, and not paragraph 2, of Article 1 72. One of the fundamental rights of an accused person is the right to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."This means that the accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the Information.Even if the prosecution successfully proves the elements of a crime, the accused may not be convicted thereof, unless that crime is alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed against the latter.Pursuant to this constitutional right, Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, commands: Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged, although proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof. In other words, variance between the allegation contained in the Information and the conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction for either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the other. JESUS O. TYPOCO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 221857/G.R. No. 222020. August 16, 2017 PERALTA, J. In falsification of public documents, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial. FACTS: Petitioners and their co-accused Aida B. Pandeagua (Pandeagua) and Angelina H. Cabrera (Cabrera) were charged with Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners were found guilty as charged, but their co-accused Pandeagua and Cabrera were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Also, the petitioners and the aforementioned accused, together with Arnulfo G. Salagoste (Salagoste), were charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Page 61 of 233

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Corrupt Practices Act, but all the accused were acquitted of the charge.That on or about 21 April 2005, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Camarines Norte, accused, Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Salary Grade 30; Noel D. Reyes, Salary Grade 22; and Aida B. Pandeagua, Salary Grade 9, holding the position of Governor, OIC-General Service Office, and Buyer II, respectively, all public officers, taking advantage of their public positions, acting together, conspiring and confederating with one another and with one Angelina H. Cabrera, owner of Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply, did then and there falsify Purchase Order No. 0628 involving the purchase of various medicine by the Provincial Government by changing its original date from April 21, 2005 to May 20, 2005 in order to conceal that an order has been (sic) made with Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply prior to the bidding conducted on May 18, 2005 to the damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in not considering "to the damage and prejudice of the provincial government" as alleged in the information under sb-11-crm-0519, negating an essential element of criminal intent to falsification of public document to which petitioner was found guilty as it is not in accord with law and pertinent jurisprudence. RULING: NO. Petitioners were chargedwith the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public as defined in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.

C. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS OPEHLIA HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 217874, December 05, 2017, En Banc, PERALTA, J. A public officer may be held liable for malversation if through his negligence he permitted the taking of property or funds under his custody. FACTS:

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Petitioner was employed as an accounting clerk in DOTC-CAR. She was promoted to supervising fiscal clerk with duties to receive cash collections. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch. The COA auditor conducted a cash audit of the accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior. The COA auditor found two deposit slips bearing the amounts of P11,300.oo and P81,348.20 which did not bear a stamp of receipt by LBP nor were they machine validated. This was confirmed by the LBP which found that petitioner did not make any deposit of those amounts. The auditors subsequently found that petitioner accounted for the P81,348.20 deposit. LBP also denied receiving any deposit in the amount of P11,300.00. COA demanded that petitioner pay this amount but she refused which led to the filing of a malversation case against her. Petitioner interposed as defense that she left the amount with LBP teller Ngaosi and that she received deposit slips without stamps but relied on the teller. The RTC convicted petitioner of the crime charged against her. On appeal, the CA initially affirmed the RTC judgment but subsequently dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime the conviction would be reversed if it was proven that it was LBP teller Ngaosi who took the money. RULING: A public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. In this case, the accused, by her negligence, simply created the opportunity for the misappropriation.

D. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONALv. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA a.k.a “JOHN,” “KONYONG” SALONGA and SERVILLANO NACIONAL @ “INONG” @ DIONISIO NACIONAL G.R. Nos. 218466 & 221425, January 23, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. FACTS: The accused-appellants Ramos, Salonga, and Nacional were charged with the crime of Murder Aggravated with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC in relation to RA No. 8294. The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o’clock in the evening of January 20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo was walking towards the store of Leonida when he chanced upon accused-appellants having an altercation with the victim, Rolando Necesito. Page 63 of 233

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From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, “Okinam patayan ka” (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround Rolando at an area around seven meters away from where Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four successive gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the ground. To ensure Rolando’s demise, Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the scene. Rolando’s body was found the next day near the duhat tree. Both the RTC and the CA convicted the accused-appellants of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants should be convicted of the crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm. RULING: NO. The accused-appellants should only be held liable for simple Murder. To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo, had established beyond reasonable doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that they deliberately used weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo stick), which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal attacks. Thus, such killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which perforce warrants accused-appellants’ conviction for Murder. The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm. Under Section 1 of RA 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.” There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution. In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv. LUDIGARIO BELEN y MARASIGAN G.R. No. 215331, January 23, 2017, PERALTA, J.: Rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. FACTS: Belen, the live-in partner of the victim’s mother, was charged with qualified rape in two separate Informations. The first incident happened when one afternoon, the victim AAA was playing outside their house when she was called by Belen to go inside the house. Once inside, Belen locked the door and poked a knife at her and ordered her to remove her clothes to which she complied. Belen instructed her to bend over and he inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, Belen placed himself on top of her, moving up and down while she was crying. The rape incident happened for about half an hour in her mother’s room. The second incident happened one evening while her mother was at work. She was just sitting at home when Belen entered the house and told her to undress to which she complied as he threatened her not to make noise or tell her mother. Belen asked her to bend and inserted his penis into her vagina then she was told to lie down and Belen went on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina and started moving up and down. The rape incident happened for about half an hour while she was crying. Belen raped her several times more which only stopped when her grandmother took her to her uncle’s house. It was only in 2005, when confronted by her mother as to the truth that she was raped by Belen that she had finally told her that she had been repeatedly sexually molested by Belen. She had never told her mother about her ordeal before because Belen threatened her. The RTC convicted Belen for two counts of simple rape. ISSUE: Whether or not Belen should be convicted for two counts of simple rape. RULING: YES. We affirm the lower court’s conviction of Belen for two counts of simple rape. Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, states the elements of the crime of rape as follows: Article 266 -A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. We have scrutinized the records of this case and are convinced that Belen had carnal knowledge of AAA with threat and intimidation, thus, against her will and without her consent. AAA categorically declared that in two separate instances, Belen had inserted his penis into her vagina Page 65 of 233

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while she was crying. It was clearly established that the first rape incident was accomplished with the use of a knife which proved that Belen employed threat in AAA’s life. As to the second rape, while there was no force and intimidation used by Belen on AAA, the fact that Belen is the live-in partner of her mother and with whom she had been living with since she was 2 years old, established his moral ascendancy as well as physical superiority over AAA. Belen’s moral ascendancy and influence over AAA substitutes for threat and intimidation which made AAA submit herself to Belen’s bestial desire. It is doctrinally settled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. We agree with the RTC as affirmed by the CA that Belen is guilty of two counts of simple rape only and not of qualified rape as charged. Rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Wellsettled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. The informations alleged that AAA is eight years old and Belen is the common law husband of AAA’s mother. The relationship of AAA with Belen was admitted by the latter but AAA’s age was not sufficiently proved during trial. The victim’s minority must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself. Article 266-B of RA 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, states that whenever rape is committed through force, threat or intimidation, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. However, whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, such as a knife in this case, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the first incident of rape, it was committed with the use of a knife which is a deadly weapon, thus the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code states that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating nor any mitigating circumstance had been proved, We find that the RTC correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. As to the second rape incident, since the moral ascendancy of Belen over AAA took the form of threat and intimidation on her, the RTC likewise correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Belen. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.MICHAEL PALANAY y MINISTER G.R. No. 224583, February 1, 2017, VELASCO, JR. J.: In a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove all the elements thereof, which are: (1) sexual congress (2) with a woman; (3) done by force, threat, or intimidation without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and (5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the victim, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. FACTS: Palanay was charged with qualified rape under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 8353. AAA testified that she was sleeping in her room when she was suddenly awakened by someone removing her short pants and panty. She awoke to find Palanay, her uncle and brother of her mother, lying beside her and removing his own short pants. Page 66 of 233

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Thereafter, he kissed AAA’s lips, touched her breasts, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After satisfying his bestial desires, Palanay slept by AAA’s side. AAA put her clothes on, went to the comfort room, and cried in silence. By early morning, AAA went to the house of her elder sister, BBB, and narrated her tragic experience. Palanay merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. The RTC convicted Palanay as charged, which the CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not Palanay is guilty of the crime charged. RULING: YES. In the present case, all the elements of qualified rape are present. AAA categorically asserted that Palanay, her uncle, had carnal knowledge of her. She was steadfast in her testimony that, in the early morning of August 31, 2010, Palanay undressed her and touched her breast against her will. He then forced himself on her and inserted his penis into her vagina. At the time of the incident, AAA was just sixteen (16) years old. The findings in the medical examination of AAA taken after the rape support this allegation. While a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of the case, the medical examination conducted and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative pieces of evidence, which strongly bolster the victim’s testimony. In addition, as found by the trial court, AAA’s recollection of what happened after her harrowing experience was sufficiently corroborated by BBB. By the distinctive nature of rape cases, conviction usually rests solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Thus, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration in the resolution of rape cases. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court given its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. In this regard, factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the CA. In AAA’s case, it is evident that she feared Palanay, her uncle, who can be reasonably expected to exercise moral authority over her, even prior to the rape incident. This fear caused her to be immobilized and unable to offer physical resistance to Palanay’s advances. The failure to physically resist the attack, however, does not detract from the established fact that a reprehensible act was done to a child-woman by no less than a member of her family. In cases of qualified rape, moral ascendancy or influence supplants the element of violence or intimidation. Physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits herself out of fear. As this Court held in People v. Lomaque, the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC Y MARQUEZ G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.: When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime, the verdict must be one of acquittal of the accused. This basic legal precept applies in this criminal litigation for rape. FACTS: AAA, 24 yrs old was then having a drinking session with the accused Tionloc 18 yrs old and Meneses 14 yrs old. She then went inside the bedroom of Tionloc and took a nap. However, she was awaken when Menses inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to cut hotdog and now lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, Tionloc approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition her body. Tionloc was charged with Rape which the RTC and CA convicted him. Tionloc still insisting his innocence went to the SC.He asserts that he should be acquitted of rape since the prosecution was not able to establish the required quantum of evidence in order to overcome the presumption of innocence. ISSUE: Whether or not the Tionloc committed the crime of Rape. RULING: NO, rape was not established. Be that as it may, the prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of appellant by presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. "In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause." Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol." It this case, the prosecution established that Tionloc was an 18-year old man who had sexual intercourse with "AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual congress with "AAA." She testified that appellant and Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of appellant. At around 7:00 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of Page 68 of 233

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appellant and chatted with him and Meneses while drinking liquor. From that time up to about 11 p.m. when she took a nap, there is no showing that appellant or Meneses forced, threatened or intimidated her. No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or appellant employed force, threat or intimidation against her. No claim was ever made that appellant physically overpowered, or used or threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered threatening words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the table nearby could be utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere product of her own imagination. There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely to threaten or intimidate her. We cannot even ascertain whether said knife can be used as a weapon or an effective tool to intimidate a person because it was neither presented nor described in court. Even assuming in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill fear in "AAA's" mind, it should be noted that he was already gone when appellant asked "AAA" for a sexual favor. In other words, the source of the feigned force, threat or intimidation was no longer present when appellant casually asked his friend, "AAA," if she "can do it" one more time. "AAA" did not respond either in the affirmative or in the negative. Moreover, resistance should be made before therape is consummated. "AAA" could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual congress when "AAA" tried to move which can hardly be considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's sexual advances. In People v. Amogis, this Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt to resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor and chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment appellant's evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and charged him with rape. Moreover, the age gap between the victim and appellant negates force, threat or intimidation. "AAA's" state of"shivering" could not have been produced by force, threat or intimidation. She insinuates that she fell into that condition after Meneses had sexual intercourse with her.However, their age gap negates force, threat or intimidation; he was only 14 while "AAA" was already 24, not to mention that they were friends. In addition, per "AAA's" own declaration, Meneses and appellant did not also utter threatening words or perform any act of intimidation against her. Also, drunkeness should have deprived the victim of her will power to give her consent. The fact that "AAA" was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant. There is authority to the effect that "where consent is induced by the administration of drugs or liquor, which incites her passion but does not deprive her of her will power, the accused is not guilty of rape." Here, and as narrated by "AAA" on the witness stand, appellant and Meneses were her friends. Thus, as usual, she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and chatted with them while drinking liquor for about four hours. And while "AAA" got dizzy and was "shivering," the prosecution failed to show that she was completely deprived of her will power. "AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it to be. "AAA" is used to consuming liquor. And if it is true that the gravity of her "shivering" at that time rendered her immobile such that she could not move her head to signal her rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to whisper to him her refusal, then she would have been likewise unable to stand up and walk home immediately after the alleged rape. It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal Page 69 of 233

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litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal. CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, and BREGIDO MALA CAT, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 205745, March 8, 2017, LEONEN, J:. Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's case must rise on its own merits, not merely on relative strength as against that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, acquittal must follow as a matter of course. FACTS: Petitioners Capistrano Daayata (Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), Bregido Malacat, Jr. (Malacat), and private complainant Bahian had a violent altercation during a basketball game. Bahian alleged that Salisi hit him with a stone on the left side of his forehead which caused him to fall to the ground. He further alleged that while he was lying on the ground, Daayata, et al. boxed and kicked him. Upon examination, it was found out that Bahian had a depressed fracture and needed a surgery. Daayata, et al. were charged with frustrated murder. The RTC found Daayata, et al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals, thereafter, affirmed the said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. RULING: NO. There has been a gross misapprehension of facts on the part of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Supreme Court acquitted petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr. Bahian's "medical certificate showed no injury other than that on his forehead. "Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses." They have been characterized as "that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." As the defense correctly points out, if the prosecution's assertion of a relentless assault were true, the greater probability was that Bahian must have been "black and blue all over." Bahian himself was noted to have admitted that his head injury was "caused by him hitting the edge of the concrete pavement." Several witnesses - both from the defense and the prosecution - have belied the prosecution's claim that petitioners Daayata, Malacat, and Salisi wielded a gun, a bolo and an iron bar, respectively. As Bahian himself recalled to Kagawad Abalde, it was he who threatened Salisi that "he would just get even with him." By his own recollection too, he acknowledged that it was only upon his Page 70 of 233

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utterance of that threat that Malacat and Daayata responded with correlative aggression. He conceded having been put in a situation where he had to back off. By his own recollection, the clash between him and petitioners could have ended there, yet it did not. It appears that, rather than letting the better part of reason and modesty prevail, Bahian elected to make good on his threat to eventually just get even with his adversaries. Along the way, it even appears that he enlisted the aid of Kagawad Abalde, whose participation in the clash, as the defense recounted, was not as a pacifier but also as an aggressor. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO ALEJANDRO y RIGOR and JOEL ANGELES y DE JESUS, G.R. No. 225608, March 13, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape. FACTS: AAA joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province of Nueva Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they stayed at the one-storey house of the latter's 62- year old mother, BBB. Thereat, AAA would sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in the morning of January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on the floor, AAA saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro and Angeles (accused). Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and underwear down and started having carnal knowledge of her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places with Angeles and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was able to fight back by scratching Angeles' s back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her face while Alejandro hit her left jaw with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke up in a hospital, while BBB died. Accused were charged of one (1) count of simple rape and one (1) count of homicide. The RTC found the accused guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification, finding Angeles guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape. ISSUES: 1. Whether the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid crimes. 2. Whether Angeles is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of simple rape. RULING: 1. YES. During the pendency of the instant appeal, Alejandro filed a Motion to Withdraw. In view thereof, the Court hereby grants said motion, and accordingly, deems the case closed and terminated as to him. Both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive identification that accusedappellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in the latter's death; and that Page 71 of 233

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thereafter, Angeles proceeded to rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. Absent any cogent reason to the contrary, the Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts and, thereby, upholds Angeles's conviction for simple rape and homicide, given that the elements of said crimes square with the established incidents. 2. NO. The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) states that "[Angeles], with lewd designs, and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party." Plainly, the wording of the amended Information reveals that it charged accused-appellants with only one (1) count of rape. As such, it was error for the CA to convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus, Angeles must be convicted with one (1) count of Rape. On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance. Notably, this will no longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision. PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES v.JESSIE GABRIELy GAJARDO G.R. No. 213390, March 15, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.: When a woman testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all that is necessary to constitute the commission of this crime has been committed. It is merely a question then, whether or not this court accepts her statement. FACTS: "AAA" at the time material to this case is a 17-year old first-year nursing student at the Colegio de Dagupan and temporarily resides at the boarding house of JESSIE GABRIELy GAJARDO (Gajardo). "AAA" testified that Gajardo accused her and her cousin and co-boarder of having stolen items of merchandise from his store. They vehemently denied this accusation, but Gajardo did not believe them. Instead, Gajardo directed them to see him in his room to talk about the matter. When "AAA" went inside Gajardo's room, the latter renewed his insistence that "AAA" own up to having stolen the merchandise in question, otherwise he would bring her to the Police Station and have a theft case against her blottered. He then told her to sit on his lap and began caressing her back. "AAA" demanded that he stop what he was doing because she did not like it, but he paid no heed to her demand. When "AAA" stood up to leave, Gajardo pulled her back, compelled her to sit on his lap anew, and then proceeded to unhook her bra. Then Gajardo made her lie down and inserted his penis. Gajardo's lecherous assault upon "AAA' ceased only when his child knocked on the door and called for him. The RTC and CA ruled against the appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not Gajardo is guilty of the crime of rape. Page 72 of 233

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RULING: YES. In the 1901 case of United States v. Ramos, this Court had already declared that "when a woman testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all that is necessary to constitute the commission of this crime has been committed. It is merely a question then, whether or not this court accepts her statement." Jurisprudence has clung with unrelenting grasp to this precept. The trial court's assessment and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis their testimonies ought to be upheld as a matter of course because of its direct, immediate and first hand opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses as they delivered their testimonies in open court. Thus, the trial court's findings bearing on the credibility of witnesses on these matters are invariably binding and conclusive upon the appellate court unless of course, there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misapprehended or misconstrued some fact or circumstance of weight or substance, or had failed to accord or assign such fact or circumstance its due import or significance. Here, it bears stressing that the CA itself declared in its Decision that there is no showing that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted some facts or circumstances of weight and substance in convicting Gajardo. Its decision must be upheld. Besides, Gajardo's defense is in the nature of a denial which hardly creates reasonable doubt of his guilt in light of his testimony that he was at the place and time of the rape. Gajardo's denial cannot prevail over "AAA's" direct, positive and categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial is inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical statement that has the earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. JOSE BELMAR UMAPAS y CRISOSTOMO, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 215742, March 22, 2017, PERALTA, J.: In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. However, oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested, as in this case. FACTS: In the evening of November 30, 1998, around 11 o'clock, accused-appellant Jose Umapas mauled his wife Gemma Gulang Umapas (Gemma) and, with the use of alcohol intended for a coleman or lantern, doused her with it and set her ablaze at their home located at Lower Kalakhan, Olongapo City. Gemma was brought to the hospital but eventually died. The police authorities were unable to talk to Gemma immediately after the incident as they were prevented from doing so by the attending physician at the hospital's emergency room. But the following day, December 1, 1998, around 1:30 p.m., SPOl Anthony Garcia (SPOJ Garcia) was able to interview the victim at her hospital bed. Though she spoke slowly with eyes closed, Gemma was said to be coherent and agreed to give a statement about the incident which included her identifying her husband, Umapas, as her assailant. Gemma was asked if she felt that she was dying, and she said "yes." SPOl Garcia reduced her statement in writing and the same was attested thru Page 73 of 233

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the victim's thumbmark. A nurse who was present when the statement of the victim was taken signed as witness. Accused-appellant was charged and convicted of paricide. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide. RULING: YES. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. In the instant case, the fact of Gemma's death is incontestable. The fact that Gemma died on December 5, 1998 was established by witnesses from both the prosecution and defense. As additional proof of Gemma's demise, the prosecution presented her Certificate of Death which was admitted by the RTC. Also, the spousal relationship between Gemma and the appellant is undisputed. Appellant already admitted that Gemma was his legitimate wife in the course of the trial of the case. In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. However, oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested, as in this case. Thus, having established the fact of death and the spousal relationship between Gemma and the appellant, the remaining element to be proved is whether the deceased is killed by the accused. Dying Declaration While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is "made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case." It is considered as "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation." Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: First, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible. Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he Page 74 of 233

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survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been competent. Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. Here, Gemma's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of her death and taking into consideration the severity of her wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that she uttered the same under the belief that her own death was already imminent. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be shown by the declarant' s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of her physician. While more than 12 hours has lapsed from the time of the incident until her declaration, it must be noted that Gemma was in severe pain during the early hours of her admission. Dr. Tamayo even testified that when she saw Gemma in the hospital, she was restless, in pain and incoherent considering that not only was she mauled, but 57% of her body was also bumed. She also underwent operation and treatment, and was under medication during the said period. Given the circumstances Gemma was in, even if there was sufficient lapse of time, we could only conclude that at the time of her declaration, she feared that her death was already imminent. While suffering in pain due to thermal bums, she could not have used said time to contrive her identification of Umapas as her assailant. There was, thus, no opportunity for Gemma to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. Moreover, Gemma would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had she survived. There is nothing in the records that show that Gemma rendered involuntary declaration. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for parricide in which Gemma was the victim. It has been held that conviction or guilt may be based mainly on the ante-mortem statements of the deceased.35 In the face of the positive identification made by deceased Gemma of appellant Umapas, it is clear that Umapas committed the crime. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can also sufficiently establish his guilt. The consistent rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All these requisites, not to mention the dying declaration of the deceased victim herself, are present in the instant case. In the instant case, the testimonies of: (1) SPO1 Belisario that during his investigation immediately after the crime was reported, he went to the crime scene and was able to talk to Ginalyn Umapas, the daughter of the victim, wherein the latter told him that Umapas was the one who set her mother ablaze inside their house, (2) Dr. Tamayo that a certain Rodrigo Dacanay told him that Umapas was the one who mauled and set Gemma ablaze, and (3) SPOl Garcia that he took the statement of Gemma which he reduced into writing after the same was thumbmarked by Gemma and witnessed by the hospital nurse, can be all admitted as circumstantial evidence. While Ginalyn Umapas and Rodrigo Dacanay or the hospital nurse were not presented to prove the truth of such Page 75 of 233

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statements, they may be admitted not necessarily to prove the truth thereof, but at least for the purpose of placing on record to establish the fact that those statements or the tenor of such statements, were made. Thus, the testimonies of SPO1 Belisario, Dr. Tamayo, and SPOI Garcia are in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Ginalyn Umapas and Rodrigo Dacanay made such statement, and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply. Parricide, under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346), the imposition of the penalty of death is prohibited. Likewise, significant is the provision found in Article 6345 of the Revised Penal Code stating that in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applying these to the instant case, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the court a quo. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ARIEL S. MENDOZA, AccusedAppellant G.R. No. 224295, March 22, 2017, REYES, J.: The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the RPC, as amended, are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. Then, to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1) of the RPC, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. FACTS: On February 10, 2010, accused Ariel Mendoza was charged with the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: That sometime in between 2008 and 2009, in Brgy. Luna, Municipality of San Antonio, Province of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [accused-appellant], with lewd design, through intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his penis into the vagina and buttocks of his own daughter, five (5) year old [AAA], against her will and consent, and which degraded and demeaned the latter of her intrinsic worth and dignity, to the damage and prejudice of said minor [AAA]. CONTRARY TO LAW. During the trial, AAA recalled that the incident transpired at her grandfather’s house, around the same time when their own house was being demolished. She claimed that while her grandfather was away, the accused-appellant stripped her naked and asked her to lie facing downwards. The accused-appellant then inserted his penis into her vagina and anus. The harrowing incident was interrupted by the arrival of her grandfather, after which she dressed up, went out of the house and played with her dog, while the accused-appellant stayed inside the house. Page 76 of 233

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For his defense, the accused-appellant claimed innocence and denied the charge. He testified that it was his compadre Rolex Labre who committed the crime when the latter was still living with them in 2008. He asseverated that the filing of the case against him was instigated by his live-in partner, EEE, who wanted him jailed so that she could freely cohabitate with her new flame who lives in Bulacan. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape. RULING: YES. The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the RPC, as amended, are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. Then, to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1) of the RPC, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. There is no question that all of the foregoing elements were duly established by the prosecution in the instant case. AAA consistently and categorically stated during the trial that the accusedappellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will. Even at her tender age, she was able to clearly relay the incident in a vernacular familiar to her and even demonstrated how she was violated. The elements of minority and relationship were also duly established during the trial by the admission of the parties and the presentation of AAA’s certificate of live birth, where the accusedappellant was identified as the father and also verified that the victim was only 5 years old at the time of the incident. As to the manner by which the crime was committed, i.e., by force, threat or intimidation, such is dismissible in view of the relationship between the parties. In the incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be proven The moral and physical domination of the father is sufficient to intimidate the victim into submission to his carnal desires. The rapist, by his overpowering and overbearing moral influence, can easily consummate his bestial lust with impunity. Consequently, proof of force and violence is unnecessary, unlike when the accused is not an ascendant or a blood relative of the victim.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee v. JUANITO ENTRAMPAS, AccusedAppellant G.R. No. 212161, March 29, 2017, LEONEN, J.: The silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue, or fabricated. A minor “cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted.” FACTS: The accused, Juanito Entrampas, raped AAA, the daughter of the accused's live-in partner. He threatened the girl with a knife that he would kill her if she told anyone of what happened. The rape occurred several more times over the following months. AAA eventually became pregnant, so her mother discovered what the accused did. The accused was charged with two counts of qualified rape. One of his contentions was that there was failure to resist his sexual aggression and failure to immediately report the rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of accused are meritorious. RULING: NO. The girl’s failures to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately report the incident to the authorities or to her mother do not undermine her credibility. The silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue, or fabricated. A minor "cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted." Force and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim's perception and judgment when the assailant committed the crime. In rape perpetrated by close kin, such as the common-law spouse of the child's mother, actual force or intimidation need not be employed. "While [accusedappellant] was not the biological father of AAA ... [she] considered him as her father since she was a child." Moral influence or ascendancy added to the intimidation of AAA. It enhanced the fear that cowed the victim into silence. Accused-appellant's physical superiority and moral influence depleted AAA's resolve to stand up against her foster father. The threats to her and her mother's lives, as well as the knife within accused-appellant's reach, further prevented her from resisting her assailant. As accused-appellant sexually assaulted AAA, she cried and pleaded him to stop. Her failure to shout or tenaciously repel accused-appellant does not mean that she voluntarily submitted to his dastardly act.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee v. KING REX A. AMBATANG, AccusedAppellant G.R. No. 205855, March 29, 2017, LEONEN, J.: A few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. FACTS: On October 17, 2002, at around 10:30 p.m., Jennifer Vidal Mateo3 (Jennifer) was at the kitchen of their house in Taguig with her cousins when she heard a barrage of stones hurled at their house. She peeked out of the window and saw accused King Rex Ambatang standing outside with a certain "Loui." Melody Vidal Navarro (Melody) immediately called barangay tanods, who then immediately went to Ambatang's house, just across the Vidals' house6 While Ambatang's mother, Nicepura Ambatang, was speaking to a tanod, another tanod, Romeo Acaba (Acaba), saw Ambatang sharpening a knife in their kitchen. Suddenly, Ambatang was nowhere to be found and appeared to have sneaked past the tanods before running towards the Vidals' house. Later, Ambatang was on top of Vidal and was stabbing him repeatedly with a kitchen knife. Ambatang ran away but was apprehended by the tanods. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Pasig Provincial Hospital. Ambantang was charged and eventually convicted for murder. He assailed the supposed inconsistencies in the statements of Jennifer and Acaba, that is, their statements on how accusedappellant left his residence and stabbed Vidal, and on the specific number of times that they saw Vidal get stabbed by accused-appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses lessen their credibility. RULING: NO. We have time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed. Regardless of Jennifer and Acaba's supposed discrepancies on how accusedappellant left his residence to stab Vidal and the exact number of times they saw him stab Vidal, what ultimately matters is that they witnessed how Ambantang stabbed Vidal.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GEORGE GACUSAN G.R. No. 207776, April 26, 2017, LEONEN, J.: Actual force or intimidation need not even be employed for rape to be committed where the over powering influence of a father over his daughter suffices. FACTS: The accused was the common law partner of AAA’s mother. When her mother dies, she was left with no one, thus, she opted to stay with the accused. AAA, who was then 15 years old, while sleeping, felt the hand of the accused touching her private parts, and he was able to insert his penis to her vagina. After the rape, she confided with her teacher that she has been molested by the accused. The accused was thereafter charged with rape. The only defense of the accused is denial. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty. RULING: YES. A victim should never be blemished for her lack of resistance to any crime especially as heinous as rape. Neither the failure to shout nor the failure to resist the act equate to a victim's voluntary submission to the appellant's lust. In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. In this case, therefore, the issue regarding the need to prove actual force or intimidation becomes superfluous since it was already established that Gacusan was the common-law partner of AAA's deceased mother. AAA’s testimony, as well as her positive identification of the accused, was at par with the findings of the examining physician that she was raped. This cannot be outweighed by Gacusan's bare denial of the accusations against him. The prosecution's positive assertions deserve more credence than the negative averment of the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON SORIANO G.R. No. 216063, June 5, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.: Factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these factual findings are accorded the highest respect by the appellate court, whose revisory power and authority is limited to the bare and cold records of the case. FACTS: Page 80 of 233

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Accused was indicted for the murder of Perfecto Narag, his maternal uncle. The witnesses testified that the accused attacked the victim at his home by stabbing him on the chest, back and several parts of his body. The accused on the other hand claims self-defense. The RTC convicted the accused as affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: YES.It is almost trite to say that the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these factual findings are accorded the highest respect by the appellate court, whose revisory power and authority is limited to the bare and cold records of the case.In the case at bench, we see no reason at all to overturn the findings of facts and the conclusions of law made by both the trial court and the appellate court relative to the fact that treachery or alevosia in fact attended the stabbing-to-death of Perfecto by the appellant at the time and place alleged in the Information. The awards for damages can stand some modification, however. Notably, the appellate court awarded P25,000.00 as actual damages which is the amount stipulated by the parties. However, it is settled that "only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the [victim] may be allowed." Hence, the award of P25,000.00 as actual damages is deleted. In lieu thereof, "it is proper to award temperate damages x x x since the heirs of the victim suffered a loss but could not produce documentary evidence to support their claims." In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we award P50,000.00 as temperate damages. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TITO AMOC G.R. No. 216937, June 5, 2017, TIJAM, J.: It has been acknowledged that even absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has moral ascendancy over the victim. FACTS: The accused was charged with 2 counts of rape allegedly committed against his 13 year old stepdaughter. Consequently, AAA became pregnant and divulged to her mother that her step father had been raping her and he was the father of the baby. The accused on the other hand, admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA but argues that it was consensual. He claims that it was a practice in Ata-Manobo, an indigenous group, to take one’s daughter as his second wife. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty. RULING: Page 81 of 233

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YES. For a charge of rape under the above-mentioned provision to .prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA; and, (2) he accompanied such act by force, threat or intimidation.We find that the evidence on record sufficiently established that the accused-appellant employed force, intimidation and threat in carrying out his sexual advances on AAA. The CA correctly found that the accused-appellant employed force upon the person of AAA. Accused-appellant tied AAA's legs with a rope, climbed on top of her, and covered her mouth to prevent her from asking for help. Accused-appellant also threatened AAA when he · pointed a knife at her and tried to stab her. And even assuming arguendo that AAA failed to resist, the same does not necessarily amount to consent to accused-appellant's criminal acts. It is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; as moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.Considering that accused-appellant was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, and as such, he was exercising parental authority over AAA. Indeed, in this case, moral ascendancy is substituted for force and intimidation. Lastly, the Informations alleged that the accused-appellant was the stepfather of AAA. The evidence, however, shows that the accused appellant was merely the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, BBB.The circumstances of relationship and minority must be both alleged in the Informations and proved during trial to be convicted of the crime of qualified rape. Therefore, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the R TC and the CA for the conviction of accusedappellant for two counts of simple rape as they were sufficiently supported by the evidence on record. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLAND BISORA G.R. No. 218942, June 5, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. FACTS: The accused was charged with rape of AAA a 16 year old minor. It was alleged that the accused first courted AAA and later had a secret relationship with the latter for they were afraid of her parents. The accused, however, forced AAA to have sexual intercourse with him in a restroom of a billiard house. She was again abused, this time inside the comfort room of their neighbor’s house. The accused merely denied the accusations against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty. RULING: YES. For conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was Page 82 of 233

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accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. AAA's failure to shout or to tenaciously resist accused-appellant should not be taken against her since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make ·voluntary her submission to accusedappellant's criminal act. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime.Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. In this case, we find that accused-appellant employed force upon AAA when he forcibly held AAA by the hand as he led her to the comfort room. We also find that intimidation facilitated the commission of the offense, considering accused-appellant's persistent threats to AAA in saying "subukan mong magsumbong sa magulang mo". We are cognizant of the fact that the victim, AAA, was then a 16-year old girl who heavily feared her parents, while accused-appellant was a 42-year old man. Evidently, it is not unreasonable to discern that AAA was cowed to surrendering to accused appellant's bestial desires. As to accused-appellant's claim that he and AAA were sweethearts, such fact does not necessarily negate AAA's lack of consent to the sexual encounter with accused-appellant. As has been consistently ruled, "A love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will. Love is not a license for lust." PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILFREDO PACAYRA G.R. No. 216987, June 5, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. FACTS: The accused was charged with 4 counts of rape of his 12 year old daughter starting when she was just 7 years old. When AAA was 7 years old, while she was changing her sibling’s diaper, the accused abused her. Less than a year thereafter, she was again abused by her father. After which, there were 2 more incidents of rape, and even after telling her mother about them, the latter refused to believe her and did nothing. It was only when their neighbour learned of the abuse that she was able to go to the DSWD and filed the instant case against her father. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty. RULING:

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YES. In the instant case, we hold the accused-appellant liable for four counts of Qualified Rape. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.To raise the crime of rape, be it simple rape or statutory rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. In the present case, the elements of qualified rape are sufficiently alleged in the four Informations, to wit: a) AAA was still a minor on the day of the alleged rape; and b) accused-appellant is AAA's father. The foregoing elements are also sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.Further, the fact that AAA was uncertain as to the exact date when the rape occurred does not result in the acquittal of the accusedappellant. The Court has repeatedly held that the exact date when the victim was sexually abused is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Indeed, the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY BENTAYO G.R. No. 216938, June 5, 2017, PERALTA, J.: When the offender is the victim's father, as in this case, there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. FACTS: AAA was allegedly raped by her mother’s new husband. At the time of the rape, the victim was only 7 years old. Allegedly, she was raped multiple times and it was only after their neighbour heard AAA’s cries while the accused molested her, that the abused stopped and she had the chance to tell the authorities of what happened. The accused was charged with rape qualified by relationship. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was guilty of rape. RULING: Page 84 of 233

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YES. Under paragraph 1 (a) of Art. 266-A of the RPC, the elements of rapeare: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. However, when the offender is the victim's father, as in this case, there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. Thus, all the elements are present. The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it createsserious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant's narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime." Moreover, the date of the commission of the rapeis not an essential element of the crime. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE DESCARTIN G.R. No. 215195, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of Qualified Rape, alleging that he raped his then 11-year old daughter AAA. AAA narrated that while she was sleeping, she felt removed her shorts, raised her right leg and was able to insert his penis to her vagina. She told their neighbour of what happened, and thereafter they went to the hospital for a medical examination and to the police to file the complaint. On the other hand, the accused claimed that he was in a different city at the time of the said rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Qualified Rape. RULING: YES. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. To raise the crime of rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. In the Page 85 of 233

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present case, the elements of qualified rape were sufficiently alleged in the Information, to wit: a) AAA was 11 years old on the day of the alleged rape; and b) accused-appellant is AAA's father. The foregoing elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. That AAA was 11 years old during the commission of the rape and that accused-appellant is AAA's father were established by AAA's Certificate of Live Birth. Since the elements of minority of AAA and the relationship of the accused-appellant with AAA were alleged in the Information and sufficiently proven by the prosecution during the trial, We agree with the CA that accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape under Article 266-A paragraph l(d), as qualified under Article 266-B of the RPC. Thus, the CA is correct in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO CLARO G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.: In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction inan unprejudiced mind. FACTS: Claro was charged with the crime of Rape. According to AAA, she and the accused met in Sta. Ana, Manila and proceeded to a nearby house, later identified as Aroma Motel. When they entered the room, she tried to leave, but the accused closed the door and pushed her towards the bed. After forcefully undressing AAA and having carnal knowledge with her, the accused left. However, AAA was compelled to ride with the accused in a jeepney because she did not know her way back. The accused in his defense, claimed that he and AAA were lovers. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of rape which was also affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: NO. The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong corroboration. This is because the mere fact that the accused and the victim were lovers should not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. Yet, it is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual intercourse interposed by the accused. The established circumstances -their having agreed to go on a lovers' date; their travelling together a long way from their meeting place on board the jeepney; their alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal together; their walking together to the motel, and checking in together at the motel without the complainant manifesting resistance; and their entering the designated room without protest from her -indicated beyond all doubt that they had consented to culminate their lovers' date in bed inside the motel. Page 86 of 233

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That the medico-legal examination of March 14, 2006 turned up with the findings of abrasions on AAA's left breast and contusions on her right hand did not necessarily mean that the accused had applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex with him.Such findings did not justify the full rejection of the demonstrable consensuality of their sexual intercourse. Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further means that the courts should duly consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the process the courts should persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every circumstance favoring his innocence should be fully taken into account. That is what we must be do herein, for he is entitled to nothing less. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL AGUDO G.R. No. 219615, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Jurisprudence is to the effect that when the offender is the victim's father, there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation. Accused-appellant is AAA's father and his moral ascendancy over his minor daughter is sufficient to take the place of actual force, threat or intimidation FACTS: The accused was charged with rape by allegedly raping his 16 year old daughter. AAA narrated that the abuse started when she was just 13 years old. She could not tell her mother of what had happened because her father threatened to kill her and her mother. The abuse happened several more times until AAA finally was able to tell her aunt about her father’s bestial acts towards her. The accused raised denial as a defense and claimed that at the time of his arrest he was not informed of the charges against him. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Qualified Rape. RULING: YES. For the prosecution of the crime of rape under Article 266-A (l)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be proved, to wit: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force, threat, or intimidation. First, that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA was established by the latter's clear and categorical testimony, found credible by the RTC, that accused-appellant inserted his penis in her vagina. The second element of the crime that the bestial act was accomplished through force, threat, and intimidation was also clearly established through AAA's testimony that the accused-appellant threatened to kill her and her· mother if she would reveal that accused-appellant raped her. Besides, jurisprudence is to the effect that when the offender is the victim's father, there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation. Page 87 of 233

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONATHAN BAAY G.R. No. 220143, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph l(d), should still be designated as simple rape under paragraph l(b). FACTS: The accused was charged with Qualified rape, allegedly sexually abusing AAA who was a mental retardate (had the mental faculties of a 5 year old). According to AAA, the accused invited her to go to the forest and there, he was able to have carnal knowledge with her. She eventually got pregnant. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Statutory Rape. RULING: NO. We, however, find it erroneous for the RTC and the CA to convict accused-appellant of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph l(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape under the said. provision is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old.28 To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the victim; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the victim. In this case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 22 years old when she was raped albeit she has a mental age of 4-5 years old. It should, however, no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1 (b), not Section 1 (d), of the said provision as the same, precisely, refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason". Considering the circumstances of this case, we find that accused appellant should be held liable for simple rape. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BLAS GAA G.R. No. 212934, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify conviction for rape. FACTS: The accused was charged with two counts of Qualified Statutory Rape, allegedly raping his 9 year old daughter. The victim narrated that while she was fetching water outside, her father asked her to remove her shorts and panty and placed himself on top of her, and tried to put in his penis but it was only up to the “bokana”, so he just inserted his fingers and played with his daughter’s vagina. The same incident happened several times until finally her mother learned about it and filed the cases against her father. Page 88 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of 2 counts of Statutory Rape. RULING: YES. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation, or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. Accused-appellant admitted, on several occasions, that he is the father of AAA.AAA's birth certificate also shows that Blas Rodriguez Gaa is her father. It is clear as crystal that accusedappellant is the father of AAA. His claim that he is not is obviously his futile attempt to defend himself and remove the qualifying circumstance of the rape for which he was convicted in order to lower his penalty. It is well-settled that full penetration of the female genital organ is not indispensable. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, is sufficient. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify conviction for rape. Since the elements of minority of AAA and the relationship of theaccused-appellant with AAA were alleged in the two Informations and thatthe same were sufficiently proven by the prosecution during the trial, weagree with the CA that accused-appellant is guilty of two counts of QualifiedStatutory Rape. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PABLO ARMODIA G.R. No. 210654, June 7, 2017, LEONEN, J.: The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code consists of the twin circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to the perpetrator, both of which must concur and must be alleged in the information. It is immaterial whether the relationship was proven during trial if that was not specifically pleaded for in the information. FACTS: The accused allegedly started raping his daughter in a makeshift house beside their piggery. She was only 16 at that time. According to the victim, his father always asked her to stay at the makeshift house and there he would threaten her with his bolo and have sex with her. He threatened to kill her and anyone who would know about the abuse. The incident happened again for the second time in the same makeshift house. Finally, AAA was able to tell her mother about Page 89 of 233

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the abuse and filed 2 charges of Qualified Rape against her father. The RTC only convicted the accused of 2 counts of simple rape which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was only guilty of simple rape. RULING: YES. Accused-appellant committed two (2) counts of simple rape, not qualified rape.The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code consists of the twin circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to the perpetrator, both of which must concur and must be alleged in the information. It is immaterial whether the relationship was proven during trial if that was not specifically pleaded for in the information. The Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found that accused-appellant's relationship with AAA was not duly alleged in the informations. Thus, his relationship with the victim cannot qualify the crimes of rape. Ruling otherwise would deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Even if the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were present, the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed." PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO DENIEGA G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017,PERALTA J.: In determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established. FACTS: The accused was charged with Statutory Rape for allegedly sexually abusing AAA, a mental retardate who was 16 years old at that time but has a mental capacity of a 6 year old. AAA went out to watch basketball game near their house. When she went back, her pants were wet and when asked by her mother to remove the same, her mother smelled the scent of semen. When quizzed further by her mother, she confided that the accused who was known to them as “Dodong” invited her to go to another basketball court where they could talk. However, instead of talking, the accused made her lie down, undressed her and inserted his penis to her vagina, making up and down movements subsequently. Upon questioning by the barangay, the accused admitted in front of his employer that he had sex with AAA, that he loves her and that he intends to marry her. The RTC convicted him of statutory rape as affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Page 90 of 233

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Whether or not the accused is guilty of Statutory Rape. RULING: YES. Accused-appellant was charged with statutory rape under Article 266- A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (RA 8353), in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610).Statutory rape is committed when: ( 1) the offended party is under twelve years of age; and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. It is also a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutoryrape.In People v. Quintas, 25 this Court held that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph l(b), Article 266-A of the RPC. Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established. In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim, at the time of the commission of the crime, was 16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child. The prosecution was able to establish these facts through AAA's Birth Certificate, Clinical Abstract prepared by a medical doctor who is a psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental Health, as well as the testimonies of the said doctor and the victim's mother, BBB. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO FORTUNA ALBERCA G.R. No. 217459, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: The absence of hymenal fluid or spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The presence or absence thereof is immaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of rape. FACTS: Two (2) separate informations for Qualified Rape were filed against the accused for raping the 11 year old daughter of his common law wife. AAA testified that on her way home from her grandmother’s house, the accused waylaid her and dragged her to the forest. Upon reaching the forest, he removed his pants and undressed the victim. He then made her lie down, held her hands and placed himself on top of her making up and down movements subsequently. The incident Page 91 of 233

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happened for the second time again in the forest but this time, the brother of AAA told their mother that the accused made AAA go to the forest with him. Thus, the mother of AAA brought her to the police and to the hospital where it was found out that she was no longer a virgin. It was eventually found out that she was pregnant, however, the child died after having been delivered prematurely. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of 2 counts of Qualified Rape. HELD: YES. Time and again, this Court has held that questions on the credibility of witnesses should be addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe the elusive and incommunicable evidence of witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts. are, thus, one with the R TC and CA in applying the jurisprudential principle that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. The medical findings of Dr. Salas that AAA was not a virgin anymore, as well as the period of her pregnancy, coincided with the rape incidents. Thus, while it has been held in the past that the accused in rape cases may be convicted solely on the basis of the victim's testimony which passed the test of credibility, in this case, there is more than sufficient evidence presented to arrive at such conclusion. The absence of hymenal laceration is of no moment. Contrary to the accused-appellant's theory, the same does not negate the fact of rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. In fact, this Court has, in a previous case, affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim's hymen since medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim's hymen to stay intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. Likewise, the absence of hymenal fluid or spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The presence or absence thereof is immaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of rape. Besides, the absence of the seminal fluid from the vagina could be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina, or simply the washing of the vagina after the sexual intercourse. At any rate, the presence of spermatozoa is not an element of the crime of rape.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMMEL RONQUILLO G.R. No. 214762, September 20, 2017, MARTIRES, J.: Our law on statutory rape demands only the requisite proof of the victim's age and of carnal knowledge with the accused to sustain his conviction. FACTS: Rommel Ronquillo was charged with statutory rape. AAA, then 11 years old, watched an amateur singing contest at the basketball court of their barangay. AAA went home at around midnight. En route to her house, AAA noticed Ronquillo standing at a nearby waiting shed. AAA was familiar with Ronquillo because the latter had chased her several times, asking for her name. While walking home, she noticed that someone was following her. When she looked back, a man with his face covered poked a gun at her. She tried to shout, but the man choked her. The man then cocked his gun. Thereafter, the attacker brought AAA to an isolated place and pressed her against a wall. The man then told her to remove her clothes. Then, he started kissing AAA all over her body. He parted her thighs, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull movements. AAA noticed that the maong pants he was wearing were the same pants she saw worn by Ronquillo at the waiting shed earlier. She also recognized Ronquillo as her attacker when the red handkerchief covering his face fell off. AAA then rushed home and related the rape incident to her parents, who immediately reported it to the authorities. Ronquillo invoked denial as his sole defense. The RTC convicted Ronquillo as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not Ronquillo is guilty of committing statutory rape. RULING: YES. The elements necessary in every prosecution for statutory rape are: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. The requisite elements were proven in the present case. As to the first element, AAA's age at the time of the commission of the offense is uncontroverted. Her birth certificate, which was duly presented and offered in evidence, shows that she was born on 9 November 1989. Thus, AAA was only 11 years and 11 months old at the time she was raped. As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, she recounted, in a steadfast and unequivocal manner, the circumstances clearly showing that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. he trial court found AAA's testimony to be detailed, credible, and unwavering. Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts. x x x The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court Page 93 of 233

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has concurred with the trial court. Here, both the RTC and the CA found AAA’s testimony to be credible and convincing. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EEE G.R. No. 227185, September 27, 2017, PERALTA J.: For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim) FACTS: EEE was indicted for raping his 13-year old stepdaughter AAA (qualified rape). AAA testified that she was about to take a bath and already preparing her things when her stepfather, accused EEE, pulled her and brought her to the room. He took off her clothes and undressed himself. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. He threatened her not to tell BBB (AAA’s mother) about the incident, saying that BBB would scold and send them to prison. BBB meanwhile testified that she almost caught EEE’s dastardly act. From thereon, BBB had a hunch as to what happened. BBB repeatedly confronted her daughter AAA but to no avail until one night when AAA finally admitted that EEE raped her. AAA said to her mother BBB that she did not immediately apprise her because EEE threatened her. EEE invoked denial and alibi as defenses. The RTC convicted EEE as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not EEE is guilty of qualified rape. RULING: YES. For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In this case, We do not find any reason to depart from the findings of the courts below that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. As borne by the records, the fourth and fifth elements of minority and relationship were sufficiently proven by AAA’s birth certificate and EEEs own admission during the trial. As for the first three elements, the Court agrees that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses deserve full faith and credence. The trial court did not hesitate to throw out the testimonies of EEE’s relatives in view of the more credible witnesses for the prosecution. Certainly, the trial judge is in the best position to assess whether the witness was telling the truth as he had the direct and singular opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture and tone of voice of the complaining witnesses while testifying. Also, the CA rightly opined that AAA withstood the cross- examination and was unequivocal on how the Page 94 of 233

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rape was committed by her stepfather. Time and again, the Court has held that in resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility the victim’s testimony.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGAR ALLAN CORPUZ Y FLORES G.R. No. 208013; 03 July 2017 LEONEN, J. Sexual intercourse with an intellectually disabled person is rape as force or intimidation become unnecessary as the victim is incapable of giving consent. FACTS: The accused was charged with 4 counts of rape of the victim, a 14-year-old mental retardate with a mental age of 5 years of 8 months. The victim later became pregnant and was examined by a medical officer. The doctor found that the victim had healed hymenal lacerations and had been pregnant for 3 to 4 months. The victim was already 20 years old when she took the witness stand. Prior to this, she was subjected to a neuropsychiatric examination which revealed that she was intellectually disabled. She identified that the accused was the father of her 4-year-old child, and testified as to the circumstances of the 4 counts of rape. The defense requested the conduct of a DNA test, which revealed that the accused was disputably presumed to be the father of the victim’s child. The RTC found the accused guilty of 4 counts of rape, which was affirmed by the CA. The accused now contends that the testimony of the victim is not credible and that the DNA test conducted was inaccurate. ISSUE: Whether or notthe accused’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. (YES) RULING: The victim was able to identify the accused and also recount the acts committed. The acts were also corroborated by the Medico Legal Certificate showing the presence of healed hymen lacerations. Accused’s denial cannot overcome this. Moreover, sexual intercourse with an intellectually disabled person is rape as force or intimidation become unnecessary as the victim is incapable of giving consent. The victim’s disability was undisputed and was substantiated by the prosecution, as the victim underwent two neuropsychiatric examinations which proved her mental age was that of a 5-year-old to a 7-year-old child. As such, the acts of the accused amounted to rape under Art. 266-A 1(d) of the RPC, wherein the victim is under 12 years of age.

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As held in jurisprudence, the circumstances in Art. 266-A must be understood with regard to the victim’s capacity to give consent, which depends on the victim’s capacity to give consent and not chronological age. Moreover, an intellectually disabled person is not ineligible to testify in court simply by reason of this disability. As long as the victim’s testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court. Here, the victim has a low IQ but can still perceive and is capable of making known her perception to others. Lastly, even assuming that the accused had not impregnated the victim, such would not disprove that he had carnal knowledge of the victim. However, based on the DNA paternity test conducted, the accused is disputably presumed to be the father of the victim’s child as the value of the Probability of Paternity was 99.9% or higher. It was the defense that requested the conducting of a DNA test, and it thereafter failed to assail the reliability of the procedure before the trial court. It is only now questioning the accuracy of the test, hence it should be deemed estopped. PEOPLE v. ALEX AMAR Y MONTANO G.R. No. 223513. July 5, 2017 TIJAM, J. It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. FACTS: On April 13, 2009, at 1:00 a.m., the victim, AAA, was sleeping alone in her room when she was roused from her sleep when she felt somebody holding her breast, who turned out to be her own father. Accused-appellant then proceeded to undress AAA. He removed his shorts, positioned himself on top of AAA, inserted his penis into her vagina and had sex with her. Thereafter, accusedappellant ejaculated on a towel and left the room.The incident was not the first time that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA. Records show that the molestation started when AAA was in Grade 6, and was repeated 10 times in a month. After being silent for some time, on April 11, 2009,AAA narrated her ordeal to her aunt, DDD. The following day, CCC, the accusedappellant's eldest daughter, likewise confided to DDD that accused-appellant was sexually molesting her.Upon learning of the incident, BBB, her mother together with AAA and CCC, lodged a complaint for sexual molestation against the accused-appellant, with the Barangay Women and Children's Desk (BWCD). Accused-appellant was. held at the Barangay hall then turned over to the police for investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not AAA's testimony regarding her ordeal on April 13, 2009 was credible, delivered in a straightforward and convincing manner that is worthy of belief. RULING: YES. After a careful review of the evidence and testimony proffered by the Prosecution, the Court opines that the trial court and the CA were not mistaken in their assessment of the credibility of Page 96 of 233

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AAA's testimony. The accused-appellant failed to show that both tribunals overlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the outcome of the case or misunderstood a circumstance of consequence in their evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.Contrary to accused-appellant's assertion, AAA's testimony regarding her ordeal on April 13, 2009 was credible, as she delivered it in a straightforward and convincing manner that is worthy of belief. It has been previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her father.That legal dictum finds application in the case at bar since accused-appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient improper motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of such a serious charge of raping his own flesh and blood. We make short shrift of accused-appellant's claim that AAA's failure to immediately report the rape incident is not the normal behavior of a minor girl who had been previously sexually assaulted.The harrowing incident experienced by AAA in the hands of her own father would negate any reasonable standard form of reaction on a rape victim. Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICKY PRIMAVERA G.R. No. 223138. July 5, 2017 TIJAM, J. Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. FACTS: Around 2:00 a.m. of November 17, 2005, AAA was sleeping alone in their living room while BBB and her siblings were sleeping in their store adjacent to their living room. She was suddenly awakened by the voice of accused-appellant, who was their neighbor, telling her not to make any noise, otherwise he will kill her with a gun. Accused-appellant also told AAA that he has been wanting her and her elder sister but the latter already got married. He also told AAA that he will bring her to hell. He recognized accused-appellant as the latter turned on a flashlight as he wanted to see her face. AAA tried to reach for the xylophone and flat iron beside her to hit him with the same but the accused-appellant was able to stop her and instead, strangled her with the cord of the flat iron.Accused-appellant then proceeded to kiss her breasts and bite her nipples. He also managed to take off his and AAA's shorts/pants and underwears, open AAA's legs, insert his penis into AAA's vagina, and make push and pull movements. Thereafter, accused-appellant played with AAA's breast and vagina. After the sexual abuse, accused-appellant pulled AAA's hair, made her sit on a chair, and threatened to kill her, BBB, and her siblings if she tells anyone about the incident. Page 97 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not AAA’s testimony is credible. RULING: YES. The RTC and the CA found that the prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime of rape and accused-appellant's guilt. The accused-appellant, however, faults the trial court for relying upon AAA's testimony in ruling for his conviction. the appeal boils down to the credibility of AAA's testimony. Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim's credibility becomes the primordial consideration. For this matter, this Court has always adhered to the rule that unless there appears certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower court overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case, the trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even finality. This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court. Time and again, this Court held that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. What is merely required in establishing rape through testimonial evidence is that the victim be categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank in her statements about the incident of rape. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLLY DIZON Y TAGULAYLAY G.R. No. 217982. July 10, 2017 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. Rape can be committed either through sexual intercourse or sexual assault. Hence, it is possible to file two separate informations for a single act of rape. FACTS: Dizon was charged with rape through sexual assault and statutory rape in two separate informations. Allegedly, while 8 year old AAA was playing with her sister BBB, Dizon instructed BBB to look for a neighbor. After which, Dizon brought AAA to a grassy area. He forcibly laid her down and then thrust his penis to the child's vagina causing her to bleed. Dizon also inserted his finger inside the anus of AAA. He told AAA not to tell anyone otherwise he will send her to jail. All of these acts were witnessed by BBB who hid behind banana plants. A neighbor who saw AAA building alerted his family. AAA was brought to the hospital where the medical report showed that she suffered perineal laceration secondary to sexual abuse. During police investigation, AAA pointed to Dizon as the culprit. Page 98 of 233

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The prosecution presented the birth certificate of AAA, the medical certificate, the blood stained skirt of AAA, the receipt of AAA's medical expenses, and the testimonies of AAA and BBB, as well as CCC who saw Dizon talking with AAA and BBB. The defense on the other hand did not offer any documentary evidence, and relied on Dizon's denials of the accusations. ISSUE: Whether or not Dizon can be charged with rape in two separate informations for a single act of rape he committed. RULING: YES. Rape can be committed either through sexual intercourse or sexual assault. For charge of rape through sexual intercourse (par. 1 of Art. 266-A) to prosper, the elements are: (1) offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when under 12 years old or demented. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years of age is statutory rape. As to rape through sexual assault (par. 2 of Art. 266-A), the elements are: (1) male offender inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice of another person, whether a man or woman under any of the attendant circumstances in par. 1 of Art. 266-A; or (2) a male or female offender inserts any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person, whether a man or woman under any of the attendant circumstances in par. 1 of Art. 266-A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNIE CARILLO Y PABELLO, ET AL. G.R. No. 212814. July 12, 2017 TIJAM, J. Jurisprudence has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help does not negate rape. The delay in reporting the incident to her parents or the proper authorities is insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. FACTS: AAA was a nursing student in Las Piñas City. At around 1:00 p.m., AAA was in Las Piñas City, waiting for a jeepney ride going to Cavite to attend a party. Suddenly, someone held her right arm and due to extreme fear and coupled with her menstrual period, she lost consciousness. Upon regaining consciousness, AAA noticed that she was lying on a "papag" inside a nipa hut (kubo) with only her bra and panty on. AAA saw five male persons standing in front of her. They were laughing, smoking and drinking. Carillo, then went on top of her, pulled AAA's panty and held her breasts. Carillo inserted his penis into AAA's vagina and made a push and pull movement. Thereafter, Espique went on top of her and did what Carillo did to her. Page 99 of 233

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When AAA woke up, she was alone and was already wearing her bra and panty. She immediately put on her clothes and left. AAA proceeded to her classmate's house in Cavite, and narrated what happened. Accused-appellants argue that it is hard to believe that a rape victim like AAA would confide her experience to her classmates and friends rather than to her family. They insist that AAA's act of going to her classmate's house in Cavite, where she narrated her experience was contrary to human experience. They also argue that there are inconsistencies in AAA's testimony vis-a-vis her statements in her complaint-affidavit. The court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to AAA's inconsistent statements and her immediate conduct following the incident of rape RULING: NO. Jurisprudence has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help does not negate rape. The delay in reporting the incident to her parents or the proper authorities is insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. Furthermore, their defense of alibi and denial cannot stand against the prosecution's evidence. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, they must adduce clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Accused-appellants failed in this regard. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINADOR LADRA G.R. No. 221443. July 17, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The presence of other people in the victim’s room does not negate the commission of the crime of rape. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. FACTS: Accused-appellant was a relative of the victim’s mother, who allowed him to stay with their family out of pity. He ran errands for them and attended to the children when the parents were busy working. Page 100 of 233

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While the parents were away and while the victim’s brother was asleep beside her, accused forced his penis into the 5 year old victim’s vagina, and made push and pull movements, causing her pain. Accused threatened to kill her if she told anyone. Thereafter, accused repeatedly molested her, each time bringing his bolo with him. The sexual abuse ceased when the accused left their house. Years later, when the victim was already 12 years old, she saw accused in their kitchen. To her shock, accused-appellant squeezed her vagina. Later, the victim filed criminal cases against accusedappellant, who was subsequently arrested ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant should be convicted for Rape and Unjust Vexation. RULING: As for the crime of Rape: YES. The presence of the victim’s brother in the room does not negate the commission of the crime. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen in the most unlikely places. As for the crime of Unjust Vexation: NO. The crime should be Acts of Lasciviousness. The SC held that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a child - a young girl 12 years of age - could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. The law indicates that the mere touching - more so, "squeezing," in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional, and clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to annoy or vex her. 'Lewd' is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. As such, accused-appellant's act of squeezing was a lewd and lascivious act within the definitions set by law and jurisprudence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO GEROLA Y AMAR G.R. No. 217973. July 19, 2017 CAGUIOA, J. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy; where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time alleged. FACTS: Page 101 of 233

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Private complainant AAA was born on July 5, 1987. She was a minor when all three (3) acts of rape were committed. She was 11 years old when the first act of rape occurred sometime in the year 1998. The second act of rape happened sometime in the year 1999 when she was 12 years old and the third time was in January 2000 when she was 12 years and 6 months of age. At the time all 3 acts of rape occurred, she was living in the same house in San Jose with her full-blood sister, her half-siblings (children of her mother and step-father), her mother and AAA's step-father, accused-appellant Federico Gerola. The RTC and CA found accused-appellant guilty of all the charges against him. Federico's lone assignment of error rests on his claim that AAA could not exactly determine what year the first rape incident occurred, which purportedly creates doubt on the credibility of AAA. Federico draws the same conclusion from AAA's failure to promptly disclose her repeated defilement to the proper authorities ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's conviction of Federico for 3 counts of Rape. RULING: NO. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy; where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time alleged. It is well to stress that variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same. ROBLE BARBOSA AND RAMDY BARBOSA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 207193. July 24, 2017 DEL CASTILLO, J. Criminal intent is conclusively presumed due to the death of the victim. In the absence of any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide and infanticide, treachery having been properly disregarded by the courts below, the crime committed is homicide. FACTS: Betita was inside their family home when she heard her father, the victim, mumbling the words: "Nagsalig Zang na sila, kay mahisaon nga mga tawo" (They are confident of themselves, and they are envious people). Minutes later, she heard a man outside their house shouting "Get out". Her father responded to the challenge and stepped out of their house. Three gunshots erupted, which prompted Betita to investigate. When she went outside, she saw petitioner Ramdy running away with a gun in his hand. She also noticed petitioner Roble on the terrace of his house holding a long Page 102 of 233

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firearm. Betita rushed towards her wounded father who was slumped on the floor. She knelt and embraced him, then shouted to Roble "tama na, tama na". The victim's mother and neighbors arrived and brought him to the hospital where he was pronounced "dead on arrival". The autopsy on the cadaver of the victim revealed that his death was due to a gunshot wound in his left eyebrow caused by a bullet fired from a caliber .25 firearm. Thus, an information for murder was filed against petitioners for the death of Artemio Betita, Jr. (the victim). RTC and CA found petitioners guilty of homicide. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45. They insist that the testimony of Betita should not be considered against them for being unreliable and insufficient. Petitioners contend that there was no conspiracy between them since nobody actually saw the commission of the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide RULING: YES. The prosecution successfully established the elements of the crime of homicide, which are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed that person without justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or that of parricide or infanticide. The Certificate of Death of Artemio Betita, Jr. shows that the underlying cause of his death was a gunshot wound. Petitioners were seen holding firearms immediately after the victim was shot and his fatal injury was caused by a bullet fired from one of the firearms of petitioners. Petitioners' criminal intent is conclusively presumed due to the death of the victim. They only desisted from further shooting the victim after Betita pleaded for them to stop. In the absence of any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide and infanticide, treachery having been properly disregarded by the courts below, the crime committed by petitioners was homicide. The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that petitioners were in conspiracy in killing the victim. The circumstantial evidence showed that petitioners are father and son, and both carried firearms when they confronted the victim. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINADOR UDTOHAN Y JOSE G.R. No. 228887. August 2, 2017 MENDOZA, J. Testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence. It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. FACTS:

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AAA, who was then eleven (11) years old, together with her mother, BBB, and two (2) siblings, stayed for free in the house of her paternal uncle, accused-appellant. Sometime, AAA went with accused-appellant, whom she called CCC, to buy some bananas. Accused-appellant would buy bananas everyday and AAA helped him in selling banana cue as she was still on vacation from school. While on their way to the YYY Camp, accused-appellant suddenly dragged AAA towards the grassy portion of a vacant lot. Then and there, he had carnal knowledge with AAA by inserting his penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant pushed AAA out of the road and proceeded to buy some bananas. He threatened AAA that should she tell anyone about the incident, he would eject her family from his house and he would not feed them. Subsequently, accused-appellant would sexually abuse AAA almost every day at the same place. In a Decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the RPC and violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It found that AAA was born on October 7, 1999, as shown by in her birth certificate, and that she was 11 years old when the two separate sexual abuses occurred. The trial court held that the testimony of AAA was clear, candid, straightforward, and convincing regarding the sexual abuses she suffered at the hands of her uncle. The RTC also ruled that the medico-legal certificate corroborated the testimony of AAA. ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court gravely erred in giving credence to AAA’s testimony. RULING: NO. The Court does not give credence to accused-appellant's argument that AAA's testimony was incredible because there were inconsistent statements regarding the frequency of the abuses. Inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim do not necessarily render such testimony incredible. In fact, minor inconsistencies strengthen the credibility of the witness and the testimony, because of a showing that such charges are not fabricated. What is decisive in a charge of rape is the complainant's positive identification of the accused as the malefactor. Testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence. It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Moreover, the medico-legal report corroborated the testimony of AAA. It showed the presence of deep-healed lacerations at the 3, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in AAA's hymen, showing blunt penetrating trauma. Time and again, the Court held that the slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of rape. Nevertheless, the crime committed by accused-appellant must be qualified under Article 266-B of the RPC. It was indicated in the Informations that accused-appellant was the paternal uncle of AAA. Also, during trial, AAA positively identified accused-appellant as her uncle and she established that it was her uncle who raped her. There is qualified rape when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is an ascendant or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. In this case, accused-appellant, the paternal uncle of AAA, was a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Hence, the crime of qualified rape was committed by accused-appellant. Page 104 of 233

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO DE GUZMAN Y DE CASTRO G.R. No. 228248. August 9, 2017 REYES, JR., J. Moral ascendancy and influence over the victim substitutes for actual physical violence and intimidation as an element of rape. FACTS: The victim, AAA, narrated that she was first sexually assaulted by her stepfather, De Guzman, when she was only 8 years old. It happened sometime in 2003 when De Guzman led AAA to the extension part of their house in Las Piñas City, then laid her on the floor and removed her clothes. Thereafter, he inserted his penis inside her vagina and successfully had carnal knowledge of her. After raping AAA, De Guzman warned her to keep her silence and not to tell anyone. Fearful of the safety of her mother BBB and her younger siblings, AAA maintained her silence until she confided her sexual abuse to her aunt CCC. The sexual abuses of AAA from the hands of De Guzman continued between the years of 2006 and 2010. On his part, De Guzman denied raping AAA and interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. He alleged that he was in Pangasinan when the purported rape in 2003 happened, thus, it would be impossible for him to commit the said crime. He likewise denied the alleged instances of rape from 2006 to 2010 as he was never left alone with AAA in their house. At the end of his testimony, he imputed bad behavior and ill motive on the part of AAA. The defense of De Guzman was supported by BBB in her testimony. She testified that she is the mother of AAA but believed that the accusation of rape against her husband was false. She also affirmed the imputation of bad behavior against AAA by De Guzman. ISSUE: Whether or not moral ascendancy as a stepparent is sufficient to replace force, violence or intimidation in the crime of rape. RULING: YES. The Court finds AAA to be a credible witness when she recounted in open court the circumstances of her ill-fated ordeal – from the first instance when De Guzman, being her stepfather, had carnal knowledge of her since she was merely 8 years of age up to the following years of repeated sexual abuses through the use of force, threat and intimidation. The first commission of rape in 2003 does not require any other circumstance to support conviction. As provided by the above-mentioned law, rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age such as AAA. Same finding is arrived at to the subsequent acts of carnal knowledge of AAA between the years of 2006 and 2010. The Court likewise cannot subscribe to the assertion of De Guzman that his moral ascendancy as a stepparent is insufficient to replace force, violence or intimidation in the crime of rape. Jurisprudence dictates that the moral ascendancy wielded by De Guzman as a stepfather substituted actual force, threat and intimidation. As held inPeople v. Barcela: Page 105 of 233

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Being regarded as the “tatay,” Barcela had gained such moral ascendancy over AAA and BBB that any resistance normally expected from girls their age could not have been put up by them. His moral ascendancy and influence over them substituted for actual physical violence and intimidation as an element of rape. This made them easy prey for his sexual advances. Barcela’s moral and physical dominion of AAA and BBB are sufficient to cow them into submission to his beastly desires. No further proof is needed to show lack of consent of the victims to their own defilement. x x x. PEOPLE v. RUBEN "ROBIN" BONGBONGA Y NALOS G.R. No. 214771. August 9, 2017 CAGUIOA, J. The Court has consistently disfavored the "sweetheart theory" defense for being self-serving in nature. Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be substantiated by the accused with convincing proof. FACTS: AAA, a minor of about 16 years of age testified that while she was seated in a chair reading a pocketbook in the yard of their house, appellant came. Since no one was at home except for the two of them, he carried her inside the house up to the second floor where he laid her down the bamboo floor. After removing his clothes, appellant then removed the shirt, pajamas, panty and bra of the victim. She wanted to shout, but the accused wielded a "balisong". The appellant then went on top of AAA and forcibly had carnal knowledge with her and mashed her breast. AAA tried to kick appellant but he was too strong for her. After the ordeal, appellant warned AAA not to tell anyone. AAA did not tell anyone out of fear of appellant. The second and third incident also happened inside their house. After such incident, AAA was again warned by the appellant not to tell her parents. However, this time AAA told her parents about the incident and her parents got mad and whipped her. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Ruben for two (2) counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness. RULING: NO. It is settled that in assessing the credibility of a witness, the findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the deportment of the witness while undergoing the rigors of examination. Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. Such rule finds an even more stringent application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA, as in the case at bench. In this case, Ruben failed to show any misappreciation by the CA of the facts or circumstances so as to warrant a reversal of the questioned Decision. In the same vein, Ruben's arguments were already Page 106 of 233

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considered and thoroughly addressed by the courts below. As correctly observed by the CA, Ruben's flimsy defense of consensual sexual congress pales in comparison to the testimony of AAA, which was delivered in a clear and straightforward manner: At the outset, it should be emphasized that the Court has consistently disfavored the "sweetheart theory" defense for being self-serving in nature. Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be substantiated by the accused with convincing proof. It bears noting that Ruben's defense was corroborated only by his daughter, Ruby Ann, which effectively weakened the defense, being supported by a mere relative of the accused. In People v. Nogpo, Jr., the Court held that where nothing supports the sweetheart theory except the testimony of a relative, such defense deserves scant consideration. On this note, Ruben anchors his claim of consensual sexual congress on the fact of his cohabitation with AAA. However, such claim was already addressed by the CA in the questioned Decision, which affirmed the findings of the RTC, that such cohabitation occurred only after the respective dates of the incidents. Here, such fact of cohabitation, by itself, had no bearing on the prior forcible advances committed by Ruben upon AAA. In fact, contrary to Ruben's assertions, any consent implied from the fact of cohabitation is dispelled by AAA's express declarations that she was forced against her will to live with Ruben out of fear of her father. To be sure, that a man and a woman are living in the same house is not enough to rule out the bestial act of forced sexual intercourse. Here, the fact of cohabitation is immaterial to the charge of rape as it only took place after the alleged incidents. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUPERTO RUBILLAR, JR. Y GABERON G.R. No. 224631. August 23, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The “sweetheart theory” may be used as an affirmative defense which is often raised to prove the non-attendance of force or intimidation. It is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and places on the accused the burden of proving the alleged relationship. FACTS: Ruperto Rubillar was convicted of the crime of Rape under the Revised Penal Code by the lower courts. That, Rubillar employed force and intimidation from the moment he drove the motorcycle at a high speed, frightened, AAA that he would bump the motorcycle if she would not shut up, dragged her to the room, pushed her to the bed, and pinned her down to insert his penis. The medical examination conducted on AAA showed attenuation of hymen. As a defense, Rubillar alleged that AAA was his sweetheart, and that they engaged in sexual intercourse consensually. ISSUE: Whether or not Rubillar's conviction for Rape should be upheld. RULING: NO, Rubillar’s conviction for Rape should not be upheld. Page 107 of 233

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The law provides that under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, ..the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. In the present case, Rubillar's invocation of the "sweetheart theory" is essentially an admission of him having carnal knowledge with AAA, albeit maintaining that the same was consensual. Thus, it is crucial to determine whether or not AAA indeed consented to the sexual act, considering that the gravamen of Rape is sexual congress with a woman without her consent. Relatedly, the “sweetheart theory” may be used as an affirmative defense which is often raised to prove the non-attendance of force or intimidation. It is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and places on accused-appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship. In this case, Rubillar's allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly corroborated by his other witnesses. Considering the totality of the evidence presented in this case, the Court doubts whether Rubillar employed force or intimidation upon AAA during their sexual encounter…It is simply that the evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of the quantum of proof required to support a conviction. Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[a] conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMANTE PADIAN Y LEONES G.R. No. 214880. September 6, 2017 DEL CASTILLO, J. There is statutory rape when: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. FACTS: Three Informations were filed against Padlan charging him with two counts of rape underArticle 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. 76103 (RA 7610), and one count of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to RA 7610, allegedly committed against "AAA," 9 years old. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan rendered judgment finding Padlan guilty as charged. The RTC was convinced that the prosecution, through the testimonies of "AAA" and her mother, was able to establish the guilt of Padlan beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s Joint Decision. However, according to Padlan, the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of his innocence. Padlan challenges the credibility of "AAA" and insists that he was in a different place at the time the alleged crimes were committed. Padlan thus prays for his acquittal. ISSUE: Page 108 of 233

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Whether or not the trial court err in finding Padlan guilty of the crimes imputed against him despite theprosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: NO. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the RTC andCA that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. In People v. Gutierrez, the Court held that there is statutory rape when: "(1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse." In the present case, all the elements of statutory rape have been sufficiently established since the prosecution's evidence showed that on two separate occasions, Padlan had carnal knowledge of "AAA," a woman under 12 years of age. The defense did not dispute the fact that "AAA" was nine years old at the time of the incident. Her birth certificate, which was presented during trial before the RTC, clearly stated that her date of birth is August 20, 1996. As shown by "AAA's" testimony, she was able to narrate in a clear and candid manner how Padlan raped and molested her. " Moreover, the defense did not present any improper motive on "AAA" why she would impute a serious charge of rape against Padlan. Besides, the RTC found that "AAA's" testimony was credible since it was given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner despite her young age. The finding of credibility should not be overturned since the trial court judge had the opportunity to personally examine the demeanor of the witnesses when they testified on the stand. The finding of credibility may be overturned only when certain facts or circumstances are overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, and the same could have materially affected the outcome of the case. No such circumstance is present in the case at bar. Thus, the finding for "AAA's" credibility stands. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMON FRANCIA Y NAVALTA G.R. No. 208625. September 6, 2017 LEONEN. J. Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. FACTS: That on or about the 19th day of January 2005, the accused motivated by carnal lust and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA], a girl eleven (11) years of age, a child within the meaning of R.A. 7610, by then and there inserting his private part into the latter's vagina, all against the latter's will, which acts [sic] debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim (a child) as a human being. The prosecution presented the child victim, AAA, who was then 11 years old and a Grade 6 student at a public school in Nueve de Pebrero in Mandaluyong City. AAA testified that she lived with her Page 109 of 233

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parents and five (5) siblings in Mandaluyong City near Cardinal Sin. AAA claimed that she knew Francica because he was their neighbor.AAA testified that Francica was a good person because he would sometimes give her money whenever he touched her.When asked how Francica touched her, AAA answered that he licked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina.She claimed that Francica started touching her sometime in March 2004 and that this went on many times. He would sometimes even give her ₱50.00 after touching her. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape as defined under Article 266-A(l )(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. RULING: YES. Rape under Article 266-A(l)(d) is also called statutory rape as "it departs from the usual modes of committing rape." The child victim's consent in statutory rape is immaterial because the law presumes that her young age makes her incapable of discerning good from evil. People v. Gutierez explained the elements of statutory rape: Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 11 years old at the time of the incidents. Her birth certificate was presented into evidence before the trial court and was not questioned by the defense. What only needs to be proven, therefore, is whether AAA and Francica had sexual intercourse. As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a straightforward and categorical manner what transpired between her and Francica. In a long line of cases, this Court has given full weight and credence to the testimony of child victims, holding that their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity." Compared to AAA's candid and categorical testimony, Francica's defense of denial must fail. Imbo v. People emphasized that the self-serving defense of denial falters against the "positive identification by, and straightforward narration of the victim." This Court has likewise repeatedly held that the lone yet credible testimony of the offended party is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERT BALANZA G.R. No. 207943. September 11, 2017 DEL CASTILLO, J. It is a time-honored principle that no young and decent lass will publicly cry rape if such were not the truth. It also bears stressing that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. FACTS: Balanza, was charged with rape of a 14-year-old girl, allegedly committed on October 7,2006. AAA was on her way home when Ronnel Fernandez approached her telling her that Balanza wanted to talk to her regarding the position of treasurer in their fraternity. She refused such offer. The members of the fraternity then forcibly brought her to a cornfield nearby and there, Balanza forcibly had sexual intercourse with AAA. Both the RTC and CA found Balanza guilty of Rape. Balanza raised an issue in his Appellant’s Brief stating that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established by the prosecution through clear and convincing evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the identity of Balanza as the perpetrator of the crime is sufficiently established by theprosecution through clear and convincing evidence. RULING: YES. Balanza was positively identified by "AAA" as the person who raped her in thecornfield. It is consistently ruled that positive identification prevails over the defense of denial and alibi especially when the victim was not actuated by any improper motive, as in this case. It is also a time-honored principle that, "no young and decent lass will publicly cry rape if such were not the truth." It also bears stressing that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a child "says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. "AAA's" testimony that she was raped by Balanza was straightforward and trustworthy. Well-settled is the rule that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was present at another place at the time of the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. In this case, Balanza testified that the house of Joseph is only about 100 meters more or less from his nipa hut.15 The element of physical impossibility is thus missing. The CA is thus correct in ruling that the said distance cannot conclusively preclude the possibility of Balanza's presence at the scene of the crime at 8:00 p.m. of October 7, 2006 when the crime was committed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO LABRAQUE AKA ARMAN G.R. No. 225065. September 13, 2017 PERALTA, J. No woman, least of a child, will concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Page 111 of 233

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FACTS: AAA testified that she was raped ("kinantot") by their neighbor Arman on January 26, 2008. She was sitting in a tricycle at the time when Arman approached her and inquired what her problem was. He then asked her to come with him to a place where she would sweep the floor. She agreed. When they arrived at the second floor of a building, he undressed himself and compelled her to remove her garments. Afraid since he was drunk, she did not oppose. He directed her to lie down on the floor and placed himself on top of her while he held her hands. He asked if he could sell her body, but she remained silent. He then forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. She shouted "saklolo " as she felt the pain in her bleeding vagina. However, an old woman vending at the ground floor exclaimed "wag kaming maingay kasi nakakabulabog kami. " Moreover, Arman told her to shut up, otherwise, papers would be placed inside her mouth. After accomplishing the deed, he directed her to put on her clothes. He also got dressed and uttered "ang sarap." When she urinated at the comfort room of the second floor, she noticed blood stains in her underwear. After he left, she hurriedly went to her house and reported the incident to BBB. When her parents discussed whether to put Arman in jail, her father asserted, "Ipakulong natin yan. Sinira niya ang kinabukasan ng anak natin. " ISSUE: Whether or not AAA’s testimony is incredulous and contrary to human nature and experience. RULING: NO. The Court is one with the RTC and CA in applying the jurisprudential principle that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Accused-appellant's imputation of ill-motive to the young victim deserves scant consideration. Indeed, no woman, least of a child, will concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. As found by the RTC and CA, AAA's testimony was candid, spontaneous, and consistent. We find no cogent reason to deviate from such finding.Besides, as can be gleaned from the records, the assailed findings and ruling were not solely based on AAA's testimony. The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, corroborating that of AAA's, were also considered. Thus, while it has been held in the past that the accused in rape cases may be convicted solely on the basis of the victim's testimony which passed the test of credibility, in this case, there is more than sufficient evidence presented to arrive at such conclusion. Accused-appellant's argument that AAA's demeanor after the alleged rape incidents was unbelievable and contrary to human experience also could not sway the Court. As already settled in jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance, while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Further, even if the Court accepts as a fact that AAA is no longer a virgin because the deeply-healed lacerations on her hymen was inflicted much earlier than the time of the alleged rape incident, Page 112 of 233

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such does not automatically result to Arman's acquittal. Suffice it to say that a medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case; it is an evidence that is merely corroborative in nature. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEDRITO ORDONA Y RENDON G.R. No. 227863; 20 September 2017 LEONEN, J. The determination of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial courts. In order for these findings to be disregarded, the party must prove that the trial court erred in appreciating the facts or made unsound inferences from the facts established. FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with murder, as he took advantage of his superior strength, with evident premeditation and treachery, stabbed the victim. The prosecution presented 3 witnesses, who saw the accused waiting outside near the house of the victim. When the victim left his house, the accused called out “Pare” to get his attention and suddenly stabbed him in the shoulder. The witnesses were allegedly 2 feet away when this happened. The victim was able to run and beg for mercy, but the accused caught up and stabbed the victim again in the torso. The accused, as the sole witness of the defense, alleged that he was at the house of his mother-inlaw. However, this was located in the same barangay where the incident allegedly took place. The RTC and CA both found the accused guilty of murder, finding that there was evident premeditation and treachery in the commission of the crime, and that the testimonies of the witnesses were credible, competent, and sufficient to prove the crime. ISSUE: Whether or notthe accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.(YES) RULING: The determination of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial courts. In order for these findings to be disregarded, the party must prove that the trial court erred in appreciating the facts or made unsound inferences from the facts established. Accused-appellant’s argument that there were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses is incorrect. As shown, the inconsistencies were minor, as they did not relate to the essential elements of murder. What is material here is the matter of the stabbing. The fact that one witness did not witness the accused leave the scene of the crime does not refute the fact that the victim was killed. Both witnesses also testified that the place was well-lit thus they saw the accused stab the victim twice. The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated here, as the prosecution did not prove the time when the accused planned to kill the victim. The mere fact that the accused was lurking outside the victim’s house is not an overt act showing his plan to kill the victim. However, the circumstance of treachery is present in this case, given the deliberate Page 113 of 233

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swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack on the unarmed victim. The victim had no opportunity to retaliate despite it being a frontal attack. The second stabbing also further implies treachery, as the victim was already wounded at the time and could not defend himself. PEOPLE v. FRANCICA G.R. No. 208625, September 6, 2017, Third Division, LEONEN, J. Hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape. The failure to present the medico-legal as witness is not fatal to a prosecution for rape, as the Court gives more weight to the victim’s testimony. Healed hymenal lacerations are corroborative evidence in proving rape. FACTS: Three charges of rape were filed against Ramon Francica for rapes committed on February 2, 2005, January 19, 2005, and March 2004. AAA was 11 years old then. She testified she lived with her parents and give siblings in Mandaluyong and Francica was a neighbor. She testified the latter paid money in the amount of P50 whenever he touched her, licked her breasts, and had sexual intercourse with her. Corroborating AAA’s testimony were her grandmother, BBB, who said she heard AAA in one of two adjacent comfort rooms, seeing Francica fleeing while AAA was inside. She saw CCC, another grandchild, who said AAA was pulling up her panties when Francica fled. Gojo, a member of the Task Force Anti-Vice, testified BBB reported the incident to them and they arrested Francica. The last witness, Leonor Laureles, a Court Social Worker, testified AAA opened up about the sexual abuse. The RTC and CA both found Francica guilty of all three charges. He appealed on the ground that the failure to present the medico-legal as a witness was fatal to the prosecution’s case and that the lacerations during the rape on February 2 were already healed. He averred the same might have been caused by normal activities like jumping and running. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused appellant is guilty of statutory rape as defined under Art. 266A-(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Sct No. 8353, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 RULING: Hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. The foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony alone, if credible is sufficient to convict. Despite the absence of the medico-legal officer as a witness, the presence of healed lacerations corroborates AAA’s testimony as it is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. || Page 114 of 233

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| PEOPLE v. PANES G.R. No. 215730, September 11, 2017, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. It is highly improbable for an innocent girl who is very naïve in the ways of this world to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but to her family. A categorical declaration from the victim she was ravished by her father several times is already enough to sustain charges against the accused. FACTS: Three informations for rape were filed against Melchor Panes, having raped his daughter AAA September 22, 2003, a few days thereafter, and on the 15 th of October. The first was committed while his mother was giving birth in the floor below while the other two were committed on a creek and their house respectively. The RTC found Panes guilty of qualified rape. Panes appealed on the grounds that AAA’s testimony was convincing; that there were times AAA failed to answer the questions of the prosecutor; that the examining physician found no external laceration, swelling, or hematoma on AAA’s external genitalia; and that there is doubt as to whether she understood the meaning of what she testified on. The CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not accused was guilty of having committed all the rapes. RULING: Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. It is highly improbable for an innocent girl who is very naïve in the ways of this world to fabricate a charge so humiliating not only to herself but to her family. There was a categorical declaration from the victim she was ravished by her father several times; this alone is already enough to sustain the charges against accused. Failure to answer questions from the prosecution is not fatal to the case and does not destroy her credibility, since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions. The alleged reluctance to testify must be taken in light of her age, level of intelligence, and mental capacity, as well as her psychological stress. Further, it is not uncommon for a young rural lass to be hesitant to disclose how she was ravished. ||| PEOPLE v. BALANZA G.R. No. 207943, September 11, 2017, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a child says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. FACTS: A charge for rape was filed against Robert Balanza after he allegedly raped AAA, a 14-year old girl. AAA stated Balanza recruited her to be treasurer in Junior Krist King Kappa, an obscure fraternity. After AAA refused, they forced her to go with them to a nipa hut where they again Page 115 of 233

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recruited her. After spurning their offer, they dragged her to a cornfield nearby, Balanza and BBB raped her. Balanza denied the charge and claimed he was staying at a neighbor’s house. The RTC found Balanza guilty; the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to damages. Balanza appealed, saying AAA failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime. ISSUE: Whether or not Balanza was guilty of having raped AAA. RULING: During trial, AAA clearly and positively identified Balanza as the person who ravaged her in the cornfield. She stated they were neighbors for a long time, identified the other perpetrators with certainty, and clearly pointed to Balanza as the person who forced his penis into her vagina. Positive identification prevails over the defense of denial and alibi especially when the victim was not actuated by any improper motive. Further, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a child says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove he was present at another place at the time of the commission of the crime and it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. The nipa hut was merely 100 meters from the locus criminis. ||| PEOPLE v. LABRAQUE G.R. No. 225065, September 13, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show rape was indeed committed. No woman, least of a child, will concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trail or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. FACTS: An information for rape was filed against Armando Labraque after AAA, a minor, said accused, her neighbor, asked her to sweep the floor at the second floor of a building, where ravished her after asking her to sell her body. She screamed for help but the old woman at the ground floor silenced them, saying they were being a bother. She saw trickles of blood on her urine after she urinated. She reported the incident to BBB, her mother. BBB said she saw dust on AAA’s elbows and that AAA cried. When asked as to why she was crying, AAA said “Kinantot ako ni Tito Dave”. Ballescas, a barangay tanod of Talon Uno, Las Pinas, asked accused to go to the barangay hall where accused admitted to the rape. The medico-legal saw hymenal lacerations. Labraque did not offer any defense but said he was just apprehended with no rhyme or reason. Labraque appealed on the basis of AAA’s credibility. ISSUE: Page 116 of 233

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Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. RULING: The question of the credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe the elusive and incommunicable evidence of witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts. The trial judge’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked, or disregarded, the reviewing court is bound by the former’s rulings. The rule is even more strictly applied with the trial court. Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show rape was indded committed. No woman, least of a child, will concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trail or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Even if AAA was no longer a virgin given the deeply-healed lacerations on her hymen were inflicted much earlier than the time of the alleged rape incident. Such does not automatically result to acquittal. A medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case; it is evidence merely corroborative in nature. PEOPLE v. RONQUILLO G.R. No. 214762, September 20, 2017, Second Division, MARTIRES, J. Our law on statutory rape demands only the requisite proof of the victim’s age and of carnal knowledge with the accused to sustain his conviction. FACTS: An information charged Rommel Ronquillo with statutory rape after AAA accused him of having carnal knowledge with her. On her way to her friend Jenny’s house, accused asked if he could walk her home, to which she refused. Since Jenny was not home, she decided to go home but someone pointed a gun at her, took her to an isolated place, and had carnal knowledge of her while her hands were tucked in her shirt and lifted over her head to prevent her from seeing her rapist, who had also covered his face with a red handkerchief. When the rapist told her to get dressed after satisfying his lust, she saw him wearing the same jeans as accused. Accused denied committing the rape, saying he had been with friends singing and thereafter went to the carnival. The RTC and the CA both found him guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not Ronquillo’s conviction should be upheld. Page 117 of 233

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RULING: The elements necessary in every prosecution for statutory rape are (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation or grave abuse of authority. It is enough the age of the victim is proven and there was sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge was proven through AAA’s categorical testimony, corroborated by medical findings. AAA recounted, in a steadfast and unequivocal manner, the circumstances clearly showing Ronquillo had carnal knowledge of her. He followed her while she was walking home from her friend’s house, a man suddenly pointed a gun at her, she was taken into an isolated place, she was raped while her face was covered by her shirt, and she saw her rapist wearing the same pair of jeans as the accused was wearing when he offered to walk her home. AAA’s testimony is sufficient to convict accused of statutory rape. The medico-legal found that the hymenal lacerations revealed she was raped within 24 to 72 hours. The medic0-legal report corroborates AAA’s testimony, which was clear, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. People v. EEE G.R. No. 227185, September 27, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent. FACTS: An information charged EEE for rape after he had carnal knowledge with his 13-year old stepdaughter, AAA. AAA said her stepfather had carnal knowledge with her on June 28, 2006 at 7AM. BBB, her mother, had just left the house while EEE told AAA’s brother to go outside. BBB almost caught them in the act. She asked EEE what happened but AAA, due to EEE’s threat, said nothing. Days after, AAA and BBB lived separately from EEE. BBB said she saw EEE and AAA coming out of the bedroom and was putting on the zipper of his trousers but AAA was dressed but hugging a blanket. The medico-legal showed hymenal lacerations. EEE denied the allegations, saying it was impossible for him to have done so because AAA and BBB were no longer residing in their house in Biso and BBB had motive to file a case against him because they regularly fought, BBB being a nagger even after he had sold his bakery business because of AAA’s and BBB’s hospitalization. FFF bolstered EEE’s defense by saying EEE had already lived with his mother, where he and EEE worked in the ricefields. The RTC convicted EEE. The CA dismissed the appeal. ISSUE: Page 118 of 233

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Whether or not EEE is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. RULING: For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent. A mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of an eyewitness to the crime. AAA’s testimony, which was bolstered by BBB, is logical, consistent, and convincing; EEE may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. AAA even broke down in tears in more than one instance during the trial. The display of such emotion is evidence of the truth of the rape charges and strengthens the credibility of her testimony. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility means the distance and facility of access between the situs of the crime and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERMIN ROMOBIO G.R. No. 227705, October 11, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. Where conditions of visibility are favorable and the victim had no axe to grind against the accused prior to the incident, the assertion of the complaining witness as to the identity of the wrongdoer commands the greater weight over the denial of the suspected offender. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness who was not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the accused. FACTS: The accused in this case was charged with the crime of robbery with rape. The prosecution alleged that in the early morning of August 9, 2009, the accused, masked with a face towel, entered the house of the victim, who was sleeping alone, and proceeded to ransack her drawers and placing items in a plastic bag. The accused would also repeatedly hit the victim when she attempted to move. The victim eventually the identity of the accused as a former helper in his brother’s shop as her room was lit by a 20-watt light bulb. After the accused was done looting the room, he placed himself on top of the victim and inserted his penis into her vagina. The accused left and the victim eventually asked for help. She went to the police and reported the incident and identified the perpetrator as the accused. The accused was arrested thereafter. The victim claimed to have lost P120,000.00 worth of valuables consisting of cell phones, jewelry, and other effects. The accused interposed the defense of alibi. The RTC convicted the accused with the CA affirming its decision. The accused challenges this decision and claims that he was not positively identified, nor was there evidence on the victim’s body, as evidenced by a medical report, that she had intercourse attended with force or violence. ISSUE: Page 119 of 233

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Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with robbery. RULING: The court held that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of rape with robbery and noted that in the intent of the accused is vital in determining whether the crime committed was robbery with rape, or two separate crimes of rape and robbery. For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. As regards the accused’s contentions, the court held that what is crucial is for the witness to positively declare during trial that the person charged was the malefactor. Here, aside from pinpointing the accused at the police line-up, the victim positively and categorically identified him in open court as her attcker. She could not have been mistaken because she had seen him a number of times prior to the commission of the crime. At the time of the incident, she also took note of specific details, vividly describing them in court, that would help her asce1iain his identity. All throughout, she never faltered in identifying him. Moreover, physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapist's advances because of fear for her life and personal safety. Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim. The victim’s positive identification and testimony of the events that transpired defeats the accused’s defense of alibi and denial. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICO NIEBRES G.R. No. 230975, December 04, 2017, Second Division, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The special qualifying circumstance of knowledge of mental disability must be properly alleged and proven during trial for it to be appreciated by the court. FACTS: Accused was charged with raping AAA, a 16 year old minor suffering from mental retardation and has a mental age of 9 years old. The accused is married to AAA’s sister Evidence for the prosecution showed that accused and his family went to Camarines Sur to AAA’s family to harvest palay. After harvest, the accused had drinks with his brother and father-in-law. He then went to AAA’s room where he undressed AAA and had carnal knowledge of her. AAA did not say anything for fear of accused and his family. A few months later, she complained of stomach pains and it was found that she was already around 5-6 months pregnant. The accused gave the defense of alibi. The RTC convicted the accused of simple rape. It also held that relationship by affinity cannot be considered as it was not alleged in the information. The CA upgraded the crime committed to qualified rape as it considered the state of mental retardation of AAA which it held was established by the prosecution. ISSUE: Page 120 of 233

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Whether or not the crime committed was qualified rape in view of AAA’s mental retardation. RULING: Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape is a special qualifying circumstance. Such, however, must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. It must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. In this case, the fact that the accused did not dispute AAA’s mental retardation during trial is insufficient to qualify the crime of rape since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of her disability at the time of its commission. Mere relationship by affinity does not create moral certainty. Moreover, the prosecution did not present evidence that the accused knew that AAA had mental retardation. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTHONY VILLANUEVA, MELVIN TUPAZ, AND RUEL REGNER G.R. 211082, December 13, 2017, First Division, TIJAM, J. Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the witness. Moreover, for a defense of denial and alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was physically impossible to be at the place where the crime was committed. FACTS: Villanueva and his co-accused were charged with 3 counts of rape. Only Villanueva was apprehended while the other two remained at large. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the three accused took turns in raping AAA. She testified that she was awakened and found three men inside her room whom she recognized as the accused. It was then that Regner approached her and covered her mouth while Villanueva poked her side with a bolo. While she was in this position, Tupaz undressed her and inserted his penis inside her vagina. After which, Villanueva kicked AAA several times in the stomach and proceeded to insert his penis inside her vagina. She became unconscious and was awakened when Villanueva bit her arm. It was then that Regner took his turn in raping her. Thereafter the three left the room. AAA reported the incident the following morning where the three asked her for forgiveness. For his part, Villanueva interposed the defense of denial and alibi. The RTC convicted Villanueva. On appeal, he raised the ground that the prosecution was not able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the element of force, threat, and intimidation was not duly established. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: Page 121 of 233

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In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. If private complainant's testimony successfully meets the test of credibility, then the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. In this case, the testimony of AAA was credibly established that Villanueva, together with his coaccused, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will. This was shown through the recollection of details that attended the crime Indeed, denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Emphatically, for the defense of alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission. In this case, Villanueva’s denial that he went home for supper does not show hat it was physically impossible for him to return to the boarding house where the rape was committed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPIPNES v. ROLANDO BAGSIC G.R. No. 218404, December 13, 2017, Third Division, MARTIRES, J. An affidavit of desistance cannot be used as a ground to dismiss a case of rape. Rape has been reclassified as a crime against persons and be prosecuted de officio. FACTS: The accused in this case was the common law husband of the victims’ maternal grandmother. He is charged for 1 count of statutory rape, 1 count of rape by sexual assault, and 1 count of violation of Sec 5(b) of R.A. 7610. Evidence for the prosecution showed that sometime in 2007, the accused took BBB to hut in a field. While inside, he told her to lie down, and proceeded to lift her skirt and remove his shorts and underwear. Accused then removed his own lower garments and had carnal knowledge of BBB, but he was unable to make a full penetration. In March 2009, AAA testified that was awakened by somebody, whom she identified to be accused because of his rough hand and odor, fiddling her nipple. The incident lasted for about two minutes. Accused stopped when he realized that AAA's siblings were already awake. The assault upon BBB happened in April 2009 while BBB was sleeping. While in bed, she was awoken by a finger being inserted into her vagina. She saw the accused when she opened her eyes, and he promptly left after seeing that BBB was already awake. During the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, an affidavit of desistance was executed by AAA, BBB, and their mother CCC.

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The accused presented the maternal grandmother of the victims. She testified that her family resented her relationship with accused because she was no longer able to support them and their disagreement resulted in the filing of the rape cases against him. The RTC convicted that accused of statutory rape and rape by sexual assault, noting that BBB was able to withstand the cross-examination. He was acquitted for violation of R.A. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the perpetrator as AAA admitted that she did not see the face of the accused but only concluded that it was him from his odor and his rough hands. The RTC also held that the affidavit of desistance could not reverse the testimony of BBB on how the accused molester her twice. The CA affirmed the RTC and held that while BBB executed an affidavit of desistance, she remained silent when asked if the accused actually raped her. ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of desistance should be considered. RULING: An affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of the case. Rape is no longer considered a private crime and may not be prosecuted de officio. An affidavit of desistance, which may be considered as pardon by the complaining witness, is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of a rape action over which the court has already assumed jurisdiction. Moreover, the court gave credence to BBB’s testimony and again noted that she was able to withstand the lengthy cross examination. The court also did not give credence to the accused’s defense and held that a disagreement among family members, even if true, does not justify dragging a young girl's honor to merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its wake. The accused’s conviction was also affirmed as all the elements of statutory rape, and rape by sexual assault were duly proven by the prosecution through BBB’s testimony. Notably, that there was carnal knowledge, and that the victim was under 12 years old. Her testimony also proved that she was sexually assaulted when the accused inserted his finger inside her vagina. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSEPH SAN JOSE Y GREGORIO AND JONATHAN SAN JOSE Y GREGORIO G.R. No. 206916; 03 July 2017 LEONEN, J. The burden of proving the accused’s guilt rests on the prosecution. The finding of guilt is fundamentally a factual issue. While the SC is not a trier of facts, it is not precluded from reviewing factual findings of the lower court. This is true especially if significant facts and circumstances were overlooked and disregarded which if properly considered, would affect the result of the case. FACTS: The two accused were charged and found guilty of murder before the RTC. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

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The RTC and CA relied heavily on the eyewitness account of the victim’s brother, Jilito, who allegedly witnessed the stabbing of his brother. According to him, one of the accused held the victim and stabbed him in the side, while the other accused stabbed the victim in the chest. Jilito claimed to have positively identified the accused as he was familiar with them because they all lived in the same barangay. ISSUE: Whether or notthe accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (NO) RULING: The burden of proving the accused’s guilt rests on the prosecution. The finding of guilt is fundamentally a factual issue. While the SC is not a trier of facts, it is not precluded from reviewing factual findings of the lower court. This is true especially if significant facts and circumstances were overlooked and disregarded which if properly considered, would affect the result of the case. Also, on appeal, the entire records of the case are thrown open for review. A review of the testimony of the victim’s brother, Jilito, reveals that there are material inconsistencies. In his direct examination he stated that the stabbing occurred in front of the house, while during his cross-examination he stated that the stabbing occurred in front of a store.Moreover, he stated that he was over 20 meters away from the store where the stabbing occurred. Another material inconsistency here is the difference between the Jilito’s testimony and the autopsy report. Jilito claimed that the victim was stabbed by the accused twice, once in the side and once in his chest. On the other hand, the autopsy report indicates that the victim sustained one fatal injury in his abdomen. Moreover, it is worth noting that two immediate family members of the victim supported the accused. The sister of the victim and Jilito testified that at the time of the incident, Jilito was at home with her. Moreover, the late father of the victim had signed an affidavit of desistance. The RTC and CA both did not give any weight to the testimony of the sister or the affidavit. It is quite unusual that two immediate family members of the victim testified on behalf of the accused, which is something that the RTC and CA should have looked into. Lastly, upon a review of the Kusang-loob na Salaysay of the victim’s brother, he stated therein that he merely heard about the incident from other people. Jilito, the alleged sole eyewitness could not even give a categorical narration of the incident.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL GO CAOILI ALIAS "BOY TAGALOG" G.R. No. 196342/G.R. No. 196848. August 8, 2017 TIJAM, J. The variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the latter. FACTS: Provincial Prosecutor Raul O. Nasayao filed an Information against Caoili, charging him with the crime of rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and R.A. No. 7610. That on or about the 23 rd day of October 2005, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Purok [III], Barangay [JJJ], [KKK], [LLL], Philippines, the accused, with full freedom and intelligence, with lewd design, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with one [AAA], [7] a minor, 15 years of age and the daughter of the herein accused, through force, threat and intimidation and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in the amount as may be allowed by law.CONTRARY TO Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of R.A. 8353, with the aggravating circumstance that the accused is the father of the victim and R.A. 7610. ISSUE: Whether or not rape by sexual assault is necessarily included in rape by sexual intercourse. RULING: NO. Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through sexual intercourse. We cannot accept the OSG's argument that based on the variance doctrine, [48] Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included in the crime of rape through sexual intercourse. The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged, is embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

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MARIO VERIDIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017, LEONEN, J. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. FACTS: The Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of drugs in Laguna having in his possession 2.72 grams of marijuana. Upon a tip that there was going to be a delivery of illegal drugs, a checkpoint was set up in Nagcarlan, Laguna. There, the Petitioner was apprehended with the contraband in his pocket. Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He asserts that his arrest was illegal. The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty as charged. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged. HELD: NO. The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible. For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be ju'stified as an inflagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from theperson to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search. Page 126 of 233

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In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid.Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner isrendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted. By jurisprudence, however, an accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This is due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape. In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the latter. PEOPLE v. RENE BOY DIMAPILIT G.R. No. 210802. August 9, 2017 LEONEN, J. A witness' inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her credibility as long as there are no material contradictions in his or her absolute and clear narration on the central incident and positive identification of the accused as inconsistency, which is not relevant to the elements of the crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction. FACTS: On February 11, 2007, victim Diego informed his live-in partner Magdalena that he would go to Pastor Dimapilit's house. Diego informed Magdalena that he would be back immediately because he would be sending off his brother, Simeon. When 20 minutes passed and Diego was still not home, Magdalena worried, since Pastor and his sons were reputed troublemakers in their place. 9 Thus, Magdalena and Simeon decided to go to Pastor's house. As they approached Pastor's house, Magdalena saw 1 of Pastor's sons, Junnel, box Diego's face. Diego tried to escape but Junnel caught him. Pastor hit Diego's head with a piece of wood, rendering Diego unconscious. Accused Rene Boy, another son of Pastor, hit Diego's face with a crowbar (bareta). Pastor and his sons Junnel and Joel Dimapilit (Joel) kept on boxing Diego, prompting Simeon to shout, "Tigilan na po ninyo ang pagbugbog atpagbareta sa mukha ng aking kapatid.” Rene Boy then responded, "Putang-ina mo, ikavv na ang susunod namapapatay.” For fear that the assailants might pursue her, Magdalena hid behind a mango tree. Simeon ran for help. When Pastor and his sons left, Magdalena went to Diego's aid, whose face was unrecognizable. Rene Boy, Pastor, Junnel, and Joel were charged with Murder. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the minor inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony affect her credibility as a witness. RULING: NO. In issues involving the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are given great respect since it has the opportunity to "observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to disce111 whether they are telling the truth." In the absence of any showing that it has overlooked or misapplied some facts, its findings of facts will not be disturbed on appeal. It ruled that the minor inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony didnot affect her credibility as a witness. One cannot suppose that witnesses could give errorless testimonies especially when they are relating the "details of a harrowing experience."Magdalena herself was shocked when she narrated that it was Junnel, not Joel, who boxed Diego. At that time, Magdalena was emotional when she recounted the traumatic incident that happened. Hence, Magdalena did not deliberately intend to commit the alleged contradictions. 77 Provided that the witness' testimonies conform to material points, "the slight clashing statements dilute neither the witness' credibility nor the veracity of [his or her] testimonies." Furthermore, Magdalena's testimony on how Diego was hit with a crow bar and a piece of wood was substantiated by the medico-legal report. Similarly, P03 Bulaclac's testimony corroborated Magdalena's narration of events regarding the injuries sustained by Diego and regarding Simeon's presence in the crime scene. Nevertheless, regardless of who really overtook Diego, Magdalena's testimony "as a whole is sufficient to support [Rene Boy's] conviction. There could be no mistake as to the identity of all the assailants, since the killing happened at daytime and Magdalena was just two arms’ length or more away from the crime scene.” Moreover, the relationship itself of a witness to an accused or complainant does not automatically discredit him or her. On the contrary, "kinship by blood or marriage to the victim would deter one from implicating innocent persons, as one's natural interest would be to secure conviction of the real culprit."

E. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv. ELMER AVANCENA, ET. AL. G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017, LEONEN, J.: "The fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused does not remove the element of deprivation of liberty if the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so." FACTS: The accused were charged with 2 counts of kidnapping for ransom and robbery of Rizaldo and Alfonso Policarpio. According to the prosecution, Rizaldo was approached by the accused with his companions when he alighted his FX. He was asked about a certain person whom he didn’t know and was accused of being involved with drugs. The accused after talking to his companions went back to Rizaldo, opened the driver’s side of the vehicle and ordered for him to move to the passenger’s side while pointing a gun at him. Another accused boarded the vehicle and handcuffed Rizaldo. They traversed to Makati and Pasay and while on the road, he was strangled by the accused who kept an asking him about people whom he might know. When they came to the parking lot of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) the group demanded for him to call his father Page 128 of 233

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Alfonso to pay 150,000 for his release. When his father arrived, the latter gave them his only money and promised that he will just give the remaining balance later. Thereafter, Rizaldo and his father were released by the group. There was a subsequent pay off of the remaining balance which was set up with the help of the police, leading to the arrest of the group. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom and Robbery. RULING: YES. In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements: "[first,] the accused was a private person; [second,] he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; [third,] the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and [fourth,] the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. Accused-appellants claim that they were agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency's Task Force Hunter but were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their claim. The prosecution, however, was able to present Police Inspector Nabor of the Human Resource Service of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who testified that accused-appellants" were not in any manner connected with [Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency]." The prosecution was likewise able to prove that Rizaldo was illegally deprived of his liberty.In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was "forcefully transported, locked up or restrained." It must be proven that the accused intended "to deprive the victim of his liberty." The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming him to prevent escape falls under this definition. The elements of simple robbery are "a) that there is personal property belonging to another; b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things." In this instance, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by means of intimidation. "Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the thing." The marked money was recovered from the accused-appellants when they were arrested, which proves that they were able to gain possession of Alfonso's money. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZENAIDA FABRO OR ZENAIDA MANALASTAS Y VINEGAS G.R. No. 208441. July 17, 2017 TIJAM, J. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. FACTS:

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On March 2, 2006, 9-year old AAA was attending her Grade IV class, when accused-appellant suddenly arrived supposedly to fetch her. Since accused-appellant was AAA's aunt residing just next to AAA's house, the teacher allowed accused-appellant to take AAA. However, accused kept AAA in Nueva Ecija despite the latter's plea to go home. AAA's parents reported the abduction to the police. After receiving information that accusedappellant might go to her brother's house, the police organized a team and monitored said house. On March 5, 2006, police operatives, accompanied by AAA's parents, rescued AAA and apprehended the accused-appellant at her brother's house. The Court found accused-appellant guilty of Serious Illegal Detention. Accused-appellant contends that AAA had not been deprived of liberty while in her custody. She argues that the records are bereft of any indication that AAA was physically restrained, or was under her constant control, or was ever prevented from going home. She claims that during the period she had custody of AAA, the latter was free to interact with third persons and communicate with her relatives, and was well taken care of. ISSUE: Whether or not the elements of Serious Illegal Detention have been sufficiently established in this case. RULING: YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. PEOPLE v. PO3 JULIETO BORJA G.R. No. 199710. August 2, 2017 LEONEN, J. Extortion done by police themselves amounting to kidnapping with ransom undermines the government efforts to establish the rule of law in general and the proper prosecution against drug traffickers in particular. Even the subsequent prosecution of the victim of extortion does not negate the criminal liability of the accused for the crime the latter committed against the former. FACTS: PO3 Borja was charged of kidnapping punished under Article 267of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion of the information read: That on or about May 26, 2004, at or about 10:10 in the morning, at the vicinity of Brgy. Central, Diliman, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Page 130 of 233

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Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with an unknown companion, conspiring and confederating with one another, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by the use of force, violence and intimidation and without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and illegally detain victim/hostage RONALYN G. MANATAD, and thereafter demanded and received the ransom money in the amount of P100,000.00 from Edwin G. Silvio, the victim's brother, for the release of said RONALYN G. MANATAD on same date. ISSUE: Whether or not Ronalyn’s apprehension for violation of RA 9165 automatically negates accused’s criminal liability. RULING: NO. Ronalyn's apprehension for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not automatically negate the criminal liability of accused-appellant. It also does not exclude the possibility of the commission of the crime with which accused-appellant is charged. The buy-bust operation carried out against Ronalyn and her kidnapping are events that can reasonably coexist.Furthermore, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime of kidnapping. Ronalyn's arrest and conviction are immaterial to the determination of accused-appellant's criminal liability. In other words, Ronalyn's innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor negate the commission of the crime of kidnapping against her. Therefore, the resolution of this case will depend solely on whether the prosecution has established all the elements of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. A conviction for the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) The offender is a private individual; (2) That individual kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of liberty; (3) The act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; (4) In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days, it is committed by one who simulates public authority, any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or any threat to kill that person is made and the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female or a public officer.Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the fact that the accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping against him.A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity. In People v. Santiano,this Court explained that public officials may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if they act in their private capacity. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO SIAPNO G.R. No. 218911. August 23, 2017 PERALTA, J. If the victim in kidnapping is a child, the deprivation of liberty also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. Moreover, the victim’s lack of consent is presumed when the victim is a minor. FACTS: Page 131 of 233

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Siapno was charged of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).The Information alleged that on or about the 30 th day of July, 2009, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, a private individual, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain and threaten to kill one CHLOE TIBAY y CAPISONDA, a minor, 1 year old, thereby depriving the said offended party of her liberty, to the damage and prejudice of the said CHLOE TIBAY y CAPISONDA. The incident was witnessed by two barangay tanods who positively identified Siapno as the person who, while in possession of a knife, took Chloe as hostage in the CR of the family home. ISSUE: Whether or not there was intention to deprive the victim of her liberty by taking the child from the mother which is essence of the crime of kidnapping. RULING: YES. According to the trial court, all the elements of serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC are present in this case: (1) Siapno is a private individual, being a technician by profession; (2) he forcibly took custody of Chloe without the intention of giving her up until and unless his demand to talk to Ronald was met; (3) his detention of the victim was unwarranted because he had no legal justification in taking custody of the child, much more of bringing her inside the CR; and (4) at the time of the commission of the offense, Chloe was a minor, being only one year, seven months, and twenty-seven days old. Siapno insisted that he got hold of Chloe purely by accident, with no intention of ever taking the child from her mother, and that he remained in the driveway of the house all the time, never taking the victim as hostage inside the CR. However, the appellate court ruled that this version of facts is incredible. For the CA, a mother like Dulce would hold tightly to her child while trying to flee from someone whom she was scared of. And assuming that Chloe was inadvertently dropped at Siapno’s arms, it is contrary to human experience that a mother would leave her child with a person whom she views as a threat to their safety. Moreover, the incident was witnessed by two barangay tanods who positively identified Siapno as the person who, while in possession of a knife, took Chloe as hostage in the CR of the family home. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. If the victim is a child, the deprivation of liberty also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. Moreover, the victim’s lack of consent is presumed when the victim is a minor. In this case, based on testimonial and documentary evidence extant from the records, the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC. Siapno, a private individual, knowingly and without lawful authority detained a minor, causing deprivation of the victim’s liberty and of the mother’s custody over her child. Page 132 of 233

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BRAHIM LIDASAN ET AL G.R. No. 227425. September 4, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The elements of the crime of kidnapping are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any if the following circumstances is present: 1. The kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days. 2. It is committed by stimulating public authority 3. Any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; 4. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. FACTS: Michele Ragos was in her residential house when suddenly Bansuan and two companions entered into her bedroom and declared kidnapping, Adil served as lookout while the other men tied Ragos hands and sealed her mouth. The accused took with them cash and personal items amounting to 200,000. Ragos was brought to a bungalow house where she was guarded by 6 men who took turns on guarding her, she was transferred to a house in Las Pinas and was kept on a room there, alternately guarded by ten to twenty men. The kidnapper initially demanded a ransom money in the amount of 30 million but was then reduced to 4.3 million. Following the incident, Presidential Anti Organized Crime Task Force were formed to monitor the kidnapping. Upon entrapment, the task force were able to witness the pay off and when the ransom money was loaded to another car they chased the kidnappers leading to their arrest. All the accused denied the charges against them. The RTC found that the elements of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom was established, and thus they were found guilty. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of kidnapping for ransom was committed in the case at bar. HELD: YES. The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any if the following circumstances is present: 1. The kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days. 2. It is committed by stimulating public authority 3. Any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; 4. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. Notably the duration of detention is immaterial if the victim is a minor or if the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom. The prosecution must establish the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effects the same. There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. Page 133 of 233

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In the case at bar the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements, as it is undisputed that accused appellants among others illegally detained the victim Ragos against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom from her family. This the Court ruled to uphold the conviction of herein accused. ||| PEOPLE v. LIDASAN ET AL. AND KAMIR ET AL., ACCUSED APPELLANTS G.R. No. 227425, September 4, 2017, Second Division, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. FACTS: On October 30, 1998, appellants kidnapped Michelle Ragos, who was staying in her family’ office/residential compound at Valenzuela City, a village guarded by security guards Bauting and Daliano, two of the accused. After taking cash and personal items, the accused brought Ragos to Novaliches and subsequently Las Pinas, where accused took turns guarding her. Accused demanded P30 million but settled for P4.83 million The PAOCTF monitored the kidnappers and accosted some of the accused during the pay-off and a shoot-out on November 7, 1998. The PAOCTF also managed to arrest the rest of the accused at the safehouse where Ragos was detained. All accused offered denials and alibi to the effect they were Mindanao-based and were only in Manila to attend to certain matters. The RTC found them guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom, with accused-appellants found guilty as accomplices. Bauting was discharged as state witness and lowered the penalty pf death to reclusion perpetua. The accused filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Notice to File Appeal with Leave of Court saying that counsel representing accused-appellants omitted their names in the appeal documents. ISSUE: Whether or not the convictions of accused and accused-appellants should be upheld. RULING: The elements of kidnapping with ransom are (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any o the following circumstances is present: (i) the kidnapping or detention last for more than three days; (ii) it is committed by simulating public authority; (iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, is a public officer. The duration of detention is immaterial if the victim is a minor or if purpose is to extort ransom. Though none of the accomplices made any appeal to the Court, it is proper to adjust their sentence if favorable and beneficial to them in accordance with Section 11, Rule 122 od the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that an “An appeal taken by one or more of Page 134 of 233

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several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter”. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI G.R. No. 217874, December 05, 2017, En Banc, PERALTA, J. Intent to detain or restrain the victim's movement is tantamount to illegal detention. FACTS: Ali and 3 others were accused of kidnapping one Christia Oliz. Evidene for the prosecution shows that Oliz was in Edwin Andrews Airbase aboard a Nissan vehicle. Three men, later identified as Ali, Hassan, and Amat approached the said vehicle and told the passengers that they were policemen. The passengers were told that they would be brought to the police station on a tip that they were transporting contraband goods. Oliz and her companions where taken to another vehicle. They did not, however, stop at the nearest police station. One of Oliz’ companions escaped by jumping out of the vehicle. They proceeded to drive to Pitogo Beach. Oliz was able to escape when she saw a woman walking nearby as she was left unguarded. She then told this woman that her employer was being kidnapped. Oliz also testified that Ali was the person giving orders. The defense of the accused was that he was a victim of the same kidnapping as well. The RTC convicted the accused of serious illegal detention which the CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not there was serious and actual illegal detention. RULING: Deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if at least one of the following circumstances exists: 1) detention lasts for more than three (3) days; 2) accused simulated public authority; 3) victim suffers serious physical injuries or is threatened to be killed; or 4) the victim is a minor, female or public officer. The essence of serious illegal detention is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with the indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect such deprivation-it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. In this case there was actual illegal detention which was qualified as serious because Oliz’ freedom of movement was restrained as she was effectively restrained by the abductors who exercised complete control and dominion over the person of the victims. This crime was qualified on account of Oliz being female.

F.CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY ANITA CAPULONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199907, February 27, 2017,PERALTA, J.: Neither Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC nor Article 535, paragraph 9 of the old penal code requires that the documents or papers are evidence of indebtedness. Page 135 of 233

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FACTS: Petitioner Anita Capulong (Anita) and her husband, Fernando Capulong (Fernando) were accused of the crime of Estafa. Private complainant Francisca P. de Guzman (De Guzman) testified that Anita obtained from her an amount of ₱700,000.00. As a security for the loan, the Spouses Capulong executed a Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney over their cargo truck, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of which were likewise delivered to De Guzman. On a later date, Anita requested to borrow the OR-CR for a week, excusing that she would apply for the amendment of the registration certificate to increase the weight or load capacity of the truck and show it to a prospective buyer. De Guzman was hesitant at first since the chattel mortgage was not yet registered, but she later on acceded. As proof of receipt, Anita issued a handwritten note. Despite the expiration of the one-week period and De Guzman's repeated demands, the documents were not returned by Anita who countered that the loaned amount was already paid. Only Anita was convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of RPC. Anita contends that there is no competent proof that she actually removed, concealed or destroyed any of the papers contemplated in Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC. Allegedly, the document removed, concealed or destroyed must contain evidence of indebtedness so as to cause prejudice, and the OR-CR are not of this nature. ISSUE: Whether or not Anita is guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of RPC. RULING: Contrary to Anita's supposition, neither Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC nor Article 535, paragraph 9 of the old penal code requires that the documents or papers are evidence of indebtedness. Notably, while the old provision broadly covered "any process, record, document, or any other paper of any character whatsoever," the new provision refers to "documents or any other papers." Indeed, there is no limitation that the penal provision applies only to documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC merely penalizes the removal, concealment or destruction of documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness, still Anita cannot be acquitted. In a chattel mortgage of a vehicle, the OR-CR should be considered as evidence of indebtedness because they are part and parcel of the entire mortgage documents, without which the mortgage's right to foreclose cannot be effectively enforced. In case of default in payment, the mortgaged property has to be sold at public auction so that its proceeds would satisfy, among others, the payment of the obligation secured by the mortgage. Prior to the foreclosure, however, the encumbrance must be annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry of the Register of Deeds and the LTO, where the OR-CR must be presented. The LTO requires, among others, not just the original copy of the CR and the latest OR of the payment of motor vehicle user's charge and other fees but even the actual physical inspection of the motor vehicle by the District Office accepting the annotation. As a businesswoman, Anita knows or is expected to know these procedures. In fact, the Spouses Capulong initially surrendered the OR-CR Page 136 of 233

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of the cargo truck precisely to give effect to the chattel mortgage they executed in favour of De Guzman. Fraudulent intent, being a state of mind, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances, and may be inferred from facts and circumstances that appear to be undisputed. For failure to comply with her promise to return the original OR-CR, or even furnish new ones in lieu thereof, and in misrepresenting that she already gave De Guzman the subject documents, Anita's intent to defraud is shown beyond question. Such malicious intent was even made more prominent with the replacement of the truck's engine without De Guzman's knowledge and the unknown whereabouts of the vehicle. With the concealment of the OR-CR, Anita's act certainly caused a positive injury to De Guzman. The absence of the OR-CR practically rendered useless the chattel mortgage. Since the mortgage could not be properly registered with the LTO, the right to foreclose the truck could not be exercised. Anita made it difficult for De Guzman to collect the unpaid debt as the latter would be forced to file a collection suit instead of conveniently going through the foreclosure proceedings. It is of judicial notice that, as opposed to a civil case for sum of money, a foreclosure of mortgage involves much less time, effort and resources. For the purpose of proving the existence of injury or damage, it is unnecessary to inquire whether, as a matter of fact, the unpaid debt could be or had been successfully collected. The commission of the crime is entirely independent of the subsequent and casual event of collecting the amount due and demandable, the result of which, whatever it may be, can in no wise have any influence upon the legal effects of the already consummated concealment of documents. NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 211917, February 27, 2017, PERALTA, J.: What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. FACTS: Private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business venture with petitioner Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters. Fineza would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop which would then be sold for profit by Gamaro to her co-employees. As security for the pieces of jewelry which were placed in the possession of Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue several checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry. When Fineza discovered that Gamaro, together with her daughters, also engaged in a similar business with other suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the business. To wind up the business, it was agreed that Gamaro would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored because the account of the Gamaro and her daughters had been closed. Fineza then confronted Page 137 of 233

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Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and the latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks. A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Gamaro and her daughters, asking for the return of the payment for all the pieces of jewelry which were not returned to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting business. The demand letter was left unanswered. Gamaro was charged charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC convicted Gamaro of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether or not a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible. RULING: YES. The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him" is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. It is hornbook doctrine that what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of a crime charged in the Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A reading of the Information yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed sufficiently charges estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry on the condition that the same will be sold for profit. Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza. Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This, at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Information. The factual allegations therein sufficiently inform Gamaro of the acts constituting her purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa by misappropriation. Gamaro fully apprised of the charge against them and for them to suitably prepare their defense. Therefore, petitioner Norma Gamaro was not deprived of any constitutional right. She was sufficiently apprised of the Page 138 of 233

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facts that pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa, because the RTC has the discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged. As mentioned, Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry which was received by her in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for his own personal use. As in fact, in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry using her own money. The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERCEDITAS MATHEUS G.R. No. 198795, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of illegal recruitment under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC. FACTS: The accused was charged with 6 counts of Estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC and 1 count of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042. The accused allegedly promised to certain people jobs in Cyprus. She showed them a copy of their Visa and promised that they can immediately leave the country after payment. One of them, Suratos, gave the accused 55,000. 3 months thereafter, she tried contacting the accused but to no avail. She only discovered that the accused was already in jail and therefore, can no longer deploy her abroad. Thus, she filed a case of illegal recruitment against the former. Another victim, paid this time an amount totalling to 15,000. She met the same faith as of Suratos and only discovered that the accused was already detained. 4 more people filed different cases against the accused all involving her promises to deploy them abroad for work. The RTC convicted the accused of Illegal Recruitment and 5 counts of estafa. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged. RULING: YES. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (l) the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. Page 139 of 233

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These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found accused-appellant to have undertakenrecruitment activity when she promised the private complainants overseas employment for a fee.Second, the March 1, 2004 Certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration unmistakably reveals that the accused-appellant neither had a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.Third, it was established that there were five complainants. Indeed, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution. We likewise affirm accused-appellant's conviction for five counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately of illegal recruitment under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC. The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused appellant deceived private complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment, despite hernot being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private complainants parted with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which accused-appellant issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her receipt of the payments. Clearly, these acts of accused-appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUTHER SABADO G.R. No. 218910. July 5, 2017 TIJAM, J. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. FACTS: Alama testified that at around 12:15 p.m., while he doing a regular task as collector of payments from the stall owners at Luzviminda, he saw accused-appellant coming out of the pawnshop, as well as two unidentified men standing near the pawnshop. He saw accused-appellant unlock the steel gate and called one of the men who entered the pawnshop. The other unidentified man, who seemed to be a lookout, stayed outside and was leaning against the glass window of the pawnshop. Thereafter, the man who went with the accused-appellant inside the pawnshop came out carrying a small bag and immediately left the place. Shortly thereafter, accused-appellant also came out, tied up and with a packing tape plastered to his mouth. When the tape was removed, accused-appellant declared that he was robbed inside the pawnshop by the two unidentified men. Brogada, the auditor and appraiser of Diamond Pawnshop, confirmed that the pawnshop was robbed, and after the inventory, she found out that there were missing items valued at PhP 582,200.00. For his defense, accused-appellant also claimed that he was admitted back to work after the robbery incident. He was even instructed by the owner of the pawnshop to conduct an inventory of the Page 140 of 233

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contents of the vault and to make a cartographic sketch of the robbers. But after five or six days, he was invited to the police station for some questioning and, thereafter, a criminal information was filed against him.Accused-appellant and two other accused are charged of Qualified Theft. ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt RULING: YES. The elements of the crime were all alleged and proved. First, there was a taking of personal property consisting of pieces of jewelry, i.e. two men's rings and one necklace with pendant. Second, said pieces of jewelry belong to the Pawnshop. Third, the taking of said pieces of jewelry was with intent to gain. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Fourth, the taking was obviously without the consent of the Pawnshop; and, Fifth, the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft here became qualified because it was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused. Accusedappellant, as established by the prosecution, is an employee of the Pawnshop. Accused-appellant could not have committed the crime had he not been holding the position of the trusted employee which gave him not only sole access to the Pawnshop's vault but also control of the premises. The management of Diamond Pawnshop clearly had reposed its trust and confidence in the accusedappellant, and it was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of his employer. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBELYN CABANADA Y ROSAURO G.R. No. 221424. July 19, 2017 PERALTA, J. The elements of qualified theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) Taking of personal property; (2) That the said property belongs to another; (3) That the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) That it be done without the owner's consent; (5) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; (6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. FACTS: Accused-appellant Cabanada was employed as a housemaid of complainant Victoria in Mandaluyong for several years. She was charged with the crime of qualified theft for stealing cash, watches and jewelry belonging to complainant while the latter and her family were in Bulacan. ISSUE: Page 141 of 233

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Whether or not the elements of qualified theft were sufficiently proven RULING: YES. The elements of qualified theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) Taking of personal property; (2) That the said property belongs to another; (3) That the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) That it be done without the owner's consent; (5) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; (6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. Cabanada's admission, coupled with presentation of the money, albeit less than the missing amount, establish the presence of the element of unlawful taking. The fact that the money was taken without authority and consent of Victor and Catherine, and that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon things, were also proven during the trial. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The taking was also clearly done with grave abuse of confidence. Cabanada was working as a housemaid of the Victoria family since 2002. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERLINDA SISON @ “MARGARITA AGUILAR” G.R. No. 187160. August 9, 2017 CARPIO, J. To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to deploy the complainants abroad in a manner that they were convinced to part with their money for that end. FACTS: Castuera was introduced to Sison by her husband. They met Sison and she briefed Castuera on the requirements for working as a fruit picker in Australia. During that meeting, Sison introduced Castuera to another man who related that he was able to go to Australia with Sison's help. She also showed Castuera pictures of other people she had supposedly helped to get employment in Australia. Sison further narrated that a couple she had helped had given her their car as payment. On 16 June 2000, Castuera met Sison at McDonald's in SM Megamall to give the ₱80,000 down payment. Sison issued a signed document as proof of payment. Sison promised Castuera that she would personally process his visa application. Sison, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. They went to Malaysia and Indonesia to process the visa but to no avail. He found out then that the extension papers that Dedales and Bacomo procured for him were fake. Castuera sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Indonesia and was able to return to the Philippines using his own funds. Upon returning to the Philippines, Castuera filed a complaint against Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo at the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The agency verified that Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo did not have any license or permit to hire and recruit for overseas employment. ISSUE: Page 142 of 233

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Whether or not the guilt of Sison was established beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: YES. Simply put, illegal recruitment is "committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes." Illegal recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or license holders. Nonlicense holders are liable by the simple act of engaging in recruitment and placement activities, while license holders may also be held liable for committing the acts prohibited under Section 6 of RA 8042. Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042. In this case, Sison herself admits that she has no license or authority to undertake recruitment and placement activities'. The Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he or she could send workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or license to do so, commits illegal recruitment. It is the absence of the necessary license or authority to recruit and deploy workers that renders the recruitment activity unlawful. To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that "the accused gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to deploy the complainants abroad in a manner that they were convinced to part with their money for that end." Since it was proven that the three accused were acting in concert and conspired with one another, their illegal recruitment activity is considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage. We affirm Sison's conviction for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042 and estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the RPC. All the elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 3 l 5(2)(a) of the RPC are present in this case. PRISCILLA Z. ORBE v. LEONORA O. MIARAL G.R. No. 217777. August 16, 2017 CARPIO, J. When money or property had been received by a partner for a specific purpose and he later misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa. FACTS: Leonora Miaral (respondent) agreed to engage in the garment exportation business with her sister, Priscilla Z. Orbe (petitioner). They executed a partnership agreement where they agreed to contribute Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) each to Toppy Co., Inc. and Miaral Enterprises, and to equally divide the profits they may earn. Respondent issued three (3) checks drawn in a bank in the United States as payment. However, one of the checks was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Petitioner likewise discovered that there was no exportation of garments to the United States or any other transactions in the United States that took place. Petitioner demanded from respondent the return and Anne Kristine the total payment Page 143 of 233

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of Two Hundred Three Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Pesos (P203,999.00) and One Thousand Dollars (US$1,000.00). Despite demands, respondent and Anne Kristine failed to return the money. Petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City. After an information had been filed with the RTC, the OCP filed a Motion to Withdraw Information on the ground that criminal liability is negated by the existence of partnership agreement which will only produce civil liability. ISSUE: Whether or not the OCP was correct in withdrawing the criminal complaint for estafa because of the existence of partnership agreement. RULING: NO. In this case, the OCP erred gravely when it based its conclusion on the Clarin case. Liwanag applies to the partnership agreement executed between petitioner and respondent. Petitioner's initial contributions of Pl83,999.00 and P20,000.00 were all for specific purposes: for the buying and selling of garments and for the salaries of the factory workers, respectively. When respondent failed to account for these amounts or to return these amounts to petitioner upon demand, there is probable cause to hold that respondent misappropriated the amounts and had not used them for their intended purposes. The Information for estafa should thus proceed. In Liwanag, this Court held: Thus, even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and between the parties, we have ruled that when money or property [had] been received by a partner for a specific purpose (such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he later misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa. JESUS V. COSON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 218830. September 14, 2017 DEL CASTILLO, J. Misappropriation or conversion refers to any disposition of another's property as if it were his own or devoting it to a purpose not agreed upon. It connotes disposition of property without any right. FACTS: On December 21, 2001, GGDC, through its President Jack Christian Coson, borrowed from private complainant Atty. Nolan Evangelista. A Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by the parties whereby the property owned by GGDC was put up as collateral for the loan. On July 29, 2003, Jesus V. Coson, received in trust and confidence from one Nolan R. Evangelista the title of the land which he had given as a security to the mortgage secured from the latter, alleging that he would use it in obtaining a loan from the Home Development Mutual Fund and promising the latter that he would pay him the mortgage consideration upon release of the proceeds of the loan by the said agency, but upon receipt of the proceeds, the herein accused failed to fulfil his promise and refused to perform his obligation to pay Nolan R. Evangelista despite demands made on him. Page 144 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, par. l(b) of the RPC. RULING: NO. There cannot be any misappropriation or conversion by petitioner to his own personal use, benefit or advantage, of TCT No. 261204 or the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG Fund loan granted to GGDC since private complainant is fully aware of the purpose of petitioner/GGDC for borrowing TCT No. 261204 and how the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG Fund loan should be applied. Moreover, TCT No. 261204 and the PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds are owned by GGDC and not by petitioner, and more so, not owned by private complainant. If there was any misappropriation or conversion of TCT No. 261204 or the PAG-IBIG Fund loan proceeds, the aggrieved party should be GGDC, and certainly not the private complainant. To stress, misappropriation or conversion refers to any disposition of another's property as if it were his own or devoting it to a purpose not agreed upon. It connotes disposition of one's property without any right. In all his dealings with private complainant, he acted for and in behalf of GGDC which owns the title and the loan proceeds. The purpose of the loan from private complainant and from the PAG-IBIG Fund was in pursuance of the housing business of GGDC, which is not totally unknown to private complainant. Moreover, the Promissory Note dated May 29, 200347 of petitioner acknowledging his indebtedness and the demand letters of private complainant to petitioner to pay his obligation 48 clearly show that the obligation contracted by petitioner on behalf of GGDC is purely civil and for which no criminal liability may attach. ||| PEOPLE v. SULAYAO G.R. No. 198952, September 6, 2017, First Division, TIJAM, J. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion o all others, as the guilty person. FACTS: William, Jose Chito, and other Barangay Security Development Officers (BSDO) of Brgy. Apolonio Samson saw two males and a female, all wearing bloodstained clothes, walking along the boulevard. When they approached, the group of three scampered and the BDSOs managed to catch appellant, who had blood all over and a wound forehead. The two others escaped. Accused told the BSDOs he and his cohorts had just robbed the Floor Center and killed the security guard. The Floor Center’s front glass door was broken, blood stained the floors, and the security guard’s body was stashed inside the comfort room. Amalia, proprietor of the Floor Center, went to the crime scene and found cash and checks worth P255,645.05 were missing. Sulayao denied his hand in the crime, saying he merely arrived at the crime scene, walked in and was stabbed by a brother of one of his co-workers. Bloodied, he came across the BDSOs, whom he accused of mauling him. The RTC and CA both found him guilty of Robbery with Homicide. He appealed on the basis of inconsistencies of the BSDO’s statements. Page 145 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether Sulayao was guilty of robbery with homicide on the basis of the BSDO’s statements, which conflicted as to the number of BSDO present and the presence of the media RULING: The circumstantial evidence in the form of testimonies from the BSDOs are sufficient to support a conviction. All circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis accused is guilty and inconsistent with the hypothesis accused is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion o all others, as the guilty person. The following pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to prove Sulayao’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt: (1) BSDO members sighted him with two others, wounded and wearing bloodstained clothes along EDSA; (2) he and his cohorts scampered in different directions when they were approached; (3) upon apprehension, he disclosed he and his companions robbed a store and killed its security guard; (4) the security guard was found dead inside the store; and (5) he admitted he hammered the victim’s head while his companions took the money. | || COSON v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 218830, September 14, 2017, Second Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. Misappropriation or conversion in estafa refers to any disposition of another’s property as if it were his own or devoting to a purpose not agreed upon. It connotes disposition of one’s property without any right. FACTS: Coson, as CEO of Good God Development Corporation, borrowed P2,552,000 from private complainant Nolan Evangelista to buy an adjacent property to GGDC’s in Pangasinan, the purchase of which was secured by a real estate mortgage. Another mortgage was constituted on the property in favor of private complainant for a loan of P4,784,000. Some time thereafter, Coson and Evangelista entered into a Memorandum of Agreement stipulating to open a joint account to obtain a loan from PAG-IBIG the proceeds of which shall be deposited. Coson made out checks for P3m and subsequent ones worth P185,000. The property will be surrendered to PAG-IBIG. Upon the release of the first tranche of the loan, petitioner failed to pay Evangelista and Coson did not return the TCT as agreed upon. Evangelista filed a complaint against Coson for estafa under Art. 315(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC and the CA found petitioner guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not Coson was liable for estafa. Page 146 of 233

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RULING: The loan granted by PAG-IBIG is a developmental loan to finance the housing project of GGDC on the lots covered by the mortgaged property. Evangelista is not totally unaware of this fact as evidenced by the MOA. Based on the MOA, there cannot be any misappropriation or conversion by petitioner to his own personal use, benefit, or advantage of the TCT or the proceeds of the loan granted by PAG-IBIG to GGDC. These proceeds are owned by GGDC and not by petitioner and not by Evangelista. For his uncollected debt, Evangelista’s remedy is not a criminal action but a civil action against petitioner, as stated in their MOA. PEOPLE v. LAYUG ET AL. G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. To prosecute robbery with homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. FACTS: An information charged Wilfredo, Noel, and Reynaldo for murdering Victorino Paule and robbing him of a necklace, wristwatch, and cash worth P20,000. Analiza, state witness, said she met up with the victim after having a shabu session to have sexual intercourse with Paule. As Paule wanted one more round of coitus, he went with Analiza back to thhe house of Wilfred to do shabu. Accused asked Analiza to go with them to their hideout, taking Victorino with them. After alighting the tricycle, the accused stabbed and robbed Victorino and threatened Analiza and her brother-in-law to keep quiet. The accused denied liability, saying they were with Councilor Bhoy Timog. On that night, the accused and Bhoy saw Emelita, Bhoy’s live-in partner, holding hands with Victorino. They invited Victorino for a drink and Bhoy asked why Victorina and Emelita were holding hands. As a confrontation arose, Bhoy picked up a knife and stabbed Victorino twice. Accused said Bhoy talked to other people implicating the accused as principals to Victorino’s murder. The RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: To prosecute robbery with homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the Page 147 of 233

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robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, if, for instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERVIN MATEO, EVELYN MATEO, CARMELITA GALVEZ, ROMEO ESTEBAN, GALILEO SAPORSANTOS, AND NENITA SAPORSANTOS G.R. No. 210612, October 09, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. Fraud is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. FACTS: The accused in this case where charged with syndicate estafa. Evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused enticed private complainants to invest in MMG International Holdings Co., Ltd., with a promise of 2.5% monthly interest from the capital that they invest. When private complainants tried to deposit the checks they receive as security for their investment, the checks were dishonored for the reason that that account where these were drawn against has been closed. Private complainants demanded the return of their money to no avail. They eventually discovered that MMG is not a registered issuer of securities. The RTC convicted the accused of syndicated estafa which the CA affirmed. The lower courts found that all the elements of the crime were present. The accused challenges this conviction and alleges that there was no fraud committed. ISSUE: Whether or not fraud as an element of syndicated estafa was sufficiently proven RULING: Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.

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In this case, fraud and deceit were sufficiently proven. The accused in this case formed a partnership which by its amended articles should not engage in stock brokerage or dealership of securities. However, the accused, in direction violation thereof, ere effectively engaging in the sale of securities by enticing the public to "invest" funds with MMG offering a promise of a 2.5% monthly compensation out of the capital on their investment which were clearly ultra vires acts. Moreover, the SEC even stated that soliciting funds from the public is a form of issuing securities, which MMG was not authorized to do so. The testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution more than amply proved that appellant, together with his partners, employed fraud and deceit upon trusting individuals in order to convince them to invest in MMG. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILFREDO LAYUG, ET AL. G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017, PERALTA, J.: In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason ofthe robbery. FACTS: Wilfredo Layug, Noel Buan, and Reynaldo Langit were all charged of robbery with homicide. Analiza testified that she overheard accused Reynaldo giving instructions to Wilfredo and Noel about a "hold-up," but did not hear the name of the person intended to be held-up. Analiza was then introduced to the victim Victorino and they agreed that the latter will bring her to Benzi Lodge to have sex with her for P500.00. They checked-in and stayed at said lodge for three hours. Since Victorino still wanted to have a good time with her, Analiza brought Victorino to Wilfredo’s house. Thereafter, Wilfredo, Noel, and Reynaldo asked Analiza to go with them to their hideout. Victorino went with them and they all rode a tricycle. Upon alighting from the tricycle, Noel held the shoulder of Victorino and stabbed him twice in front of his body which led the latter to lean forward. Wilfredo and accused Reynaldo surrounded Victorino and helped Noel in stabbing Victorino. Victorino shouted "Tulungan ninyo ako," as Reynaldo took his wallet, wristwatch and necklace. Because of fear, Analiza remained in the tricycle, while Victorino was being stabbed and robbed. Thereafter, the three accused boarded the tricycle, and warned Analiza not to report the incident to anybody or else they will also get killed. The medico-legal report stated that Victorino sustained 19 stab wounds which caused his death. The accused’s defense was mere denial. The RTC convicted the accused as charged and considered the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the convictions should be upheld. RULING: YES. For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. All the essential ingredients of robbery with homicide have been established by the prosecution with proof beyond reasonable doubt through the convincing testimony of Analiza. Page 149 of 233

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Through her testimony, it was established that personal properties and cash belonging to Victorino were taken by the appellants by means of force, and with an obvious intent to gain. Moreover, during the heist, Victorino was mercilessly and repeatedly stabbed by the appellants which resulted to his immediate death. Also, treachery was adequately proven by the prosecution and aptly appreciated by the RTC and the CA. In People v. Baron, this Court reiterated that treachery is not considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide but as a generic aggravating circumstance, the presence of which merits the imposition of the higher penalty. Again, robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously. Evident premeditation, on the other hand, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide because the elements of which are already inherent in the crime. Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property.

G. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY VIRGILIO LABANDRIA AWAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 203114, June 28, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.: In prosecutions for acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. Youth, and, as is more applicable herein, immaturity of the victim are generally badges of truth that the courts cannot justly ignore. FACTS: The accused was charged with Rape by Sexual Assault upon a 10 year old girl. The prosecution alleged that the accused who was the boyfriend of AAA’s sister while inside latter’s house brought her inside a room and touched her vagina. He made her lie beside him and touched her vagina again. AAA was wearing leggings at that time and the accused did not remove it when he touched her. The RTC found him guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5 of RA 7610 as affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of acts of lasciviousness. RULING: YES. The failure of AAA to shout during the incident would not exculpate the petitioner. There is no standard behavior for a victim of a crime against chastity. Behavioral psychology teaches that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. AAA could have been submissive due to her tender age, but the fact that she did cry after the incident was a true indication, indeed, that she had felt violated.Moreover, in prosecutions for acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.

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The acts committed by the petitioner against AAA constituted acts of lasciviousness. The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code are, to wit: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex. Such acts are punished as sexual abuse under Republic Act No. No. 7610, whose elements under Section 5 of the law are namely: (1) the accused commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with· a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Pursuant to the foregoing, the penalty for lascivious conduct when thevictim is under 12 years of age is reclusion temporal in its medium period, which ranges from 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower to the statutory penalty is reclusion temporal in its minimum period (i.e., 12 years and one day to 14 years and eight months). Due to the absence of modifying circumstances, the statutory penalty is imposed in its medium period (i.e., 15 years, six months and 21 days to 16 years, five months and 10 days). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORIETO MONROYO G.R. No. 223708, June 28, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene. It is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is a mental process that can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. FACTS: Four (4) informations were filed against the accused charging him of 3 counts of Acts of Lasciviousness of AAA (14), his niece and 1 count of Qualified Rape of her sister BBB (16). It was alleged that while AAA was alone in their house, her uncle approached her and touched her private organ. The same incident happened for 2 more times in the same house. On the other hand, BBB alleged that while she was sleeping, she felt someone touching her breast and saw her uncle beside her bed. He instructed her to lie down on the floor and started kissing her all over her body, forcibly removed her shorts and underwear then placed himself on top of her. They eventually mustered the courage to tell their mother about the sexual abuses and filed the cases. The RTC convicted him of 3 counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and Simple Rape. The CA affirmed the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the charges against him. RULING: YES. In the present case, the recital of facts in the Informations constitute violations of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.Common to both legal provisions is the element of lascivious conduct or lewdness. The term "lewd" is Page 151 of 233

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commonly defined as something indecent or obscene. It is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is a mental process that can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the aforementioned elements. As correctly observed by the lower courts, AAA clearly and convincingly narrated in detail each lascivious act committed by Monroyo against her. Separately, Monroyo was charged with the crime of Qualified Rape in Crim. Case No. C-04-7788, this time committed against AAA's sister, BBB.The elements of Qualified Rape under these provisions are: (a) the victim is a female over twelve (12) years but under eighteen (18) years ofage; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative byconsanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-lawspouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledgeof the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation. The presence of these circumstances is readily verifiable from the records of this case. As to BBB's minority (i.e., sixteen years old at the time the crime was committed), the prosecution formally offered a photocopy of her birth certificate, the authenticity of which was not in any way disputed by the defense. Meanwhile, the fact that Monroyo is BBB's relative by affinity within the third civil degree was attested to by BBB, who testified that Monroyo is the husband of her mother's halfsister. In fact, Monroyo admitted their relationship on cross-examination, stating that "his wife is the sister of the mother of [BBB]."Based on the foregoing, Monroyo's criminal liability in Crim. Case No. C-04-7788 is thus upheld. However, for the reasons initially stated, his conviction is modified from Rape to Qualified Rape.

H. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR MEDELARNALDO B. BELEN, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017, PERALTA, J.: Sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues. The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP of San Pablo City as a remedy for the dismissal of his estafa complaint during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of relevancy. FACTS: Medelarnaldo Belen filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle. The complaint was dismissed by the handling prosecutor, ACP Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman. Belen thus filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Disqualify, which states among others:

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In the instant case, however, the Investigating Fiscal was not impartial and exhibited manifest bias for 20,000 reasons. The reasons were not legal or factual. These reasons were based on her malicious and convoluted perceptions. If she was partial, then she is stupid. The Investigating Fiscal's stupidity was clearly manifest in her moronic resolution Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumption were tarnished with silver ingots. She is also an intellectually infirm or stupidly blind… For all the 20,000 reasons of the Investigating Fiscal, the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind - a manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity in her resolution. Lastly, the invocation of the dismissal of I.S. No. 03-1412 was a nail in the coffin for the idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal. Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal, despite the letter-request for clarificatory question to shed lights of all the transaction and facts under investigation, chose to be guided by her manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity. Sued for libel, Belen invoked the defense of lack of publication and privileged communication. ISSUE: Whether or not Belen’s defense is meritorious. RULING: NO. As to the element of publication, publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by the witness in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive to the questions propounded to said witnesses. The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice, if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry. Sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that a matter alleged in the pleading may be privileged, it need not, in any case, be material to the issue presented by the pleadings; however, Page 153 of 233

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it must be legitimately related thereto or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial. What is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not be scrutinized with microscopic intensity, as it would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communication. The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP of San Pablo City as a remedy for the dismissal of his estafa complaint during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of relevancy. An examination of the motion shows that the following defamatory words and phrases used, even if liberally construed, are hardly 'material or pertinent to his cause, which is to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of his estafa complaint and the disqualification of ACP SuñegaLagman from further acting on the case: (1) "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons"; (2) "the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumptions were tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind"; (4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons"; (5) "moronic resolution"; (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind"; (7) "manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty." These statements are neither relevant grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid and justifiable reasons for disqualification. These diatribes pertain to ACP Suñega-Lagman's honor, reputation, mental and moral character, and are no longer related to the discharge of her official function as a prosecutor. MANILA BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP., RUTHER BATUIGAS v. VICTOR A. DOMINGO AND PEOPLE G.R. No. 170341; 05 July 2017 MARTIRES, J. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. FACTS: Petitioner Mr. Batuigas was the chief reporter and columnist of Tempo, a tabloid published in the Manila Bulletin. He was charged with libel for authoring 2 articles containing multiple allegations against Mr. Domingo, who was then the DTI Director for Region VIII. The RTC found Batuigas guilty for libel and held him and Manila Bulletin solidarily liable to Domingo for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s MR was denied. ISSUE: Whether or notthe CA erred in upholding the RTC decision.(YES) RULING:

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As a general rule, the findings of the lower courts are conclusive. However, this is subject to exceptions, with the applicable one in this case being when the decision of the lower court is based on a misapprehension of facts. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Upon examining the first article written by Batuigas in its entirety, it is a fair and true report based on the documents he had received. Under Art. 354 of the RPC, an exception to the presumption that a defamatory imputation is malicious is when it is a fair and true report made in good faith, without any comments, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceeding which is not confidential in nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. The article cannot be considered defamatory as it did not ascribe to Domingo any commission of crime, etc. It was a mere factual report which was lifted from the letters of DTI employees reiterating their complaints against Domingo. Moreover, during trial Domingo himself presented documents confirming that indeed there were complaints filed against him before the CSC and Ombudsman. However, the second article written by Batuigas is libelous as the statements referring to the “lousy” performance and “mismanagement” of Domingo, impeached the virtue and reputation of Domingo as Regional Director. However, these statements amount to qualifiedly privileged communications, which require actual malice on the part of the author for them to be actionable. The statements relate to the moral conduct and capacity of Domingo as Regional Director and are therefore of public interest. However, actual malice on the part of Batuigas was not proven. The article was written after receiving letter complaints from various DTI employees, hence Batuigas cannot be deemed to have written the article with reckless disregard of the falsity of the statements. In fact, Batuigas merely expressed his opinion based on the fact that there were complaints filed against Domingo, which can be fairly inferred from the documents he had received. Lastly, Batuigas stated that he believed the matters he reported in his articles were of public interest. This claim of good intention and justifiable motives is a defense for a defamatory imputation even if it be true.

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III. SPECIAL LAWS A. ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW (R.A. No. 6539, as amended by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 10883) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN G.R. No. 212815, March 1, 2017, PERALTA, J:. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain. FACTS: Accused-appellant Enrile Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were accosted during a checkpoint by the Concepcion Police Station. When asked for his identity, he introduced himself as Raul Layug and handed the police officer a temporary license bearing the said name. He also failed to produce its registration papers. Upon visual search, the police discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They seized the tricyle and the bolo, and then brought the three to the police station. Donio asked permission to leave in order to get the registration papers. The officers allowed him, however, he did not return. Meawhile, the remains of Raul Layug, the driver of the said tricycle. Donio was charged with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The RTC convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide.The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court noted, however, that the prosecution should have filed an Information for the special complex crime of qualified carnapping in aggravated form. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide. RULING: YES. Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was camapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. "Unlawful taking" or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using Page 156 of 233

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force upon things. It is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to the person robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. The said principle may be applied in this case as the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. Here, Donio failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated the victim before the police officers when his identity was asked, and left under the guise of getting the said documents. It was also established that he and the others were strangers to Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained possession, coupled with the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's death. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain. Donio's intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was proven as he and his companions were using it as means of transportation when they were confronted by the Concepcion police officers. While it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime. Failure to designate the offense by the statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information determines the character of the crime and not the caption or preamble of the information or the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY MACARANAS G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017,PERALTA, J.: So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it becomes qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed or raped. FACTS: Appellant Macaranas, together with 2 others, were charged with qualified carnapping (before the repeal of R.A. No. 6539 by R.A. No. 10883). Frank Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Cervantes were aboard the former’s motorcycle (Honda Wave 125). When they were about to leave, three men suddenly appeared. One of the three held Frank by the neck and shot Frank and died instantaneously. Thereafter, he pointed the gun at Kathlyn and hit her at the back. While the incident was taking place, the second man took Frank’s motorcycle, while the third man, appellant Page 157 of 233

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Macaranas, just stood to guard them and acted as the look-out. Afterwards, the three men left together riding Frank’s motorcycle. The RTC convicted the appellant as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of qualified carnapping. RULING: YES. Thus, the elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as amended are the following: 1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; 3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and 4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of camapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. In other words, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the camapping or on the occasion thereof. In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim’s motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing his death. ||| CHUA v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J. The violence against or intimidation of persons perpetrated by the accused to commit a robbery under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code renders the accused also liable for carnapping committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons as defined and punished by Sec. 14 of RA 6549 involving the taking of a vehicle to transport the stolen goods. FACTS: Chua was charged in separate informations for the crimes of carnapping and robbery, respectively. Two other men, upon his instruction, robbed Teresa Legaspi-Ravago in Bulacan, taking jewelry, appliances, and cash. They stabbed Ravago’s husband who locked himself in the bathroom. They loaded the robbed items in a stainless owner type jeep belonging to complainants. The car was recovered in Pangasinan, where Chua had already sold it to another. Chua denied committing the said crime and knowing of his accomplices, saying he hid in Malolos after the robbery in fears of being killed. Chua appealed the RTC decision finding him Page 158 of 233

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guilty, claiming his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as the lower court relied slowly on circumstantial evidence. The CA upheld the RTC, saying the circumstances point to Chua as the mastermind, given he had eavesdropped on a conversation between Ravago’s husband and a compadre about the broker’s commission for the sale of a fishpond, the knowledge of the other assailants about the commission, Chua’s subsequent disappearance, and the sale of the ownertype jeep, as the mechanic who had fixed it and its subsequent buyer pointed to him as the seller. ISSUE: Whether Chua’s guilt for robbery and carnapping was established beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: Despite his physical absence from the scene of the crime, Chua was liable as a principal by inducement, and also for the violence committed by the two other assailants during the execution of the crimes. The circumstances pointed out by the Court of Appeals were sufficient and competent to prove Chua masterminded the robbery and carnapping. His inducement was not merely casual but influential as the two others could not have committed the crimes without his inducement. Robbery under Art. 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code was committed. The stabbing injuries committed against Ravago’s husband do not constitute any of the serious physical injuries mentioned under Art. 263 of the Revised Penal Code as required by Arts. 294(2)(3) and (4). Carnapping committed with violence or intimidation of persons was established beynd reasonable doubt; hence his penalty should be higher. The taking of the motor vehicle in order to carry the stolen articles was still attended by violence and intimidation of the owner and his wife.

B. ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW (R.A. No. 7610, as amended) VAN CLIFFORD TORRES Y SALERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017, LEONEN, J.: Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age. FACTS: CCC, AAA's uncle, previously filed a complaint for malicious mischief against Torres, who allegedly caused damage to CCC's multicab. AAA witnessed the alleged incident and was brought by CCC to testify during the barangay conciliation. On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from fishing. In the middle of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged CCC's multicab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to pry in the Page 159 of 233

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affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop.However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's multicab. As a result, Torres whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. CCC came to his nephew's defense and punched Torres. They engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of whipping a child three times in the neck with a wet t-shirt constitutes child abuse. RULING: YES. We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is not child abuse but merely slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred. Therefore, AAA is entitled to protection under Republic Act No. 7610. As can be gleaned from Section 3(b), a person who commits an act that debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being, whether habitual or not, can be held liable for violation of Republic Act No. 7610. Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse,petitioner's intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child can be inferred from the manner in which he committed the act complained of. To note, petitioner used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times.Common sense and human experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck, with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times. There is also reason to believe that petitioner used excessive force. Otherwise, AAA would not have fallen down the stairs at the third strike. AAA would likewise not have sustained a contusion. Indeed, if the only intention of petitioner were to discipline AAA and stop him from interfering, he could have resorted to other less violent means. In Araneta: [Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610] punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. . . . [An] accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts. Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Page 160 of 233

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Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted ... as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age. Petitioner, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old child. EDUARDO QUIMVEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017, VELASCO, JR., J.: The very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront. FACTS: Accused was the caretaker of the ducks of AAA’s grandfather. The former lived with the latter’s grandparents a few meters away from their house. While her mother was away, accused went to AAA’s house to deliver some vegetables. The latter requested for him to stay with her and her siblings for they were afraid. However, while they were sleeping AAA (who was then 7 years old) was awakened when she felt the leg of the accused on top of her and his hand inside her panty caressing her private part. The RTC found the accused guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to violation of RA 7610. The CA affirmed the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged. RULING: YES. Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against children. Clear from the records of the deliberation is that the original wording of Sec. 5 of RA 7610 has been expanded so as to cover abuses that are not by gain, monetary or otherwise. In the case at bar, the abuse suffered by AAA squarely falls under this expanded scope as there was no allegation of Page 161 of 233

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consideration or profit in exchange for sexual favor. As stated in the Information, petitioner committed lascivious conduct through the use of ''force" and "intimidation."The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover ''force and intimidation" as used in the Information.It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different. Interestingly, the acts constitutive of the offense, as alleged in the Information, could make out a case for violation of either Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 or Rape under the RPC. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the finding that Malto is criminally liable for violation of RA 7610, and not for Rape. Sec. 4 of RA 8353 did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC for if it were the intent of Congress, it would have expressly done so.If Art. 336 then ceased to be a penal provision in view of its allegedincompleteness, then so too would Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 be ineffective since it defines and punishes the prohibited act by way of reference to the RPC provision. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALVADOR AYCARDO G.R. No. 218114, June 5, 2017, PERALTA, J.: Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one - through coercion, intimidation or influence - engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. FACTS: The accused was charged with rape and rape by sexual assault by allegedly raping his wife’s 11 year old niece. According to her, the accused was trying to undress her and was able to insert his fingers inside her panty and touch her vagina. On the same day, he was able to have carnal knowledge with her warning the girl that he would kill her if she tells anyone about it. It was while she was sleeping that AAA shouted the accused’s name yelling for him to stop, that her mother found out what happened. The RTC convicted the accused of Acts of Lasciviousness and Qualified Rape which the CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was correctly found to be guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness and Qualified Rape. RULING: YES. With respect to Criminal Case No. FC-08-0272, both the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that Aycardo cannot be convicted of the charge of rape by sexual assault, as he was unable to insert his finger inside AAA's vagina, but he can still be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because its elements are necessarily included in the offense charged, and were proved in court. Accordingly, although an accused is charged in the information with the crime of statutory rape, the offender can be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, which is included in rape.

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Section 5 (b), Article III ofR.A. No. 7610 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but alsowith a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one - through coercion, intimidation or influence - engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. As correctly found by the CA, all the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, are present in Criminal Case No. 08-0272 because the evidence of the prosecution showed that Aycardo, an adult, took advantage of his influence as the uncle and a relative by affinity within the 3rd civil degree of AAA, and was able to touch her vagina, while he forcibly removed her shorts and panties. It is not amiss to stress that the alleged and proved modifying circumstances that the victim is under 12 years old and the offender is a relative by affinity within the third (3rd) civil degree, are insufficient in order for the maximum period to be imposed against the perpetrator pursuant to Section 31, Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, because the same provision requires that such collateral relative must be within the second (2nd) civil degree. At any rate, the said relationship of the offender with the child victim can be considered as an aggravating circumstance for purposes of increasing the period of imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. As one of the elements of the same crime, however, the minority of the victim cannot be cited again as an aggravating circumstance in order to increase the period of the imposable penalty. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NICOLAS TUBILLO G.R. No. 220718, June 21, 2017, MENDOZA, J.: A reading of the information would show that the case at bench involves both the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. As elucidated in People v. Abay and People v. Pangilinan, in such instance, the court must examine the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused on the specific force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with the victim. FACTS: Tubillo was charged with rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610. Victim HGE, then 13 years old, was sleeping in their house. Suddenly, she was awakened when Tubillo, her neighbor, entered their house by breaking the padlock of the door. Upon entry, Tubillo went directly to HGE and then he removed her clothes and his own. He then forcibly inserted his penis in her vagina by pushing his body towards her. HGE felt pain, but she did not resist as Tubillo was poking a knife at her neck. The incident lasted for about thirty (30) seconds. The RTC convicted Tubillo of simple rape. The CA affirmed the conviction but related it to R.A. No. 7610. ISSUE: Whether or not Tubillo is guilty of rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610. RULING: Page 163 of 233

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Only of simple rape and not in relation to R.A. 7610. Under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.In this case, the CA and the RTC fully appreciated the testimony of HGE that, on February 1, 2006, Tubillo forcibly entered the house where she was sleeping alone; that he took off her clothes and his; that he forcibly inserted his penis in her vagina; and that she could not resist because he poked a knife at her neck. The sexual violation suffered by HGE in Tubillo's hands was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Ortiz. The CA found that Tubillo committed the crime of rape against HGE, then a 13-year-old minor. Nevertheless, it opined that he must be convicted under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 because it was the crime alleged in the information. The Court disagrees. the elements of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It is also stated there that children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse are those children, whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. A reading of the information would show that the case at bench involves both the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. As elucidated in People v. Abay and People v. Pangilinan, in such instance, the court must examine the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused on the specific force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with the victim. Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or intimidation employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC. The prosecution presented the testimony of HGE who narrated that Tubillo unlawfully entered the· house where she was sleeping by breaking the padlock. Once inside, he forced himself upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and inserted his penis in her vagina. She could not resist the sexual attack against her because Tubillo poked a bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo employed brash force or intimidation to carry out his dastardly deeds. In fine, Tubillo should be found guilty of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC with a prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of Section 5 (b) ofR.A. No. 7610. RICHARD ESCALANTE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No 218970, June 28, 2017, MENDOZA, J.: Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 specifically applies in case of sexual abuse committed against children; whereas, Section 10(a) thereof punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by other provisions of R.A. No. 7610. FACTS: Escalante was charged with violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. On his way back home from his classmate’s house, AAA, a 12-year old, was called by Escalante and was pulled into a comfort room at the Divine School in Parada, Valenzuela City. Once inside, Escalante pulled down AAA’s shorts and sucked the latter’s penis for 10 minutes. Thereafter, he forcibly inserted AAA's penis into his anus. AAA was thereby afflicted with gonorrhea. RTC convicted Escalante as charged. The CA affirmed the RTC. Page 164 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not Escalante is guilty of child abuse. RULING: YES. Escalante was convicted by the RTC of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The correct provision, however, should be Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which imposes a higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 specifically applies in case of sexual abuse committed against children; whereas, Section 10(a) thereof punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by other provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Parenthetically, the offense will not fall under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 if the same is specifically penalized by a particular provision of the law such as Section 5(b) for sexual abuse. In People v. Larin, the Court stated that the elements of sexual abuse under Section S(b) ofR.A. No. 7610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. All of the foregoing elements are present in the case at bench. First, in forcibly sucking AAA’s penis and thereafter inserting it in his anus, Escalante, without question exposed AAA to lascivious conduct. Second, AAA is a child subjected to other sexual abuse. Third, AAA's minority was sufficiently established. As shown by his birth certificate, he was only twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged sexual assault occurred. All in all, it is clear that Escalante, an adult with all his influence and power over the minor AAA, coerced the latter into satiating his sexual urges at the expense of his youth, innocence and purity. Surely, such perverse actions warrant the harsher penalty under R.A. No. 7610 in consonance with the State's policy to protect children from all forms of abuse or exploitation. Finally, even if the Information does not categorically state that Escalante was being charged with child abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, he may still be convicted for the said crime. It is doctrinal that it is not the title of the complaint or information which is controlling but the recital of facts contained therein. CHRISTOPHER FIANZA A.K.A. "TOPEL," v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 218592. August 2, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. In instances where the child subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below twelve (12) years of age, the offender should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. FACTS: Fianza was charged with 2 counts of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.Sometime in July 2010,AAA, who was then 11 years old, was called by Fianza to his house and thereupon, was asked to wash his clothes. After AAA was finished with the laundry, Fianza asked her to go with Page 165 of 233

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him to the kamalig. Thereat, they proceeded to the second floor where Fianza removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to hold his penis and masturbate him. After ejaculating, Fianza put on his clothes, and gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went home. This was repeated on November 30, 2010. After the second incident, AAA related the matter to her cousin, CCC,who, in turn, told BBB,AAA's mother, who reported the matter to the police. ISSUE: Whether or not it is ppropriate to correct the appellation of the crime with which Fianza was charged to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. RULING: YES. The Court deems it appropriate to correct the appellation of the crime with which Fianza was charged to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC considering that the victim, AAA, was only 11 years old at the time of the incidents. In instances where the child subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below twelve (12) years of age, the offender should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently reads: SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: xxxx (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims [sic] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse thereunder. Accordingly, the Court finds the prosecution to have sufficiently established Fianza's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. ANTONIETA LUCIDO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 217764. August 7, 2017 LEONEN, J. Page 166 of 233

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The crime under Republic Act No. 7610 is malum prohibitum. Hence, the intent to debase, degrade, or demean the minor is not the defining mark. Any act of punishment that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child constitutes the offense. FACTS: The RTC found Antonieta Lucido guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. On or about the month of December, 2007 in Brgy. Atabay, Hilongos, Leyte, Lucido, did then and there, maliciously, willfully, unlawfully, and intentionally, beat with the use of a belt, pinched, and strangulated the child victim [AAA], who was then 8 years old, thereby inflicting physical injuries that affected the normal development of the said child victim. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was only slight physical injuries and not a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. RULING: NO. Lucido contends that the prosecution failed to prove "that the physical injuries inflicted on the child had prejudiced the child's development so as to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being." She cites the absence of an expert opinion validating scientifically that the acts complained of proximately caused the "prejudice inflicted upon the child's development." Furthermore, she argues that the prosecution was not able to prove the infliction of physical injuries on the child. These are without merits.It is a fact that when the incident happened, the victim was a child entitled to the protection extended by RA No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. Thus, petitioner was properly charged and found guilty of violating Article VI, Section 10(a) of RA No. 7610. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether it is habitual or not. Lucido’s acts fall squarely within this definition. Lucido further insists that the prosecution failed to prove that the acts complained of were prejudicial to the victim's development. This Court disagrees. Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes 4 distinct offenses, i.e. (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the element that the acts must be prejudicial to the child's development pertains only to the fourth offense. Here, AAA was maltreated by petitioner through repeated acts of strangulation, pinching, and beating. These are clearly extreme measures of punishment not commensurate with the discipline of an eight (8)-year-old child. Discipline is a loving response that seeks the positive welfare of a child. Petitioner's actions are diametrically opposite. They are abusive, causing not only physical injuries as evidenced by the physical marks on different parts of AAA's body and the weakness of her left knee upon walking, but also emotional trauma on her. Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence against child abuse and exploitation and to give a special protection to children from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, Page 167 of 233

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exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It must be stressed that the crime under Republic Act No. 7610 is malum prohibitum. Hence, the intent to debase, degrade, or demean the minor is not the defining mark. Any act of punishment that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child constitutes the offense. PEOPLE v. PADLAN G.R. No. 214880, September 6, 2017, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. Section 5 (b), Article III of RA No. 7160 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. FACTS: Amante Padlan was charged with two counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness, under Article 266-A and Art. 336, respectively and in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. AAA, the nine-year old victim from Meycauayan, testified Padlan twice put his penis in her vagina (September 27 and 28, 2005) and touched and rubbed her vagina on a separate incident (August 7, 2005. After complaining to her mother her vagina was feeling pain, charges were filed against Padlan. Padlan interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that he was buying vegetables in Nueva Ecija from 12 noon until 2AM in the morning for the charge of acts of lasciviousness. For the charges of rape, he claimed he collected payments from buyers of his vegetables until 12 midnight on the 27th and claimed he was merely resting and watching television on the day subsequent. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding him guilty despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilty beyond reasonable doubt RULING: Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force, threat, or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; (4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. AAA’s testimony was given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner despite her young age. The defense did not present any improper motive why AAA would impute a serious charge of rape against Padlan. Padlan’s alibi does not conclusively prove it was physically impossible to commit the crime after his return from Nueva Ecija. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. His alibis for two incidents of rape did not remove him from the locus criminis, as his testimony placed him at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity.

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Since the informations provided the crimes were committed in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, the penalty shall be modified. For the provisions of RA 7160 on sexual abuse to apply, the victim need not be a a child exploited in prostitution for money or profit. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides if the offense is punished under a special law, the maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same; nonetheless, when an offense is defined in a special law but the penalty is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would necessarily apply to the special law. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCIS URSUA Y BERNAL G.R. No. 218575, October 4, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. In case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5(b) of RA 7610,if the victim is under 12 years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under RPC 336 in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.” If the victim isexactly 12, or more than 12 but below 18, or is 18 years or older under special circumstances, the crime should be designated as "Sexual Abuse / Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610." FACTS: AAA was born on January 16, 1992and is accused-appellant Ursua's biological daughter. Together with her father and elder brother, BBB, she lived in a small house with one room, but without kitchen and living room (sala). Charges for qualified rapewere filed against Ursua in three Informations alleging sexual intercourse with one [AAA], 14 years old, a minor and his daughter, against her will and consent on 3 separate instances: January 17, 2006, and January 18, 2006 (morning and evening). Ursua denied having any carnal knowledge of AAA. RTC Pasig convicted Ursua of 3 counts of qualified rape. CA convicted accused of qualified rape and acts of lasciviousness in view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact of penile penetration with regard to the alleged rape that occurred in the evening of January 18, 2006. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of conviction should be reversed. RULING: There is no reason to reverse the judgment of conviction, but a modification of the penalties imposed, the damages awarded, and the nomenclature of the offense committed, is in order. Contrary to the CA's ruling that Ursua is, at the most, liable for 1 count of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 due to the prosecution's failure to prove the fact of carnal knowledge, we rule that the proper nomenclature of the offense is sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Page 169 of 233

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The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 are: 1. accused commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct 2. said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse 3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age First, accused-appellant's touching of AAA's breasts and vagina with lewd designs constitute lascivious. Second, appellant, as a father having moral ascendancy over his daughter, coerced AAA to engage in lascivious conduct, which is within the purview of sexual abuse. Third, AAA is below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Court takes this opportunity to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty: 1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty. 2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period. 3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

C. ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) ROBERTO P. FUENTES v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE J.: In other words, there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the other hand, "evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. FACTS: The accused was the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte and was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. It was alleged that he refused to issue a business permit to Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services (Triple A) owned by Fe Valenzuela, despite the payment of the renewal fees and obtaining other necessary permits. He accused Triple A of being involved in smuggling and drug trading causing the cessation of their business as ordered by the BOC. This caused for Triple A to incur spoilage of its goods and suspension of its operations from 2002 to 2006. It was only in 2007 that a permit was issued. Page 170 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. RULING: YES. The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officerdischarging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of.As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the crime, namely, through "manifest partiality", "evident bad faith", and/or "gross negligence." In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela's chandling operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of a Business Permit. As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said issuance. Here, it is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the prerequisites for the issuance of a Business Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained the prior approval of the other concerned officials of the LGU. Anent the third and last element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. EDWIN GRANADA REYES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PAUL ARCHES G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017, LEONEN, J.: FACTS: In 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao passed a Municipal Ordinance, prohibiting the storing, displaying, selling and blowing up of pyrotechnics products. In 2009, however, the Mayor of said town, approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market. Fire befell the public market due to the firecrackers. Thus, Paul Arches (Arches) filed a complaint agaist Petitioner in the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, questioning the issuance of permit to said vendors. The OMB found probable cause and filed the case before the Sandiganbayan. Page 171 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not the OMB was correct in finding probable cause for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. RULING: YES. As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.” A preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause.The existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. Based on opinion, reasonable belief, and the evidence on record, the Ombudsman found that the elements of the crime punishable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 existed. Petitioner and his co-respondents quo did not deny that they were public officers when the alleged acts were committed. There was "unwarranted benefit and advantage [given] to the firecracker vendors." The issuance of the mayor's permit was "tainted with bad faith" or gross inexcusable negligence. Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish whether probable cause exists. Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process requirements that must be present during trial.A person's rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law. Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-respondents. This Court has held that during preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman is not required to furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his corespondents.Thus, petitioner's non-receipt of Andres' affidavit did not violate his procedural rights during preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner was fully accorded due process in the preliminary investigation proceedings.

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CORAZON M. LACAP v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017, CAGUIOA, J.: In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or city, the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the required documents and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of failure to comply with the requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the application is compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act is a course of action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is motivated by personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory, and constitutes a violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. FACTS: Accused Corazon Lacap was indicted for violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. 3019, for having refused, after due demand, on the application of Fermina Santos for a business permit. Fermina owns a variety store in Pampanga. From 1975 to 1998, the Mayor of Masantol had been issuing her a Mayor's Permit. In 1999, however, accused, then the town Mayor, denied Fermina’s application for Mayor’s Permit because Fermin filed a complaint against the accused’s husband and compadre. As defense, the accused said that she denied the 1998 application due to lack of supporting documents. The Sandiganbayan convicted accused as charged. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Lacap is guilty of violation of Section 3(f), R.A. 3019. RULING: YES. The elements of the offense are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the said officer has neglected or has refused to act after due demand or request has been made on him; (3) reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and (4) such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another. As the then Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, who assumed office on June 30, 1998, Corazon was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged, a public officer. Accused Lacap acknowledged in open court her receipt of the letter sent to her by Atty. Calderon [of the Ombudsman’s Office] with attachments which included Fermina's application and other requirements. It is to be noted that Atty. Calderon wrote the Mayor, accused Lacap, and forwarded to the latter all the documents. In that letter, Atty. Calderon stated: “We hope that by this transmittal letter, action on Mrs. Santos' application will now be attended to with dispatch”. Accused Lacap did not reply, and instead, simply referred the matter to her lawyer with whom she allegedly consulted. Having received the documents and necessarily aware of what those documents are, the appreciation of and action on which being within her official competence as Mayor, it was incumbent upon, as it was expected of, accused Lacap to act promptly on the matter, given the Page 173 of 233

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request that the matter be acted upon with dispatch, and considering prior incidents of rejection of the same application allegedly due to incomplete requirements. The duty of accused Lacap as the public official concerned, to act is clear and unambiguous. The situation then obtaining did not call for any legal expertise. There was no need for accused Mayor Lacap to refer the matter to a lawyer for consultation. The Mayor simply had to check if the documents are complete and then act on it. It was obviously a case of refusal to act, and for which we find no justification, as none is extant in the records.

D. ANTI-PLUNDER ACT (R.A. No. 7080, as amended) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 220598 & 220593, April 18, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.: Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00, the identification in the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. FACTS: In 2016, the court granted the Demurrer to evidence of Petitioner dismissing the criminal case of plunder against her. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration averring that the dismissal was contrary to the Rules of Court, that the Court creates an additional element for Plunder which is not found in the law and that he evidence of the prosecution was not fully taken into account. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a need to identify the main plunderer and the personal benefit to the accused under RA 7080. RULING: YES. The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner.

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Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not expressly define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted to statutory construction. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

E. ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT (R.A. No. 9208) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY HIRANG y RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant. G.R. No. 223528, January 11, 2017, REYES, J.: The elements of trafficking in persons are: (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders";(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another"; and (3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." FACTS: Hirang, also known as Jojit and Jojie, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons, as defined and penalized under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9208, via an Amended Information that reads: That on or about June 27, 2007, at Taguig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruited, transported and provided in a large scale minors [AAA],317 years old, [BBB], 17 years old, [CCC], 14 years old and [DDD], 17 years old, for the purpose of prostitution by taking advantage of their vulnerability as young girls through promise of a good time or "gimik" in a disco and good food if they would simply accompany him in meeting and entertaining his Korean friends and to induce their full consent further promise them Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) to Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00) each afterwards when in truth and in fact peddled them for sexual favors and pleasure in consideration of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) each and engaged' their services in prostitution as in fact he already received Seven Thousand Pesos down payment from the Korean national who engaged their services. The private complainants are minor victims of Hirang in his prostitution activities. The following persons testified for the prosecution: victims DDD, AAA, CCC and BBB, International Justice Mission (UM) Investigators Alvin Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and Jeffrey Villagracia (Villagracia), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator (SI) Menandro Cariaga (Cariaga), SI Anson L. Chumacera and forensic chemist Loren J. Briones.

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When their group arrived at Chowking, Hirang talked to a Korean and then introduced the girls to him. The Korean handed money to Hirang and as the latter was counting it, NBI agents arrived at the scene and announced a raid. NBI agents arrested Hirang, while a social worker approached the girls and brought them to the NBI for their statements. The raid was conducted following a prior investigation conducted by IJM, a non-profit organization that renders legal services and is based in Washington, D.C. IJM's investigators Sarmiento and Villagracia gathered data on human trafficking in Metro Manila, after information that Hirang was selling minors for prostitution. Hirang was introduced by a confidential informant to Villagracia, who posed as a travel agency employee having Korean friends. Villagracia claimed to have Korean friends as they knew Hirang to be transacting only with foreign customers. The RTC and CA found Hirang guilty of the crime charged Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Hirang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. RULING: YES. The following are the elements of trafficking in persons: (1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders";(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another"; and (3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the minor victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age. The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial.The young victims themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were lured by Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls to become victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus, joined him on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes. Police authorities personally, witnessed Hirang's unlawful activity, as they conducted the entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted with the supposed customers and received payment therefor. In this case, it was established during trial that Hirang had been recruiting and deploying young girls for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel approached him for girls precisely because of his illicit activities. Also, Hirang was not first approached for prostitutes by police or government authorities, but by investigators of IJM, which is a non-profit and non-governmental organization. Page 176 of 233

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IJM only sought coordination with the police officers after Hirang, Sarmiento and Villagracia had determined to meet on June 27, 2007 for the transaction with the purported Korean customers. Clearly, there could be no instigation by officers, as barred by law, to speak of. Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police officers to inform Hirang of the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no sufficient ground for the Court to acquit him. The CA correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by his voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue.

F. BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. Blg. 22) IVY LIM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND BLUE PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC. G.R. No. 224979, December 13, 2017, Second Division, PERALTA, J. In B.P. 22 cases, the material date is the date of issuance of the checks and not those when the checks were signed and/or delivered. FACTS: Private respondent granted petitioner a loan amounting to P1,149,500.00 as evidenced by a promissory note. Petitioner signed as a co-maker of her sister. To guarantee this obligation, petitioner issued 11 checks, each with a value of P67,617.65. 10 of these 11 checks were subsequently dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Private respondent sent petitioner demand letters to no avail. Petitioner was finally sent a final demand letter dated June 8, 2005 which she supposedly received as evidenced by her signature in the registry receipt. For failing to pay the amount of the checks, petitioner was charged with 11 counts of violation of B.P. 22. Petitioner raised the following defenses: 1) she could not have signed the checks in question because she was abroad during that time, 2) private respondent had no permit to conduct financing business, 3) the checks were used for illegal trafficking, and 4) there was no consideration for the checks. The MeTC found petitioner guilty of 10 counts of violation of B.P. 22. The RTC and the CA affirmed the conviction. Lim challenges the decision on the ground that the checks were unauthenticated and could not have been issued by her as she was out of the country during the time these were supposedly signed. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. 22. RULING: What is material in B.P. Blg. 22 cases is the date of issuance of the checks which appear on their face, and not the exact date of the delivery or signing thereof. This can be gleaned from the fact that the offenses punished in the said law are not committed if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from date of issue. Page 177 of 233

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In this case, the court did not give credence to petitioner’s claim that she did not sign the checks in question. For one, the parties admitted that whenever the court refers to the name of Ivy Lim, the name pertains to the accused, and stipulated on the existence and due execution of the 11 checks. These checks were also presented and identified during trial and petitioner did not deny that the signature on the 11 checks were hers nor claim that her signatures thereon were forged. As regards her alibi, the court affirmed the MeTC ruling that the fact that the checks were issued is not an issue, as the existence of the checks and signatures of the accused on these checks are uncontroverted.

G. COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT (R.A. No. 9165) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONIR JAAFAR y TAMBUYONG G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017, LEONEN, J.: While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. FACTS: The police conducted a buy-bust operation at Jaafar's house. Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at the door of his house and asked them if they were buying shabu. PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked ₱500.00 bill. Jaafar called for Gani inside the house. Gani came out and handed Jaafar a sachet containing shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to PO1 Look, who immediately lit a cigarette-the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust team. Jaafar was arrested. Immediately after the arrest, PO1 Look marked the confiscated sachet of shabu with his initials. He then turned over the sachet and the marked ₱500.00 bill to their team leader, SPO4 Morales. The buy-bust team brought Jaafar and Gani to the police station for investigation. Chief Larubis prepared a letter-request addressed to forensic chemist Melvin Manuel for the examination of the contents of the sachet. Upon examination, the contents tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Jaafar filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and raised the following errors: (1) the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the arresting team violated the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jaafar argued that the shabu was not formally offered as evidence during trial; rather, it was only presented during the hearing for the application for bail. Hence, the Regional Trial Court should not have considered the shabu as evidence. Jaafar further argued that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody of the shabu allegedly obtained from him. He pointed out that the police officers neither photographed nor inventoried the seized shabu sachet and emphasized that there were no representatives from the media and the Department of Justice as well as an elected public official to witness the proceedings. ISSUE: Page 178 of 233

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Whether or not the guilt of accused appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. RULING: NO.This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the manner by which law enforcement officers should handle seized dangerous drugs: SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), ·and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied) The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 further provide: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by Page 179 of 233

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the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied) While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant noncompliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Although the buy-bust team marked and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do not show that the seized sachet had been photographed. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the physical inventory was done in the presence of accusedappellant or his representative, representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, and an elected public official. The buy-bust team had an entire day within which to coordinate with the persons required by law to be present during the physical inventory of the seized drugs. The Chief of Police received the confidential tip early in the moming. He immediately instructed SP04 Morales to form a buy-bust team and coordinate with agents from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. The buy-bust team had ample time to contact an elected public official and representatives from the media and the Department of Justice. The prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buybust operation had been carefully planned by narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the prosecution relied heavily on the exception to the chain of custody rule. Worse, the prosecution did not even offer any explanation on why they failed to comply with what was mandated under the law. Indeed, if the police authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust operation, then there was no reason for them to neglect such important requirements. They cannot feign ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Police officers are presumed and are required to know the laws they are charged with executing. This Court cannot merely gloss over the glaring procedural lapses committed by the police officers, especially when what had been allegedly seized from accused-appellant was only 0.0604 grams of shabu. Recent cases have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of seized drugs in the chain of custody when only a miniscule amount of drugs had been allegedly seized from the accused. Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 casts doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. KUSAIN AMIN y AMPUAN, a.k.a. "Cocoy,", Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 215942, January 18, 2017, SERENO, CJ.: While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. FACTS: Accused-appellant Cocoy was charged under the following Information: That on January 2, 2004, at 5:40 p.m. more or less, at Landless, Colrai, Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without authority of law, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have in his possession custody and control one (1) small heated-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance locally known as shabu with approx. weight of 0.09 gram valued to more or less P100 and sold it to a poseur-buyer of PNP-CDO for a consideration of P100.00 marked money one (1) pc one hundred pesos bill with serial number FA246643, well knowing it to be a dangerous drug. Cocoy was convicted. On appeal, he argued that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since the poseur buyer was not presented as witness. ISSUE: Whether or not the presentation of the poseur buyer is necessary for Cocoy to be convicted. RULING: YES.While prior coordination with the PDEA is not necessary to make a buy-bust operation valid, we are constrained to reverse the findings of the CA because the non-presentation of the poseurbuyer is fatal to the cause of the prosecution. In People v. Andaya, the importance of presenting the poseur-buyer's testimony before the trial court was underscored by the Court in this wise: The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person. The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence. Page 181 of 233

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In the same case, we emphasized that "[t]here would have been no issue against [the buy-bust operation], except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction." It was even noted in that case that the "members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur-buyer." While there is a "need to hide [the poseur-buyers] identit[ies] and preserve their invaluable service to the police," this consideration cannot be applied to this case, because, as in Andaya, the "poseurbuyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate [the accused]." The testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO2 Bagas, SPO2 Alvior, Jr., SPO2 Dacara, and P/Insp. Ramas (who was 10 meters away) cannot be considered as eyewitness accounts of the illegal sale. There was no indication that they directly saw an illegal drug being sold to the poseur-buyer. In People v. Guzon, we held that "the police officer, who admitted that he was seven (7) to eight (8) meters away from where the actual transaction took place, could not be deemed an eyewitness to the crime." PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG, AccusedAppellant G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.: In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." FACTS: Appellant Salim Ismael was charged with selling and possession of shabu. According to him, on August 25, 2003, he went to a store to buy cellphone load so that he could call his wife. After buying the cellphone load, he went back to his house on board a sikad-sikad, a bicycle-driven vehicle with a sidecar. When he was about 160 meters away from the Muslim cemetery in Barangay Talabaan, he was arrested by five persons in civilian attire who introduced themselves as police officers. The police officers conducted a search on his person but did not find any dangerous dn1gs. Thereafter, he was brought to Culianan Police Station where he was detained for two days. Appellant insisted that he never sold shabu to the police officers who arrested him. He said that the first time he saw the alleged shabu was when it was presented before the trial court. He denied that the police officers had confiscated a cellular phone from him. He also asserted that all these police officers took away from him was his money and that he had never met the said police officers prior to his arrest. ISSUE: Page 182 of 233

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Whether or not appellant should be convicted. RULING: NO. In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."After a careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in violation of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. The testimony of SPO l Rodriguez on the chain of custody of the seized drugs leaves much to be desired. It is evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain when he failed to mark the sachet' of shabu immediately upon seizing them from the appellant. According to SPO1 Rodriguez, after finding sachets of shabu in appellant's possession, he turned the drugs over to the desk officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did not even explain why he failed to mark or why he could not have marked the seized items immediately upon confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving the seized items from SPO1 Rodriguez, in turn handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk officer was not presented in court thereby creating another break in the chain of custody. Again, no explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer or why he himself did not mark the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly from the desk officer, of the seized chugs that the same were marked at the police station. This means that from the time the drugs were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan marked the same, there was already a significant gap in the chain of custody. Because of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs presented as evidence in the trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession. SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized drugs immediately after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations were given why markings were not immediately made. At this stage in the chain, there was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt." Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case. The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs were likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break in the chain tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity of the seized drugs became highly questionable.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. ADAL TON ARCE y CAMARGO G.R. No. 217979, February 22, 2017, SERENO, CJ.: For both offenses (illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana), it is crucial that the prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way that their integrity is well preserved from the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court. FACTS: Adalton Arce was arrested for illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana after a buy-bust operation, with PO1 Maquinta acting as a poseur-buyer. Upon receiving the marked money, Arce took one matchbox and gave it to Maquinta. After verifying that the contents of the matchbox were dried marijuana leaves, stalks, and seeds, Maquinta arrested Arce. After placing Arce under arrest, Maquinta conducted a body search, and found seven more matchboxes containing marijuana. Maquinta also recovered the P100 marked bill and money of different denominations totalling to an amount of ₱435.00. Maquinta then marked the first matchbox, the subject of the buy-bust operation, with "ACA-BB 08/05/10", while the seven other matchboxes recovered from the body search, with ''ACA-Pl 08/05/10" to "ACA-P7 08/05/10". As PO2 Jonathan Abucayon was making inventory of all the confiscated items in the presence of representatives of the media, the Department of Justice [DOJ], the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency [PDEA], and an elected barangay official, Maquinta took several photographs of the evidence. In his defense, Arce denied having sold and possessed marijuana. He alleged that he was arrested by Maquinta when he was sitting and drinking at the dike. He was then subjected to a body search and his money was confiscated. The trial court found Arce guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9I65. Arce appealed that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crimes charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not Arce is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana. RULING: YES. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller; (2) the object and the consideration; and (3) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, in a prosecution for the illegal possession of marijuana, the following elements must be proved: (1) that the accused was in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that the drug possession was not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. For both offenses, it is crucial that the prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way that their integrity is well preserved - from the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court. The fact that the substance said to Page 184 of 233

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have been illegally sold or possessed was the very same substance offered in court as exhibit must be established. The evidence presented by the prosecution convincingly establishes beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Arce and the law enforcers' compliance with the rule on the preservation of the integrity of the seized dangerous drugs. The records also reveal that there was compliance with the rule on the preservation of the integrity of the confiscated items allegedly sold and possessed by Arce. In the instant case, when accused-appellant was arrested for selling one matchbox of marijuana, Maquinta marked the item "ACA-BB/ 08/05/10." Upon arrest, accused-appellant was also found to be in possession of 7 more matchboxes of marijuana. For illegal possession of the illegal drug, he was again arrested by PO1 Maquinta. The latter also immediately marked the seized items "ACA-Pl 08/05/10" to "ACA-P7 08/05/10." After marking them, PO1 Maquinta made an inventory and took photographs of the items in the presence of the accused and the representatives of the media, the DOJ, and PDEA, as well as a barangay official. The Certificate of Inventory was thereafter signed by PO1 Maquinta, along with PO1 Buquiran and the witnesses. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.: When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in the confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation, the State has the obligation to credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is doubtful, and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. FACTS: The accused-appellant Eddie Barte was charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu to a police officerposeur buyer during a buy-bust operation. At the target area, P02 Cabatingan met with Barte, and informed the latter that he wanted to buy shabu. Upon Barte’s assent to his offer, P02 Cabatingan handed the buybust money to him, and in turn the latter gave to him a small sachet with white colored contents. P02 Cabatingan then gave the pre-arranged signal by touching his head. The other officers rushed forward and identified themselves to Barte as policemen. P02 Cabatingan identified the sachet marked "EBM", which contained the white substance. He confirmed the request for laboratory examination. He delivered the confiscated substance, along with the request, to the crime laboratory, which later on found the substance to be positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The RTC rendered its decision convicting him as charged. The trial court stated that although no evidence has been produced to prove compliance of the procedure under Section 21, Article II of the new law on physical inventory, it believes that it is not fatal to the State's cause on the validity of the entrapment. The same was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of Eddie Barte for the crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Page 185 of 233

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RULING: NO. The non-compliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal because it cast doubt on the integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation. It put into serious question whether the sachet of shabu had really come from Barte and whether the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from Barte at the time of the arrest. Testimonies provided by the police officers and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties did not override the non-compliance with the procedural safeguards instituted by our laws. Indeed, anything short of observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what the law required meant that the former did not regularly perform their duties. The presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties then became inapplicable. As such, the evidence of the State did not overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant. Although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements would not automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only when there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Any departure from the prescribed procedure must then still be reasonably justified, and must further be shown not to have affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Otherwise, the non-compliance constitutes an irregularity, a red flag, so to speak, that cast reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti. The Supreme Court convicts the accused only when his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. Conformably with this standard, the Court is mandated as an appellate court to sift the records and search for every error, though unassigned in the appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is warranted, and to correct every error that the lower court has committed in finding guilt against the accused. In this instance, therefore, the Court is not limited to the assigned errors, but can consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision on grounds other than those the parties raised as errors. It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are "susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion." The high possibility of abuse was precisely the reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as a means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent from abuse and violation of their rights but also guide the law enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the evidence to be presented in court. In the prosecution of the crime of selling a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven, to wit: (1) the identities of the buyer, seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, the essential requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs that must be established are the following, namely: (1) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug. Inasmuch as the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of both offenses, its identity and integrity must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This means that on top of the elements of possession or · illegal sale, the fact that the substance possessed or illegally sold Page 186 of 233

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was the very substance presented in court must be established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a conviction. The prosecution must account for each link in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure from the accused unti it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. The chain of custody as an important procedural safeguard is defined under Section l (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, as follows: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time or seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. As explained in Malillin v. People, the chain of custody, as a method of authenticating evidence, requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering - without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO G.R. No. 225965 March 13, 2017,PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: The plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. FACTS: Macapundag was charged by violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. On the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila Puyat Macapundag, during a buy bust operation, allegedly sold and delivered to PO3 GEORGE ARDEDON who posed, as buyer, EPHEDRINE, a Page 187 of 233

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dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore. Moreover, he was caught with three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing EPHEDRINE in his possession, custody and control. When subjected for laboratory examination, it gave positive result to the tests of Ephedrine, a dangerous drug. In his defense, Macapundag denied the charges against him. He testified that he was arrested on March 12, 2009, and not on March 14, 2009 as alleged by the prosecution. At around noon of the said date, he claimed that he was just sitting in his house when three (3) armed men suddenly entered and looked for a certain "Rei." He told them that "Rei" lived in the other house, but one of the men held and handcuffed him. He was then brought to the Sangandaan Police Station where he was detained in a small cell. Later, he was asked to call some relatives. When he replied that he only has his daughter, SPO 1 Victoriano hit him on the chest. After a few days, the police demanded ₱50,000.00 from Macapundag's daughter for his release. When he told them that he did not have that amount, he was hit again. On March 15, 2009, he was brought to the house of the fiscal for inquest. The RTC found Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively, finding that all the necessary elements thereof have been proven. The RTC further observed that the prosecution was able to demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody over the seized items. Meanwhile, the RTC gave no credence to the latter's defenses of denial and alibi in light of his positive identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of their duties. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Macapundag's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld. RULING: NO. Macapundag prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Particularly, he claims that they did not make any inventory and failed to take pictures of the confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of his arrest. There was also no justification given as to why they failed to comply with these requirements of law. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twentyfour (24) hours from confiscation for examination. The prosecution did not even bother to explain why the inventory and photograph of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the police station, as required by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a representative from the DOJ, the media and an elected public official to witness the inventory and receive copies Page 188 of 233

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of the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and photographs of the seized items. Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. MEDEL CORONEL y SANTILLAN, RON ALDO PERMEJO y ABARQUEZ, NESTOR VILLAFUERTE y SAPIN and JOANNE OLIVAREZ y RAMOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 214536 March 13, 2017,LEONEN, J.: Before a person may be convicted under Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165, it must be shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited the place despite this knowledge. FACTS: A PDEA team implemented a search warrant covering a building at No. I 734 F. Mufioz Street, Tramo Street, Barangay 43, Zone 6, Pasay City. Three (3) persons, identified as Olivarez, Erlinda Fetalino, and Benjie Guday, were found inside the subject building. Coronel, Permejo, and Villafuerte were apprehended after trying to escape out of the window. During the search, the team recovered, among others, transparent plastic sachets, aluminium foils, containers of white crystalline substance and white powdery residue, disposable lighters, improvised plastic scoops, a total amount of ₱580.00 in assorted bills, and ₱165.00 in coins. They were arrested and apprised of their constitutional rights. The confiscated items were also inventoried, photographed, and marked in their presence, as well as in the presence of the Barangay officials and the Department of Justice and media representatives. The arrested suspects were brought to the PDEA Headquarters for investigation and mandatory drug testing, together with the seized objects, one of which was identified as shabu. Coronel, Villafuerte, Permejo, and Olivarez tested positive for shabu. The RTC and CA found Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and Olivarez (accused) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Sections 7 and 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. The SC denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165. RULING: NO. On Motion for Reconsideration, the SC found that the prosecution failed to establish that the accused knowingly visited a drug den. Before a person may be convicted under Section 7, it must be Page 189 of 233

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shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited the place despite this knowledge. The prosecution established that petitioners knew that the place was a drug den, based solely on the positive drug test results. True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs some time before their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or how long the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no basis to assume that petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest, and thus, at the location of the arrest. Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is not sufficient to show that they were aware of the nature of the suspected drug den before visiting it, absent any other circumstantial evidence. There was no attempt to show that petitioners knew the nature of the alleged drug den, or even that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to be in possession of any drugs. When petitioners were arrested, nobody was found "in the act of using, selling or buying illegal drugs, nor packaging nor hiding nor transporting the same." There were no acts alleged or evidence found, which would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the place as a drug den. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ANASTACIO HEMENTIZA y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 227398, March 22, 2017, MENDOZA, J.: The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. FACTS: On May 25, 2003, at around 1:15 o'clock in the morning, Palconit, SP02 Gerry Abalos (Abalos), P02 Manuel Bayeng (Bayeng), and P03 Russel Medina (Medina), conducted a buy-bust operation at Sitio Lower Sto. Nifio, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. A confidential informant told them that a certain Anastacio was peddling drugs in the area. A buy-bust team was formed with Abalos as the team leader and Palconit as the poseur-buyer. Abalos marked two (2) ₱100.00 bills for the operation. After briefing and coordination with the local police, the team was dispatched to Barangay Sta. Cruz. Upon arrival, the informant pointed to their target person. Palconit approached accused-appellant and asked if he could buy shabu. After receiving the marked money, accused-appellant handed to Palconit one (1) small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. At that point, Palconit scratched his head to signal that the sale was consummated, and the rest of the team rushed to the scene. Abalos introduced themselves as police officers and immediately frisked accused-appellant. Abalos recovered the marked money and two (2) other plastic sachets containing shabu from the left pocket of accused-appellant's pants. Thereafter, accused-appellant and the seized items were brought to the PDEA Office in Barangay San Roque, Antipolo City. The seized items were turned over to the case investigator who prepared the corresponding request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, Palconit brought the seized items to the crime laboratory. After Page 190 of 233

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examination, Fabros issued a report confirming that the crystalline substance in the sachets were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted. RULING: NO. The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial compliance by the apprehending officers with the safeguards provided by R.A. No. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. To begin with, the records are bereft of any showing that an inventory of the seized items was made. Neither does it appear on record that the apprehending team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. Further, People v. Dahil restated the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. First Link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the Apprehending Officer In this case, Palconit claimed that he had placed his initials on the seized items. Based on his testimony, it is clear that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure; instead, the markings were only placed at the PDEA office, for which the prosecution did not offer any justifiable reason. Even if the Court glosses over this lapse, still, it could not be said that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. For one, neither in the direct examination nor in the cross-examination of Palconit was it mentioned that the markings were made in the presence of accused-appellant or his representatives. He merely testified that he placed the markings at the PDEA office, without any allusion to the identities of the persons who were present when he did the markings. To make matters worse, from the place of seizure to the PDEA office, the seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit. The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction. While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Page 191 of 233

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presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to the Investigating Officer Here, the identity of the investigating officer was unknown. It is unlikely that Palconit did not know the officer to whom he supposedly turned over the seized drugs. Surely, this investigating officer worked with him in the same office. Indeed, the apprehending officer and investigating officer might be one and the same person. If that was the case, however, then there would have been no need to say that Palconit turned over the seized items to the investigator. He could have simply said that he was the one who conducted the investigation and prepared the necessary documents for the filing of a criminal case against accused-appellant. Similarly, in People v. Nandi, where the apprehending officer was unable to identify the investigating officer to whom he turned over the seized items, the Court held that such circumstance, when taken in light of the several other lapses in the chain of custody that attend the case, raises doubts as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs had been preserved. Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to the Forensic Chemist From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the substance. In this case, it was uncertain who received the seized items when it was brought to the forensic laboratory. Palconit testified that he placed the markings on the sachets upon arrival at the office. Then, he turned over the seized items to the investigator. In the latter part of his testimony, however, he said that after placing the markings, he brought the illegal drugs to the crime laboratory. The circumstances surrounding the custody of the illegal drugs, from the time they were brought to the PDEA office up to their turnover to the forensic laboratory, are all muddled. In People v. Beran, the investigator of the case claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but there was no showing who was the laboratory technician who received the drug from him. The Court noted that there was serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item had not been fatally compromised. Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic Chemist to the Court In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence as to how the illegal drugs were brought to court. Fabros merely testified that she made a report confirming that the substance contained in the sachets brought to her was positive for shabu. The saving clause in Section 21, IRR of R.A. No. 9165 fails to remedy the lapses and save the prosecution's case. In People v. Garcia, the Court stated that "the saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter cited justifiable grounds." Failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. Page 192 of 233

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In fine, the Court holds that the totality of the evidence presented does not support a finding of guilt with the certainty that criminal cases require. The procedural lapses committed by the apprehending team show glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a reasonable doubt on whether the shabu seized from accused-appellant was the same shabu that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. Hence, the corpus delicti has not been adequately proved. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES, Accused-Appellant G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.: In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial importance must be given to "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." FACTS: PI Barber of the PNP Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to conduct a surveillance on appellant Myrna Gayoso after receiving several reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, SP03 De Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving him ₱200.00 marked money for the operation. On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of appellant and asked her if they could buy shabu. The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message about the successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his team of police officers who were positioned 100 meters away dashed towards the house of appellant. He also instructed SP03 De Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness the search of the house. When he arrived together with a ko,gawad and a media representative, SP03 Salamida read the search warrant to appellant. During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress. SP03 De Dios took it from SP04 Bandoy and gave it to SP03 Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu inside, in addition to the four sachets of shabu found inside the right pocket of the short pants of appellant. The search of the house also revealed several drug paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was prepared and the same was signed by the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy, and appellant. The sachets of shabu were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the examination verified that the seized sachets contained shabu. Appellant argued among others that: (1) The "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers was not valid since she was induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios, and the confidential informant to sell the seized shabu. (2) The chain of custody of evidence was not established. ISSUE: Page 193 of 233

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Whether or not the contentions of appellant are meritorious. RULING: Partly meritorious. There was no instigation. The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It does not amount to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him. Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as reference. The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation." In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station,28 no evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings. While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures. Here, the police officers secured a search warrant prior to their operation. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However, the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody. The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in the police station constitutes the second link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court takes note that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom the seized items were turned over at the police station. While SP03 Salamida was identified as the property custodian of the police station, this does not necessarily mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is nothing in the records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance considering that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented during trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of custody is missing. Page 194 of 233

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The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist in the crime laboratory is the third link in the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned over by PI Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it was handled therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were placed at the PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the crime laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police officer who delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO1 Asis, but he was not presented to testify that the shabu delivered to the crime laboratory was the same shabu confiscated from appellant. There is a third break in the chain of custody. Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI Cruto. His testimony is not clear and positive since he failed to assert that the alleged packs of chemical substance presented for laboratory examination and tested positive for shabu were the very same substance allegedly recovered from appellant. His testimony was limited to the result of the examination he conducted and not on the source of the substance. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICHARD TRIPOLI AND ROMULO IMPAS G.R. No. 207001, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the illegal drugs inadmissible in evidence. FACTS: A team of police from the Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Branch of Cebu City Police, conducted a buy bust operation in Queensland Motel. The police was able to apprehend the two accused with two plastic sachets of shabu and the marked money. The plastic sachets were marked and delivered to the PNP crime laboratory for testing. According to the defense, they were working as an asset for the police and were only instructed to get the marked money and wait for the seller of the shabu. The RTC and the CA convicted the two for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5 of RA 9165. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of illegal sale of shabu. RULING: YES. The essential elements for illegal sale of shabu are as follows: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction. These elements are present in this case. The presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit Page 195 of 233

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arrested through his efforts. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded.There was, therefore, no need for the presentation of the informant since the other witnesses presented had personal knowledge of the transaction as well. The prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.” In this case, accused-appellants point to the police officers' failure to mark the evidence at the crime scene, lack of inventory and photographs as affecting the integrity of the chain of custody. However, such failure does not, by itself, void the arrest of the accused-appellants or impair the integrity of the chain of custody. Non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly" the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCIAL PARDILLO G.R. No. 219590, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Jurisprudence is replete with cases indicating that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality, it is not, as it is almost always, impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS: A group of police officers who were conducting a roving patrol, spotted the accused while holding two piece of white transparent sachets. When the police approached him, he merely said that somebody asked him to buy shabu. The accused was charged with violation of Sec. 11 of RA 9165, with which the RTC and the CA convicted him. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165. RULING: YES. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, substantial compliance with the legal requirement on the handling of the seized item is sufficient. This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly Page 196 of 233

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comply with the requirement under Section 21 of RA 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items inadmissible in evidence. Jurisprudence is replete with cases indicating that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality, it is not, as it is almost always, impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. As the CA held, SPO 1 Aparis testified in a clear and categorical manner regarding the seizure, custody, and handling of the two heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu. To recall, SPO 1 Aparis marked the items with "MMP I" and "MMP2" upon their arrival at the police station. SPO 1 Aparis then prepared a request for laboratory examination.In a Chemistry Report issued by Foreign Chemist Salinas, the seized items were identified by their markings and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. It cannot be overemphasized that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. STEPHAN CABILES G.R. No. 220758, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: The direct account of law enforcement officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. Unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. FACTS: The accused was charged with violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 or illegal sale of drugs, in this case, shabu. A group of police officers conducted a buy bust operation where the accused was apprehended by the poseur buyer while buying a sachet of shabu and giving him the 200 pesos marked money. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of illegal sale of drugs. RULING: YES.In a prosecμtion for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the following elements must be duly established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and the consideration; and, (2) the delivery of the thing· sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseurbuyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. Here, the prosecution submitted evidence that duly established the elements of illegal sale of shabu. It was positively identified that the accused-appellant was the seller of the seized illegal substance which turned out to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Page 197 of 233

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Accused-appellant sold and delivered the drug for PhP 200.00 to POI Piano. The act of accused appellant of handing over the shabu after receiving the PhP 200.00 buy-bust money handed by POI Piano, is sufficient to consummate the sale of illegal drugs. Verily, all the elements of the sale of illegal drugs were established to warrant accused-appellant's conviction. Moreover, the Court finds no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The testimonies of PO1 Piano and SP04 Gonzales established beyond reasonable doubt accused appellant's culpability.It should be noted that "unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any improper motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit." Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE CUTARA G.R. No. 224300, June 7, 2017, TIJAM, J.: Admittedly, a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS: Acting on a tip of illegal sale of shabu, a group of police officers of Western Police District formed a team to conduct a buy bust operation. When the accused was approached by poseur buyer and asked for shabu, he handed a transparent sachet and pocketed the marked money of 200 pesos. Thereafter, the police introduced himself and apprehended the accused. On his part, the accused claims that he was at home with his wife, when 6 armed men entered and searched their house. When they found nothing, they handcuffed him and brought him to the police station where they demanded 200,000 from him in exchange for his freedom. He was charged with sale of illegal drugs. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of selling illegal drugs. RULING: YES. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer andthe seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the deliveryof the thing sold and its payment. The prosecution must also prove theillegal sale of the dangerous drugs and present the corpus delicti in court asevidence. In this case, the prosecution duly established the following: (1) the identity of the buyer - P03 Marcial, the seller - accused-appellant, the object of the sale - one sachet of shabu which is an illegal drug, and the consideration - the two pieces of marked two hundred peso bills; and (2) P03 Marcial positively identified accused-appellant as the one who transacted and sold the shabu to him in exchange for the marked money. He caught accused-appellant in flagrante delicto selling the shabu during a buy bust operation. The seized item was sent to the crime laboratory and yielded positive results for presence of a dangerous drug. The seized sachet of shabu was likewise presented in court with the proper identification by P03 Marcial. Evidently, what determines ifthere was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. Evidently, the records of the case showed that the prosecution successfully established the links in the chain of custody over the seized sachet of shabu, from the time the poseur-buyer seized the drugs, to the time it was brought to the PDEA office, then to the crime laboratory for testing, until the time the same was offered in evidence before the court. Lastly, Cutara failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption that the buy-bust team regularly performed their duties. Except for his bare allegation of denial, he has not Page 199 of 233

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ascribed any improper motive on the part of the police officers as to why the latter would falsely accuse him of selling shabu that would cause him to be imprisoned for life. Hence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the preservation of the integrity. and the evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs deserve full faith and credit. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILTON ALACDIS AKA WELTON, ET.AL. G.R. No. 220022, June 19, 2017, TIJAM, J.: In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction. FACTS: The accused with 2 others were charged with illegal sale, delivery and transport of 65 bricks of dried marijuana leaves. They were apprehended as a result of an entrapment operation by PDEA where a police officer initially pretended to be buying marijuana and asked for a sample to ensure that it was of good quality. After the delivery of the 2 kilos, the poseur-buyer asked to buy 107 kilos of the same. At the Rizal Park, where they intended to deliver the goods, the police gave the marked money and signalled to his team to apprehend the accused. In his appeal, the accused points out that there was no proof that he acted in conspiracy with the other accused and that to sustain a conviction for delivery of drugs there must intent and knowledge of the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged. RULING: Partly. Only guilty of Illegal delivery and transportation. In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction. Inarguably, consideration/payment is one of the essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, without which, accused-appellant's conviction for said crime cannot stand. In this case, the sale of the dangerous drugs cannot be said to have been consummated because the accused-appellant did not receive consideration. He was arrested immediately after the box containing the marijuana bricks were opened for SP02 Agbayani. As it is, we cannot agree with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that accused-appellant is liable for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Be that as it may, accused-appellant is not absolved of criminal liability and may still be held liable under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the delivery and transport of marijuana. To sustain a conviction for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that: (1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) suchdelivery is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration. Page 200 of 233

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It is clear from the foregoing that the accused-appellant knew that he was delivering marijuana to SP02 Agbayani, who testified as to the matter. Accused-appellant also was unable to prove that he had the authority to possess or deliver the marijuana. The sheer volume of marijuana found also indicates the intent to deliver the same.Here, accused-appellant was found in possession of almost 110 kilos of marijuana. That, in itself, is a clear indicia of one's purpose and intent to sell, distribute, and transport the same Based on the charges against and the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery and transportation of marijuana under Article II, Section 5 of RA 9165. KEVIN BELMONTE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 224143, June 28, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Verily, under varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. FACTS: Two separate informations were filed against the accused with Mark Gumba and Billy Costales, charging them of violation of Section 5 and Section 11 of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) received information that a certain “Mac-mac”, later identified as Gumba, was selling Marijuana. A buy-bust operation was planned where the PDEA agent will be the poseur-buyer. Four P500 peso bills were prepared as marked money. During the operation, the accused with his two other companions handed a bundle suspected to be dried marijuana leaves. Believing that it was marijuana, the poseur-buyer declared that they were PDEA agents and apprehended the accused, however, Costales managed to escape with the marked money. When the barangay officials came, the black bag that they carried was opened and 4 more bricks of dried marijuana were found. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of violation of Sec. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. RULING: YES. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.In this relation, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of the marijuana confiscated from the accused were preserved, and any deviation from the chain of custody procedure was adequately justified.Records bear that the bricks and Page 201 of 233

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bundle of marijuana confiscated from the accused were immediately marked, photographed, and inventoried upon the arrest of Belmonte and Gumba, and that the markings were done by Ominga herself who placed her initials, signature, and the date of confiscation thereat in the presence of Belmonte, Gumba, the back-up officers from the PDEA and the PNP, and the Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Gabriel. Verily, under varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In People v. Rebotazo, the Court held that so long as this requirement is met, as in this case, non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated inadmissible. Furthermore, the Court also agrees with the finding that there was conspiracy among the accused. As aptly observed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, conspiracy among them is evident as Belmonte even asked ifOminga and her team were the buyers. Indeed, there is no other explanation for Belmonte's question aside from the fact that he knew why they were there, i.e., for the sale of the marijuana. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFERSON DEL MUNDO AND MITOS LACSON-DEL MUNDO G.R. No. 208095, September 20, 2017, Third Division, MARTIRES, J.: In prosecuting both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the identity of said drugs. FACTS: Jefferson Del Mundo was charged of illegal sale of 0.03 gram of shabu and illegal possession of 0.14 gram of shabu. Mitos Lacson-Del Mundo was likewise charged of illegal sale of 0.03 gram of shabu. PO3 Rodil acted as poseur-buyer. PO3 Rodil handed to Mitos the marked money. Mitos called Jefferson and asked him to give her two-peso worth of shabu. Jefferson then handed to PO3 Rodil a plastic sachet containing shabu. PO3 Rodil then immediately apprehended Mitos. Meanwhile, upon getting the signal, SPO2 Espiritu and SPO1 Buhay immediately rushed to Jefferson but he ran inside their house. The police officers caught Jefferson inside the toilet where he was seen throwing something into the toilet bowl. Using a broomstick, the police officers retrieved four plastic sachets containing shabu from the toilet bowl. SPO2 Espiritu then turned these over to PO3 Rodil. At the police station, the seized items were photographed, inventoried, and marked by PO3 Rodil with her initials, in the presence of the accused-appellants, Romeo Gargullo, a barangay kagawad, and Nicanor Ocampo, Sr., the president of Kill Droga movement in the area. The plastic sachet seized by PO3 Rodil was marked with the initial "YEL" while the 4 plastic sachets recovered by SPO2 Espiritu were marked with the initials MDRJ, MDR2, MDR3, and MDR4. Letter-requests for laboratory examination were then prepared and delivered to the crime laboratory, together with the seized items, by PO3 Rodil. As defense, the accused invoked denial, frame-up, and planted evidence. The RTC convicted the accused as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Page 202 of 233

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Whether or not there was reasonable doubt on the identity of the drugs seized from the accused. RULING: YES. While the prosecution was able to present the inventory of the confiscated items, which was apparently prepared by PO3 Rodil, and attested to by Ocampo, Sr., of Kill Droga, the Court opines that the same could not be given any credence. Readily apparent from the said inventory is the fact that it is undated. Hence, the requirement that the inventory must be made immediately after seizure was not satisfied. Further, none of the persons required to sign the inventory, as enumerated under the law, were made to sign the same. The Court notes that while the prosecution witnesses testified that the seized items were physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused-appellants and Garguilo, they were not made to sign the inventory. Instead, a certain Ocampo, Sr. was made to sign the inventory. It must be noted that Ocampo, Sr. is not among those persons required by the law to witness and sign the inventory as he did not represent the accused-appellants, the media, or the Department of Justice. Neither was he an elected public official. PO3 Rodil further testified that photographs were taken of the accused-appellants and of the items confiscated from them. Not one of the alleged photographs, however, was presented in court as part of the evidence for the prosecution and no explanation was offered to explain why. With respect to the sachet marked as "YEL," PI Alviar testified that after performing qualitative examination on its contents, she found out that the same yielded positive for shabu, a dangerous drug. The said finding was written in Chemistry Report No. D-027-05 37 which the prosecution presented during PI Alviar's testimony. Interestingly, PI Alviar failed to produce before the court the specimen subjected to examination. Instead, she undertook to present the same on the next scheduled hearing and the prosecution reserved its right to recall her for the purpose of identifying the sachet marked as “YEL" The presentation of evidence for the prosecution was completed and yet they failed to present the sachet marked "YEL." Although the prosecution's Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly referring to the confiscated five (5) sachets of shabu, the records do not show that the plastic sachet with the markings "YEL" was ever presented and identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses. The parties merely stipulated that PO3 Rodil would be able to identify the specimen subject of this case which remained in the custody of the criminal laboratory. In his testimony, SPO2 Espiritu recalled having custody of the four (4) sachets of shabu from the time he retrieved the same from the toilet bowl until they arrived at the police station. However, PO3 Rodil's testimony contradicts the version of SPO2 Espiritu and SPO1 Buhay. According to PO3 Rodil, SPO2 Espiritu gave her the four sachets after their retrieval. Evidently, there is confusion and uncertainty regarding the person who had custody of the sachets when they were brought to the police station. Worse, no attempt to reconcile this inconsistency was made by the prosecution. As a consequence, the identity and integrity of the items marked at the police station were placed in serious doubt. Aside from the confusion, another matter that militates the cause of the prosecution is the doubt on the number of confiscated sachets which actually contained a white crystalline substance. SPO2 Espiritu testified that he recovered four (4) plastic sachets, each containing a white crystalline substance, which Jefferson had thrown into the toilet bowl. On the other hand, SPO1 Buhay testified that only one (1) out of several sachets retrieved from the toilet bowl contained a white Page 203 of 233

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crystalline substance. He even surmised that the substances from the other sachets may have been dissolved after being wet. Indeed, SPOl Buhay's testimony that only one of the four sachets contained a white crystalline substance casts reasonable doubt on the integrity and identity of the contents of the remaining sachets, if not on all of them. Thus, there is uncertainty on whether the four (4) plastic sachets presented in court and identified by PI Alviar were the same ones confiscated from Jefferson. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SIEGFRED CABELLON Y CABANERO G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017, LEONEN, J.: The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential part of the chain of custody. Absent this step, a gap is created which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of the accused. FACTS: Cabellon was charged with illegal sale of 0.03 grams of shabu. He was arrested in a buy-bust operation. According to the prosecution, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of shabu he purchased from Cabellon to PO3 Bucao. PO3 Bucao then handed the sachet to PO3 Abellar. PO3 Abellar was allegedly the one who prepared the request for chemical analysis of the seized sachet. The prosecution likewise presented a Request for Laboratory Examination signed by P/Superintendent Perigo. That same date, a sachet was marked “SCC 04/13/06” was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The PNP forensic chemist testified that she had examined a heat-sealed plastic sachet of white crystalline substance labelled with "SCC 04/13/06” and it tested positive for shabu. Cabellon invoked denial and alibi as defenses. The trial court convicted Cabellon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Cabellon argues on appeal that there was a broken chain of custody. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a broken chain of custody such that Cabellon’s may be acquitted due to reasonable doubt. RULING: YES. While it may be true that strict compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 may be excused under justifiable grounds, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items must still be preserved by the apprehending officer. This Court is not convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the shabu supposedly seized from the accused. PO3 Bucao claimed that the poseur-buyer turned over to him the sachet purchased from the accused and that he had custody of the sachet until he reached the police station. He then handed the sachet to PO3 Abellar, who supposedly prepared the request for the chemical analysis of the seized item. However, PO3 Bucao failed to identify who placed the markings on the sachet.

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Undeniably, a noticeable gap exists in the chain of custody with the prosecution's failure to present evidence that the seized sachet was actually marked by any of the three (3) apprehending officers. The prosecution likewise did not present evidence that the seized sachet was inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused or his representative, a representative from the media or the Department of Justice, and an elected public official. Neither did it provide an explanation as to why the police officers did not follow the requirements provided under the law. PO3 Bucao also testified that he turned over the unmarked seized sachet to PO3 Abellar, who then prepared the request to the Philippine National Police for chemical analysis. However, a careful review of the Request for Laboratory Examination shows that it was signed by P/Superintendent Perigo, not PO3 Abellar, who supposedly prepared it. This blatant lack of compliance with the safeguards established in Republic Act No. 9165 is made even more egregious by the fact that the seized sachet only contained 0.03 grams51 of shabu, no more than a grain of rice. The danger of tampering and planting of evidence was, thus, heightened, which should have put the lower courts on guard and not have so easily relied on the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of their official acts. ROLANDO DACANAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199018, September 27, 2017, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: In prosecuting cases for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or object, which was identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. FACTS: Dacanay was indicted for illegal possesion of 0.03 gram of shabu. Patrolling police officers Maniego et al. noticed petitioner Dacanay holding a plastic sachet in his right hand and a baseball cap in his left hand. The officers already knew petitioner for he had been previously arrested several times by authorities for illegal drug possession. As the officers neared petitioner, the latter scurried away. He tried to throw away the plastic sachet but the officers caught up with him. The officers retrieved the plastic sachet, placed their initials therein, informed petitioner of his rights, and then brought him to the hospital for examination. The plastic sachet was turned over to the PNP forensic chemist (Forro). The substance in the sachet tested positive for shabu. As defense, petitioner said that the police set him up. The RTC convicted petitioner as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. RULING: YES. In prosecuting cases for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or object, which was identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

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Additionally, in the prosecution of criminal cases involving drugs, it is settled in our jurisprudence that the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti, the body or substance of the crime, and the fact of its existence is a condition sine qua non to sustain a judgment of conviction. Evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimonies of its witnesses, chiefly that of Genguyon; documentary evidence, particularly, Genguyon's Sworn Statement and P/Sr. Insp. Forro's Chemistry Report No. D-2096-02E; and the corpus delicti, the plastic sachet of shabu confiscated from petitioner. The prosecution then submitted in evidence the Chemistry Report No. D-209602E, which confirmed that the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet recovered from petitioner was methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a prohibited drug. The totality of the evidence satisfactorily establishes all the necessary elements for the conviction of petitioner for illegal possession of prohibited drug. Notably, petitioner did not offer any evidence to prove that he had authority to possess the said drug, and it is well-entrenched that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi of the prohibited drug, sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of satisfactory explanation. Petitioner miserably failed to present clear and convincing evidence to prove that the police officers who arrested him were impelled by a sinister motive in charging him with the serious offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Petitioner also failed to raise any objection as to his warrantless arrest before he entered his plea of "not guilty." Therefore, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC and waived any objection to the jurisdiction of the RTC based on a defect in his arrest. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMMEL DIPUTADO G.R. No. 213922. July 5, 2017 TIJAM, J. The presumption of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused. FACTS: An asset of PNP Region 6 went to their Office and gave an information to P/Sr. Insp. Gallardo that a certain Rommel Diputado, who was in the Watch List of said Task Force, is engaged in selling drugs in Brgy. San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City. Upon receipt of said information, Inspector Gallardo instructed the members of said Task Force, to conduct surveillance and test buy on the accused. The operation ensued. Accused-appellant claims that the seized illegal drug was not marked immediately after his arrest at the scene of the crime. It was only marked at the office of the RSAC-TF by PO1 Estares with the initial "RDM." He further argues that there was no evidence on record that photographs were taken during the inventory of the seized items. Another break in the chain of custody, according to the accused-appellant, was the failure of the prosecution to present P03 Holleza, the person who allegedly received the Request for Laboratory Examination. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the procedural lapses or the gaps in the chain of custody of the illegal drug and the failure of the police officers to offer a justifiable reason for their non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, create a reasonable doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drug. RULING: YES. Chain of Custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping and the presentation in court for identification and destruction.Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have been seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In the present case, PO1 Estares testified that he did not mark the seized item immediately after the arrest of the accused-appellant at the place where the latter was arrested, the seized item was only marked with the initials "RDM" at the office of the RSAC-TF. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties in favor of the police officers will not save the prosecution's case, given the foregoing lapses and gaps in the chain of custody. The presumption stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the presumption of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused. Since the prosecution was not able to establish an unbroken chain of custody, reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused-appellant. Thus, the court is constrained to acquit accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. PEOPLE v. ERNESTO SAGANA Y DE GUZMAN G.R. No. 208471. August 2, 2017 LEONEN, J. To establish whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. FACTS: On July 21, 2010 at around 2:20 p.m., police officers coordinated with the PDEA to act on a tip by a confidential informant. Police officers carried out a buy-bust operation in Sagana's residence at Page 207 of 233

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Muslim Tondaligan, Dagupan City.PO3 Salonga posted as the poseur-buyer. Five (5) P100.00 bills served as buy-bust money, marked with PO3 Salonga's initials, "LCS."Allegedly before the operation, PO3 Salonga had arranged the transaction through a phone call with Sagana, who set the meeting at his house.The operation ensued.On the other hand, the defense posed frame-up and extortionagainst the police officers in their version of the events. ISSUES: 1.

Whether or not there was a valid entrapment and whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation. -NO 2. Whether or not Ernesto Sagana's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt –NO 3. Whether or not the police officers complied with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules in handling the alleged confiscated shabu -NO RULING: To establish whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. More so, as in this case where the seized quantities of shabu are merely 0.12 grams and 0.59 grams, it is important that all details are clear. Hence, the miniscule quantities of dangerous drugs allegedly confiscated magnify the uncertainties with regard their integrity. The miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs heightens the importance of a more stringent conformity with Section 21,which the police officers in this case miserably failed to do so. The significant lapses committed, as well as their failure to explain their non-compliance with the directives of the law, cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. With these circumstances, this Court acquits accused-appellant Sagana as his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's narration of events reveals that the police officers did not to conform with the chain of custody. This is in contravention to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, which is mandatory in nature, as reflected in the presence of the word "shall" in the provision. The prosecution in this case offered testimonies corroborating the narration of the alleged sale of illicit drugs that paved the way for Sagana's arrest. However, there were apparent lapses in the chain of custody that cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. Hence, the prosecution failed to establish that the miniscule amounts of 0.12 grams and 0.59 grams of dangerous drugs presented as evidence in court were the very same ones allegedly seized and retrieved from Sagana. PEOPLE v. JOHN PAUL CERALDE Y RAMOS G.R. No. 228894. August 7, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. Failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Page 208 of 233

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FACTS: Ceralde is charged of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. That on or about July 23, 2011, the accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell 3 small transparent plastic sachet containing dried Marijuana leaves, a dangerous and prohibited drug, worth P200.00 to SPOl Jolly V. Yanes, acting as poseur-buyer, without any lawful authority and for having in his possession, control and custody 1 heat-sealed plastic sachets containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 0.480 grams, without any necessary license or authority to possess the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule were unjustified. RULING: NO. Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Pertinently, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the IRR of RA 9165 provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule were unjustified, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of Page 209 of 233

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the items purportedly seized from Ceralde. An examination of the records reveals that while the prosecution was able to show that the seized items were properly marked by P03 Delos Santos immediately upon their confiscation at the place of the arrest and in the presence of Ceralde, the same was not done in the presence of any elected public official and a representative from the DOJ and the media. The accused is acquitted. PEOPLE v. DELIA SAUNAR G.R. No. 207396. August 9, 2017 LEONEN, J. Although strict compliance with the chain of custody rule may be excused provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, a more exacting standard is required of law enforcers when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs are alleged to have been seized from the accused. FACTS: The authorities acted on a tip and conducted surveillance operations on Saunar.Capt. Dalonos formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. At around 6:00 p.m., the operation ensued. Upon reaching Camp Simeon Ola, PO2 Montales prepared a seizure receipt, which Saunar refused to sign. Meanwhile, Capt. Dalanos invited representatives from the media and the Department of Justice and a barangay official to witness the marking and inventory. For her defense, Saunar asserted that she was merely framed-up. She testified that on the day of the alleged incident, the authorities raided her house looking for shabu. However, they only found her cellphone.Although the police officers found nothing, Saunar was brought to Camp Simeon Ola and was forced to sign a seizure receipt, which indicated that two (2) sachets of shabu were taken from her. Saunar did not sign this seizure receipt. ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant Delia Saunar for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: NO. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the transaction actually took place by establishing the following elements: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment."Aside from this, the corpus delicti must be presented as evidence in court. Hence, its identity and integrity must likewise be established beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation of the prosecution is to ensure that the illegal drugs offered in court are the very same items seized from the accused. This would entail the presentation of evidence on how the seized drugs were handled and preserved from the moment they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation in court. Non-compliance with this requirement creates doubt regarding the origin of the dangerous drugs.The chain of custody rule provides the manner by which law enforcers should handle seized dangerous drugs. Although strict compliance with the chain of custody rule may be excused provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, a more exacting standard is required of law enforcers when only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs are alleged to have Page 210 of 233

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been seized from the accused. In this case, only 0.0496 grams and 0.0487 grams or a total of 0.0983 grams of shabu were allegedly taken from accused-appellant. Such a miniscule amount of drugs is highly susceptible to tampering and contamination. A careful review of the factual findings of the lower courts shows that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of preserving the identity and integrity of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from accused-appellant.The prosecution failed to establish who held the seized items from the moment they were taken from accused-appellant until they were brought to the police station. Based on the testimony of PO2 Montales, the two (2) plastic sachets were only marked at Camp Simeon Ola. Any of the apprehending officers could have taken custody of the seized items during transit. It is highly probable, therefore, that the two (2) sachets had been tampered with, altered, or contaminated. The belated marking of the seized items creates doubt on the identity and origin of the dangerous drugs allegedly taken from accused-appellant. While it may be true that the seized items were marked and inventoried in the presence of a media representative, an elected barangay official, and a representative from the Department of Justice, there is no evidence showing that these procedures were done in the presence of accused-appellant or her authorized representative or counsel. Moreover, none of the witnesses to the marking and inventory of the seized items was presented in court to testify. SALVADOR A. ESTIPONA, JR. v. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO G.R. 226679. August 15, 2017 PERALTA, J. Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the equal protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court. FACTS: Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12. Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates: 1) The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; 2) The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and 3) The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional. Page 211 of 233

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RULING: YES, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the equal protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court. PEOPLE v. JOCELYN CARLIT Y GAWAT G.R. No. 227309. August 16, 2017 VELASCO, JR., J. In drug cases, every link of the chain of custody must be proved. FACTS: P03 Christian Carvajal was tasked to act as poseur buyer in the buy bust operation against Jocelyn Carlit. Their office received information that Carlit is engaged in illegal activities. During their preparation, they recorded the buy bust money to be used in the police blotter. The police officer did not know whether there was coordination with the PDEA. It was around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he, with a civilian asset, went to conduct the buy bust. After he got hold of the shabu, the police officer introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the Accused. The shabu was marked in the police station with the officer's initials and also recovered the buy bust money from the Accused. The officer declared that he did not know the Accused prior to the buy bust and confirmed the identity only through the asset. The officer said that the Accused and his supervising officer were both present when he prepared the confiscation receipt which was signed by a DOJ representative although there was no media. At the police station, the police blotter, request for laboratory examination and coordination with the PDEA as well as his affidavit were prepared. The police officer also narrated that he was the only one in sole possession of the specimen from its seizure up to the station where it was only shown to the investigator and thereafter brought by him to the crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI Myrna Malojo. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove every link in the chain of custody. RULING: YES. We have consistently held in drug cases that every link of the chain of custody must be proved. It is quite regrettable though that the prosecution fell short of satisfying this standard when it opted to present only two witnesses herein, P03 Carvajal and PSI Malojo Todeño. To refresh, the substance of P03 Carvajal's testimony was that he was the poseur-buyer who received the sachet containing the dangerous drug from Carlit, and that he was the only arresting officer who handled the same until it was turned over to PSI Todeño at the PNP Crime Laboratory. PSI Todeño confirmed receiving the narcotic substance from P03 Carvajal for testing, and added that her specimen was then handed to one P02 Manuel, the evidence custodian, for safekeeping. This is Page 212 of 233

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where the chain breaks. Clear in Salvador is that the final link of the chain must be on how the drug item seized came into the court's physical custody. Unfortunately, P02 Manuel was never presented as witness in this case. Needless to say, the probability of the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti being compromised is present in every single time the prohibited item is being stored or transported, be it from the PNP crime laboratory directly to the court or otherwise. It was therefore imperative for the prosecution to have presented as witness P02 Manuel, and anyone else for that matter who may have handled the drug after him. For during the interim time - from when the specimen was placed under his custody until the time it was brought to court - the threat of tampering, alteration, or substitution of the corpus delicti still existed. Without P02 Manuel’s testimony, there is no guarantee that the corpus delicti of the offense had been preserved. This alone is sufficient to warrant accused-appellant Carlit' s acquittal in the extant case. Plainly, there was a failure of the prosecution to prove that the chain of custody was unbroken due to (1) its failure to offer the testimony of the evidence custodian, and (2) non-compliance with Paragraph 1, Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, without justifiable reason. As such, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, warranting her acquittal of the crime charged. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv. FERNANDO GERONIMO Y AGUSTINE, ALIAS "NANDING BAKULAW G.R. No. 180447. August 23, 2017 BERSAMIN, J. If the State does not establish the corpus delicti, such as when the dangerous drug subject of the prosecution is missing, or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as evidence in court, then the crime is not established beyond reasonable doubt. FACTS: A certain Nanding Bakulaw was reported by a confidential informant to the Mayor Special Action team, to be allegedly engaged in illegal drug activities victimizing young individuals. The report lead to a buy-bust operation with PO1 Sabo tasked as the poseur-buyer. Ultimately, based on the prosecution, Nanding Bakulaw who was identified to be Fernando Augustine was caught in flagrante delicto illegally selling shabu. That PO1 Sabo was able to confiscate from the appellant the buy bust money and the confiscated crystalline substance which she labelled with her initials JAS. It was later on, by request of SPO2 Layno, brought to the laboratory for examination. It was confirmed to be metamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu. Meanwhile, the accused-appellant denied the charges against him and claimed instead that the arresting police officers had arrived and conducted a search of another house near the house of his sister where he was then watching a show on television with his niece and her three classmates. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the chain of custody was broken in this case, which therefore did not preserve the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti. RULING: YES, the chain of custody was broken in this case, hence, the accused should be acquitted. The law provides that in every prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense, failing in which the State would not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the State does not establish the corpus delicti, such as when the dangerous drug subject of the prosecution is missing, or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as evidence in court, then the crime is not established beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Prosecution tendered no explanation of why none of the members of the buy-bust team had seen to the taking of any photograph of the seized shabu immediately after the arrest, or even afterwards. Likewise, there was no explanation given as to why they did not ensure the presence of an elected official, or member of the media, or representative of the Department of Justice during the entrapment and confiscation of the evidence. The procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team as herein noted underscored the uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the shabu presented and admitted as evidence against the accused-appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABUNDIO M. SARAGENA G.R. No. 210677. August 23, 2017 LEONEN, J. To successfully convict an accused under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the prosecution must establish the identities of the buyer and the seller, the item sold, and the consideration given for it. There must be an actual sale, consummated through delivery and payment. Finally, the corpus delicti must be presented in court as evidence. FACTS: In this case, the prosecution failed to present the Police Officer who acted as poseur-buyer (PO1 Misa). During the operation, While PO 1 Misa was allegedly buying shabu from accused appellant, SPO 1 Paller and SP03 Magdadaro were hiding at the side of the stage. Accused-appellant's house was at the back of this stage where they hid.75 Likewise, it was already 7:00 p.m. and the night time would have impaired their vision. SPOl Paller and SP03 Magdadaro's location, the nightfall, and the miniscule amount of the alleged illegal drug further call into question prosecution's claim that SPOl Paller and SP03 Magdadaro witnessed the scene. ISSUE: Page 214 of 233

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Whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of custody rule. RULING: NO, the law enforcement officers were not able to substantially comply with the chain of custody rule. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes any person who sells a dangerous drug, regardless of quantity. To successfully convict an accused under this provision, the prosecution must establish the identities of the buyer and the seller, the item sold, and the consideration given for it. There must be an actual sale, consummated through delivery and payment. Finally, the corpus delicti must be presented in court as evidence. POI Misa, the only person who could attest to the commission of the crime, was not presented in court. 76 The poseur-buyer "had personal knowledge of the transaction since he conducted the actual transaction."77 His testimony is crucial in establishing the alleged facts and circumstances surrounding the purported sale.78 The failure to present the poseur-buyer casts doubt on the charge that an illegal sale of drugs took place. Even if there was a sale, the corpus delicti was not proven as the chain of custody was defective. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JALIL LAMAMA G.R. No. 188313. August 23, 2017 BERSAMIN, J. What is material in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. The commission of the offense requires the consummation of the sale transaction. FACTS: Herein accused, Jalil Lamama was charged with illegal sale of metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu punished under the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002. On one hand, the prosecution alleged that as a result of intelligence by an informant, Lamama became the subject of a casing surveillance, and later on of an actual buy bust operation. Lamama upon taking the bait, was arrested and was brought to PDEA Station in Dagupan. The seized items were then marked and inventoried in detail at the PDEA Station as well. The plastic sachets confiscated, after a verified examination, was confirmed to be shabu. On the other hand, the defense asserted that a certain Vargas told Lamama to proceed to a house in Barangay Pinmaludpod, that upon entering said house he found three plastic sachets of shabu on top of a table. Thereafter, several PDEA agents surrounded and arrested him. ISSUES: Whether or not an illegal sale of drugs really took place. Page 215 of 233

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Whether or not the chain of custody of the evidence was broken. RULING: YES, an illegal sale of dangerous drugs took place and the chain of custody was unbroken. The law provides that the elements of illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs , requires the consummation of the sale transaction. In the case at bar, the sale was consummated. The law does not expressly require that the marking, photographing and inventorying be always made at the site of the buy-bust operation, and that the elected officials be always from the place where the buy-bust arrest occurred. Relatedly, the custody of the evidence was not broken. The sachets of shabu were properly marked and were personally delivered after request, for examination—these were all validly done even if the confiscated evidence had to be marked, photographed and inventoried at the PDEA Station. In this case, the buy bust team substantially complied with the requirements of the law on making, photographing, and inventorying of the dangerous drugs seized. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONAS GERONIMO Y PINLAC G.R. No. 225500. September 11, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. There is nothing in the law which exempts the apprehending officers from securing the presence of an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ or media, particularly in instances when they are not equipped with a search warrant. In fact, RA 9165 and its IRR explicitly provide that noncompliance with the required procedure can only be allowed under exceptional circumstances, provided that justifiable grounds are given and proven as a fact therefor by the apprehending officers. FACTS: 2 Informationswere filed before the RTC accusing Geronimo of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On or about the 12 th day of April, 2010 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, the accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to 101 Crisanto L. Lorilla, a [bona fide] member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who posed as poseur buyer, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) and MEFENOREX, dangerous drugs, weighing 0.1076 gram, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be such and for having in possession, custody and control One (1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag with marking EXH B 04-12-10 CLL containing dried MARIJUANA leaves and fruiting tops. ISSUE: Page 216 of 233

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Whether or not Geronimo's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld. RULING: NO. Geronimo prayed for his acquittal in light of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR and their failure to proffer a plausible explanation therefor. In particular, he claims that the inventory and certification was neither done in the presence of nor signed by a representative from the DOJ and the media. An examination of the records reveals that although the requisite inventory and photography of the seized items were conducted in the presence of Geronimo and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of the representatives from the DOJ and the media. Based on the foregoing testimony, the justification given by Arquero was grossly insufficient and without legal basis. It appears that he clearly misunderstood the law and its application in buy-bust operations. The law mandates the apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 mainly to ensure the proper chain of custody and avoid the possibility of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. There is nothing in the law which exempts the apprehending officers from securing the presence of an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ or media, particularly in instances when they are not equipped with a search warrant as claimed by IA1 Arquero. In fact, RA 9165 and its IRR explicitly provide that non-compliance with the required procedure can only be allowed under exceptional circumstances, provided that justifiable grounds are given and proven as a fact therefor by the apprehending officers, which IA1 Arquero likewise failed to show in this case. LEONARDO P. CASONA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179757. September 13, 2017 BERSAMIN, J. Too much reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the arresting officers in the prosecution of drug-related offenses is unwarranted if the records show noncompliance with the affirmative safeguards prescribed to preserve the chain of custody of the contraband. The presumption of regularity applies only when there is no showing of noncompliance. FACTS: Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On or about the 6th day of February 2004, in the City of Mandaluyong, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing 0.03 and 0.02 grams of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as 'shabu' a dangerous drug, without corresponding license and prescription. Page 217 of 233

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ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite patent weakness of the prosecution evidence. RULING: NO. A careful review of the records reveals that the police operatives did not faithfully follow the affirmative safeguards. For one, although the safeguards required a physical inventory and photographing of the shabu immediately upon seizure and confiscation "in the presence of the accused x x x, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof," there was no showing why no such inventory and photographing of the shabu had been made by the arresting team. It is true that under the guidelines they could have also made the inventory and photographing at the police station by virtue of the confiscation having been in flagrante delicto. Yet, they also did not make any inventory or take any photographs at the police station. And, secondly, it was not also established that any of the police operatives had marked the seized shabu at the crime scene and in the presence of the petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the DOJ, and any elected official, as similarly required. In this regard, PO1 Madlangbayan identified the shabu in court through the markings "LCP-1" and "LCP-2" (which were the initials of the petitioner), but there was no testimony by him or any other about the specific circumstances of the placing of such markings, such as the time when and the place where the markings were actually made. In light of the foregoing, the State did not establish the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. How can there be any moral certainty of his guilt as having illegally possessed the shabu presented at the trial if there were lapses in the observance of the affirmative safeguards? In view of the suspicion infecting the evidence of guilt, his defense of not having been the focus of the operation by the police officers when he first encountered them that evening gains ground. As a result, his version of being apprehended only on his return from the off-track betting station cannot be discounted or dismissed as implausible. Therein lies the reasonable doubt of his guilt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SIEGFRED CABELLON Y CABANERO G.R. No. 207229; 20 September 2017 LEONEN, J. Four crucial links must be established in order to constitute an unbroken chain of custody, namely: [i] the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; [ii], the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; [iii], the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and [iv], the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with sale of illegal drugs under Sec. 5, R.A. 9165. A buy-bust was conducted in Talisay, Cebu wherein an asset poseur-buyer transacted with the accused in an alley. Upon the transaction being consummated, the poseur-buyer gave a signal and police officers Page 218 of 233

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chased after the accused. The accused was apprehended in a nearby house, with others sniffing shabu, and the officers recovered the marked bills from him. The marked sachet was turned over for examination, and the PNP Crime Laboratory forensic chemist confirmed it was shabu. The RTC and CA both found the accused guilty, waiving the strict application of the rule on chain of custody as the integrity of the evidence was maintained. Also, the CA stated that the defense only questioned the integrity of the evidence on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or notthe accused-appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the nonobservance of the rule on chain of custody.(NO) RULING: In order to sustain a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must: [i] prove that the sale took place; and [ii] present in court the illicit drug or corpus delicti as evidence. The prosecution presented the two police officers who were part of the buy-bust team, who testified as to the sale and the giving of a signal, as well as the apprehension of the accused. While this proves that a transaction took place, the prosecution did no convincingly present the corpus delicti as evidence. Strict compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 may be excused under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity of the seized items are preserved. As held in People v. Nandi, four crucial links must be established, namely: [i] the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; [ii], the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; [iii], the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and [iv], the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. Here, there is a gap as the prosecution could not prove that the seized sachet was marked by any of the apprehending officers, and that the sachet was inventories and photographed in the presence of the accused, the media, the DOJ, and an elected public official. There was also no explanation as to why these requirements were not followed. This lack of compliance with the requirements under R.A. 9165 is even worse given that the sachet only contained 0.03 grams of shabu, which is no more than a grain of rice. This already should have put the lower courts on guard. As held in People v. Holgado, the likelihood of tampering with evidence is greatest when the exhibit is small and has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. PEOPLE v. GERONIMO G.R. No. 225500, September 11, 2017, Second Division, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure and non-compliance with requirements of Section 21 – under justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly Page 219 of 233

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preserved by the apprehending officer of team. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. FACTS: Two informations were filed against Jonas Geronimo for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 after he was caught selling shabu and marijuana in 2010. He was caught after a buy-bust operation in Caloocan City. Geronimo interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up claiming he was drinking at a friend’s place when three armed men forced him to board a Revo, was beaten up by said armed men and his girlfriend, and was brought to the PDEA office to drink something. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt; the CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9165 was properly followed. RULING: Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the seized drugs, the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of the evidence, the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the drugs that were evidence of the corpus delicti are negated and adversely affect the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. The inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure and non-compliance with requirements of Section 21 – under justifiable grounds – will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer of team. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. Although the requisite inventory and photography of the seized items were conducted in the presence of Geronimo and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of DOJ and media representatives. One of the apprehending officers said the requirements of Sec. 21 are to be dispensed with in cases of buy-bust operations, which have no basis in law. Another apprehending officer offered the excuse the area was so dark and risky, hence the same inventory and photographing were done at their office, but another officer said there were no serious threats after the arrest of the suspect. | CASONA v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 179757, September 13, 2017, Third Division, BERSAMIN, J. Page 220 of 233

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The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of arresting officers in the prosecution of drug-related offenses is unwarranted if the records show non-compliance with the affirmative safeguards prescribed to preserve the chain of custody of the contraband. The presumption of regularity applies only when there is no showing of non-compliance. FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong charged petitioner with illegal possession of shabu after drug enforcement unit of the Mandaluyong City Police Station acted on a tip, seeing a male hand a small plastic sachet to another; the sachet was found filled with shabu. Petitioner insisted he was on his way to the off-track betting station but was then arrested for no reason. He claims he was brought to the hospital before he was investigated and detained. The RTC found Casona guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the conviction. Casona appealed n the basis that he was merely tipped off by an anonymous person and that the CA erred in finding the chain of custody was preserved by the arresting officers. ISSUE: Whether or not Casona was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 provides that the apprehending team having initial custody and control of drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The police operatives did not follow the prescribed procedure: the shabu was not inventoried and photographed at all. It was not established that any of the police operatives had marked the seized shabu at the crime scene and in the presence of the petitioner, a representative of the media, the DOJ, and an elected official. The lack of the inventory signed by petitioner himself and a representative of the media, the DOJ, and an elected official could be held to mean no shabu has been seized from petitioner on that occasion. The RTC and CA gravely erred by not asking the apprehending team for an explanation for failing to photograph and inventory the bare minimums provided by the law. ||| PEOPLE v. CABELLON G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017, Third Division, LEONEN, J. The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential part of the chain of custody. Absent this step, a gap is created which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of the accused.. Page 221 of 233

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FACTS: An information charged Cabellon with the sale of shabu weighing 0.03g after he was caught in a buy-bust operation in Talisay City. Cabellon ran and hid inside a nearby house where the police officers also found three men sniffing shabu. After Cabellon’s arrest, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet marked SCC 04/13/06. The forensic chemist confirmed the contents were of the packet tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Cabellon interposed a defense of denial, claiming he was buying barbecue when he saw his aunt crying, having come from a fight. He defended his aunt by slapping the lady whom his aunt had a fight with. Later that evening, he was arrested; however, nothing was recovered. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty. The Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal. The CA waived the stringent application of Sec. 21 of RA 9165 considering the circumstances obtaining the case and given the defense never questioned the integrity of the evidence on trial. ISSUE: Whether or not Cabellon’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt RULING: To sustain a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The testimonies of the apprehending officers provided proof that a transaction or sale took place; however they were unable to present the alleged corpus delicti in evidence. The apprehending officers failed to follow Sec. 21 of RA No. 9165. While strict compliance with Sec. 21 may be excused under justifiable grounds, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items must still be preserved by the apprehending officer. None of the apprehending officers could identify who placed the markings on the sachet. Four links should be established by the prosecution to constitute an unbroken chain of custody: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. ||| PEOPLE v. DEL MUNDO AND LACSON-DEL MUNDO G.R. No. 208095, September 20, 2017, Third Division, MARTIRES, J. In prosecuting both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the identity of said drugs. The identity of the dangerous drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact the dangerous drug illegally possessed and sold is the same drug offered in court as exhibit must be established with the same degree of certitude needed to sustain a guilty verdict. Page 222 of 233

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FACTS: Jefferson and Mitos were indicted for illegal sale of prohibited drugs while Jefferson was additionally charged with illegal possession of drugs, after having been found selling shabu in Calapan during a buy-bust operation in the Del Mundos’ house. Qualitative examination of the substances inside the sachets yielded positive results for shabu; Jefferson’s and Mitos’ urine also tested positive for shabu. The Del Mundos averred the police banged on their door and frisked Mitos. They allegedly searched the house and mauled him after finding nothing. The RTC found Jefferson guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession while Mitos was found guilty of illegal sale. The CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting the accused-appellants despite the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: It is indispensable the substance confiscated from the accused be the same substance offered in Court, hence the chain of custody rule. It is established by testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way every person who touched the exhibit would be able to describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. As a general rule, the prosecution must endeavor to establish four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. The buy-bust team failed to observe the proper procedure in taking custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. The inventory was not dated. None of the persons required to sign the inventory were made to sign the same. Not one of the photographs of the drugs were presented in court as part of the evidence for the prosecution and no explanation was offered to explain why. DACANAY v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 199018, September 27, 2017, First Division, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. FACTS: Page 223 of 233

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An information charged Dacanay with illegal possession of dangerous drugs after he was found to have in his possession a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of shabu. He was caught holding a plastic sachet while policemen and the Task Force Anti-Vice were patrolling Barangay Highway Hills in Mandaluyong. When they approached, he tried to scurry away and throw the plastic sachet while boarding a tricycle but he was arrested. Genguyon, one of the TFAV, placed his initials on the sachet. The Chemistry Report revealed it was shabu. Petitioner, a tricycle driver, said that while a sale of shabu on Fernandez Street was ongoing, he was flagged down by the TFAV. The TFAV searched his tricycle while another member picked up a plastic sachet a few meters away from his tricycle. The TFAV member said he recovered the sachet from Dacanay’s tricycle. The RTC convicted him and the CA affirmed. Dacanay appeals on the ground he was illegally arrested and illegally searched. ISSUE: Whether or not Dacanay is guilty of illegal possession. RULING: In prosecuting cases for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish (1) the accused was in possession of an item or object, which was identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. Evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimonies of Genguyon, the TFAV member; documentary evidence in the form of Genguyon’s statement and the Chemistry Reprot; and the sachet of shabu as corpus delicti. Dacanay waived any objection to his warrantless arrest. Granting he did not waive it, he was legally arrested without a warrant. Sec. 5 of Rule 113 provides a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In in flagrante delicto arrests, the concurrence of two elements I s necessary: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.MANUEL LIM CHING G.R. 223556, October 9, 2017, Second Division, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. In drug cases, it is essential that the identity of the seized drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. FACTS: Accused is charged with violation of R.A. 9165 for possession of illegal drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, use of illegal drugs, and sale of illegal drugs. He was apprehended following a buybust operation which wielded a number of sachets of suspected shabu and drug paraphernalia. When accused was apprehended, the police failed to photograph and take an inventory of the items seized. Moreover, these were only delivered to the PNP Crime Lab 10 days after the operation. During trial, the accused claimed that he was in his house with his nephews and was about to leave when policemen, together with some barangay officials, arrived and roamed around his residence. He later saw one of the men insert a plastic inside the chicken cage and thereafter, gathered some things and placed them on top of a table. The RTC and CA convicted the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody rule was complied with. RULING: Section 21 of RA 9165 outlines the chain of custody rule. However, under varied field conditions, the requirements for this rule may not always be possible and the court has held that non-compliance thereto, under justifiable grounds, will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. However, the prosecution must must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. In this case, there were substantial gaps in the chain of custody. The seized items were not photographed nor were they inventoried when they were taken from the accused. These were also delivered to the PNP crime lab way past 24 hours from seizure. These procedural lapses were left unjustified by the prosecution. As such, reasonable doubt is cast as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARIEL CALVELO G.R. No. 223526, December 06, 2017, Third Division, MARTIRES, J. In prosecution of violations of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165, particularly those arising from buy-bust operations, the details of the transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. Page 225 of 233

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FACTS: The accused was charged with violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165. Evidence for the accused showed that an informant gave the tip to the Laguna Police that accused was selling shabu. A buy-bust operation was conducted where PO2 Villanueva acted as the poseur-buyer and the informant was the middleman. The accused was apprehended immediately after the sale and the shabu was marked on the spot. The accused interposed the defense of frame up and planted evidence. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused. He challenges his conviction and claims the existence of reasonable doubt as the informant, who acted as the middleman during the buy-bust operation, did not testify in court. ISSUE: Whether or not the the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: The "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Evaluation of the records applying the "objective test" will prove that the prosecution was able to establish beyond moral certainty the details of the transaction that took place between Villanueva and Ariel from the offer to purchase shabu until the consummation of the sale thereby proving the elements of the crime. Moreover, there is no need for the prosecution to present the informant if only to determine whether there was a prior drug deal between him and Ariel. The informant's testimony would only corroborative. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOJO EJAN G.R. No. 212169, December 12, 2017, First Division, DEL CASTILLO, J. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution. FACTS: The accused in this case is charged with violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165. He was caught in a buybust operation organized by SI Tagle and SPO1 Germodo. After seeing their informant/poseur buyer buy from the accused using the marked money, SPO1 Germodo quickly apprehended the accused. He marked the confiscated sachet with the initials JE-BB 4-2-08, conducted the inventory of the seized item in the presence of the accused and witnesses from the DOJ, the media, and a kagawad, took photographs, and prepared the receipt of the seized item which the witnesses also signed. Accused attempted to flee while he was being taken to the police vehicle but was apprehended soon after. During this time, SPO1 Germodo kept the sachet on his person. SPO1 Page 226 of 233

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Germodo brought accused and the sachet to the Provincial Crime Lab where the sachet was received by PCT Llena who found that the sachet contained shabu. The accused denied that he was selling illegal drugs and alleged that he was framed and the police planted the evidence. The RTC convicted the accused and found his denial weak as against positive identification that he was caught selling drugs in flagrante delicto. The RTC also held that the integrity of the seized drugs was properly preserved. On appeal, the accused claims that the prosecution failed to establish that he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt because of failure to present the informant/poseur buyer and thus, the identity of the buyer was not established. The CA affirmed the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of an informant/buyer is necessary to convict an accused for violation of R.A. 9165 RULING: What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. In this case, the accused was positively identified by SPO1 Germodo as the seller of the sachet and the person who received the marked money as payment. His testimony established the presence of the elements of the crime. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. Despite the non-presentation of the informant, the guilt of the appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt through the testimonies of SPO1 Germodo who witnessed the whole transaction or sale of shabu unfold firsthand. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL DELA ROSA G.R. No. 230228, December 13, 2017, Third Division, GESMUNDO, J. Non-compliance with the chain of custody rule can be excused 1) when the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. FACTS: Accused was charged with the sale of marijuana in violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The evidence for the prosecution showed that he was arrested following a buy-bust operation inside his tattoo parlor where a pack of banana leaves that allegedly contained marijuana were taken. Accused was then taken to the police vehicle where the seized marijuana was marked. They then travelled 54 km to the PDEA office where inventory was done and photographs were taken in the presence of a barangay captain and a media representative. The item was confirmed to contain marijuana. The accused denied these accusations and claims that he was arrested for being associated with a person who was earlier apprehended for drug-related charges.

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The RTC convicted the accused and held that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements and that the custody of the drug was duly accounted for. The CA affirmed the RTC and held that there was substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule. ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody rule was complied with. RULING: Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Section 21 of R.A. 9165 enumerates the requisites of the chain of custody rule. This rule may be relaxed, however, when it can be proven that there is justifiable ground that prevented compliance with the requirements, and that the evidentiary value of the items seized are preserved. In this case, there was no compliance with the chain of custody rule as the apprehending team did not immediately conduct the physical inventory and the taking of the photographs at the time the suspected drug was confiscated or at the nearest police station. Instead, they travelled 54 kilometers before they conducted the inventory of the seized drug. Moreover, the prosecution failed to provide a justifiable ground for the non-compliance of the chain of custody rule. The prosecution also failed to establish that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the item seized was preserved as they failed to properly safe-keep the item, and the testimony as to who received the item was inconsistent, and that the crime laboratory's arrangement made it possible for other personnel to contaminate the evidence.

H. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. Nos. 8294 and 10591) JOSELITO PERALTA Y ZARENO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 221991. August 30, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. FACTS: The prosecution alleged that a team of Police Officers responded to a telephone call received by their desk officer-on-duty with regard to a man firing a gun at the back of PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. That two men were walking, later on identified as Peralta and his Page 228 of 233

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companion, Calimlim; the two were holding a gun and a knife, respectively. Upon seeing the Police Officers, the men became uneasy hence, the police swooped in. Thereafter, an apprehension took place where a caliber .45 pistol was recovered with ammunitions and the knife of Calimlim. The men were then brought to the Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City, and later, to the community precinct for paraffin and gun powder residue test. Meanwhile, the pistol and the magazine with live ammunitions were endorsed to the duty investigator. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Peralta's conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. RULING: YES, CA correctly upheld the conviction against the accused. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements, considering that: (a) the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a . 45 caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and live ammunitions, which was seized from him and later on, marked, identified, offered, and properly admitted as evidence at the trial; and (b) the Certification dated August 10, 2011 issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police which declared that Peralta "is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .45 Pistol, make (unknown) with Serial Number 4517488 per verification from the records of this office as of this date.

I. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (P.D. No. 1829) NAVAJA v. DE CASTRO AND BORJE G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017, Second Division, PERLAS-BERNABE, J. While the informations pertain to acts done days apart and in different locations, petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829 since the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation. FACTS: Navaja, whose wife was embroiled in a case with DKT Philippines for falsification of private document in Tagbilaran, told one of the material witnesses in the case that his wife’s lawyer instructed her to tell the witness she was no longer needed in the scheduled hearing (March 9, 2004). Borje found out from the witness that the latter would have attended if it were not for Page 229 of 233

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petitioner’s misrepresentation, that her affidavit was not personally prepared but was merely signed out of her superior’s instruction, and that she could not have had it notarized in Cebu as she had work that day (March 15, 2004). Separate complaints were filed against Navaja for violation of Sec. 1(a) of PD 1829 and Section 1(f) of the same law for the March 9 and March 15 incidents. The MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash, the RTC affirmed the MCTC-Jagna, and the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, which in esse held petitioner allegedly committed several acts and there is enough basis to try him for two separate crimes under two distinct informations. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled petitioner may be tried for different acts constituting violations of PD 1829. RULING: Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the elements of which are (a) the accused committed any of the acts listed under Sec. 1o f PD 1829; and (b) such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of cases. While the informations pertain to acts done days apart and in different locations, petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829 since the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation. The conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. Petitioner’s acts of preventing the witness from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a single impulse.

OTHER TOPICS A. ACCESS DEVICES REGULATION ACT (R.A. No. 8484) ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017, LEONEN, J.: The possession and use of a counterfeit credit card is considered access device fraud and is punishable by law. To successfully sustain a conviction for possession and use of a counterfeit access device, the prosecution must present not only the access device but also any evidence that proves that the access device is counterfeit. Facts: The accused was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of RA 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998. According to the prosecution, the accused tried to purchase 2 bottles of Calvin Klein perfume worth US$96 using his credit card which was approved. He again purchased a pair of Ferragamo shoes worth US$363 which again was approved. However, when the Page 230 of 233

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cashier called Citibank for verification, it was discovered that the credit card was a counterfeit and the real “Gerry Santos” (the name appearing on the card) was the Head of Citibank’s Fraud Risk Management Division. Thereafter, the accused was apprehended and brought to the security office where Citibank officials met him. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the charges. Held: YES. A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or counterfeit access device." Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the possession and use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the crime is not merely the access device, but also any evidence that proves that it is counterfeit. Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008, which bore the name "Gerry Santos." He used the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes worth US$363.00 at Duty Free Fiesta Mall. Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008 was later proven to be a counterfeit access device. Petitioner argues that according to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, the alleged counterfeit credit card should not have been admitted as evidence because it was not pre-marked during pre-trial. Here, the trial court allowed the presentation of the counterfeit credit card at trial due to the prosecution's explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card was still in the Criminal Investigation and Detective Group's custody. The prosecution was able to present and mark during pre-trial Citibank's certification that the access device used was counterfeit. It is this certification that makes the possession and use of the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial court determined that the access device could still be presented at trial since it merely formed part of an· exhibit that had already been presented and marked during pre-trial.

B. MIGRANT WORKERS ACT OF 1995 (R.A. No. 8042) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILDA ABELLANOSA G.R. No. 214340. July 19, 2017 DEL CASTILLO, J. Section 6 of RA 8042 defines illegal recruitment as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee on non-holder of authority. Provided, that any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. Page 231 of 233

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FACTS: The prosecution presented several complainants against Gilda Abellanosa for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale. Complainants said that they met accused in Iloilo. Said accused introduced herself to them as a recruiter of workers for Brunei, and she showed a job order and a calling card as well. Accused promised their deployment abroad after receipt of processing and placement fees. Despite submitting all requirements, the private complainants were not given work abroad and their placement/processing fees were not reimbursed. On the other hand, the defense presented the appellant as its sole witness. She denied meeting any of the private complainants while she was in Iloilo ISSUE: Whether the guilt of accused for the crime charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: YES. Accused was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad as shown by the certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.; she offered or promised employment abroad to private complainants; she received monies from private complainants purportedly as placement or processing fees; private complainants were not actually deployed to Brunei; despite demands, appellant failed to reimburse or refund to private complainants their monies; and that appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the minimum of three persons required by law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale. As to the penalty and fine: The penalty of life imprisonment shall apply collectively to all seven cases lumped together, and not individually. The same is true with the accompanying penalty of fine; it must likewise be imposed collectively on all seven cases lumped together, not individually.

C. EXCLUDED SPECIAL LAWS OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON v. DIONISIO G.R. No. 220700. July 10, 2017 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former. FACTS: Complainants are the owners of Sariling Atin Drug Store, while Dionisio and Molina were the School Principal of Barasoain Memorial Elementary School (the school) and President of its Teacher's Association, respectively. Respondents allegedly agreed to lease a portion of the school grounds to the complainants to open a drug store. The agreement was unknown to DepEd, the Page 232 of 233

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Teacher’s Association, the PTA and the Brgy. Council. It has a condition that instead of the P120,000 annual rent, only P36,000 will be recorded and it should be in a guise of a donation. Dionisio allegedly received a sum of P1, 280,000 from the complainants. She also assured the complainants that they will be the only drug store in that part of the school grounds for the next 2 to 3 years. However, barely a month after the commencement of the construction of the drugs store, they were informed that the area beside their drug store will be leased to another drug store. Complainants were informed by the DepEd officials that the MOA was illegal as it did not have the proper DepEd approval, and that the school could not enter into any commercial pursuits because it is not a registered cooperative. Also, Teachers' Association is not a legal entity and, hence, could not enter into the MOA.Dr. Magno, the School Superintendent of Malolos City ordered to defer the construction of the new drug store and to hold in abeyance the operation of the complainant’s drug store. Thus, complainant filed a complaint before the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held respondents administratively liable only for Simple Misconduct. HELD: NO. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former. A judicious perusal of the records would readily reveal that the acts of respondents fall under the jurisprudential definition of Grave Misconduct, and not just Simple Misconduct. First, the Ombudsman correctly observed that respondents had no authority to lease out a portion of the school premises, it being owned by the Provincial Government of Bulacan. Second, respondents failed to abide by the Constitutionally-prescribed principle of accountability of public officers as they failed to submit official receipts and other documents that would support their claim. In Patog, Sr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court emphasized that public school teachers are first and foremost civil servants accountable to the people. Third, the respondents failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9184, otherwise known as the "Government Procurement Reform Act” which mandates that all government procurement must be done through competitive bidding which the respondents failed to do so. Respondents cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance or lack of familiarity with the foregoing laws and policies. Verily, circumstances indicate that respondents knew of existing laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the lease of public properties, use of public funds, and procurement of government projects, among others; and despite these, they still went ahead with their transactions. By and large, these exhibit respondents' clear intent to violate the law and/or flagrant disregard of established rules, thus, justifying the finding that they are indeed liable for Grave Misconduct.

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