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Key: if it has an * then its good Vocab… Sting: an extremely illegal operation, such as the bribing of public officials, often used by undercover agents to collect evidence of wrongdoing. Agent provocateur (ap): a person who induces others to break the law so that they can be convicted. In our case an FBI agent.

The 1AC In December 2001, the FBI arrested Shahed Hussain for running a fake driver's license scam. He was a Pakistani immigrant granted political asylum in the 1990s, and now faced federal charges and deportation. Like many Muslim immigrants after 9/11 who were charged with criminal offenses, he was offered the chance to stay in the US without time in prison if he agreed to work as an informant for the FBI. And Hussain soon discovered that his abilities as a fraudster could be of use to the government. In 2003, based in Albany, New York, he manipulated two law-abiding men-Mohammed Hossain and Yassin Aref-into involvement in what they thought was a business loan deal. When prosecutors brought the case to court they presented the deal as a terrorist fund-raising operation, and the two men received fifteen-year sentences. When the prosecuting attorney was asked by journalists whether there was anything to connect Aref to terrorism, he said: "Well, we didn't have the evidence of that, but he had the ideology:'" The FBI then used Hussain for other covert work, in Pakistan and London, before he returned to the US and settled in Newburgh, a dilapidated,

he implanted himself in the local Muslim community, posing as a wealthy businessman. After a year searching for would-be targets, most of whom guessed he was an FBI agent, he met James Cromitie, a forty-five-year-old African American who was an occasional visitor to the local mosque. He worked night shifts at Walmart, and had served two years in prison in the 1980s for selling crack cocaine. When they first met in the mosque parking lot, Cromitie said: "Did you see what they did to my people over there? In Afghanistan. Those motherfuckers:' Hussain had found his quarry.18 Hussain worked on Cromitie for four months, showering him with flattery, cash, and free meals . These conversations were poverty-stricken town sixty miles north of New York City, where

not recorded by the FBI (and many later recordings had gaps-again, equipment malfunction was blamed), but by the end of it, it seems Cromitie was captivated by the lavish generosity of his new rich friend and happily joined in conversations laced with anti-Semitism about attacking synagogues. But he was less than enthusiastic about doing

When Hussain gave him a camera to photograph potential targets, he immediately sold it for fifty dollars. For months, he did nothing. Then he disappeared for six weeks, telling Hussain that he was moving to North Carolina; in fact, he remained in Newburgh and just wanted Hussain to stop pursuing him. But Hussain kept up the anything beyond talk.

pressure, telling Cromitie he had not done anything to advance the plan: "You've not started on the first Step,

Only when Cromitie lost his job and became desperate for money did he get back in touch with Hussain, who offered to pay him $250,000, provide him with a two-week holiday in Puerto Rico, a barbershop business, and a BMW if he agreed to participate in a scheme to bomb two Bronx synagogues . "I told you, I can make brother. Come on.”

you $250,000, but you dont want it, brother," Hussain said. Cromitie, who knew Hussain by the fake name Maqsood, gave in: "OK, fuckit. I don't care. Ah, man. Maqsood, you got me:' Hussain later testified in court that "$250,000" was code for the plot, not an offer of payment, but this seems unlikely-he acknowledged that he had told neither his FBI handlers nor Cromitie about the sum's supposed secret meaning. Later Cromitie tried to withdraw from the scheme, telling Hussain he could not do it, to which Hussain replied that his terrorist "brothers" might cut off his

Cromitie was given the task of recruiting others from Newburglls Muslim community. Three other African-American men-Onta Williams, Laguerre Payen, and David Williams (not a relative of Onta)-were all roped in and also offered large sums of money . Onta Williams, head.19

whose mother had a crack cocaine addiction, had started selling drugs at the age of fourteen and had spent time in prison. Payen suffered from schizophrenia, had been in and out of mental health facilities, and kept bottles of urine in his bedroom. 20 David Williams had become a Muslim as a teenager after an uncle had introduced him to the religion. But other relatives had introduced him to selling drugs, and he served five years in prison. He settled in Queens, New York; when he was released at the age of twenty-four he found a job in a restaurant and enrolled in college. But when his younger brother Lord fell ill with liver cancer, he decided to return to Newburgh to help his mother, who had to leave her job to care for him. Realizing David feared for his brother's life and the family was unable to afford adequate health care, Hussain offered to pay for a liver transplant on the understanding that David would join his scheme.21 Payen said barely anything in the meetings between Hussain and the four other Newburgh men. But Cromitie and the two Williamses soon realized that the more extravagant their conversations about criminal activity became, the more money Hussain handed out. They began to put on a show for him, saying things they thought he would like to hear and expecting to be rewarded with cash. Cromitie claimed to have stolen guns,

thrown bombs at police stations, been jailed for murder, and visited Afghanistan, none of which was true. Little did

When Hussain was not around to harangue the others into developing the plot, nothing happened. The supposed terrorists preferred to sit around getting stoned and playing video games. According to he realize that Hussain was manipulating him far more effectively than he was manipulating Hussain.

his aunt, David Williams was hallucinating on PCP throughout the entire period, barely aware of what was happening.22 Indeed, he would have likely been in prison at this time were it not for FBI agents pulling strings to

None of the four men had money, cars, contacts, weapons, or ideas of their own to contribute. Hussain supplied the plan, the vehicles, and the equipment . When Hussain gave Cromitie postpone a pending larceny case against him so he could be caught in their sting instead."

eighteen hundred dollars and asked him to buy a gun, the supposedly hardened criminal was unable to score a deal and had to return with the money unspent.

A few days before the attacks Hussain had planned, he drove the four men to Connecticut and showed them a fake missile system that he said could be used to shoot down military airplanes-they talked about using the weapon at Stewart Airport, near Newburgh. It is far from clear what the four Newburgh men were thinking at this point. They later claimed they were planning to scam Hussain for the money they had been promised (which they had been told was waiting for them in a UPS mailbox) and then disappear without actually

Hussain's promises of vast sums of money may have tempted them to be part of a plot ; there is some evidence that they thought it would only involve property damage to empty buildings. What is certain is that without Hussain's money and manipulation, they would never have been involved in terrorism. On May 20,2009, Hussain drove the four men to the Bronx, where Cromitie had the job of placing what he thought were explosive devices in the trunks of parked cars outside two synagogues while the others acted as lookouts. An FBI SWAT team appeared as Cromitie returned to Hussain's car, smashed through the car's windows, and arrested the men, charging them with attempting to use weapons of mass destruction. The news coverage of the case presented the four as America-hating terrorists dedicated to mass violence and motivated by radical Islam. doing anything. To a certain extent, this is consistent with their behavior. On the other hand,

(Narrative taken from: Arun Kundnani, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (2012), p. 188-191)

Cromitie’s story is far from unusual – the use of Agent Provocateurs for entrapment runs rampant in the post 9/11 era Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 188)

Martinez's story is far from unusual-it is in fact a textbook case of current FBI tactics in the domestic war on terror. Investigative journalist Trevor Aaronson has examined forty-nine terrorist prosecutions since 9/11 which involved an FBI agent provocateur . Among them were most of the high-profile terrorism cases over the last ten years. In all of them someone working for the FBI "provided not only the plan but also the means and opportunity for the terrorist plot:'" Without the FBI's help in supplying money, weapons, and often a specific plan of attack, the accused would not have had the capability to carry out any plot. In many cases, there is evidence suggesting that FBI agents provocateurs manipulated vulnerable people with mental health or drug addiction problems into conspiring in acts of planned violence they would otherwise have had

no intention of carrying out.

The most significant conversations between the agents provocateurs and the defendants were not recorded on these occasions (which, as Aaronson notes, is implausibly explained by technical failures).

Advantage One is the Police State: Provocation is the foundation stone for a corrupt police state – the FBI racially and ideologically profiles and targets, infiltrating groups that resist white colonial power Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, pp. 195 – 198)

In 2008, a new set of guidelines was introduced by Ashcroft's successor, Michael Mukasey, that explicitly defined the FBI as "an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency" and authorized the mass collection and circulation of surveillance data regardless of its connection to any unlawful conduct as conventionally understood. " (More recently, Mukasey has appeared at a conservative conference spouting Islamophobic conspiracy theories.) 34 From March 2009 to March 2011, FBI agents conducted 42,888 national security assessments-preliminary

which relax the requirement that suspicions have a factual basis.35 In carrying out "assessments'' the FBI can use informants, informal interviews, and physical surveillance without any time limitation." By 2011, the bureau had introduced Field Intelligence Groups to all of its fifty-six field offices and investigations of people or groups-following the new guidelines,

reportedly raised the number of intelligence analysts from 1,100 in October 2001 to nearly 3,000.37 Of its $8.1 billion budget, $4.9 billion was allocated to intelligence and counterterrorism3' Mark F. Giuliano, assistant director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, boasted that they had successfuliy transformed it from an investigative agency into an intelligence agency-in other words, the bureau was now gathering vast amounts of information unconnected

Models of radicalization gave the illusion that collecting information this way was somehow still tethered to preventing crime. But the truth was that the FBI's transformation had probably made it less effective at detecting actual terrorist plots, while the ones it was busily manufacturing with agents provocateurs gave the superficial appearance of an efficient counterterrorism program. The use of agent provocateurs has a long history. In his account of the tsarist secret police, known as the Okhrana, Maurice Laporte described provocation tactics as "the foundation stone" of a police state.40 The Okhranis innovative filing system, in which cards were held on half a million Russiansto specific criminal acts.39

with cross-referenced political friends, nonpolitical acquaintances, and persons in contact with friends of the suspect but not known to him personally-remains the basis of modern intelligence gathering-except today agencies use specialty software applications that are capable of far more efficient processing of much greater amounts of social network data than the paper-based techniques of a century ago.41 The model of the tsarist police state found its way to the US colonial regime in the Philippines when the constabulary's Information Section was established there in 1901 by Henry Allen, who had earlier worked as an American military attache in Russia in the 1890s.42 The section cultivated hundreds of paid Filipino agents across the country, making it "scarcely possible for seditionary measures of importance to be hatched without our knowledge;' as Allen wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt''

The techniques of compiling dossiers on dissidents' private lives, spreading disinformation in the media, and planting agents provocateurs among militants were applied to combating radical nationalist groups in Manila. Control over information proved as effective a tool of colonial power as physical force. During World War I, notes historian Alfred W McCoy, police methods that had been tested and perfected in the colonial Philippines migrated homeward to provide both precedents and personnel for the establishment of a US internal security apparatus ... After years of pacifying an overseas empire where race was the frame for perception and action, colonial veterans came home to turn the same lens on America, seeing its ethnic communities not as fellow citizens but as internal colonies requiring coercive controls.44 On this basis,

a domestic national security apparatus emerged. By the late 1950s the FBI's COINTEL program had systematized these techniques, using provocateurs and informants to infiltrate the Left, Puerto Rican nationalists, the

student movement, the civil rights movement, and some far Right groups :-About 1,500 of the 8,500 American Communist Party members were likely FBI informants in the early 1960s.Bythe end of the decade, agents who had previously worked in US foreign intelligence were transferring to the burgeoning field of domestic intelligence to spy on radical movements· A key part of the strategy was the manipulation of political

Agents provocateurs initiated disruptions of meetings and demonstrations, fights between rival groups, attacks on police, and bombings." At least one provocation ended in death. On May 15, 1970, Seattle activists into committing criminal acts so that the FBI could arrest and prosecute them.

police shot and killed Larry Eugene Ward as he fled the scene of an attempted bombing at a real estate office that had been accused of maintaining racial segregation in the city. It emerged that Ward had been recruited to place the bomb by an FBI informant as part of a plan to undermine the Black Panthers." As of 2008 the FBI had a roster of at least fifteen thousand informants- the number was disclosed in a budget authorization request that year for the $12.7 million needed to pay for software to track and manage them. The proportion who are assigned to infiltrate Muslim communities in the United States is unknown but likely to be substantial, given the FBI's prioritization of counterterrorism and its analysis of radicalization. told him: "We could go to a source and say, 'We know you're having an affair. If you work-with us, we won't tell your wife:"49 so been at Occupy Wall Street provoking violence.

Agent provocateurs destroy civil liberties through their blatantly unconstitutional, and universally immoral methods Aziz 12 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/11043-creeping-counterterrorism-from-muslims-to-politicalprotesters) The New York Police Department (NYPD) and other police departments conducted mass group arrests without having probable cause to arrest the group. Agent provocateurs infiltrated the Occupy movement to disturb and disrupt civil political assembly. Similar to mosque congregants who made like complaints, protesters accused the police of entrapping young people who were mentally disabled, drug addicts or who had just experienced a traumatic personal experience. Like their Muslim counterparts, Occupy leaders were subjected to hostile interrogations by law enforcement agents visiting their homes before a protest. The billions of dollars spent on increasing our government's domestic surveillance capabilities, ostensibly to protect Americans from "Islamist terrorists," is now used to spy on political protesters. In New York City alone, over 3,000 cameras have been installed to feed into a control center housed in a secret location, and $150 million surveillance systems allowed the NYPD to closely monitor Occupy protests, identify targets for infiltration and ultimately chill political activity. Hence the same playbook used to frighten Muslims from critiquing American policies or attending their mosques has now become the one used against the Occupy protesters. And the same national security powers expanded after 9/11 under the guise of keeping us safe from the Muslims are now enforced against political dissenters who challenge the economic inequities ailing our nation. By believing in the fallacy of the "Muslim terrorist other," we weakened our resolve to protect fundamental American values. As a result, post-9/11 counterterrorism authorities are

used to spy, infiltrate, entrap, arrest and aggressively prosecute any protesters. When we allow governments to forfeit our civil rights to protect "us" from "them," we lose sight of how quickly we can become the "them." So, how many more Americans must be subjected to civil liberties violations before we realize that no one is immune from creeping counterterrorism?

And, this surveillance apparatus functions as racialized totalitarianism under the guise of a liberal democracy Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 281-282)

Everyday life for communities under state surveillance programs increasingly resembles the patterns described in classic accounts of totalitarianism. There is the same sense of not knowing whom to trust, of choosing one's words with special care when discussing politics, and of the arbitrariness and unpredictability of state power. The thousands of American Muslims on the US government's no-fly list, for example, have no idea why their names are on it. Is it because they share a name with a suspected terrorist? Is it because someone with a grudge has phoned the government with false information? There

No one can be sure whether the telephone call to relatives in Iran is wiretapped, whether Facebook posts are read by officials, or whether the new face in the mosque congregation is an informant . They have heard the stories, so they are careful-just in case. Totalitarian rule thrives on its subjects' ignorance of the extent to which the surveillance system is monitoring their lives . The possibility, rather is no way of knowing.

than the fact, of surveillance is enough to generate fear, anxiety, and informal pressures to conform, to downplay

Thus an enforced culture of self-censorship emerges in communities that used to express their political opinions freely . Linda dissenting opinions, to declare one's absolute loyalty.

Sarsour, an Arab-American community activist from Brooklyn, New York, notes: Were Arabs, we talk about politics

This new idea that we must be suspicious of those who speak about politics- something's wrong .26 all the time. Politics is all we do! Every coffee shop, it's either al-jazeera or a soccer game on TV.

Humor is often the way people cope with this subtle psychological terror. The jokes American Muslims tell about state surveillance will be eerily familiar to those who lived under the East German Stasi; they are a way of

Occasions on which political issues might be tentatively discussed by Muslim Americans usually begin with a humorous reference to the wiretapped phone or the presence of an informant ." Such humor is also an acknowledgment that the surveillance regime has been normalized in their everyday lives. Sunaina Marr Maira, a New England community activist, has written of how she and her acknowledging the same anxiety.

colleagues began to develop strategies to manage the unspoken anxiety about the intrusion of state powers into everyday life, by self-consciously drawing attention to this constant possibility of surveillance. We made jokes about FBI videotaping and wiretapping, dressing for the camera, and possible informants in our midst ... Our humor, I think, was a way to grapple with the unknown and ever-present reach of state powers. 28 After repeated FBI interrogations over a six-month period in 2002, in which he was asked about every aspect of his life, Hasan M. Elahi, an artist and scholar at the University of Maryland, began to produce a Web site that automatically documented every flight he took, every place he visited, every financial transaction, and every meal he ate-a darkly humorous parody of the national-security state's obsession with quotidian detail. "There are 46,000 images on my site;' he writes - -"I trust that the FBI has seen all of them."29

And, preemptive counterterrorism strategies specifically target Muslims for undue surveillance Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, pp. 194-195)

After 9/11, the FBI adopted a preemptive stance on countering terrorism- what john Ashcroft, then attorney general, repeatedly promoted as a new "paradigm of prevention :'" The belief was that the usual principles of the rule of law-investigating individuals when there was a reasonable

Surveillance had to be broadened to a wider group suspected of radicalization . In line with this, Ashcroft revised the FBI's guidelines so that the threshold for counterterrorism investigations was significantly lowered .29 Whereas earlier, informants could be used only when there was strong evidence of criminal activity, after 9/11 they could be employed much more widely . Philip Mudd, who suspicion of criminal intent -were insufficient for tackling terrorism.

in 2006 became associate executive director of the National Security Branch of the FBI, explained the

there will be people dragged into those investigations who did not do something wrong :'" Mudd was recruited consequences of the new preventive approach: "By definition, if you are preventative,

to lead the process of transforming the FBI into a spy agency on the model of Britairis MIS, of moving the bureau beyond investigating individual cases to a wideranging gathering of information on American Muslim communities in general. He had previously been deputy director of the CIA:s Counterterrorism Center, during the period when it tortured terrorism suspects, and in the run-up to the Iraq war, when he liaised with then secretary of state Colin

Mudd introduced a program at the FBI called "domain management'' that involved producing electronic maps showing in detail where ethnic groups were clustered, crossreferencing such information with databases of financial transactions, charitablegiving activities, jobs held, and so on. This then became the basis for allocating resources and informant recruitment to specific neighborhoods-effectively, a form of ethnic profiling.31 The FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, which implements The Attorney Powell prior to his notorious speech at the UN, which was based on fabricated intelligence.

General Guidelines, calls on agents to refrain from profiling "solely" on the b.asis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. But they permit the collection of informalion regarding ethnic behaviors "reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community" - which, given the FBI's model of

would allow for all kinds of Muslim religious practices to be subject to surveillance. Also permitted is the identification of"locations of concentrated ethnic communities [and] the radicalization,

locations of ethnic-oriented businesses and other facilities;' which presumably includes mosques. 32

Advantage Two is Terrorist Threat Construction Agent provocateurs create “terrorism scares” that are used to legitimate increased surveillance and securitization Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, pp. 201)

agent provocateur operations can also have serious disruptive effects in particular localities . In October 2010, Farooque Ahmed was arrested in northern Virginia after an operation involving an FBI agent provocateur. He appears to have been planning to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the US military presence there, but as part of a sting operation, the FBI hatched a plan for him to bomb subway stations on the DC Metro. 56 Though the idea to attack the Metro originated with the FBI, the arrest caused officials to become concerned that As well as distorting the overall perception of threat,

the DC subway network was indeed vulnerable to terrorism. Security was beefed up in response to the imagined plot, and physical and mechanical bag searches were introduced. Officials argued that even if the idea to bomb the Metro had come from the FBI, now that it was public, it had to be taken seriously as a plot that might be emulated by others." Another hidden cost was the disbanding of a local women's group that called itself Hip Muslim Moms, of which Ahmed's wife happened to be a member. The group was tarred by association after the media coverage of his high-profile arrest and ended its activities, though his wife was not accused of any crime. It had been involved in such radical activities as coupon clipping, exchanging recipes, and watching Sex and the City. 58

Muslim American groups are targeted more so than Far-Right groups, even though Far-Right groups perform a substantially greater number of terrorist acts. –This is based of and further perpetuates threat construction, stripping American Muslims from their Constitutional rights, forcing then to be seen as “foreign.” Braine 15 (Braine, Naomi. "Terror Network or Lone Wolf? | Political Research Associates." Political Research Associates. Political Research Associates, 19 June 2015. Web. 19 July 2015. . Naomi Braine is an Associate Professor in the Sociology Department at Brooklyn College, CUNY, and a lifelong activist in struggles for social justice. Her political and intellectual work has addressed mass incarceration, the “War on Drugs”/drug policy, HIV and collective action, and, more recently, the “War on Terror.”)

“Terrorism,” unmodified, is used to refer to international terrorism, involving people or plans that include a demonstrated or attributed link to an international entity. Cases involving Muslims that clearly originate in the U.S. are classified as “homegrown” international terrorism, even though any links to international networks or entities may exist only in the eyes of law enforcement. The Congressional Research Service defines “domestic terrorists” as “people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based militant ideologies and movements.”16 This somewhat confusing FBI and DoJ distinction between “homegrown” and “domestic” terrorism produces interesting contradictions: in domestic cases involving Christian militants, antisemitism is cast as a U.S.-based ideology, but in “homegrown” cases, it’s evidence of global jihad among Muslims. The DoJ lists 403 cases of (international) terrorism from September 2001 through March 201017: 11 percent non-Islamist (mostly FARC or Tamil Tigers), 45 percent Islamist, and 44 percent undetermined (mostly cases of fraud or financial misconduct involving someone with an “Arab-sounding” name). The Islamist category includes 30 cases considered to be “homegrown.” The FBI and DoJ do not provide publicly accessible lists of domestic terrorism cases, which complicates direct comparisons between domestic and homegrown cases. The data that do exist on domestic terrorism, or politically motivated violence, result from examining local, state, and federal law enforcement activity to identify relevant cases. A few nonprofit institutes track domestic political violence and terrorism cases, although their definitions and exact lists vary. For the purposes of this report, I have drawn upon the two most extensive and widely cited. The Southern Poverty Law Center focuses primarily on right-

The period from September 2001 through December 2010 lists 50 cases, almost double the number of “homegrown” wing activity, and has the most detailed and comprehensive list.18

Islamist cases in a similar period, and 21 of the 50 took place in 2009 and 2010, following President Obama’s inauguration. All 50 domestic cases involve elements of the Far Right, from Christian Identity to various militia movements to the KKK and other white supremacist groups. Terrorist acts often involved significant caches of weapons and explosives, with targets ranging from the murder of government representatives to assaults on synagogues or mosques and other Islamic centers. According to the New America Foundation, 19 which tracks cases explicitly classified as terrorism within the U.S., only 41 percent of jihadist plots in the U.S. since 9/11 involved weapons, and in almost one-third of those cases, the weapons were supplied by U.S. government agents. By contrast, 89 percent of domestic terrorism cases involved weapons, and in 92 percent of these cases the arms were acquired without assistance from government agents. Based on the statistics and analysis of available cases, there are significant differences in the procedures, charges, and penalties in domestic (non-Islamist) and

Despite the greater prevalence of incidents and deaths resulting from right-wing violence, U.S. Muslims experience more aggressive surveillance, greater use of informants, more severe charges, and greater use of restrictive confinement once incarcerated. The differential treatment of right-wing and Muslim cases draws attention to the political contexts surrounding terrorismrelated law enforcement, as these disparities only make sense within politicallydriven calculations. Mainstream conservative politicians and media personalities protest depictions of right-wing militants as anything more than troubled but patriotic Americans, while Muslim men—particularly young men— are constantly monitored as intrinsic security risks. In the process, Muslims lose Constitutional protections for belief, speech, and association—forced to inhabit an ambiguous territory as “un-American” and presumptively foreign . homegrown (usually Islamist) cases.

And, fabricated terrorist attacks prove the nature of the terrorist threat is in part a self-fulfilling prophecy. The FBI’s choice of whom to target determines the terrorist threat and sustains racial violence in the War on Terror Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 199-200)

A second consequence of the provocation strategy is the distorting effect on perceptions of the domestic terrorist threat. The FBI has generated a stream of terrorist convictions that are considered genuine by policy makers and analysts. That these cases would not have existed without FBI fabrication is ignored. This means that mainstream analysis of the scale and nature of the terrorist threat is in part a self-fulfilling prophecy, reflecting the FBI's choices of whom to target. If the numbers of people arrested in a particular year go up, it is as likely to be because of

a step-up in the number of agent provocateur operations the FBI is carrying out as the result of an independent increase in terrorist plotting. If Muslims constitute the majority of those indicted for terrorism in the US, this is in large part a product of whom the FBI is deciding to target in provocation operations rather than an objective measure of where the threat of terrorism comes from. In the two decades leading up to 2010, 348 people were killed in acts of political violence committed by the American far Right in the United States. Of course, a much larger number of people died in the 9/11 attacks, carried out by Muslims present in the US as foreign visitors . But the number of people killed in acts of political violence carried out by Muslim American citizens or longterm residents of the US is much smaller: twenty people between 1990 and 2010.51 Yet because the FBI considers Muslim Americans a special risk, it targets them with agents provocateurs to a far greater degree than it does the far Right . The result is that every two months or so the FBI announces another high-profile arrest of a Muslim terrorist suspect, keeping the US on its war on terror footing and sustaining the multi-billion dollar homeland security industry, while the far Right threat is downplayed. In turn, the stereotype of Muslims as inherently prone to terrorism is perpetuated.

Thus the Plan: The US Supreme Court should substantially curtail the FBI’s use of agents provocateurs.

The use of Agent Provocateurs should be expressly prohibited to avoid the harms of entrapment expressed in both advantages Klemencic, 2006. (Goran, Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security Studies, University of Maribor, Slovenia. “Review of the Law on Operative Investigations of the Republic of Moldova.” European Commission, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 12 October. http://old.parlament.md/download/expertises/912%20Molico%20Klemencic %20expert%20legisl%20%20Law%20on%20operative%20Investigations%20PCRED%20DGI %20EXP(2006)%2047.doc)

Expressly prohibit “agents provocateurs” Use of undercover agents and investigative experiment , for all its benefits, is also associated with a number of problems resulting in possibilities that they provoke criminal activity and entrap an innocent person . Accordingly, the law should address the issue of agents provocateurs by sanctioning entrapment / provocation which falls beyond the scope of admissible law enforcement conduct . In accordance to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Teixeira de Castro v Portugal (1999) 28 EHRR 101 the issue could be address in the law

along the following lines:

In implementing the covert measures and in employing undercover agents the competent agencies, their agents and persons cooperating with them are prohibited to provoke criminal activity. In determining whether the criminal activity was provoked, the court shall give primary consideration to whether the measure as implemented led to the committing of a criminal offence by a person who would otherwise not have been

prepared to commit this type of criminal offence . It shall not be deemed that the criminal activity was provoked where it is obvious from all the circumstances that the state agencies and their agents did no more (whether by passive or active means) then to provide the suspect the opportunity to commit the offence, of which he or she freely took advantage in circumstances where it appears that he or she would have behaved in a similar way if offered the opportunity by someone else.

If the criminal activity was provoked, this shall be a circumstance that excludes the initiation of criminal proceedings for criminal offences committed in connection with the measures.

Empirically the Courts have the ability to regulate the FBI's surveillance, and through regulation it is necessary to eliminate Agent Provocateurs to further restrict surveillance. Holden, 2008 (Henry M. is an aviation historian and author. In 1994, Mr. Holden was cited in the United States Congressional Record for his work in recording the history of American women in aviation, and was the recipient of the Author’s Award from the New Jersey Institute of Technology for his book Her Mentor Was An Albatross – The Autobiography of Pioneer Pilot Harriet Quimby. FBI 100 Years)

FISA Court Throughout the twentieth century, the FBI used wiretaps and other surveillance methods without a warrant when it felt that national security was at risk. In some cases, the FBI and the CIA spied on domestic political groups, in clear violation for the Fourth Amendment. In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that the president’s authority over national security did not justify using domestic wiretaps without a warrant: “The freedoms of the Fourth Amendment,” said the court, “cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances are conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch, without the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate.” Six years later, Congress responded by passing FISA in an attempt to regulate the few cases (then) in which national security is at stake and in which law enforcement agents are either unable to procure a traditional warrant because they cannot show probable cause or are unwilling to do so because the information is classified or time is critical . Wiretapping is a more accurate and benign technique to penetrate terrorist cells than the main alternative, which is recruiting informers, a dangerous and unreliable way tactic. The narrower the government’s surveillance powers, the more it will rely on informants who provide information second-hand.

External restrictions are key—the FBI currently executes changes as it sees fit—only external restrictions increase public accountability and permanence. ACLU, 13 (September 2013, “UNLEASHED AND UNACCOUNTABLE; The FBI’s Unchecked Abuse of Authority,” https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/unleashed-and-unaccountable-fbireport.pdf)//CB The next section of the report discusses the ways the FBI avoids accountability by skirting internal and external oversight.

The FBI, which Congress exempted from the Whistleblower Protection Act, effectively suppresses

internal dissent by retaliating against employees who report waste, fraud, abuse, and illegality. As a result, 28 percent of non-supervisory FBI employees surveyed by the Inspector General said they “never” reported misconduct they saw or heard about on the job. The FBI also aggressively investigates other government whistleblowers, which has led to an unprecedented increase in Espionage Act prosecutions over the last five years. And the FBI’s overzealous pursuit of government whistleblowers has also resulted in the inappropriate targeting of journalists for investigation, infringing on free press rights. Recent coverage of overbroad subpoenas for telephone records of Associated Press journalists and an inappropriate search warrant for a Fox News reporter are only the latest examples of abuse. In 2010 the Inspector General reported the FBI used an illegal “exigent letter” to obtain the telephone records of 7 New York Times and Washington Post reporters. And the FBI thwarts congressional oversight with excessive secrecy and delayed or misleading responses to questions from Congress. ¶ Finally, the report highlights evidence of

abuse that requires greater regulation , oversight, and public

accountability. These include many examples of the FBI targeting First Amendment activities by spying on protesters and religious groups with aggressive tactics that infringe on their free speech, religion, and associational rights. In 2011, the ACLU exposed flawed and biased FBI training materials that likely fueled these inappropriate investigations.¶ The FBI also operates increasingly outside the United States, where its activities are more difficult to monitor. Several troubling cases indicate the FBI may have requested, facilitated, and/or exploited the arrests of U.S. citizens by foreign governments, often without charges, so they could be held and interrogated, sometimes tortured, and then interviewed by FBI agents. The ACLU represents two proxy detention victims, including Amir Meshal, who was arrested at the Kenya border in 2007 and subjected to more than four months of detention in three different East African countries without charge, access to counsel, or presentment before a judicial officer, at the behest of the U.S. government. FBI agents interrogated Meshal more than thirty times during his detention. ¶ Other Americans traveling abroad discover that their government has barred them from flying; the number of U.S. persons on the No Fly List has doubled since 2009. There is no fair procedure for those mistakenly placed on the list to challenge their inclusion. Many of those prevented from flying home have been subjected to FBI interviews after seeking assistance from U.S. Embassies. The ACLU is suing the government on behalf of 10 American citizens and permanent residents who were prevented from flying to the U.S., arguing that barring them from flying without due process is unconstitutional.¶ These FBI abuses of authority must end. We call on President Barack Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder to tighten FBI authorities to prevent unnecessary invasions of Americans’ privacy; prohibit profiling based on race, ethnicity, religion and national origin; and protect First Amendment activities. And we call on Congress to make these changes permanent through statute and improve oversight to prevent future abuse. The FBI serves a crucial role in protecting Americans, but it must protect our rights as it protects our security.

2AC Blocks

Case

Advantage 1: The Police State After 9/11 the FBI has increasingly been racially profiling, and infiltrating groups that resist white colonial power. AP’s contribute to a totalitarian like state that uses preemptive counterterrorism strategies that strip citizens of their constitutional rights specifically Muslims, and all without probable cause.

Advantage 2: Terrorist Threat Construction Agents provocateurs create “terrorism scares” or their own probable cause that’s used to rationalize surveillance and securitization of threats. These fabricated terrorist attacks allow the FBI to endlessly create their own terrorism threats, and the creation of these false threats sustains racial violence in Society, and the War on Terror today..

Solvency Extensions 1) Courts have the ability to rule on FBI surveillance cases. Infringements such as: Surveillance through domestic wire tapping, and warrantless surveillance on political groups reveal the need for court ruling—That’s Holden 2) Extend Our Klemencic evidence it gives clear guidelines that a. Bans any type of agent provocateur from operating b. Says that under the guidelines even if the FBI does provoke someone, the victim will not be subject to criminal trials or charges. 3) Only an external approach to regulating the FBI pulls back the shower curtain, and solves for the otherization of Muslims. By going through the supreme court, the FBI’s operations become exposed to the public and they’ll realize that the majority of terrorist attacks by Muslims were incited by agent provocateur’s and there is no such thing as an exclusively terrorist race. That’s Kundnani, and ACLU.

AT: Inherency They only talk about age old laws that our aff directly answers when our Aziz, Braine , and Kundnani evidence cite several examples where ap’s are still fully operating today.

Impact framing NOTES: Must win ! framing, and Value to life. Don’t concede the util debate. Util is bad, because x,y,z…

1ar O/v for util--- Here are reasons why you’re voting aff, they aren’t winning ! framing. The reason why you have to weigh value to life over util is… (insert reasons) You have to prefer VTL over util calculability, and VTL is better than util cause it allows convo’s of racism and oppression that would be skirted in the 1nc.

2ac O/v– Case turns their impacts- extend the entire 1ac, its whole preface is that util is terrible, and impact turns any util good args. We outweigh on magnitude, our ev talks about racialized violence, and makes the arg that minority groups are being severely screwed over through racial profiling by FBI surveillance. This destroys any VTL, and VTL is infinitely more important than util cause it allows policies to solve for racism and oppression, which is skirted in the 1nc. We also outweigh on probability, and timeframe, in the sqou ap’s intentionally create, and sustain the otherization of Muslim’s. This means that Muslim’s lives are degraded to nothing, and they are doing this to rationalize the large increase in securitization, and surveillance that the state uses. The government uses this surveillance to infiltrate and destroy activist groups that resist white colonial power, which strips citizen’s civil liberties, and perpetuates racial profiling. Probability is the most important measurement for debate because… Value to life is Not Based on Duration or Longevity – Living As If We’re Never-Going-to-Die, Just Means We Will Die HavingNever-Really-Lived. Razinsky 9-Lecturer in the Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies @ Bar-Ilan University [Liran Razinsky, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2) 2009 Pg 76-81 ProjectMuse]

Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The

encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life.17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards

Life is impoverished , it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked . It becomes as

death has a powerful effect on our lives.

shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take

Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur.

necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear.18 The examples—not experimenting

It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide.

better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a

It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our efort in surviving , something of the true nature of life evades us . It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture:

both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value . Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist.

The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements

(violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest . Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are

Life without death is life lacking in intensity , an impoverished, shallow and empty life . Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the dealing here, and to extend it.

conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be denied. We are forced to believe in it. People

Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences , taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death , a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291).

is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,”

the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty.19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum , or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world , according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present . Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time . This is one reason for the threat of death : it ruins value where value is only assured through duration . It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production

Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations . It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, and accumulation.

the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is

this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and

stops us sometimes from living the present . “ The need for duration ,” in the words of Bataille, “ conceals life from us ” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial .

Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end Weizman 11-professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London (Eyal Weizman, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10) The

theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend

In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘ Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort .’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-toohuman version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped to those who have suffered as a result.

between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff

Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost .’16 In one of its more into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14

macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization . Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the

The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources.

other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s

Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them . Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility . philosophical essay The Order of Evils. In this book

-(if they concede util) Yo they’ve conceded that is util bad there’s no analysis as to why their impact is worse in the world of the af, which means we win that our impacts take precedence to any other, and we still have value to life. Don’t let them bring this up in the 2nr they had 13 minutes in the block. No new in the 2. Note: if they concede util make ^^^ your o/v

-They say “even if we lose util debate conditions are still worsened by the d/a’s impacts.” but we’ve already won ! d.

-

Ap’s intentionally create, and sustain the otherization of muslims. They are doing this to rationalize the large increase in securitization, and surveillance that the state uses. The government uses this surveillance to infiltrate and destroy activist groups that resist white colonial power. Without the plan the FBI gives other government agencies the ability to use surveillance as a tool to seek out threats, but there are no actual threats that they survey. Our Kundnani evidence even says that right-wing extremist have been involved in 15x more terrorist attacks than muslims in the past 2 decades, and almost all muslim terrorist attacks were provoked by the FBI’s ap’s.

STOCK ISSUES FOR NOVICES

Significance This answers the "why" of debate. All advantages and disadvantages to the status quo and of the plan are evaluated under significance. Significance is derived from calculating between advantages and disadvantages, whereas significant policy changes are determined by how much the policy itself changed (rather than how good or bad the effects are). So significance is about the effects of the plan.

Solvency The mechanics of the plan itself are defined in solvency. What it causes and why. Here the harms are often demonstrated to be solved by the plan, or the link to new advantages are shown. Without solvency, a plan is useless. Thus, the affirmative loses a debate without solvency, no matter how well it described problems of the status quo.

Topicality The affirmative case has affirm the resolution, or else it obviously doesn’t reside under the resolution which makes it unfair for the negative team since your aff could be literally anything. Most aff’s will be topical, as is ours, but there will always be that bell-air team that reads weird stuff.

Harms Harms are a way of quantifying the problems or short-comings of the status quo. They give reasons why we shouldn’t keep the status qou as it is.

Inherency Inherency: Inherent barriers as to why the plan can’t be passed in the status quo

-The FBI can use AP’s to do whatever they want them to do, and the Government has basically allowed for this to happen because no one is stopping them from doing it -Not only will your plan overcome inherent barriers but also will pass, but you really don’t have to focus on the plan happening more if it happens, because you need to win that it’s absolutely necessary for whatever reason.

Card Structure Evidence in debates is organized into units called cards. Cards are designed to condense an author's argument so that debaters have an easy way to access the information. A card is composed of three parts: the tag, the cite, and the body. The tag is the debater's summary of the argument presented in the body. It’s usually only one or two sentences. The cite, the author, date of publication, journal, title, etc.. In round you’ll just read the author’s last name, and date for a citation. Some teams will also read the author's qualifications if they wish to emphasize this information. The body of a card is often underlined or highlighted in order to eliminate unnecessary or redundant sentences when the card is read in a round. So again, In a round, the tag is read first, followed by the cite and the body. - Next is the argument structure of a card… - Claim: a claim is a statement you are advancing as true. The claim is usually summarized in the card’s tag. Even when you’re not reading evidence, a claim is any declarative statement that you are trying to establish as true within the debate. -

Warrant: Warrants are what you use to create legitimacy for your claims. They are the reasons why the claim is true. You should dedicate a substantial amount of your time to debating about warrants

-

Impact: The impacts are why someone should care about your argument. Impacts connect small pieces of the debate to the broader picture. They help the judge decide what decision is best.

Other case stuf Adv 1 EXT Kundnani 12 evidence stating that Provocation is the foundation stone for a police state – the FBI racially and ideologically profiles and targets, infiltrating groups that resist white colonial power. Kundnani does a really good job explaining this by showing how informants can be used at no expense and have empirically been used to break up social justice movements, the exact example cited is the COINTEL program infiltrating the civil rights movement and Puerto Rican nationalists. EXT Kundnani 12 evidence stating that the surveillance apparatus functions as racialized totalitarianism under the guise of a liberal democracy; the fact that there is now questioning and uncertainty within Muslim American communities that promotes self-censorship is blunt thoughtpolicing

AT: FBI’s racial profiling They say that the af can’t gain access to solvency because it doesn’t include the entirety of FBI operations against racial profiling. Even if the af doesn’t address the entirety of the FBI, only the absence of agent provocateurs can uniquely solve for terror threat construction. Extend the first piece of Kundnani evidence in the 2nd advantage. This card cites the instance in which the FBI itself came up with the idea to bomb the DC Metro station, and then after the FBI agent provocateurs encouraged a Muslim to act on it, they beefed up security and used it as a way to justify an increase in surveillance. This gives way to unnecessary terror threat construction, because the threat in question would not have existed without it being carried out in part or constructed by agent provocateurs. AND Extend our Kundnani 12 evidence stating the FBI’s choice of whom to target via terrorist threat construction sustains racial violence in the War on Terror. Kundnani does a really good job by comparing the death numbers of those victim to Far Right terrorist acts vs Muslim American terrorist acts and how even though the Far Right is substantially more, because Muslim Americans are deemed as a special risk to America, the FBI targets them. This means that because of terror threat construction, that is what stems the racial aspect of what a “terrorist looks like” or the “characteristics of a terrorist” that drives the FBI to target in the first place, therefore by solving (which our plan does) the terror threat construction, the FBI will no longer be able to target in the first place. AND cross-apply the Kundnani 12 evidence stating that provocation is the foundation stone for a police state and that the police state of the FBI is what ideologically profiles and targets groups. This means that because provocation is what drives profiling and targeting, the af

garners solvency for provocation, then, prohibiting the use of agent provocateurs uniquely solves profiling and targeting of the entirety of the surveillance apparatus.

Durable Fiat (Pretty Gucci) Durable FIAT is good, and FIAT solves for the plan enforcement. When plan goes into efect, it’s implemented fully, allowing it to be enforced without any circumvention. More importantly whether or not plan is later overturned is irrelevant as far as policy debate is concerned - the purpose of policy debate is to test a fictional world in where the plan is deemed a good or bad idea. Since they haven’t given a single reason why the af is a bad idea, whether or not it will be later overturned doesn't matter because the benefits to plan outweigh the ramifications of not doing plan.

Racial Profiling Extensions

Racial Profiling Link FBI Agent provocateurs specifically target Muslim communities for unwarranted, illegal surveillance Freeland 11 [Bridget, Muslims Say FBI Informant Dealt Drugs While Snooping on Believers' Sex Lives, 2/24/11, Courthouse News, http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/02/24/34410.htm] LOS ANGELES (CN) - In a federal class action, Muslims claim the FBI hired an "agent provocateur" to infiltrate mosques and "indiscriminately collect personal information on hundreds and perhaps thousands of innocent Muslim Americans in Southern California." The class claims the agents had their snitch provide illegal drugs to Muslims and snoop on their sex lives, and that the fruitless "dragnet investigation" did not end until "members of the Muslim communities of Southern California reported the informant to the police because of his violent rhetoric, and ultimately obtained a restraining order against him." Represented by the ACLU and Council on American-Islam Relations, the three named plaintiffs say the FBI's agent provocateur's "violent rhetoric" about "jihad and armed conflict" disrupted their religious practice. The class claims the FBI has been profiling Muslim communities since Sept. 11, 2001, and requested interviews with hundreds of Muslims, "often by sending FBI agents to appear unannounced" to their homes or workplaces, to question them about religious practices. This despite the fact that in 2006, the FBI's Assistant Director for the Los Angeles area, Stephen Tidwell, assured a Muslim group that the FBI would never send an undercover informant to spy on believers. But in July 2006, FBI agents Kevin Armstrong and Paul Allen directed undercover informant Craig Monteilh to infiltrate the mosques in Southern California and paid him $6,000 to $11,000 per month create video and audio recordings of Muslim activities, the plaintiffs claim. They add that Monteilh was provided with "sophisticated audio and video recording devices." Monteilh then publicly declared his Muslim faith during a prayer in front of hundreds of members of the Islamic Center of Irvine (ICOI), and immersed himself in the religion, the class says. Monteilh went to 10 mosques in the area to interact with followers, and attended up to four mosques in one day. Armstrong and Allen ordered him to "gather as much information on as many people in the Muslim community as possible," the class claims. Armstrong and Allen told Monteilh "that they could get in a lot of trouble if people found out what surveillance they had in the mosques, which Monteilh understood to mean that they did not have warrants," the complaint states. It continues: "Nonetheless, Agent Armstrong told Monteilh that the FBI had every mosque in the area under surveillance - including both the ones he went to and the ones he didn't." Halfway through the 75-page complaint, the class claims: "Agents Armstrong and Allen were well aware that many of the surveillance tools that they had given Monteilh were being used illegally . Agent Armstrong once told Monteilh that while warrants were needed to conduct most surveillance for criminal investigations, 'National security is different. Kevin is God.' Agent Armstrong also told Monteilh more than once that they did not always need warrants, and that even if they could not use the information in court because they did not have a warrant, it was still useful to have the information. He said that they

could attribute the information to a confidential source if they needed to." The class claims: "Apart from the electronic surveillance program, Agents Armstrong and Allen also directed their surveillance at people on the basis of their religion by instructing Monteilh to look for and identify to them people with certain religious backgrounds or traits, such as anyone who studied fiqh (a strand of Islamic law concerning morals and etiquette), who was an imam or sheikh; who went on Hajj; who played a leadership role at a mosque or in the Muslim community; who expressed sympathies to mujahideen; who was a 'white' Muslim; or who went to an Islamic school overseas." They also told Monteilh to look particularly for people attracted younger Muslims, and to discuss extreme Islamic attitudes and leaders to observe people's reactions, the class claims. Monteilh was ordered to work under cover as a "fitness consultant," and, following orders, he "worked out with Muslims in various gyms around the Orange County area and elicited a wide variety of information, including travel plans, political and religious views," the class claims. He collected names, phone numbers, email addresses and license plate numbers of mosque members and turned them over to his handlers, the class says. The agents sought to collect incriminating information about certain Muslims - "such as immigration issues, sexual activity, business problems, or crimes like drug use. Agents Armstrong and Allen instructed Monteilh to pay attention to people's problems, to talk about and record them, including marital problems, business problems, and petty criminal issues. Agents Armstrong and Allen on several occasions talked about different individuals that they believed might be susceptible to rumors about their sexual orientation, so that they could be persuaded to become informants through the threat of such rumors being started," the complaint states. The agents told Monteilh that "everybody knows somebody," and then "explained" what that meant: "They explained that if someone is from Afghanistan, that meant that they would likely have some distant member of their family or acquaintance who has some connection with the Taliban. If they are from Lebanon, it might be Hezbollah; if they are from Palestine, it might be Hamas. By finding out what connections they might have to these terrorist groups, no matter how distant, they could threaten the individuals and pressure them to provide information, or could justify additional surveillance. "Agents Armstrong and Allen also instructed Monteilh to engage in acts that would build his reputation as a devout Muslim who had access to black market items. On one occasion, Agents Armstrong and Allen instructed Monteilh to provide Vicodin to a person whose father was sick in a foreign country. On another occasion, Agent Allen instructed Monteilh to provide prescription anabolic steroids to another two individuals to similarly further his credibility, which he did." In early 2007, the agents told Monteilh "to start asking more pointedly about jihad and armed conflict, then to more openly suggest his own willingness to engage in violence," according to the complaint. "Pursuant to these instructions, in one-on-one conversations, Monteilh began asking people about violent jihad, expressing frustration over the oppression of Muslims around the world, pressing them for their views, and implying that he might be willing or able to take action. "In about May 2007, on instructions from his handlers, Monteilh told a number of individuals that he believed it was his duty as a Muslim to take violence actions, and that he had access to weapons. Many members of the Muslim community at ICOI then reported these statements to community leaders, including

Hussam Ayloush. Ayloush both called the FBI to report the statements and instructed the individuals who had heard the statements to report them to the Irvine Police Department, which they did. "As a community, ICOI also brought an action for a restraining order against Monteilh to bar him from the mosque. A California Superior Court granted the restraining order in June 2007." Monteilh's identity was eventually revealed, "first in court documents where the FBI and local law enforcement revealed his role, and then through his own statements which were reported widely in the press," the class claims. Monteilh sued the FBI for $10 million in January 2010. As Courthouse News reported at the time, Monteilh claims he "was arrested in December 2007 and 'forced under the color of authority by the FBI and its agents, to plead guilty to grand theft, suffer a felony conviction, and endure sixteen months in prison for work performed at the direction of the FBI.'" He also claimed that he was endangered by being placed in the general population in prison after it was revealed that he was an FBI snitch. In the new class action, named plaintiff Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, an imam with the Orange County Islamic Foundation, says that he can no longer counsel congregants at the mosque because they fear surveillance. Fazaga claims that since having contact with Monteilh, he "has also been subjected to secondary screening and searches upon return to the U.S. from various international trips, being held up between 45 minutes and three hours most times he travels." The complaint states: "By targeting Muslims in the Orange County and Los Angeles areas for surveillance because of their religion and religious practice, the FBI's operation not only undermined the trust between law enforcement and the Southern California Muslim communities, it also violated the Constitution's fundamental guarantee of government neutrality towards all religions." It adds that the 14-month "dragnet investigation did not result in even a single conviction related to counterterrorism." "Approximately 500,000 Muslims live in Southern California, more than 120,000 of them in Orange County, making the area home to the second-largest population of Muslims in the United States," the complaint states. The class demands damages from the FBI, its Director Robert Mueller, Assistant Director Steven Martinez, Agents Armstrong and Allen and three other agents, for violations the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Privacy Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The class also wants destruction of the information the FBI obtained illegally. Its lead counsel is Peter Bibring with the ACLU of Southern California.

Far Right Not Profiled Almost half of Islamic terrorism cases involved an agent provocateur – attacks from the Far-Right are rarely built through stings. Braine 15 (Braine, Naomi. "Terror Network or Lone Wolf? | Political Research Associates." Political Research Associates. Political Research Associates, 19 June 2015. Web. 19 July 2015. . Naomi Braine is an Associate Professor in the Sociology Department at Brooklyn College, CUNY, and a lifelong activist in struggles for social justice. Her political and intellectual work has addressed mass incarceration, the “War on Drugs”/drug policy, HIV and collective action, and, more recently, the “War on Terror.”) The disparate treatment of the two groups of alleged terrorists begins before charges are ever filed, with how the two are investigated. Covert surveillance is, by definition, difficult to prove unless specific prosecutions or other evidence bring it into public view. A report by the New York University School of Law20 describes systematic surveillance of Muslim communities by the NYPD, FBI, and other law enforcement entities in the U.S. The

No evidence exists of similar routine surveillance of communities with significant rightwing activity, and reports and other materials about the Right produced by the FBI, DHS, and Congressional Research Service all emphasize the right to freedom of speech and expression, including the importance of differentiating beliefs from actions. Based on available case summaries, the majority of domestic terrorism prosecutions occur after the perpetrator has taken concrete action or as a consequence of other law enforcement contact, which suggests a low level of ongoing surveillance of right-wing movements. The New America Foundation data indicate that 46.8 percent of Islamic terrorism cases involve use of an informant but only 27.5 percent of non-Islamic cases do.21 According to a report by Columbia University Law School and Human Rights Watch, 50 percent of federal counterterrorism convictions resulted from informant-based cases, and almost 30 percent were stings.22 (A “sting” refers to a case in which an informant or undercover agent actively developed the case, leading defendants to escalate their activity and often providing explosives or other materials.) The Columbia Law School report found that all but four of the high-profile homegrown terrorism plots of the last 10 years were FBI sting operations. While informants play a role in domestic cases, there is little recent evidence of right-wing cases being built through stings (although there is some history of FBI stings with environmental activists in the early 2000s). A 2009 case in Newburgh, NY, that became known as the Newburgh Four23, 24 provides an widespread use of informants in homegrown terrorism cases also indicates an ongoing undercover presence.

example of an FBI sting operation. Newburgh is a small, formerly industrial city about 60 miles north of New York City, with a substantial African-American population and relatively high poverty rate. In 2011, the city was declared

In the winter of 2009, an FBI informant developed a relationship with an openly antisemitic Muslim man who had a history of drug addiction. The informant offered him $250,000 plus additional luxuries if he would gather a group of Muslims to carry out a terrorist attack. The man recruited three the murder capital of New York state.

friends, each of whom had significant financial needs. Each received small amounts of cash during the time the informant guided them in developing a plan to attack Stewart Air National Guard Base and bomb a local synagogue, using explosives and a vehicle provided by the informant. The men were arrested after the informant delivered the men and the explosives to cars provided by the FBI. All four were charged with conspiracy, attempt to use weapons of mass destruction, and plotting to kill U.S. government employees, and were sentenced to 25 years in prison. A judge rejected an appeal based on entrapment, accepting the government’s rationale that the men would have eventually committed terrorism on their own—a theory called “radicalization” that has been used in multiple prosecutions of accused Muslim terrorists. In contrast, the participation of informants and undercover agents in right-wing cases has been much more limited, and does not involve either initiating a plot or being the only source of weapons or explosive materials . In 2002, Larry Raugust, an anti-government militant well known to law enforcement, gave an explosive device to an undercover agent; he ended up pleading guilty to 15 counts of making bombs, and served just over five years in a federal prison.25 Similarly, in 2005, Gabriel Carafa, a man with ties to the neonazi World Church of the Creator and a racist organization called The Hated, was arrested after he and another man asked an informant to build them a bomb. They were charged with selling 11 guns illegally to police informants and providing 60 pounds of urea for use in building a bomb; Carafa was sentenced to seven years and his accomplice to 10. 26 In both of these cases, not only did the defendants acquire their own weapons and explosive materials, but the men had extensive histories of right-wing activism. The Internet plays an increasingly central role in the development and communication of beliefs, as well as law enforcement monitoring of potentially violent activity. However, the consequences of posting beliefs that signal the potential for violence varies considerably by religion. Adel Daoud was a socially isolated 17-year-old Muslim boy in suburban Chicago who found refuge online. In 2012, he began to post on message boards and write emails relating to violent jihad, at which point the FBI drew him into planning an attack with an undercover agent. In 2013, the agent drove Daoud to a jeep filled with fake explosives, and he was arrested after he tried to trigger the explosives outside a bar they had agreed to target. He was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, and the case is still in court.27 Compare that to the 2010 case of 26-year-old Justin Carl Moose, who described himself as the “Christian counterpart to Osama bin Laden” and posted threats of violence against abortion providers along with information about the use of explosives on his Facebook page. The FBI were tipped off, and Moose pled guilty to distributing information on the manufacture and use of explosives. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison and was released early, despite having demonstrated knowledge of explosives and his alignment with a movement that has an extensive track record of murders and destruction of medical facilities. 28

Right-wing violence is seen as individual while Muslim American violence is assumed to be involved as part of a worldwide terror network. Braine 15 (Braine, Naomi. "Terror Network or Lone Wolf? | Political Research Associates." Political Research Associates. Political Research Associates, 19 June 2015. Web. 19 July 2015. . Naomi Braine is an Associate Professor in the Sociology Department at Brooklyn College, CUNY, and a lifelong activist in struggles for social justice. Her political and intellectual work has addressed mass incarceration, the “War on Drugs”/drug policy, HIV and collective action, and, more recently, the “War on Terror.”)

While the discourse of terrorism situates Muslims accused of violence as part of a worldwide terror network, their right-wing counterparts are usually depicted as “Lone Wolves,” acting alone. As a result, the social and organizational contexts for right-wing violence are systematically erased. When the authors of the April 2009 DHS report on right-wing extremism put out a draft version for review, the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties argued for a narrow definition of “right-wing extremist” that would be limited to persons known to have committed violence themselves and exclude those who were members of or who donated money to organizations with well-known histories of violence, such as the KKK.47 The DHS report maintained a broader definition that included groups and social movements, but the overall trend has been toward viewing perpetrators of right-wing violence as isolated actors. The February 2015 DHS report on right-wing extremists, for example, focused exclusively on the sovereign citizen movement, which was described as engaging in low levels of often spontaneous violence that take a highly individualized and non-symbolic form, such as a threat or assault towards a specific individual law enforcement officer or government representative.48 For example, the DHS report describes an incident in which a sovereign citizen in Alaska conspired to murder an Internal Revenue Service officer and a judge who oversaw legal

The individualized “Lone Wolf ” model of viewing right-wing violence reflects an intentional change in strategy by right-wing militant groups. In proceedings against him.

1987, the government indicted a core group of 14 visible national leaders within right-wing militant movements, all associated with the 1983 Aryan World Congress, on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government. They were acquitted at trial, but the experience led one of the men, Louis Beam, to republish an essay he had written

Over the past 10-15 years, most incidents of right-wing violence have been carried out by individuals or small groups, in keeping with the philosophy of leaderless resistance and Lone Wolf action. However, a decision to act alone does not mean acting outside of social movement frameworks, philosophies, and networks. Research has shown that, at the time they engage in political violence, the majority of so-called Lone Wolves are over 30 years old. A comparison of case descriptions shows that many have had significant histories of participation in hard-right movements.50 Preliminary findings from a calling for “leaderless resistance” as a way to evade infiltration and surveillance. 49

study of individual radicalization point to the importance of social ties with other militants as a key element of the radicalization process, again casting doubt on the model of the isolated actor. 51 Another study found that organizations whose members commit violence have higher levels of interconnection with other movement organizations than groups not associated with violence. 52 The findings from these two studies fit with the age and

movement experience of Lone Wolves while challenging the model of the isolated actor. Scott Roeder, Dr. Tiller’s assassin, saw himself as acting as part of a movement even if he was not representing a specific organization.

Politically, the organizational and national contexts for right-wing activists disappear in the focus on the individual, while the individuality and immediate social context for the actions of Muslims are rendered invisible by the focus on the global.

AT: FBI circumvents policy First, they say there’s no 100% certainty the FBI will comply – durable fiat solves this, and Durable FIAT is good for debate. FIAT solves for the enforcement. When the plan goes into efect, it’s implemented fully, allowing it to be enforced without any circumvention, but more importantly whether or not the plan is later overturned is irrelevant as far as policy debate is concerned - the purpose of policy debate is to test a fictional world in where the plan is deemed a good or bad idea. Since they haven’t given a single reason why the af is a bad idea then whether or not it will be later overturned doesn't matter because the benefits to the plan outweigh the ramifications of not doing plan. Second the government is willing to comply anyways Extend our ACLU evidence – once the policy is passed, the FBI will be pressured by the public as the issue of surveillance has come into more careful scrutiny in the eyes of civilians. And this is crucial for the FBI’s image as they engage and/or interfere with issues regarding other countries and their surveillance. Moreover, the federal judicial review checks true implementation of the plan as well by creating another area of pressure from within the government.

AT: Regulations Check Extend ACLU lol go ham Extend our first piece of Kundnani evidence that says there have been at least 49 incidents where an FBI AP was caught thoroughly provoking a terrorist attack, so even if there are regulations they obviously aren’t working since ap’s are still profiling races, and ethnicities with harmful intent. Passing the plan is the only way to eliminate any chance of racial profiling.

There are no current successful regulations against racial profiling Aziz 11 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America,” 2011) Prohibitions against racial profiling in law enforcement do not apply to religious or ethnic origin profiling. n40 Therefore, the government profiles on account of religion and ethnic origin in counterterrorism enforcement with no legal recourse for those targeted. n41 Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation [*439] ("FBI") diverts resources to "map" U.S. communities based on religious, ethnic, and national-origin characteristics, identifying particular "Arab-American and Muslim communities" as "potential terrorist recruitment grounds." n42 The following cases demonstrate the problematic relationship between counterterrorism enforcement and religious and political activity.

Govt Action Key The racial violence ap’s are creating is a social problem, and governmental action must be taken immediately Witte 14 (Rob Witte is a political scientist and has more than 25 years of experience working in the government, academic, public and commercial sectors. Racist Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France and the Netherlands, Routledge, 9/11/14, Print.) Phase B: racist violence as a social problem When different groups in society perceive racist violence as constituting a social problem, state action does not automatically follow. Due to the marginal position of most victimised groups, the attention of the public at large, and a widely shared public concern that state action is taken, are essential (Cobb and Elder, 1983: 85). This may be achieved by activities designed to attract public attention, and by formulating demands. Public awareness and pressure on state authorities in favour of these demands may be increased by organising demonstrations, publishing reports, exerting direct influence on decision-makers, and so on. Of course, this does not mean that racist violence is placed on the public, or even the formal, agenda after every demonstration. Often demonstrations and other activities receive very little (media) attention; if they do, their importance is often trivialised. Sometimes, these activities do attract a lot of attention, only to be portrayed as a danger in themselves with effects contrary to those intended. This seems to be the case especially when state authorities, and for instance the mainstream media and the public, disagree with the demands of the activists. Small disturbances during these activities may even be enough to criminalise the activists, and to depoliticise and trivialise their demands. Examples in the following chapters will include demonstrations in which the demonstrators, partly as a result of over-policing, were perceived as constituting the main problem. instead of the issues of racism or racist violence against which they were demonstrating. Registering racist incidents, publishing criticism of the (lack of) responses to incidents, and publishing reports are other ways of increasing prcssure and drawing attention to racist violence. Sometimes this increase in attention and pressure is realised by internal actors, such as politicians and civil servants. All of these activities may contribute to a perception of racist violence as a social problem in local or national society.

Civil Liberties Agent provocateurs destroy civil liberties no matter who they provoke Aziz 12 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. http://www.truthout.org/opinion/item/11043-creeping-counterterrorism-from-muslims-to-politicalprotesters) The New York Police Department (NYPD) and other police departments conducted mass group arrests without having probable cause to arrest the group. Agent provocateurs infiltrated the Occupy movement to disturb and disrupt civil political assembly. Similar to mosque congregants who made like complaints, protesters accused the police of entrapping young people who were mentally disabled, drug addicts or who had just experienced a traumatic personal experience. Like their Muslim counterparts, Occupy leaders were subjected to hostile interrogations by law enforcement agents visiting their homes before a protest. The billions of dollars spent on increasing our government's domestic surveillance capabilities, ostensibly to protect Americans from "Islamist terrorists," is now used to spy on political protesters. In New York City alone, over 3,000 cameras have been installed to feed into a control center housed in a secret location, and $150 million surveillance systems allowed the NYPD to closely monitor Occupy protests, identify targets for infiltration and ultimately chill political activity. Hence the same playbook used to frighten Muslims from critiquing American policies or attending their mosques has now become the one used against the Occupy protesters. And the same national security powers expanded after 9/11 under the guise of keeping us safe from the Muslims are now enforced against political dissenters who challenge the economic inequities ailing our nation. By believing in the fallacy of the "Muslim terrorist other," we weakened our resolve to protect fundamental American values. As a result, post-9/11 counterterrorism authorities are used to spy, infiltrate, entrap, arrest and aggressively prosecute any protesters. When we allow governments to forfeit our civil rights to protect "us" from "them," we lose sight of how quickly we can become the "them." So, how many more Americans must be subjected to civil liberties violations before we realize that no one is immune from creeping counterterrorism?

Civil liberties are more important than counterterror and crime Jones 15 (Jeffrey writes for the Washington times – Assistant Director at Hoover Institution – research fellow - June 10, 2015 http://www.gallup.com/poll/183548/americans-say-liberties-trump-antiterrorism.aspx)

The new USA Freedom Act was passed in a public opinion environment very different from that of the 2001 Patriot Act. Once the heightened concern about terrorism evident in the first several months after 9/11 faded, Americans began to place a greater emphasis on protecting civil liberties when thinking about preventing further acts of terrorism . Importantly, those shifts in public opinion occurred long before Snowden exposed the vast government program of collecting data on Americans' electronic communications. And Americans continue to place a greater emphasis on civil liberties even as concern about terrorism has risen amid the growing threat of ISIS. The change in the public opinion climate, which is reflected in the views of elected representatives, may help explain why the newly passed USA Freedom Act pulls back some of the powers the Patriot Act provided to the government in its efforts to prevent terrorism.

There is no balance – we need to prefer civil liberties to everything. Protecting them increases security and international relations. Dorfman and Zudziak 14 (Mary Dudziak, Zack Dorfman – Duziak is a leading historian, Attended Yale, multiple awards for her work. Zack Dorfman, senior editor of Carnegie Council's journal, Ethics & International Affairs. Attended University of Chicago http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/0230.html) The discussion about war and civil liberties often focuses on whether the right "balance" has been achieved between liberty and security. But there is no way of measuring this, and we have a long history of security excesses, such as surveillance of U.S. civil rights leaders during the 1960s. More importantly, rights and security are not oppositional, at least not always. Sometimes protecting rights enhances security—by strengthening patriotism and commitment to war aims. Sometimes, as happened during the Cold War, protecting rights is important to the way peoples of the world view the United States, so domestic rights protection can aid international relations. It is better to see rights and security as two values that should be pursued in relation to each other, rather than as a tradeof. And because there is ongoing projection of military force and the ongoing focus of security in American life, there's no "peacetime" to serve as a civil liberties reset button. Just as the nation is perpetually focused on security, we must also be perpetually

focused on maintaining constitutional liberty. Because the nation we're securing is a constitutional democracy, full "security" should mean securing constitutional rights.

Civil liberties > anti terrorism Jones 15 (Jeffrey writes for the Washington times – Assistant Director at Hoover Institution – research fellow - June 10, 2015 http://www.gallup.com/poll/183548/americans-say-liberties-trump-antiterrorism.aspx)

The new USA Freedom Act was passed in a public opinion environment very different from that of the 2001 Patriot Act. Once the heightened concern about terrorism evident in the first several months after 9/11 faded, Americans began to place a greater emphasis on protecting civil liberties when thinking about preventing further acts of terrorism . Importantly, those shifts in public opinion occurred long before Snowden exposed the vast government program of collecting data on Americans' electronic communications. And Americans continue to place a greater emphasis on civil liberties even as concern about terrorism has risen amid the growing threat of ISIS. The change in the public opinion climate, which is reflected in the views of elected representatives, may help explain why the newly passed USA Freedom Act pulls back some of the powers the Patriot Act provided to the government in its efforts to prevent terrorism.

Even in wartime – civil liberties should come first ShareAmerica 15 (April 6, 2015 – ShareAmerica is managed by the Bureau of International Information Programs within the U.S. Department of State. https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/) First, the United States has a long and unfortunate history of overreacting to the perceived dangers of wartime. In each instance, we allowed our fears to get the better of us. Second, it is often argued that in light of the sacrifices we ask citizens (especially soldiers) to make in time of war, it is small price to ask others to surrender some of their peacetime freedoms to help the war effort. As the Supreme Court argued in Korematsu, “hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.” This is a seductive, but dangerous argument. To fight a war successfully, it is necessary for soldiers to risk their lives. But it is not necessarily “necessary” for others to surrender their freedoms. That necessity must be convincingly demonstrated, not merely presumed. And this is especially true when, as is usually the case, the individuals whose rights are sacrificed are not those who make the laws, but minorities, dissidents and noncitizens. In those circumstances, “we” are making a decision to sacrifice “their” rights — not a very prudent way to balance the competing interests.

AP’s and other counterterror operations destroy Muslim communities and civil liberties – they also fuel public racism and discriminations. Civil liberties hold this country together Aziz 12 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. The book this is from is called “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America.”)

While post-9/11 preventive counterterrorism policies have adversely impacted various groups of Americans, no group has been more profoundly afected than the Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities. n16 Mosque infiltration has become so rampant that some congregants assume they are under surveillance as they fulfill their religious obligations. n17 Government informants have ensnared numerous, seemingly hapless and unsophisticated young men such that Muslims no longer know whom they can trust among each other. n18 Aggressive prosecutions of Muslim charities and individuals [*434] across the country have embittered communities that now feel under siege by their government and distrusted by their non-Muslim compatriots. n19 Selective counterterrorism fuels public bias, as evidenced by the vitriolic discourse surrounding the Park 51 Community Center in lower Manhattan in 2010. n20 As a consequence, the vibrancy and development of civil society within these

communities has been significantly stunted. n21 Current counterterrorism eforts thus attack the social relationships, as well as the civil liberties, long understood as the glue holding this country together.

Counter terrorism destroys civil liberties Aziz 12 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. The book this is from is called “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America.”) This article focuses on three powerful components of the government's counterterrorism preventive paradigm and the significant risks they pose to civil rights and civil liberties. Part I examines the adverse consequences of the government's use of religiosity as a proxy for terrorism. Specifically, the current preventative paradigm for countering

terrorism risks the First Amendment infringement of protected activities and misdirects limited law enforcement resources away from criminal activity. n22 In addition to wasting limited resources, religious and racial profiling erodes trust between law enforcement and Muslim communities. To the extent constructive relations between communities and law enforcement bolster public safety, the [*435] government has an interest in curtailing arbitrary and overreaching counterterrorism enforcement.

Aggressive counterterrorism destroys civil liberties and makes other more efective programs fail Aziz 12 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. The book this is from is called “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America.”) The current preventive paradigm for countering terrorism misguidedly uses political beliefs and religious practices as proxies for criminal activity. n34 Orthodox Muslims or those who openly critique U.S. government policies find themselves targeted by aggressive

counterterrorism tactics. Not only does this practice undermine civil liberties, it wastes limited law enforcement resources by monitoring legal activity while ignoring unlawful activity committed by those not fitting the religious profiles. Looking for evidence of radicalization through an individual's clothing, facial hair, or religious observances diverts resources from investigations of true threats.

AP’s fail even at the cost of civil liberties Aziz 12 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. The book this is from is called “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America.”) While countering terrorism is no easy feat, it is remarkable that the government was unable to prevent some major attempted attacks after having invested so many resources into counterterrorism, often at the expense of civil liberties of all Americans. Despite the creation of fusion spy centers nationwide, the relaxation of surveillance laws, the use of technology to peer into nearly every aspect of American life, and the reallocation of thousands of agents to countering terrorism, the government has yet to show results proportionate to the vested resources. n348 In the apt words of David Cole and Jules Lobel, we have

become both less safe and less free.

All of our surveillance destroys civil liberties and is inefective – we have been lucky Aziz 12 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. The book this is from is called “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America.”) It is long overdue for Americans to reassess the successes and failures of counterterrorism policies over the past ten years. Are we safer or are we just lucky? n359 Has the PATRIOT Act made our government better able to prevent terrorism? Is it time for Americans, as many congressional leaders of both parties have proclaimed, to thoughtfully debate the efficacy of the PATRIOT Act and whether its infringements on the civil liberties of all Americans are warranted? n360 Are we seeking

to rationalize our forfeiture of civil liberties by convincing ourselves that our national security policies work, irrespective of the facts on the ground? If we cannot answer these questions based on evidence, rather than fear-based speculation, then we have little to account for the last ten years of significant government expenditure, public anxiety, and civil liberties costs.

Loss of civil liberties leads to a formation of a police state Aziz 11 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly

served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America,” 2011) Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa - even by one day we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage ... . Our single objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street. As the U.S. government adopted a notolerance policy to apprehending the terrorists, a fear-stricken public watched images of nefarious, dark-skinned, and bearded Muslims flash across millions of television screens. The message was, if there had ever been any doubt, that the 9/11 attacks confirmed Muslims and Arabs are inherently violent and intent on destroying the American way of life. [*431] Heightened government scrutiny of these communities was not only warranted, but a rational response to a perceived existential threat to the country. Ten years later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have transformed the American way of life for the worse. In the hasty passage of the expansive USA PATRIOT Act ("PATRIOT Act"), our fears gave way to the government's demand for unfettered discretion to preserve national security at the expense of civil liberties for all Americans. As a consequence, America has come to resemble a police state where government surveillance extends into almost every aspect of life.

Current counterterrorism eforts take away our civil liberties. Aziz 11 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America,” 2011) While post-9/11 preventive counterterrorism policies have adversely impacted various groups of Americans, no group has been more profoundly affected than the Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities. n16 Mosque infiltration has become so rampant that some congregants assume they are under surveillance as they fulfill their religious obligations. n17 Government informants have ensnared numerous, seemingly hapless and unsophisticated young men such that Muslims no longer know whom they can trust among each other. n18 Aggressive prosecutions of Muslim charities and individuals [*434] across the country have embittered communities that now feel under siege by their government and distrusted by their non-Muslim compatriots. n19 Selective counterterrorism fuels public bias, as evidenced by the vitriolic discourse surrounding the Park 51 Community Center in lower Manhattan in 2010. n20 As a consequence, the vibrancy and development of civil society within these communities has been significantly stunted. n21 Current counter-terrorism efforts thus attack the social relationships, as well as the civil liberties, long understood as the glue holding this country together. This article focuses on three powerful components of the government's counterterrorism preventive paradigm and the significant risks they pose to civil rights and civil

liberties. Part I examines the adverse consequences of the government's use of religiosity as a proxy for terrorism. Specifically, the current preventative paradigm for countering terrorism risks the First Amendment infringement of protected activities and misdirects limited law enforcement resources away from criminal activity. n22 In addition to wasting limited resources, religious and racial profiling erodes trust between law enforcement and Muslim communities . To the extent constructive relations between communities and law enforcement bolster public safety, the [*435] government has an interest in curtailing arbitrary and overreaching counterterrorism enforcement. n23

Current counterterrorism methods that target specific ethnic groups undermine civil liberties and divert from the investigation of true threat Aziz 11 (Sahar Aziz is associate professor at Texas A&M School of Law where she teaches national security and civil rights law. Aziz is the author of Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. She formerly served as a senior policy adviser to the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Homeland Security. “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America,” 2011) First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out - Because I was not a Socialist. Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out - Because I was not a Trade Unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out Because I was not a Jew. Then they came for me - and there was no one left to speak for me. - Martin Niemoller, 1892-1984 n33 The current preventive paradigm for countering terrorism misguidedly uses political beliefs and religious practices as proxies for criminal activity. n34 Orthodox Muslims or those who openly critique U.S. government policies find themselves targeted by aggressive counterterrorism tactics. Not only does this practice undermine civil liberties, it wastes limited law enforcement resources by monitoring legal activity while ignoring unlawful activity committed by those not fitting the religious profiles . Looking for evidence of radicalization through an individual's clothing, facial hair, or religious observances diverts resources from investigations of true threats. n35 [*438] Furthermore, it is unlawful for the government to investigate and prosecute individuals solely based on First Amendment protected speech, association, assembly, and religious practices n36 - and for good reason. Our Founding Fathers were cognizant that when the government exercises its authority to quash political opponents or dissenting views, our democracy is threatened. n37 The Founding Fathers experienced first-hand the devastating effects of state entanglement in religious affairs. When one religion is disfavored among others, it results in a stigmatization and shunning of the religion's congregants in the court of public opinion or, worse, in a court of law. n38 Once the government is permitted to persecute a particular group based on its protected constitutional rights, it is only a matter of time before other groups are unfairly targeted. n39

Current counterterrorism methods that specifically target religious and ethnic groups are inefective; they fail to separate the fake from the real terrorists Aziz 11 (Sahar Aziz is an Associate Professor of Law at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. She previously served as a Senior Policy Advisor with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and as an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, where she taught national security and civil rights law. Prior to entering academia, she practiced civil rights law where she focused on post-9/11 discrimination in employment, immigration, and law enforcement, “Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America,” 2011) Focusing on religiosity and ethnic origin wastes government resources when only a small portion of investigations result in criminal charges. n113 It also diverts resources away from persons who do not fit the post-9/11 profile of a Muslim terrorist. n114 As shown by recent attempted plots, bona fide terrorists [*449] often operate covertly with no connections to established institutions, such as mosques or other religious institutions. n115 There is little evidence to suggest that such individuals operate overtly through protests, public campaigns, or other lawful means for seeking social change. Hence, when law enforcement directs its resources toward groups and individuals openly expressing their political dissent, true terrorists - whether Muslim or not - proceed with their plans undetected. n116 Evidence of the failure of counterterrorism strategies is ample. Notably, t he government has failed to prevent some of the most serious terrorist plots attempted over the past few years . For instance, but for a fortuitous technical failure and the rapid response of a bystander, thousands of people could have been killed in Times Square in 2010. n117 Similarly, the 2009 Nigerian Christmas day bomber would have successfully killed hundreds on an airplane headed for Detroit but for the failure of his bomb to ignite. n118 Despite the massive [*450] intelligence infrastructure created post-9/11, the intelligence community failed to act on his father's warnings to the U.S. embassy in Nigeria, as well as other relevant intelligence. n119 Meanwhile ,

terrorists who do not fit the "Muslim terrorist" profile are fortuitously stopped or in some cases tragically missed. White supremacist James Cummings, for example, was actively constructing a lethal dirty bomb undetected by the FBI. n120 Only after his wife shot him in self-defense did the government discover his terrorist plot. n121 Similarly, Joseph Stack flew an airplane into an IRS building in Austin, Texas in protest of the IRS's demands that he pay his taxes. n122 Stack's terrorist attack killed an IRS employee who was a military veteran. n123 Had the attack occurred at a different time of day, however, hundreds of IRS employees could have been killed. Donny Eugene Mower threw a Molotov cocktail into a Planned Parenthood clinic in California, causing $ 26,000 of damage. n124 That he did not injure or kill anyone was only because he acted "in the early morning hours." n125 Another white supremacist was charged with murdering a security guard at the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., and an anti-abortion extremist was convicted of murdering abortion-provider George Tiller in his church in Wichita, Kansas. n126 Finally, in Tucson, Arizona, Jared Loughner shot and killed six people while wounding fourteen others, including Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. n127 [*451] Despite these incidents, the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") shortsightedly focuses almost exclusively on domestic Muslim groups. n128 Yet in 2009 DHS issued an internal intelligence report entitled "Rightwing Extremism," warning of rising terrorism by right-wing domestic groups. n129 The backlash to the report was remarkable: more than a dozen organizations representing the political right called for the immediate removal of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, prompting her to apologize for the report, dismember the analytical unit that produced the report, and block the distribution of definitions for terms such as "white supremacist" and "Christian Identity" from its analytical digest. n130 This occurred despite the well- [*452] documented evidence n131 of right-wing groups using or attempting to use weapons of mass destruction. n132 For example, the Washington Post reported several cases of similar right-wing extremism in 2010:

Terrorism creates an overreaction - it leads to neo-imperialist wars and legitimizes securitization Koppel 13 (Ted Koppel is a special correspondent for NBC News and news analyst for NPR. “Ted Koppel: America's Chronic Overreaction to Terrorism”, Wall Street Journal, 8/6/14, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324653004578650462392053732) June 28, 2014, will mark the 100th anniversary of what is arguably the most eventful terrorist attack in history. That was the day that Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, shot and killed the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. In one of those mega-oversimplifications that journalists love and historians abhor, the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his pregnant wife, Sophie, led directly and unavoidably to World War I. Between 1914 and 1918, 37 million soldiers and civilians were injured or killed. If there should ever be a terrorists' Hall of Fame, Gavrilo Princip

Terrorism, after all, is designed to produce overreaction. It is the means by which the weak induce the powerful to inflict damage upon themselves—and al Qaeda and groups like it are surely counting on that as the centerpiece of their strategy. It appears to be working. Right will surely deserve consideration as its most effective practitioner.

now, 19 American embassies and a number of consulates and smaller diplomatic outposts are closed for the week due to the perceived threat of attacks against U.S. targets. Meantime, the U.S. has launched drone strikes on al Qaeda fighters in Yemen. By the standards of World War I, however, the United States has responded to the goading

during almost a decade of terrorist provocation, the U.S. government showed the utmost restraint . In February of 1993, before of contemporary terrorism with relative moderation. Indeed,

most of us had any real awareness of al Qaeda, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who would later be identified as the principal architect of 9/11, financed an earlier attack on the World Trade Center with car bombs that killed six and injured more than 1,000. Five years later, al Qaeda launched synchronized attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 220 and injuring well over 4,000 people. In October 2000, al Qaeda operatives rammed a boat carrying explosives into the USS Cole, which was docked in Yemen. Seventeen American sailors were killed

In each case, the U.S. responded with caution and restraint. Covert and special operations were launched. The U.S. came close to killing or capturing Osama bin Laden at least twice, but there was a clear awareness among many policy makers that bin Laden might be trying to lure the U.S. into overreacting. Clinton administration counterterrorism policy erred, if at all, on the side of excessive caution. Critics may argue that Washington's feckless response during the Clinton years encouraged al Qaeda to launch its most spectacular and devastating attack on Sept. 11, 2001. But President George W. Bush also showed great initial restraint in ordering a response to the 9/11 attacks. Covert American intelligence operatives working with special operations forces and 39 were injured. Each of these attacks occurred during the presidency of Bill Clinton.

coordinated indigenous Afghan opposition forces against the Taliban on the ground, while U.S. air power was

It was only 18 months later, with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, that the U.S. began to inflict upon itself a degree of damage that no external power could have achieved. Even bin Laden must have been astounded. He had, it has been reported, hoped that the U.S. would be drawn into a ground war in Afghanistan, that graveyard to so many foreign armies. But Iraq! In the end, the war left 4,500 American soldiers dead and 32,000 wounded. It cost well in excess of a trillion dollars—every penny of which was borrowed money . Saddam was killed, it's true, and the world directed against the Taliban and al Qaeda as they fled toward Pakistan.

is a better place for it. What prior U.S. administrations understood, however, was Saddam's value as a regional

It is hard to look at Iraq today and find that the U.S. gained much for its sacrifices there. Nor, as we seek to untangle ourselves from Afghanistan, can U.S. achievements there be seen as much of a bargain for the price paid in blood and treasure. At home, the U.S. has constructed an antiterrorism enterprise so immense, so costly and so inexorably interwoven with the defense establishment, police and intelligence agencies, communications systems, counterweight to Iran.

and with social media, travel networks and their attendant security apparatus, that the idea of downsizing, let alone disbanding such a construct, is an exercise in futility. The Sunday TV talk shows this past weekend resonated with the rare sound of partisan agreement: The intercepted "chatter" between al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri and the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was sufficiently ominous that few questions have been raised about the government's decision to close its embassies. It may be that an inadequate response to danger signals that resulted in the death of the U.S. ambassador in Benghazi last September contributed to an overreaction in the current instance. Clearly, it does not hurt, at a time when the intelligence community is charged with being overly intrusive in its harvesting of intelligence data, that we be presented with dramatic evidence of the program's effectiveness. Yet when all is said and done, al Qaeda—by most accounts decimated and battered by more than a decade of the worst damage that the world's most powerful nation can inflict—remains a serious enough threat that Washington ordered 19 of its embassies to pull up their drawbridges and take shelter for fear of what those terrorists still might do. Will terrorists kill innocent civilians in the years to come? Of course. They did so more than 100 years ago, when they were called anarchists—and a responsible nation-state must take reasonable measures to protect its citizens. But there is no

We have created an economy of fear, an industry of fear, a national psychology of fear. Al Qaeda could never have achieved that on its own. We have inflicted it on ourselves. Over the coming years many more Americans will die in car crashes, of gunshot wounds inflicted by family members and by falling off ladders than from any attack by al Qaeda. There is always the nightmare of terrorists acquiring and using a weapon of mass destruction. But nothing would give our terrorist enemies greater satisfaction than that we focus obsessively on that remote possibility, and restrict our lives and liberties accordingly. way to completely eliminate terrorism. The challenge that confronts us is how we will live with that threat.

Complete elimination of terrorism is impossible, terrorism is inevitable Koppel 13 (Ted Koppel is a special correspondent for NBC News and news analyst for NPR. “Ted Koppel: America's Chronic Overreaction to Terrorism”, Wall Street Journal, 8/6/14, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324653004578650462392053732) It may be that an inadequate response to danger signals that resulted in the death of the U.S. ambassador in Benghazi last September contributed to an overreaction in the current instance. Clearly, it does not hurt, at a time when the intelligence community is charged with being overly intrusive in its harvesting of intelligence data, that

when all is said and done, al Qaeda—by most accounts decimated and battered by more than a decade of the worst damage that the world's most powerful nation can inflict—remains a serious enough threat that Washington ordered 19 of its embassies to pull up their drawbridges and take shelter for fear of what those terrorists still might do. Will terrorists kill innocent civilians in the years to come? Of course. They did so more than 100 years ago, when they were called anarchists—and a responsible nationstate must take reasonable measures to protect its citizens. But there is no way to completely eliminate terrorism. The challenge that confronts us is how we will live with that threat. We have created an economy of fear, an industry of fear, a national psychology of fear. we be presented with dramatic evidence of the program's effectiveness. Yet

Al Qaeda could never have achieved that on its own. We have inflicted it on ourselves. Over the coming years many more Americans will die in car crashes, of gunshot wounds inflicted by family members and by falling off ladders

There is always the nightmare of terrorists acquiring and using a weapon of mass destruction. But nothing would give our terrorist enemies greater satisfaction than that we focus obsessively on that remote possibility, and restrict our lives and liberties accordingly . than from any attack by al Qaeda.

Political Movements Agent provocateur force can transform peaceful movements into masses of violence. Kevin Zeese and Margaret Flowers 12 --Kevin Zeese JD and Margaret Flowers MD host Clearing the FOG on We Act Radio co-direct It's Our Economy and are organizers of the PopularResistance.org. (http://www.sott.net/article/242299-The-Agent-Provocateurs-in-Occupys-Midst )

On the very first day of the Occupation of Wall Street, we saw infiltration by the police. We were leaving Zuccotti Park and were stopped in traffic. We saw the doors of an unmarked van open and in the front seat were two uniformed police. Out of the back came two men dressed as Occupiers wearing backpacks, sweatshirts and jeans. They walked into Zuccotti Park and became part of the crowd. In the first week of the Occupation of Freedom Plaza in Washington, D.C., we saw the impact of two right wing infiltrators. A peaceful protest was planned at the drone exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution. The plan was for a banner drop and a die-in under the drones. But as protesters arrived at the museum, two people ran out in front, threatening the security guards and causing them to pepper spray protesters and tourists. Patrick Howley, an assistant editor at the American Spectator, wrote a column bragging about his role as an agent provocateur. A few days later we uncovered the second infiltrator, Michael Stack, when he was urging people on Freedom Plaza to resist police with force. We later learned he was from the Leadership Institute, which trains youth in right wing ideology and tactics. We were told he had al

Agent provocateurs instill fear into those who would start a movement – prevents the formation of political movements. Jackie Goldberg 62 -- Jackie Goldberg is an American politician and teacher, and a member of the Democratic Party. She is a former member of the California State Assembly. (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-13/goldberg1.html) INT: There are two other things that I would like to pick up on, first there's the business of harassment, you mentioned that you were labeled communist and the rest of it, can you tell me a little bit about what you personally experienced on an everyday level, in terms of being followed and harassment. JACKIE: You know if you don't ever

my phone was tapped, everyday when I left there was one or two men who would follow me to campus who would wait outside my classrooms, who would follow me to lunch, and experience in your life, you just don't believe it, I mean that was my view anyway. I didn't believe it,

after a while we would, we would speak, I mean Hi how are you, I mean do you think it's going to rain today, you know, I mean there was sort of nothing that you could do about it. and then we started, we started getting, because it was very unnerving in spite of what everybody will tell you, it is very unnerving, and they did it openly, I think

but we do things like pick up the telephone and say that this is S251J to 40693, Mary had a little lamb, eat pizza 7 and hang up, it was gibberish and meant absolutely nothing, but we hoped that we were keeping them busy trying to figure out what these codes were, and there were of course no codes. you do things like that, but it was very unnerving. There were rumors continuously, there were agent provocateurs, there were, we were completely infiltrated because we knew we were completely infiltrated because we'd keep finding people in the steering committee meetings that nobody could ever find their address or where they lived or what classes they were taking, and basically we decided really as a policy to just assume that everything that we said and did was immediately known by the police and anybody else who was against what we because the point was to unnerve you.

were doing. there were rumors, frequently that that in the middle of the night, all of the leadership was going to be

arrested, on conspiracy charges, at one point all of us did secretly select another person who only knew you and

We all thought we the FBI and the red squad of Oakland police, passed these rumors through other students all the time so that we would be kind of off our guard, not off our guard, on guard part of that all of us all the time, I just remembered a friend of mine had an apartment and he had trouble getting a dial tone and he just called the telephone company to have them come and figure out what was wrong with his phone, and they kept coming inside and we were all just hanging out that afternoon, it was a Friday afternoon after classes, and finally the guy came in from the phone company obviously nobody had informed him, but he said I just can't figure out, there are about five lines on your line, I don't know where any of them are coming from or going to he said but I took them all one other person to immediately form a new steering committee if we were taken away. were,

off, [y]our phone should be alright now you know. so there was, we all took it in kind of stride, but I don't think that anybody was really unaffected by it, the notion that you really do believe that you could be snatched off at any time

your phones were tapped, that you're you are being followed and no-one denied that you were being followed. it was all you know pretty scary and of course made us all wonder what they were doing about real criminals and real crime if they were expending this amount of resources on those of us who were trying to promote the first amendment. it made me worry about how they expend they're resources. I figured that you know, I much and arrested, that for conspiracy charges, that you could, that

rather them be trying to do something about organized crime or something in the city than to follow us, we were pretty benign people around, but it was very unnerving. There was no doubt about it, I can remember the emotions I had at the time about it.

APs infiltrate political movements

Gary T. Marx 2012. -- Gary T. Marx is Professor Emeritus from M.I.T. He has worked in the areas of race and ethnicity, collective behavior and social movements, law and society and surveillance studies. (http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/agentsprovocateursfaux.html) When authorities or elites are challenged by a social movement, they may ignore it or respond with a variety of tools from cooptation to redirection to repression with many points in between. One extreme form of the latter is provocation. The idea of the agent provocateur entered popular consciousness in the 19th century as Europe experienced dislocation and conflicts associated with industrialization and urbanization. The concept initially referred to an activist secretly working with authorities who might provide information, sow suspicion and internal dissension, and/or provoke violent actions that would turn public opinion against a social movement and ofer legal and moral grounds for its repression. The term has entered popular culture as the name of a lingerie brand and British electronica band. There are many historical examples. Some of the most dramatic occurred in Russia where, lacking basic democratic rights, clandestine groups sought to overthrow the Tsar. Police responded by infiltrating existing groups and, in a strategy that could backfire, creating their own. Roman Malinovsky, a highly paid agent of the Russian secret police (Okhrana), was an important Bolshevik leader. The English Cato Street conspiracy offers a classic case . Joseph Conrad's novel The Secret Agent provides a fictional account. Social movements in the United States in the 1960s saw many examples of provocation, some in conformity with the FBI's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO.) (Donner 1990; Cunningham 2005.) A New York detective helped open and headed the Bronx chapter of the Black Panthers, and Malcolm X's bodyguard, who tried to resuscitate him when he was shot, was an undercover police officer.

AT: CP

Civil Business

AT States CP Actions trickle down from the intelligence agencies to the federal and state governments Nathan Freed Wessler 14 -- Nathan Freed Wessler is a staff attorney with the ACLU’s Speech, Privacy and Technology Project, handling cases involving free speech and privacy issues. (http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/surveillance-lawenforcementnsastringray3.html)

Cell site simulators, also known as “stingrays,” are devices that trick cellphones into reporting their locations and identifying information . They do so by mimicking cellphone towers and sending out electronic cues that allow the police to enlist cellphones as tracking devices, thus revealing

The equipment also sends intrusive electronic signals through the walls of private homes and offices, learning information about the locations and identities of phones inside. Initially the domain of the National Security Agency (NSA) and other intelligence agencies, the use of stingrays has trickled down to federal, state and local law enforcement. In one Florida case, a police officer explained in court that he “quite literally stood in front of every door and window” with his stingray to track the phones inside a large apartment complex. people’s movements with great precision.

Impact – Civil Liberties Using social agencies as ideology police is a violation of civil liberties Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 175) It is entirely appropriate for the police and MIS to place Muslims under surveillance if there is a reasonable suspicion of their active involvement in terrorism. It is also right that channels are available for other professionals, such as youth workers and teachers, to provide information to the police if there are reasons to believe an individual is

Prevent sought to draw professionals providing nonpolicing local services into routinely providing information to the counterterrorist police not just on individuals who might be about to commit a criminal offense, but also on the political and religious opinions and behaviors of young people . A major part involved in criminality. But, as noted above,

of Prevent was the fostering of much closer relationships between the counterterrorist policing system and providers of nonpolicing local services to facilitate these kinds of flows of information on individuals considered at

The attempt to integrate policing with agencies of local government can be traced back to the early 1980s, with the reorganization of policing under Metropolitan Police risk of extremism.

Commissioner Kenneth Newman (who had previously served as chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland).

New legislation sought to incorporate social and welfare agencies into the policing process. This was presented as a supportive form of "community policing; but its purpose was to embed police surveillance in schools and other agencies providing public services. This new approach, of coordinating police work with social agencies, was reflected in the 1982 Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, which in its original version, proposed a power to search

Civil rights lawyer Paul Boateng noted that the bill raised the prospect of civil liberties abuses as "the proper professional distinctions between the roles of social workers, probation officers, local government workers, teachers and policemen, become confused :'54 Grassroots campaigns for police accountability in confidential records held by professionals. 53

the early 1980s led to some diminution of these dangers, and the power to search records was dropped by the time the bill became the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Nevertheless, the idea that social agencies should coordinate their work with the police took hold, and it led to these multiagency partnerships becoming common practice.

Impact – Totalitarianism (cards need tags + formatting) Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 282-283)

The East German Stasi is estimated to have had one intelligence · analyst for every 166 citizens. Adding regular informants brings the number to one spy for every 66 citizens.30 The FBI reportedly has at present 10,000 intelligence analysts and agents working on counterterrorism and 15,000 paid informants31 Exactly how many of them are focused on Muslims in the United States is unknown; there is little transparency in this area. But given the emphasis the FBI has placed on preventing Muslim terrorism, it is reasonable to estimate that at least two-thirds are assigned to spy on Muslims. Taking the usual estimate of the Muslim population in the United States of2.35 million, this would mean that the FBI has a spy for every ninety-four Muslims in the United States-before the resources of the National Security Agency, regional intelligence fusion centers, and the counterterrorism resources of local police departments, such as the NYPD, are added. This suggests that Muslims in the United States are likely to be exposed to levels of state surveillance similar to that which the East German population faced. The collapse of East Germany's communist system and the opening of the Stasi's files gave regular citizens the uncanny experience of discovering their names in state intelligence documents and finding out who among their circles of friends was an informant. The 20ll leaking of some NYPD intelligence files has already begun giving individual Muslims the same disturbing experience. Numerous businesses, cafes, restaurants, and mosques in New York became aware that the NYPD considers them hot spots and deploys informants to monitor them. And the recent outing of a small number of NYPD informants has meant that some have found out that relationships they thought of as genuine friendships were actually covert attempts to gather intelligence. Asad Dandia, a nineteen-year-old student at City University of New York, has spoken of becoming aware that a friend was an informant. I met him through the Muslim Student Associations Facebook connections. He had told me he wanted to become a better person and to strengthen his faith. So I took him in, introduced him to all of my friends, got him involved in our extracurricular activities. I would wake him up for prayer every morning. He even slept over at my house ... When I was texted the news [that he was an informant], the shock caused me to drop my phone. It took me twenty-four hours to get myself together." Another student at City University, Jawad Rasul, saw his name listed when a file on Muslim students became public in 2012, and that was when he discovered a friend of his was an informant. "You always hear about the NYPD spying on this group or that group, having your name come up, it just brings everything home:'" Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 283-284)

Our current models of totalitarianism, largely derived from the cold war, are poorly equipped to make sense of these practices. Whether derived from fiction or

historical studies, they usually picture a narrow, ideologically driven elite controlling the mass of the population. Such a state of affairs is normally assumed to be incompatible with a formal democratic process and a liberal economy. But the experience of the war on ten,·or suggests that, if the same tools of totalitarian rule are applied only to racialized groups rather than the population as a whole, the trappings of democracy can be maintained for the majority. (Numerous other examples such as China-have long demonstrated the compatibility of a liberalized economy with state authoritarianism.) The key to such a seemingly inconsistent "democratic totalitarianism'' is a racialized discourse offear that constructs Muslims as a cultural threat to the liberal order. It is the race principle that enables the separation of Muslims from the usual liberal norms of rights and citizenship. And it is on the basis of race thinking that Muslim dissent is read only as the intrusion of alien, illiberal cultural values into the public sphere and rarely as an attempt to use the political process to hold states accountable to their own liberal standards. From this perspective, the totalitarianism of the war on terror intersects with other racialized regimes, such as the war on drugs and the militarized policing of immigration, in which similar patterns of discriminatory surveillance, brutality, and incarceration are central.34 So long as the unspoken assumption that these measures will only be directed at racialized subjects-Muslims, African Americans, undesired immigrants, asylum seekers-remains valid, then the consent of the majority can be secured. And if this racialized totalitarianism begins to overreach and step on the freedoms of others-through, for example, overbearing screening at airports or by trying to introduce universal identity cards-such excesses can be quickly corrected while preserving the essential structure of the system. Moreover, since a transformative politics is more likely to emerge from racialized se~tions of society, the special measures the state reserves for these populations prove useful tools for maintaining the status quo. The analysis of totalitarianism today therefore requires a critical understanding of the centrality of race-but in a more radical way than managed by Hannah Arendt, who ultimately saw it as merely one of various possible precursors.

AT: Due Process Checks Empirically, civil trials do not protect victims against FBI’s encroachment on civil liberties – juries accept government bias Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 192-193)

the FBI's provocation tactics should be held to account when cases come to trial, but this has not happened. In every case where defendants have attempted an entrapment defense in post- 9/11 terrorist trials, it has been unsuccessful . Such a In theory,

defense involves two parts: first, showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime; second, if the defendant succeeds in proving inducement, the burden is on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime .

In the end, these cases come down to a subjective judgment of whether the defendants were predisposed to terrorism. So far juries have accepted the prosecutors' flawed argument that radical views-such as anger at foreign policy-are evidence of a predisposition to commit terrorist acts. Implicitly, juries in these cases have endorsed the central proposition in the official analysis of radicalization: ideology causes violence." In effect, Muslims have been criminalized for behaviors associated with the early stages in a fallacious model of radicalization-though such behaviors are entirely lawful, according to the First Amendment.

Cede the Political Cede the political - Their method can’t create institutional change- the AFF is a DA to the alt and only the perm solves- AFF is a better strategy Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 284-285) But as even the Stasi eventually discovered, no system of surveillance can ever produce total knowledge. Indeed, the greater the amount of information collected, the harder it is to interpret its meaning. The relevant information in the majority of recent US terrorist attacks was somewhere in the government's systems, but its significance was

what is obscured by the demands for ever greater surveillance and information processing is that security is best established through relationships· of trust and political empowerment. A society that has blocked a section of its population from shaping a process of political transformation is one that has hollowed out its democracy until what's left is an empty, technocratic consensus in which real politics is disavowed. When radical political contestation is suffocated, the processes by which societies reinvent themselves and resolve their social tensions are neutered, and in the absence of a genuinely emancipatory alternative, the only possible outlet for the impulses generated by social and economic marginalization is the fake radicalism of armored identity politics, conspiracy theories, and apocalyptic fantasies. lost amid a morass of useless data. More significantly,

Topicality – AP = Surveillance Agent Provocateurs constitute an element of USFG surveillance Gitlin, 2013 (Todd Gitlin is a professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, the chair of the PhD program in communications. “The Wonderful American World of Informers and Agents Provocateurs,” The Nation, June 27. http://www.thenation.com/article/wonderful-american-world-informers-and-agents-provocateurs/) Only Martians, by now, are unaware of the phone and online data scooped up by the

Agency

National Security

(though if it turns out that they are aware, the NSA has surely picked up their signals and crunched their

high-tech surveillance is not, however, the only kind around. There’s also the lower tech, up-close-and-personal kind that involves informers and sometimes government-instigated violence . Just how much of this is going on and in how metadata). American

coordinated a way no one out here in the spied-upon world knows. The lower-tech stuff gets reported, if at all, only one singular, isolated event at a time — look over here, look over there, now you see it, now you don’t. What is known about such surveillance as well as the suborning of illegal acts by government agencies, including the FBI, in the name of counterterrorism has not been put together by major news organizations in a way that would give us an overview of the phenomenon. (The ACLU has done by far the best job of compiling reports on spying on Americans of this sort.) Some intriguing bits about informers and agents provocateurs briefly made it into the public spotlight when Occupy Wall Street was riding high. But as always, dots need connecting. Here is a preliminary attempt to sort out some patterns behind what could be the next big story about government surveillance and provocation in America.

APs are surveillance – Scotland Yard Proves Savage, 2011 (Michael Savage, “Police under fire as trial collapses over 'agent provocateur' claims,” The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-under-fire-as-trial-collapses-over-agentprovocateur-claims-2181118.html)

Scotland Yard has come under pressure to reveal the extent of its covert surveillance of peaceful protesters after the collapse of a case following the unmasking of an undercover police officer. Prosecutors announced they were dropping charges against six people accused of a 2009 plot to shut down the coal-fired Ratcliffe-on-Soar power station, in Nottinghamshire, at Nottingham Crown Court yesterday. Lawyers acting for the protesters had demanded that the

the undercover officer, PC Mark Kennedy, had played [a role] in aiding and encouraging the break-in. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) should be forced by the trial judge to reveal what role

defence team was told on Friday that the prosecution was to drop the case rather than hand over details of PC Kennedy's involvement. A recent video of PC Kennedy talking to an activist suggests he was not the only officer infiltrating green activist groups. In the video shown on BBC's Newsnight programme last night he tells an activist: "I'm not the only one by a long shot – it's like a hammer to crack a nut. It's spun in different ways but, you know, you start looking at the way the law is used and manipulated." Activists first suggested they had unmasked the officer's real identity in October. Since beginning his covert work in 2000, he had assumed the identity of Mark Stone and earned the nickname "Flash" because he seemed to have more money than his fellow protesters. He was quickly put to use by the groups he infiltrated because of his driving skills. He was also a keen climber, who has been photographed scaling pylons as part of anti-climate change protests. PC Kennedy subsequently fled overseas and left the Metropolitan Police. Some suspect he is now in the United States. There was no reply from a string of email addresses and mobile numbers he had used over the last decade. However, he has been in touch with lawyers defending the six protesters due to go on trial yesterday and had recently indicated he was willing to give evidence to help their case. All six claimed they had never finally agreed to aid the Ratcliffe protest. The extent of the Met officer's involvement in helping to organise protests led some to accuse the police of entrapment. Bradley Day, 23, a charity worker who has already faced trial for his involvement in the Ratcliffe-on-Soar plot, said PC Kennedy had even paid to hire a van used to transport equipment. Mr Day added that, last January, PC Kennedy had accompanied protesters on a reconnaissance trip to the power station. However, police waited for four months before taking action. They arrested more than 100 people on 13 April last year when they raided a meeting of activists held at Iona School in Sneinton, Nottingham. Mike Schwarz, the solicitor for the six protesters who saw the case against them dropped, said police and the CPS had chosen to "hush up" details of the covert operation. He said the Metropolitan Police should be forced to explain their policy for monitoring protest groups, adding that a miscarriage of justice had been averted only when activists found a passport revealing PC Kennedy's identity. "There should now be a publicly accountable process about how we came so close to a miscarriage of justice here,

if his identity had not been uncovered by protesters," Mr Schwarz said. " The

ball is in the court of the police to answer a number of questions on the use of undercover officers to monitor peaceful protesters. The police have still yet to explain PC Kennedy's role." The CPS denied the collapse of the trial was triggered by the unmasking of PC Kennedy. A spokesman for the Met said the force was "not prepared to discuss" PC Kennedy's involvement. Danny Chivers, a defendant in the trial, said the police must be forced to answer questions about how they went about the operation. "The police appear to have waited for the opportunity to arrest over 100 people," he said. "Political protest of the kind being planned that day presents no risk to the public, yet the police consistently resort to the most extreme tactics they can muster." There were calls for Theresa May, the Home Secretary, to answer questions in Parliament about the undercover officer. David Winnick, a Labour member of the Commons Home Affairs committee, said she needed to answer accusations that PC

had acted as an "agent provocateur".

Kennedy

Topicality – FBI = Domestic Surveillance FBI handles all domestic surveillance Podolsky, 2015. (Brett, JD/Criminal Defense Lawyer. “What Is the Difference between the CIA, FBI and Interpol?” Criminal Law Blog. http://brettpodolsky.com/uncategorized/what-is-the-difference-between-the-cia-fbiand-interpol#sthash.qicHxcgi.dpuf)

The FBI and CIA are both federal agencies that gather intelligence on threats to the United States and her citizens. Even so, the FBI is primarily a law enforcement agency that is responsible for investigating federal crimes such as tax evasion, bank robbery and kidnapping. On the other hand, the CIA is mostly concerned with gathering intelligence that will help senior government officials make decisions relating to national security. The CIA also provides valuable information to commanders in combat zones in order to help them plan their operations. Some other key differences include:

Territory-FBI agents work primarily within the U.S., while CIA agents tend to operate outside her borders 

The FBI may work in conjunction with local law enforcement agencies to solve crimes, whereas the CIA operates independently.

All domestic surveillance is handled by the FBI, even when required by the CIA

Topicality

2AC T- Curtail 1. We meet: [CONTEXTUALIZE] The affirmative lessens or reduces FBI domestic surveillance – agent provocateurs only make up a portion of FBI operations. 2. Prefer our counter-interpretation: Curtailment includes complete elimination FASB 85 (Financial Accounting Standards Board, EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR SETTLEMENTS AND CURTAILMENTS OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND FOR TERMINATION BENEFITS (ISSUED 12/85)) Statement 87 continues the past practice of delaying the recognition in net periodic pension cost of (a) gains and losses from experience different from that assumed, (b) the effects of changes in assumptions, and (c) the cost of retroactive plan amendments. However, this Statement requires immediate recognition of certain previously unrecognized amounts when certain transactions or events occur. It prescribes the method for determining the amount to be recognized in earnings when a pension obligation is settled or a plan is curtailed. Settlement is defined as an irrevocable action that relieves the employer (or the plan) of primary responsibility for an obligation and eliminates significant risks related to the obligation and the assets used to effect the settlement. A curtailment is defined as a significant reduction in, or an elimination of, defined benefit accruals for present employees' future services.

This is better for education because A. Predictability: Tons of affs eliminate programs, rarely do they ONLY reduce them B. Ground: No Ground Loss – Neg still has access to FBI specific CPs and DAs, kritiks of method, and general links to offense, such as the terror DA. C. Limits: Their definition overlimits the topic and is infinitely regressive. This excludes popular affs like banning all drone surveillance. It also restricts possibilities for innovative thinking in debate which dooms us to cyclical, un-educational rounds. This is a DA to the neg’s interp. 3. Turn on fairness: It justifies banning 99% of all agent provocateurs, drones, data collection, etc., so affirmatives will be doomed to preserve the 1%. Affirmatives could never win if their advantages function primarily on eradicating any problem.

2AC lbl? DON”T SAY

1. Their _________(ex: Monahan 11) evidence is powertagged – their evidence they use to defend their interpretation is talking about how after 9/11, the USFG has beefed up security and has brought about a rise in spying programs and innovation in surveillance tactics. This only talks about how domestic surveillance includes these tactics, not that these tactics are the only ones that characterize domestic surveillance.

2AC T- Surveillance 1. We meet: AP’s are surveillance [CONTEXTUALIZE] Agent provocation has been a tactic of surveillance long before mere additions like wire-tapping and intensive spying. As the card already contends existing forms of surveillance, we can assume that agent provocation is included. Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 282-283)

The East German Stasi is estimated to have had one intelligence · analyst for every 166 citizens. Adding regular informants brings the number to one spy for every 66 citizens.30 The FBI reportedly has at present 10,000 intelligence analysts and agents working on counterterrorism and 15,000 paid informants31 Exactly how many of them are focused on Muslims in the United States is unknown; there is little transparency in this area. But given the emphasis the FBI has placed on preventing Muslim terrorism, it is reasonable to estimate that at least two-thirds are assigned to spy on Muslims. Taking the usual estimate of the Muslim population in the United States of2.35 million, this would mean that the FBI has a spy for every ninetyfour Muslims in the United States-before the resources of the National Security Agency, regional intelligence fusion centers, and the counterterrorism resources of local police departments, such as the NYPD, are added. This suggests that Muslims in the United States are likely to be exposed to levels of state surveillance similar to that which the East German population faced. The collapse of East Germany's communist system and the opening of the Stasi's files gave regular citizens the uncanny experience of discovering their names in state intelligence documents and finding out who among their circles of friends was an informant. The 20ll leaking of some NYPD intelligence files has already begun giving individual Muslims the same disturbing experience. Numerous businesses, cafes, restaurants, and mosques in New York became aware that the NYPD considers them hot spots and deploys informants to monitor them. And the recent outing of a small number of NYPD informants has meant that some have found out that relationships they thought of as genuine friendships were actually covert attempts to gather intelligence. Asad Dandia, a nineteen-year-old student at City University of New York, has spoken of becoming aware that a friend was an informant. I met him through the Muslim Student Associations Facebook connections. He had told me he wanted to become a better person and to strengthen his faith. So I took him in, introduced him to all of my friends, got him involved in our extracurricular activities. I would wake him up for prayer every morning. He even slept over at my house ... When I was texted the news [that he was an informant], the shock caused me to drop my phone. It took me twenty-four hours to get myself together." Another student at City

University, Jawad Rasul, saw his name listed when a file on Muslim students became public in 2012, and that was when he discovered a friend of his was an informant. "You always hear about the NYPD spying on this group or that group, having your name come up, it just brings everything home:'"

2. Counter- Interpretation-Agent Provocateurs constitute an element of USFG surveillance Gitlin, 2013 (Todd Gitlin is a professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, the chair of the PhD program in communications. “The Wonderful American World of Informers and Agents Provocateurs,” The Nation, June 27. http://www.thenation.com/article/wonderful-american-worldinformers-and-agents-provocateurs/) Only Martians, by now, are unaware of the phone and online data scooped up by the

Security Agency

National

(though if it turns out that they are aware, the NSA has surely picked up their

high-tech surveillance is not, however, the only kind around. There’s also the lower tech, up-close-and-personal kind that involves informers and sometimes government-instigated violence. Just how much of this is going on and in how coordinated a way no one out here in the signals and crunched their metadata). American

spied-upon world knows. The lower-tech stuff gets reported, if at all, only one singular, isolated event at a time — look over here, look over there, now you see it, now you don’t. What is known about such surveillance as well as the suborning of illegal acts by government agencies, including the FBI, in the name of counterterrorism has not been put together by major news organizations in a way that would give us an overview of the phenomenon. (The ACLU has done by far the best job of compiling reports on spying on Americans of this sort.) Some intriguing bits about

informers and agents

provocateurs briefly made it into the public spotlight when Occupy Wall Street was riding high. But as always, dots need connecting. Here is a preliminary attempt to sort out some patterns behind what could be the next big story about government surveillance and provocation

3. Prefer our counter-interp: A. Predictability: We are predictable -- Functional limits and other words check abuse -- even if the af violates one word, other words in the resolution provide enough limits for the af to be predictable. Also, Agent

Provocateurs are an important part of the FBI, one of the largest surveillance agencies in the United States, and is frequently used in its operations. There are lots of affirmatives that curtail portions of the FBI, so there is no reason that our specific curtailment is unpredictable. If we are considered unpredictable, so are all the FBI affirmatives that exist, which places many limits on this debate and hurts our education. B. Ground: The FBI is one of the biggest agencies in the United States that is used for surveillance, and agent

provocateurs are a critical part of FBI strategy. By justifying exclusion of this critical part of the FBI, they are destroying important affirmative ground and creating debates that exclude a large portion of U.S. surveillance. C. Limits: We create a clear bright line for the topic; we don't underlimit because there is only a small number of affirmatives that use agent provocateurs. Make them prove why the inclusion of agent provocateurs would explode the limits. Furthermore, they overlimit the topic because their interpretation excludes any form of active surveillance, this severs a huge part of the topic and limits our discussion on the actual topic – we’re doomed to having the same debates over and over again. This prevents any innovation to arguments that go beyond the scope of passive surveillance. AND this turns education. D. There is no internal link to their negative ground arguments. The negative gets ample ground—make them prove what ground they lose. We still link to FBI DA’s, CP's, and multiple K’s. And the negative get’s core generics such as terror DA's, as well as the Politics DA. E. Prefer education impacts over fairness -- education is the only tool from debate that alter how you interact with the world and provide a diferent perspective on prevalent issues.

Surveillance refers to any method of investigation carried out by law enforcement officials – this includes agent provocateurs whose main objective is to enforce the law AND includes actions of provocation and government-instigated violence. Simmons 13 – Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University Ric, PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: ENDING THE ZERO-SUM GAME: HOW TO INCREASE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Spring 2013, Lexis n13 Throughout this Article I will use the word "surveillance" to cover any method of investigation carried out by law enforcement officials, from accessing a Department of Motor Vehicles database to wiretapping a telephone to strip-searching a suspect. This rather awkward terminology is required because the term "search" has a very particular meaning in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a method of surveillance

that implicates the Fourth Amendment to the degree that it requires probable cause or a warrant. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967).

2AC-Substantial 1. We meet: Our plan is substantial because [Contextualize] 2. Counter-interpretationSubstantial means considerable Words & Phrases 7 (WORDS AND PHRASES CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENTARY PAMPHLET,2007, Vol. 40B, 07, 95.) The term “substantially” in the ADA means considerable or to a large degree. Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank.

3. Prefer our counter-interpretation because: A) predictability- Our interpretation is very predictable it is the most common usage of the word. B) Limits- allowing the negative to arbitrarily dictate what is considered substantial and what is not substantial means that the debate around substantiality become infinitely regressive.

C) There is no internal link to their negative ground arguments. The negative gets ample ground—make them prove what ground they lose. We still link to FBI DA’s, CP's, and multiple K’s. And the negative get’s core generics such as terror DA's, as well as the Politics DA. D) Reasonability A. Good is good enough - if the neg has disadvantages, counterplans, and other forms of clash, then there is no reason to exclude us from the topic. Clash is ultimately the point of debate. B. Insures ground, limits, and avoids abuse- reasonability even if arbitrary- allows the negative their disadvantage ground and decent ground for other arguments - their arguments all assume an affirmative that is beyond the general realms of the resolution - which they will not win a link to.

2AC- T is not a voter

T not a voter: A. Clash checks abuse-if the negative has something to say against our aff then there is no reason we should lose the round.

B. Literature checks abuse-the affirmative is grounded topic literature which enables the negative to research against our affirmative.

C. Discourages research-voting on topicality justifies the negative not doing any research and running topicality every round which destroys education.

AT: AP def outdated Cross-apply Kundnani 12 ev stating that preemptive counterterrorism strategies specifically target Muslims for undue surveillance. Post-9/11, there was a surge in AP usage. This means that agent provocateurs do meet the definition of surveillance that was preexisting before 9/11 and are included when discussing developments of those programs.

Disad’s

2AC Terrorism DA Case Outweighs the disad - Cross apply our Wiezman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life.. Value to life is critical cause it allows convo’s of racism and oppression that are skirted in the 1nc. No Impact – Extend our first 3 pieces of Kundnani evidence that proves that there are no actual terrorist threats, and reveals how state agencies create their own fake terrorist attacks only to justify other types of domestic surveillance that oppress people. The af solves for racialization of the state through eliminating their ability to rationalize a nonexistent threat. No Link (specific) – Their Mosendz evidence is terrible. It just says that two women were accused of planning to think about trying to commit a terrorist attack. First of all the card is super power tagged there isn’t a single sufficient warrant in this card, and the situation is completely hypothetical, Second of all, these women were most likely provoked by AP’s to even think about committing any kind of terrorist attack. No Link: FBI uses APs to create terrorists – these people would not commit terrorist acts if it weren’t for provocation Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 191-192)

there was nothing to suggest Cromitie and his crew were potential al-Qaeda recruits. What seemed to initially draw Cromitie into the FBI's plot was his anger at US foreign policy. For the In reality,

other three, it was being Muslim, poor enough to be vulnerable to cash inducements, and gullible enough to believe they were really going to receive thousands of dollars for an operation they were completely incapable of carrying out. The three had not expressed radical views or outrage at the oppression of Muslims in other parts of the world

The Newburgh four were simply struggling to survive in the face of poverty, addiction, and mental health issues. The money spent by the government on securing their convictions-Hussain received $100,000 in wages and expenses -could have given them the support they needed to turn their lives around, whether a living wage in a regular job or the health care services they needed . David Williams's prior to Hussain's appearance.

aunt, Alicia McWilliams, characterizes the case as a television show put on by the government rather than a genuine criminal investigation. Instead of wasting all this money to make a TV production, you could open up a job traiuing center in Newburgh. These are all ex-offenders. You know what Newburgh looks like. Newburgh is the most impoverished county. She

compares what happened to her nephew to earlier government

programs directed at African-American activism. COINTELPRO. The Black Panthers. The use of informants in churches, back in the 1940s and 1950s. This is happening all over again. But now the profile is Muslims. It just has a different name, and they're using different terms.24 Although-judge Colleen McMahon gave each of the Newburgh four twenty-five-year prison sentences, she nevertheless criticized the FBI's approach. Only the government could have made a terrorist out of Mr. Cromitie , a man whose buffoonery is positively Shakespearean in its scope ... I believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime here except [that] the government instigated it, planned it, and brought it to fruition."

Turn: One third of domestic terrorist attacks are instigated by agent provocateurs Gitlin, 2013 (Todd Gitlin is a professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, the chair of the PhD program in communications. “The Wonderful American World of Informers and Agents Provocateurs,” The Nation, June 27. http://www.thenation.com/article/wonderful-american-world-informers-and-agents-provocateurs/)

Who teaches bombers to build and plant actual or spurious bombs? The history of the secret police planting agents provocateurs in popular movements goes back at least to nineteenth century France and twentieth century Russia. In 1905, for example, the priest who led St. Petersburg’s revolution was Who casts the first stone? Who smashes the first window?

some sort of double agent, as was the man who organized the assassination of the Czar’s uncle, the Grand Duke. As it happens, the United States has its own surprisingly full history of such planted agents at work turning small groups or movements in directions that, for better or far more often worse, they weren’t planning on going. One well-documented case is that of “Tommy the Traveler,” a Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) organizer who after years of trying to arouse violent action convinced two 19-year-old students to firebomb an ROTC headquarters at Hobart College in upstate New York. The writer John Schultz reported on likely provocateurs in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of 1968. How much of this sort of thing went on? Who knows? Many relevant documents molder in unopened archives, or have been heavily redacted or destroyed. As the Boston marathon bombing illustrates, there are homegrown terrorists capable of producing the weapons they need and killing Americans without the slightest help from the U.S. government. But

historically, it’s surprising how

relatively often the gendarme is also a ringleader. Just how often is hard to know, since information on the subject is fiendishly hard to pry loose from the secret world. Through 2011, 508 defendants in the U.S. were prosecuted in what the Department of Justice calls “terrorism-related cases.” According to Mother Jones’s Trevor Aaronson, the FBI ran sting operations that “resulted in prosecutions against 158 defendants” — about onethird of the total. “Of that total, 49 defendants participated in plots led by an agent provocateur — an FBI operative instigating terrorist action . With three exceptions, all of the high-profile domestic terror plots of the last decade were actually FBI stings .”

Link Turn: SQ lack of trust due to FBI surveillance curtails traditional avenues of political activism, which makes terrorism more likely. Plan restores civil liberties, preventing ideological violence Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 199) The use of a provocation strategy to secure terrorism convictions among American Muslims has had a number of

Given the large numbers of informants operating in Muslim-American communities, mosque congregations and Muslim community organizations understand· that there is the possibility of an far-reaching consequences beyond the impacts on the individuals prosecuted.

informant jotting down names and conversations and passing the information to the government. With the prosecutors of the war on terror blurring the distinctions between First Amendment -protected speech and criminal activity, many feel it is safest to avoid discussing certain topics, such as Western foreign policy , except with one's closest friends and family. Relationships of trust within Muslim communities are thereby eroded, as people consider open discussions risky. Those who hold views critical of the government choose not to express themselves publicly. As fear takes hold, the traditional avenues of political activism, such as taking to the streets to protest, are less likely to occur. According to official theories of radicalization, an atmosphere in which political opposition to US imperialism cannot be freely expressed by Muslims helps prevent terrorism. But in reality, the more those angry at foreign policy see their community paralyzed by fear and reluctant to express itself openly, the more likely it becomes that some will end up supporting terrorism . A strong, active, and confident Muslim community enjoying its civil rights to the full and able to engage with young people on issues they feel strongly about is the best way of preventing violence.

No Link and Turn: Radical behavior is not predictive of propensity to commit terrorist attacks – By isolating radicals and luring them into attacks, the FBI makes it harder to isolate real terrorism Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 193-194)

Even putting aside such civil liberties issues, there are serious problems from a pragmatic point of view. At the very least, a significant statistical correlation between the ideological indicators of radicalization and terrorist violence would have to be demonstrated in order to give some support for the view that ideology causes terrorism. It would also be necessary to show that provocation is the most effective way for a counterterrorist system to respond to it. On both counts, there are serious objections. As we saw in Chapter 4, academic attempts to substantiate a link betweenradicalization indicators (such as expressions of religious ideology) and terrorist violence fall flat when properly scrutinized. Such studies always seek to trace the ways in which an individual's belief in a radical ideology emerges, on the assumption that radical ideologies cause violence - but this is precisely what

expressing particular religious beliefs or anger at foreign policy are poor predictors of the likelihood of an individual becoming a terrorist. Moreover, a counterterrorism system that monitors radicalization indicators, assuming needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed. In fact,

that they have predictive value, may well be worse at avoiding attacks than one focused more narrowly on

Amassing vast quantities of information on large numbers of so-called radical persons makes it harder to spot the terrorism intelligence that is actually significant . More often than not, when the US individuals inciting, financing, or preparing to carry out acts of terror.

government has failed to prevent terrorist acts, it is not because the intelligence was missing but because its significance was not identified amid the huge tracts of surveillance data the national security state collects.

Government harassment makes cooperation with police less likely Bertini, 2011 (Joseph, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. STINGS, STOOLIES, AND AGENTS PROVOCATEURS: EVALUATING FBI UNDERCOVER COUNTERRORISM OPERATIONS. MA Thesis, Proquest)

Undercover counterterrorism operations have even greater negative effects on Muslim-American communities. In a qualitative study of Muslim-American reactions to the USA PATRIOT Act, Tony Gaskew found that many

Muslims

reported feeling harassed and unfairly targeted by law enforcement

since September 11, 2001.28 A Pew Research Center study found that 54% of Muslims feel that they are being singled-out by the government, and 74% reported that this bothered them either some or a lot.29 In a similar study, Schanzer, et al.

the use of infiltrators in counterterrorism operations was a substantial source of tension between Muslim-Americans and law enforcement organizations .30 found that

Muslim-American civil society groups have begun to draw attention to the prevalence of undercover operations.31

undercover operations must be weighed with the knowledge that their unpopularity in Muslim-American communities could conflict with other counterterrorism methods such as community-based policing.32 The CRS report argues that

Only a risk that FBI surveillance strategies increase violent terrorism Gitlin, 2013 (Todd Gitlin is a professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, the chair of the PhD program in communications. “The Wonderful American World of Informers and Agents Provocateurs,” The Nation, June 27. http://www.thenation.com/article/wonderful-american-world-informers-and-agents-provocateurs/)

when it comes to informers, agents provocateurs, and similar matters, four things are clear enough : • Terrorist plots arise, in the United States as elsewhere, with the intent of committing murder and mayhem. Since 2001, in the U.S., these have been almost exclusively the work of freelance Islamist ideologues like the Tsarnaev brothers of Boston. None have been connected in any meaningful way with any legitimate organization or movement. • Government surveillance may in some cases have been helpful in scotching such plots, but there is no evidence that it has been essential. • Even based on the limited information available to us, since September 11, 2001, the net of surveillance has been thrown wide indeed. Tabs have been kept on members of quite a range of suspect populations, including American Muslims, anarchists, and environmentalists, among others — in situation after situation where there was no probable cause to suspect preparations for a crime. • At least on occasion — we have no way of knowing how often — agents provocateurs on government payrolls have spurred violence. Whatever the fog of surveillance,

Civil Libs o/w Terror Err af - Even in wartime – civil liberties come first ShareAmerica 15 (April 6, 2015 – ShareAmerica is managed by the Bureau of International Information Programs within the U.S. Department of State. https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/) First, the United States has a long and unfortunate history of overreacting to the perceived dangers of wartime. In each instance, we allowed our fears to get the better of us. Second, it is often argued that in light of the sacrifices we ask citizens (especially soldiers) to make in time of war, it is small price to ask others to surrender some of their peacetime freedoms to help the war effort. As the Supreme Court argued in Korematsu, “hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.” This is a seductive, but dangerous argument. To fight a war successfully, it is necessary for soldiers to risk their lives. But it is not necessarily “necessary” for others to surrender their freedoms. That necessity must be convincingly demonstrated, not merely presumed. And this is especially true when, as is usually the case, the individuals whose rights are sacrificed are not those who make the laws, but minorities, dissidents and noncitizens. In those circumstances, “we” are making a decision to sacrifice “their” rights — not a very prudent way to balance the competing interests.

2AC Human Trafficking DA Destroy this da please it’s trash Case outweighs the Dis- AD in every aspect. The Dis-AD doesn’t provide any type of magnanimous or probable impact. Look to our klemencic evidence that particularly states entrapment is happening now and is putting the minorities in distress. No Link- Their evidence is talking about ALL UNDERCOVER AGENTS and isn’t specific to agent provocateurs which are set out specifically to provoke the minorities.

AND, Human trafficking is done through the department of Defense not the FBI as the Neg would want you to believe (lol gg you messed up bruh)

DHS ’15 -

(http://www.dhs.gov/topic/human-trafficking”Combating Human Trafficking”)

Human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery, and involves the use of force, fraud, or coercion to exploit human beings for some type of labor or commercial sex purpose. Every year, millions of men, women, and children worldwide—including in the United States—are victims of human trafficking. Victims are often lured with false promises of well-paying jobs or are manipulated by people they trust, but instead are forced or coerced into

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for investigating human trafficking, arresting traffickers and protecting victims. DHS initiates hundreds of investigations and makes numerous arrests every year, using a victim-centered approach. DHS also processes immigration relief through Continued Presence (CP), T prostitution, domestic servitude, farm or factory labor, or other types of forced labor.

visas, and U visas to victims of human trafficking and other designated crimes.

2AC Focus DA Case Outweighs the disad – Focusing on deterring nonexistent threats destroys any value to life that’s our first piece of Kundnani. And cross-apply our Weizman evidence here that says value to life is critical cause it allows convo’s of racism and oppression that are skirted in the 1nc. Link Turn: Entrapment is a waste of bureaucratic energy – plan frees up resources to focus on real threats Gitlin, 2013 (Todd Gitlin is a professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, the chair of the PhD program in communications. “The Wonderful American World of Informers and Agents Provocateurs,” The Nation, June 27. http://www.thenation.com/article/wonderful-american-world-informers-and-agents-provocateurs/)

Entrapment and instigation to commit crimes are in themselves genuine dangers to American liberties, even when the liberties are those of the reckless and wild. But there is another danger to such pursuits: the attention the authorities pay to nonexistent threats (or the creation of such threats) is attention not paid to actual threats. Anyone concerned about the security of Americans should cast a suspicious eye on the allocation or simply squandering of resources on wild goose chases . Consider some particulars which have recently come to light. Under the Freedom of Information Act, the Partnership for Civil Justice

in 2011 and 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies were busy surveilling and worrying about a good number of Occupy groups — during the very time that they were missing actual warnings about actual Fund (PCJF) has unearthed documents showing that,

terrorist actions. From its beginnings, the Occupy movement was of considerable interest to the DHS, the FBI, and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies, while true terrorists were slipping past the nets they cast in the wrong places. In the fall of 2011, the DHS specifically asked its regional affiliates to report on “Peaceful Activist

Aware that Occupy was overwhelmingly peaceful , the federally funded Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), one of 77 coordination centers known generically as “fusion centers,” was busy monitoring Occupy Boston daily. As the investigative journalist Demonstrations, in addition to reporting on domestic terrorist acts and ‘significant criminal activity.’”

Michael Isikoffrecently reported, they were not only tracking Occupy-related Facebook pages and websites but

It was in this period that the FBI received the second of two Russian police warnings about the extremist Islamist activities of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the future Boston Marathon bomber. That city’s police commissioner later testified that the federal authorities did not pass any information “writing reports on the movement’s potential impact on ‘commercial and financial sector assets.’”

at all about the Tsarnaev brothers on to him, though there’s no point in letting the Boston police off the hook either. The ACLU has uncovered documents showing that, during the same period, they were paying close attention to the internal workings of Code Pink and Veterans for Peace.

2AC Agenda Politics DA 1. Case outweighs the disad

Cross apply our Wiezman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. This gives our !’s the most magnitude. 2.

3. Fiat solves the link – we should imagine a world in which the plan has passed, not how it would pass 5. Vote no - the plan has already been introduced which would

trigger the link regardless 6. The plan is popular, there’s no reason it shouldn’t be because agents provocateurs provide no benefit to society.

Plan is popular with Americans especially Muslim Americans Bertini, 2011 (Joseph, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. STINGS, STOOLIES, AND AGENTS PROVOCATEURS: EVALUATING FBI UNDERCOVER COUNTERRORISM OPERATIONS. MA Thesis, Proquest) Undercover counterterrorism operations have even greater negative effects on Muslim-American communities. In a qualitative study of Muslim-American reactions to the USA PATRIOT Act, Tony Gaskew found that many

Muslims

reported feeling harassed and unfairly targeted by law enforcement

since September 11, 2001.28 A Pew Research Center study found that 54% of Muslims feel that they are being singled-out by the government, and 74% reported that this bothered them either some or a lot.29 In a similar study, Schanzer, et al.

the use of infiltrators in counterterrorism operations was a substantial source of tension between Muslim-Americans and law enforcement organizations .30 Muslim-American civil society groups have begun to draw attention to the prevalence of undercover operations.31 The CRS report argues that undercover operations must be found that

weighed with the knowledge that their unpopularity in Muslim-American communities could conflict with other counterterrorism methods such as community-based policing.32

7. Not intrinsic – rational policymakers can do both 8. Politics are compartmentalized Dickinson 9 – professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt (5/26/09, Matthew, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/, JMP

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power.

Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores ” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call

These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although outcomes?

journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual

Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the evidence of presidential influence.

importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of

most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then,

primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with leftleaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

9.

1AR Intrinsicness A logical policymaker resolves the link – their link evidence doesn’t prove a unique political tradeof between the af and the disad. Opportunity costs are the only way to determine the risk of the link.

And intrinsicness is not a voter – forcing teams to read intrinsic disads is key to opportunity cost education which is a better form of politics.

They say politics disad good – this is not an answer because you can read politics scenarios with sequencing or horsetrading links that have intrinsic tradeofs with the plan.

BELOW NEEDS TO BE ORGANIZED INTO AN ARG Intrinsicness:A logical policymaker would both do the plan and pass_____________ Instrinsicness is fundamentally a theory of decision-making Before you can make a decision about action, you have to first consider who the decision-maker is. Intrisicness posits the judge in the role of the entirety of the USFG It isn’t a cost to the actor to do something and not do something negative to themselves. [(move to neg file) Neg response – maybe your decision-making model is good but it’s not connected to reality – there is no singular USFG. Intrinsicness is illogical – no one policymaker wields control over the entirety of the USFG. Takes out all disads – intrinsicness tends to become infinitely regressive. Politics DA is good. If neg says that condo is logical, then go ahead and use it to endorse the logical policymaker] 1AR Block

In the 1AR extend the impact as to why intrinsicness is good – things you can say is that it’s key to logical decision-making and it’s reciprocal Logical decision making – coherent decision making model wouldn’t view the plan as an opportunity cost Reciprocity – adv. Cps are reciprocal, we should get to test whether the DA is germane to the plan A2 takes out all disads – we can only deal with things that are in the disadvantages specifically. The brightline is that intrinsicness arguments shouldn’t require solvency arguments – the politics da provides evidence in the 1NC that proves the DA isn’t intrinsic. A2 not logical b/c not whole USFG – it is logical because this decision-making model accommodates fiat. Decision-making education is portable – useful outside of debate, more transferable than just politics based education. Tether politics debate god arguments to process, the model; not just the normal “learning about politics is c00l!!!!” If the neg drops theory args then say: WE GET NEW RESPONSES Otherwise it incentivizes the 2ac to proliferate theory arguments Discourages substantive debate Theory is about best practices Intrinsic: the policy is not the only unique instance of policymaking in the round; if the judge is like the USFG, and he can pass the plan, then he can pass the politics DA as well. It is intrinsic because congress is made up of a lot of people, and the announcement of the plan would cause backlash from the people who dislike it. Intrinsic key to politics and negative ground, you learn about current events education, and it’s the most real world. The real inherent barrier to the plan is the unpopularity of it. Fiat solves the link: Our interpretation is that the affirmative must defend the political ramifications from passing their plan. Politics DA are good (look at intrinsicness).

1AR Political Capital Not Real Political capital isn’t real – constituencies and party ideologies are what influence how members of Congress vote. The president doesn’t hold sway – their evidence discounts the fact that pushes made by Clinton, Reagan, Johnson, Carter, etc. couldn’t overcome institutional dynamics.

1AR Politics st

1 , UNIQUENESS 2nd LINK 3rd I/L 4th IMPACT

2AC ISIS Strikes Politics DA Non-unique – Obama authorized strikes already Fox News 9/11

(Fox News, “Obama authorizes military strikes against ISIS leadership”, 09/11/14, AD: 09/12/14, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/11/obama-authorizes-military-strikes-against-isis-leadership/ | Kushal)

Obama has authorized the Pentagon to target and kill leaders of the Islamic State militant group, with the organization’s head Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi being at the top of the administration’s list. U.S. military officials confirmed to Fox News Thursday that Obama had approved the strikes against individual targets for the first time. The authorization was first reported by the Washington Post. Obama had previously not permitted the military to target individuals from the terrorist organization, also known as ISIS or ISIL, even if intelligence showed where they were located. President

White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said in a press briefing Thursday that the president is “actively engaged” in selecting possible Islamic State targets that are “available.” “The president has gotten guidance about targets that are available and would be critical to denying ISIL a safe-haven both in Iraq and in Syria,” Earnest said. Earnest said the administration has identified the targets through ramped up "intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets” in the region. Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby also told reporters Thursday that destroying a group like the Islamic State requires an “aggressive” approach, which includes “disrupting their ability to command and control and to lead their own forces.” Obama announced on Wednesday he is sharply escalating

the U.S. military campaign against militants, authorizing U.S. airstrikes in Syria along with expanded airstrikes in Iraq.

2AC Ex-Im Politics DA 1. Case outweighs the disad Cross apply our Wiezman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. This gives our !’s have the most magnitude

2. Won’t pass – rider bills and political brinkmanship Hanson 8/28

(Christine Hanson, political correspondent for The Hill, “Senate Dems threaten to hold government hostage over Ex-Im Bank”, 08/28/14, AD: 08/28/14, https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/politics/215765-senate-dems-threaten-to-hold-government-hostage-over-ex-im-bank | Kushal)

Leading up to the annual August Congressional recess, it was still business-as-usual on Capitol Hill. As members caught their flights home, news reports were suggesting that Senate Democrats may try to tie legislation

the beleaguered Export-Import Bank and a longer term transportation spending package to a continuing resolution bill that would be needed to fund the government beyond extending the life of

September 30. In a brazen example of election-year brinksmanship, they may threaten to shut down the government unless they get their way. Reauthorizing the Export Import Bank and the continuing resolution, which funds the government, have absolutely nothing to do with one another. Although the government runs out of money on September 30, the same day as the charter for the Export Import expires, the similarity stops there. This is an important distinction and shouldn’t be hijacked by politicians saying one is dependent on the other. In order to avoid a government shutdown, Congress should pass a clean, long-term CR that runs until early next year, and refrains from logrolling unrelated items into the measure. Democrats cried foul last autumn when House Republicans wanted to attach health care related items to any continuing resolution. They would be wise to heed their own advice this time around. Threats of shut down are political tactics, meant to distract from

the mounting evidence that the Export Import Bank should expire. As Americans for Prosperity and our 30+ coalition partners have highlighted over the past several months, the reasons to oppose the Export Import Bank are myriad: It’s corporate welfare, it disadvantages domestic companies, it send Americans’ tax dollars abroad, it crowds out private sector loans, it uses taxpayer funds to boost private profits, etc. Reauthorizing the Export Import Bank should be debated on its merits, which are dubious at best. To begin with, the bank accounts for a mere two percent of all exports from the United States, a pittance in terms of the overall exports the United States send abroad. Backstopped by the taxpayers, this “free money” is loaned to large multi-national corporations which then go overseas to encourage foreign countries to buy their products. Taxpayers shouldn’t be on the hook, especially when businesses have the same ability as ordinary folks to go private lenders and not the federal government when they need a loan. Even more disturbing, a recent article in the Wall Street Journal reported that bank officials received “gifts and kickbacks” in

order to “steer federal contracts to favored companies.” While they are back in their home districts over recess, legislators are hearing from their constituents that they are tired of seeing corporate welfare come out of Washington. Letting the Export Import Bank expire would send a clear message that Washington gets it and is starting to get its house in order. Legislators should be applauded for taking a stand against the special interests who are currently roaming the halls of Congress, knocking on lawmakers’ doors and spreading the same politically-charged myths about the Bank’s activities (along with their generous contributions, of course).

3. Fiat solves the link – we should imagine a world in which the plan has passed, not how it would pass

5. Vote no - the plan has already been introduced which would

trigger the link regardless 6. The plan is popular

7. Not intrinsic – rational policymakers can do both 8. Politics are compartmentalized Dickinson 9 – professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt (5/26/09, Matthew, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/, JMP What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power.

Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores ” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call

These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although outcomes?

are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because

journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual

Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the evidence of presidential influence.

importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then,

most legislative outcomes don’t

depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with leftleaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

9. No impact – losing the bank has no long term economic efects DePillis, 8/1/14 (Lydia, The Washington Post, “Do I Need to Care: Export-Import Bank edition,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/08/01/do-ineed-to-care-export-import-bank-edition/, AW) The Ex-Im bank, at the very least, likely doesn’t do Americans any harm. It’s selffunded, returning about $1 billion last year to the Treasury in proceeds from interest rates. While some companies – such as Delta Airlines – claim Ex-Im financing helps their foreign rivals purchase supplies at lower cost, the effect is probably outweighed by the U.S. government using its prodigious lending capacity on the behalf of U.S. producers. The bank calculates that its 2013 portfolio currently “supports” 205,000 jobs, which is an insignificant number of jobs. But would you notice if the bank disappears at the end of September? If you’re one of the 7,000 businesses the bank says it helped between 2007 and 2014, it could make the difference between getting a big contract or not. If you’re a shareholder of Caterpillar, General Electric or Boeing — three of the biggest recipients of Ex-Im financing — you might notice slightly lower returns. But overall, it only touches two percent of U.S. exports. And often, Ex-Im financing is something that’s just nice to have, not essential. As the chief financial officer of New Jersey-based Rastelli Foods, a big Ex-Im client, put it: “If their charter is not renewed, we will be scrambling to find trade insurance that is as flexible and easy to manage as that provided by Exim Bank.” Ultimately, as the Wall Street Journal explained, the fight over the Ex-Im Bank reauthorization is more important for what it says about the shifting nature of American politics than it is to the overall economy. The right wing of the Republican party is flouting the desires of big business, while moderates get behind a mild form of protectionism. Meanwhile, liberals have largely abandoned their previous opposition, which arose in response to environmental and human rights issues with the projects that Ex-Im used to support. Whether it survives is an indicator of who’s on top in Washington — with some real consequences, but not far-reaching effects.

10. Private sector checks the impact James 12 – trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies (October 2012, Sallie, “Ending the Export-Import Bank”, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/export-import-bank#7)//spark The bank does not create the resources to provide financing out of thin air: the money comes from taxes or the repayment fees from previous loans, which would otherwise flow to the U.S. Treasury . In that sense, the bank only redistributes resources by taking them from other areas of the economy. It reallocates capital that would otherwise be available for other uses . When the bank diverts resources to However, that is only one side of the equation.

politically selected activities, economic efficiency is lost unless the reallocation corrects a true market failure. But

there is no reason to think that the Ex-Im Bank knows how to better deploy resources than consumers, investors, and businesses in private markets . Ex-Im Bank supporters often say that the bank creates jobs without acknowledging any offsetting losses to the rest of the economy. Thus the 227,000 jobs that Hochberg claims to have created are not necessarily "net jobs" that would not exist in a world without the Ex-Im Bank. The relevant question is whether the Ex-Im Bank's activities create more value—measured in terms of jobs, or exports, or economic growth—than they destroy. At best,

the activities

of the bank have no discernible net impact on the number of jobs in the U.S. economy. In many cases, Ex-Im–backed sales would have be completed anyway with private financing. The bank says that it tries to avoid displacing private-sector finance, but it can't avoid displacement entirely. Because the Ex-Im Bank is ready to step in with financing, no one can know what terms might have been offered by private lenders had the bank not existed.

11.

2AC TPA DA Tpa already passed

2AC NSA Reform DA 1. Case outweighs the disad Cross apply our wiezman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. This gives our !’s have the most magnitude. 2) They’re a topical af. They’re dumb..

2AC NASA Tradeof DA 1. Case outweighs the disad 2. Cross apply our wiezman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. Our !’s have the most magnitude

2. The disad is terminally non-unique – budget has been declining for decades Foust 14 (Jeff, National Geographic, 05.30.14, “NASA Facing New Space Science Cuts”, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/05/140530-space-politics-planetary-science-funding-exploration/, Accessed 07.06.14)//LD

Funding for NASA's Spitzer Space Telescope , launched in 2003 and still producing good science, may be cut.¶ Alien worlds and the search for extraterrestrial life recently took center stage on Capitol Hill, a break from standard political fare in Washington D.C. (Related: "Future of Spaceflight.") ¶ "Finding other sentient life in the universe would be the most significant discovery in human history," began Lamar Smith, a Republican from Texas who's chairman of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, at the May 21 astrobiology hearing.¶ "The unknown and unexplored areas of space spark human curiosity," he went on, applauding recent discoveries such as the most Earth-like world orbiting a nearby star discovered so far by NASA's Kepler Space

while the stars and planets beckon, a budget battle is brewing over NASA, the $17.6-billion civilian space agency. Cuts threaten spacecraft and telescopes, even as NASA struggles to clarify its mission in the post-space shuttle era. (Related: "Future of Spaceflight.")¶ Since the end of the Apollo missions in 1973, the space agency's budget has steadily declined from 1.35 percent of federal spending to less than 0.6 percent . A long-running annual drop in inflation-adjusted funds took a sharp downward turn in the past two years, as budget cuts, including mandatory ones ordered by Congress, trimmed almost a billion dollars from 2012 to 2013. The Telescope.¶ But the reality is that

2014 budget recovered some, but not all, of that cut. ¶ In addition, a fundamental debate is under way over the future exploration aims of NASA. The Obama Administration favors "stepping stone" plans leading to an asteroid

A National Research Council report released in late 2012 called NASA's strategic plan to explore asteroids "vague," adding that the agency's explanations did not explain "why it is worthy of taxpayer investment."¶ The debate over funding the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI)—which visit in the next decade; congressional representatives call for a return to the moon. ¶

was barred from receiving federal dollars in a 1993 congressional vote that scrubbed its ten-million-dollar yearly

Already squeezed by decades of straitened funding, a variety of NASA missions, ranging from an infrared space telescope to a 747-mounted observatory, now face cancellation. operating cost—mirrors, in microcosm, the larger debate about paying for space science.

3. Sequestration makes Mars mission impossible Kramer 14 (Miriam, Space Staff, 01.14.14, “Manned Mission to Mars By 2030s Is Really Possible, Experts Say¶ “,¶ http://www.space.com/24268-manned-mars-mission-nasa-feasibility.html¶ , Accessed 07.06.14)//LD

While Carberry said that it is possible to launch a manned mission to Mars by the 2030s under pre-sequestration budget levels, a NASA-led human mission to Mars will probably never launch under current budgetary constraints, Carberry said.¶

"We're not far off from what we need," Carberry said. "We just need to get back into a reasonable budget, which we're not in right now."¶ President Barack Obama requested about $17.7 billion for NASA during his 2013 budget proposal, $59 million less than what the space agency received in 2012.¶ "[NASA] funds are divided between various missions, directorates and centers," Carberry said via email. "Unless there was a MAJOR restructuring, it would be hard to accomplish a NASA-led Mars mission [under the current budget]. That said, major disruptive technology gains could always occur that could make it viable — we just can't count on that happening."

4. No link –Ap’s aren’t based on surveillance agencies – the FBI approves permits AND the plan doesn’t mandate USFG investment

5. Empirically funding isn’t zero sum Mangu-Ward 13 (Katherine, Reason magazine, New America Foundation, 09.04.13, “Is the Ocean the Real Final Frontier?”, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/09/sea_vs_space_which _is_the_real_final_frontier.html, Accessed 07.07.14)//LD Ocean exploration is certainly the underdog, so to speak, in the sea vs. space face-off . There’s no doubt that the general public Is Hawkes right? Should we all be crawling back into the seas from which we came?

considers space the sexier realm. The occasional James Cameron joint aside, there’s much more cultural celebration of space travel, exploration, and colonization than there is of equivalent underwater adventures. In a celebrity death match between Captain Kirk

the rivalry can feel a bit lopsided —the chess the jocks aren’t losing much sleep over the price of pawns and cheerleaders rarely turn out for chess tournaments. But somehow the debate rages on in dorm rooms, congressional committee rooms, and Internet chat rooms. ¶ Damp ocean boosters often aim to borrow from the rocket-fueled glamour of space . and Jacques Cousteau, Kirk is going to kick butt every time. ¶ In fact,

club may consider the football program a competitor for funds and attention, but

Submersible entrepreneur Marin Beck talks a big game when he says, “We can go to Mars, but the deep ocean really is our final frontier,” but he giggles when a reporter calls him the “Elon Musk of the deep sea,” an allusion to the founder of the for-profit company Space X who is rumored to be the real-life model for Iron Man’s Tony Stark. ¶ Even Hawkes admits that he “grew up dreaming of aircraft”—though he means planes, not spaceships—but “then I got to look at this subsea stuff and I saw this is where

many of the technologies for space and sky are the similar, right down to the goofy suits with bubble heads—the main difference is that in space, you’re looking to keep pressure inside your vehicle and underwater you’re looking to keep pressure out— there’s often a sense that that sea and space are competitors rather than compadres.¶ They needn’t be, says Guillermo Söhnlein, a man who straddles both realms. Söhnlein is a serial space entrepreneur and the founder of the Space Angels Network. aviation was all those years ago. The whole field was completely backwards, and that’s why I jumped in.” ¶ While

(Disclosure: My husband’s a member.) The network funds startups aimed for the stars, but his most recent venture is Blue Marble Exploration, which organizes expeditions in manned submersibles to exotic underwater locales. (Further disclosure: I have made a very small investment in Blue Marble, but am fiscally neutral in the sea vs. space fight, since I have a similar amount riding on a space company, Planetary Resources.)¶ As usual, the fight probably comes down to money . The typical American believes that NASA is eating up a significant portion of the federal budget (one 2007 poll found that respondents pinned that figure at one-quarter of the federal budget), but the space agency is actually nibbling at a Jenny Craig–sized portion of the pie. At about $17 billion, government-funded space exploration accounts for about 0.5 percent of the federal budget. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—NASA’s soggy counterpart—gets much less, a bit more than $5 billion for a portfolio that, as the name

But the way Söhnlein tells the story, this zero sum mind-set is the result of a relatively recent historical quirk: For most of the history of human exploration, private funding was the order of the day. Even some of the most famous examples of state-backed suggests, is more diverse.¶

exploration—Christopher

Columbus’

long petitioning of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, for instance, or Sir Edmund

Hillary’s quest to climb to the top of Everest— were

actually funded primarily by private investors or

nonprofits.

6. No threshold for the impact – can’t colonize fast enough to solve for our !’s, the af is critical to solve

7. Mars colonization isn’t feasible – radiation, space sickness, sustainability Lemind 14 (Anna, University of Piraeus, 02.20.14, “The Other Side of Mars Colonization: Potential Dangers of the Red Planet”, http://www.learning-mind.com/the-other-side-of-mars-colonization-potential-dangers-of-the-redplanet/#Ay8spY2O4ifCbzcy.99, Accessed 07.04.14)//LD

As the prospect of a permanent colony on Mars is getting closer with every new press release from the Mars One project, it probably makes sense to remember that any person who will move permanently to Mars will most likely die untimely and painful death.¶ Here are some things that are most likely to cause it (all kinds of technical problems are excluded from consideration): ¶ First of all, the Mars colonists will be subjected to radiation before having set foot on the threshold of their new home. Technically, the radiation level during the trip from Earth to Mars does not exceed the capacity of the human body, but one should remember that the Sun is a huge unpredictable radioactive destructive mass.¶ Just one solar flare during the trip to Mars will send a stream of high-energy particles that will damage any shielding that can be created today. In fact, it will ‘roast’ any creature that is not protected by the planetary magnetic fields. In 2022, just a couple of years before the planned start of the expedition, the Sun will be at the peak of its 11-year cycle.¶ Then, on the surface of Mars, the colonists would have to find a way to deal with a reduced gravitational field of the planet. Since Mars has only a third of the earth’s gravity, this factor can be fatal in the long term perspective. All aspects of our biological structure – from heart rate to the strength of our bones – are related to gravity.¶ As soon as this force is removed, we begin to lose bone marrow and our heart and vestibular system start to malfunction. It is the reason why the astronauts do not stay on the ISS for longer than necessary. The effects of the so-called “space sickness” on Mars will be reduced compared to the microgravity of outer space, but in the long run they will likely lead to the terminal health problems.¶ And finally, there is a problem of self-sustaining life on the Red Planet. Since the supply missions to Mars will cost billions of dollars, they will be probably delayed if the colonists suddenly run out of something important, like the air, water or food. ¶ Of course, each colony on Mars is planned as a self-sustaining system. However, just one serious crop failure will lead to the lack of oxygen, which will be produced by plants, and will raise the question of survival of the colonists.

2AC Cassini Tradeof DA 1. Case outweighs the disad Cross apply our wiezman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. Our !’s have the most magnitude

2. The disad is terminally non-unique – budget has been declining for decades Foust 14 (Jeff, National Geographic, 05.30.14, “NASA Facing New Space Science Cuts”, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/05/140530-space-politics-planetary-science-funding-exploration/, Accessed 07.06.14)//LD

Funding for NASA's Spitzer Space Telescope , launched in 2003 and still producing good science, may be cut.¶ Alien worlds and the search for extraterrestrial life recently took center stage on Capitol Hill, a break from standard political fare in Washington D.C. (Related: "Future of Spaceflight.") ¶ "Finding other sentient life in the universe would be the most significant discovery in human history," began Lamar Smith, a Republican from Texas who's chairman of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, at the May 21 astrobiology hearing.¶ "The unknown and unexplored areas of space spark human curiosity," he went on, applauding recent discoveries such as the most Earth-like world orbiting a nearby star discovered so far by NASA's Kepler Space

while the stars and planets beckon, a budget battle is brewing over NASA, the $17.6-billion civilian space agency. Cuts threaten spacecraft and telescopes, even as NASA struggles to clarify its mission in the post-space shuttle era. (Related: "Future of Spaceflight.")¶ Since the end of the Apollo missions in 1973, the space agency's budget has steadily declined from 1.35 percent of federal spending to less than 0.6 percent . A long-running annual drop in inflation-adjusted funds took a sharp downward turn in the past two years, as budget cuts, including mandatory ones ordered by Congress, trimmed almost a billion dollars from 2012 to 2013. The Telescope.¶ But the reality is that

2014 budget recovered some, but not all, of that cut. ¶ In addition, a fundamental debate is under way over the future exploration aims of NASA. The Obama Administration favors "stepping stone" plans leading to an asteroid

A National Research Council report released in late 2012 called NASA's strategic plan to explore asteroids "vague," adding that the agency's explanations did not explain "why it is worthy of taxpayer investment."¶ The debate over funding the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI)—which visit in the next decade; congressional representatives call for a return to the moon. ¶

was barred from receiving federal dollars in a 1993 congressional vote that scrubbed its ten-million-dollar yearly

Already squeezed by decades of straitened funding, a variety of NASA missions, ranging from an infrared space telescope to a 747-mounted observatory, now face cancellation. operating cost—mirrors, in microcosm, the larger debate about paying for space science.

3. No link –Ap’s aren’t based on surveillance agencies – the FBI approves permits AND the plan doesn’t mandate USFG investment 4. Other budgets are bookmarked for tradeofs SVITAK 11 (3/29. Amy; Senior Writer – Space.com, “NASA’s Budget Could Get Infusion From Other U.S. Departments,” http://www.space.com/11247-nasa-budgetfunding-commerce-justice-departments.html, 2011, RZ)

Congressional appropriators could tap the funding accounts of the U.S. departments of Commerce and Justice to help cover what some see as a $1 billion shortfall in NASA’s $18.7 billion spending plan for 2012, which allocates less money for a heavy-lift rocket and crew capsule than Congress directed last year. “There’s over a billion-dollar difference between the budget request and the authorized levels in [20]12 for the launch system and the crew vehicle, and now that falls squarely back on the shoulders of [the appropriations committees] to try and figure out where to come up with that money,” said a panelist at a March 23 breakfast on Capitol Hill. Sponsored by Women in Aerospace (WIA), the breakfast was held under the Chatham House Rule, an 84-year-old protocol fashioned by the London-based nonprofit think-tank to promote frank discussion through anonymity. [What Obama and Congress Should Do for Spaceflight] The panelist, one of six whose names and job titles were circulated by WIA prior to the meeting, said funding requested in NASA’s 2012 spending plan does not square with levels Congress set in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 that U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law in October. Specifically, the request called for spending $1.2 billion less than the $4 billion Congress authorized for the heavy-lift launch vehicle and crew capsule in 2012. At the same time, the request includes $350 million more than the $500 million Congress authorized to nurture development of commercial vehicles to deliver cargo and crews to the International Space Station after the space shuttle retires

it is now up to congressional appropriators “to find a to make those tradeoffs and take that money out of the departments of Commerce or Justice or the other agencies that are funded in the same bill as NASA.” NASA’s annual appropriation is part of a broader spending package totaling nearly $65 billion that funds the U.S. Commerce and Justice departments, the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and related agencies. But with NASA and other federal later this year. Consequently, the panelist said,

billion dollars in other places in NASA to pay for those activities or to decide

agencies operating in a fiscally constrained environment, the panelist said Congress could struggle to fund new multibillion-dollar programs next year. “It’s not impossible but the ability to do that is severely constrained in the environment we’re working in now, and that’s exacerbated by budget requests coming up from the administration that don’t track with the authorization,” the panelist said. Congress has yet to pass an appropriations bill for 2011, leaving NASA and most federal agencies to subsist at 2010 spending levels in the current budget year. The panelist said passing spending legislation for NASA “is a complicated and challenging thing this year, and it will be again next year” given a fiscal climate that has changed dramatically authorized funding levels for the space agency were set last fall. However, the panelist said the appropriations subcommittees that fund NASA are “very supportive of the agency, they’re supportive of the authorization, they want to see NASA get as close as possible to those authorized levels, so that will be a work in progress.”

5. Empirically funding isn’t zero sum Mangu-Ward 13 (Katherine, Reason magazine, New America Foundation, 09.04.13, “Is the Ocean the Real Final Frontier?”, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/09/sea_vs_space_which _is_the_real_final_frontier.html, Accessed 07.07.14)//LD Ocean exploration is certainly the underdog, so to speak, in the sea vs. space face-off . There’s no doubt that the general public Is Hawkes right? Should we all be crawling back into the seas from which we came?

considers space the sexier realm. The occasional James Cameron joint aside, there’s much more cultural celebration of space travel, exploration, and colonization than there is of equivalent underwater adventures. In a celebrity death match between Captain Kirk

the rivalry can feel a bit lopsided —the chess club may consider the football program a competitor for funds and attention, but the jocks aren’t losing much sleep over the price of pawns and cheerleaders rarely turn out for chess tournaments. But somehow the debate rages on in dorm rooms, congressional committee rooms, and Internet chat rooms. ¶ Damp ocean boosters often aim to borrow from the rocket-fueled glamour of space . and Jacques Cousteau, Kirk is going to kick butt every time. ¶ In fact,

Submersible entrepreneur Marin Beck talks a big game when he says, “We can go to Mars, but the deep ocean really is our final frontier,” but he giggles when a reporter calls him the “Elon Musk of the deep sea,” an allusion to the founder of the for-profit company Space X who is rumored to be the real-life model for Iron Man’s Tony Stark. ¶ Even Hawkes admits that he “grew up dreaming of aircraft”—though he means planes, not spaceships—but “then I got to look at this subsea stuff and I saw this is where

many of the technologies for space and sky are the similar, right down to the goofy suits with aviation was all those years ago. The whole field was completely backwards, and that’s why I jumped in.” ¶ While

bubble heads—the

main difference is that in space, you’re looking to keep pressure inside your vehicle and underwater

you’re looking to keep pressure out— there’s

often a sense that that sea and space are competitors rather than compadres.¶ They needn’t be, says Guillermo Söhnlein, a man who straddles both realms. Söhnlein is a serial space entrepreneur and the founder of the Space Angels Network. (Disclosure: My husband’s a member.) The network funds startups aimed for the stars, but his most recent venture is Blue Marble Exploration, which organizes expeditions in manned submersibles to exotic underwater locales. (Further disclosure: I have made a very small investment in Blue Marble, but am fiscally neutral in the sea vs. space fight, since I have a similar amount riding on a space company, Planetary Resources.)¶ As usual, the fight probably comes down to money . The typical American believes that NASA is eating up a significant portion of the federal budget (one 2007 poll found that respondents pinned that figure at one-quarter of the federal budget), but the space agency is actually nibbling at a Jenny Craig–sized portion of the pie. At about $17 billion, government-funded space exploration accounts for about 0.5 percent of the federal budget. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—NASA’s soggy counterpart—gets much less, a bit more than $5 billion for a portfolio that, as the name

But the way Söhnlein tells the story, this zero sum mind-set is the result of a relatively recent historical quirk: For most of the history of human exploration, private funding was the order of the day. Even some of the most famous examples of state-backed exploration—Christopher Columbus’ long petitioning of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, for instance, or Sir Edmund Hillary’s quest to climb to the top of Everest— were actually funded primarily by private investors or nonprofits. suggests, is more diverse.¶

6. No threshold for the impact – other countries have overtaken us in leadership, satellite construction is long-term and can’t solve

7. STEM leadership is structurally flawed Charette 5/12 (2014, Robert, http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/at-work/techcareers/exposing-the-roots-of-the-perpetual-stem-crisis-? utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+IeeeSpectrum+(IEEE+Spectrum), IEEE SPECTRUM, accessed 5/19/14,

Okay, here are your choices: 1957, 1982, and 2014. Match each year to when the following statements were made:¶ a. “It is pretty generally realized that our country faces a serious scientific and engineering manpower shortage. We have at present about half the engineers which we need, and each year we are graduating only about half our annual needs.”¶ b. “Science, technology, engineering and math form the foundation of the global economy. Yet, … if educational trends continue, fewer qualified candidates will be available to support growth in these areas.”¶ c. “We appear to be raising a generation of Americans, many of whom lack the understanding and the skills necessary to participate fully in the technological world in which they live and work.” ¶ Well, for the record, the order of the year when each statement was made is1957, 2014 and 1982. However, as explained in Michael Teitelbaum’s new book, Falling Behind?: Boom, Bust & the Global Race For Scientific Talent (Princeton University Press:2014),

Teitelbaum is a Senior Research Associate in the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School (and whom I interviewed for my IEEE Spectrum feature, The STEM Crisis is a Myth). According to him, since the end of the Second World War there have been regular proclamations of shortfalls in the graduation rates of engineers and scientists, as well as prophecies of the imminent loss of U.S. technical leadership caused by the abysmal education of U.S. students in math and sciences . ¶ Teitelbaum writes that these recurring concerns whatever order you chose is as good as any other.

could well be cut and pasted into one sentence: ¶ “The United States, long a leader in the number and quality of its scientists and engineers, has been falling behind its international competitors, and is thereby risking serious deterioration in its future prosperity and security.”¶ However, as Teitelbaum clearly demonstrates in his well-

the past and current cries of an engineering and science crisis “are quite inconsistent with nearly all the available evidence ,” going back to the early 1950s.¶ Teitelbaum researched book,

begins Falling Behind? by examining the many hyperbolic claimsof the current so-called science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) crisis. He expertly dissects these assertions and clearly demonstrates the weak assumptions and sloppy reasoning underlying each.¶ Teitelbaum next turns his attention to previous declarations of engineer and scientist shortages over the previous seventy years in a chapter aptly titled, “No

Shortage of Shortages.” Teitelbaum has been debunking these claims since the 1980s. In Falling Behind?, he shows

the fear sown by the false alarms of impending doom did achieve their political goals spurring governmental actions to alleviate the supposed crisis by pouring more money into research and education. However, those crying wolf have also produced a series of (at least) five alarm that

of successfully

boom-busts episodes that have predictably—if unintentionally—destabilized the U.S. science and engineering workforce. In addition, Teitelbaum argues, when the artificially created demand for engineers and scientist goes bust, it serves to discourage those very same sought-after students from pursuing engineering and science careers

the basic problems in attracting students to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics are structural in origin, and “cannot be cured simply by in the first place.¶ Teitelbaum's analysis shows that

providing additional resources.” He devotes a full chapter describing how the U.S. engineering and science “academic production process” operates, and how that process is insulated, especially at the graduate degree level, from the needs of the market. As Teitelbaum demonstrates, the current system of higher education has been geared for some time towards producing PhDs and postdoctoral students “irrespective of whether there is sufficient demand for such highly educated personnel in the market place.” ¶ Especially useful is the light Teitelbaum shines on the many financial and political incentives that motivate industry, academia and government to proclaim an engineering and science crisis. He dedicates most of a chapter to, for example, exposing incessant lobbying efforts to increase the number H-1B visa workers to meet the supposed STEM shortage. Teitelbaum describes in detail the various lobbying organizations, interest groups and companies involved and how they are spending tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars to change immigration policy. ¶ Teitelbaum also distressingly, but accurately, points out how “advocates of these shortage claims have had a nearly open field in politics and the media,” and that while there have been decades of credible evidence debunking shortage claims, those making them are far less “organized, funded or politically connected” than those making those claims. This disparity in resources, organization and political power make the fight for the truth, “really no contest.” ¶ This was apparent in a recent “STEM Crisis Debate” sponsored by the Information Technology and Information Foundation (ITIF), a Washington, D.C. think tank. The ITIF insists there is a shortage of STEM students and workers, and is an advocate of increasing the number of H-1B visas. Robert Atkinson, ITIF president, for example, was quoted as saying, “If you don’t say there is a shortage, you don’t drive improvement.” That sort of admission (as do others) goes unnoticed in much of the press, as exemplified by the newspaper USA Today, which has been strongly beating the U.S. STEM crisis drum for quite some time.

8. No impact - science diplomacy fails and risks more conflict Dickson ‘9 [David, Director SciDev.Net, news editor of Nature from 1993 to August 2001, and was the journal’s Washington correspondent from 1977 to 1982, The limits of science diplomacy, June 4, http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html],

Using science for diplomatic purposes has obvious attractions and several benefits. But there are limits to what it can achieve. The scientific community has a deserved reputation for its international perspective — scientists often ignore national boundaries and interests when it comes to exchanging ideas or collaborating on global problems. So it is not surprising that science attracts the interest of politicians keen to open channels of communication with other states. Signing agreements on scientific and technological cooperation is often the first step for countries wanting to forge closer working relationships. More significantly, scientists have formed key links behind-the-scenes when more overt dialogue has been impossible. At the height of the Cold War, for example, scientific organisations provided a conduit for discussing nuclear weapons control. Only so much science can do Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New

using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems. Some scientific collaboration clearly Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) —

demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction

whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved . Indeed, one speaker at the in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But

London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval . In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking. Conflicting ethos Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet co-dependent

The truth is that science and politics

make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy diferent universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But

a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the

diferences — acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is dangerous. The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing .

2AC Environment DA 1. Case outweighs the disad Cross apply our wiezzman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. Our !’s have the most magnitude.

2. No link (blow this up) – The af doesn’t endorse any type of consumption, or create any polution

3. Life adapts against pollution UCSB, 13

(University of California Santa Barbara, “Ocean's future not so bleak? Resilience found in shelled plants exposed to ocean acidification”, Science Daily, 4/15/13, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/04/130415100903.htm)//SJF

Marine scientists have long understood the detrimental effect of fossil fuel emissions on marine ecosystems. But a

group led by a UC Santa Barbara professor has found a point of resilience in a microscopic shelled plant with a massive environmental impact, which suggests the future of ocean life may not be so bleak. As fossil fuel emissions increase, so does the amount of carbon dioxide oceans absorb and dissolve, lowering their pH levels. " As pH declines, there is this concern that marine species that have shells may start dissolving or may have more difficulty making calcium carbonate, the chalky substance that they use to build shells," said Debora Iglesias-Rodriguez, a professor in UCSB's Department of Ecology, Evolution and Marine Biology. IglesiasRodriguez and postdoctoral researcher Bethan Jones, who is now at Rutgers University, led a large-scale study on the effects of ocean acidification on these tiny plants that can only be seen under the microscope. Their research, funded by the European Project on Ocean Acidification, is published in the journal PLoS ONE and breaks with traditional notions about the vitality of calcifiers, or creatures that make shells, in future ocean conditions. "The

story years ago was that ocean acidification was going to be bad , really bad for calcifiers," said Iglesias-Rodriguez, whose team discovered that one species of the tiny single celled marine coccolithophore, Emiliania huxleyi, actually had bigger shells in high carbon dioxide seawater conditions. While the team acknowledges that calcification tends to decline with acidification, "we

now know that there are variable responses in sea corals, in sea urchins, in all shelled organisms that we find in the sea." These E. huxleyi are a large army of ocean-regulating shell producers that create oxygen as they process carbon by photosynthesis and fortify the ocean food chain. As one of Earth's main vaults for environmentally harmful carbon emissions, their survival affects organisms inside and outside the marine system.

as increasing levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide causes seawater to slide down the pH scale toward acidic levels, this environment could become less hospitable. The UCSB study incorporated an approach known as shotgun proteomics to uncover how E. huxleyi's biochemistry could change in future high carbon dioxide conditions, which were set at four times the current levels for the study. This approach However,

casts a wider investigative net that looks at all changes and influences in the environment as opposed to looking at individual processes like photosynthesis. Shotgun proteomics examines the type, abundance, and alterations in proteins to understand how a cell's machinery is conditioned by ocean acidification. "There is no perfect approach," said Iglesias-Rodriguez. "They all have their caveats, but we think that this is a way of extracting a lot of information

from this system." To mirror natural ocean conditions, the team used over half a ton of seawater to grow the E. huxleyi and bubbled in carbon dioxide to recreate both present day and high future carbon levels. It took more than six months for the team to grow enough plants to accumulate and analyze sufficient proteins. The team found that E. huxleyi cells exposed to higher carbon dioxide conditions were larger and contained more shell than those grown

larger cells grow slower than those under current carbon dioxide conditions. Aside from slower growth, the higher carbon dioxide levels did not seem to affect the cells even at the biochemical level , as measured by the shotgun proteomic approach. "The E. huxleyi increased the amount of calcite they had because they kept calcifying but slowed down division rates ," said IglesiasRodriguez. "You get fewer cells but they look as healthy as those under current ocean conditions, so the shells are not simply dissolving away." in current conditions. However, they also found that these

6. Turn – growth empirically drives environmental improvements

Mead, 12 --- Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College (7/28/2012, Walter Russell, “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/, JMP)

Capitalism is not, Monbiot is forced to admit, a fragile system that will easily be replaced . Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, it is here to stay. Industrial civilization is, as far as he can now see, unstoppable. Gaia, that treacherous slut, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly. Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011: I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we’re out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we’re going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth. Here’s why the tar sands are important: It’s a decision point about whether, now that we’re running out of the easy stuff, we’re going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into? A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it’s clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the “crappy liquor.”

greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to shape the behavior of the political and economic systems they seek to control. If their understanding of the future of the earth’s climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems,

as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I’ve written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren’t rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record.

the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had. Nevertheless,

If greens weren’t so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found. The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism.

Let’s be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn’t been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn’t going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator. The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more

The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of success in the future.

lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan.

The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse . Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works. The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks. The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that

environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive

A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn. and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will.

Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical . It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night. An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won’t fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure . A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them . A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests . A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries and the protection of the coral reefs. But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn’t where we are headed.

A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about

A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one. managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons.

Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air. Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared. When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions.

A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings . A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do. A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers.

Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is. For Monbiot and for many others, Gaia’s decision to put so much oil into the United States and Canada seems like her biggest indiscretion of all. Certainly, a United States of America that has, in the Biblical phrase, renewed its youth like an eagle with a large infusion of fresh petro-wealth is going to be even less eager than formerly to sign onto various pie-in-the-sky green carbon treaties. But think how much worse things would be if the new reserves lay in dictatorial kleptocracies. How willing and able would various Central Asia states have been to regulate extraction and limit the damage? How would Nigeria have handled vast new reserves whose extraction required substantially more invasive methods?

the new sources are concentrated in places where environmentalists have more say in policy making and where, for all the shortcomings and limits, governments are less corruptible, more publicly accountable and in fact more competent to develop and enforce effective energy regulations. This won’t satisfy McKibben and Instead,

Monbiot (nothing that could actually happen would satisfy either of these gentlemen), but it is a lot better than what we could be facing. Additionally, if there are two countries in the world that should worry carbon-focused greens more than any other, they are the United States and China. The two largest, hungriest economies in the world are also home to enormous coal reserves. But based on what we now know, the US and China are

In a world of energy shortages and insecurity, both the US and China would have gone flat out for coal. Now, that is much less likely. among the biggest beneficiaries of the new cornucopia. Gaia put the oil and the gas where, from a carbon point of view, it will do the most good.

And there’s one more reason why greens should thank Gaia for shale. Wind and solar aren’t ready for prime time now, but by the time the new sources start to run low, humanity will have mastered many more technologies that can used to provide energy and to conserve it. It’s likely that Age of Shale hasn’t just postponed the return of coal: because of this extra time, there likely will never be another age in which coal is the dominant industrial fuel. It’s virtually certain that the total lifetime carbon footprint of the human race is going to be smaller with the new oil and gas sources than it would have been without them.

Neither the world’s energy problems nor its climate issues are going away any time soon. Paradise is not beckoning just a few easy steps away. But the new availability of these energy sources is on balance a positive thing for environmentalists as much as for anyone else. Perhaps, and I know this is a heretical thought, but perhaps Gaia is smarter than the greens.

7.

(!D) AT: Environment (General) Bad studies—their evidence is anecdotal, empirically denied, and tainted by moral tunnel vision—there is no scenario for complete collapse Ridder 2008 – PhD, School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania (Ben, Biodiversity And Conservation, 17.4, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation”) *ES = environmental services

The low resilience assumption

‘low resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity. Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This

An extreme example of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase” then observe that attempts to artificially replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich

This assertion—that the only alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 i nhis response (with four 1982, pp. 95–96).

co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101).

The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al. 2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification indicates its influence.

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld . In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation: Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha , which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192)

most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that

consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g

., Tudge

1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001). The low resilience assumption is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the actual ES these species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the

The preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental authors. tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence.

The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the conservation of biodiversity

Species loss alt causes EDF 7

(Environmental Defense Fund, The Importance of Wildlife and the Diversity of Life, http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=445, AG)

habitat. As forests, wetlands, prairies, coastal estuaries and other habitats are converted to residential, commercial or agricultural use and other types of development, wild plants and animals vanish. In addition, many areas known as "hotspots" for their unusually rich biodiversity, such as Florida and Southern California, also have rapidly expanding human populations , which accelerates the loss of biodiversity. In the U.S. non-native species are the second largest cause of species loss. Hundreds of Hawaii's unique wildlife and plants are being driven to extinction by non-native plants and animals. Other factors are pollution, disease, over-fishing and over-hunting. The major cause of species loss in the U.S. and worldwide is the loss and degradation of

No extinction Easterbrook 3—senior fellow at the New Republic (“We're All Gonna Die!”, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html? pg=1&topic=&topic_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation.

Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain . Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

(!D) AT: Keystone Species No impact or spillover to biodiversity from keystones Ridder 2008 – PhD, School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania (Ben, Biodiversity And Conservation, 17.4, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation”) *ES = environmental services

The low resilience assumption

‘low resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity. Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This

An extreme example of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase” then observe that attempts to artificially replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich

This assertion—that the only alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 i nhis response (with four 1982, pp. 95–96).

co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101).

The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al. 2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification indicates its influence.

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld . In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation: Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha , which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192)

most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that

consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g

., Tudge

1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001). The low resilience assumption is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the actual ES these species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the

The preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental authors. tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence.

The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the conservation of biodiversity

Intervening actors safeguard keystones Kunich, law prof, 94 – Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law (John, 24 Envtl. L. 501, AG) species that provide obvious, practical benefits to humans are not in danger of extinction. In fact, many actively safeguarded, raised, cultivated, and otherwise managed to maximize their productivity. There have been some cases of overharvesting of such species, but for the most part this type of species is safe, due to man's own self-interest. Most are

(!D) AT: Oceans Ocean bio-d is toast for other reasons – sea level rise and salinity EPA 7

Environmental Protection Agency, climate change, November 30th, 2007, http://www.epa.gov/bioiweb1/aquatic/climate.html

Global climate change poses a serious threat to many aquatic ecosystems. Over the last century, increased global temperatures have caused sea levels to rise approximately 15-20 cm (6-8 inches) worldwide, and is expected to continue to rise at an average rate of 1-2mm/year. This rise in sea level is due primarily to the melting of mountain glaciers, the expansion of ocean water due to warmer ocean temperatures, the pumping of ground water, and the melting of the polar ice sheets. On average, for every foot of sea level rise, the ocean moves inland 50-100 feet. At this rate, low lying areas and coastal aquatic ecosystems such as estuaries, marshes, and mangrove forests are being threatened. Higher salinities caused by increased evaporation, greater levels of tidal inundation, increased occurrences of flooding, and increased shoreline erosion are significantly altering the composition of these ecosystems, affecting both the plants and animals living in these habitats. If measures are not taken to help prevent further global warming, aquatic biodiversity could be greatly affected. Not only could the composition of species within specific ecosystems be greatly altered, but species extinction could also occur. Kennedy, environmental science prof, 2. Environmental science prof, Maryland. Former Director, Cooperative Oxford Laboratory. PhD. (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change. Alt cause—coastal expansion and overfishing Kunich, law prof, 6

– Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law (John, Killing Our Oceans, p 122-3, AG)

threats to marine biodiversity that originate, not in the oceans, but on dry land coastal zones of the world. Part of the reason these threats are prevalent is that an estimated 67 percent of the entire global human population lives either on the coast or within 37 miles of the coast, and that percentage is increasing. These huge and growing populations often cause overutilization of fishing and other resources in coastal areas, habitat destruction and degradation, pollution (both organic and inorganic), eutrophication and related issues such as pathogenic bacteria and algal toxins, introduction of invasive species, watershed alteration , marine littering, and other harms to the nearby marine regions. Given that so many key marine centers of biodiversity reside in the near-coast coral reefs and continental shelf areas, it is of tremendous importance that our legal approach embrace appropriate controls over these land-based threats. Any plan that shortsightedly and narrowly focuses too much on ocean-based activities will , paradoxically, miss the boat. There are enormous in the

(!D )AT Ocean Acidification This impact is dumb – multiple disasters like the oil spill prove oceans are resilient --No ocean acidification – best data Idso et al. ’11 [Craig D. Idso,

B.S. in Geography from Arizona State University, his M.S. in Agronomy from the University of Nebraska Lincoln, and his Ph.D. in Geography from Arizona State University, and Sherwood B. Idso, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy degrees are all from the University of Minnesota, “Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future”, Feb 2, http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf, CMR]

The chemistry aspect of the ocean acidification hypothesis is rather straightforward, but it is not as solid as many make it out to be; and a number of respected researchers have published papers demonstrating that the drop in oceanic pH will not be nearly as great as the IPCC and others predict it will be, nor that it will be as harmful as they claim it will be. Consider, for example, the figure below, which shows historical and projected fossil fuel CO2 emissions and atmospheric CO2 concentrations out to the year 2500, as calculated by NOAA’s Pieter Tans (2009). As can be seen there, his analysis indicates that the air’s CO2 concentration will peak well before 2100, and at only 500 ppm compared to the 800 ppm value predicted in one of the IPCC’s scenarios. And it is also worth noting that by the time the year 2500 rolls around, the atmosphere’s CO2 concentration actually drops back down to about what it is today. When these emissions estimates are transformed into reductions of oceanic pH, it can readily be seen in the following figure that Tans’ projected pH change at 2100 is far less than that of the IPCC. And Tans’ analysis indicates a pH recovery to values near those of today by the year 2500, clearly suggesting that things are not the way the world’s climate alarmists make them out to be, especially when it comes to anthropogenic CO2 emissions and their effects on the air’s CO2 content and oceanic pH values. --Over-fishing outweighs warming – oceanic collapse is inevitable. Craig ’02 [Robin Kundis, Professor of Law at Indiana University, 29 Ecology L.Q. 649, Lexis] A recent scientific study by Jeremy B.C. Jackson and several colleagues suggests a far broader range of possible states for marine ecosystems. The study,

This temporallyexpanded perspective reveals that the traditional scientific view of ocean management, based on short-term studies of changes in marine ecosystems, is inadequate because humans have been altering and weakening complex marine relationships for centuries - ever since we , as a species, learned to fish. According to this study, historical overfishing by humans profoundly disturbed marine ecosystems and greatly reduced ocean productivity long before the twentieth century. As a result, more recent disturbances such as pollution, industrialization, and climate change are, at best, dependent proximate causes of marine ecosystem collapse, and ocean managers cannot "fix" impaired ocean ecosystems unless they also account for historical fishing pressures. which appeared in Science, applies a centuries-long perspective on anthropogenic (human-induced) changes to the oceans.

(!D) AT: Dead Zones There are a number of diferent dead zones and causes of ocean destruction Edmonton Journal, 8 (Elaine O’Connor, “World's oceans at risk of becoming soupy swill; Rising temperatures, runoff toxins creating 'dead zones'” 9/15/2008, www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=3c40fbee-40e4-443a-b736-c70c6072649e) // JMP

VANCOUVER - Sally Cole came home from a sailing trip in August looking forward to a hot shower. But when she turned on her tap, all she got was slime. "I turned on the tap and it just flooped. Just a bit of viscous gloop came out. It was really horrible," said the resident of B.C's Saltspring Island between the mainland and Vancouver Island. The culprit was an algae bloom on the nearby lake that had choked the water pipes of hundreds of the area's residents. It

toxic slime -- algae feasting on pollutants and fertilizers, and starving the ocean of oxygen -- is killing off sea life at an alarming rate. A new study published in August reveals the world's "dead zones" have doubled in size every decade since 1960. Coastal waters with once rich marine life -- Chesapeake Bay, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and off Peru, Chile and Namibia -- are rapidly losing species. According to the report by two U.S. scientists, there are 405 asphyxiating dead zones in our oceans. The cause, predictably, is pollution. The culprits are fertilizer runoff in estuaries, sewage, global warming, overfishing and industrial waste . Millions of tonnes of "nutrient pollution" -- chemical fertilizer that adds took three days to clear. The incident is one example of how seas and lakes are suffocating in slime. That

phosphates and nitrogen to the water -- feed algae blooms. Some zones are vast -- the Baltic Sea's 70,000-square-kilometre aquatic graveyard is the largest. The Gulf of Mexico harbours North America's giant dead zone: A 22,000-square-km sea morgue, or something roughly the size of New Jersey.

dead zones have been discovered off California, in Lake Erie, around the Florida Keys, in North and South Carolina creeks and in Washington's Puget Sound. Together, they Other

have turned 246,048 square kilometres of the seas -- an area the equivalent of all five of the Great Lakes -- into marine wastelands. Robert Diaz, a Virginia Institute of Marine Science professor and co-author of the study, says the problem is already evident in Canadian waters. In B.C., a dead zone was first spotted in the Saanich Inlet in 1960. Dead zones have been recorded in P.E.I. fish-farming bays since 2000. If fish swim into a dead zone, they often become unconscious and cannot escape. Shellfish and bottom-dwellers move too slowly, so a stew of rotting marine life is left behind. Even when fish survive in low-oxygen water, research shows their reproduction suffers, which could jeopardize wild fish stocks. Diaz says this could be catastrophic for our local marine life and aquaculture. He says zones are likely to intensify as their contributing factors of algal blooms and intensive fish-farming are "problems that will continue into the future." Already, the impact of ocean deterioration is being felt all along the Pacific coast. Fishermen are bringing up cages of dead Dungeness crabs and salmon researchers have found low oxygen from the Columbia River on Oregon border's to northern Washington. As fish stocks fall, seabird populations are dying of starvation.

Pacific West Coast.

Deadly algae are also becoming common on the

They have been blamed for the erratic behaviour and mass die-offs of sea mammals since some algae act as

neurotoxins and impair brain function. Some 14,000 seals, sea lions and dolphins have washed up sick or dead in California in the last 10 years, and 650 grey whales have beached. Deadly algae have been a problem in the region since the 1980s, but scientists say they're increasingly frequent and intense. Algae is also storming international seas and claiming human victims. Near Sweden, cyanobacteria blooms at times turn the Baltic Sea into a brown slush that makes residents' eyes burn. On Florida's Gulf Coast, toxic tides have killed hundreds of manatees and caused breathing problems for area residents. Algae has smothered 80 per cent of coral reefs in the Caribbean and ruined 75 per cent of California's fish-rich kelp forests. Poison day-glo-green caulerpa algae is killing fish off the coasts of 11 countries. What will become of our oceans? One U.S. oceanographer has a succinct answer: slime. Jeremy

Jackson, a Scripps Institution of Oceanography professor, released a report in August warning of "mass extinction" in oceans due to dead zones, global warming, overfishing, pollution, ocean acidification, ecosystem destruction and invasive species.

2AC Federalism DA (needs work) 1. Case outweighs the disad Cross apply our Wiezman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. Our !’s have the most magnitude

2. No link –

3. Courts check spillover Nagel 2001

Robert F., Law Professor, University of Colorado, March, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, p. 53

the Supreme Court has recently issued a series of rulings that limit the power of the national government. Some of these decisions, which set boundaries to Congress's power to regulate commerce and to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, establish areas that are subject (at least in theory) only to state regulation. Others protect the autonomy of state governments by restricting congressional authority to expose state governments to suit in either state or federal courts and to "commandeer" state institutions for national regulatory purposes. Taken together, these decisions seem to reflect a judgment held by a slight majority of the justices that the dramatic expansion of the national government during the twentieth century has put in jeopardy fundamental principles of constitutional structure. In what appears to be an ambitious campaign to enhance the role of the states in the federal system,

4. The CP links to federalism- all of their evidence calls for a balance between state and federal action but the CP excludes the federal government which isn’t a balance at all. This supercharges perm solvency and guts the core of the net benefit 5. No internal link to modeling – newest studies Law and Versteeg 12. [David, Prof. of Law and Prof of PoliSci @ Washington University, St Louis, PHD @ Stanford, JD @ Harvard Law, Mila, Assoc. Prof, U of Virginia Law, D.Phil @ Oxford, "The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution" New York University Law Review -- Vol 87:762 -www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__law_review/documents/documents/ecm_pr o_072892.pdf]

There are growing suspicions, however, that America’s days as a¶ constitutional hegemon are coming to an end. ¶ 12¶ It has been said that the United States is losing constitutional influence because it is¶ increasingly out of sync with an evolving global consensus on issues of¶ human rights.¶ 13¶ Indeed, to the extent that other countries still look to¶ the United States as an example, their goal may be less to imitate ¶ American constitutionalism than to avoid its perceived flaws and mistakes.¶ 14¶ Scholarly and popular attention has focused in particular¶ upon the influence of American constitutional jurisprudence. The¶ reluctance of the U.S. Supreme Court to pay “decent respect to the¶ opinions of mankind” 15 by

participating in an ongoing “global judicial¶ dialogue”¶ 16¶ is supposedly diminishing the global appeal and influence¶ of American constitutional jurisprudence.¶ 17¶ Studies conducted by scholars in other countries have begun to yield empirical evidence that¶ citation to U.S. Supreme Court decisions by foreign courts is in fact on the decline.¶ 18¶ By contrast, however, the extent to which the U.S.¶ Constitution itself continues to influence the adoption and revision of¶ constitutions in other countries remains a matter of speculation and ¶ anecdotal impression.¶ With the help of an extensive data set of our own creation that ¶ spans all national constitutions over the last six decades, this¶ Article explores the extent to which various prominent¶ constitutions—including the U.S. Constitution—

A stark contrast can be drawn between the¶ declining attraction of the U.S. Constitution as a model for other¶ countries and the increasing attraction of the model provided by¶ America’s neighbor to the north, Canada. We also address the possibility that today’s constitution makers look for inspiration not only to ¶ other national constitutions, but also to regional and international¶ human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of¶ Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights . Our findings do little to assuage American fears of diminished influence in ¶ the constitutional sphere. epitomize generic¶ rights constitutionalism or are, instead, increasingly out of sync with ¶ evolving global practice.

7.

2AC NOAA Tradeof DA 1. Case outweighs the disad Cross apply our wiezzman evidence here that says Util is terrible, and focusing on deterring non-existent threats destroys any value to life. Our !’s have the most magnitude

2. Non-unique- Obama just massively expanded ocean policy Eilperin 14 [6- 17-14, Juliet Eilperin is a reporter for the House of Representatives, “Obama proposes Vast Expansion of Pacific Ocean Marine Sanctuary, ”http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-will-propose-vastexpansion-of-pacific-ocean-marine-sanctuary/2014/06/16/f8689972-f0c6-11e3-bf76447a5df6411f_story.html] Obama announced Tuesday his intent to make a broad swath of the central Pacific Ocean off-limits to fishing, energy exploration and other activities. The proposal, slated to go into effect later this year after a comment period, could create the world’s largest marine sanctuary and double the area of ocean globally that is fully protected. “I’m going to use my authority President

to protect some of our nation’s most precious marine landscapes,” Obama said in a video to participants at a State Department conference, adding that while the ocean is being degraded, “We cannot afford to let that happen.

The announcement — first reported earlier Tuesday by The Washington Post — is part of a broader push on maritime issues by an That’s why the United States is leading the fight to protect our oceans.”

administration that has generally favored other environmental priorities. The oceans effort, led by Secretary of State John F. Kerry and White House counselor John D. Podesta, is likely to spark a new political battle with Republicans over the scope of Obama’s executive powers. The president will also direct federal agencies to develop a comprehensive program aimed at combating seafood fraud and the global black-market fish trade. In addition,

the administration finalized a rule last week allowing the public to nominate new marine sanctuaries off U.S. coasts and in the Great Lakes. Obama has used his executive authority 11 times to safeguard areas on land, but scientists and activists have been pressing him to do the same for untouched underwater regions. President George W. Bush holds the record for creating U.S. marine monuments, declaring four during his second term, including the one that Obama plans to expand. Under the proposal, according to two independent analyses, the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument would be expanded from almost 87,000 square miles to nearly 782,000 square miles — all of it adjacent to seven islands and atolls controlled by the United States. The designation would include waters up to 200 nautical miles offshore from the territories. “It’s the closest thing I’ve seen to the pristine ocean,” said Enric Sala, a National Geographic explorer-in-residence who has researched the area’s reefs and atolls since 2005. Obama has faced criticism from a variety of groups — including cattle ranchers, law enforcement officers and ATV enthusiasts — over his expansion of protections for federal lands. The ocean area under consideration, by contrast, encompasses uninhabited islands in a remote region with sparse economic activity. Even so, the designation is expected to face objections from the U.S. tuna fleet that operates in the region. Fish caught in the area account for up to 3 percent of the annual U.S. tuna catch in the western and central Pacific, according to the Pew Charitable Trusts. When Bush created the monument in 2009, he exempted sport fishing to address industry opposition. Mike Leonard, ocean resource policy director for the American Sportfishing Association, said recreational fishing enthusiasts would push to ensure their existing exemption stays in place if the protected area is expanded. “We believe in almost all instances you can still have marine conservation and marine protection, and still allow for sustainable recreational fishing activities to take place,” Leonard said, adding there’s almost no sportfishing activity in the area because “it’s a heck of a trek out there. Our concern is obviously with the precedent this might set.” Podesta said a public comment period over the summer will allow the Commerce and Interior departments to “fully understand the commercial activity out there” and modify the plan if necessary. Kerry said Monday that the United States and other nations need to take bolder steps to protect marine habitats and combat other threats. “If this group can’t create a serious plan to protect the ocean for future generations, then who can and who will?” he asked during an appearance at a State Department oceans conference. On Capitol Hill, some Republicans have sought to limit the administration’s ability to influence offshore

activities, viewing it as another attempt by the president to test the limits of White House power. “It’s another example of this imperial presidency,” House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.) said in an interview, noting that Obama established a National Ocean Policy during his first term to coordinate competing interests at sea. “If there are marine sanctuaries that should be put in place, that should go through Congress.” For

the administration has focused on the nuts and bolts of marine issues, aiming to end overfishing in federally managed fisheries and establishing a new planning process for maritime activities. This week’s State Department ocean summit launches what officials there call a broader “global campaign” to address the problems of overfishing, pollution and ocean acidification. the past 51 / 2 years,

3. No link – NOAA has no role in the af – the FBI licenses the AP’s you’re dumb.

5. No threshold for the impacts – intervening actors can solve

6. Climate impacts are overyhyped, nothing will happen for 300 years and even then it won’t be that bad, tech solves in the meantime Lomborg 8 – Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated”, The Guardian, 8/15,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange

alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre , and could be dismissed as sociological oddities , if it weren’t for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a

These

global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a “catastrophe” and the beginning of the “extinction” of the human race. This

is simply silly.

His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to

Tickell has maxed out the campaigners’ scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400 . Tickell will undoubtedly claim 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly,

that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland’s ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica)

Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting tech nology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world’s coastal infrastructure and much of the world’s farmland – “undoubtedly” causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur with in a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading , mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years’ time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell’s for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries.

claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up . Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe,

there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century. did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes,

AT: DeDev 1. Their ev assumes a planned transition – not forced collapse – their impacts are inevitable because countries will try to maintain growth in the face of crises– try-or-die for the af Rubin 8—Associate Degree of Science (Chem.), Bachelor of Arts (Sociology, w/honours) (Dani, 9 January 2008, Beyond Post-Apocalyptic EcoAnarchism, http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=7133&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0, RBatra)

increasingly, people are adopting the anarcho-apocalyptic, civilizationmust-fall-to-save-the-world attitude. It is a fairly clean and tight worldview, zealously bulletproof, and it scares me. I want the natural world, Unlike twenty-five years ago,

the greater community of life beyond our species, with all its beautiful and terrifying manifestations, and its vibrant landscapes to survive intact – I think about this a lot.

quick collapse of global civilization, will almost certainly lead to greater explosive damage to the biosphere, than a mediated slower meltdown. A

When one envisions the collapse of global society, one is not discussing the demise of an ancient Greek city-state, or even the abandonment of an empire

The end of our global civilization would not only result in the death of six billion humans, just wiping nature’s slate clean. We also have something like 5,000 nuclear facilities spread across the planet’s surface. And this is just one obvious and straightforward fact cutting across new radical arguments in favor of a quick fall. like the Mayans.

We have inserted ourselves into the web of life on planet Earth, into its interstitial fibers, over the last 500 years. We are now a big part of the world’s

If we get a “fever” and fall into social chaos, even just considering our non-nuclear toys laying about, the damage will be profound. It will be much more devastating than our new visionaries of post-apocalyptic paradise have prophesized. dynamic biological equation set – its checks and balances.

If one expands upon current examples of social chaos that we already see, like Afghanistan or Darfur, extrapolating them across the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia, North and South America, and elsewhere, then one can easily imagine desperate outcomes where nature is sacrificed wholesale in vain attempts to rescue human life. The outcomes would be beyond “ugly”; they would be horrific and enduring. The end-point of a quick collapse is quite likely to resemble the landscape of Mars, or even perhaps the Moon. I love life. I do not want the That is why I cannot accept this new wave of puritanical anarcho-apocalyptic theology.

Earth turned barren.

Imagine 100 Chernobyl’s spewing indelible death. Imagine a landscape over-run with desperate and starving humans, wiping out one ecosystem after another. Imagine endless tribal wars where there are no restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Imagine a failing industrial infrastructure seeping massive quantities of deadly toxins into the air, water and soil. I think that those who are dreaming of a world returned to its wilderness state are lovely, naive romantics – dangerous ones.

2. Even if people COULD be convinced that dedev is good, they don’t access a mindset shift absent education programs Fotopoulos, 2k (Takis,

Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Polytechnic of North London, Editor of The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, “The limitations of Life-style strategies: The Ecovillage ‘Movement’ is NOT the way towards a new democratic society,” The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, July 2000, Volume 6, Number 2, Tashma)

social transformation towards an inclusive democracy would never come about by ‘ example and education ’ alone , since the required change in values and culture can only be the So,

outcome of a process of continuous interaction between changes in institutions and changes in values. In other words, the change in values would have to come about as part of a programmatic political movement with an overall goal for systemic change, rather than as part of the activities of some fractionalised movement s to create a new relation between the sexes, identities, or society and nature.

3. No logical reason collapse is inevitable—space colonization etc. means that resources are functionally infinite and the unsustainability of growth is self-correcting.

4. Collapse only reinforces the system Mead 9—Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, teaches foreign policy at Yale (Walter, 4 February 2009, “Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America”, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2169866/posts, RBatra)

Perhaps--but the long history of capitalism suggests another possibility. After all,

capitalism has seen a steady procession

of economic crises and panics, from the seventeenth-century Tulip Bubble in the Netherlands and the Stop of the Exchequer under Charles II in England through the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles of the early eighteenth century, on through the crises associated with the Napoleonic wars and the spectacular economic crashes that repeatedly wrought havoc and devastation to millions throughout the nineteenth century. The panics of 1837,

the Great Crash of 1929, which set off a depression that would not end until World War II. The series of crises continued after the war, and the last generation has seen the Penn Central 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 were especially severe, culminating in

bankruptcy in 1970, the first Arab oil crisis of 1973, the Third World debt crisis of 1982, the S&L crisis, the Asian crisis of 1997, the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, and today's global financial meltdown.

relentless

crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system

And yet, this series of , centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems

financial and economic crises do not , by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development . reasonable to conclude that

Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship

financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones. between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that

5. Timeframe outweighs – collapse is several years away – intervening actors can save the planet

6. Growth sustainable – tech & alternatives Goklany ‘7 – PhD, science and tech policy analyst for the US Dept of the Interior Indur M, M.S. and Ph.D are from Michigan State University, “the improving state of the world”, page number below in [brackets], CMR

It may be argued that the improvements in human well-being have been obtained through massive and unsustainable depredation of the earth's nonrenewable resources and degradation of its environment. While deferring the latter issue to subsequent sections, in the following I will address the issue of nonrenewable resources. This discussion is brief because it has been addressed comprehensively in Julian L. Simon's The State of Humanity, as

we are not likely to run out of critical energy and mineral resources any time soon, if at all.52 The contention that we are depleting "nonrenewable" resources stems from a static view of what a "resource" is. For example, while every atom of copper is a potential resource for humanity, it is not a usable resource unless it is accessible at an affordable price. But what is accessible and afordable depends on technology, which, as we have already seen, is constantly advancing. Economic geologists classify the amount of resources that can well as elsewhere, and the general finding is that

be extracted profitably at current prices as current, proven, or economic reserves. However, at any time, there will be resources that can be extracted using tin-rent technology, but which could not then be sold profitably. Such resources are classified as potential reserves, and they are a (unction of current prices and technology. Consider, for instance, that technology limited us to bore a hole no deeper than a thousand feet. All the copper beyond that, even 11 it comprised 99 percent of the earth's total resource endowment of copper, would be inaccessible. Therefore, the price of copper (assuming

if technology advances we can access copper beyond that thousand feet and be able to sell that additional amount at a profit, its price would drop in recognition of the expansion of the resource base. In fact, it is not necessary for a technology to actually be functioning for markets to factor it into prices. The likelihood that a technology may increase economic reserves itself would be considered in the pricing. The greater the likelihood, the lower prices would drop in anticipation . Thus, prices are always changing in response to short- and long-term prospects for accessing and using a commodity. In a free market system, the fact that prices are attached to commodities means that suppliers are in a constant quest to increase supplies so that they can sell more while at the same time reducing prices so that they are not undersold. Meanwhile, direct and indirect users of the commodities are on their own quest to reduce consumption so that they can reduce their costs. The higher the price of a resource, the greater the response from both suppliers and consumers. This response can take the form of greater penetration of improved-but-less-used technologies, as well as research, development, and adoption of brand new technologies. For suppliers, this leads to technological change in the search for more efficient methods to locate, extract, and refine the free markets and good information) would not consider 11 it; 99 percent that would be inaccessible. But w» that

resource. For consumers, higher prices stimulate technological change in the reuse, recycling, and conservation of that resource. Thus, today with global steel demand at record heights (around a billion tonnes annually), more than a third of the steel produced each year comes from recycled scrap, which is a

High prices also intensify the search for substitutes for that resource. And sometimes those substitutes can drive out the "original" resource. To paraphrase Bj0rn Lomborg, the stone age didn't end because we ran out of stones, the iron age because we ran out of iron, or the bronze age because we ran out of bronze.54 As a result of this dynamic, technology increases the amount of resources that can be used or there is increased substitution, which would stabilize if not reduce prices. Alternatively, if these eforts fail to reduce prices, its usage would drop and eforts to find substitutes would increase until they are, in fact, found. Consider $100 billion per year business.53

whale blubber. Once it was the preferred fuel used to light households. It became scarce, prices went up, and substitutes were found. Today, although there might be a niche for whale blubber somewhere, it no longer has an international market as a lighting fuel. So although reportedly you can get a

it is hardly surprising that despite short-term fluctuations, the long-term price trend of virtually every commodity that is used today has been downward over the past two centuries not only in terms of "real," inflation-adjusted dollars but also more importantly in terms of the amount of effort an average individual pound of whale blubber for half-a-penny in Norway (down from 15 cents per pound in 1999), its current price is irrelevant.55 Thus,

has to expend to obtain or to purchase a given mass of that commodity.56 As one illustration of this general phenomenon, figure 4.4 shows that, despite a recent upturn in prices probably because of increased demand in Asia, there has been a long-term decline in the price of 13 metals relative to wages.57 On that basis, in 2005, the price of copper was an l/80th of its 1800 level, aluminum dropped to a 1/ 40th of its 1900 price, silver declined to a l/40th of its 1860 level, and tin to a l/7th of its price in 1880. These long-term declines in prices indicate that those commodities are not getting any scarcer. In fact, the only metal that had a price-relative-to-wages higher in 2005 than in 1900 was platinum: in 2005, it was 35 percent more expensive that it was in 1900, but its price had peaked around 1920, at a level three and one-half times higher than today's. Given that commodity prices have, by and large, dropped, it is interesting to ponder on the etymology of the phrase "searching for a needle in a haystack." Before the industrial revolution when metals were scarcer than they are today and needles, therefore, more costly, it might have made sense to search a haystack for a lost needle. But today that would be a sheer waste of time and energy. Finally, in recent years there have been a spate of books and articles trumpeting the imminent end of oil.38 As Jerry Taylor of the Cato Institute notes, "Fortunately, the debate over the likelihood of declining production is in a sense irrelevant.'"19 Perhaps the end of oil will come about sometime in the future but whenever it comes, it will only be a footnote to history, just as the end of blubber is today. The end of oil

we have a number of technologies waiting in the wings ranging from "clean coal" to nuclear as a substitute for fossil fuels to different forms of renewables that could generate electricity for ultimate use in the home, workplace, and even in transportation. And when the price is right, they will step in, either because oil becomes more expensive as it becomes scarcer or technological does not mean an end to energy production. Even today

innovation reduces the price of substitutes. [Page 97-100]

7. Massive transition wars Nyquist 5 J.R. renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, WorldNetDaily contributing editor, “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash,” February 4, www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html

Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit

the formation of anti-capitalist majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would catastrophically impact an international system That presently allows 6 billion people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage

Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global marke t and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold millions would die of starvation. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be waged with mass destruction weapons and the United States would be blamed because it is the cente r of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars , invasions and mass destruction attacks . A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs. But we cannot do this. As one observer recently lamented, “We drank the poison and now we must die.”

8. Extinction – we have to go to space

Garan, 10 – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-tothe-moon) Resources and Other Benefits: Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet. Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all

people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration. The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

1AR DeDev Growth is good and inevitable: A) No transition – their claims are utopian fiction; individuals won’t accept a mindset shift of attrition. There’s no planned transition from growth without educational programs because countries become reactionary in the face of decline – risk of collapse only INCENTIVIZES conflict which makes it try or die for the af

B) Reification Disad –empirics prove declines only reinforce growth, increased regulation after the Great Depression, market bubbles, etc. prove – attempts at system-wide shifts only result in conflict because there’s an economic incentive for states to achieve dominance in a growth-driven system

C) Tech good – no logical reason why resource collapse is inevitable – innovations like renewables prove that humans will always find alternatives – transitioning doesn’t eradicate the CONSUMPTION mindset. Growth solves the impact – creates a sustainable path forward

Counterplans

2AC Generic Advantage Counterplan Huge solvency deficit – the 1AC evidence is specific to the impact of currency stability and natural gas leverage – the uniqueness diferential between the two methods ensures the advantage counterplan can’t solve our impacts.

The impacts aren’t rectified by the band aid solutions of the counterplan – the af is critical to resolve the energy dominance of producer states as well as create a long-term transition from petrodollars

Permutation do both – shields the link to the net benefit because the link gets diluted (explain)



2AC Generic Conditions CP Permutation do both – pass the plan and (insert mandate of conditioning) solves the link to the net benefit because (explanation)

Perm do the counterplan

First Not Severance “Resolved” is “to express; to decide by a formal vote” that’s a quote from Webster’s 98 –

Revised Unabridged Dictionary, (dictionary.com)

Resolved: To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be 5.

apropriated (or, to appropriate no money).

And “Should used in regular sense is not mandatory but permissive” that’s a quote from Words and Phrases, 2002

(“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By

Thomson West. P. 370) Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term “should,” as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is

used in regular,

persuasive

sense,

as

recommendation, and is thus not mandatory but permissive. West’s Ann.Pen Code, § 1538.5(b).--Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.

This is best – we determine what our plan does

A) Normal means is arbitrary – the plan is our creation, and we’re the ones who decide what it mandates – this avoids millions of normal means CPs

B) Cross-examination checks – had they asked us about the counterplan in cross-x, they would have known not to read it – don’t reward them for being lazy

Our interpretation is that a cp must be textually and functionally competitive

Process bad

A) Predictability - hundreds of diferent generic process that could be used to result in the af make it impossible to be af because the practice encourages contrived counterplans

B) Education – leads to a lack of research because teams recycle the same generics for 4 years – also encourages throwing everything at the wall

A) Advocacy skills – process focus destroys advocating the substance of a policy

D) Timeframe fiat – CP fiats the outcome of ruling after ruling takes place – justifies timeframe fiat and terrible CPs like delay

E) They need a comparative solvency advocate – defending the action of the conditions counterplan in the context of the affirmative- key competitive equity and an independent reason to reject the plan

Multi actor fiat is a voting issue-

A) Reciprocity- we only have one actor they can gain an infinite number of advantages and solvency mechanisms with each actor

B) Predictability- infinite amount of combinations means it’s impossible to research ofense to each possible counterplan

*2AC Generic Consult CP 1. Consult counterplans are a voting issue for fairness and education A) It is conditional fiat – they get to choose between the world of yes and the world of no which allows them to suck up all our ofense and just defend the squo with a disad that doesn’t link to the plan B) Infinite worlds – they have the world of yes, no, and all infinite modifications – any world we don’t have ofense on they can extend and we automatically lose, we cant cover C) It’s the uniquely worst form of a pic since they literally do the exact same action as the plan and something else – coopts 8 minutes of 1ac ofense against the counterplan in the form of solvency deficits which are key to internal clash and competitive equity 2. Permutation do the counterplan - their interpretation of resolved is arbitrary. 3. Double Bind: Either they have uniqueness to their net benefit and we already consult which means it is part of normal implementation of the plan or we never consult and they have ZERO uniqueness for the internal link and impact. 4. Perm: Enter into consultation with ________________, but do the plan regardless of their response. Either they say yes which means the permutation solves the net-benefit or the case is a disad to the counterplan and we’ll outweigh. 5. Perm: Do the plan and enter into consultation over its implementation – solves then net-benefits and avoids the case impacts 6. Turn - rising expectations We’ll go back to non-consultation post the counterplan which makes relations even worse National Journal 2 9-14-‘2 But failing to say what you mean is usually a bad tactic. In the end, you get found out. President Clinton's support for the Kyoto accord on global warming was a much-praised instance of international cooperation. He took foreigners' concerns seriously. He backed the agreement, knowing it was unworkable and would never be implemented, to appease critics at home and abroad and to affirm his

multilateralist outlook. Did the pretense serve America's longer-term interests? Just the opposite. In due course, when America stepped back from its commitments under the plan-as it was bound to do-it was reviled all the more furiously for reneging on its promises.

We’ll inevitably veto decisions made through consultation which kills our soft power National Journal 9-14-‘2

Moreover, if America engages in processes such as Kyoto and the ICC-while recognizing (as Nye admits) that they pose threats to American interests- it is entirely possible that the effect on soft power will be zero, or even negative.

America's would-be partners in multilateral projects may find a veto exercised from inside even less attractive than a politely declined invitation at the outset. Remember too that those partners are not interested in adding to any kind of American power, soft or hard. They are chiefly interested in doing the opposite. For them, the whole point of multilateralism is to deal with the "problem" of American hegemony-to contain and to check. This is a matter not of interpretation, but merely of listening to what they say. Nye wants the United States to embrace multilateralism and then insist, somehow, on having its way. Its partners will hate

that. This course yields no great soft-power premium.

*2AC XO CP 1. Perm do the counterplan – The counterplan is a specification of how the af is done. The plan text just says “the Courts should", not "executive shouldn’t". The perm adopts the specification, it does not sever out of the plan. 2. The af should not have to defend normal means:

A) Af Critical thinking—reward strategic plan text writing B) Af Burden—doing the resolution through something other than normal means still proves the resolution true C) Opportunity Cost Education—a shift in agent is not a cost to the af, that education is key to real world decision-making – our reasons for why agent cps are bad justify this

3. Solvency deficits Future presidents dispose of Cooper 97 [Phillip, Professor of Poli Sci @ University of Vermont, Administration and Society, Lexis] Even if they serve temporary goals,

executive orders can produce a significant amount of not yield a long-term benefit because the next president may dispose of predecessors’ orders at a whim. It may be easier than complexity and conflict and

moving a statute through Congress and faster than waiting for agencies to use their rule-making processes to accomplish policy ends, but executive orders may ultimately be a much

weaker foundation on which to build a policy than the alternatives.

4. Counterplan links to politics

A) XO’s are perceived and unpopular with Republicans Cohen 11/1 (Tom, CNN, “Obama uses executive orders as a political tool,” http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-01/politics/politics_obama-executiveorders_1_executive-orders-press-secretary-jay-carney-inaction?_s=PM:POLITICS , accessed 11/4)

Republicans reject the premise of the White House position, arguing that Obama chooses to blame Congress for inaction instead of working with legislators from both parties on bills that can pass. House Speaker John Boehner, speaking on the Laura

Ingraham show last week, described as laughable the prospect that Obama would use executive orders to bypass Congress on substantive issues . At the same time, though, the Ohio Republican said he would keep close watch to make sure nothing unconstitutional happens. To Adam Warber, a Clemson University political science professor who wrote a book on executive orders, Obama is carrying on a consistent tradition of his predecessors in trying to expand the power of the presidency as much as possible. "It's incremental," Warber said. "Each president kind of adds to the power that the presidency has." In Obama's case, "we pretty much are seeing that behind the scenes he's centralizing power," Warber continued. "He's not really different than anyone else." For Obama, the strategy of executive orders serves a dual purpose by moving forward on parts of his agenda despite Republican opposition while projecting an image of decisive action in the face of political inaction.

B) XOs turn the President into a lightning rod Cooper 97 [Phillip, Professor of Poli Sci @ University of Vermont, Administration and Society, Lexis] the effort to avoid opposition from Congress or agencies can have the effect of turning the White House itself into a lightning rod. When an administrative agency takes action under its statutory authority and responsibility, its opponents generally focus their conflicts as limited disputes aimed at the agency involved. Where the White House employs an executive order, for example, to shift critical elements of decision making from the agencies to the executive office of the president, the nature of conflict changes and the focus shifts to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue or at least to the executive office buildings Interestingly enough,

The saga of the OTRA battle with Congress under regulatory review orders and the murky status of the Quayle Commission working in concert with OIRA provides a dramatic case in point. The nature and focus of conflict is in some measure affected by the fact that executive orders take administrative action outside the normal rules of administrative law. And although there are tensions in that field of law, the fact is that it has been carefully developed over time with the intention of accommodating the needs of administration and the demands for accountability by agencies filled with unelected administrators who make important decisions having the force of law in the form of rules and administrative adjudications. On one hand, administrative law requires open, orderly, and participative decision processes, but it also creates significant presumptions in favor of administrative agencies. The courts provide legal support in the form of favorable decisions as well as assisting agencies in enforcement through orders enforcing subpoena and other investigative authority while also ordering compliance with agency decisions once the investigations and decision processes are complete. Administrative law also provides a vehicle for integrating administrative decisions having the force of law with the larger body of law and

The use of executive orders to confound or circumvent normal administrative law is counterproductive and ultimately dysfunctional. policy.

C) XOs fail and are unpopular – gun control from this year proves Hunter 13

(Hunter, Daily Kos, “Roundup: GOP outraged by Obama's executive orders on guns, but still not certain why”, 01/17/13, AD: 02/13/13, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/01/17/1179617/-Roundup-GOP-outragedby-Obama-s-executive-orders-on-guns-but-still-not-certain-why | Kushal)

Republicans spent Tuesday announcing that whatever Obama was about to announce in order to help curb gun violence in America was "tyranny." So, did the announcement of Obama's actual executive orders quell

the fears of the paranoid? Of course not, and so we spent the entirety of the day listening to generic statements about how Obama's list of seemingly not all-that-controversial small actions

is,

in fact, definitely still tyranny.¶ Notably absent in any of the statements was a specific note of which specific Obama executive orders were the outrageous ones. Are we still going to impeach Obama? For which thing, for promising to nominate an ATF director? For informing the CDC that their scientists are, in fact, allowed to at least examine the issue of gun violence? The bit about more armed security officers in schools, which was the National Rifle Association's greatest plan ever but which presumably is what Hitler would have done, now that Obama actually agreed to it? Let's run down the list of oh-so-wounded responses. ¶ Sen. Marco Rubio:¶ “Nothing the President is proposing would have stopped the massacre at Sandy Hook. President Obama is targeting the 2nd Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens instead of seriously addressing the real underlying causes of such violence. Rolling back responsible citizens’ rights is not the proper response to tragedies committed by criminals and the mentally ill. Making matters worse is that President Obama is again abusing his power by imposing his policies via executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress. President Obama’s frustration with our republic and the way it works doesn’t give him license to ignore the Constitution. ¶ Which orders? Where's the problem? No clue, possibly because Marco Rubio is too dumb to read through the list and decide. ¶ Rick Perry, who is just phoning it in from Xanax-and-booze-land, at this point: ¶ "There is evil prowling in the world - it shows up in our movies, video games and online fascinations, and finds its way into vulnerable hearts and minds. As a free people, let us choose what kind of people we will be. Laws, the only redoubt of secularism, will not suffice. Let us all return to our places of worship and pray for help. Above all, let us pray for our children. ¶ "In fact, the piling on by the political left, and their cohorts in the media, to use the massacre of little children to advance a pre-existing political agenda that would not have saved those children, disgusts me, personally. The second amendment to the Constitution is a basic right of free people and cannot be nor will it be abridged by the executive power of this or any other president."¶ Yes, how outrageous that someone try to do something, as a result of a tragedy. Something other than shrugging our shoulders and going off to pray for more competent leaders, anyway. ¶ The Republican National Committee, still run by eternal twelve year old Reince Preibus: ¶ “President Obama’s series of gun control measures amount to an executive power grab that may please his political base but will not solve the problems at hand. He paid lip service to our fundamental constitutional rights, but took actions that disregard the 2nd Amendment and the legislative process. Representative government is meant to give voice to the

people; President Obama’s unilateral executive action ignores this principle ,” said RNC Chairman Reince Priebus.¶ Again, which goddamn actions are the outrageous ones? Do we have to offer a cash reward for the first yokel to tell us exactly what part of Obama's executive orders they find so damn offensive? ¶ Murderer's Row, formerly known as the National Rifle Association: ¶ Attacking firearms and ignoring children is not a solution to the crisis we face as a nation. Only honest, law-abiding gun owners will be affected and our children will remain vulnerable to the inevitability of more tragedy. ¶ If you were looking for more substantive criticisms than a sniffling pout over Obama "attacking firearms" (silly Obama, everyone knows children are the real cause of gun violence, not guns), you'll have to look elsewhere. ¶ The entire government of Mississippi, which on the bright side apparently still has a government of sorts and has not gone all Mad Max on us just yet: ¶ Leading the charge to ignore new federal regulations is Mississippi, where the state’s Republican governor and state House speaker took to the mics right after Obama finished announcing his plans and pledged to ensure the ones they don’t like don’t take effect in the state.¶ The Constitution is clear that such an effort would be illegal. Nevertheless, the Mississippi leaders say they have a plan.¶ Bonus points to Mississippi Gov. Phil Bryant for the nearly zenlike defense of one metric buttload of unregulated weaponry for any Mississippian that wants it: "“When it’s for self protection, you need as much firepower as needed to protect your family." ¶ Genius, that guy.¶ And then there's Rand Paul. Rand Paul may or may not be angling for a spot as America's dumbest senator—I don't know, I'm not privy to the Republican mind—but he wants you to know that the President's outrageous executive orders, things like nominating someone to head the ATF and maybe looking at how to let the appropriate agencies more easily share information about crazy people who really shouldn't be allowed to buy guns, this tyranny will not stand. ¶ Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) has a plan to undo President Obama’s executive actions on guns. […] ¶ “We only have descriptions of the executive actions, yet many could be construed to describe an attempt by the executive to make laws in violation of the Article 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and the 2nd Amendment,” reads the one-page summary of the Paul plan shared with TPM by his staff. ¶

Paul’s bill will set out to nullify Obama’s executive actions, deny any federal funding for their implementation, and allow members of Congress and state officials to challenge the actions in court.¶ Which ones, among the executive orders, are the ones that "make laws in violation" of the Constitution as understood by Rand Paul? Hell if he knows—his one-page document doesn't mention a single one of them—but he's aginnit anyway. Sweet Jesus, these people have sailed so far past the shores of reality that they can't even remember what reality looks like.

D) Empirics

Weisman 9 (Jonathan, WSJ, Obama’s Fiat Angers Lawmakers, 7/15/9, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124761651200542351.html)//LA

White House economic officials begged, cajoled and cut deals with Democrats to secure passage of legislation boosting the fund's power. Days later, President Barack Obama announced he wasn't bound by any of the agreements. The ensuing flap over the president's June 24 signing statement is the latest in a series of clashes between the White House and Congress over an issue Mr. Obama once fought against himself: presidential fiat. As a candidate, Mr. Obama pledged that he wouldn't abuse the presidential signing statement, a declaration issued by the president when he signs a bill to give his interpretation of that law. President George W. Bush used so many signing statements -- more than 750 -- that the American Bar Association criticized it as an abuse of power . After Mr. Obama's issuance of his second signing statement last month, even some Democrats say he isn't keeping his word on reining in unilateral presidential actions. "Of course there's a broader issue here," said House Financial Services WASHINGTON -- With $108 billion in International Monetary Fund loan guarantees in jeopardy last month,

Chairman Barney Frank (D., Mass.), referring to the brewing battles with Mr. Obama over presidential prerogative.

A White House official said the signing statement was issued "out of an abundance of caution" to preserve "core presidential prerogatives" in the area of foreign policy. "The administration negotiated in good "It's outrageous. It's exactly what the Bush people did."

faith on this bill and has every intention of living up to our commitments undertaken in the legislation," said White House deputy press secretary Jen Psaki. The House last week reinstated the restrictions on the IMF that were undone by the president's June signing statement, by a vote of 429-2, in a foreign-operations appropriations bill. In

House Appropriations Committee Chairman and New York Democratic Reps. Nita Lowey and Gregory Meeks will inform the president that if he issues another signing statement on IMF and World Bank funding, Congress will cut off the funds he wants. Mr. Obama needs good relations with congressional Democrats to help pass his agenda on health care, energy and financial-markets regulation. At the London summit of the Group of 20 largest economic powers in April, Mr. Obama had promised to secure large increases in loan guarantees for the IMF. With the Group of Eight summit kicking off soon, failure to make good on that promise would have been an embarrassment. Many Republicans opposed the IMF loan-guarantee language, which had been inserted in a war-spending bill making its way through Congress last month, calling it a bailout for international bankers. The White House needed to win over balking Democrats . Rep. Brad Sherman (D., Calif.), negotiating a letter slated for delivery on Wednesday, Mr. Frank, David Obey (D., Wis.),

for some Jewish lawmakers, said he told White House National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers they needed stronger guarantees that IMF loans wouldn't go to Iran.

5. Counterplans that result in the plan are bad and a voter Strategy skew – jacks our 1ac by focusing the debate on our actor Unpredictable – there are too many sub-agencies or ways to implement a policy They can still say our agent is bad– solves all their offense No specific solvency evidence proves abuse – we do not have evidence that x agency should not do the plan, because it is not part of their normal role in the government.

Not having a specific solvency advocate is an independent voter – it forces us to defend process questions not grounded in the literature

6. Overexpansion of executive powers gets modeled – causes international destruction of human rights. Sloane 8

(Robert D, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 88 B.U.U. Rev. 341, Lexis)

There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of the executive power in the

it is vital to appreciate that the scope of the executive power, particularly in the twenty-first century, is not only a constitutional or historical issue. As an international lawyer rather than a constitutionalist, I want to stress briefly that these debates and their concrete manifestations in U.S. law and policy potentially exert a profound effect on the shape of international law. Justice twenty-first century. But

Sutherland's sweeping dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., that the President enjoys a "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power ... as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress," n52 has been (correctly, in my view) criticized on a host of grounds. n53 But in practice, in part for institutional and structural reasons,

Because of the nature of the international legal and political system, what U.S. Presidents do and say often establish precedents that strongly influence what other states do and say - with potentially dramatic consequences for the shape of customary international law. The paradigmatic example is the establishment of customary international law on the continental shelf following the Truman Proclamation of September 28, 1945, n55 which produced an echo of similar claims and counterclaims, culminating in a whole new corpus of the international law of the sea for what had previously been understood only as a geological term of art. n56 Many states took note, for example, when in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States ("NSS"), President Bush asserted that the United States had the right under international law to engage in preventive wars of [*350] self-defense. n57 While, contrary to popular belief, the United States never in fact formally relied on that doctrine in practice, many would argue that President Bush de facto exercised this purported right when he initiated an armed conflict with Iraq based on claims, which have since proved unfounded, about n54 it accurately reflects the general preeminence of the President in the realm of U.S. foreign affairs.

its incipient programs to develop catastrophic weapons. The 2006 NSS notably retreats from the 2002 NSS's

even within this brief, four-year period, an astonishing number of other states have asserted a comparable right to engage in preventive self-defense. These include not only states that robust claims of a right to engage in preventive wars of self-defense. n58 Yet

the United States has described as "rogue states," such as North Korea and Iran, but Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, China, India, Iran, Israel, Russia, and (though technically not a state) Taiwan. n59 I doubt we will welcome the consequences of this pattern for the evolving jus ad bellum of the twenty-first century. Equally, after President Bush's decision to declare a global war on terror or terrorism - rather than, for example, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and their immediate allies - virtually every insurgency or disaffected minority around the world, including peoples suffering under repressive regimes and seeking to assert legitimate rights to liberty and self-determination, has been recharacterized by opportunistic state elites as part of the enemy in this global war. n60 The techniques employed and justified by the United States, including the resurrection of rationalized torture as an "enhanced interrogation technique," n61 likewise have emerged - and will continue to emerge - in the [*351] practice of other states.

Because of customary international law's acute sensitivity to authoritative assertions of power, the widespread repetition of claims and practices initiated by the U.S. executive may well shape international law in ways the United States ultimately finds disagreeable in the future. So as we debate the scope of the executive power in the twenty-first century, the stakes, as several panelists point out, could not be higher. They include more than national issues such as the potential for executive branch officials to be prosecuted or impeached for exceeding the legal scope of their authority or violating valid statutes. n62 They also include international issues like the potential use of catastrophic

weapons by a rogue regime asserting a right to engage in preventive war; the deterioration of international human rights norms against practices like torture, norms which took years to establish; and the atrophy of genuine U.S. power in the international arena, which, as diplomats, statesmen, and international relations theorists of all political persuasions appreciate, demands far more than the largest

what Presidents do, internationally as well as domestically - the precedents they establish may afect not only the technical scope of the executive power, as a matter of constitutional law, but the practical ability of future Presidents to exercise that power both at home and abroad. We should candidly debate whether and most technologically advanced military arsenal. In short,

terrorism or other perceived crises require an expanded scope of executive power in the twenty-first century.

it is dangerous to cloak the true stakes of that debate with the expedient of a new in the view of most, indefensible - "monarchical executive" theory, which claims to be coextensive with the defensible, if controversial, original Unitary Executive theory. n63 We should also weigh the But

and,

costs and benefits of an expanded scope of executive power. But it is vital to appreciate that there are costs.

They include not only short-term, acute consequences but long-term, systemic consequences that may not become fully apparent for years. In fact, the exorbitant exercise of broad, supposedly inherent, executive powers may well - as in the aftermath of the Nixon administration - culminate in

the sort of reactive statutory constraints and de facto diplomatic obstacles that proponents of a robust executive regard as misguided and a threat to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century. precisely

7. Their executive order ignores Congressional legislation – that destroys separation of powers [Ronald Turner, University of Alabama School of Law professor, JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS, Winter 1. (DRGCL/E264)]

1996, p.

The increased and aggressive presidential use of executive orders can present serious constitutional questions when there are no congressional or constitutional bases for a particular order. Orders not tethered to or derived from statutes or the Constitution raise issues about the legitimacy of presidential legislation because, as noted previously, lawmaking is a legislative function . Thus, the issuance of an executive order by a President without a clear statutory or constitutional basis can be inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers and the sequential trumping inherent in the constitutional system. A baseless and unauthorized order provides a means for the President to subvert the system of checks and balances , for she can make laws free from congressional involvement or agreement and is "able to make sweeping policy value choices without any check by either the federal courts or by a majority of Congress." Such unchecked executive power allows a President to "alter the distribution of the background set of private rights entitlements" and to evade the filtering mechanisms of the bicameral legislature and judicial review. Evasion is particularly problematic when different political parties dominate different branches of government. An executive order issued by the President of one party that declares national policy that is opposed by the opposition party with a legislative majority can result in a clash of ideologies and views as to the law that should govern the nation. As a result "strengthening a particular institution may not only improve its effectiveness but also the relative influence of a particular political party or ideology."

*AT: Presidential Powers NB Perm – Do the plan and an XO on another issue. Solves their prez powers nb. Their Mayor evidence isn’t specific to our plan and isn’t even specific to Obama – it is from 2001. This perm is legit

Their prez powers nb is artificially competitive. They should at least have to prove that the plan is the key issue. The perm is necessary to test competition.

Obama’s an executive order extremist – no threshold to the net benefit FRIEDERSDORF 9/12

(Conor Friedersdorf is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs, “Obama Acts Like He Doesn't Know He's an Executive-Power Extremist”, 09/12/13, AD: 09/12/13, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/obama-acts-like-he-doesnt-know-hes-an-executive-powerextremist/279583/ | Kushal)

It's often hard to tell if President Obama is lying to the American people or to himself. Is he willfully misrepresenting who he is? Or is he blind to his true self? Over the last five years he has repudiated many of the positions he took in 2008, but still talks like and perhaps likes to think of himself as the man who ran on change. A passage from his Tuesday speech on Syria provides a striking example. The relevant passage -- an aside on executive power -- comes just after the president explains that he favors a strike on Syria to deter the

use of chemical weapons (emphasis added): That's my judgment as commander-in-chief. But I’m also the president of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy. So even though I possess the authority to order military strikes, I believed it was right, in the absence of a direct or imminent threat to our security, to take this debate to Congress. I believe our democracy is stronger when the president acts with the support of Congress. And I believe that America acts more effectively abroad when we stand together. This is especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president, and more and more burdens on the shoulders of our troops, while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force. What a fascinating paragraph! Even as Obama implies that he is a circumspect steward of constitutional

democracy, he asserts that even absent "a direct or imminent threat," he has absolute power to wage war without congressional support, the Constitution and the opinions of the demos be damned. If the passage ended there it would be staggering in its internal tension. As Jack Goldsmith explained in detail, intervening in Syria without congressional sign-off would "push presidential war unilateralism beyond where it has gone before." Asserting that power without using it is still an extreme position to take.

Obama goes a delusion farther. Ostensibly because he hasn't yet intervened, even though he repeatedly and needlessly asserts his right to do so unilaterally, he casts himself as moving away from unilateralism and toward consulting Congress. The benefits are "especially true after a decade that put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president," he notes, "while sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force." The grammer is priceless. Who "put more and more war-making power in the hands of the president"? In Obama's telling, "a decade" put the executive power there. The absence of a human subject in the sentence isn't hard to figure out. For all President George W. Bush's faults, he sought and received majority support for the Patriot Act, the September 2001 AUMF, the War in Afghanistan, and the War in Iraq. Obama's expansion of the drone war and his illegal war-making in Libya didn't turn out as bad as Iraq, so it's hard to see him as a worse president, but Obama has done more than Bush to expand the war-making power of the White House. As for "sidelining the people’s representatives from the critical decisions about when we use force," it's Obama who went into Libya despite the fact that a House vote to approve U.S. involvement was brought to the floor and voted down. Yet Obama complains about these trends as if someone other than Obama is responsible for them, and as if he has been and remains powerless to do more to reverse them. When Obama asked Congress to vote in Syria, no one forced him to insist that he had

the power to intervene militarily even if a legislative vote declared otherwise. No one forced him to defend the extreme position that the presidential war power is so sweeping that it

includes waging wars of choice rejected by Congress that don't involve any direct or imminent threat to the United States. He went out of his way to defend that maximal precedent, even as gave us the impression that he was trying to rein in executive power that he claims to find regrettable and worrisome. It's all consistent with Obama's favorite rhetorical tactic: granting the validity of an objection in his rhetoric, then totally ignoring the objection in his actions. In so doing, he confuses public discourse and subverts debate. We know that Obama is an executive-power extremist

in his actions. He believes the president has the power to intervene militarily without Congress in places that do not threaten America; that he can order American citizens killed in secret without due process; that he can secretly collect data on the phone calls of all Americans; that he can invoke the state-secrets privilege to avoid adjudicating constitutional challenges to his policies on their merits; that he can indefinitely detain prisoners without evidence, charges or due process, that he can sit in judgment of anyone on earth, then send a drone anywhere to strike them. Yes, we know that Obama is an executive-power extremist in his actions, that there are many steps to rein in executive power that he could take but hasn't taken ... and that he worries repeatedly about an excess of executive power in his rhetoric. What we don't know is the reason for this disconnect. After all, this ain't like Gitmo. If he really wanted to do more to shrink executive power, he could do a lot unilaterally, and no one could stop him. Is he trying to fool us? Or is he fooling himself, because he likes to think of himself as more prudent and moderate man than he is? Can he not bear the truth that he's a Cheneyite extremist*? My best guess is that he's trying to fool us. But it's hard to know for sure.

And prez powers should be at an all-time high – Obama XO’d cyber security this year Larose 13

(Cynthia J. Larose, “United States: President Signs Cybersecurity Executive Order”, 02/15/13, AD: 02/15/13, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/221874/Data+Protection+Privacy/President+Signs+Cybersecurity+Executiv e+Order | Kushal)

Just before delivering his State of the Union address, President Obama signed an Executive Order aimed at increasing information sharing between the government and private-sector businesses in order to move the issue of cybersecurity protection. The goal of the order is to achieve a "partnership with owners and operators of critical infrastructure to improve cybersecurity information sharing..." by developing and promoting a new cybersecurity framework. The framework will partner critical infrastructure with sector-specific agencies to increase the flow of cybersecurity information between the government and private industry.

No nb - single executive orders don’t spillover* Kreider 6 [Dr. Kyle L. Kreider, Assistant Professor of Political Sciences at the Political Science Department, Wilkes University June 2006 [http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/warber0606.htm]//DoeS A part of the strategic environment surrounding executive orders is what Congress is likely to do in response. As Warber sees it, Congress has two options: apply verbal pressure or pass legislation “to nullify or reform existing executive orders” (p.108). While

“Congress devotes a small portion of its time debating executive orders” (p.114) and “has been relatively inactive in reforming and eliminating specific executive Congress has these two options, the data show that

orders issued by presidents who served between the Kennedy and George H. W. Bush administrations” (p.120). Warber concludes with a cursory examination of President George W. Bush’s use of executive orders and some thoughts on where future research should go. While his political opponents and some members of the media criticize President Bush for his penchant for acting unilaterally (in both domestic and foreign affairs), expanding the powers of the presidency, and sometimes bypassing the expertise found in Congress, “the results demonstrate that Bush has not significantly departed from previous presidents regarding the types and quantity of executive orders that he issued during his first term” (p.124). However, what has been different under President Bush is his willingness to change existing public policy by revoking, superseding, or amending executive orders made by previous presidents. Yearly averages show President Bush to be second only to President Carter in revising inherited executive orders. A key finding of this book is that

“presidents have not dramatically expanded their power with

[executive orders] across the modern presidency ” (p.128). Though Warber does not have the specific answers as to why presidents have not increased their use of executive orders over time, he speculates the stasis in presidential directives to a number of [*437] factors, one being the continued existence of separation of powers—specifically Congress’s ability to pass legislation to revoke or revise executive orders and the federal courts’ authority to decide upon their constitutionality.

Congressional backlash to executive orders kills prez powers – this also proves the link to politics* Posner 2K [Michael, Professor Emeritus at the University of Oregon and Adjunct Professor at the Weill Medical College in New York “Blocking the Presidential Power Play” National Journal, Jan 1, http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20000101_15.php]

Some legal experts counsel Congress to be careful not to usurp legitimate presidential power. One expert urging caution is Douglas Cox, a lawyer who was deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department during the Bush Administration. "When a President

overreaches and uses executive orders to invade or supersede the legislative powers of Congress, Congress may be sufficiently provoked to consider an across-the-board approach to rein in those abuses," he told the House Rules subcommittee. "Although that reaction is understandable, Congress must be careful to understand the extent to which executive orders are a necessary adjunct of the President's constitutional duties," Cox added. "At all times, Congress has ample legislative and political means to respond to abusive or lawless

executive orders, and thus Congress should resist the temptation to pursue more sweeping, more draconian, and more questionable responses."

*2AC Commissions CP 1. “The” limits us to the federal government but doesn’t require the whole thing Random House 2012 [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the] The 1    [stressed thee; unstressed before a consonant thuh; unstressed before a vowel thee] Show IPA definite article 1. (used, especially before a noun, with a specifying or particularizing effect, as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of the indefinite article a or an ): the book you gave me; Come into the house.

2. Perm do both 3. Should is not mandatory Words and Phrases 02 (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 370) Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976. Term “should,” as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by magistrate who issued warrant, is used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory but permissive. West’s Ann.Pen Code, § 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.

4. Links to politics-A) Empirics Klein 10 – Ezra Klein, awesome political blogger, “Sins of Commission,” February 19, 2010, online: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezraklein/2010/02/sins_of_commission.html There's nothing magic about a commission. Like a congressional committee, it puts together legislation that Congress later votes to accept, reject or delay. And as of now, there's simply no reason to believe that the votes exist for any serious compromise. Republican leaders, for instance, are arguing that the commission simply shouldn't consider tax increases, which makes a deal impossible. That was their rationale for filibustering the very formation of a commission, which is why Obama had to do this through an executive order. But elites still like the idea, in part because elites can see the outlines of a deal that elites would make. Greg Mankiw for instance, thinks Republicans should demand that the commission include a value-added tax and a carbon tax. I would support that. The problem is that the Republican Party opposes both policies, and there's no reason to believe they're going to change their minds.

B) Even unanimous commissions link. Hennessey 10 – Keith Hennessey, economic policy analyst, January 20, 2010, “Error of Commission,” online: http://keithhennessey.com/2010/01/20/error-ofcommission/ The President’s commission does not create any binding fast-track process. Leader Reid cannot unilaterally bind 100 Senators to an up-or-down vote and no amendments. Even if a commission were to produce unanimous recommendations, Republicans should fear that a Democratic Senate majority would use those recommendations as a starting point, substitute even more tax increases for whatever spending cuts are in the recommendations, and then pass the bill. Scott Brown’s election as the 41st vote has little effect on this dynamic, since the changes would probably happen in committee. Any commission created by Executive Order has this weakness: it cannot bind Congress. Only Congress can tie itself to the mast. 5. Process counter plans kill substantive debate: They don’t test if the plan is a good idea, they’re unpredictable without a specific solvency advocate which is an independent voter, counter-interp: non-plan inclusive counterplans and disads, educational and a better test of the af. 6. Risk of a politics link to the af means Congress says no. Mayer 7 – Kenneth R. Mayer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, December 2007, “The Base Realignment and Closure Process: Is it Possible to Make Rational Policy?,” online: http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and %20Closure%20Process.pdf The second question is whether the BRAC model can succeed in other policy areas, where Congress has been similarly unable to act. The success of the BRAC process has spurred many efforts to replicate it on other controversial issues. In 1999, I argued that independent commissions have a poor record; there have been very few instances where they have actually resolved legislative impasses (Mayer 1999).5 The problem is that legislators are usually reluctant to delegate substantial policy authority, at least without strong procedural safeguards and ongoing monitoring. The conditions that made BRAC successful were the consensus on the goals, agreement about what precise policy steps were necessary, and the narrow range (at least initially) of the policy making authority. These conditions are rarely present, and clearly do not apply to, say, efforts to create BRAC-like commissions on entitlement reform, where there is intense controversy over both goals and specific policies. 7. No solvency – they aren’t binding and inconsistency dooms success DalBello, 11 [2-25, Mr. Richard Vice President Legal and Government Affairs Intelsat General Corp., National Space Policy: The Challenge of Implementation, http://www.intelsatgeneral.com/sites/default/files/2011-02-25_HighFrontier.pdf]

Space policies are not laws. Although they provide some guidance to agencies, they do not assign budgets, establish programs, or obligate Congress. They are, instead, written to bedirectional and aspirational, and, in a tradition that goes all the way back to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, serve to focus the nation’s thinking about this one area of American expertise. Because of the holistic and ecumenical nature of space policy documents, they also tend to have a ‘something for everyone’ character that can be confusing and, occasionally, internally inconsistent.

8. Permutation do the CP – its plan plus because it acts as a recommendation .

5. The counterplan links to the net benefit – recommendation would still cause the plan to be perceived by courts.

6. Double bind – either Courts say no and the counterplan doesn’t do anything OR the creation of the commission convinces Courts that the plan is good and the permutation resolves the link. 7. No solvency advocate is a voter – we can’t generate ofense to a CP if there’s no one who thinks it should happens

2AC Judicial Sunsets CP 1. Permute: Do the counterplan – Its plan plus. The counterplan only impacts the way the decision is worded which doesn’t change the plan text that they rule for the petitioners. Katyal 4

John Carroll Research Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 4 (Neal, “THE CHANGING LAWS OF WAR: DO WE NEED A NEW LEGAL REGIME AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?: SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS,” Notre Dame Law Review, July, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237)

It was perhaps because the language of judicial sunsets had not been invented, that the one possible recent example of it, Grutter, was itself hazy. Some of the haze is due, no doubt, to the way in which the Court shoehorned the sunset into the opinion. The Supreme Court for years has insisted on affirmative action having a "logical stopping point." n27 But this stopping point was one internal to the program - the term was meant to refer to the time period in the affirmative action policy where the preference should end. In

The Court said, in essence, that it did not want to give the University carte blanche for all time. Grutter, however, the Court appears to have imposed an external, judicial stopping point - one that had nothing to do with the University of Michigan policy .

n28 This does not really appear to be a claim about a "logical stopping point" as such; rather, it appears to be one about the vitality of a Supreme

the characterization of it enumerates a possible template for such sunsets. That is, the Court can hand down an opinion and announce that its holding is entitled to the full effect of the stare decisis doctrine for a set number of years (e.g., "In five [*1245] years, we will be completely open to reconsideration of these claims."), or that it will be binding law until a designated event (e.g., "Following the cessation of hostilities with Court opinion in the face of evolving circumstances. Regardless of whether this "judicial sunset" reading of Grutter is descriptively correct, above

Japan and Germany, we will be completely open to reconsideration."). After the elapse of that time period, both lower courts and the Supreme Court would not be bound by the decision, though they could of course follow its reasoning and logic. In effect, the decision would become something akin to an out-of-circuit precedent for a federal court of appeals, in that it would have no formal binding weight as law, but its reasoning could be cited as persuasive authority via an affirmative codification of the old decision.

2. The counterplan makes ZERO sense. Judicial sunsets would only be used to prevent incorrect court rulings. The entire case proves it’s not a bad decision that would need to be reviewed. They have to prove some portion of the case would need to be reviewed down the line Katyal 4, John Carroll Research Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 4 (Neal, “THE CHANGING LAWS OF WAR:

DO WE NEED A NEW LEGAL REGIME AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?: SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS,” Notre Dame Law Review, July, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237)

There are two principal reasons to adopt this approach. First, error correction. As human beings,

judges necessarily will

make mistakes. The liklihood of such mistakes is a function not only of cognitive biases and simple human error, but also of the time pressures the Justices face. Because the Justices are deciding so many momentous issues at any one time, n29 it is difficult for them to reach agreements, particularly long-term binding ones, without error. Mistakes are particularly likely to occur in areas that are beyond the Court's expertise, matters in which judges have a tendency to overreact, and circumstances where background

a decision might be appropriate when announced, but later events might collude to make the ruling ineffective or even wrong. Unlike facts are subject to constant flux. Indeed,

Supreme Court doctrine, constitutional principles are self-consciously flexible and adaptable; as Chief Justice Marshall put it, the text is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." n30

3. No Solvency: They don’t send the same signal we do – Sunsets show the court isn’t sure about the long-term applicability of the decision. The entire case is a disad because nobody will comply Katyal 4, John Carroll Research Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 4 (Neal, “THE CHANGING LAWS OF WAR: DO WE NEED A NEW LEGAL REGIME AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?: SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS,” Notre Dame Law Review, July, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237)

Instead of using devices that minimize the impact of systematic mistakes as part of a broader architecture of justice, our judicial system has adopted a system to magnify it. Both the doctrine of stare decisis and the superiority of the Supreme Court over the lower courts exacerbate Supreme Court errors, the former over time, the latter over distance. The stare decisis principle is so entrenched into jurisprudence that even when the Supreme Court realizes it made a mistake - such as Plessy v. Ferguson - it does not often admit the

The sunset gives the Court a way to convey its uncertainty about the long-term effect of its holding. The Justices may come to a decision in a particular case, but fear that the underpinnings of its decision may evaporate over time. Or they may error. n31 [*1246] In these settings, and some others, the judicial sunset provides a method to prevent the automatic magnification of the mistake.

know themselves well enough to know that they may be overreacting to a potential crisis, but at the same time believe that a generalist court, in the midst of a national security emergency, should not hamstring the executive branch. Some might say that a judicial sunset is not necessary because the Court always retains the power to overrule itself. The same thing could be said of the legislature, which has the power to overrule itself and therefore arguably does not need a sunset provision either. The gambit here replaces reality with formalism: the Court rarely overrules itself, particularly given the strong adherence to stare decisis. And even if the Court became predisposed to reconsidering precedent more often, it would be difficult to signal to lower courts that the Court was ready to question one of its decisions. Instead, the matter would be likely taken as settled law,

Without the aforementioned signal that the holding of a case is up for reconsideration, political actors and private parties are unlikely to take decisions that flout precedent. Supreme Court decisions are generally understood to be binding law, and the incentives are to stay within that precedent, or at most to nibble around its edges. The upshot is that generating a test case to enshrined into the jurisprudence and accepted by lawyers and lower court judges alike. Second, agenda-setting .

question a precedent is not easy and requires potential parties to read the tea leaves of the Supreme Court and buck an established case. And if that task is hard for potential parties, it is even harder for the lower courts, who are under orders not to call Supreme Court cases into question or to anticipate an overruling by the Court. n32 The only other real alternative is for litigants to resort to counting votes and retirements, practices that

A judicial sunset, by contrast, puts the political branches, the media, other judges, and litigants on all sides on notice that the holding is bound to be questioned at a date later in time. As such, the announcement of a sunset can invite these entities to develop a factual record assume that Justices cannot change their minds [*1247] as circumstances evolve.

and data about the wisdom of retaining a judicial rule. (Consider Judge Posner's Wittmer opinion, which in effect called upon the government to develop a factual basis for its boot-camp affirmative action policy or face something akin to a sunset. n33) A judicial sunset may even prompt the Court, should it decide to reaffirm a lapsed precedent, to do so in a way that articulates the true basis for its decision, instead of crutching its holding to what the Court has said before. n34

4. And, their author says the only time it’s okay to violate stare decision is when core freedoms are at stake, which isn’t true in the case we rule on Katyal 4, John Carroll Research Professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 4 (Neal, “THE CHANGING LAWS OF WAR:

DO WE NEED A NEW LEGAL REGIME AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?: SUNSETTING JUDICIAL OPINIONS,” Notre Dame Law Review, July, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237)

Judicial sunsets could be in tension with stare decisis and may jeopardize one of its principal aims: to limit the ability of any one particular Court to impose its will on the nation. For example, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, the Court stated that if it were to overrule a previous decision, and apply that overruling only to future (and not present) litigants, it would "minimize the costs of overruling, and thereby allow the courts to act with a freedom comparable to that of legislatures." n35 From this perspective, the theory goes, stare decisis ensures that a contemporary Court, such as the Rehnquist Court, cannot depart too much from the Burger Court, the Warren Court, and so on. There is no doubt that, viewed in the backward looking direction of what the Rehnquist Court could do, respect for precedent can constrain decisionmaking. The rub, however, occurs when the temporal direction is flipped - and the point is made about how stare decisis empowers a contemporary Court to exert control over subsequent Supreme Court majorities far into the future. As discussed in Part I.B, once a specific legal matter has been resolved by the Court, the formal rule of stare decisis, the informal constraint of a passive judiciary, and the existence of other agenda-setting limits all [*1248] may preclude that matter

. This precedent-laden alternative to judicial sunsets permits nine, or as few as five, Justices of the Supreme Court to make a ruling that can last indefinitely - binding people who have not yet been born. While in many cases such a result may be acceptable, surely when our nation's most cherished freedoms are at stake, and when there is a strong tendency for our judiciary to overreact to a crisis, this grave expansion of judicial power must be resisted. from arising again

The counterplan destroys judicial independence Monaghan 98, Law Professor at Columbia, 98 (“Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, Columbia Law Review, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723)

Focus on system legitimation convincingly underpins only some aspects of stare decisis. For example, the wisdom of judicial reconsideration of a whole series of "small" constitutional questions -- such as whether jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn rather than when it actually hears evidence, or whether remittitur is consistent with the common-law trial by jury -- is not determined by system-maintenance concerns. Of greater note,

There is, however, a second, and perhaps more universal justification for the application of stare decisis to contested matters, one that also arises from a rationale concerned with stability and continuity. Namely, the Court must strive to demonstrate -- at least to elites -- the continuing legitimacy of judicial review. A general judicial adherence to constitutional precedent supports a consensus about the rule of law, specifically the belief that all organs of government, including the Court, are bound by the law. At first blush it may seem perverse it seems that most issues one would consider "currently contested" 166 are not easily disposed of by appeals to system legitimacy.

to defend the idea that the Court maintains its subservience to the fundamental law by upholding decisions that depart from that law. But this difficulty is not insurmountable. What the Constitution requires is often a matter for debate, and once having been adequately canvassed and resolved by the Court, an issue might presumptively remain at rest. Even when the prior judicial resolution seems plainly wrong to a majority of the

adherence to precedent can contribute to the important notion that the law is impersonal in character, that the Court believes itself to be following a "law which binds [it] as well as the litigants." present Court,

167 In listing "the weighty considerations" supporting [*753] adherence to precedent, Justice Harlan included "the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments." 168 While it is quite clear to any observer that the Court has no coherent or stable conception of the appropriate role of precedent in constitutional adjudication, Justice Harlan's theme is something of a decorative favorite, especially among dissenters who object to an overruling decision 169 -- and it is certain the theme is sensible beyond mere decoration. To my mind, this rule of law argument does not suffer from criticism that the man in the street is unaware of the overruling of "small" precedents and that, in any event, he would expect the Constitution and not the Court's precedents to control adjudication. 170 For me, the real focus of rule of law theories

The concern is to contain, if not minimize, the existing cynicism that constitutional law is nothing more than politics carried on in a different forum. 171 In a recent work, Professor Cox states that the future of judicial review turns largely on whether law is seen by the profession as only judicial policymaking, or "whether room is left for the older belief that judges are truly bound by law both as a confining force and as an ideal about the Supreme Court in the main is elites, at least "the reasoning classes."

search for justice." 172 Perhaps it goes too far to tie the whole future of judicial review to this distinction, but Professor Cox's point does have merit.

the Court's institutional position would be weakened were it generally perceived that the Court itself views its own decisions as little more than "a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only." 173 If courts are viewed as unbound by precedent, and the law as no more than what the last Court said, considerable efforts would be expended to get control of such an institution -- with judicial independence and public confidence greatly weakened. 174 My submission is that

5. Turn: The counterplan undermines the rule of law Justice O’Connor, Supreme Court Justice, Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.CT. 2791)

92 (With Kennedy & Souter, Majority Opinion, Planned Parenthood v.

The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921). Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13, 16. At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.

*2AC Sunsets CP 1. Perm- do both 2. Perm- do the counterplan, it’s not textually competitive, they only add a plank that includes a sunset in 5 years 3. Perm- do the plan and insert a sunset provision but continue doing the plan regardless of its recommendations 4. No Solvency- Congress will forget about the sunset provision and the counterplan will accidentally expire Inside Bay Area 7, 3/1/7’ [State needs to Reinstate sideshow law, Nexis]

It's not clear who lost track of the sunset clause or why. It's not the first time government officials and lobbyists forgot to track time limits in legislation. The documentation shows the sideshow and drag racing law successfully reduced reckless driving. Unfortunately, it was submitted months after the Legislature finished last year's business. The lapse could prove deadly. Getting the law back on the books and in operation is crucial before the spring months; sideshows are particularly popular during warm weather. Even though it has expired, lawmakers can renew it on an urgent basis and it would take effect as soon as it was signed by the governor. It's not a matter of opposition or ineffectiveness. It was simply a goof. Lawmakers should fix it as quickly as possible -- we hope to see it reinstated this month. And next time city officials should make sure to set the reminder on their computer calendars well in advance.

5. Timeframe counterplans are bad- they only generate any ofense based of a change in the plan 5 years from now, there is no literature as to how this would occur in relation to our plan, kills education and fairness because we can’t generate predictive literature 6. No Solvency- If they win the plan is unpopular- it proves Congress will want to roll back during review 7. Double Bind- Either A. The plan will be rolled back later and the case outweighs politics OR B. Theres no Net Benefit- Congresspeople will still fight the counterplan if they know it wont be rolled back Deseret Morning News 7, 2/16/7’ [Seat-belt measure stumbles by 6 votes in House, Nexis]

Sen. Pat Jones, D-Salt Lake, sponsored the bill and helped shepherd it out of the Senate. Last year, similar legislation made it out of the Senate but failed in the House. She hoped a sunset provision in the legislation would have helped the bill pass. With the provision, the law would have expired after three years. The bill's House sponsor, Rep. Sheryl Allen, R-Bountiful, was disappointed with the outcome. "I think it's very unfortunate because this was a way to save lives." During floor debate, Allen pointed out that not wearing a seat belt is already illegal. She also used the impact accidents have on taxpayers and the sunset clause as selling points. "We have heard a number of studies that say ... seat belts do save lives. . ." But, the bill met resistance from Rep. Carl Wimmer, R-Herriman. Wimmer, who is a police officer by profession, told his fellow House members that he had been on the scene of many fatal car accidents and knew the consequences of not buckling up. But Wimmer said the bill represented "heavy-handed government." Something he called "uglier than any death I've ever seen." Rep. Curt Oda, R-Clearfield, dismissed the sunset clause when he offered a very different substitute version of the bill. "Once it's enacted it's not really ever going to go away."

8. Sunset provisions are unpopular and links to politics - tax cuts proves Guinto 7, Investor’s Business Daily, ’03 (Joseph, May 5, “House Nearing Final Tax-Cut Package That Trims Cap Gains, Dividend Levies; Senate Limits Still A Hurdle” lexis)

The idea would be to hold down long-term estimates of costs to the

Treasury arising from the tax cut. And while that's nothing new on Capitol Hill, talk of a sunset provision has already proven unpopular in the Senate. That's just one of several things that continue to cleave apart even the Republican leaders in the House and Senate. A Senate blueprint on the tax cut might come today. But Senate tax writers are so far apart on the issue that sources told IBD that it could be as late as next Friday before an outline emerges. Still, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., said Thursday he now favors phasing in an elimination of dividend taxes over 10 years. That would meet Bush's goal of eliminating the tax while letting the Senate hold down the 10-year cost of the overall tax cut to $350 billion. Senate leaders last month committed to capping the tax cut at that $350 billion level. But even that commitment remains in flux. "We want to fight for as high a number as possible," Frist said. His goal now is $550 billion. Even so, Thomas does not back Frist's phase-in and Frist does not back Thomas' plan to tax dividends as capital gains.

9. The Counterplan won’t be shielded from politics Liberman 99, Plain Dealer Publishing, ‘99 (Brett, Feb. 21, Prosecutors Run Amok; Independent Counsel Law Next Target For Impeachment-Weary Congress, lexis)

Regardless of their views, both political parties are faced with crafting some instrument for impartial investigations of a president or senior administration officials. "I hope to start off by seeking a consensus to the effect that we must have a mechanism to deal with conflicts of interest," said Rep. George Gekas, Republican of Pennsylvania, who plans to hold hearings on the subject in the House Judiciary subcommittee he chairs, perhaps in

March. "We never will have a situation where conflicts of interest will not exist," said Gekas, one of 13 House impeachment managers who prosecuted Clinton in the Senate. He wants to reauthorize the law but include a sunset provision and other restraints to prevent runaway investigations. Gekas has suggested extending the act beyond the executive branch to cover members of Congress, an unpopular idea on Capitol Hill. When the law last was reauthorized in 1993, Gekas tried to limit investigations to two years and to require independent counsels to receive annual appropriations, both as ways to rein in investigators.

*2AC NGO CP 1. Perm: do both- combined government and NGO action is critical to efective policy Sanyal 97, Chair department of Urban studies at MIT, 97 (554 Annals 21, Bishwarpriya) Yet another surprise for NGO proponents was the finding that the NGO’s that were somewhat successful in implementing bottom-up projects were led, in most cases, not by the poor but by individuals from higher up in the social echelon, with strong but informal linkages to government political parties and other institutions at the top. Although these individuals belonged to the upper social echelon, they cared

deeply for the poor and utilized their knowledge of and contacts with the market and state institutions to channel resources and and institutional support from these dominant institutions to the poor. If there is one lesson to be learned from the numerous bottomup projects let by NGOs, it is the following: to be effective, NGOs must abandon their autonomy fetish and begin to work closely with dominant institutions, such as the state, market institutions, political parties, and so on. To say it another way, just as development does not trickle down from the top, pushed by the state alone, it cannot effervesce from the bottom, initiated by NGOs

alone. The state and NGOs must work together and include market institutions in their joint effort to aleviate poverty. This is borne out by the experience of a few relatively successful NGOs, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Self-Employed Women’s Association in India. For the sake of brevity, I will not describe these relatively successful NGOs in this article. However, I would highlight the key lesson exemplified by them, namely, to be effective, cooperation between NGOs, the state, and market institutions must draw on the distinctly different institutional strengths of each. The state alone can create the policy

environment necessary for the NGO’s success, and only it has the administrative machinery for the large-scale implementation of projects. Although NGO’s lack this ability, their comparative advantage is in their ability to reach citizens who are beyond th ereach of the government’s bureaucratic administrative apparatus. NGOs are also good at ensuring the citizen’s participation in the development process by engaging them in learning environments, as opposed to the rule-driven hiearchically structured institutional setting common to government projects. Market institutions provide a third kind of strength to development efforts: unlike the government and NGOs they heighten the sensitivity of development effortsto the preferences of consumers and producers and inject a sense of market discpline in the organization of development efforts

2. The af is a disad to the counterplan – NGO’s can’t solve for federal reserve currencies

3. No solvency – NGOs don’t have access to natural gas or jurisdiction over exports

*2AC Consult Congress CP Perm—do the plan and consult using a nonbinding committee framework Kampelman 2 (Max M., The Washington Post, A New Structure for Foreign Policy, 1/5/2, Lexis)//LA A foreign policy declared by a president , except in an emergency, is subject to criticism by the opposing political party, by 535 members of Congress, by the press, by nongovernmental organizations and by other governments. Yet democracies, such as ours, require a broad consensus behind a foreign policy; a bare majority is not sufficient. Members of Congress tend to believe, particularly in foreign policy, that if, for the sake of unity, they are expected to be in on a potential crash landing, they want to be in on the takeoff. This comes face to face with the constitutional duty of the president to be in charge of foreign policy. What to do, particularly given the congressional role to appropriate funds and the congressional right to criticize? It is impractical and unwise to "consult" 535 members of Congress, whereas not to consult is to deprive the administration of the cooperation it requires as well as the judgment and experience possessed by Congress. What is required is for congressional leadership to create a joint committee on international strategic policy, which would not deal with legislation and would not have any appropriation authority. In addition to the speaker of the House and the majority and minority leaders of both houses, its membership should consist of the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Appropriations, armed services, foreign policy and intelligence committees from each house. Given his constitutional role in the Senate, the vice president should chair this committee, but should the leadership resist

Such a structure would make cooperation with Congress more than a superficial exercise, strengthen the president's leadership by enlarging it with input from an experienced and powerful legislative group and overcome a major potential obstacle to an effective foreign policy. this arrangement, the vice president could also be an ex officio member as the president's representative.

Oversight makes for better policy Eizenstat 98 (Stuart E., JD Harvard Law School, Jimmy Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Bill Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, and Undersecretary of Commerce, also was United States Ambassador to the EU from 1993-6, Very qualified individual, TESTIMONY FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE STUART E. EIZENSTAT HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE JUNE 3, 1998, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/h980603se.htm)//LA The President needs Flexibility The President should have the authority to tailor specific U.S. actions to meet our foreign policy objectives. We recognize important Congressional prerogatives in foreign policy , in particular where economic sanctions are involved. This Administration, or any Administration, must take into account Congressional concerns over foreign affairs questions. At the same time, the President is, of

course, responsible under the Constitution for the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. Ideally, our foreign policy should be the product of a bipartisan consensus focusing on U.S. national interests. One expression of that constitutional responsibility and comity between branches of government is expressed in sanctions legislation through the inclusion of appropriate Presidential waiver authority. Ultimately only the President can weigh all the issues at stake at any given moment and tailor our response to a specific situation. Legislation should set forth the broad objective but should allow the flexibility to respond to a constantly changing and evolving situation . In this regard, there are two particular pieces of legislation, Mr. Chairman, which are of particular concern: the Iran Missile Proliferation

The President's senior advisors are recommending that the Iran Missile Proliferation Act of 1997 be vetoed because of its low standard of evidence, its unworkable waiver standard, and because its inflexible and indiscriminate requirement to impose sanctions would be Act of 1997; and the Wolf-Specter Anti-Religious Persecution Bill, which passed the House by a large margin.

counterproductive to our nonproliferation objectives. Similarly while we strongly support the goals of the WolfSpecter Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998, the President's senior advisors have also said that they would recommend a veto of the Wolf-Specter Bill if passed in its current form, because of its automatic sanctions, the confusing bureaucratic structure it would create, and the inappropriate hierarchy of human rights violations in U.S. law the bill would establish. We believe that

enactment of the bill would undermine many of our important foreign policy interests, including ultimately the bill's own goal of helping those who face religious persecution. Mr. Chairman, this rapid pace of change, sometimes unanticipated change, highlights the absolutely critical need for flexibility in the application of economic sanctions. Simply put, without flexibility we will not be able to tailor our actions to meet our foreign policy objectives. There can be no "one-size fits all" approach. Only the President can balance all the factors. It is important the President have the flexibility to respond in an appropriate fashion to changing circumstances. That flexibility also provides the President appropriate leverage to achieve the statute's goals while minimizing collateral damage to other important national interests. If the Congress feels that he has not struck the right balance, then oversight and criticism in a spirit of comity are appropriate, but not removal of the President's discretion -- that would make for bad policy. Using these general principles as a standard against which to grade our - and your - efforts, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus on three specific cases where the actual use or prospect of unilateral economic sanctions was an integral part of our policy : our use of ILSA on Iran and Helms-Burton on Cuba to advance our cooperation with the European Union. Mr. Chairman, to illustrate and underscore these guiding principles, I would like to focus on two specific cases, the Libertad Act and the Iran-

the prospect of sanctions rather than their use effectively achieved greater cooperation in support of the Acts' objectives without upsetting our political and Libya Sanctions Act. In both cases

economic relations with our allies and friends. In the Helms-Burton case, we decided our success with the property disciplines we agreed upon with the EU merits seeking authority to waive Title IV.

Executive flexibility is best Eizenstat 98 (Stuart E., JD Harvard Law School, Jimmy Carter’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Bill Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, and Undersecretary of Commerce, also was United States Ambassador to the EU from 1993-6, Very qualified individual, Sanctions By Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, 9/8/98, http://wpobw-res8.wpafb.af.mil/Pubs/Indexes/Vol %2021_2/Eizenstat.pdf)//LA

The LCH bill would also impose a number of specific procedural and substantive restrictions on Executive Branch imposition of new sanctions imposed under IEEPA and all future unilateral economic sanctions laws. We would propose instead that the President would be willing to issue an Executive Order that would set guidelines--many of which are taken from the LCH proposal--which would apply in two situations. First. they would apply to all future sanctions regimes under IEEPA. Second. they would apply to imposition of sanctions under future sanctions laws passed by Congress. where appropriate. LCH would impose many inflexible restrictions on the President's imposition of sanctions. e.g .. requiring him to announce and publish his intent to do so forty five days in advance. and specifying that all future sanctions shall include. among other things, a cost benefit analysis. a contract sanctity provision, and a two year sunset clause. We support the general idea behind some constraints. but the simple fact of life is that there are instances when such requirements would prove unworkable and destroy the value of the sanctions as a foreign policy tool. For example, telegraphing in advance our intention to seize the assets of Restrictions on Executive Branch

suspected terrorists, narcotics traffickers, major international criminals. or indeed for any foreign policy purpose

Contract sanctity provisions maybe similarly unworkable and counterproductive--for example. in dealing with front companies in the narcotics area-----particularly when combined with the requirement for advance notice of intent to impose sanctions. They would encourage businesses to negotiate quick deals to get in under the wire and avoid the effect of sanctions . Sunset clauses tied to time rather than performance may also often not be appropriate. Many of the purposes tor which we may impose sanctions-non-proliferation, to combat drug trafficking. to combat terrorism. to encourage greater respect for human rights-are long term: they are simply not time bound. We should not give the targets of such sanctions the ability to wait us out. What is the lesson? Flexibility is an absolute necessity. In these as in all cases. the President needs the flexibility to tailor our response most appropriately to the specific situation. LCH contains differing waiver standards for these restrictions, ranging from a national would effectively rule out asset freezes as sanctions tool.

interest standard to a national emergency standard to an armed conflict standard. and specifies that some

We need to modify such requirements to protect the President's flexibility. With such enhanced flexibility. the President would be willing to sign an Executive Order that would include the following particular guidelines according to which the President should impose sanctions: a requirement to analyze costs and gains to all relevant U.S. interests: contract sanctity unless the President determines that it would detract from the effectiveness of the sanctions; a provision calling for an annual review of future Executive Branch sanctions under which the President must determine that the sanctions are meeting certain criteria in order tor the sanctions to continue in effect: narrow targeting: appropriate exemptions to minimize adverse humanitarian impact; and prior consultations with Congress, wherever possible. provisions would never be waivable.

*2AC The PIC 1. Perm do both

2. CP gets rolled back – legal context proves Southwestern Reporter 1908 [State v. Campbell, Southwestern Reporter, Google Book]

This being true, it is plainly manifest that, by the omission of the definite article “the,” which should immediately precede the word “state,” the conclusion to the indictment in the case at bar falls far short of indicating the power or authority against which the facts charged in the body of the indictment constitute an offense. While it may be conceded that the word “the” is a small one and in many

instances of little importance, however, if we are to longer recognize rules in the proper interpretation of language, then we see no escape from the conclusion that the definite article “the,” preceding the word “state,” is absolutely essential , in order to designate the particular state against which the offense is charged to have been committed. It is clear that the omission of this word not only changes the sense, but the very substance of the clause , and, as was said by Mr. Bishop, in the discussion of the proposition of the conclusion prescribed by the Constitution, that, “Whatever alters the substance, even in what seems unimportant, will render it void.” While it may be said that the definite article “the” in many instances is an unimportant phrase, yet, as applicable to the conclusion prescribed by the Constitution of this State, it is full of force and vitality. As was said by the learned counsel in their brief in State v. Skillman (decided at the present term of this court) 107 S. W. 1071: “The article ‘the’

directs what particular thing or things we are to take or assume as spoken of. It determines what particular thing is meant; that is, what particular thing we are to assume to be meant. It is used before nouns with a specifying or particularizing effect.” In the use of the definite article “the” immediately preceding “state” in the conclusion prescribed by the Constitution, we have pointed out the state whose peace and dignity has been offended, and by the omission of such definite article we have

a conclusion that does not designate the power or authority against which the offense is committed. “The state,” in the conclusion prescribed by the Constitution of this state, means the state of Missouri, and this, in substance, was what was decided in the Hays Case, 78 Mo. 600, heretofore cited. If this conclusion embraced language similar to that pointed out in the cases to which we have heretofore referred, such as “against the peace and dignity of our said state,” or “against the peace and dignity of state of Missouri,” it might be very properly ruled that such language was at least equivalent to the language prescribed by the Constitution, for the reason that it indicated the power and authority against which the offense, as charged in the body of the indictment, constitutes an offense. This case falls far short of conforming to or meeting the requirements of the rule announced by Judge Lewis in State v. Waters, supra. It was there said: “If the intent of the Constitution be responded to in this part of the indictment, a literal transcript of the formula is not essential.” But in that same case it will be

observed that the learned judge said that the purpose and meaning of the conclusion was to indicate the power or authority against which the facts charged constitute an offense. Therefore it is obvious that the intent of the Constitution has not been substantially responded to, for the reasons heretofore suggested, that, in the

omission of the definite article “the” preceding “state,” there is an absolute failure to indicate the power or authority against which the offense is charged to have been committed. It is not a satisfactory solution of this proposition to say we know what

was intended or meant by the conclusion in the case at bar, or that it was a mere matter of form. The proposition confronting us is not what the pleader meant to say, but what he did say, and do the terms used in concluding the indictment in this case substantially conform to the requirements prescribed by the Constitution? Constitutional requirements are not ordinarily to be regarded as mere matters of form. As was said in Cox et al. v. State, 8 Tex. App. 254, 34 Am. Rep. 746: “However much we may feel disposed to consider a matter prescribed by the Constitution ill-advised or uselesshowever much we may be inclined to doubt the propriety of inserting into the organic, fundamental law of the state requisites of forms with regard to procedure and practice in the courts-the answer is, the people themselves, the source of all power and authority in a Republican government, have spoken it; and with regard to their ipse dixit, when contained in the Constitution, which is but the expression of their sovereign will, the courts can only bow in humble obedience, and say, ‘Ita est scripta.’ If plain and unambiguous, no ordinary rules of construction are applicable to these expressions; their inherent, binding authority is superior to all ordinary rules.”

3. The lack of a “the” before the state empirically caused rollback Wicht 97 James Edward, ARTICLE: There is No Such Thing as a Harmless Constitutional Error: Returning to a Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. Pub. L. 73

Despite this seemingly accurate verdict, the appellate court reversed Mr. Campbell's conviction.22 The reversal occurred not because Mr. Campbell's federal Constitutional rights had been violated, not because the state failed to proffer evidence on one of the elements of rape 23 and not because the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.24 Instead, the appellate court reversed Mr. Campbell's conviction merely because the language at the end of the charging indictment alleged that the rape occurred “against the peace and dignity of state” rather than the required “against the peace and dignity of the state .”25

4. Critiques of speech produces a reactionary politics in which change is focused on language directly trading of with eforts to reform the socioeconomic root causes of injustice Brown, Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, 2K1 (Wendy, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37)

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usur p the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political

practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legis lated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conserva tive as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power . Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, vio lence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.

*2AC Should PIC 1. Perm do both 2. Consequentialism solves their impact – moral language is only bad within a deontological framework and Greene admits that the word “should” is usually okay – this also proves the permutation solves because we can recognize that moral realism is flawed while still using potentially realist language Greene, 02 (Joshua David Greene, currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Harvard University. “THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT.” Dissertation presented to Princeton University in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. November 2002. http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/GreeneDissertation.pdf)

Realist words like “good,” “bad,” “better,” and “worse,” while not ideal from a revisionist perspective, are not so terrible either. First, this is because their ordinary uses are more often subjective or hypothetical as compared to words like “right” and “wrong.” When I say that the sea bass was “good” last night, I’m very likely expressing nothing more than that I enjoyed eating it , and when I say that the movie last night was “better” than the one I saw last week, I may not be expressing anything more than a preference. I might intend to express more than that, but I might not. In contrast, if I say, as Bertrand Russell (1946) once did, that bullfighting is wrong, I, like Russell, almost certainly intend to express more than my distaste for it.13 Second, our use of terms like “good” and “bad,” as compared to “right” and “wrong,” is more easily interpreted

When I say that ice cream is “good,” I surely mean that it is good for eating (or, perhaps, for tasting) and not good for, say, cleaning my rug. as making implicit reference to optional standards.

In other words, our use of “good” in such contexts is implicitly hypothetical: If you want something tasty to eat, then ice cream is good. While terms like “right” and “wrong” and “rights” have some hypothetical uses of their own, as in the “right” way to hit a forehand volley, their uses are very often implicitly categorical. For example, when one says that it’s wrong to kill people, it’s not at all clear what, if anything, this is supposed to be wrong for. Wrong for morality? Yes, but standards imposed by morality aren’t supposed to be optional. Indeed, we say that killing people is just plain wrong,

In contrast to our most moralistic uses of “right” and “wrong,” it’s harder to find uses of “good,” “bad,” “better,” or “worse,” that are so naturally interpreted as implying categorical demands. And without categorical demands, with only optional moral standards, there is no realism.14 Thus, it seems that some bits of realist language are less subjective and more categorical than others, making them more realist and therefore more important to avoid. The main enemy here, the language that is the most unambiguously categorical and objective in its implications, is the language characteristic of deontology . Deontology is usually contrasted regardless of one’s goals or preferences.

with consequentialism. According to consequentialism, The Good precedes The Right. In other words, the moral quality of an action is assessed in terms of its efects—or its intended efects, or its likely efects, or its perceived likely efects, or some other more sophisticated variant of this idea. Deontologists, in contrast, believe that The Right precedes The Good, or is at least somewhat independent of it. The moral quality of an action is not simply a function of its associated outcomes, but depends, rather, on whether that action exhibits proper respect for the dignity, freedom, autonomy, etc. of others in a way that goes beyond merely factoring in other people’s wellbeing as part of the cost-benefit analysis. For consequentialists, every practical moral issue is largely an empirical issue, a matter of figuring out what states of afairs are likely to result from the action in question. For deontologists, many practical moral issues are to be settled a priori simply by considering the “intrinsic” nature of the action in question. In deciding whether it would be wrong to tell a certain lie, for example, a consequentialist’s deliberation will consist of a tabulation of that lie’s expected efects, both direct and indirect. In contrast, a deontologist may pass judgment on that action without much thought for its consequences. One might conclude, for example, that telling this lie would be wrong regardless of the good consequences it may achieve because all deception

Consequentialists and deontologists each help themselves to the full array of the common sense moral terms; “right,” “wrong,” “good,” “bad,” “ought;” but they emphasize them differently. Another way to characterize the difference in emphasis is to say that consequentialism emphasizes the language of balance while deontology exhibits insufficient respect for the autonomy of others and is therefore wrong.

emphasizes the language of line drawing. Line-drawing is a bad habit,15 the normative expression of what is most destructive in moral realism. Recall from Chapter 3 the psychological basis of moral realism. People project their values onto the world, mistakenly thinking that the forceful intuitions they experience are perceptions of a mind-independent moral reality. How will people in the grip of such projections be inclined to express their views? Answer: with a language as forceful and absolute as their moral intuitions. Thus, an ardent liberal, one whose liberal judgments stem from deeply felt moral intuitions, will say that capital punishment is a clear violation of human rights and that abortion is a clear violation of a woman’s right to choose. Likewise, an ardent conservative will say that family members of murder victims have a right to see justice served in the form of an execution and that abortion is a clear violation of a fetus’ right to life. Of course, both sides will appeal to consequences when it serves them. Liberals will argue that capital punishment is not an effective deterrent and that making abortion illegal will only result in more backroom butchery and unwanted children. Likewise, conservatives will defend capital punishment’s effectiveness as a deterrent and argue that illegal abortions and unwanted children can be replaced by adoptions. But the more honest members of either camp will admit that their commitments are not beholden to these sorts of contingent claims about the consequences of capital punishment and abortion. Once again, liberals—the more ardent ones, anyway—oppose capital punishment because they feel that it is just plain wrong, likewise for conservatives and their opposition to abortion. This is why talk of rights is such a natural expression for these powerful commitments. It captures the clarity and absoluteness of the conviction, its insensitivity to the empirical calculus of costs and benefits. In other words, the notion of rights epitomizes the practical failure of moral realism, the stubbornness, rigidity, and irreconcilable differences that emerge when people believe that they, unlike their perverse opponents, clearly have the moral truth on their side. There are two kinds of rights to which one can appeal, legal rights and moral rights, and in either case the appeal is inevitably question-begging. Gunlovers appeal to their (legal) right to bear arms: “Read the Second Amendment!” But, of course, this gets them nowhere with their opponents, to whom the whole issue is whether we should change the Second Amendment or (re)interpret it so as to achieve the same thing. When two legal rights conflict, it’s equally pointless to appeal to one of them as if this might settle the issue. This is especially true when there is no clear legal standard for determining which right takes precedence, but even when there is such a standard, one can question that standard on moral grounds just as one can question any law on moral grounds. The only time it’s not question-begging to appeal to a legal right is when there is genuine ignorance of the letter of the law, as when board game players are forced, after much heated dispute, to consult the fine print on the inside of the box. Given that moral realism is false, it is equally pointless to appeal to moral rights in the context of a purely moral disagreement. Suppose some people are discussing whether their mutual friend should confess to her husband that she’s had an extramarital affair. “She must tell him. Gustave has a right to know!” one of them asserts. If realism were true, such a claim might convey useful information about the Moral Truth, but to people who know the terrible, horrible truth about morality, such assertions are no more effective than an expressivist “Boo!” or “Hurrah!,” and probably less so given that revisionists will inevitably find people who speak as if they have the Moral Truth on their side somewhat annoying. Assertions about rights, wrongs, duties, and obligations (over)state a position, but they do nothing to defend it. They tell you what to do, but they don’t tell you why, and they certainly don’t give someone who is inclined to disagree a reason to change her mind. Contrast assertions about rights and other deontological entities with these contributions: “I think it’s selfish to tell him. Let her live with it! Why make things worse for him?” This statement suggests a shift in perspective. Rather than conceiving of her confession as an act of bravery performed out of respect for her husband, it is portrayed as a selfish act, one of sacrificing her husband’s happiness in order to ease her own sense of guilt. To this one might reply, “She should tell him because he probably already suspects, and knowing is better than always wondering.” This comment performs a useful service by drawing one’s attention to a relevant “empirical” issue, namely the possibility that her husband already suspects her infidelity and that he may have less to lose in being told about it than one might suspect. Another friend adds, 297 “Would you want to live a lie? I’d want to know the truth no matter what.” This comment suggests yet another shift in perspective, one achieved through the empathetic exercise of role-reversal. Unlike empty assertions about rights and duties, comments such as these do offer something of value. Some draw attention to relevant facts (“Good point! I hadn’t thought of that!”), while

Moral realists, and those anti-realists who would emulate them, have the option of dogmatism, of blindly acting by moral norms that one takes to be authoritative. Revisionists, in contrast, have no choice but to acknowledge that all moral judgment is an imprecise process of weighing values. The nature of moral action requires the drawing of lines: One either jumps others offer new perspectives on the same facts, inducements to view the same situation in a different evaluative light (“Good point! I hadn’t thought of it that way!”).

in and saves the drowning child, or one does not. One either votes to allow abortion or one does not. Of course, one will sometimes make compromises by adopting middle-ofthe- road courses of action, but, at some level, all action is discrete. To any particular course of action one must say either “yes” or “no.” Thus, while the inputs to moral judgment are fuzzy, fluid, and continuous considerations, the practical outputs of moral judgment are discrete actions. Deontology is intuitively appealing because it offers answers as clear and forceful as our intuitions, drawing theoretical lines that translate into practical lines, the kinds of lines that we, like it or not, are forced to draw by the nature of action. But, contrary to appearances, nature contains no true moral lines. We begin with only a mush of 298 morally relevant considerations, things we care about, and any lines that get drawn must be drawn by us. Therefore, any attempt to settle a moral question with deontological appeals to rights, obligations, etc. always begs the question. Such appeals are merely

In contrast to deontological language, characteristically consequentialist words like “good,” “bad,” “better,” and “worse” may be used by revisionists without too much cringing because such words lend themselves to talk of balancing , to making sense of the moral mush rather than denying its mushiness. Justifying one’s opposition to the action under consideration by labeling it “bad” is as bad as doing so by labeling it “wrong,” but less dogmatic uses of “bad,” “good,” etc. can be useful. One can use such attempts to settle moral issues by insisting that they have, in effect, already been settled by Mother Moral Nature and the lines she has drawn.

terms in one’s subjective accounting of costs and benefits. When one says, for example, “It’s bad enough that she did it… Why make things worse for him?” the “bad” and “worse” are not controversial labels that beg the ultimate moral question, but rather indications of uncontroversial16 moral2 subjudgments that will feed into the all-thingsconsidered judgment that practice requires. Often one can think of words like “good” and “bad” as non-specific placeholders for evaluatively relevant factual terms. Continuing with the example 16 When such judgments turn out to be controversial, then one must drop the evaluative label and go a level deeper, treating the use of the label as a moral issue in itself. 299 above, a revisionist might just as easily say, “Her actions have caused a lot of unhappiness already… Why create additional unhappiness for him?” Zealous revisionists may prefer a formulation of the latter sort, one completely purged of realist moral language, but the advantages here are minimal. Likewise, when one says that it’s “better” to know than to wonder, one can easily interpret this as an empirical assertion, probably one to the effect that knowing the unpleasant truth makes one happier in the

What about the “should” in “She should tell him, because…?” Here we might say instead, “I recommend telling him, because…” but, again, the gain is minimal. In this context the emphasis is on the factual claim following the “because,” and not on abstract moral considerations. long run.

3. Turn – awkwardness A. The link – the counterplan text is substantially more awkward-sounding than the plan text B. The impact – using the word “should” is okay if it sounds better Greene, 02 (Joshua David Greene, currently an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Harvard University. “THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT.” Dissertation presented to Princeton University in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. November 2002. http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/GreeneDissertation.pdf)

What about “ought” and “should?” These words are more or less equally comfortable in the mouths of deontologists and consequentialists, and, as we would expect, not so bad as “rights” and “duties,” but a bit more dangerous than “good” and “bad.” In asserted contexts one can avoid them by saying “I favor …,” “I’m for,” “I recommend…,” “I support…,” “I’m opposed to…,” or “I’m against…” instead of “We ought to…,” or “He should….,” or “They must….” It’s a bit hard to let go of these words in non-asserted contexts. For example how would a revisionist ask, “Should abortion be legal?” One could ask, “Are we for or against abortion?” but this sounds like a question about our current position, as if our votes have been cast and it’s simply a matter of tallying them. “ Shall we allow abortion?” and “Are we to allow abortion?” both sound a bit too realist, not to mention stilted.

“Will we allow abortion?” makes it sound like the issue is one of predicting the future. As far as I can see, there is no standard English way of asking the anti-realist question, “Should2 abortion be legal?” or of translating the phrase, “the dispute over whether abortion should2 be legal.” For this reason, revisionists may have to settle for “ought” and “should” for use in non-asserted contexts.

4. Critiques of speech produces a reactionary politics in which change is focused on language directly trading of with eforts to reform the socioeconomic root causes of injustice Brown, Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, 2K1 (Wendy, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37)

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usur p the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legis lated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert

emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conserva tive as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power . Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, vio lence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.

2AC Government PIC 1. Permutation do both - the state is inevitable—means there’s an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical— solvency isn’t a question Simmons 99 (William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics .55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an universality rule.

ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for and his followers.’61

politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state. The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself , trying to be more just. It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Infinity, state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

2. The government is good—it’s essential to our freedom and liberty. The negative’s anti governance stance is what makes it fail in the first place, we must work through the government to solve for oppression and violence. Douglas Amy 2007(Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College, “Government as the Champion of Justice, Equality, Freedom, and Security”, http://www.governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=12, nikhil) Do you believe in justice? That our civil liberties should be protected? That all citizens should all be treated as equals? You would probably answer, “Of course!” But do you also realize that if you are an avid supporter of public values like “justice,” “liberty” and “equality,” then you should also be an avid supporter of government? Government is often the only institution that can make these kinds of core political values a reality. In fact, without an active and healthy public sector, these kinds of public values would be in very short supply. Take justice, for instance. It is not usually something provided by the marketplace or created by the actions of individuals. More often it is something that can only be provided and sustained in the public sphere by the actions of government organizations like the courts and the legislatures. If we want a just society, we must work through government to get it. This argument – that government is an essential mechanism for realizing vital public values – is an important one in making the case for government. Government is good not simply because it provides us as individuals with certain services and benefits (such as the ones described in another article on this site, “A Day in Your Life”) but also because it is the main way to promote important values that are good for us as a whole – values that are in the public interest. This view of government as the insurer of core democratic values is one that goes back to the very beginning of our national political institutions. Consider, for example, the political sentiments expressed by the founding fathers in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution: We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. From the outset, the American government was primarily seen as an indispensable means of establishing and promoting certain universally

recognized public values, such as justice, tranquility, and liberty. And today, as citizens, we need to recognize in government what the founding fathers saw in it: that it is the only institution we can rely on to nourish and protect these kinds of values in our society. Many people actually share this value-oriented vision of government. They get involved in politics and the governing process not because they want something for themselves but because they want to promote certain democratic values – such as equality or freedom – that they feel are important. They have a vision of what the good society is and they try to use government to make that vision a reality. They vote for candidates and lobby the government not simply to line their own pockets but in order to encourage government to do what is right for society as a whole. Many people participate in the democratic process because they want to promote principles and values that they believe are in the public interest. For many people in the National Rifle Association, for example, it is not just about owning their own shotgun, it is about liberty. And for many in the Civil Rights movement it was not about using the same restaurants as whites, it was about equality. To really appreciate the unique role that government plays in promoting these basic political principles, we need to take a more careful look at some of these key values and see how they can be ensured only by government and how they are embodied in particular policies and programs. Let’s start with justice and fairness.

3. Language isn’t deterministic, changing it does nothing but makes the problem less visible Mark S Meisner, Professor of environmental studies at York University, 19 95 [“Resourcist Language: The Symbolic Enslavement of Nature,” http://markmeisner.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/meisnerresourcist_language.pdf]/sbhag Changing the language we use to talk about non-human nature is not a solution. As I suggested, language is not the problem. Rather, it seems more like a contagious symptom of a deeper and multi-faceted problem that has yet to be fully defined. Resourcist language is both an indicator and a carrier of the pathology of rampant ecological degradation. Furthermore, language change alone can end up simply being a band-aid solution that gives the appearance of change and makes the problem all the less visible. In a recent article on feminist language reform, Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King (1994) argue that because meanings are socially constructed, attempts at introducing nonsexist language are being undermined by a culture that is still largely sexist. The words may have shifted, but the meanings and ideologies have not. The real world cure for the sick patient matters more than the treatment of a single symptom. Consequently, language change and cultural change must go together with socialstructural change. It is naive to believe either that language is trivial, or that it is deterministic.

4. Doesn’t do change structures – cedes the discussion to elites Darryl Jarvis (Director of the Research Institute for International Risk and Lecturer in International Relations, The University of Sydney) 2k “International relations and the challenge of postmodernism”) Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrary inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts form its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley’s hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not make its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us form paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist without subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus while intellectually interesting, constructivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce that there are no foundations and all reality is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of recognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of the is objectively given fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representation. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great consequence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long taken care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley wn government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.

*2AC Military CP Military is going to kill agent provocateurs lol Permutation do both – double action is double solvency

Perm do the counterplan - noncombat functions of the military are non-military – proves normal means Huntington, 93 – former professor of government at Harvard (Samuel, Noncombat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era, ed: James Graham, p. 5)

These would clearly seem to be non-traditional roles. But are they really? The more I have thought about this issue, the more I have become convinced that with one possible exception the subject of this conference does not exist There are almost no conceivable roles for the American military in this new phase of national security that the American military have not performed in some earlier phase. The true distinction, I believe, is not between traditional and non-traditional roles but between military and non-military roles, or more precisely, between the combat missions of the military and the non-combat uses of military forc e. The purpose of military forces is combat, that is to deter and to defeat the enemies of the United States; that is their central mission, their raison d'etre, the only justification for expending resources on their creation and maintenance. The forces created for that mission, however, can and throughout our history have been employed in noncombat non-military uses.

DOD fails – inefficiency -inefficient -little experience

Khan, 2012 - Director of Financial Management and Assurance for GAO (Asif, “DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Challenges in Attaining Audit Readiness and Improving Business Processes and Systems,” 4/18/2012, http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590203.pdf ) DS GAO’s recent work highlights the types of challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) as it strives to attain audit readiness and reengineer its business processes and systems. The urgency in addressing these challenges has been increased by the goals of an auditable DOD Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) by the end of fiscal year 2014 and a complete set of auditable financial statements by the end of fiscal year 2017.

GAO’s 2011 reporting highlights difficulties the DOD components experienced in attempting to achieve an auditable SBR. These include: • the Navy’s and the Air Force’s premature assertions of audit readiness and missed interim milestones; • the Army’s inability to locate and provide supporting documentation for its military pay; • the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ inability to reconcile their Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT) accounts; and • the Marine Corps’ inability to receive an opinion on both its fiscal years 2010 and 2011 SBRs because it could not provide supporting documentation in a timely manner, and support for transactions was For example,

missing or incomplete. In a February 2012 briefing on its updated plans, DOD accelerated milestones for its components —in some cases, significantly—to accomplish the 2014 SBR goal. For example, the Air Force had planned to validate its audit readiness for many SBR- related items in fiscal year 2016; however, the department’s February 2012 accelerated plans show that most of the Air Force’s SBR line items will be audit-ready in fiscal years 2013 or 2014. Also, in its February 2012 update DOD shows that 7 of 24 material general fund Defense Agencies and Other Defense Organizations have either already had SBR audits or are ready to have their SBRs audited, which represent important positive steps. DOD has stated it considers the successful implementation of its enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems critical to transforming its business operations, addressing long-standing weaknesses, and ensuring the department meets its mandated September 30, 2017 auditability goals. However, in 2011, GAO reported that independent assessments of two of these systems— the

Army’s and Air Force’s new general ledger systems—identified operational problems, gaps in capabilities that required manual workarounds, and training that was not focused on system operation. Moreover, users of these systems had difficulties using these systems to perform daily operations. GAO also reported in 2011 on numerous weaknesses in DOD’s enterprise architecture and business processes that afect DOD’s auditability. For example, while DOD continued to update its corporate enterprise architecture, it had not yet augmented its corporate architecture with complete, coherent subsidiary architectures for DOD components such as the military departments. Also, while DOD and the military departments largely followed DOD’s Business Process Reengineering Guidance to assess business system investments, they had not yet performed the key step of validating assessment results. GAO has made prior recommendations to address these issues. DOD has generally agreed with these recommendations and is taking corrective actions in response. GAO has work underway to evaluate DOD’s continuing efforts in these areas.

Alt causes thump the net benefit – A) State authority Wolfrum, 2008 - president of the international tribunal for the law of the sea (Rüdiger, “Freedom of Navigation: New Challenges,” 2008, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements_of_president/wolfrum/fre edom_navigation_080108_eng.pdf ) DS The ambiguity prevailing at the time concerning coastal States’ legislative competences as regards innocent passage was meant to be clarified by article 21 of the Convention. This provision tries to establish a delicate balance between the interests of international navigation and the right of coastal States to regulate the passage of foreign ships in the territorial sea. Only a handful of actions are qualified as not being protected under the notion of innocent passage in article 19, paragraph 2, of the Convention, e.g., any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to the Convention (article 19, paragraph 2(h)). The

coastal State may regulate innocent passage in respect of a wide range of matters under article 21, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in conformity with the Convention and other rules of international law ,. Paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of article 21 in particular refer to the safety of navigation, the regulation of maritime traffic, and the protection of navigational aids, while paragraph 1(f) relates to the preservation of the marine environment and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof. Paragraph 1(g) refers to article 245 of the Convention, which accords to coastal States an exclusive right to regulate, authorize and conduct marine scientific research in their territorial sea, and paragraph 1(h) refers to custom, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters. In short, article 19 of the Convention excludes certain actions from the protection accorded by the notion of innocent passage, whereas article 21 of the Convention opens the possibility for coastal States to limit further the freedom of navigation.

B) International agreements Wolfrum, 2008 - president of the international tribunal for the law of the sea (Rüdiger, “Freedom of Navigation: New Challenges,” 2008, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements_of_president/wolfrum/fre edom_navigation_080108_eng.pdf ) DS International agreements, in many cases established under the auspices of the IMO, mandate coastal States, including States bordering international straits, to adopt further measures for the management and control of international navigation. Such measures may be taken unilaterally or in conjunction with the IMO . This system is still in the stage of development and some uncertainty exists in this respect. Among many international conventions having a bearing on coastal State jurisdiction over foreign shipping in the territorial sea, four contain provisions that allow for the adoption of rules and standards applicable to foreign merchant ships. These are the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. 1972 (COLREG)4 which provides for the possibility of

The other international instruments are: the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78),5 the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS),6 and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 1989 .7 traffic separation schemes.



*2AC NEPA CP 1. Conditions counterplans are a voting issue a) Creates an artificial net-benefit by taking away uniqueness and link arguments. Discourages in depth debate by allowing the neg to win with a small risk of a contrived impact b) Creates an unfair side bias by stealing the entirety of the af which is the only predictable basis for ofense c) Kills topic education - we focus on minute, infinitely regressive implementation questions instead of transportation

2. Permutation do both - solves the net benefit because the plan would be implemented but have funds withheld if the impact statement wasn't followed 3. Perm solves public participation and politics Lindstrom and Nie 97 – Research Consultants for the Arizona Department of Transportation Matthew and Martin, “HOW DO YOU COLLECT AND USE PUBLIC INFORMATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PLANS AND PROGRAMS?,” ADOT, REPORT NUMBER: FHWA-AZ97-452, http://www.azdot.gov/TPD/ATRC/publications/project_reports/PDF/AZ452.pdf There are two key facets to any process whereby the public participates in the decision making process. First, the procedural element simply allows the public a formal opportunity to voice their concerns and opinions, usually at various stages of decision making. The procedural requirements for public participation are a prerequisite for substantive participation, or participation that entails a real impact and effect on public policy. Secondly, substantive participation implies two-way channels of communication the extent that government officials and the public become mutual partners in the decision making process. Most participation takes place on

procedural grounds while creating an illusion that the public can have a substantive impact. As a result, even though a citizen’s advice is rejected, they may feel at least they had their day in court and will probably be more willing to go along with the final decision. Towards the end of this report, we will come back to this issue when we recommend techniques and strategies for Arizona’s Department of Transportation.

1. Permutation do the counterplan. It's legitimate - the af shouldn't have to defend certainty and immediacy against counterplans. Counterplans must be textually and functionally competitive. 2. EIS is normal means Argus 14

(Argus Media, “DOE to start new policy for non-FTA LNG exports”, 08/14/14, AD: 09/11/14, http://www.argusmedia.com/News/Article?id=922000 | Kushal)

Projects that are required by FERC to complete a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS) will be placed by the DOE into a queue for non-FTA consideration 30 days after the final EIS is published. Projects that are required to undergo a less comprehensive environmental assessment will be placed in the DOE's non-FTA queue after the DOE publishes a finding of no significant impact. Non-FTA authorizations are seen as crucial for most US projects as most of the world's largest LNG consuming nations by volume, including Japan, by far the largest, do not have FTAs with the US.

6. Permutation do the counterplan in the world in which they say yes 7. The CP results in a multi-year delay – studies prove Dill 5 – PhD in Urban Studies Jennifer, “What Influences the Length of Time to Complete NEPA Reviews? An Examination of Highway Projects in Oregon and the Potential for Streamlining,” http://dot.alaska.gov/stwddes/desenviron/assets/pdf/resources/nepareviewtime.pdf How long does the environmental review process take? The Louis Berger Group sampled 100 EISs from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, to help FHWA obtain a baseline for measuring performance (2). They estimated the length of time taken to complete the NEPA process based on the information in the EIS. The end date was the date on the final EIS. The start date varied. In Phase II of the project, the Louis Berger Group collected data on 244 projects from 1995 to 2001 and calculated the length of the NEPA process using the Notice of Intent (NOI) as the start date and the Record of Decision (ROD) as the end date. In addition, for the past five years, FHWA has tracked the length of time to complete the NEPA process, also using the NOI and ROD dates (7). The data from these three sources is shown in FIGURE 1. The two studies by the Louis Berger Group noted that the time to complete NEPA was not normally distributed, and that a handful of very lengthy projects often skewed the data. In such cases, the median may be a better indication of central tendency. For example, the median time to complete NEPA for the projects from the 1970s through 1990s was 3.0 years, compared to a mean of 3.6 years for all three decades. FIGURE 2 shows the medians from the same three data sources. In addition, in 1994 the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed 76 projects with EISs completed between 1988 and 1993 (5). The average time from NOI to ROD was about 4.5 years. This figure is consistent with the Berger Group data. At the request of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), in 2003 TransTech Management, Inc. surveyed 31 state departments of transportation about their most recent final EIS document (8). They found a median time taken from NOI to ROD of 3.7 years, ranging from just over two years to almost 12 years. The difference from the FHWA/Berger Group data was not explained

8. NEPA reviews cause ineffective overlap and delays – all their environmental impacts are solved by local and state actors Stanford Law 7/15 – “Comments and Recommendations on NEPA Reform for the White House Council on Environmental Quality,” https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/organization/601795/doc/slspublic/N EPA%20Pushing%20The%20Reset%20Button%20Submittal%20to%20CEQ %20FINAL.pdf, 7/21/14 BRoche NEPA lead agencies also create inefficiencies and/or litigation risk when they fail to recognize— or simply do not know—that another agency is undertaking an environmental analysis of similar issues in the same region , or another agency is analyzing environmental impacts associated with the same type of project in a different region. The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Commerce Department’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provided a recent example of this phenomenon as they simultaneously undertook separate, largely-uncoordinated programmatic EISs evaluating environmental aspects of 9 potential oil and gas developments in the

If agencies like these fail to communicate with one another, they miss a valuable opportunity to streamline their work and develop more robust analyses. They also may be opening themselves up to litigation risk by undertaking individual reviews that do not address the full scope of related project impacts, particularly cumulative impacts. same sensitive offshore environment in the Arctic.

9. Links to politics Dreher 5 - Deputy Executive Director of the Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute. He served as Deputy General Counsel of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Robert, “The Political Assault on the National Environmental Policy Act,” http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/research_archive/nepa/NEPAUnderSiegeFinal.p df NEPA is justly regarded as the foundation for U.S. environmental protections. In addition to establishing our nation’s basic commitment to a policy of environmental protection, NEPA creates a framework for informed and responsive government decision-making based on extensive public input. The assault on the Act that is taking place on Capitol Hill and within some federal agencies threatens to destroy this basic environmental framework. After 35 years, it is worthwhile to consider how NEPA should be improved. Thoughtful improvements in agency practices and renewed commitments of federal resources can make the Act more effective. The goal should be to improve and strengthen this bedrock environmental law, not to undermine and weaken it

*2AC EU CP Permutation do both – double action is double solvency

The perm solves – EU can’t act independently – foreign policy execution requires US involvement Georgescu ’13 Radu Georgescu, Translated by Nelly Tsekova, “The EU needs the USA,” Le Taurillon, 4/28/2013, http://mobile.taurillon.org/? page=mobile_article&id_article=5720 Americans have developed a global strategy . Therefore, other countries built their own strategies based on the American political orientation . Thanks to a strategically advantageous position, the United States have both built active external policy and security strategy which was considered invulnerable. In this context and as international relations are becoming increasingly uncertain, the European Union has no choice but to follow the American model. In 2011, the showdown that was to target the Gaddafi regime shows that the transatlantic partners have special relations. Despite this showdown, these relationships deteriorate, for purely geopolitical reasons. In this perspective, Europe is not attractive anymore, especially because of the significant changes that have occurred in Asia - both economic (eg, China) that the political and military (eg the Middle East). Asia has many faults, as shown by the records of Iran and Syria, the lack of predictability of China (as well as China-Japan and China-Taiwan relations), the Pakistan-India relations and finally the situation in Afghanistan.

Europe wants the plan – already started building terminals Baugh 14

(Les Lo Baugh, a partner at Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, has practiced LNG, environmental and corporate law for over thirty years. At the LNG export proceedings before the U. S. Department of Energy, he has strongly advocated that national security and geopolitical considerations should be part of the public interest determination. “Winter and Gazprom Won't Wait: What The Geopolitics of LNG Will Mean for the People of the Ukraine and Europe”, 08/15/14, AD: 08/27/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/agnia-grigas/winter-and-gazpromwont-w_b_5681791.html | Kushal)

Countries needing U.S. LNG are taking action now. U.S. companies are welcomed in Eastern Europe, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere, and so is American leadership. At the very least, domestic partisan politics and red-tape should not send mixed signals and impede free commerce. Even taking steps towards small-scale LNG projects, the likes of Lithuania's Klaipeda terminal, coming online by 2015,

can reap impressive rewards through the promise of gas alternatives .

A striking demonstration of this effect is that Vilnius has already managed, for the first time ever, to negotiate a discount from Gazprom in its long-term gas contract. Other EU member states are also lining up: Poland is six months away from building the largest LNG terminal on the Baltic Sea, while Croatia, Portugal, Finland, and Estonia are also making plans for enhanced LNG infrastructure. A basic first step for the U.S. administration would be to expedite

issuance of LNG export permits. Most have languished for years and clearing up the backlog would be a boon to energy dependent allies. Some progress has been made - but the U.S. must speed up the progress and send a clear message before Europe falls into the icy clutch of winter. If the U.S. does not move with the pace of the global economy, the market will default to others whose interests are not aligned with the U.S. and its allies.

International fiat is a voting issue, illogical, no policymaker has a choice between the plan and the cp, it doesn’t test the opportunity cost of the plan, affirmative ground, there are an infinite rage of actors, this cp is especially bad since it fiats multiple states acting in unison. No solvency - EU diplomacy systems fail Rettman ’12 Andrew Rettman, “Ministers identify glitches in EU diplomatic service,” EU Observer, 6/1/2012, http://euobserver.com/foreign/114783 Twelve member states have said bureaucracy and bad management are hampering the effectiveness of the EU's new diplomatic service one year after its launch. The foreign ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden put forward their ideas in an informal three-page paper dated 8 December and seen by

the text strikes raw nerves in Brussels on issues including turf battles between the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton's handling of ministerial meetings and her purported neglect of security affairs . Under current EUobserver. While couched in polite language,

arrangements, Ashton's service is responsible for framing EU foreign policy and managing joint relations with nonEU countries via 140 foreign delegations. But the European Commission is responsible for funding foreign programmes and for handling many day-to-day EEAS matters, such as making sure Ashton's people have working

The hybrid set-up has created problems such as forcing Ashton's foreign ambassadors to do book-keeping on commission spending over which they have no decision-making powers . It has also seen around 60 EEAS computers on their desks and get their expenses on time.

staff leave their posts amid frustration that they do not have the basic tools for their job. "Does the EEAS have the right organisational structure to ensure effective co-operation with the commission on all external action aspects? ... An EU delegation can function effectively only if the head of delegation receives all necessary information in good time and can fully focus on political priorities, and if a delegation can manage its administrative

Ashton has done a poor job of chairing their regular monthly meetings. Brussels is awash with anecdotes about the EEAS sending out agendas at too short notice for ministers to prepare properly and about Ashton chafing with colleagues. In one episode in March last year expenditures efficiently," the ministers said. On a more personal note, they indicated

she called ministers to the EU capital ahead of a snap summit on Libya then said mid-meeting she had to leave. Sweden's Carl Bildt at the time reportedly told her to stay until the talks ended, with Ashton falling into line. "Ways to further optimise the identification of political priorities should be explored," the 12 ministers said, urging her to circulate a yearly agenda for the events and "more regularly to produce preparatory policy and/or decision-making papers to be circulated sufficiently in advance."

The 1AC is a solvency deficit to the counterplan – the EU has severe energy insecurity right now, Russia scenario proves – EU wants the plan in order to have a stable source of imports

No impact to the counterplan - the EU’s resilient – 50 years of governance won’t be reversed in the short term Pelinka 11 (Anton, “The European Union as an Alternative to the Nation-State,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, June 2011, Volume 24, Issue 12, pp 21-30, AK) This observation must not be misunderstood that the end of the integration is visible. And whatever can be called the EU’s “final status” is foreclosed. There is no

determinism in the process. But here is empirical evidence: The Union is moving in the direction of an ever less unfinished federal system. Whatever that means—whether the EU could, should and would become the “United States of Europe” or whether the process can be stabilized in form of a Europe of concentric circles with a more federalized core group does not mean that the integration has become irreversible. The integration has not

The member states are still able to reverse the trend and become more sovereign again. There is no guarantee whatsoever for the EU’s bright future. But taking all observations into account: More than half a century of integration has strengthened the Union—and not weakened it. reached the point of no return. The EU still could develop in a more loser form of an international organisation.

*2AC Consult China CP

Permutation do both – double action is double solvency

Perm- do the CP- if they say yes, the perm doesn’t sever the plan Solvency deficit- there’s a chance China says no, which means the case is a disad to the counterplan Consult CPs are badSteals the entire af- we can’t weigh the af against the CP Infinitely regressive- we can’t predict every random countries that they could consult- it’s an unfair research burden for the af Doesn’t disprove the desirability of the af- they agree that the plan should be done, which means you should vote affirmative Creates multiple worlds- China could say yes, no, or make modifications- makes solvency too indeterminate and makes the debate too unpredictable

*2AC Consult the Indigenous CP

Permutation do both – double action is double solvency

Perm- do the CP- if they say yes, the perm doesn’t sever the plan Consultation trades of with indigenous activism to address immediate threats to survival by locking native groups into complex debates over legal procedure. Rodriguez-Garavito 2010 Cesar, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights, University of the Andes (Colombia); Hauser Global Fellow, New York University Law School; Founding member, Center for Law, Justice, and Society, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 18 #1 (Winter), http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/Public %20Sociology,%20Live/Rodriguez.Global%20Governance.pdf

Thereafter, the phrase repeated in the presentation is “prior consultation.” Its effect is magnified because it is one of the few Spanish terms—along with others, such as Corte Constitucional (Constitutional Court), sentencia (ruling), and gobierno (government)—that sprinkle the remarks of participants who only speak Embera. At this point, it is clear that the talk has turned into a legal memorandum. The speaker, a leader who has braved death sentences from the paramilitaries and the guerillas for nearly a decade to defend his people, stumbles uncertainly into the terrain of legal procedure: how to prove the dam has caused harm to Embera communities; which court to bring a new case before in order to suspend the government and the company’s plans to enlarge the dam; what is the status of the last legal action presented by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) that represents them; who is the indigenous people’s legal representative in the approaching prior consultation procedure; how to make use during these ensuing procedures of the Constitutional Court’s judgment6 and the report by the ILO committee, 7which both condemned the Colombian government for authorizing the construction of the Urrá dam without consulting the Embera. These legal artifacts—the succession of procedural deadlines, the architecture of laws and decisions, the affirmation of equality between parties to a case—are precisely what generate the illusion of order, and in turn, make us forget for a moment that we are in the heart of the chaos. Thereafter, we get stuck in a long discussion about prior consultation’s technicalities, as if death squads were not patrolling just a few kilometers away, as if the territory were not littered with landmines, as if all of the few families in attendance did not have some member who had been assassinated or forcibly displaced, as if we had not crossed paths along the river with speedboats that were driven by fully armed soldiers, who play cat and mouse with the settlers that transport coca downriver.

Consultation fails to resolve the net benefit --- Limited negotiation leverage and decision-making power prevent consultation from preserving indigenous culture. Rodriguez-Garavito 2010 Cesar, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights, University of the Andes (Colombia); Hauser Global Fellow, New York University Law School; Founding member, Center for Law, Justice, and Society, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 18 #1 (Winter), http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/Public %20Sociology,%20Live/Rodriguez.Global%20Governance.pdf

In the absence of strict procedural standards and effective monitoring mechanisms and sanctions, the version of FPIC endorsed in multilateral bank directives and TNC codes of conduct embodies the two principal limitations of the governance paradigm mentioned earlier. On the one hand, the lack of procedural guarantees to mitigate the profound power asymmetries among indigenous communities, corporations, and states render consultation a form of participation in which indigenous peoples have limited negotiating leverage and even more limited decision-making power. On the other hand, the absence of effective and functional monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms is reminiscent of the preference for selfregulation inherent in governance’s approach, which accounts for the ineffectiveness of operational policies and voluntary standards recognizing the duty to consult indigenous peoples. Similar limitations are apparent in the version of consultation incorporated into legislation in the majority of states that have ratified Convention 169.87 As a result, this dominant version of FPIC and this interpretation of Convention 169 are central pieces of what Hale calls “neoliberal multiculturalism,” which is the legal regime that recognizes cultural rights, but denies, de facto or de jure, “the assertion of control over resources necessary for those rights to be realized.”88 It is the type of multiculturalism and consultation that is today prevalent even in those Latin American countries that have joined the wave of multicultural constitutionalism and ethno-development, without addressing the structural causes of indigenous peoples’ exclusion or establishing forms of participation with decision-making power.89

Counterplan doesn’t solve case --- Massive delays for as much as 20 years. Rodriguez-Garavito 2010 Cesar, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights, University of the Andes (Colombia); Hauser Global Fellow, New York University Law School; Founding member, Center for Law, Justice, and Society, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 18 #1 (Winter), http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/Public %20Sociology,%20Live/Rodriguez.Global%20Governance.pdf

Those who attend negotiations and discussions during a consultation process will notice something strange. When it seems that a point on the agenda has been exhausted or an agreement has been reached, it is common that the conversation returns to the same matters or, in fact, discussion of them in a subsequent meeting begins again from scratch. For this reason, unless the proceedings are perfunctory or imposed under deception or coercion (which is not infrequent), consultations tend

to follow a non-linear path in which delays, repetition, and misunderstandings are endemic. Once again, the case of the Urrá dam is indicative of this tendency. In effect, one of the principal points of controversy among the parties to the case is whether an agreement had ever been reached. In other words, the State, the company, and the Embera-Katío have not agreed on the existence of an agreement. While the first two maintain that they reached an agreement with the Embera in 1999, allowing the dam to be filled following the Court’s decision, the Embera argue that such an agreement never existed. To complicate the misunderstanding further, the consultation process, as it often does, produced an internal division within the Embera people. Thus, some communities currently argue that there was an agreement, while others disagree. 109 Considerable uncertainty results, thus aggravating the lack of confidence among the parties and heightening rather than mitigating the volatility of the situation on the ground. How are such misunderstandings produced? What causes miscommunication, which is so prevalent that it leads to constant communication breakdown among the parties and to long stalls in consultation processes? One of the primary causes is that consultations embody a discursive clash, in which claims and different kinds of knowledge, based on radically distinct epistemological roots, get crossed. In a stark historical short circuit, consultations combine “pre-modern” indigenous claims, “post-modern” designs of global governance, and classical “modern” forms of primitive accumulation of capital—all of which are smelted in the crucible of modern legal forms par excellence: due process and freedom of contract. The misunderstandings that can arise from this epistemic Tower of Babel are apparent in various consultation processes that I have observed. One particularly telling and internationally known case is the consultation of the U’wa people, which derived from Occidental Petroleum’s plans for oil exploration in the U’wa’s territory in eastern Colombia.110 The U’wa’s consultation process has lasted for nearly twenty years, and a stalemate among the parties persists, due in part to the countervailing power of a coalition of indigenous and environmental NGOs worldwide that have assembled in solidarity with the U’wa. Beyond the case’s intricacies, what is interesting to highlight is the abyss between the State and the oil companies’ proextraction vision and the U’wa’s conception of territory and oil—both sacred and untouchable, to the point where the U’wa have announced that they will commit collective suicide in the event of oil exploration in their territory.111 The result is a breakdown in communication, unresolved by the procedural mechanism of consultation, as various paradoxical incidents in the case reveal. For example, in 1997, when the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the U’wa regarding a complaint that they brought and, thereby, ordered the State to undertake prior consultation before authorizing seismic exploration in indigenous territory,112 the U’wa surprised their allies who were celebrating this “legal victory” by issuing a communiqué expressing their rejection of the Court´s ruling and reiterating that their goal was not that the oil project be consulted or negotiated, but rather that it simply be cancelled for attacking their most profound cultural convictions. As the circulated communiqué stated, “we do not understand why they summon us to participate in a hearing when they know what we will say, which is the same as what we have been saying from the beginning.”113

Indigenous groups say no --- They reject new energy and resource exploitation. Rodriguez-Garavito 2010 Cesar, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights, University of the Andes (Colombia); Hauser Global Fellow, New York University Law School; Founding member, Center for Law, Justice, and Society, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 18 #1 (Winter), http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/Public %20Sociology,%20Live/Rodriguez.Global%20Governance.pdf

The emancipatory effect also operates through indirect means, far from the formal consultation meetings. In societies such as those of Latin America, where the wave of multicultural constitutionalism of the 1990s arrived precisely when indigenous peoples were experiencing both organizational revitalization and collective extermination, the norms enshrined in Convention 169 and other legal instruments opened up additional paths of resistance and political mobilization. In these circumstances, consultation has been embraced as an instrument for slowing down the avalanche of mining and other extractive projects engulfing indigenous communities situated in economies bent on the exploitation of natural resources. This explains why, as I have observed in countries like Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Guatemala, cases and technical legal discussions about FPIC occupy a privileged position in the agendas of national indigenous organizations.125 As a result, at the national level, FPIC has become a useful card that indigenous movements can play in negotiations and litigation before States and companies. The card’s effectiveness is demonstrated by the multiple laws that regulate matters of vital importance for companies and indigenous peoples, such as the use of forests or the exploitation of hydrocarbons, in those countries,126 which have been subsequently struck down by national courts for violating Convention 169.

Consult Counterplans are illegitimate and a voting issue: A) Infinitely regressive: they could consult anyone—making the AFF burden impossible. B) Moving target: the efect of the counterplan changes with the answer the indigenous groups give—making this undebatable. C) Counter Interpretation: the negative gets consultation counterplans with state actors. Solves their consult good ofense while guaranteeing a finite and predictable group of organizations that can be consulted. No link to their ofense --- Indigenous culture can still be protected without defining indigenous groups as nation states. Wiessner 2007 Siegfried, Professor of Law & Director Graduate Program in Intercultural Human Rights St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida Chair, ILA Committee on

the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ga_61-295/ga_61-295.html Indigenous peoples generally do not aspire to statehood in the sense of the political independence of players in the Westphalian system of modern nation states. The claim to indigenous sovereignty is primarily founded upon the aspiration to preserve their inherited ways of life, change those traditions as they see necessary, and to make their cultures flourish. This fundamental policy of UNDRIP is reflected in article 5, which states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State” [emphasis added].

*2AC Privatization CP Permutation do both

Plan is a prerequisite to the counterplan – only the USFG has jurisdiction over agents provocateurs.

Possession can be joint Supreme Court of New Jersey 89 (“State v. McCoy,” 116 N.J. 293, Lexis)//BB HN4 Possession, moreover, can be actual or constructive. Here, for example, the driver was in actual possession of the stolen automobile. As we have previously stated, however, "[p]hysical or manual control of the proscribed item is not required as long as there is an intention to exercise control over it manifested in circumstances where it is reasonable to infer that the capacity to do so exists." Brown, supra, 80 N.J. at 597. Thus, HN5 constructive possession exists when a person intentionally obtains a measure of control or dominion over the stolen goods although they are under the physical control of another. Kimbrough, supra, 109 N.J.Super. at 64. Finally, HN6 [300] possession may be exercised jointly by two or more persons at the same time. Brown, supra, 80 N.J. at 597. Consequently, the question in the present case becomes whether defendant's relationship to the car was sufficient to permit a finding that he shared possession with the driver

Permitting makes projects federal – legal definitions concur Calloway 97 - adjunct professor of Environmental Law at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School (Cheryl, “The "Human Environment" Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act: Implications for Environmental Justice,” 1997 Det. C.L. Rev. 1147)//BB Other activities which courts have deemed "major federal action" include the grant of a license to construct a high voltage line, 34 the issuance of an interim operating license for a nuclear power plant, 35 and the authorization for the abandonment of a railroad line. 36 Even when the project is constructed with non-federal funds, federal government action may rise to the level of a "major action" if it makes possible significant effects on the human environment. 37 In City of Atlanta v. United States, 38 the court held that the [1157] Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) installation of navigational equipment and adoption of flight procedures constituted "major federal action," even though the airport runway expansion was not funded by the federal government. 39 These steps taken by the FAA made possible increased air and noise pollution. 40 "[A] non-federal project is considered a 'federal action' if it cannot begin or continue without prior approval by a federal

agency and the agency possesses authority to exercise discretion over the outcome."

Perm solves- diferences are minor Williams ’12, PhD in economics from Harvard Heidi, “Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to Policy”, MIT Economics, http://economics.mit.edu/files/7823 Although the specific focus of this paper is on innovation inducement prizes of ¶ the type federal agencies may implement under the America COMPETES Reauthorization¶ Act, McKinsey (2009) argues that the distinctions between governmentsponsored,¶ philanthropic-sponsored, and corporate-sponsored prizes are modest in¶ terms of design and administration—implying that much of the discussion in this¶ paper may also be relevant for nongovernment sponsored innovation inducement¶ prizes. Although the size of the prize sector is difficult to estimate due to a lack of¶ centralized data on offered prizes, McKinsey (2009) estimates the prize sector is¶ currently on the order of $1 to $2 billion. This figure can be compared to the $55¶ billion U.S. universities spent on research in 2009, about 60 percent of which was¶ federally funded (see Stephan, 2011). However, the McKinsey (2009) data suggest¶ the prize sector has seen tremendous growth in recent decades, with more than a 15-¶ fold increase in value since 1970. They estimate that much of the growth to date has¶ come from the philanthropic sector, but the America COMPETES Reauthorization¶ Act may lead to accelerated growth in prizes offered by the government sector.

Privatization leads to resource inequity and territorial conflict Mitchell 8 - Professor and Department Chair Political Science University of Iowa (Sara, “Ruling the Sea: Institutionalization and Privatization of the Global Ocean Commons, 1/1/98, Dept of Political Science Publications, http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=polisci_pubs, HW) While privatization is an attractive solution, its primary drawback is the potential for the creation and/or exacerbation of resource distributional inequities. It has been admitted that the formalization of EEZs as part of the UNCLOS agreement “has increased, rather than decreased, inequality among states, giving more to the already well-endowed richer states” (Borgese, 1995: 15). One of the most significant problems is that the subdivision of the commons is not homogenous. Merely allocating equivalent portions of the commons does not mean that all users will get an equal share. States may be tempted to seek larger shares of the commons to put more resources under their private control; a lack of information about the resource will also complicate negotiations regarding the distribution of a resource since a state risks getting a worthless share (Wijkman, 1982). In addition, the migratory nature of fish stocks and the interconnectedness of the ocean’s ecosystem mean that resources cannot be managed solely within the EEZ, leading to problems with fishing fleets pursuing migratory fish stocks just outside of other

states' EEZs (Borgese, 1995; Bailey, 1996).7 Since some resources can move between EEZs, each state has incentives to exploit the resource before another does the same.

CP doesn’t solve and links to politics Upton 10 – Analyst in Natural Resource Policy (Harold, “Open Ocean Aquaculture”, 8/9/10, http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Sep/RL32694.pdf2, HW) Using offshore waters for a private activity such as aquaculture is likely to be controversial. Traditionally, nearshore waters and their resources under state jurisdiction are considered to be held and managed “in the public trust.” Open ocean aquaculture may be perceived by some as de facto privatization of the ocean, which has historically been considered a common property resource.47 Precedents in leasing offshore areas for developing oil and gas resources may be relevant to these concerns. However, significant questions remain concerning whether an appropriate mechanism exists for any federal agency to provide an open ocean aquaculture permit or lease applicant with the necessary property rights to begin construction and operation. Siting and site tenure in federal waters are important issues for development and private investment— without assurances and protection of exclusive rights, there is little incentive for financial investment.

2AC States CP

TURN: The use of undercover drug stings lead to entrapment and fuels the War on Crime rather than fight against it. Sawyer 7/16 – Free Thought Project Mark, Creating Crime: FBI Bribes People to Take Fake Drugs onto Planes So they Can Bust Them, 7/16/15, http://thefreethoughtproject.com/creating-crime-fbi-bribespeople-fake-drugs-planes-bust/ Dallas, TX — Apparently the FBI has a hard time finding criminals these days, as they have resorted to bribing people into committing fake crimes so they can later bust them. It’s already widely known among those who are awake to government corruption that nearly 95 percent of terrorist arrests in the US have been the result of the FBI foiling its own entrapment plots as a part of the so-called post-9/11 War on Terror. Mentally diminished, poverty stricken individuals are sought out and duped into playing along with the FBI’s fake plans of fake crimes. The poor soul whose life is then ruined is paraded around on TV and used as a human trophy to show the world how “great America is at catching and fighting terrorists.” On Monday, we broke the story of Alexander Ciccolo, 23, also known as Ali Al Amriki, who was arrested for allegedly plotting to cause terror on behalf of ISIS. The FBI gave this mentally ill man multiple weapons and then charged him for possessing those weapons. According to an FBI affidavit, they began investigating Ciccolo after a “close acquaintance … stated that Ciccolo had a long history of mental illness and in the last 18 months had become obsessed with Islam.” This likely gave the FBI a warm and fuzzy feeling knowing that they had a new “terrorist” to groom. Ciccolo certainly said some disturbing things, but without the help and encouragement of the FBI, he would have likely remained a harmless mentally ill nobody. Instead, thanks to his FBI handlers, he is now the “Terrorist Arrested for Plotting to Blow Up College Campuses.” Shake in your boots America! There are FBI created patsies terrorists everywhere! The FBI has taken this approach and is now applying it to average citizens who don’t express their mentally deranged affections towards the Islamic State. On Wednesday, the FBI announced that dozens of people are facing charges related to smuggling drugs on airline flights from Dallas to other cities across the nation. The only problem here is that these people weren’t actual drug smugglers, nor were they smuggling drugs. Imagine for a moment that you are down on your luck, behind on bills, and in dire need of some cash. Out of the blue, a friendly person says, “Hey, I know how to earn $9,000 cash in just a single day. All you have to do is carry this box of cocaine onto a plane and deliver it for me. I do it all the time; you won’t get caught, trust me.” You think to yourself, “I don’t really want to be a drug delivery boy, but $9,000 cash would really help me out.” So you do it. When you land in your destination city, you’re met by the FBI and arrested for smuggling fake drugs. According to CBS News, Undercover agents gave some suspects packages, purporting they contained drugs, that were then carried onto flights for payments of up to

$9,000, according to an indictment unsealed Wednesday. Prosecutors said the drugs were flown to Las Vegas; Newark, New Jersey; Phoenix; Chicago; Wichita, Kansas; and San Francisco. Oddly enough the IRS was also involved in this “sting” operation. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Dallas released a statement saying most of the 46 defendants are from northern Texas and would appear in court beginning Wednesday. They face charges that include intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamines, conspiracy, and money laundering, according to CBS News. Using an undercover agent to catch a person who’s going to commit a crime is one thing. However, manipulating an otherwise innocent person into committing a crime is something entirely different. Who is protected when the FBI bribes someone to convince them to carry fake drugs onto a plane? Who is served by locking a person in a cage because they needed some money and decided to make a delivery for a drug dealer? Apparently the FBI is diligently trying to justify their bloated multibillion dollar a year budget. Unfortunately, this is done so by compromising the trust of the American people and ruining the lives of people who may have never caused harm to another human.

Perm do both – double action means double solvency

Perm solves and shields the link – states fail on their own OPC 13 [State of California Ocean Protection Council, “CALL FOR ACTION: PROECT THE NATION’S OCEANS & COSTS, 11/27/13, http://www.opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/project_pages/WCGA/0805COPC_02_Attachment.pdf, 07/15/14]

CLEAR PRIORITIES ¶ The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Coastal States Organization, and other partners have

¶

held public discussions around the country centered on four priorities to direct the nation’s

¶ • Support healthy coastal communities and coastal-dependent economies; ¶ • Protect and restore coastal ecosystems, habitats, and unique resources; ¶ • Prepare for impacts of climate change; and, ¶ • Make sure that local, state, regional, and federal coastal programs work together at all appropriate scales. ¶ ¶ States will use these priorities and scientific and technical assessments of state and local coastal conditions and ¶ need to prepare multi-year strategic approaches to implement them. States will be accountable through measures ¶ of performance in meeting priorities. State efforts will be evaluated periodically . ¶ ¶ STRENGTHEN PARTNERSHIP AND ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ¶ State and local government land use decisions and

future coastal efforts:

public infrastructure investments are key to the future of

¶

protecting coastal resources and creating healthy

state and local governments need technical, ¶ planning, and financial assistance to improve decision-making and management. National investments are critical ¶ to enabling local governments to be strong partners in developing and carrying out programs to meet coastal management objectives. communities. But

Perm solves efficiency, coordination and integration of state and federal policies JOCI 13 (Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, “Charting the Course Securing the Future of America’s Oceans”, June 2013, http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/joint-ocean-commission-initiative-2013.pdf)

Support state and regional ocean and coastal priorities Coastal states and regions play an essential role in fostering durable ocean policy solutions that lead to both healthier ocean ecosystems and stronger coastal economies . In fact, states and regions often play a leadership role, developing and implementing innovative approaches that can serve as models for national efforts. It is widely understood that decision-making approaches led by states and regions, with strong federal support in the form of technical resources and engaged commitment, are more effective and durable than those driven exclusively from the federal level . The fact is that decades of insufficiently coordinated, sector-based management of ocean and coastal resources at the federal level have taken their toll on the health of our ocean and coastal ecosystems. Fortunately, federal agencies are now working to create a more efficient, integrated approach to management by setting up mechanisms to increase coordination and reduce duplication of federal agency policies and activities. This should lead to increased transparency, support predictable and efficient decision making, and be undertaken in close collaboration with regional, state, and tribal entities. Such a coordinated approach will help to reduce conflicts, redundancies, and inefficiencies that waste time and money, and will also result in better resource management. Federal agencies must also make efforts to think beyond their specific missions and Action 3:

collaborate across jurisdictional boundaries to address the priorities of each region in which they operate in ways that are appropriate for states in the region.

The Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to research - states would have to ask for permission- links to politics

Kritiks

*2AC Anti-Blackness K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations C) Inevitability of the state creates an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical — solvency isn’t a question

Simmons 99

(William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics .55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let universality rule.

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state

to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for and his followers.’61

the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself, trying to be more just . It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

2) No link – They say we neglect the black body but, Extend our 2nd piece of Kundnani evidence in the 1st advantage which is the preface of the entire af that says the modern surveillance apparatus functions as racialized totalitarianism regime under the guise of a liberal democracy. The state is using surveillance to oppress the black body, and only the af can solve for that through the elimination of the tool to rationalize oppressive surveillance, which is ap’s . 3. Anti-blackness is NOT the root cause 4. Blackness cannot be actualized within the framework of a political debate. The premise of their argument is that there is no political agency for the non-white body. Voting for the alt proves that’s incorrect, there is political efficacy to the non-white body. This has a couple impacts: a) The links are all disads to the alternative – their strategy of rhetorical redemption operates from an above/beyond viewpoint that links to our ofense as well b) Proves that the total destruction of modernity from this space is impossible, meaning the permutation is a preferable strategy…

Wilderson, 2010

(Frank, Assoc Prof of African Amerian Studies @ UC Irvine, Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US

Antagonisms, pages 54-57)

This theoretical aphasia is symptomatic of a debilitated ensemble of questions regarding political ontology. At its heart are two registers of imaginative labor. The first register is that of description, the rhetorical labor aimed at explaining the way relations of power are named, categorized, and explored. The

prescription, the rhetorical labor predicated on the notion that everyone can be emancipated through some form of discursive, or symbolic, intervention. But emancipation through some form of discursive or symbolic intervention is wanting in the face of a subject position that is not a subject position—what Marx calls "a speaking implement" or what Ronald Judy calls second register can be characterized as

"an interdiction against subjectivity." In other words, the Black has sentient capacity but no relational capacity. As an accumulated and fungible object, rather than an exploited and alienated subject, the Black is openly vulnerable to the whims of the world, and so is his or her cultural "production."

What does it mean—what are the stakes—when the world can whimsically transpose one's cultural gestures, the stuff of symbolic intervention, onto another worldly good, a commodity of style? Frantz Fanon echoes this question when he writes, "1 came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that 1 was an object in the midst of other objects." He clarifies this assertion and alerts us to the stakes which the optimistic assumptions of film studies and cultural studies, the counter hegemonic promise of alternative cinema, and the emancipatory project of coalition politics cannot account for, when he writes: "Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black." This presents a challenge to film production and to film studies given their cultivation and elaboration by the imaginative labor of cultural studies, underwritten by the assumptive logic of Humanism; because if everyone does not possess the dna of culture, that is, (a) time and space transformative capacity, (b) a relational status with other Humans through which one's time- and space-transformative capacity is recognized and incorporated, and (c) a relation to violence that is contingent and not gratuitous, then

How do we think outside of the conceptual framework of subalternity —that is, outside of the explanatory power of cultural studies—and think beyond the pale of emancipatory agency by way of symbolic intervention? I am calling for a diferent conceptual framework, predicated not on the subject-efect of cultural performance but on the structure of political ontology, a framework that allows us to substitute a culture of politics for a politics of culture . how do we theorize a sentient being who is positioned not by the dna of culture but by the structure of gratuitous violence?

… because reformism and revolution are ultimately the same strategy. Winant 1997 (Howard, Director, UC Center for New Racial Studies. Institute for Social, Behavioral, and Economic. Research. University of California Santa Barbara, CA, Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html)

the social historians who have provided the core insights of the abolitionist project stress the "invention of whiteness" as a pivotal development in the rise of US capitalism. They have begun a process of historical reinterpretation which aims to set race -- or more properly, the gestation and evolution of white supremacy -- at the center of US politics and culture. Thus far, they have focused attention on a series of Drawing their inspiration from W.E.B. Du Bois and James Baldwin,

formative events and processes: the precedent of British colonial treatment of the Irish (Allen 1994, Ignatiev 1995); the early, multiracial resistance to indentured servitude and quasi-slavery, which culminated in the defeat of Bacon's Rebellion in late 17th century Virginia; the self-identification of "free" workers as white in the antebellum North (Roediger 1991); and the construction of a "white republic" in the late 19th century (Saxton 1990). These studies, in some cases quite prodigious intellectual efforts, have had a significant impact on how we understand not only racial formation, but also class formation and the developing forms of popular culture in US history. What they reveal above all is how crucial the construction of whiteness was, and remains, for the development

the meaning of whiteness, like that of race in general, has time and again proved flexible enough to adapt to shifts in the capitalist division of labor, to reform initiatives which extended democratic rights, and to changes in ideology and cultural representation. The core message of the abolitionist project is the imperative of repudiation of white identity and white privilege, the requirement that "the lie of whiteness" be exposed. This rejection of whiteness on the part of and maintenance of capitalist class rule in the US. Furthermore, these studies also show how

those who benefit from it, this "new abolitionism," it is argued, is a precondition for the establishment of substantive racial equality and social justice -- or more properly, socialism -- in the US. Whites must become "race traitors," as the new journal of the abolitionist project calls itself. Its motto: "Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity." How is this rejection of whiteness to be accomplished? Both analytical and practical measures are envisioned. On the intellectual level, the abolitionist project invites us to contemplate the emptiness, indeed vacuity, of the white category: It is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false.... It is the empty and terrifying attempt to build an identity based on what one isn't and on whom one can hold back (Roediger 1994, 13;

). In short, there is no white culture, no white politics, no whiteness, except in the sense of distancing and rejection of racially-defined emphasis original

"otherness." On the practical level, the argument goes, whites can become "race traitors" by rejecting their privilege, by refusing to collude with white supremacy. When you hear that racist joke, confront its teller. When you see the police harassing a nonwhite youth, try to intervene or at least bear witness. In short, recognize that white supremacy depends on the thousands of minute acts that reproduce it from moment to moment; it must "deliver" to whites a sense of their own security and superiority; it must make them feel that "I am different from those "others." Single gestures of this sort, Race Traitor's editors say, ...would [not] in all likelihood be of much consequence. But if enough of those who looked white broke the rules of the club to make the cops doubt their ability to recognize a white person merely by looking at him or her, how would it affect the cops' behavior (Editorial 1993, 4-5)? Thus the point is not that all whites recognize the lie of their privilege, but that enough whites do so, and act out their rejection of that lie, to disrupt the "white club's" ability to enforce its supremacy. It is easy to sympathize with this analysis, at least up to a point. The postwar black movement, which in the US context at least served as the point of origin for all the "new social movements" and the much-reviled "politics of identity," taught the valuable lesson that politics went "all the way down." That is, meaningful efforts to achieve greater social justice could not tolerate a public/private, or a collective/individual distinction. Trying to change society meant trying to change one's own life. The formula "the personal is political," commonly associated with feminism, had its early origins

problems come when deeper theoretical and practical problems are raised. Despite their explicit adherence to a among the militants of the civil rights movement (Evans 1980). The

"social construction" model of race (one which bears a significant resemblance to my own work), theorists of the abolitionist project do not take that insight as seriously as they should. They employ it chiefly to argue against biologistic conceptions of race, which is

. Is the social construction of whiteness so flimsy that it can be repudiated by a mere act of political will, or even by widespread and repeated acts aimed at rejecting white privilege? I think not; whiteness may not be a legitimate cultural identity in the sense of having a discrete, "positive" content, but it is certainly an overdetermined political and cultural category, having to do with socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, ideologies of individualism, opportunity, and citizenship, nationalism, etc. Like any other fine; but they fail to consider the complexities and rootedness of social construction, or as we would term it, racial formation

complex of beliefs and practices, "whiteness" is imbedded in a highly articulated social structure and system of significations; rather than trying to repudiate it, we shall have to rearticulate it. That sounds like a daunting task, and of course it is, but it is not nearly as impossible as erasing whiteness altogether, as the abolitionist project seeks to do. Furthermore, because whiteness is a relational concept, unintelligible without reference to nonwhiteness -- note how this is true even of Roediger's formulation about "build[ing] an identity based on what one isn't" -- that rearticulation (or reinterpretation, or deconstruction) of whiteness can begin relatively easily, in the messy present, with the recognition that whiteness already contains substantial nonwhite elements. Of course, that recognition is only the beginning of a large and arduous process of political labor, which I shall address in the concluding section of this paper. Notwithstanding these criticisms of the abolitionist project, we consider many of its insights to be vital components in the process of reformulating, or synthesizing, a progressive approach to whiteness. Its attention is directed toward prescisely the place where the neo-liberal racial project is weak: the point at which white identity constitutes a crucial support to white supremacy, and a central obstacle to the achievement of substantive social equality and racial justice. CONCLUDING NOTES: WHITENESS AND

In a situation of racial dualism, as Du Bois observed more than 90 years ago, race operates both to assign us and to deny us our identity. It both makes the social world intelligible, and simultaneously renders it opaque and mysterious. Not only does it allocate resources, power, and privilege; it also provides means for challenging that allocation. The contradictory character of race provides the context in which racial dualism -or the "color-line," as Du Bois designated it, has developed as "the problem of the 20th century." So what's new? Only that, as a result CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

of incalculable human efort, sufering, and sacrifice, we now realize that these truths apply across the board. Whites and whiteness can no longer be exempted from the comprehensive racialization process that is the hallmark of US history and social structure. This is the present-day context for racial conflict and thus for US politics in general, since race continues to play its designated role of crystallizing all the fundamental issues in US society. As always, we articulate our anxieties in racial terms: wealth and poverty, crime and punishment, gender and sexuality, nationality and citizenship, culture and power, are all articulated in the US primarily through race. So what's new? It's the problematic of whiteness that has emerged as the principal source of anxiety and conflict in the postwar US. Although this situation was anticipated or prefigured at earlier moments in the nation's past -- for example, in the "hour of eugenics" (Stepan 1991, Kevles 1985, Gould 1981) -- it is far more complicated now than ever before, largely due to the

Whiteness -visible whiteness, resurgent whiteness, whiteness as a color, whiteness as diference -- this is what's new, and newly problematic, in contemporary US politics. The reasons for this have already emerged in my discussion of the spectrum of racial projects and the particular representations these projects assign to whiteness. Most centrally, the problem of the meaning of whiteness appears as a direct consequence of the movement challenge posed in the 1960s to white supremacy. The battles of that period have not been resolved; they have not been won or lost; however battered and bruised, the demand for substantive racial equality and general social justice still lives. And while it lives, the strength of white supremacy is in doubt. The racial projects of the right are clear efforts to resist the challenge to white supremacy posed by the movements of present unavailability of biologistic forms of racism as a convenient rationale for white supremacy.[7]

the 1960s and their contemporary inheritors. Each of these projects has a particular relationship to the white supremacist legacy, ranging from the far right's efforts to justify and solidify white entitlements, through the new right's attempts to utilize the white supremacist tradition for more immediate and expedient political ends, to the neoconservative project's quixotic quest to surgically separate the liberal democratic tradition from the racism that traditionally underwrote it. The biologistic racism of the far right, the expedient and subtextual racism of the new right, and the bad-faith anti-racism of the neoconservatives have many differences from each other, but they have at least one thing in common. They all seek to maintain the long-standing association between whiteness and US political traditions, between whiteness and US nationalism, between whiteness and universalism. They all seek in different ways to preserve white identity from the particularity, the difference, which the 1960s movement challenge assigned to it. The racial

Both the neoliberal racial project and the abolitionist project seek to fulfill the movement's thwarted dreams of a genuinely (i.e., substantively) egalitarian society, one in which significant redistribution of wealth and power has taken place, and race no longer serves as the most significant marker between winners and losers, haves and have nots, powerful and powerless. Although they diverge significantly -- since the neoliberals seek to projects of the left are the movements' successors (as is neoconservatism, in a somewhat perverse sense).

accomplish their ends through a conscious diminution of the significance of race, and the abolitionists hope to achieve similar ends through a conscious reemphasizing of the importance of race -- they also have one very important thing in common. They both seek to rupture the barrier between whites and racially-defined minorities, the obstacle which prevents joint political action. They both seek to associate whites and nonwhites, to reinterpret the meaning of whiteness in such a way that it no longer has the power to

Although the diferences and indeed the hostility -between the neoliberal and abolitionist projects, between the reform-oriented and radical conceptions of whiteness -- are quite severe, we consider it vital that adherents of each project recognize that they hold part of the key to challenging white supremacy in the contemporary US, and that their counterpart project holds the other part of the key. Neoliberals rightfully argue that a pragmatic approach to transracial politics is vital if the momentum of racial reaction is to be halted or reversed. impede class alliances.

Abolitionists properly emphasize challenging the ongoing commitment to white supremacy on the part of many whites. Both of

these positions need to draw on each other, not only in strategic

terms, but in theoretical ones as well. The recognition that racial identities -- all racial identities, including whiteness -- have become implacably dualistic, could be far more liberating on the left than it has thus far been. For neoliberals, it could permit and indeed justify an acceptance of race-consciousness and even nationalism among racially-defined minorities as a necessary but partial response to disenfranchisement, disempowerment, and

There is no inherent reason why such a political position could not coexist with a strategic awareness of the need for strong, class-conscious, transracial coalitions. We have seen many such examples in the past: in the superexploitation.

anti-slavery movement, the communist movement of the 1930s (Kelley 1994), and in the 1988 presidential bid of Jesse Jackson, to name but a few. This is not to say that all would be peace and harmony if such alliances could come more permanently into being. But there is no excuse for not attempting to find the pragmatic "common ground" necessary to create them. Abolitionists could also benefit from a recognition that on a pragmatic basis, whites can ally with racially-defined minorities without renouncing their

abolitionists should also be able to recognize that racial identities are not either-or matters, not closed concepts that must be upheld in a reactionary fashion or disavowed in a comprehensive act of renunciation . To use a whiteness. If they truly agree that race is a socially constructed concept, as they claim,

postmodern language I dislike: racial identities are deeply "hybridized"; they are not "sutured," but remain open to rearticulation. "To be white in America is to be very black. If you don't know how black you are, you don't know how American you are" (Thompson 1995, 429).

The alt fails – ontological blackness creates bodies structural dependent on sufering – makes any sort of liberation impossible Pinn 2004 (Anthony, Anthony B. Pinn is an American professor and writer whose work focuses on liberation theology, Black religion, and Black humanism. Pinn is the Agnes Cullen Arnold Professor of Humanities and Professor of Religious Studies at Rice University, “‘‘Black Is, Black Ain’t’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology, Volume 43, Number 1 . Spring 2004

This connection between ontological blackness and religion is natural because: ‘‘ontological blackness signifies the totality of black existence, a binding together of black life and experience. In its root, religio, religion denotes tying together, fastening behind, and binding together. Ontological blackness renders black life and experience a totality.’’13 According to Anderson, Black theological discussions are entangled in ontological blackness. And accordingly, discussions of black life revolve around a theological understanding of Black experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist system. The goal of this theology is to find the ‘‘meaning of black faith’’ in the merger of black cultural consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War II Black defiance. An admirable goal to be sure, but here is the rub: Black theologians speak, according to Anderson, in opposition to ontological whiteness when they are actually dependent upon whiteness for the legitimacy of their agenda. Furthermore , ontological

blackness’s strong ties to suffering and survival result in blackness being dependent on suffering, and as a result social transformation brings into question what it means to be black and religious. Liberative outcomes ultimately force an identity crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility. In Anderson’s words: Talk about liberation becomes hard to

justify where freedom appears as nothing more than defiant self-assertion of a revolutionary racial consciousness that requires for its legitimacy the opposition of white racism . Where there exists no possibility of transcending the blackness that whiteness created, African American theologies of liberation must be seen not only as crisis theologies; they remain theologies in a crisis of legitimation.14 This conversation becomes more ‘‘refined’’ as new cultural resources are unpacked and various religious alternatives acknowledged. Yet the bottom line remains racialization of issues and agendas, life and love. Falsehood is perpetuated through the ‘‘hermeneutic of return,’’ by which ontological blackness is the paradigm of Black existence and thereby sets the agenda of Black liberation within the ‘‘postrevolutionary context’’ of present day USA. One ever finds the traces of the Black aesthetic which pushes for a dwarfed understanding of Black life and a sacrifice of individuality for the sake of a unified Black ‘faith’. Yet differing experiences of racial oppression (the stuff of ontological blackness) combined

with varying experiences of class, gender and sexual oppression call into question the value of their racialized formulations. Implicit in all of this is a crisis of faith, an unwillingness to address both the glory and guts of Black existence—nihilistic tendencies that, unless held in tension with claims of transcendence, have the potential to overwhelm and to suffocate. At the heart of this dilemma is friction between ontological blackness and ‘‘contemporary postmodern black life’’—issues, for example related to ‘‘selecting marriage partners, exercising freedom of movement, acting on gay and lesbian preferences, or choosing political parties.’’15 How does one foster balance while embracing difference as positive? Anderson looks to Nietzsche. European genius, complete with its heroic epic, met its match in the aesthetic categories of tragedy and the grotesque genius revived and espoused by Friedreich Nietzsche. The grotesque genius served as an effective counter-discourse by embracing both the ‘light’ and ‘dark’ aspects of life, and holding in tension oppositional sensations—pleasure and pain, freedom and oppression.16 Utilizing Nietzsche’s work, Anderson ask: ‘‘what should African American cultural and religious criticism look like when they are no longer romantic in inspiration and the cult of heroic genius is displaced by the grotesquery—full range of expression, actions, attitudes, behaviors

everything found in African American life—of contemporary black expressive culture and public life?’’17 Applied to African Americans, the grotesque embodies the full range of African American life—all expressions, actions, attitudes, and behavior. With a hermeneutic of the grotesque as the foci, religio-cultural criticism is free from the totalizing nature of racial apologetics and the classical Black aesthetic. By extension, Black theology is able to address both issues of survival (Anderson sees their importance.) and the larger goal of cultural fulfillment, Anderson’s version of liberation. That is to say, placing ‘‘blackness’’ along side

other indicators of identity allows African Americans to define themselves in a plethora of ways while maintaining their community status. This encourages African Americans to see themselves as they are— complex and diversified—no longer needing to surrender personal interests for the sake of monolithic collective status.

5. Permutation do both it’s the only possibility to alt solvency 6. Reformism solves Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_) Political mobilisation around suffering engenders solidarities

between those who are suffering and those who afford recognition of (and then action around) that suffering. Those who suffergenerally claim their common humanity with others

the request is to address those specific circumstances on the basis of a humanity not bound to the circumstances . The mistake of some forms of identity politics, then, is to associate identity with sufering. While a recognition of historical (and contemporary) suffering is an important aspect of the political process of seeking redress for the conditions of suffering, it does not constitute identity singularly. ¶ “Wounded attachments”, we would argue, do not representthe general condition of politicised identities, but rather, are prob-lematic constructions of identities which fail to recognise (oraccept) the processes of change associated with movements. The accumulation of different sorts of challenges around similar issues generally leads to the gradual amelioration of the condi-tions which generated the identity (and the associated move-ment) in the first instance. If the emphasis in the movement is on identity then successful reform (even partial reform) reduces the injury and thus diminishes the power of the identity claim based upon that injury. This is because reform is necessarily uneven in terms of the impact it has. This then poses a problem for those within the movement who would wish the reforms to go further and who see in the reforms a weakening of the identity that they believe is a necessary prerequisite for political action. As they can no longer mobilise the injured identity – and the associated sufering – as common to all (and thus requiring address becauseof its generalised effect), there is often, then, a perceived need to privilege that sufering as particular and to institute a politics of guilt with regard to addressing it – truly the politics of ressentiment. ¶ The problems arise by insisting on the necessity of political action being constituted through pre-existing identities and solidarities (for example, those of being a woman). If, instead, it was recognised that equality for women is not separable from (or achievable separated from) wider issues of justice and equality within society then reforms could be seen as steps towards equality . A movement concerned with issues of social justice (of whichgender justice is an integral aspect) would allow for provisional reforms to prevailing conditions of injustice without calling into question the basis for the movement – for there would always be more to be achieved . 8 Each achievement would itself necessitate further revision of what equality would look like. And it in asking forpeople to look beyond the specific circumstances of their suffer-ing, and in doing so,

necessitate revision of the particular aims that constitute the “identity” afforded by participating in that movement. In this way, identity becomes more appropriately understood as being, in part at least, about participating in a series of dialogues about what is desired for the future in terms of understandings of social justice . ¶ Focusing on the future, on how we would like things to be tomorrow , based on an understanding of where we are today , would allow for partial reforms to be seen as gains and not threats. It is only if one believes that political action can only occur in the context of identification of past injustices as opposed to future justice that one has a problem with (partial) reforms in the present. Political identity which exists only through an enunciation of its injury and does not seek to dissolve itself as an identity can lead to the ossification of injured relations . The “wounded attachment” occurs when the politicised identity can see no future without the injury also constituting an aspect of that future. Developing on the work of Brown, we would argue that not only does a “reformed” identity politics need to be based upon desire for the future , but that that desire should actually be a desire for the dissolution (in the future) of the identity claim. The complete success of the femi-nist movement, for instance, would also

would mean that feminists no longerexisted, as the conditions that caused people to become feministhad been addressed. Similarly, with the dalit movement, its success would be measured by the dissolution of the identity of “dalit” as asalient political category. There would be no loss here, only a gain.¶ As we have argued, following Mohanty ([1993] 2000) andNelson (1993), it is participation in the processing of one’s ownand other’s experiences into knowledge about the world, in thecontext of communities that negotiate epistemological premises, which confers a notion of politicised identity.

Since it is an under-standing of “tomorrow” (what that would be, and how it is to beachieved) that establishes one as, for example, a feminist, such an identity claim does not exclude others from participation, and it does not solicit the reification of identity around the fact of historical or contemporary sufering. By removing these obstacles to progress, the “tomorrow” that is the goal, is more readily achievable . Identity politics , then, “ needs a tomorrow ” in this sense: that the raison d’être of any politicised identity is the bringing about of a tomorrow in which the social injustices of the present have been overcome. But identity politics also needs that tomorrow – today – in the sense that politicised identities need to inscribe that tomorrow into their self-definition in the present , in order to avoid consolidating activity around the maintenance of the identity rather than the overcoming of the conditions that generated it . That the tomorrow to be inscribed – today – in the self-definition of one’s political identity, is one in which that identity will no longer be required, is not a situation to be regretted, since it is rather the promise of success for any movement for justice.

7. Perm do the plan then the alt

8. Revenge politics is bad – the ball0t serves as a palliative that denies their investment in oppression as a means by which to claim the power of victory Enns 12—Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University (Dianne, The Violence of Victimhood, 28-30)

Guilt and Ressentiment We need to think carefully about what is at stake here. Why is this perspective appealing, and what are its effects? At first glance, the argument appears simple: white, privileged women, in their theoretical and practical interventions, must take into account the experiences and conceptual work of women who are less fortunate and less powerful, have fewer resources, and are therefore more subject to systemic oppression. The lesson of feminism's mistakes in the civil rights era is that this “mainstream” group must not speak for other women. But such a view must be interrogated. Its effects, as I have argued, include a veneration of the other, moral currency for the victim, and an insidious competition for victimhood. We will see in later chapters that these effects are also common in situations of conflict where the stakes are much higher. ¶ We witness here a twofold appeal:

otherness discourse in feminism appeals both to the guilt of the privileged and to the resentment, or ressentiment, of the other. Suleri's allusion to “embarrassed privilege” exposes the operation of guilt in the misunderstanding that often divides Western feminists from women in the developing

The guilt of those who feel themselves deeply implicated in and responsible for imperialism merely reinforces an imperialist benevolence, polarizes us unambiguously by locking us into the categories of victim and perpetrator, and blinds us to the power and agency of the other. Many fail to see that it is embarrassing and insulting for those identified as victimized others not to be subjected to the same critical intervention and held to the same demands of moral and political responsibility . Though we are by no means equal in power and ability, wealth and advantage, we are all collectively responsible for the world we inhabit in common. The condition of victimhood does not absolve one of moral responsibility. I will return to this point repeatedly throughout this book. ¶ Mohanty's perspective ignores the possibility that one can become attached to one's subordinated status, which introduces the concept of ressentiment, the focus of much recent interest in the injury caused by racism world, or white women from women of color.

and colonization. Nietzsche describes ressentiment as the overwhelming sentiment of “slave morality,” the revolt

ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values. 19 The sufferer in this schema seeks out a cause for his suffering—“ a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering”— someone on whom he can vent his affects and so procure the anesthesia necessary to ease the pain of injury. The motivation behind ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, is the that begins when

desire “to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.” 20 In its contemporary manifestation, Wendy

ressentiment acts as the “righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured,” which “delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the ‘injury’ of social subordination.” Identities are fixed in an economy of perpetrator and victim , in which revenge, rather than power or emancipation, is sought for the injured, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer Brown argues that

does. 21¶ 30¶ Such a concept is useful for understanding why an ethics of absolute responsibility to the other

the triumph of a morality rooted in ressentiment is the denial that it has any access to power or contains a will to power. Politicized identities arise as both product of and reaction to this condition; the reaction is a substitute for action— an “imaginary revenge,” Nietzsche calls it. Suffering then becomes a social virtue at the same time that the sufferer attempts to displace his suffering onto another. The identity created by ressentiment, Brown explains, becomes invested in its own subjection not only through its discovery of someone to blame, and a new recognition and revaluation of that subjection, but also through the satisfaction of revenge . 22¶ The outcome of feminism's attraction to theories of difference and otherness is thus deeply contentious. First, we witness the further reification reification of the very oppositions in question and a simple reversal of the focus from the same to the other. This observation is not new and has been made by many critics of feminism, but it seems to have made no appeals to the victimized. Brown remarks that, for Nietzsche, the source of

serious impact on mainstream feminist scholarship or teaching practices in women's studies programs. Second, in the eagerness to rectify the mistakes of “white, middle-class, liberal, western” feminism,

the other has been

uncritically exalted, which has led in turn to simplistic designations of marginal, “othered” status and, ultimately, a competition for victimhood. Ultimately, this approach has led to a new moral code in which ethics is equated with the responsibility of the privileged Western woman, while moral immunity is granted to the victimized other. Ranjana Khanna describes this operation aptly when she writes that in the field of transnational

the reification of the other has produced “separate ethical universes” in which the privileged experience paralyzing guilt and the neocolonized, crippling resentment. The only “overarching imperative” is that one does not comment on another's ethical context. An ethical response turns out to be a nonresponse. feminism,

23 Let us turn now to an exploration of this third outcome.

9. Perm do the alt 9 & ½. Cede the political - Their method can’t create institutional change- the AFF is a DA to the alt and only the perm solves- AFF is a better strategy Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 284-285) But as even the Stasi eventually discovered, no system of surveillance can ever produce total knowledge. Indeed, the greater the amount of information collected, the harder it is to interpret its meaning. The relevant information in the majority of recent US terrorist attacks was somewhere in the government's systems, but its significance was

what is obscured by the demands for ever greater surveillance and information processing is that security is best established through relationships· of trust and political empowerment. A society that has blocked a section of its population from shaping a process of political transformation is one that has hollowed out its democracy until what's left is an empty, technocratic consensus in which real politics is disavowed. When radical political contestation is suffocated, the processes by which societies reinvent themselves and resolve their social tensions are neutered, and in the absence of a genuinely emancipatory alternative, the only possible outlet for the impulses generated by social and economic marginalization is the fake radicalism of armored identity politics, conspiracy theories, and apocalyptic fantasies. lost amid a morass of useless data. More significantly,

10. Wilderson is wrong – A) Social death theory is wrong and demeans black pathology Brown 2009 (Vincent, Professor of History and of African and African American Studies at Harvard University, Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery, December) Although the deaths of slaves could inspire such active and dynamic practices of social reconnection ,

scholars in recent years have made too little of events like the funeral aboard the Hudibras and have too often followed Orlando Patterson’s mon- umental Slavery and Social Death (1982) in positing a metaphorical “social death” as the basic condition of slavery. In a comparative study of sixty-six slaveholding societies ranging from ancient Greece and Rome to medieval Europe, precolonial Africa, and Asia, Patterson combined statistical analysis and voluminous research with brilliant

theoretical insights drawn from Marxian theory, symbolic anthropology, law, philosophy, and literature in order to offer what he called a “preliminary definition of slavery on the level of personal relations.” Recognizing violence, violations of personhood, dishonor, and namelessness as the fundamental constituent elements of slavery,

Patterson distilled a transhistorical characterization of slavery

as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” In this way the institution of slavery was and is a “relation of domination,” in which slaveholders annihilated people socially by first extracting them from meaningful relationships that defined personal status and belonging, communal memory, and collective aspiration and then incorporating these socially dead persons into the masters’ world. As a work of historical sociology concerned primarily with the comparative analysis of institutions, the book illuminated the dynamics of a process whereby the “desocialized new slave” was subsumed within slave society.5 Slavery and Social Death was

social death has become a handy general definition of slavery, for many historians and non-historians alike. But it is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s breathtaking survey—a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an idealtype slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.6 As a concept, it is what Frederick Cooper has called an “agentless abstraction” that provides a neat cultural logic but ultimately does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement and the struggles that produce historic transformations.7 Indeed, it is difficult to use such a distillation to explain the actual behavior of slaves, and yet in much of the scholarship that followed in widely reviewed and lavishly praised for its erudition and conceptual rigor. As a result of its success,

the wake of Slavery and Social Death, Patterson’s abstract distillates have been used to explain the existential condition of the enslaved. Having emerged from the discipline of sociology, “social death” fit comfortably within a scholarly tradition that had generally been more alert to deviations in pat- terns of black life from prevailing social norms than to the worldviews, strategies, and social tactics of people in black communities. Together with

“social death” reflected sociology’s abiding concern with “social pathology”; the “pathological condition” of twentieth-century black life could be seen as an outcome of the damage that black people had sufered during slavery. University of Chicago professor Robert Park, the grand-p`ere of the social pathologists, set Patterson’s work on the distortions wrought by slavery on black families,

the terms in 1919: “the Negro, when he landed in the United States, left behind almost everything but his dark

Patterson’s distillation also conformed to the nomothetic imperative of social science, which has traditionally aimed to discover universal laws of operation that would be true regardless of time and place, making the synchronic study of social phenomena more tempting than more descriptive studies of historical transformation. Slavery and Social Death took shape during a period when largely complexion and his tropical temperament.”8

synchronic studies of antebellum slavery in the United States domi- nated the scholarship on human bondage, and Patterson’s expansive view was meant to situate U.S. slavery in a broad context rather than to discuss changes as

one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition, an academic artifact with limited purchase for contemporary scholarship, were it not for the concept’s the in- stitution developed through time. Thus

reemergence in some im- portant new studies of slavery.9

B) Binaries bad – homogenizes multiple bodies, and efaces ethnicities culture’s. This is specifically bad in the context of the 1ac.

Roksana Badruddoja. Badruddoja is and Assistant Professor of Sociology at Manhattan College. 2006. [“WHITE SPACES AND BROWN TRAVELING BODIES: A PROJECT OF RE-WORKING OTHERNESS.” International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 2006), pp. 1-34. JSTOR] VR

Moreover, Kibria (see Bashi, 1998: 962) supports that the addition of pan- ethnic labels in the system of racial categories in the U.S. moves us away from the white /black discourse to one that has more than two levels "white/Asian/Hispanic/Black." But, Visweswaran (1997) posits that even as we move away from a racially bifurcated system, the centuries- long black and white polarization simply cast the identities of South Asian groups in the U.S. as either symbolically whitened or blackened, or to place Asian groups in a mediating position between blacks and whites. Both, though, speak to the racialization process unique to the U.S. Ronica's words speak to immigrant adaptation to new racial structures in destination countries within old hierarchies, further suggesting racialization: I definitely think that, especially in America, there is a very strong idea of what an NRI [Non-Resident Indian]17 is supposed to look like. If you are South Asian and you are in your early thirties or late twenties, you should have bought a house, have this much education, preferably in the sciences, and definitely be living out this ideal that is very much a construct of people coming to this country and wanting to have the best and coming here and thinking that they're a failure unless they make lots of money. To me, [this is about] being caught in this myth of a model, a minority, and also that there is a predestination for where you are supposed to go sin your life based on where you come from and where you are right now. Roñica clearly refers to how modern immigration policies, as a continuation of Orientalist practices, helped to construct a bi-modal distribution of the South Asian population - the post-1965 group consisting of highly educated and financially successful members, and the post-1980 group largely working-class, including undocumented workers (Das Dasgupta and Warrier, 1997; Prashad, 2000; Maira, 2002)-and subsequently the myth of the model minority. While AsianAmericans have overcome the status of "alien citizenship" in different ways like naturalized citizenship and occupational and residential mobility, the model minority stereotype, first, elides the existence of refugees, undocumented workers , and working-class immigrants, and, second, it reproduces the idea of Asian-American's foreignness (Ngai, 2004). Here, then, the Orientalist discourse helped to create the myth of the model- minority and its purpose is to pacify unwanted bodies in "non-violent" and "non-coercive" ways. Hence, like Roñica, Poore (1998) is also suspicious of the term "South Asian": The terms "South Asian," which seemed like a perfect solution to encompass multiplicity of South Asian communities has slowly been co-opted, frequently by Indians who have fallen prey to and reflect Indian hegemony even beyond the subcontinent. As a consequence, South Asians from Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, or Africa are excluded from and in turn exclude themselves from the gatherings, collaborative projects, and political alliances being formed by 5 an increasingly visible and vocal South Asian community in movements for gay rights, women's rights, and college

student's rights in the United States. These exclusions further limit the geopolitical perspectives of the South Asian diaspora.

11) Nonviolent resistance solves – case studies

A) Ghana Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 63)

Action - it doesn't include passivity or inaction - and it goes beyond conventional methods of political communication and waging conflict, such as discussion, negotiation or lobbying. Nonviolent action is nonviolent on the part of those who use it. Their opponents can and often do use violence, sometimes brutally. The newly independent state of Ghana took a leading role in advocating and using civil resistance. In Deember 1958 independent Ghana hosted the All-African Peoples’ Conference, a follow-up to the 1945 Pan-African Congress. Patrice Lumumba and Tom Mboya were there

Nkrumah attributed the success of the Ghanaian independence movement to nonviolent positive action . Kojo Botsio, who led the CPP delegation, told countries still struggle for liberation that, “with the united will of the people behind you, the power of the imperialists can be destroyed without the use of violence.” Some delegations were unhappy with the emphasis on nonviolent resistance, especially the Algerians along with a large Algerian contingent. In his opening speech,

and Egyptians who “regarded the very word ‘nonviolence’ as an insult to brothers fighting and dying for freedom.” Ultimately, the congress declared its support for peaceful means in territories where democratic means were available but also supported those in circumstances where arms were the only protection from colonial violence. In 1959, after hearing that France planned to test nuclear weapons in the Sahara Desert at Regan, Algeria, a group of eleven Ghanaians along with British and other international activists attempted to intervene nonviolently, but were ejected from French territory in Upper Volta and ended up back in Ghana. Another conference to discuss the way forward for positive action was held in Accra in April 1960, Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa. While Nkrumah opened the conference with a speech advocating “nonviolent positive action” as the main tactic, after the criticism of Frantz Fanon and pressure from some other African delegates, the conference’s emphasis on continent – wide nonviolent positive action was muted. Nevertheless, Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer describe positive action as

Nonviolent tactics were used as part of a self-conscious overall nonviolent strategy that led Ghana quickly to independence with minimal casualities. They included consciousness-raising among the people about their right to self-government, a determination to act in concert with each other through a variety of associations, and a willingness to accept imprisonment. Boycotts and strikes showed the people that withdrawing cooperation leaves colonial forces powerless (and that cooperation reinforces subjection). Many marginalized sectors of society were mobilized in a common cause, including the youth, market women, and elementary school graduates. Newspapers and popular songs spread the message of the movement and the leaders emphasis on the need for nonviolent discipline resonated with people’s deeply held value systems . being “a phenomenal success for Gandhian strategy.”

There was the grace to accept compromise in certain situations as well as the determination to go the harder way of strikes and imprisonment when sacrifice was required.

The impact of mass nonviolent civil

resistance on shaping Ghanaian nationalism needs further exploration, but it is clear – if rarely acknowledged – that if facilitated this process of nation building.

B) Poland Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 274)

A critical attitude toward organic work is particularly perplexing given the extent to which the nineteenth-century nonviolent resistance and its constructive program of creating and running parallel institutions served as an inspiration for future generations of Poles faced with oppression . The conspiratorial experience of organizing and running secret education became ingrained in the collective memory of the national resistance. It was recalled during traumatic events such as the German occupation of 1939 – 1945 and during communist rule, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s when widespread illegal education (including the reestablishment of the flying university) ensured the truthful reading of national history, culture, and tradition. In fact, working at the base of society became the imperative nonviolent strategy of the anticommunist opposition. Solidarity leaders drew parallels between their nonviolent efforts to liberate the society from the control of the communist government and the nonviolent strategies of nineteenth century organicists to undermine the authority of the partitioning powers. Bohdan Cywinski’s influential Genealogy of the Defiant (1971) studied the fin-de-siecle (defiant ones) and made parallels between their nonviolent defiant attitude and practice against the czarist government and the then contemporary

Poles and showed clearly how a century old tradition of nonviolent resistance – although generally underappreciated in the national annals – could play a vital role in shaping the thinking , and determining the strategies and actions, of a new generation of unarmed resisters struggling with no less oppressive autocratic rulers than their indomitable predecessors who lived under partitions. Without nonviolent resistance, Poles could not have taken charge of their national destiny after World War I or changed the geopolitical situation in their favor during the 1980s. It would have been equally implausible to integrate partitioned lands after 1918 and establish statehood so swiftly without the base of social, economic, and cultural development constructed through organic work. Although nonviolent resistance has been widely used by different generations of Poles against both external occupation and domestic dictatorship, this form of struggle is still awaiting much-deserved recognition of its role in not only defending, but essentially reimagining, the Polish nation. resistance to communism. That book inspired thousands of

B) Not passitivity Martin 08, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong (Brian, How nonviolence is misrepresented, http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/08gm2.html#_edn1) Nonviolent action, as a technique of political communication and waging conflict, can be distinguished from conventional action and from violence. Conventional political action includes voting, lobbying and campaigning - anything that is routine within a society. Conventional economic action includes working, and buying and selling goods and shares. Conventional social action includes meetings of clubs or neighbours, charitable work and much else. Nonviolent action, in contrast, goes beyond routine behaviour , often by challenging

conventional practices. Examples include protesters disrupting a government meeting by dressing as clowns, a neighbourhood association setting up an alternative system of social welfare, war resisters refusing to pay taxes, consumer activists blocking service in a bank by opening and closing small accounts, bus drivers refusing to collect fares, office workers sending large files to clog an email system, and communities setting up local currencies. The boundary between conventional and nonviolent action depends on the circumstances. When government repression is severe, handing out a leaflet might count as nonviolent action, whereas in some places strikes are so common and widely accepted that participating in one might be considered conventional action. Violence means physical force used against humans, including imprisonment, beatings, shootings, bombings and torture.[4] Nonviolent action excludes these. Sabotage - violence against objects - lies at the boundary between violence and nonviolence.

Nonviolent action thus encompasses a wide range of activities that go beyond conventional, routine action but do not involve physical violence against humans. When people think about nonviolent protests, rallies and sit-ins commonly come to mind, but there are many other sorts, such as workers refusing to tear down an iconic building, judges resigning in protest over political pressure, roads activists digging up streets and planting [5]

crops, and office workers misplacing or destroying files on dissidents targeted for surveillance and arrest.

1AR Permutation Conceded permutation do the alt – no new answers protect 1AR time allocation choices; even if we lose perm do both, they dropped perm do the alt – it’s functionally the same as the af, we should win. Silence is a concession. Social death theory is wrong A) Demeans black pathology Brown 2009 (Vincent, Professor of History and of African and African American Studies at Harvard University, Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery, December) Although the deaths of slaves could inspire such active and dynamic practices of social reconnection ,

scholars in recent years have made too little of events like the funeral aboard the Hudibras and have too often followed Orlando Patterson’s mon- umental Slavery and Social Death (1982) in positing a metaphorical “social death” as the basic condition of slavery. In a comparative study of sixty-six slaveholding societies ranging from ancient Greece and Rome to medieval Europe, precolonial Africa, and Asia, Patterson combined statistical analysis and voluminous research with brilliant theoretical insights drawn from Marxian theory, symbolic anthropology, law, philosophy, and literature in order to offer what he called a “preliminary definition of slavery on the level of personal relations.” Recognizing violence, violations of personhood, dishonor, and namelessness as the fundamental constituent elements of slavery,

Patterson distilled a transhistorical characterization of slavery

as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” In this way the institution of slavery was and is a “relation of domination,” in which slaveholders annihilated people socially by first extracting them from meaningful relationships that defined personal status and belonging, communal memory, and collective aspiration and then incorporating these socially dead persons into the masters’ world. As a work of historical sociology concerned primarily with the comparative analysis of institutions, the book illuminated the dynamics of a process whereby the “desocialized new slave” was subsumed within slave society.5 Slavery and Social Death was

social death has become a handy general definition of slavery, for many historians and non-historians alike. But it is often forgotten that the concept of social death is a distillation from Patterson’s breathtaking survey—a theoretical abstraction that is meant not to describe the lived experiences of the enslaved so much as to reduce them to a least common denominator that could reveal the essence of slavery in an idealtype slave, shorn of meaningful heritage.6 As a concept, it is what Frederick Cooper has called an “agentless abstraction” that provides a neat cultural logic but ultimately does little to illuminate the social and political experience of enslavement and the struggles that produce historic transformations.7 Indeed, it is difficult to use such a distillation to explain the actual behavior of slaves, and yet in much of the scholarship that followed in widely reviewed and lavishly praised for its erudition and conceptual rigor. As a result of its success,

the wake of Slavery and Social Death, Patterson’s abstract distillates have been used to explain the existential condition of the enslaved. Having emerged from the discipline of sociology, “social death” fit comfortably within a scholarly tradition that had generally been more alert to deviations in pat- terns of black life from prevailing social norms than to the worldviews, strategies, and social tactics of people in black communities. Together with Patterson’s work on the distortions wrought by slavery on black families,

“social death” reflected

sociology’s abiding concern with “social pathology”; the “pathological condition” of twentieth-century black life could be seen as an outcome of the damage that black people had sufered during slavery. University of Chicago professor Robert Park, the grand-p`ere of the social pathologists, set the terms in 1919: “the Negro, when he landed in the United States, left behind almost everything but his dark

Patterson’s distillation also conformed to the nomothetic imperative of social science, which has traditionally aimed to discover universal laws of operation that would be true regardless of time and place, making the synchronic study of social phenomena more tempting than more descriptive studies of historical transformation. Slavery and Social Death took shape during a period when largely complexion and his tropical temperament.”8

synchronic studies of antebellum slavery in the United States domi- nated the scholarship on human bondage, and Patterson’s expansive view was meant to situate U.S. slavery in a broad context rather than to discuss changes as

one might see “social death” as an obsolete product of its time and tradition, an academic artifact with limited purchase for contemporary scholarship, were it not for the concept’s the in- stitution developed through time. Thus

reemergence in some im- portant new studies of slavery.9

B) Empowers whiteness by assuming the Master is OUTSIDE death Peterson 7 (Christopher, Lecturer @ University of Western Sidney, Kindred Specters: Death, Mourning, and American Affinity, pgs. 12-14)

redoubled ghostliness situates racial and sexual minorities in intimate contact with death. This heightened proximity to mortality is not only social, moreover, but material. As Karla Holloway observes in Passed On: African-American Mourning Stories, black Americans historically have had a "particular vulnerability to an untimely death," from lynching to suicides, from police violence to disease." Echoing Holloway, Abdul JanMohamed argues that African What I am calling

Americans are "death-bound-subject[s] ... formed, from infancy on, by the imminent and ubiquitous threat of

slaves, and by extension, "emancipated" black Americans, live under a constantly commuted death sentence. Drawing from Heidegger's account of death in Being and Time, JanMohamed notes that, "if death." Tracing the emergence of this subject in Richard Wright's fiction, JanMohamed argues that

natural death marks the termination of life and, thereby, retroactively defines the entirety of life, then this is even more so the case for the slave because he faces the imminent presence of death on a mundane basis" (284). Jan

Heidegger's account of death does not provide a detailed account of death's unequal social and historical distribution. Yet, in "correcting" this elision, JanMohamed reduces death to its political deployment . He writes: The existential description of death tends to be radically agnostic about the source or agency of death .... For the slave, death is not an eventuality that somehow "comes" or "arrives" in the natural course of events ... but rather something deliberately brought and imposed on him by another, by the master. (15) The problem with this formulation, however, is that it figures death as originally exterior to the slave, coming to inhabit him only via the master's monopolistic violence. As Bauman astutely observes with regard to the modern interdiction of mortality, "we do not hear of people dying of mortality. They die only of individual causes, they die because there was an individual cause (138, his emphasis). Hence, we ought to say that the slave's availability to death is first conditioned by his "having" a body, which means that death is both what "comes" or "arrives" and is what the master wields as a form of coercive control." If finitude were "always embodied in the agency of the Mohamed is certainly right that

master," then death would name a condition unique to the slave as such (294). Indeed, by insisting on a radical disjunction between the death that haunts all life and the historical particularity of the immanent death to which African Americans are uniquely bound, JanMohamed reinscribes the exceptionalist logic through which the master evades death by projecting it onto the slave. In short, JanMohamed's analysis overparticularizes death, thereby reproducing the "state of exception" that he seeks to avoid. According to this logic, the master presides over the slave's life and death all the while exempting himself from the death that he deploys." While JanMohamed contends that the slave, unlike the master, "has always already been condemned to death ill the present," this presumes that the master's ontology is not also always already put into question by the spectrality that disturbs each and every present (282). Death is not a "final punctuation mark that retroactively defines" the "syntax" of one's life (298). On

death stretches along the syntax of each and every life according to incommensurate social and political grammars. To speak of the redoubled ghostliness of racial and sexual minorities, then, is not to subsume the particularity of social death under a universal being-toward-death that effaces political and social distinctions. Unlike what has often been said of death, spectrality is not the great equalizer. However, one 'cannot fully separate the particularity of social death from the generality of each subject's being-toward-death , as if finitude were reducible to its political distribution, or for that matter, to its external imposition. This does not mean that we should turn our attention away from the particular political and material losses exacted by the history of racism and heterosexism in America. Indeed, the readings of literary the contrary,

texts by Chesnutt, Morrison, and Faulkner offered in subsequent chapters bear witness to this violence while working to rethink the law's erasure of minority kinship in relation to the absence that founds all social relations. Before turning to those literary readings, however, the remainder of this chapter aims to elaborate further how kinship is implicated in a dialectical negation that "precedes" any legal effacement of particular kinship relations.

1AR Cede the political Extend our cede the political arg that says the Kritik's leftist withdrawal from political action within the state leaves political power to those that would enact the violences of the kritiks the most. It turns all of their alt solvency and is a net benefit to the perm. The perm's combination of the kritik's mindset and political action prevents cession of political power to right wing elites.

AT: Wilderson Wilderson is overly reductive---he has no way to explain historical resistance to anti-blackness because his theory pigeon holes all oppression into the non-falsifiable register of psychoanalysis Saër Maty Bâ 11, prof of film at Portsmouth University, The US Decentred, http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/article/view/2304/2474 As we shall see below, blacks in the US cannot and do not have ontology, or so Wilderson argues, denying with the same breath the workability of analogy as a method, because analogy can only be a ruse. Thus, what he calls ‘the ruse of analogy’ grants those who fall for it, for example, ‘Black film theorists’ or Black academics, an opportunity to reflect on (black) cinema only after some form of structural alteration. (38) Analogy does seem tricky if one follows Wilderson’s line of thought, that is, the Holocaust/Jews and slavery/Africans. Jews entered and came out of Auschwitz as Jews whereas Africans emerged from the slave ships as Blacks.2 Two types of holocaust: the first ‘Human’, the second ‘Human and metaphysical’, something which leads to Wilderson

for Wilderson, blacks are socially and ontologically dead in the sense that the black body has been violently turned into flesh, ‘ripped saying that ‘the Jews have the Dead ... among them; the Dead have the Black among them’. (38) It bears reiterating that

apart literally and imaginatively’, that it is a body vulnerably open, ‘an object made available (fungible) for any subject’ and ‘not in the world’ or civil

differences between black and white ethical dilemmas separate them dialectically into incompatible zones. As illustration society the way white bodies are. (38)¶ Furthermore, Wilderson argues that

Wilderson reflects on black women suffering in US prisons in the 1970s and then juxtaposes the suffering with white women’s concurrent public preoccupations in civil society. For example, the violence and neglect underwent by Safya Bukhari‐ Alston3 in solitary confinement at the Virginia Correctional Center for Women is linked to the similar plight of another black woman, Dorothy, in Haile Gerima’s Bush Mama (1977) before Wilderson questions what both situations mean in relation to images of ‘[w]hite women burning bras in Harvard Square ... marching in ... Manhattan campaigning for equal rights’. (135) Wilderson’s answer is that the images of female black pain and white activism are irreconcilable precisely because they cannot be read

he does not develop this point, preferring instead to examine suffering through ‘a libidinal economy’ (131) leading, predictably, to the conclusion that white radicalism, white political cinema and white supremacy are one and the same thing. Most unfortunate though inevitable is the reason Wilderson gives to justify this: a so‐called ‘anti‐Blackness’ that, ¶ [wilderson quote begins]¶ as opposed to white apathy, is necessary to White against one another without such an exercise appearing intellectually sloppy. However,

political radicalism and to White political cinema because it sutures affective, emotional, and even ethical solidarity between the ideological polar extremes of Whiteness. This necessary anti‐Blackness erects a structural prohibition that one sees in White political discourse and in White political cinema. (131) [wilderson quote ends]¶ undamentally, the first three chapters of Red, White and Black are concerned with what it takes to think blackness and agency together ethically, or to permit ourselves intellectual mindful reflections upon the homicidal ontology of chattel slavery. Wilderson posits ways through which ‘the dead’ (blacks) reflect on how the living can be put ‘out of the picture’. (143) There seems to be no let off or way out for blacks (‘The Slave’) in Wilderson’s logic, an energetic and rigorous, if unforgiving and sustained, treadmill of damning analysis to which ‘Indians’ (‘The “Savage”’/‘The

yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent Red’) will also be subjected, first through ‘“Savage” film’ analysis.¶ ¶ And

one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film

ignoring the African Diaspora is that it exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance. Here, beyond the US‐centricity or ‘social and political specificity of [his] filmography’, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of was formulated. Yet another consequence of

films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act(STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film.¶ Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by

Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes ¶ [wilderson quote begins]¶ The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7¶ [wilderson quote ends] ¶

Black is irredeemable

Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. , he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of

I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐ studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279)¶ Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below),

once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

AT: Fluidity Our advocacy isn’t fluidity---members of “privileged” groups should speak out for equity Tim Wise No Date, Antiracist Essayist, Author and Educator, former adjunct faculty member at the Smith College School for Social Work, "F.A.Q.s", www.timwise.org/f-a-q-s/ it makes no sense to think that if I receive privilege, I must therefore be a hypocrite for also criticizing the privileges and the system that bestows them. By that logic, members of dominant groups should never speak out on behalf of equity. They should just passively accept — or maybe even actively pursue — their advantages, and the maintenance of the system that bestows those advantages, so as to seem “consistent.” Or perhaps we should silently oppose the system from which we benefit, but do nothing openly to oppose it, for fear that doing so might draw attention to ourselves . But to do either of those things — passively accept or just silently oppose white supremacy — would seem like an abdication of all moral agency, not to mention strategic wisdom.¶ Although there may be an inherent tension between fighting white privilege and receiving it — as I do, for instance, by often being taken more seriously than people of color when they offer the same types of arguments — the alternative (to not speak out) would only further the deafening white silence on these issues, and allow other whites to believe that the only people who oppose racism and white supremacy are people of color. This belief, directly or indirectly, contributes to white ambivalence and white racism, by seeming to vest whites with a personal stake in the maintenance of the system , rather than getting them to think how we would all be better off were that system to fall. Furthermore, to remain silent so as to defer to the voices of people of color, perpetuates the imbalance where by people of color are responsible for doing all the heavy lifting against white supremacy. How is that an example of solidarity or allyship? Certainly it cannot help the antiracist struggle to say, in effect, “No really, you do all the work, and I’ll just watch, thanks . Because, ya know, I wouldn’t want to draw attention to myself!”¶ Although whites who challenge racism need to be as accountable as possible to But

people of color in the way we do the work (see the Appreciation and Accountability Statement, here, for examples of how I try to do that, as well as the newly published Code of Ethics for Anti-Racist White Allies, which I helped

the argument that somehow white folks shouldn’t engage in that work in any real way (or at least not publicly) makes very little sense ethically, and is absurd from a strategic perspective. develop, for additional information),

AT: Violent Revolution Violent resistance is intrinsically connected to violent masculinity and patriarchy. The move towards violence ensures resistance failure and subjugation of those seen as weak Bartkowski 13, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 339) Changing entrenched views about the effectiveness of armed resistance is particularly hard as they are usually rooted in a warrior psychology that is shaped by violent masculinity and patriarchy. Strugglesfor independence typically have privileged male leadership. As a consequence, conspiracies of belligerent men plotting in small, secretive circles in an atmosphere that congratulates violent bravery and rewards machismo, leave little room for recognizing the importance of nonviolent alternatives or the contributions of women or non-fighting-age young men to the struggle. In fact, the discourse of hegemonic victors tends to conform to a masculinist construct that, as Jean Bethke Elshtain maintains, from antiquity though to the present has divided society into “just warriors” (male fighters and protectors) and “beautiful souls” (female victims and noncombatants). The circle of just warriors is also limited as it would normally exclude men who wanted to play other roles (i.e., gays) or their virility did not conform to the prevailing warrior achetype. Furthermore, teaching history, including the rise of nations, formation of state institutions, conduct of state politics, and development and implementation of public policies, shapes a nation’s commemorative landscape and punctuates it with stories of military battles, patriotic risings, wars and violent defeats – all dominated by men, be they soldiers, scholars, politicians, or other elite actors. This has inhibited people from remembering,

acknowledging, and understanding the presence and efficacy of civil resistance, including the central place of women engaged in writing and distributing petitions; organizing and leading demonstrations and protests; setting up and running autonomous associations and educational institutions; and supporting and participating in social and economic boycotts, strikes and sit-ins. Masculinity and Civil Resistance. While armed struggle and violent masculinity are almostsymbiotically joined in the historical imagination, the question of systemic male domination in civil resistance is more complex and ambiguous. Foreign occupation and colonization has frequently been based on economic exploitation and has often involved cultural genocide or extreme forms of coercion such as slavery, forced migration, resettlement, and conscription. Often a systematic part of foreign domination has been sexual exploitation of women and (as mentioned in Chapter 7 on Egypt) humiliation of indigenous men. In conditions where a foreign colonizer’s racist stereotypes affected both a symbolic and real emasculation, the oppressed population – particularly its men – often saw “regaining manhood” as a basic element of independence equivalent to self-respect or dignity. Becoming men is thus a common theme to be found in both armed and nonviolence anticolonial stuggles, as indeed in other struggles against other kinds of oppression.

*2AC Sousveillance K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations -No link – The plan isn’t nearly sufficient to trigger a link. There is still a thousand diferent types of state surveillance after passage of the plan. We don’t defend surveillance good or bad aside from agents provocateurs (only for this k), which means that there are no spillover fx regarding state surveillance from our plan.

-No alt solvency - Kevin carter was an example of a sousveillance activist that captured violent instances of the states actions. People often feel they can persuade someone with an image. For example the Tiananmen square photograph, or the burning Vietnam man. A widely comparable example of when sousveillance failed is when carter entered a clearing where he came upon a naked 9 year old girl in the desert dying with a vulture eagerly towering over her. He took a picture and it won the Pulitzer prize, and became one of the most famous pics in the world. He ended up committing suicide because of the haunting thought that he did nothing to actually help the girl, and the world criticized him because he didn’t actually help the girl. Kevin carter is the vulture in this instance. With all this in mind look back to the tianamen square photograph where it just shows a single man with no support, with his face planted into the barrel of a tank. The photographer was of to the side taking a picture of the poor man, and not actually taking any material action. This is the other problem with sousveillance, it doesn’t take any true form of resistance seeing as these world famous pictures truly amounted to no significant change. Also video evidence of police brutality hardly changes anything, and doesn’t separate us from the states surveillance which means minority groups are still oppressed by disciplinary power. No alt solvency - Counter Surveillance does not remove individuals from the gaze of the state and ultimately expands state power. Monahan 2006 (Torin, Prof. @ UNC Chapel Hill, “Counter Surveillance as Political Intervention?” Social Semiotics 16:4)

While each of the four counter-surveillance interventions covered so far seeks to raise public awareness and to mobilize for social change, none of them are completely successful at moving their critique from the individual to the institutional plane. The SCP come closest to doing this, but so far

their plays remain too isolated and discrete to efect long-term change. This deficiency may be in part because activists construct surveillance problems in individualized and abstracted terms in order to make them somewhat tractable and receptive to intervention. The challenge lies in ratcheting-up the unit of analysis to the institutional level so that lasting change can be effected. The

desired outcomes might take the form of better regulation and oversight of surveillance and/or meaningful democratic participation in the process of setting surveillance policies, for instance. In the long run, as the next section will argue, the oppositional framing of surveillance versus counter-surveillance may be counterproductive for achieving these goals.

Counter surveillance assumes equal economic and political footing that is inaccessible to the poor turns their method Monahan 6 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, SOCIAL SEMIOTICS VOLUME 16 NUMBER 4 (DECEMBER 2006), p 11, PDF)

Mann’s rather unforgiving denouncement of individuals working in stores, however, reveals certain assumptions about the problems of modern surveillance . First, by criticizing employees as being ‘‘puppets’’ who blindly accept their companies’ explanations for surveillance and comply with company policies, Mann implies that all individuals are rational actors with equal social and economic footing. Thus, if low-income employees elect not to fight the system like he does, then they must be either ignorant or weak-willed, or both. Second, by calling store clerks and security guards representatives of totalitarian surveillance regimes, Mann conflates individuals with the institutions of which they are a part, effectively sidestepping the important but more difficult problem of changing institutional relations, structures, or logics. Both these assumptions lead to the conclusion that one can contend with the problem of rampant surveillance by intervening on the level of the individual and by educating people about their complicity with the systems. Unfortunately, the fact that people have very real dependencies upon their jobs or that vast asymmetrical power differentials separate workers from the systems they work within (and perhaps from the activists as well) become unimportant issues once the critique of surveillance is abstracted and individualized in this way.

Perm do both - Combining legal reform and critical surveillance studies is necessary to make meaningful political change. Cohen 15 [Julie, professor at Georgetown University. “Studying Law Studying Surveillance,” Surveillance and Society. Vol. 13 Is. 1]Relative to legal scholarship, work in Surveillance Studies is more likely to build from a solid foundation in contemporary social theory. Even so, such work often reflects both an insufficient grasp of the complexity of the legal system in action and lack of interest in the ways that legal and regulatory actors understand, conduct, and contest surveillance. By this I don’t mean to suggest that Surveillance Studies scholars need law degrees, but only to point out what ought to be obvious but often isn’t: legal processes are social processes, too, and in overlooking these processes, Surveillance Studies scholars also engage in a form of black-boxing that treats law as monolithic and surveillance and government as interchangeable. Legal actors engage in a variety of discursive and normative strategies by which institutions and resources are mobilized around surveillance, and understanding those strategies is essential to the development of an archaeology of surveillance practices. Work in Surveillance Studies also favors a type of theoretical jargon that can seem impenetrable and, more importantly, unrewarding to those in law and policy communities. As I’ve written elsewhere (Cohen 2012a: 29), “[t]oo many such works find power everywhere and hope nowhere, and seem to offer well-meaning policy makers little more than a prescription for despair.” Returning to the topics already discussed, let us consider some ways in which Surveillance Studies might benefit from dialogue with law. Let us return first to the problem of digitally-enhanced surveillance by law enforcement—the problem of the high-resolution mosaic. As discussed in the section above, works by Surveillance Studies scholars exploring issues of mobility and control offer profound insights into the ways in which continual observation shapes spaces and subjectivities—the precise questions about which, as we have already seen, judges and legal scholars alike are skeptical. Such works reveal the extent to which pervasive surveillance of public spaces is emerging as a new and powerful mode of ordering the public and social life of civil society. They offer rich food for thought—but not for

action. Networked surveillance is increasingly a fact of contemporary public life, and totalizing theories about its power don’t take us very far toward gaining regulatory traction on it. That enterprise is, moreover, essential even if it entails an inevitable quantum of self-delusion. Acknowledgment of pervasive social shaping by networked surveillance need not preclude legal protection for socially-shaped subjects, but that project requires attention to detail. To put the point a different way, the networked democratic society and the totalitarian state may be points on a continuum rather than binary opposites, but the fact that the continuum exists is still worth something. If so, one needs tools for assessment and differentiation that Surveillance Studies does not seem to provide. As an example of this sort of approach within legal scholarship, consider a recent article by legal scholars Danielle Citron and David Gray (2013), which proposes that courts and legislators undertake what they term a technology-centered approach to regulating surveillance. They would have courts and legislators ask whether particular technologies facilitate total surveillance and, if so, act to put in place comprehensive procedures for approving and overseeing their use. From a Surveillance Studies perspective, this approach lacks theoretical purity because its technology-specific focus appears to ignore the fact that total surveillance also can emerge via the fusion of data streams originating from various sources. But the proposal is pragmatic; it does not so much ignore that risk as bracket it while pursuing the narrower goal of gaining a regulatory foothold within the data streams. And because it focuses on the data streams themselves, it is administrable in a way that schemes based on linear timelines and artificial distinctions between different types of surveillance are not. One can envision both courts and legislatures implementing the Citron and Gray proposal in a way that enables far better oversight of what law enforcement is doing.

2AC Capitalism K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations C) Inevitability of the state creates an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical — solvency isn’t a question

Simmons 99

(William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics.55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an universality rule.

ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for and his followers.’61

the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state. The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself, trying to be more just . It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics . For example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political responsibility for the Other justice and

thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

3.Case outweighs and turns the kritik – (Racialized violence through state surveillance begins with agent provocateur’s, simply because they are stealing peoples lives to maintain securitization of threats. This is the life blood of the otherization of muslims, and browns around the world. This false threat construction needs to be exposed or else the state will persist in its totalitarian ways) 7. No link – They say we affirm neoliberalism, but that is

the very thing we are indicting, and trying to fiercely reform… Extend our 2nd piece of Kundnani evidence in the 1st advantage that says the modern surveillance apparatus functions as racialized totalitarianism under the guise of neoliberalism. 8. No root cause and attempts to transition only reify proximate causes Larrivee 10— PF ECONOMICS AT MOUNT ST MARY’S UNIVERSITY – MASTERS FROM THE HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL AND PHD IN ECONOMICS FROM WISCONSIN, 10 [JOHN, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORAL ANALYSIS OF MARKETS, 10/1, http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf] The Second Focal Point: Moral, Social, and Cultural Issues of Capitalism Logical errors abound in critical commentary on capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a capitalist economy. Therefore capitalism causes X. ” They draw their conclusion by looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one system. Others merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The

solution to such flawed reasoning is to be comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a number of issues—greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth, alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious

participation—that have often been associated with capitalism, but have

also been problematic in other systems

and usually in more extreme form. I conclude with some

evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear communism or to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.” The

critical point is that certain people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified. That they failed to solve the problems , and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new problems, implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of the problems in the first place, at least not to the degree theorized.

9. Perm do the plan and the alt in every other instance — either the alt overcomes the residual link or it’s insufficient to overcome the status quo 9 & ½ . Cede the political - Their method can’t create

institutional change- the AFF is a DA to the alt and only the perm solves- AFF is a better strategy Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 284-285) But as even the Stasi eventually discovered, no system of surveillance can ever produce total knowledge. Indeed, the greater the amount of information collected, the harder it is to interpret its meaning. The relevant information in the majority of recent US terrorist attacks was somewhere in the government's systems, but its significance was

what is obscured by the demands for ever greater surveillance and information processing is that security is best established through relationships· of trust and political empowerment. A society that has blocked a section of its population from shaping a process of political transformation is one that has hollowed out its democracy until what's left is an empty, technocratic consensus in which real politics is disavowed. When radical political contestation is suffocated, the processes by which societies reinvent themselves and resolve their social tensions are neutered, and in the absence of a genuinely emancipatory alternative, the only possible outlet for the impulses generated by social and economic marginalization is the fake radicalism of armored identity politics, conspiracy theories, and apocalyptic fantasies. lost amid a morass of useless data. More significantly,

10. Globalization good – the status quo is structurally improving Goklany 7

(Indur, scholar who has 25 years of experience working and writing on global and national environmental issues. He has published several peer-reviewed papers and book chapters on an array of issues Author of The Improving State of the World: Why We're Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet, Mar. 23, http://www.reason.com/news/show/119252.html, twm)

globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been Environmentalists and

materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of

postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population . Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The

early

stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe

greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000 . India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries —in this water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because

case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression. Despite all of this progress and good news, then, there is still much unfinished business. Millions of people die from hunger, malnutrition, and preventable disease such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diarrhea. Over a billion people still live in absolute poverty, defined as less than a dollar per day. A third of the world’s eligible population

Barriers to globalization, economic development, and technological change—such as the use of DDT to eradicate malaria, genetic engineering, and biotechnology—are a big source of the problem. Moreover, the global population will grow 50 percent to 100 percent this century, and per capita consumption of is still not enrolled in secondary school.

energy and materials will likely increase with wealth. Merely preserving the status quo is not enough. We need to protect the important sustaining institutions responsible for all of this progress in the developed world, and we need to foster and nurture them in countries that are still developing. Man’s

Ensuring that our incredible progress continues will require not only recognizing and appreciating the progress itself, but also recognizing and preserving the important ideas and institutions that caused it, and ensuring that they endure. remarkable progress over the last 100 years is unprecedented in human history. It’s also one of the more neglected big-picture stories.

10. Marx was super racist, this turns the entire kritik, and means no alt solvency Walter Williams, WND Commentator, 2006, “MARX'S RACISM,” http://www.wnd.com/2006/06/36692/ Karl Marx is the hero of some labor union leaders and civil-rights organizations, including those who organized the recent protest against proposed immigration legislation. It’s easy to be a Marxist if you haven’t read his writings.

Most people agree that Marx’s predictions about capitalism turned out to be dead wrong. What most people don’t know is that Marx was an out and out racist and anti-Semite. He didn’t think much of Mexicans . Concerning the annexation of California after the Mexican-American War, Marx wrote: “Without violence, nothing is ever accomplished in history.” Then he asks, “ Is it a misfortune that magnificent California was seized from the lazy Mexicans who did not know what to do with it?” Friedrich Engels, Marx’s co-author of the “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” added, “In America, we have witnessed the conquest of Mexico and have rejoiced at it. It is to the interest of its own development that Mexico will be placed under the tutelage of the United States.” Much of Marx’s ideas can be found in a book written by former communist Nathaniel Weyl, titled “ Karl

Marx, Racist” (1979). In a July Marx wrote, “… it is now completely clear to me that he, as is proved by his cranial formation and his hair, descends from the Negroes from Egypt, assuming that his mother or grandmother had not interbred with a n[egro]. Now this union of Judaism and Germanism with a basic Negro substance must produce a peculiar product. The obtrusiveness of the fellow is also n[egro]-like .” Engels shared much of Marx’s racial philosophy. In 1887, Paul Lafargue, who was Marx’s son-in-law, was a candidate for a council seat in a Paris 1862 letter to Engels, in reference to his socialist political competitor, Ferdinand Lassalle,

district that contained a zoo. Engels claimed that Paul had “one-eighth or one-twelfth n[egro] blood.” In an April 1887 letter to Paul’s wife, Engels wrote, “Being

in his quality as a n[egro], a degree nearer to the rest of the animal kingdom than the rest of us, he is undoubtedly the most appropriate representative of that district.” Though few claim him as their own, such as leftists claim Karl Marx, Thomas Carlyle is another unappreciated historical figure. Carlyle is best-known for giving economics the derogatory name “dismal science,” an inversion of the phrase “gay science,” which at the time (1849) referred to life-enhancing knowledge. Most people have incorrectly learned that the term “dismal science” had its origins in reference to Thomas Malthus’ gloomy predictions that the global population would grow faster than food supplies, condemning mankind to perpetual poverty and starvation. My George Mason University colleague, professor Davy Levy, and his co-author, Sandra Peart, tell the true story in their 2001 book, “The Secret History of the Dismal Science: Economics, Religion and Race in the 19th Century.” Carlyle first used the term “dismal science” in his 1849 pamphlet entitled “An Occasional Discourse on the N[egro] Question.” He attacked the ideas of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and other free market, limited-government economists for their belief in the fundamental equality of man and their anti-slavery positions. The fact that economics assumes that people are all the same and are equally deserving of liberty was offensive to Carlyle and led him to call economics the dismal science. Carlyle argued that blacks were subhuman, “two-legged cattle,” who needed the tutelage of whites wielding the “beneficent whip” if they were to contribute to the good of society. Carlyle was by no means alone in denouncing economics for its anti-slavery and pro-equality position. No less a historical figure and a Christmastime favorite, Charles Dickens, author of “A Christmas Carol,” shared Carlyle’s positions on slavery and blacks as

Marx, Engels, Carlyle and Dickens all share one belief prevalent throughout mankind’s history down to today: the belief that some people are endowed with superior intelligence and wisdom, and they’ve been ordained to forcibly impose that wisdom on the masses. subhuman.

*1AR Capitalism/Neoliberalism Framework Extend our interpretation – we get to weigh the plan. This is net better:

A) Competitive Equity – debate is a game and games are no fun if you don’t play by the rules – denying us access to the thesis of the af moots the 1AC B) Political Activism – the state as a construct is inevitable but our relationship with it is fluid – the fact that the state is responsible for bad things in the past only creates an ethical imperative to work within it. You should prioritize debates over plan implementation because it’s the only lens to evaluate the materiality of our arguments

1AR Capitalism/Neoliberalism Link (ish sketchy)

There’s no link – consumption is institutionalized - demand exists independent of the af.

Maximizing energy production is human nature Datschefski 4 (Edwin – BioThinking International, “Consumption is Good ? !”, January, http://www.biothinking.com/consume.pdf) it's natural to use energy, and the more the better. Ecologists like Lotka (1922) and Odum and Pinkerton (1955) suggested that the biological systems that survive are those that develop the most power inflow and u se it to best meet their needs for survival . It seems that

Schneider and Kay (1994) proposed that a better description of these "power laws" would be that biological systems develop in a manner as to "increase their degradation rate, and that biological growth, ecosystem

As ecosystems develop or mature they tend to increase their total dissipation , and develop more complex structures with greater diversity, more cycling, more energy flow and more hierarchical levels. So ecological theory shows us that a complex adaptive system like the current industrial system will inherently evolve to maximise throughput of energy and materials. I'm not disputing the benefits of efficiency, or the limits to growth. But there does seem to be a lot of (in my view) futile effort directed at encouraging people to consume l ess . People are natural-born shoppers. I defy anyone reading this to claim that they have deprived themselves of that hifi, boat, shoes, camera, etc. that they really fancied. You also can't solve environmental problems by simply using less. There is a fundamental package of food and goods that a household requires, and while it's possible to make the footprint of that package smaller, we're still looking at about 7 tonnes of stuff per household per year, which is about 140 tonnes including embodied energy and mass. You can avoid this shooting up to 10 or development and evolution represent the development of new dissipative pathways."

15 tonnes of stuff by renting and buying durable products and so on, but even the thriftiest household will still have

The focus for improvement must therefore be on changing product and process design so that materials flow is more systemic . All products are a basic consumption requirement.

ultimately disposable. We just need all of them to be designed to go back and become food for another system. So don't feel guilty about buying the products you have to get. Buy with caution and respect for the materials used. And divert the energy of your concerns into action -- tell the manufacturer of your new camera / car / bed etc. about how they can make it better. Most manufacturers think they are doing perfectly OK if they are complying with the law and have no -one demonstrating outside their head office. Going 100% cyclic solar and safe simply isn't on the agenda yet. So what if every member of every environment group (that's about 5 to 50% of the population, depending what country you live in) asked the manufacturers of the myriad of products that they

We link turn the kritik – Agents provocateurs is an example of bad neoliberalism – by transitioning away we fix the system

*1AR Capitalism/Neoliberalism Permutation Reformism solves the link – combining criticism with policy is only feasible political strategy

A) The state is inevitable – 2AC Simmons evidence is phenomenal, material realities mean the only ethical imperative is to WORK WITHIN the state B) Reformism solves – modular resistance can restructure markets that’s Dixon – labor unions and trustbusting prove

*1AR Cede the political Extend our cede the political argument that says the Kritik's leftist withdrawal from political action within the state leaves political power to those that would enact the violence’s of the kritik’s the most. It turns all of their alt solvency and is a net benefit to the perm. The perm's combination of the kritik's mindset and political action prevents cession of political power to right wing elites.

*1AR Capitalism/Neoliberalism Impact Turns Impact turns are net benefits to the permutation and independent ofense against the alt – capitalism/neoliberalism is net good

A) Improvements – only in the most capitalist nations has life expectancy increased, disease rates are declining, infant mortality is decreasing, hunger is declining along with child labor and literacy has increased— despite increasing populations. In developing nations where capitalism is increasing, sufering has substantially decreased and rights and freedoms have substantially increased. Only increased globalization and capitalism can continue to solve world problems—criticisms aren’t based in fact rather irrational fears—our evidence cites statistics while their sensationalistic authors hype up their warrants with no basis – that’s Golanky B) Peace – economic interdependence is the basis for peace – statistics prove that violence decreases proportionally to growth – that’s Gat

*2AC Histo-Mat K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations C) Inevitability of the state creates an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical — solvency isn’t a question

Simmons 99

(William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics.55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an universality rule.

ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for and his followers.’61

the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state. The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself, trying to be more just . It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics . For example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political responsibility for the Other justice and

thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

3. Case outweighs and turns the kritik – (Racialized violence through state surveillance begins with agent provocateur’s, simply because they are stealing peoples lives to maintain securitization of threats. This is the life blood of the otherization of muslims, and browns around the world. This false threat construction needs to be exposed or else the state will persist in its totalitarian ways) 4. Permutation do the plan and the alt 5. Reformism can challenge the state Chris Dixon 5, Activist and founding member of Direct Action Network, “Reflections on Privilege, Reformism, and Activism,” www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/dixon2.html, accessed 3-6-05 Evidently sasha doesn't grasp my argument in "Finding Hope." Or else he disagrees. It's difficult to tell because, while skillfully sidestepping engagement with my discussion of privilege, he also sidesteps the main thrust of my essay: rethinking radicalism, particularly in the context of privilege. As I wrote, "we have to move beyond the myopic view--often endemic among anarchists--that the most 'important' activism only or mainly happens in the streets, enmeshed in police confrontations." In other words, spheres of traditional 'radical action' are limited and limiting. And though I don't believe that sasha fundamentally disagrees with this criticism, he refuses to accept its broader consequences. For instance, where I question the bounds of 'radicalism' with examples of struggles like opposing prison construction and establishing community and cultural centers, he conclusively points to "a set of demands and goals of which none suggest any serious critique of capitalism and the state in their totality." There is much more to the "totality" that we all confront than capitalism and the state. That's unequivocal. Furthermore, a "totality" has an undeniable physical presence, and people do in fact contest and resist it every day through a variety of struggles using a variety of means--not all containing the "serious critique" necessary to satisfy sasha. J. Kellstadt nicely observes this, noting that an 'activist' perspective (not unlike sasha's) overlooks a whole layer of more "everyday" forms of resistance - from

slacking off, absenteeism, and sabotage, to shopfloor "counter-planning" and other forms of autonomous and "unofficial" organizing - which conventional activists and leftists (including most anarchists) have a bad track record of acknowledging. And this still leaves out all of those modes of struggle which take place beyond the shopfloor, such as various forms of cultural and sexual revolution. Unfortunately, sasha doesn't deign to discuss these all-toopedestrian realities, many of which potentially embrace the very anarchist ethics he touts. They certainly have bearing on the lives of many folks and speak to a breadth of social struggle, but they apparently don't constitute a sufficient "critique." Even if sasha were to acknowledge their importance, my sense is that he would erect a rationalized theoretical division between Kellstadt's "everyday forms of resistance" and 'reformism.' No doubt, he would use a rhetorical sleight of hand on par with the "simple fact of language that those who want to reform the present system are called reformists." A seemingly irrefutable, selfapparent statement, this actually glosses over legitimate questions: Are 'reformists' so easily discernable and cleanly categorized? Are all 'reforms' equal? Can they be part of a longterm revolutionary strategy? So let's talk plainly about reformism. No matter how much some might wish otherwise, it simply isn't a cut-and-dry issue. And while it actually deserves a book-length examination, here I'll sketch some general considerations. Principally, I ask, assuming that we share the goal of dismantling systems of power

and restructuring our entire society in nonhierarchical ways, what role does reform play? Must we eschew it, unconditionally embrace it, or is there another approach? sasha steadfastly represents one rather limited 'radical' view. To bolster his critique of 'reformism,' for instance, he critically cites one of the examples in my essay: demanding authentic public oversight of police. "[This] might be a small step for social change in some general sense," he argues, "but ultimately it is a step backwards as it strengthens the legitimacy of the police and of imposed decision."

I respect the intent of this critique; it makes sense if one is in real life, it's both

privileged enough to engage with the police on terms of one's own choosing. Yet

simplistic and insulated. Look at it this way: accepting sasha's argument, are we to wait until the coming insurrectionary upheaval before enjoying an end to police brutality? More specifically, are African-American men to patiently endure the continued targeting of "driving while Black"? Should they hold off their demands for police accountability so as to avoid strengthening "the legitimacy of the police and of imposed decision"? And if they don't, are they 'reformists'? Many folks who experience daily police occupation understand that ending the "imposed decision" (often epitomized by police) will require radical change, and they work toward it. At the same time, they demand authentic public oversight of police forces. The two don't have to be mutually exclusive. I'll even suggest that they can be complementary, especially if we acknowledge the legacies of white supremacy and class stratification embedded in policing. Ultimately, we need a lucid conception of social change that articulates

we need revolutionary strategy that links diverse, everyday struggles and demands to long-term radical objectives, without sacrificing either. Of course, this kind of complementarity. That is,

this isn't to say that every so-called 'progressive' ballot initiative or organizing campaign is necessarily radical or

Reforms are not all created equal. But some can fundamentally shake systems of power, leading to enlarged gains and greater space for further advances. strategic.

Andre Gorz, in his seminal book Strategy for Labor, refers to these as "non-reformist" or "structural" reforms. He contends, "a struggle for non-reformist reforms--for anti-capitalist reforms--is one which does not base its validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria, and rationales. A non-reformist reform is determined not in terms

the end of slavery, the eight-hour workday, desegregation. All were born from long, hard struggles, and none were endpoints. Yet they all struck at the foundations of power (in these cases, the state, white supremacy, and capitalism), and in the process, they created new prospects for revolutionary change. Now consider contemporary struggles: amnesty for undocumented immigrants, of what can be, but what should be." Look to history for examples:

socialized health care, expansive environmental protections, indigenous sovereignty. These and many more are

None will single-handedly dismantle capitalism or other systems of power, but each has the potential to escalate struggles and sharpen social contradictions. And we shouldn't misinterpret these efforts as simply meliorative incrementalism, making 'adjustments' to a fundamentally flawed system. Certainly that tendency exists, but there are plenty of other folks working very consciously within a far more radical strategy, pushing for a qualitative shift in struggle. "To fight for alternative solutions," arguably non-reformist reforms as well.

Gorz writes, "and for structural reforms (that is to say, for intermediate objectives) is not to fight for improvements in the capitalist system; it is rather to break it up, to restrict it, to create counter-powers which, instead of creating a new equilibrium, undermine its very foundations." Thankfully, this is one approach among a diverse array of strategies, all of which encompass a breadth of struggles and movements. Altogether, they give me hope.

7. No link – They say we affirm neoliberalism, but that is

the very thing we are indicting, and trying to fiercely reform… Extend our 2nd piece of Kundnani evidence in the 1st advantage that says the modern surveillance apparatus functions as racialized totalitarianism under the guise of neoliberalism. 8. No root cause and attempts to transition only reify proximate causes Larrivee 10— PF ECONOMICS AT MOUNT ST MARY’S UNIVERSITY – MASTERS FROM THE HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL AND PHD IN ECONOMICS FROM WISCONSIN, 10 [JOHN, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORAL ANALYSIS OF MARKETS, 10/1, http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf] Logical errors abound in critical commentary on capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a capitalist economy. Therefore capitalism causes X. ” They draw their conclusion by The Second Focal Point: Moral, Social, and Cultural Issues of Capitalism

looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one system. Others merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The

solution to such flawed reasoning is to be comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a number of issues—greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth, alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious participation—that have often been associated with capitalism, but have

also been problematic in other systems

and usually in more extreme form. I conclude with some

evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear communism or to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.” The

critical point is that certain people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified. That they failed to solve the problems , and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new problems, implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of the problems in the first place, at least not to the degree theorized.

8 & ½ .Permutation: Do the af—the affirmative is already in the direction and is prerequisite to the alternative The point of no return is not strictly confined to illegal and violent actions, but in the normalization of surveillance as part of the fabric of a modern civil society via a war on debate and dissent Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the

Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

The point of no return in the emergence of the corporate-state surveillance apparatus is not strictly confined to the task of archiving immense pools of data collection to be used in a number of illegal ways.18 It is in creating a culture in which surveillance becomes trivialized, celebrated, and legitimated as reasonable and unquestioned behavior. Evidence that diverse forms of public pedagogy are sanctioning the security state is on full display in postOrwellian America, obvious in schools that demand that students wear radio chips so they can be tracked.19 Such anti-democratic projects are now also funded by billionaires like Bill Gates who push for the use of biometric bracelets to monitor students' attentiveness in classrooms.20 The normalization of surveillance is also evident in the actions of giant Internet providers who use social messaging to pry personal information from their users. The reach of the surveillance culture can also be seen in the use of radio chips and GPS technologies used to track a person's movements across time and space. At the same time,

cultures of surveillance work hard to trivialize the importance of a massive surveillance environment by transforming it into a source of entertainment . This is evident in the popularity of realty TV shows such as "Big Brother" or "Undercover Boss," which turn the event of constant

The atrophy of democratic intuitions of culture and governance are evident in popular representations that undermine the meaning of democracy as a collective ethos that unconditionally stands for social, economic, and political rights.22 One surveillance into a voyeuristic pleasure.21

example can be found in Hollywood films that glorify hackers such as those in the Matrix trilogy, or movies that celebrate professionalized modern spying and the government agents using their omniscient technological gizmos to fight terrorists and other

What is lost in the culture of surveillance is that spying and the unwarranted collection of personal information from people who have not broken the law in the name of national security and for commercial purposes is a procedure often adopted by totalitarian states. The surveillance state with its immense data mining capabilities represents a historical rupture from traditional notions of forces of evil.

modernity with its emphasis on enlightenment, reason, and the social contract. The older modernity held up the ideals of justice, equality, freedom, and democracy, however flawed. The investment in public goods was seen as central to a social contract that implied that all citizens should have access to those provisions, resources, institutions, and benefits that expanded their sense of

The new modernity and its expanding surveillance net subordinates human needs, public goods, and justice to the demands of commerce and the accumulation of capital, at all costs. The contemporary citizen is primarily a consumer and agency and social responsibility.

entrepreneur wedded to the belief that the most desirable features of human behavior are rooted in a "basic tendency towards

Modernity is now driven by the imperatives of a savage neoliberal political and economic system competitive, acquisitive and uniquely self-interested behavior which is the central fact of human social life."23

that embrace what Charles Derber and June Sekera call a "public goods deficit" in which "budgetary priorities" are relentlessly pushed so as to hollow out the welfare state and drastically reduce social provisions as part of a larger neoliberal counter revolution

Debates about the meaning and purpose of the public and social good have been co-opted by a politics of fear, relegating notions of the civic good, public sphere, and even the very word "public" to the status of a liability, to lower the taxes of the rich and mega-corporations while selling off public good to private interests.24

if not a pathology.25 Fear has lost its social connotations and no longer references fear of social deprivations such as poverty,

Fear is now personalized, reduced to an atomized fear that revolves around crime, safety, apocalypse, and survival. In this instance, as the late Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith once warned, modernity now privileges "a disgraceful combination of 'private opulence and public squalor.' " 26 This homelessness, lack of health care, and other fundamental conditions of agency.

is not surprising given the basic elements of neoliberal policy, which as Jeremy Gilbert indicates, include the: privatization of public assets, contraction and centralization of democratic institutions, deregulation of labor markets, reductions in progressive taxation, restrictions on labor organization, labor market deregulation, active encouragement of competitive and entrepreneurial modes of

Under the regime of neoliberal capitalism, the expansion of government and corporate surveillance measures become synonymous with new forms of governance and an intensification of material and symbolic violence.28 Rather than wage a war on terrorists, the neoliberal security state wages a war on dissent in the interest of consolidating class power . How else to explain the merging of relation across the public and commercial sectors.27

corporate and state surveillance systems updated with the most sophisticated shared technologies used in the last few years to engage in illicit counterintelligence operations, participate in industrial espionage29 and disrupt and attack pro-democracy movements such as Occupy and a range of other nonviolent social movements protesting a myriad of state and corporate injustices.30 This type of illegal spying in the interest of stealing industrial secrets and closing down dissent by peaceful protesters has less to do with national security than it has to do with mimicking the abuses and tactics used by the Stasi in East Germany during the Cold War. How else to explain why many law-abiding citizens "and those with dissenting views within the

Public outrage seems to disappear, with few exceptions, as the state and its corporate allies do little to protect privacy rights, civil liberties and a culture of critical exchange and dissent. Even worse, they shut down a culture of questioning and engage in forms of domestic terrorism. State violence in this case becomes the preferred antidote to the demanding work of reflection, analysis, dialogue and imagining the points of views of others. The war against dissent waged by secret counterintelligence agencies is a mode of domestic terrorism in which, as David Graeber has argued, violence is "often the preferred weapon of the stupid."32 Modernity in this instance has been updated, wired and militarized. No longer content to play out its historical role of a modernized panopticon, it has become militarized and a multilayered source of insecurity, entertainment and commerce. In addition, this new stage of modernity is driven not only by the need to watch but also the will to punish. Phone calls, emails, social networks and almost law can be singled out for surveillance and placed on wide-ranging watch lists relating to terrorism."31

every other vestige of electronic communication are now being collected and stored by corporate and government organizations such as the NSA and numerous other intelligence agencies. Snowden's exposure of the massive reach of the surveillance state with its biosensors, scanners, face recognition technologies, miniature drones, high speed computers, massive data mining capabilities and other stealth technologies made visible "the stark realities of disappearing privacy and diminishing liberties."33 But the NSA and the other 16 intelligence agencies are not the only threat to privacy, freedom and democracy. Corporations now have their own intelligence agencies and data mining offices and use these agencies and new surveillance technologies largely to spy on those who question the abuses of corporate power. The emergence of fusion centers exemplifies how power is now a mix of corporate, local, federal and global intelligence agencies, all sharing information that can be used by various agencies to stifle dissent and punish pro-democracy activists. What is clear is that this combination of gathering and sharing information often results in a lethal mix of anti-democratic practices in which surveillance now extends not only to potential terrorists but to all law-abiding citizens. Within

this sinister web of secrecy, suspicion, state-sanctioned violence and illegality, the culture of authoritarianism thrives and poses a dangerous threat to democratic freedoms and rights. It also poses a threat to those outside the U nited States who, in the name of national security, are subject to "a grand international campaign with drones and special operations forces that is generating potential terrorists at every step." 34 Behind this veil of concentrated power and secrecy lies not only a threat to privacy rights but the very real threat of violence on both a domestic and global level.

9. Permutation: Do the af and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative Net benefit to the permutation—the alternative in and of itself by starting at a materialist analysis of production cannot explain the lack of resistance to capitalism because they do not recognize the impacts of surveillance.

9 & ½ . Cede the political - Their method can’t create

institutional change- the AFF is a DA to the alt and only the perm solves- AFF is a better strategy Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 284-285) But as even the Stasi eventually discovered, no system of surveillance can ever produce total knowledge. Indeed, the greater the amount of information collected, the harder it is to interpret its meaning. The relevant information in the majority of recent US terrorist attacks was somewhere in the government's systems, but its significance was

what is obscured by the demands for ever greater surveillance and information processing is that security is best established through relationships· of trust and political empowerment. A society that has blocked a section of its population from shaping a process of political transformation is one that has hollowed out its democracy until what's left is an empty, technocratic consensus in which real politics is disavowed. When radical political contestation is suffocated, the processes by which societies reinvent themselves and resolve their social tensions are neutered, and in the absence of a genuinely emancipatory alternative, the only possible outlet for the impulses generated by social and economic marginalization is the fake radicalism of armored identity politics, conspiracy theories, and apocalyptic fantasies. lost amid a morass of useless data. More significantly,

10. Globalization good – the status quo is structurally improving Goklany 7

(Indur, scholar who has 25 years of experience working and writing on global and national environmental issues. He has published several peer-reviewed papers and book chapters on an array of issues Author of The Improving State of the World: Why We're Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet, Mar. 23, http://www.reason.com/news/show/119252.html, twm)

globalization foes are united in their fear that greater population and consumption of energy, materials, and chemicals accompanying economic growth, technological change and free trade—the mainstays of globalization—degrade human and environmental well-being. Indeed, the 20th century saw the United States’ population multiply by four, income by seven, carbon dioxide emissions by nine, use of materials by 27, and use of chemicals by more than 100. Yet life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years. Onset of major disease such as cancer, heart, and respiratory disease has been postponed between eight and eleven years in the past century. Heart disease and cancer rates have been in rapid decline over the last two decades, and total cancer deaths have actually declined the last two years, despite increases in population . Among the very young, infant mortality has declined from 100 deaths per 1,000 births in 1913 to just seven per 1,000 today. These improvements haven’t been restricted to the United States. It’s a global phenomenon. Worldwide, life expectancy has more than doubled, from 31 years in 1900 to 67 years today. India’s and China’s infant mortalities exceeded 190 per 1,000 births in the early 1950s; today they are 62 and 26, respectively. In the developing world, the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1970 and 2001 despite a 83 percent increase in population. Globally average annual incomes in real dollars have tripled since 1950. Consequently, the proportion of the planet's developing-world population living in absolute poverty has halved since 1981, from 40 percent to 20 percent. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 percent to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated than ever. People are freer politically, economically, and socially to pursue their well-being as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be Environmentalists and

arbitrarily deprived of life, limb, and property. Social and professional mobility have also never been greater. It’s easier than ever for people across the world to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth. People today work fewer hours and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time than their ancestors. Man’s environmental record is more complex. The

early

stages of development can indeed cause some environmental deterioration as societies pursue first-order problems affecting human well-being. These include hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of education, basic public health services, safe

greater wealth alleviates these problems while providing basic creature comforts, individuals and societies initially focus on economic development, often neglecting other aspects of environmental quality. In time, however, they recognize that environmental deterioration reduces their quality of life. Accordingly, they put more of their recently acquired wealth and human capital into developing and implementing cleaner technologies. This brings about an environmental transition via the twin forces of economic development and technological progress, which begin to provide solutions to environmental problems instead of creating those problems. All of which is why we today find that the richest countries are also the cleanest. And while many developing countries have yet to get past the “green ceiling,” they are nevertheless ahead of where today’s developed countries used to be when they were equally wealthy. The point of transition from "industrial period" to "environmental conscious" continues to fall. For example, the US introduced unleaded gasoline only after its GDP per capita exceeded $16,000 . India and China did the same before they reached $3,000 per capita. This progress is a testament to the power of globalization and the transfer of ideas and knowledge (that lead is harmful, for example). It's also testament to the importance of trade in transferring technology from developed to developing countries —in this water, sanitation, mobility, and ready sources of energy. Because

case, the technology needed to remove lead from gasoline. This hints at the answer to the question of why some parts of the world have been left behind while the rest of the world has thrived. Why have improvements in well-being stalled in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world? The proximate cause of improvements in well-being is a “cycle of progress” composed of the mutually reinforcing forces of economic development and technological progress. But that cycle itself is propelled by a web of essential institutions, particularly property rights, free markets, and rule of law. Other important institutions would include science- and technology-based problem-solving founded on skepticism and experimentation; receptiveness to new technologies and ideas; and freer trade in goods, services—most importantly in knowledge and ideas. In short, free and open societies prosper. Isolation, intolerance, and hostility to the free exchange of knowledge, technology, people, and goods breed stagnation or regression. Despite all of this progress and good news, then, there is still much unfinished business. Millions of people die from hunger, malnutrition, and preventable disease such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diarrhea. Over a billion people still live in absolute poverty, defined as less than a dollar per day. A third of the world’s eligible population

Barriers to globalization, economic development, and technological change—such as the use of DDT to eradicate malaria, genetic engineering, and biotechnology—are a big source of the problem. Moreover, the global population will grow 50 percent to 100 percent this century, and per capita consumption of is still not enrolled in secondary school.

energy and materials will likely increase with wealth. Merely preserving the status quo is not enough. We need to protect the important sustaining institutions responsible for all of this progress in the developed world, and we need to foster and nurture them in countries that are still developing. Man’s

Ensuring that our incredible progress continues will require not only recognizing and appreciating the progress itself, but also recognizing and preserving the important ideas and institutions that caused it, and ensuring that they endure. remarkable progress over the last 100 years is unprecedented in human history. It’s also one of the more neglected big-picture stories.

10. Marx was super racist, this turns the entire kritik Walter Williams, WND Commentator, 2006, “MARX'S RACISM,” http://www.wnd.com/2006/06/36692/ Karl Marx is the hero of some labor union leaders and civil-rights organizations, including those who organized the recent protest against proposed immigration legislation. It’s easy to be a Marxist if you haven’t read his writings.

Most people agree that Marx’s predictions about capitalism turned out to be dead wrong. What most people don’t know is that Marx was an out and out racist and anti-Semite. He didn’t think much of Mexicans . Concerning the annexation of California after the Mexican-American War, Marx wrote: “Without violence, nothing is ever accomplished in history.” Then he asks, “ Is it a misfortune that magnificent California was seized from the lazy Mexicans who did not know what to do with it?” Friedrich Engels, Marx’s co-author of the “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” added, “In America, we have witnessed the conquest of Mexico and have rejoiced at it. It is to the interest of its own

development that Mexico will be placed under the tutelage of the United States.” Much of Marx’s ideas can be found in a book written by former communist Nathaniel Weyl, titled “ Karl

Marx, Racist” (1979). In a July Marx wrote, “… it is now completely clear to me that he, as is proved by his cranial formation and his hair, descends from the Negroes from Egypt, assuming that his mother or grandmother had not interbred with a n[egro]. Now this union of Judaism and Germanism with a basic Negro substance must produce a peculiar product. The obtrusiveness of the fellow is also n[egro]-like .” Engels shared much of Marx’s racial philosophy. In 1887, Paul Lafargue, who was Marx’s son-in-law, was a candidate for a council seat in a Paris 1862 letter to Engels, in reference to his socialist political competitor, Ferdinand Lassalle,

district that contained a zoo. Engels claimed that Paul had “one-eighth or one-twelfth n[egro] blood.” In an April 1887 letter to Paul’s wife, Engels wrote, “Being

in his quality as a n[egro], a degree nearer to the rest of the animal kingdom than the rest of us, he is undoubtedly the most appropriate representative of that district.” Though few claim him as their own, such as leftists claim Karl Marx, Thomas Carlyle is another unappreciated historical figure. Carlyle is best-known for giving economics the derogatory name “dismal science,” an inversion of the phrase “gay science,” which at the time (1849) referred to life-enhancing knowledge. Most people have incorrectly learned that the term “dismal science” had its origins in reference to Thomas Malthus’ gloomy predictions that the global population would grow faster than food supplies, condemning mankind to perpetual poverty and starvation. My George Mason University colleague, professor Davy Levy, and his co-author, Sandra Peart, tell the true story in their 2001 book, “The Secret History of the Dismal Science: Economics, Religion and Race in the 19th Century.” Carlyle first used the term “dismal science” in his 1849 pamphlet entitled “An Occasional Discourse on the N[egro] Question.” He attacked the ideas of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and other free market, limited-government economists for their belief in the fundamental equality of man and their anti-slavery positions. The fact that economics assumes that people are all the same and are equally deserving of liberty was offensive to Carlyle and led him to call economics the dismal science. Carlyle argued that blacks were subhuman, “two-legged cattle,” who needed the tutelage of whites wielding the “beneficent whip” if they were to contribute to the good of society. Carlyle was by no means alone in denouncing economics for its anti-slavery and pro-equality position. No less a historical figure and a Christmastime favorite, Charles Dickens, author of “A Christmas Carol,” shared Carlyle’s positions on slavery and blacks as

Marx, Engels, Carlyle and Dickens all share one belief prevalent throughout mankind’s history down to today: the belief that some people are endowed with superior intelligence and wisdom, and they’ve been ordained to forcibly impose that wisdom on the masses. subhuman.

11. The K is Wrong – Racism First Charles Mills, 1997, The Racial Contract, p. 31-40 The classic social contract, as I have detailed, is primarily moral/political in nature. But it is also economic in the background sense that the point of leaving the state of nature is in part to secure a stable environment for the industrious appropriation of the world . (After all, one famous definition of politics is that it is about who gets what and why.) Thus even in Locke's moralized state of nature, where people generally do obey natural law, he is concerned about the safety of private property, indeed proclaiming that "the great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property."42 And in Hobbes's famously amoral and unsafe state of nature, we are told that "there is no

So part of the point of bringing society into existence, with its laws and enforcers of the law, is to protect what you have accumulated. / What, then, is the nature of the economic system of the new society? The general contract does not itself prescribe a particular place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth."43

model or particular schedule of property rights, requiring only that the "equality" in the prepolitical state be somehow preserved. This provision may be variously interpreted as a self-interested surrender to an absolutist Hobbesian government that itself determines property rights, or a Lockean insistence that private property accumulated in the moralized state of nature be respected by the constitutionalist government. Or more radical political theorists, such as socialists and feminists, might argue that state-of-nature equality actually mandates class or gender economic egalitarianism in society. So, different

political interpretations of the initial moral egalitarianism can be advanced, but the general background idea is that the equality of human beings in the state of nature is somehow (whether as equality of opportunity or as equality of outcome) supposed to carry over into the economy of the created sociopolitical order, leading to a system of voluntary human intercourse and exchange in which exploitation is precluded. / By contrast, the economic dimension of the Racial Contract is the most salient, foreground rather than background, since the Racial Contract is calculatedly aimed at economic exploitation. The whole point of establishing a moral hierarchy and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate the privileging of

those individuals designated as white/persons and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons. There are other benefits accruing from the Racial Contract—far greater political influence, cultural hegemony, the psychic payoff that comes from knowing one is a member of the Herrenvolk (what W. E. B. Du Bois once called "the wages of

Globally, the Racial Contract creates Europe as the continent that dominates the world; locally, within Europe and the other continents, it designates Europeans as the privileged race. / The challenge of explaining what has been called "the European miracle"—the rise of Europe to global domination —has long exercised both academic and lay opinion.45 How is it that a formerly peripheral region on the outskirts of the Asian land mass, at the far edge of the trade routes, remote from the great civilizations of Islam and the East, was able in a century or two to achieve global political and economic dominance? The explanations historically given by Europeans themselves have varied tremendously, from the straightforwardly racist and geographically determinist to the more subtly environmentalist and culturalist. But what they have all had in common, even those influenced by Marxism, is their tendency to depict this development as essentially autochthonous, their tendency to privilege some set of internal variables and correspondingly-downplay or ignore altogether the role of colonial conquest and African slavery. Europe made it on its own, it is said, because of the peculiar characteristics of Europe and Europeans. / Thus whereas no whiteness")44—but the bottom line is material advantage.

reputable historian today would espouse the frankly biologistic theories of the past, which made Europeans (in both pre- and post-Darwinian accounts) inherently the most advanced race, as contrasted with the backward/less-evolved races elsewhere, the thesis of European specialness and exceptionalism is still presupposed. It is still assumed that rationalism and science, innovativeness and inventiveness found their special home here, as against the intellectual stagnation and traditionalism of the rest of the world, so that Europe was therefore destined in advance to occupy the special position in global history it has. James Blaut calls this the theory, or "super-theory" (an umbrella covering many different versions: theological, cultural, biologistic, geographical, technological, etc.), of "Eurocentric diffusionism," according to which European progress is seen as "natural" and asymmetrically determinant of the fate of non-Europe." Similarly, Sandra Harding, in her anthology on the "racial" economy of science, cites "the assumption that Europe functions autonomously from other parts of the world; that Europe is its own origin, final end, and agent; and that Europe and

Third World theorists have traditionally dissented from this notion of happy divine or natural European dispensation. They have claimed, quite to the contrary, that there is a crucial causal connection between European advance and the unhappy fate of the rest of the world. One classic example of such scholarship from a half century ago was the Caribbean historian Eric Williams's Capitalism and Slavery, which argued that the profits from African slavery helped to make the industrial revolution possible, so that internalist accounts were fundamentally mistaken. 48 And in recent years, with decolonization, people of European descent in the Americas and elsewhere owe nothing to the rest of the world."47 / Unsurprisingly, black and

the rise of the New Left in the United States, and the entry of more alternative voices into the academy, this challenge has deepened and broadened. There are variations in the authors' positions—for example, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Andre Guilder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein9—but the basic

the exploitation of the empire (the bullion from the great gold and silver mines in Mexico and Peru, the profits from plantation slavery, the fortunes made by the colonial companies, the general social and economic stimulus provided by the opening up of the "New World") was to a greater or lesser extent crucial in enabling and then consolidating the takeoff of what had previously been an economic backwater. It was far from the case that Europe was specially destined to assume economic hegemony; there were a number of centers in Asia and Africa of a comparable level of development which could potentially have evolved in the same way. But the European ascent closed off this development path for others because it forcibly inserted them into a colonial network whose exploitative relations and extractive mechanisms prevented autonomous growth. / Overall, then, colonialism "lies at the heart" of the rise of Europe. 50 The economic theme is that

unit of analysis needs to be Europe as a whole, since it is not always the case that the colonizing nations directly involved always benefited in the long term. Imperial Spain, for example, still feudal in character, suffered massive inflation from its bullion imports. But through trade and financial exchange, others launched on the capitalist path, such as Holland, profited. Internal national rivalries continued, of course, but this common identity based on the transcontinental exploitation of the non-European world would in many cases be politically crucial, generating a sense of Europe as a

As Victor Kiernan puts it, "All countries within the European orbit benefited however, as Adam Smith pointed out, from colonial contributions to a common stock of wealth, bitterly as they might wrangle over ownership of one territory or another... [T]here was a sense in which all Europeans shared in a heightened sense of power engendered by the successes of any of them, as well as in the pool of material wealth ... that the colonies produced."51 / Today, correspondingly, though formal decolonization has taken place and in Africa and Asia black, brown, and yellow natives are in office, ruling independent nations, the global economy is essentially dominated by the former colonial powers, their offshoots (Euro-United States, Euro-Canada), and their international financial institutions, lending agencies, and corporations. (As previously observed, the notable exception, whose history confirms rather than challenges cosmopolitan entity engaged in a common enterprise, underwritten by race.

the rule, is Japan, which escaped colonization and, after the Meiji Restoration, successfully embarked on its own industrialization.) Thus one could say that the world is essentially dominated by white capital.

Global figures on income and property ownership are, of course, broken down nationally rather than racially, but if a transnational racial disaggregation were to be done, it would reveal that whites control a percentage of the world's wealth grossly disproportionate to their numbers. Since there is no reason to think that the chasm between First and Third Worlds (which largely coincides with this racial division) is going to be bridged—vide the abject failure of various United Nations plans from the "development decade" of the 1960s onward—it seems undeniable that for years to come, the planet will be white dominated. With the collapse of communism and the defeat of Third World attempts to seek alternative paths, the West reigns supreme, as celebrated in a London Financial Times headline: "The fall of the Soviet bloc has left the IMF and G7 to rule the world and create a new imperial age."52 Economic structures have been set in place, causal processes established, whose outcome is to pump wealth from one side of the globe to another, and which will continue to work largely independently of the ill will/good will, racist/antiracist feelings of particular individuals. This globally color-coded distribution of wealth and poverty has been produced by the Racial Contract and in turn reinforces adherence to it in its signatories and beneficiaries. / Moreover, it is not merely that Europe and the former white settler states are globally dominant but that within them, where there is a significant nonwhite presence (indigenous peoples, descendants of imported slaves, voluntary nonwhite immigration), whites continue to be privileged vis-a-vis non-whites. The old structures of formal, de jure exclusion have largely been dismantled, the old explicitly biologistic ideologies largely abandoned53—the Racial Contract, as will be discussed later, is continually being rewritten—but opportunities for nonwhites, though they have expanded, remain below those for whites. The claim is not, of course, that all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but that, as a statistical generalization, the objective life chances of whites are significantly better. / As an example, consider the United States. A series of books has recently documented the decline of the integrationist hopes raised by the 1960s and the growing intransigence and hostility of whites who think they have "done enough," despite the fact that the country continues to be massively segregated, median black family incomes have begun falling by comparison to white family incomes after some earlier closing of the gap, the so-called "black underclass" has basically been written off, and reparations for slavery and post-Emancipation discrimination have never been paid, or, indeed, even seriously considered.54 Recent work on racial inequality by Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro suggests that wealth is more important than income in determining the likelihood of future racial equalization, since it has a cumulative effect that is passed down through intergenerational transfer, affecting life chances and opportunities for one's children. Whereas in 1988 black households earned sixty two cents for every dollar earned by white households, the comparative differential with regard to wealth is much greater and, arguably, provides a more realistically negative picture of the prospects for closing the racial gap: "Whites possess nearly twelve times as much median net worth as black s,or $43,800 versus $3,700. In an even starker contrast, perhaps, the average white household controls $6,999 in net financial assets while the average black household retains no NFA nest egg whatsoever." Moreover, the analytic focus on wealth rather than income exposes how illusory the muchtrumpeted rise of a "black middle class" is: "Middle class blacks, for example, earn seventy cents for every dollar earned by middle-class whites but they possess only fifteen cents for every dollar of wealth held by middle-class whites." This huge disparity in white and black wealth is not remotely contingent, accidental, fortuitous; it is the direct outcome of American state policy and the collusion with it of the white citizenry. In effect, "materially, whites and blacks constitute two nations,"55 the white nation being constituted by the American Racial Contract in a relationship of structured racial exploitation with the black (and, of course, historically also the red) nation. / A collection of papers from panels organized in the 1980s by the National

Economic Association, the professional organization of black economists, provides some insight into the mechanics and the magnitude of such exploitative transfers and denials of opportunity to accumulate material and human capital. It takes as its title The Wealth of Races—an ironic tribute to Adam Smith's famous book The Wealth of Nations–and analyzes the different varieties of discrimination to which blacks have been subjected: slavery, employment discrimination, wage discrimination, promotion discrimination, white monopoly power discrimination against black capital, racial price discrimination in consumer goods, housing, services, insurance, etc.56 Many of these, by their very nature, are difficult to quantify; moreover, there are costs in anguish and suffering that can never really be compensated. Nonetheless, those that do lend themselves to calculation offer some remarkable figures. (The figures are unfortunately dated; readers should multiply by a factor that takes fifteen years of inflation into account.) If one were to do a calculation of the cumulative benefits (through compound interest) from labor market discrimination over the forty-year period from 1929 to 1969 and adjust for inflation, then in 1983 dollars, the figure would be over $1.6 trillion.57 An estimate for the total of "diverted income" from slavery, 1790 to 1860, compounded and translated into 1983 dollars, would yield the sum of $2.1 trillion to $4.7 trillion.58 And if one were to try to work out the cumulative value, with compound interest, of unpaid slave labor before 1863, underpayment since 1863, and denial of opportunity to acquire land and natural resources available to white settlers, then the total amount required to compensate blacks "could take more than the entire wealth of the United States"59 / So this gives an idea of the centrality of racial exploitation to the U.S. economy and the dimensions of the payoff for its white beneficiaries from one nation's Racial Contract. But this very centrality, these very dimensions render the topic taboo, virtually undiscussed in the debates on justice of most white political theory. If there is such a backlash against affirmative action, what would the response be to the demand for the interest on the unpaid forty acres and a mule? These issues cannot be raised because they go to the heart of the real nature of the polity and its structuring by the Racial Contract. White moral theory's debates on justice in the state must therefore inevitably have a somewhat farcical air, since they ignore the central injustice on which the state rests . (No wonder a hypothetical contractarianism that evades the actual circumstances of the polity's founding is preferred!) / Both globally and within particular nations, then, white people, Europeans and their descendants, continue to benefit from the Racial Contract, which creates a world in their cultural image, political states differentially favoring their interests , an economy structured around the racial exploitation of others, and a moral psychology (not just in whites but sometimes in nonwhites also) skewed consciously or unconsciously toward privileging them, taking the status quo of differential racial entitlement as normatively legitimate, and not to be investigated further.

*1ar extensions Extend our Giroux evidence that talks about “the point of no return” surveillance net subordinates human needs, public goods, and justice to the demands of commerce and the accumulation of capital. This means curtailing surveillance is key to the end of capitalism.

2AC Speaking For Others K (super sketch) 1. The subalternity of identity is not static but rather socially contingent – that means fracturing linearities of history by piecing together ensembles of narratives to re-conceptualize power relationships. 2. Silence is never the answer – our pedagogical performance is productive Giroux 13

(Henry Giroux, Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University, “Hope in a Time of Permanent War”, 09/04/13, AD: 12/4/14, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/18578-hope-in-a-time-of-permanentwar | Kushal)

War has become not simply a strategy but a way of life in the United States. It has been elevated to an all-encompassing ideology and politics that includes a view of all citizens as potential terrorists in need of surveillance and an ongoing attack on dissidents, critical journalists, educators and any public sphere capable of questioning authority. Hope provides a potential register of resistance , a new language, a different understanding of politics and a view of the future in which the voices of the public are heard rather than silenced. Hope also accentuates how politics might be played out on the terrain of imagination and desire as well as in material relations of power and concrete social formations. Freedom and justice, in this instance, have to be mediated through the connection between civic education and political agency, which presupposes that the goal of hope is not to liberate the individual from the social - a central tenet of neoliberalism - but to take seriously the notion that the individual can only be liberated through the social. Democratic hope is a subversive, defiant practice that makes power visible and interrogates and resists those events, social relations and ideas that pose a threat to democracy. It refuses to escape into firewall of obtuse academic discourse removed from the problems of everyday life, it rejects the alleged neutrality of mainstream media, rebuffs the discourse of idiocy and simplification that characterizes celebrity culture, and it disallows a sterile and empty discourse of common sense, which wages a war on informed criticism, the imagination and the very possibility of imagining a better world. Hope at its best provides a link, however transient, provisional and contextual, between passion, vision and critique, on the one hand, and engagement and transformation, on the other. But for such a notion of hope to be consequential it has to be grounded in a pedagogical project that has some hold on the present. Hope becomes meaningful to the degree that it identifies agencies and processes, offers alternatives to an age of profound pessimism, reclaims an ethic of compassion and justice, and struggles for those institutions in which equality, freedom and justice flourish as part of the ongoing struggle for a global democracy. Yet, such hopes do not materialize out of thin air. They have to be nourished, developed, debated, examined and acted upon to become meaningful . And this takes time, and demands what might be called an "impatient patience." When outrage dissipates into silence, crippling the mind, imagination, spirit, and collective will, it becomes almost impossible to fight the galloping forces of authoritarianism that beset the United States and many other countries. But one cannot dismiss as

impossible what is simply difficult, even if such difficulty defies hope itself. Bauman is right, once again, in arguing that "As to our hopes: hope is one human quality we are bound never to lose without losing our humanity. But we may be similarly certain that a safe haven in which to drop its anchor will take a very long time to be found."[xx] As the current administration tries to persuade the American public and a cravenly Congress that military intervention is necessary in Syria, Obama is betting against hope - against the possibility that his investment in war, state violence and secrecy will be challenged by the American public. There is more at stake here than a military strike against Syria, there is the Hobbesian imaginary of endless permanent war and the presence of a security-warfare state that can only imagine violence as a solution to whatever problem it identifies. The future of American society lies in opposition to the warfare state, its warfare culture, its mad machinery of violence and its gross misdeeds. State violence is not a measure of greatness and honor. Such violence trades in incredulous appeals to security and fear mongering in its efforts to paralyze the impulse for justice, the culture of questioning, and the civic courage necessary to refuse and oppose complicity with state terrorism. Hope turns radical when it exposes the acts of aggression against injustices perpetuated by a militarized state that can only dream of war. But hope does more than critique, dismantle, and expose the ideologies, values, institutions, and social relations that are pushing so many countries today into authoritarianism. It begs for more than a retreat into the language of criticism by developing a renewed sense of what it means to imagine otherwise , rethink a more just sense of the future, reclaim the principles of a real democracy, and organize a political discourse that inhabits not common sense but reflective sense, good sense— a sense that the struggle is not over and demands a broad based social movement in which the struggle for a new democratic global social order can be constructed.

3. Authentic representation should not be a reason for rejection because any understanding of identity is internal. The affirmative’s scholarship is NOT a PRESCRIPTION of our own identities that’s 1AC Prashad. This has two impacts: A) Liminality DA — their critique does not take into account the insufficiency of racial categorization. Because of the multiplicity of identity, claims to authenticity only serve whiteness because it limits inter-racial and inter-subaltern solidarity and is reminicist of “divide and conquer” politics – this turns the K B) Shared Heritage DA – we all are burdened with the legacies of African, South Asian, and South American heritages. Arguing that “only blacks can represent blacks”, and “only desis can represent desis” builds our communities behind high walls. This reifies cultural oppression. This prevents social justice C) Divide and Conquer DA – they reconstitute the divide and conquer tactics of white colonialism Bell Hooks 3, social critic extraordinaire, “Beyond Black Only: Bonding Beyond Race”, http://prince.org/msg/105/50299?pr African Americans have been at the forefront of the struggle to end racism and white supremacy in the United States since individual free black immigrants and the larger body of enslaved blacks first landed here. Even though much of that struggle has been directly concerned with the plight of black people, all gains received from civil rights work have had tremendous positive impact on the social status of all non-white groups in this country.

Bonding between enslaved Africans, free Africans, and Native Americans is well documented. Freedom fighters from all groups (and certainly there were many traitors in all three groups who were co-opted by rewards given by the white power structure ) understood the importance of solidarityof struggling against the common enemy, white supremacy. The enemy was not white people. It was white supremacy. ¶ Organic freedom fighters, both Native and African Americans, had no difficulty building coalitions with those white folks who wanted to work for the freedom of everyone. Those early models of coalition building in the interest of dismantling white supremacy are often forgotten. Much has happened to obscure that history. The construction of reservations (many of which were and are located in areas where there are not large populations of black people) isolated communities of Native Americans from black liberation struggle. And as time passed both groups began to view one another through Eurocentric stereotypes, internalizing white racist assumptions about the other. Those early coalitions were not maintained. Indeed the bonds between African Americans struggling to resist racist domination, and all other people of color in this society who suffer from the same system, continue to be fragile, even as we all remain untied by ties, however frayed and weakened, forged in shared anti-racist struggle. ¶ Collectively, within the United States people of color strengthen our capacity to

Since white supremacy emerged here within the context of colonization, the conquering and conquest of Native Americans, early on it was obvious that Native and African Americans could best preserve their cultures by resisting from a standpoint of political solidarity. The concrete practice of solidarity between the two groups has been eroded by the divide-and-conquer tactics of racist white power and by the complicity of both groups. Native American artist and activist of the Cherokee people Jimmie Durham, in his resist white supremacy when we build coalitions.

collection of essays A Certain Lack of Coherence, talks about the 1960’s as a time when folks tried to regenerate that spirit of coalition: “In the 1960’s and ‘70’s American Indian, African American and Puerto Rican activists said, as loudly as they could, “This country is founded on the genocide of one people and the enslavement of another.” This statement, hardly arguable, was not much taken up by white activists.” As time passed, it was rarely taken up by

the fear that one’s specific group might receive more attention has led to greater nationalism, the showing of concern for one’s racial or ethnic plight without linking that concern to the plight of other non-white groups and their struggles for liberation. ¶ Bonds of solidarity between people of color are continuously ruptured by our complicity with white racism. Similarly, white immigrants to the United States, both past and present, establish their right to citizenship within white anyone. Instead

supremacist society by asserting it in daily life through acts of discrimination and assault that register their contempt for and disregard of black people and darker-skinned immigrants mimic this racist behavior in their interactions with black folks. In her editorial “On the Backs of Blacks” published in a recent special issue of TIME magazine Toni Morrison discusses the way white supremacy is reinscribed again and again as immigrants seek assimilation: ¶ All immigrants fight for jobs and space, and who is there to fight but those who have both? As in the fishing ground struggle between Texas and Vietnamese shrimpers, they displace what and whom they can…In race talk the move into mainstream America always means buying into the notion of American blacks as the real aliens. Whatever the ethnicity or nationality of the immigrant, his nemesis is understood to be African American…So addictive is this ploy that the fact of blackness has been abandoned for the theory of blackness. It doesn’t matter anymore what shade the newcomer’s skin is. A

hostile posture toward resident blacks must be struck at the Americanizing door. ¶ Often people of color, both those who are citizens and those who are recent immigrants, hold black people responsible for the hostility they encounter from whites. It is as though they see blacks as acting in a manner that

scapegoating is the mark of the colonized sensibility which always blames those victimized rather than targeting structures of domination. ¶ Just as many white Americans deny both the prevalence of racism in the United States and the role they play in perpetuating makes things harder for everybody else. This type of

and maintaining white supremacy, non-white, non-black groups, Native, Asian, Hispanic Americans, all deny their investment in anti-black sentiment even as they consistently seek to distance themselves from blackness so that they will not be seen as residing at the bottom of this society’s totem pole, in the category reserved for the most despised group. Such jockeying for white approval and reward obscures the way allegiance to the existing social structure undermines the social welfare of all people of color. White supremacist power is always weakened when people of color bond across differences of culture, ethnicity, and race. It is always strengthened when we act as though there is no continuity and overlap in the patterns of exploitation and oppression that affect all of our lives. ¶ To ensure that political bonding to challenge and change white supremacy will not be cultivated among diverse groups of people of color, white ruling groups pit us against one another in a no-win game of “who will get the prize for model minority today.” They compare and contrast, affix labels like “model minority,” define boundaries, and we fall into line. Those rewards coupled with internalized racist assumptions lead non-black

This will to disassociate is a gesture of racism . ¶ Even though progressive people of color consistently critique these standpoints, we people of color to deny the way racism victimizes them as they actively work to disassociate themselves from black people.

have yet to build a contemporary mass movement to challenge white supremacy that would draw us together. Without an organized collective struggle

forgetting common concerns sets the stage for competing concerns. Working within the system of white supremacy, non-black people of color often feel as though that consistently reminds us of our common concerns, people of color forget. Sadly

they must compete with black folks to receive white attention. Some are even angry at what they wrongly perceive as a greater concern on the part of white of the dominant culture for the pain of black people. Rather than seeing the attention black people receive as linked to the gravity of our situation and the intensity of our resistance, they want to make it a sign of white generosity and concern. Such thinking is absurd. If white folks were genuinely concerned about black pain, they would challenge racism, not turn the spotlight on our collective pain in ways that further suggest that we are inferior. Andrew Hacker makes it clear in Two Nations that the vast majority of white Americans believe that “members of the black race represent an inferior strain of the human species.” He adds: “In this view Africans-and Americans who trace their origins to that continent-are seen as languishing at a lower evolutionary level than members of other races.” Non-black people of color often do not approach white attention to black issues by critically interrogating how those issues are presented and whose interests the representations ultimately serve. Rather than engaging in a competition that sees blacks as winning more goodies from the white system than other groups, non-black people of color who identify with black resistance struggle recognize the danger of such thinking and repudiate it. They are politically astute enough to challenge a rhetoric of resistance that is based on competition rather than a capacity on the part of non-black groups to identify with whatever progress blacks make as being a positive sign for everyone. Until non-black people of color define their citizenship via commitment to a democratic vision of racial justice rather than investing in the dehumanization and oppression of black people, they will always act as mediators, keeping black people in check for the ruling white majority. Until racist anti-black sentiments are let go by other people of color, especially immigrants, and complain that these groups are receiving too much attention, they undermine freedom struggle. When this happens people of color war all acting in complicity with existing exploitative and oppressive structures. ¶ As more people of color raise our consciousness and refuse to be pitted against one another, the forces of neo-colonial white supremacist domination must work harder to divide and conquer. The most recent effort to undermine progressive bonding between people of color is the institutionalization of “multiculturalism”. Positively,

multiculturalism is presented as a corrective to a Eurocentric vision of model citizenship wherein white middle-class ideals are presented as the norm. Yet this positive intervention is undermined by visions of multiculturalism that suggest everyone should live with and identify with their own self contained group. If white supremacist capitalist patriarchy is unchanged then multiculturalism within that context can only become a breeding ground for narrow nationalism, fundamentalism, identity politics, and cultural, racial, and ethnic separatism. Each separate group will then feel that it must protect its own interests by keeping outsiders at bay, for the group will always appear vulnerable, its power and

When people of color think this way, white supremacy remains intact. For even though demographics in the United States would suggest that in the future the nation will be more populated by people of color, and identity sustained by exclusivity.

whites will no longer be the majority group, numerical presence will in no way alter white supremacy if there is no collective organizing, no efforts to build coalitions that cross boundaries. Already, the white Christian Right is targeting large populations of people of color to ensure that the fundamentalist values they want this nation to uphold and represent will determine the attitudes and values of these groups. The role Eurocentric Christianity has played in teaching non-white folks Western metaphysical dualism, the ideology that under girds binary notion of superior/inferior, good/bad, white/black, cannot be ignored. While progressive organizations are having difficulty reaching wider audiences, the white-dominated Christian Right organizes outreach programs that acknowledge diversity and have considerable influence. Just as the white-dominated Christian church in the U.S. once relied on biblical references to justify racist domination and discrimination, it now deploys a rhetoric of multiculturalism to invite non-white people to believe that racism can be overcome through a shared fundamentalist encounter. Every contemporary fundamentalist white male-dominated religious cult in the U.S. has a diverse congregation. People of color have flocked to these organizations because they have felt them to be places where racism does not exist, where they are not judged on the basis of skin color. While the white-dominated mass media focus critical attention on black religious fundamentalist groups like the Nation of Islam, and in particular Louis Farrakhan, little critique is made of white Christian fundamentalist outreach to black people and other people of color. Black Islamic fundamentalism shares with the white Christian Right support for coercive hierarchy, fascism, and a belief that some groups are inferior and others superior, along with a host of other similarities. Irrespective of the standpoint, religious fundamentalism brainwashes individuals not to think critically or see radical politicization as a means of transforming their lives. When people of color immerse themselves in religious fundamentalism, no meaningful challenge and critique of white supremacy can surface. Participation in a radical multiculturalism in any form is discouraged by religious fundamentalism.

4. Some forms of commodification are inevitable – our redeployment solves the terminal impacts Rich 12

(Camille Gear Rich, she’s an associate professor of law at USC specializing in feminist and racial legal theory, “Racial Commodification in the Era of Elective Race: Affirmative Action and the Lesson of Elizabeth Warren,” http://lawweb.usc.edu/centers/cleo/working-papers/olin/documents/12_19_paper.pdf) gz

To be clear, this essay is largely supportive of the current cultural trend encouraging greater respect for individuals’ racial self-identification decisions. However, it also shows that there is a need to reclaim so-called authenticity judgments about race and properly name them for what they are: functionalist inquiries that structure and limit employer discretion to define racial categories. For functionalist inquiries about race in the employment context allow the law to consider with precision how race is being “commodified” or used by an employer in a given setting,

by proposing substantive standards for this functionalist inquiry, ones that reject essentialist uses of race, the analysis charts a path that allows us to avoid the primary concerns Leong raises about racial commodification. For despite Leong’s concerns about the tendency of employers to racially commodify employees while administering diversity-based affirmative action programs, she also recognizes that it is unlikely we can fully extricate race from market pressures.17 This essay demonstrates that a properly tailored functionalist analysis will serve as the market control that ensures that diversity programs do not become unintended vehicles for racial stereotyping and subordination. Antidiscrimination scholars will recognize my approach as a variant of the “sociological and to set fair terms for what Nancy Leong calls a “racial capital” exchange.16 Additionally,

approach” to antidiscrimination law articulated by Robert Post, a method that recognizes government’s unavoidable and necessary role in shaping racial categories, even as it attempts to blunt their negative social significance.18 However, unlike Post, in this essay I fully embrace the functionalist logic of employment discrimination law.19 I show that functionalist inquiries that explore race’s use value do not by definition creating stereotyping dangers.

a properly tailored functionalist inquiry that uses race to explore and understand employees’ varied experiences of racialization gives us a unique opportunity to redefine diversity in a more effective manner. More specifically, by redesigning diversity initiatives to select for employees with diverse experiences of racialization, we can both destabilize race and discourage employers from engaging in racial essentialism. Rather

5. Permutation do the 1AC and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative 6. Perm do the alt – the af is an instance of genuine activism.

Butler and Spivak 10 (Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak, Who Sings the NationState? Page 66-69, 2010) I don't think it would be very easy to imagine Arendt singing and I'm not sure I'd want to. She doesn't have that Nietzschean moment. And I'm not sure I'd want Nietzsche singing either. It would probably still have those Wagnerian undertones. But I confess to liking the singing I heard on the street. That seemed good, that seemed like good singing. I think it leaves us with a question about language, performance, and politics. Once we reject the view that claims that no political position can rest on performative contradiction, and allow the performative function as a claim and an act whose effects unfold in time, then we can actually entertain the opposite thesis, namely, that

there can be no radical politics of change without performative contradiction . To exercise a freedom and to assert an equality precisely in relation to an authority that would preclude both is to show how freedom and equality can and must move beyond their positive articulations. The contradiction must be relied upon, exposed, and worked on to move toward something new. There seems to be no other way. I

we can understand it as a mobilization of discourse with some degree of freedom without legal legitimation on the basis of which demands for both equality and freedom are made. But this also involves a deformation of dominant language, and reworking of power, since those who sing are without entitlement . But that does not mean their lives are not mired in power. Obviously, the folks who are singing are not singing from a state of Nature. They're singing from the streets in San Francisco and Los Angeles. And this means that they alter not just the language of the nation but its public space as well . It would finally be an offense to regard it in any other way. SPNAK. Finally what? BUTLER. An offense. SPIVAK. Yes, a defense, a fantasy. BUTLER . think

The call for that exercise of freedom that comes with citizenship is the exercise of that freedom in incipient form: it starts to take what it asks for. We have to understand the public exercise as enacting the freedom it posits, and positing what is not yet there. There's a gap between the exercise and the freedom or the equality that is demanded that is its object, that is its goal. It's not that everything is accomplished through language . No, it is not as if "I can say I'm free and then my performative utterance makes me free." No. But to make the demand on freedom is already to begin its exercise and then to ask for its legitimation is to also announce the gap between its exercise and its realization and to put both into public discourse in a way so that that gap is seen, so that that gap can mobilize.

7. Alternative fails – A) Inaction is complicity Alcof 94 [Linda, Asst. Prof. of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Feminist Nightmare: Women at Odds, pgs. 296] The major problem with such a retreat is that it significantly undercuts possibility of political effectivity. There are numerous examples of the practice of speaking for others that have been politically efficacious in advancing the needs of those spoken for, from Rigoberta Menchu to Edward Said and Steven Biko. Menchu’s efforts to speak for the thirty-three Indian communities facing genocide in Guatemala have helped to raise money for the revolution and bring pressure

The point is not that for some speakers the danger of speaking for others does not arise, but that in some cases certain political effects can be garnered in no other way. against the Guatemalan and U.S. governments, who have committed the massacres in collusion.

B) Reinforcement of oppression Blomley 94 (Nicholas K. Blomley – Professor of Geography at Simon Fraser University, 1994, “Activism and the Academy”, http://www.praxisepress.org/CGR/CG_Whole.pdf) //MD why the silence? Several reasons spring to mind. One likely option is that, for many, it is not an issue, given that many progressive academics seem to think that “activist” work is not really “intellectual” work. If people engage in “external” struggle, they do so “on their own time,” as citizens. Certainly this is something that tenure committees So

seem to believe. For example, my university carefully codes it as “community service” and weighs it

That uncoupling of the categories “academic” and “activist” seems, for me, difficult to sustain. I was struck by the view of one friend, who noted that she did not see herself as an academic occasionally engaged in activism, but thought of herself as an activist who happens to be an academic. It could also be said that such a distancing evades a special charge – what Noam Chomsky once termed the political “responsibility of intellectuals.” Intellectuals in the academy enjoy a special privilege that comes from political liberty, access to information, and freedom of expression. “For a privileged minority”, Chomsky (1969, 324) insists, “Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth behind the veil of misrepresentation, ideology and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us.” To neglect that responsibility is, at the very best, to acquiesce to oppression. There are more as some small percentage of my total academic worth.

reasons for this self-silencing, perhaps, as we come to embrace a postmodern humility, caution against speaking for the Other. Although such a prudence is laudable, it can also all too easily become a self-serving excuse for inaction. We certainly need to be alert to the perils of the academic colonization of community life, but we should also avoid any romantic assumptions of some authentically ‘pure’ field of activism. The activists I have encountered have all had complex, and occasionally self-serving, agendas. As we all occupy multiple subject positions, so activism is a field of contradiction and diversity. recent and

8. Ethnically fixed representation is the same notion of normativity that underlies whiteness – truly endorsing a politics of social locations means accepting the fact that political resistance requires multiple nodes of attack – only a broad-based account can give us an efective map with which to navigate politics Rosi Braidotti 6, contemporary philosopher and feminist theoretician, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 7-8 'transposition' refers to mobility and cross-referencing between disciplines and discursive levels . I rely on transposable notions that drift nomadically among different texts - including those I authored myself - while producing their own specific effects. Transposable concepts are 'nomadic notions' that weave a web connecting philosophy to social realities ; theoretical speculations to concrete plans; concepts to imaginative figurations. TransSecondly, the term

disciplinary in structure, transposable concepts link bio-technology to ethics and connect them both with social and

I will inject feminism, anti-racism, environmental and human rights as an extra booster of theoretical energy and then let nomadic flows of becoming run loose through them all. political philosophy. Moreover,

Thirdly, the notion of transposition describes the connection between the text and its social and historical context, in the material and discursive sense of the term. The passion that animates this book is a concern for my historical

amor fati motivates me, not as fatalism, but rather in the pragmatic mode of the cartographer. I am seeking modes of representation and forms of accountability that are adequate to the complexities of the real-life world I am living in. I want to think about what and where I live - not in a flight away from the embodied and embedded locations which I happen to inhabit. In Metamorphoses I argued that, if you do not like complexities you couldn't possibly feel at home in the third millennium . Transpositions enacts this notion by proposing creative links and zigzagging interconnections between discursive communities which are too often kept apart from each other. To name but a few significant ones: bio-technologies and ethics and political agency; the omnipresence of a state of crisis on the one hand and the possibility of sustainable futures on the other; the practice of nomadic politics of difference versus technological monoculture; the creative potential of hybrid subjectivity, in opposition to new and more virulent forms of ethnically fixed identities; cartographic accounts of locations and normative stances . Ultimately: post-structuralism and ethical norms or values. situation, in so-called advanced, post-industrial cultures at the start of the third millennium. A kind of

More specifically, I will transpose nomadically from philosophical theory to ethical practice. Loyal to the feminist politics of locations, I remain committed to the task of providing politically informed maps of the present, convinced of the usefulness of a

situated approach as a critical tool to achieve an enlarged sense of objectivity and a more empowering grasp of the social. Politically, a cartographic method based on the politics of locations results in the recognition that not one single central strategy of resistance is possible (Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Patton 2000; Massumi 1992b). A heterogeneous style of politics is needed instead, based on centrelessness. As a corollary, this implies a variety of possible political strategies and the non-dogmatic acceptance of potentially contradictory positions. A scattered, weblike system is now operational, which defies and denies any pretence at avant-garde leadership by any group. Resistance being as global as power, it is centreless and just as non-linear: contemporary politics is rhizomic.

2AC University K (sketchy) Reclaiming the university is absolutely vital – it serves as a pipeline to the political – transforming debate into a site for critical pedagogy allows us to become efective critically engaged citizens Henry Giroux, #1 badass, November 11th 2011, “Occupy Colleges Now: Students as the New Public Intellectuals,” http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/5046:occupycolleges-now--students-as-the-new-public-intellectuals Finding our way to a more humane future demands a new politics, a new set of values, and a renewed sense of the fragile nature of democracy. In part, this means educating a new generation of intellectuals who not only defend higher education as a democratic public sphere, but also frame their own agency as intellectuals willing to connect their research, teaching, knowledge, and service with broader democratic concerns over equality, justice, and an alternative vision of what the university might be and what society could become. Under the present circumstances, it is time to remind ourselves that academe may be one of the few public spheres available that can provide the educational conditions for students, faculty, administrators, and community members to embrace pedagogy as a space of dialogue and unmitigated questioning, imagine diferent futures, become border-crossers, and embrace a language of critique and possibility that makes visible the urgency of a politics necessary to address important social issues and contribute to the quality of public life and the common good. As people move or are pushed by authorities out of their makeshift tent cities in Zuccotti Park and other public spaces in cities across the United States, the harsh registers and interests of the punishing state become more visible. The corporate state cannot fight any longer with ideas because their visions, ideologies and survival of

Students all over the country are changing the language of politics while reclaiming pedagogy as central to any viable notion of agency, resistance and collective struggle. In short, they have become the new public intellectuals, using their bodies, social media, new digital technologies, and any other viable educational tool to raise new questions, point to new possibilities, and register their criticisms of the the fittest ethic are bankrupt, fast losing any semblance of legitimacy.

various antidemocratic elements of casino capitalism and the emerging punishing state. Increasingly, the Occupy Wall Street protesters are occupying colleges and universities, setting up tents, and using the power of ideas to engage other students, faculty, and anyone else who will listen to them. The call is going out from the University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, Florida State University, Duke University, Rhode Island College, and over 120 other universities that the time has come to connect knowledge not just to power, but to the very meaning of what it means to be an engaged intellectual responsive to the possibilities of individual and collective resistance and change. This poses a new challenge not only for the brave students mobilizing these protests on college campuses, but also to faculty who often relegate themselves to the secure and comfortable claim that scholarship should be disinterested, objective and removed from politics.

There is a great deal these students and

young people can learn from this turn away from the so-called professionalism of disinterested knowledge and the disinterested intellectual by reading the works of Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, Jacques Derrida, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Elaine Scarry, Pierre Bourdieu and others who offer a treasure trove of theoretical and political insights about what it means to assume the role of a public intellectual as both a matter of social responsibility and political urgency. As the world rises up against economic injustice, Truthout brings you the latest news and analysis, free of corporate influence. Help support this work with a tax-deductible donation today. In response to the political indifference and moral coma that embraced many universities and scholars since the 1980s, the late Said argued for intellectuals to move beyond the narrow interests of professionalism and specialization as well as the cheap

seductions of celebrity culture being offered to a new breed of publicity and anti-public intellectuals. Said wanted to defend the necessity - indeed, keep open the possibility - of the intellectual who does not consolidate power, but questions it, connects his or her work to the alleviation of human suffering, enters the public sphere in order to deflate the claims of triumphalism and recalls from exile those dangerous memories that are often repressed or ignored. Of course, such a position is at odds with those intellectuals who have retreated into arcane discourses that offer the cloistered protection of the professional recluse. Making few connections with audiences outside of the academy or to the myriad issues that bear down on everyday lives, many academics became increasingly irrelevant, while humanistic inquiry suffers the aftershocks of flagging public support. The Occupy Wall Street protesters have refused this notion of the deracinated, if not increasingly irrelevant, notion of academics and students as disinterested intellectuals. They are not alone. Refusing the rewards of apolitical professionalism or

intellectuals need to ask themselves some very "uncomfortable questions about our values and traditions, our vision for the future, our responsibilities as citizens, the legitimacy of our 'democratic institutions,' the role of the state, the police, the army, the judiciary, and the intellectual obscure specialization so rampant on university campuses, Roy has pointed out that

community."[1] Similarly, Scarry points to the difficulty of seeing an injury and injustice, the sense of futility of one's own small efforts, and the special difficulty of lifting complex ideas into the public sphere.[2] Derrida has raised important questions about the relationship between critique and the very nature of the university and the humanities, as when he writes: The university without condition does not, in fact, exist, as we know only too well. Nevertheless, in principle and in conformity with its declared vocation, its professed essence, it should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance - and more than critical - to all the power of dogmatic and unjust appropriation. [3] Chomsky and the late Zinn have spoken about and demonstrated for over 40 years what it means to think rigorously and act courageously in the face of human suffering and manufactured hardships. All of these

theorists are concerned with what it means for intellectuals both within and outside of higher education to embrace the university as a productive site of dialogue and contestation, to imagine it as a site that ofers students the promise of a democracy to come, to help them understand that there is no genuine democracy without genuine opposing critical power and the social movements that can make it happen. But there is more at stake here than arguing for a more engaged public role for academics and students , for demanding the urgent need to reconnect humanistic inquiry to important social issues, or for insisting on the necessity for academics to reclaim a notion of ethical advocacy and connective relationships. There is also the challenge of connecting the university with visions that have some hold on the present, defending education as more than an investment opportunity or job credential, students as more than customers, and faculty as more than technicians or

At a time when higher education is increasingly being dominated by a reductive corporate logic and technocratic rationality unable to differentiate training from a critical education, we need a chorus of new voices to emphasize that the humanities, in particular, and the university, in general, should play a central role in keeping critical thought alive while fighting back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unraveling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning a subaltern army of casualized labor.

itself and prevent that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished. Corporations and the warfare state should not dictate the needs of public and higher education, or, for that matter, any other democratic public sphere. As the Occupy student protesters have pointed out over the last few months, one of the great dangers facing the 21st century is not the risk of illusory hopes, but those undemocratic forces that promote and protect state terrorism, massive inequality, render some populations utterly disposable, imagine the future only in terms of immediate financial gains, and promote forms of self-serving historical reinvention in which power is measured by the degree to which it evades any sense of actual truth and moral responsibility. Students, like their youthful

education, even in its imperfect state, still holds the promise, if not the reality, of being able to ofer them the complex knowledge and interdisciplinary related skills that enable existing and future generations to break the continuity of common sense, come to terms with their own power as critical agents, be critical of the authority that speaks to them, translate private considerations into public issues, and assume the responsibility of not only being counterparts in the 1960s, are once again arguing that higher

governed but learning how to govern. Inhabiting the role of public intellectuals, students can take on the difficult but urgent task of reclaiming the ideal and the practice of what it means to reclaim higher education in general and the humanities, more specifically, as a site of possibility that embraces the idea of democracy not merely as a mode of governance but, most importantly- as journalist Bill Moyers points out - as a means of dignifying people so they

it is crucial to struggle for the university as a democratic public sphere and the need to use that sphere to educate a generation of new students, faculty and others about the history of race, racism, politics, identity, power, the state and the struggle for justice. They are increasingly willing to argue in theoretically insightful and profound ways about what it means to defend the university as a site that opens up and sustains public connections through which people's fragmented, uncertain, incomplete narratives of agency are valued, preserved, and made available for exchange while being related analytically to wider contexts of politics and power. They are moving to reclaim, once again, the humanities as a sphere that is crucial for grounding ethics, justice and morality across existing disciplinary terrains , while raising both a sense of urgency can become fully free to claim their moral and political agency. Students are starting to recognize that

and a set of relevant questions about what kind of education would be suited to the 21st-century university and its global arrangements as part of a larger project of addressing the most urgent issues that face the social and

The punishing state can use violence with impunity to eject young people from parks and other public sites, but it is far more difficult to eject them from sites that are designed for their intellectual growth and well-being , make a claim to educate them, and register society's investment and commitment to their future. Students can be forced out of parks and other public spaces, but it is much more difficult to force them out of those sites designed to educate them - places that are identified with young people and register the larger society's obligation to their future and well-being . The political world.

police violence that has taken place at the University of California campuses at Berkeley and Davis does more than border on pure thuggery; it also reveals a display of force that is as unnecessary as it is brutal, and it is impossible to justify. These young people are being beaten on their campuses for simply displaying the courage to protest a system that has robbed them of both a quality education and a viable future. But there is more. It is also crucial not to allow casino capitalism to transform higher education into another extension of the corporate and warfare state.

If higher education loses its civic purpose and becomes simply an adjunct of corporate and military power, there will be practically no spaces left for dissent, dialogue , civic courage, and a spirit of thoughtfulness and critical engagement. This is all the more reason to occupy colleges and use them as a launching pad to both educate and to expand the very meaning

Knowledge is about more than the truth; it is also a weapon of change. The language of a radical politics needs more than hope and outrage; it needs institutional spaces to produce ideas, values, and social relations capable of fighting off those ideological and material forces of casino capitalism that are intent in sabotaging of the public sphere.

any viable notion of human interaction, community, solidarity, friendship, and justice. Space is not the ultimate prize here.[4] Politics and ideology are the essence of what this movement should be about. But space becomes invaluable when it its democratic functions and uses are restored. In an age when the media have become a means

the university ofers a site of informed engagement, a place where theory and action inform each other, and a space that refuses to divorce intellectual activities from matters of politics, social responsibility and social justice . As students and faculty increasingly use the space of the university as a megaphone for a new kind of critical education and politics, it will hopefully reclaim the democratic function of higher education and demonstrate what it means for students, faculty, and others to assume the role of public intellectuals dedicated to creating a formative culture that can provide citizens and others with the knowledge and skills of mass distraction and entertainment,

necessary for a radical democracy. Rather than reducing learning to a measurable quantity in the service of a narrow instrumental rationality, learning can take on a new role, becoming central to developing and expanding the capacity for critical modes of agency, new forms of solidarity, and an education in the service of the public good, an expanded imagination, democratic values, and social change. The student intellectual as a public figure merges rigor with civic courage, meaning with the struggle for eliminating injustice wherever it occurs and hope with a realistic notion of social change. Hopefully, the Occupy Wall Street movements will expand their appropriation of public space to the university. And if so, let's hope that higher education will be viewed as a crucial public good and democratic public sphere. Under such circumstances,

the university might be transformed into a

new and broad-based community of learning and resistance . This is a huge possibility, but one worth struggling for. Unlike the youth movements of the past, such a movement will not crystallize around specific movements, but will create, hopefully, a community of the broadest

movement will connect to the larger world through a conversation and politics that links the particular with broader notions of freedom and justice. And against the pedagogical machine and possible resistance and political clout. In this way, the Occupy

political forces of casino capitalism, this expanding movement will fight hopefully with renewed energy. It will be determined in its mission to expand the capacities to think otherwise, and courageous in its attempts to take risks.

It will be brave in its willingness to change the nature of the questions asked, fight to hold power accountable, and struggle to provide the formative culture for students and others to fight for those economic, political, social, and cultural conditions that are essential both to their future and to democracy itself .

Try or die for the academy Henry A. Giroux, #1 badass, 11-20-2008, “Against the Militarized Academy,” http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/81138:against-the-militarized-academy While there is an ongoing discussion about what shape the military-industrial complex will take under an Obama

what is often left out of this analysis is the intrusion of the military into education. One example of the increasingly intensified and expansive symbiosis between the military-industrial complex and academia was on full display when Robert Gates, the secretary of defense, announced the creation of what he calls a new "Minerva Consortium," ironically named after the goddess of wisdom, whose purpose is to fund various universities to "carry out social-sciences research relevant to national security."(1) Gates's desire to turn universities into militarized knowledge factories producing knowledge, research and personnel in the interest of the Homeland (In)Security State should be of special concern for intellectuals , artists, academics and others who believe that the presidency, higher

university should oppose such interests and alignments. At the very least, the emergence of the Minerva Consortium raises a larger set of concerns about the ongoing militarization of higher education in the United States.

the increasing spread of the discourse and values of militarization throughout the social order is intensifying the shift from the promise of a liberal democracy to the reality of a militarized society. Militarization suggests more than simply a militaristic ideal - with its celebration of war as the truest measure of the health of the nation and the soldier-warrior as the most noble expression of the merging of masculinity and unquestioning patriotism – [and] an intensification and expansion of the underlying values, practices, ideologies, social relations and cultural representations associated with military culture . What appears new about the amplified militarization of the post-9/11 world is that it has become normalized, serving as a powerful educational force that shapes our lives, memories and daily experiences. As an educational force, military power produces identities, goods, institutions, knowledge, modes of communication and afective investments - in short, it now bears down on all aspects of social life and the social order. As Michael Geyer points out, what is distinctive about the militarization of the social order is that civil society not only "organizes itself for the production of violence,"(2) but increasingly spurs a gradual erosion of civil liberties . Military power and In a post-9/11 world, with its all-embracing war on terror and a culture of fear,

policies are expanded to address not only matters of defense and security, but also problems associated with the entire health and social life of the nation, which are now measured by military spending, discipline and loyalty, as well as hierarchical modes of authority. As citizens increasingly assume the roles of informer, soldier and consumer

we see the very idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research being usurped by a manic jingoism and a market-driven fundamentalism that enshrine the willing to enlist in or be conscripted by the totalizing war on terror,

entrepreneurial spirit and military aggression as means to dominate and control society. This should not surprise us, since, as William G. Martin, a professor of sociology at Binghamton University, indicates, "universities, colleges and schools have been targeted precisely because they are charged with both socializing youth and producing knowledge of peoples and cultures beyond the borders of Anglo-America."(3) But rather than be lulled into

we need to be prepared to reclaim institutions such as the university that have historically served as vital democratic spheres protecting and serving the interests of social justice and equality. What I want to suggest is that such a struggle is not only political, but also pedagogical in nature. Over 17 million students pass through the hallowed halls of academe, and it is crucial that they be educated in ways that enable them to recognize creeping militarization and its efects throughout American society, particularly in terms of how these efects threaten "democratic government at home just as they menace the independence and sovereignty of other countries." (4) But students must also recognize complacency by the insidious spread of corporate and military power,

how such anti-democratic forces work in attempting to dismantle the university itself as a place to learn how to think critically and participate in public debate and civic engagement.(5) In part, this means giving them the tools

resist complicity with the production of knowledge, information and technologies in classrooms and research labs that contribute to militarized goals and violence. Even so, there is more at stake than to fight for the demilitarization of knowledge on college campuses - to

simply educating students to be alert to the dangers of militarization and the way in which it is redefining the very mission of higher education. Chalmers Johnson, in his continuing critique of the threat that the politics of empire

if the United States is not to degenerate into a military dictatorship, in spite of Obama's election, a grass-roots movement will have to occupy center stage in opposing militarization, government secrecy and imperial power, while reclaiming the basic principles of democracy.(6) Such a task may seem daunting, but there is a crucial need for faculty, students, administrators and concerned citizens to develop alliances for long-term organizations and social movements to resist the growing ties among higher education, on the one presents to democracy at home and abroad, argues that

hand, and the armed forces, intelligence agencies and war industries on the other - ties that play a crucial role in

Opposing militarization as part of a broader pedagogical strategy in and out of the classroom also raises the question of what kinds of competencies, skills and knowledge might be crucial to such a task. One possibility is to develop critical educational theories and practices that define the space of learning not only through the critical consumption of knowledge but also through its production for peaceful and socially just ends. In the fight against militarization and "armed intellectuals," educators need a language of critique, but they also need a language that embraces a sense of hope and collective struggle . This reproducing militarized knowledge.

means elaborating the meaning of politics through a concerted effort to expand the space of politics by reclaiming "the public character of spaces, relations, and institutions regarded as private" on the other.(7) We live at a time when matters of life and death are central to political governance. While registering the shift in power toward the large-scale production of death, disposability and exclusion, a new understanding of the meaning and purpose of higher education must also point to notions of agency, power and responsibility that operate in the service of life, democratic struggles and the expansion of human rights. Finally, if higher education is to come to grips with the multilayered pathologies produced by militarization, it will have to rethink not merely the space of the university as

the global space in which intellectuals, educators, students, artists, labor unions and other social actors and movements can form transnational alliances to oppose the death-dealing ideology of militarization and its effects on the world - including violence, a democratic public sphere, but also

pollution, massive poverty, racism, the arms trade, growth of privatized armies, civil conflict, child slavery and the

it is time for educators and students to take a stand and develop global organizations that can be mobilized in ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the Bush regime comes to an end,

the effort to supplant a culture of war with a culture of peace, whose elemental principles must be grounded in relations of economic, political, cultural and social democracy and the desire to sustain human life.

They are contradictory because they engage academia while also saying it is bad – that sustains whiteness Nakayama & Krizek ‘95 Asst Prof, Dept of Communication @ Arizona State Univ. Asst Prof, Dept of Communication @ St. Louis Univ. 1995 Thomas K. -& Robert L.-; “WHITENESS: A Strategic Rhetoric”; QUATERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH 81, 291-309 Whether or not one discursively positions oneself as “white,” there is little room for maneuvering out of the power relations imbedded in whiteness. Whiteness, stated or unstated, in any of its various forms, leaves one invoking the historically constituted and systematically exercised power relations. This creates an enormous problem for those in the center who do not want to reinforce the hegemonic position of the center and for those elsewhere who would challenge this assemblage and its influence on their lives . As Foucault observed, discursive formations are replete with contradictions. In the assemblage of whiteness, we find

contradictions are an important element in the construction of whiteness, as it is by these contradictions that whiteness is able to maneuver through and that these

around challenges to its space. The dynamic element of whiteness is a crucial aspect of the persuasive power of this strategic rhetoric. It garners its representational power through its ability to be many things at once, to be universal and particular, to be a source of identity and difference. The discourses of nationality, for example, run counter to those of scientific classification; yet the emergence of a racialized nation has been marked out time and again in the U.S. and elsewhere. The discourses that define whiteness through its historical relationships to Europe further problematize these discursive movements. Whiteness eludes essentialism through this multiplicity

and dynamism, while at the same moment containing within it the discourses of essentialism that classify it scientifically or define it negatively . Our point here is not that there are contradictions within this discursive assemblage. Rather our principal thesis is that these contradictions are central to the dynamic lines of power that resecure the strategic, not tactical space of whiteness, making it all the more necessary to map whiteness. Whiteness is complex and problematic; yet in communication interactions we are expected to understand what it means when someone says “white” or “American” or even “All-American.” It is perhaps when whites use whiteness in communicating with other whites that the lines of power are particularly occluded, yet resilient as ever. This also has significant implications for communication researchers.

Some forms of commodification are inevitable – our redeployment solves your impacts Rich 12 (Camille Gear Rich, she’s an associate professor of law at USC specializing in feminist and racial legal theory, “Racial Commodification in the Era of Elective Race: Affirmative Action and the Lesson of Elizabeth Warren,” http://lawweb.usc.edu/centers/cleo/workingpapers/olin/documents/12_19_paper.pdf) gz To be clear, this essay is largely supportive of the current cultural trend encouraging greater respect for individuals’ racial self-identification decisions. However, it also shows that there is a need to reclaim so-called authenticity judgments about race and properly name them for what they are: functionalist inquiries that structure and limit

employer discretion to define racial categories. For functionalist inquiries about race in the employment context allow the law to consider with precision how race is being “commodified” or used by an employer in a given setting,

by proposing substantive standards for this functionalist inquiry, ones that reject essentialist uses of race, the analysis charts a path that allows us to avoid the primary concerns Leong raises about racial commodification. For despite Leong’s concerns about the tendency of employers to racially commodify employees while administering diversity-based affirmative action programs, she also recognizes that it is unlikely we can fully extricate race from market pressures.17 This essay demonstrates that a properly tailored functionalist analysis will serve as the market control that ensures that diversity programs do not become unintended vehicles for racial stereotyping and subordination. Antidiscrimination scholars will recognize my approach as a variant of the “sociological and to set fair terms for what Nancy Leong calls a “racial capital” exchange.16 Additionally,

approach” to antidiscrimination law articulated by Robert Post, a method that recognizes government’s unavoidable and necessary role in shaping racial categories, even as it attempts to blunt their negative social significance.18 However, unlike Post, in this essay I fully embrace the functionalist logic of employment discrimination law.19 I show that functionalist inquiries that explore race’s use value do not by definition creating stereotyping dangers.

a properly tailored functionalist inquiry that uses race to explore and understand employees’ varied experiences of racialization gives us a unique opportunity to redefine diversity in a more effective manner. More specifically, by redesigning diversity initiatives to select for employees with diverse experiences of racialization, we can both destabilize race and discourage employers from engaging in racial essentialism. Rather

2AC Tuck and Yang (sketchy) TRY OR DIE FOR RESEARCH – research may be coopted, but it’s the only hope for inquiry – permutation solves because research isn’t just saying no, but investigating the crime, which is what the af does Tuck and Yang – ’14 – Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations, SUNY New Paltz and Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies, UC San Diego (Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” Humanizing Research, https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf, p. 223, MM)

Research is a dirty word among many Native communities (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999), and arguably, also among ghettoized (Kelley, 1997), Orientalized (Said, 1978), and other communities of overstudied Others. The ethical standards of the academic industrial complex are a recent development , and like so many post-civil rights reforms, do not always do enough to ensure that social science research is deeply ethical, meaningful, or useful for the individual or community being researched. Social science often works to collect stories of pain and humiliation in the lives of those being researched for commodification. However, these same stories of pain and humiliation are part of the collective wisdom that often informs the writings of researchers who attempt to position their intellectual work as decolonization. Indeed, to refute the crime, we may need to name it. How do we learn from and respect the wisdom and desires in the stories that we (over) hear, while refusing to portray/betray them to the spectacle of the settler colonial gaze? How do we develop an ethics for research

as fraught as research is in its complicity with power, it is one of the last places for legitimated inquiry. It is at least still a space that proclaims to care about curiosity. In this essay, we theorize refusal not just as a "no," but as a type of investigation into "what you need to know and what I refuse to write in" (Simpson, 2007, p. 72). Therefore, we present a refusal to do research, or a refusal within research, as a way of thinking about humanizing researchers. that differentiates between power—which deserves a denuding, indeed petrifying scrutiny—and people? At the same time,

Research is uniquely good in context of the af – a combination of desire and pain centered narratives, the perm, solves the impact to the K * By having our desire and the damage research together, we generate productive tension between different epistomologies

Tuck and Yang – ’14 – Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations, SUNY New Paltz and Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies, UC San Diego (Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” Humanizing Research, https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf, p. 237, MM)

Research is just one form of knowing , but in the Western academy, it eclipses all others. In this way, the relationship of research to other human ways of knowing resembles a colonizing formation, acquiring, claiming,

In the current neoliberal moment, there are few spaces that remain dedicated to human curiosity and human inquiry aside from research. This component of research is valuable, and worth sustaining, yet we must simultaneously protect and nurture other nonresearch spaces/approaches for curiosity and inquiry. Calling everything research doesn't help to ensure that there are multiple opportunities to be curious, or to make meaning in life. We aren't advising anyone to insert artificial or insurmountable barriers between research and absorbing, consuming.

other forms of human inquiry, or to think of research and art as impermeable or discrete—just to attend to the productive tensions between genres/epistemologies, to gather the benefits of what might be a dialogical relationship between research and art.

Their argument creates the personal as inevitably inferior – recreates our impacts Ahmed 4 (Sara, Australian and British academic working at the intersection of feminist theory, queer theory, critical race theory and postcolonialism “The Cultural Politics of Emotion”, http://books.google.com/books? hl=en&lr=&id=QT8YAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Emotion+Pain+Spectacle&ots =G1xGus-RMD&sig=WTOzM5XSx5ggYFmCKBHpZj4aW-g#v=onepage&q=Emotion %20Pain%20Spectacle&f=false) I have associated emotions not with individuals, and their interior states or character, nor with the quality of

emotions have often been linked to the power of language . But they are often constructed as an instrument: as something that we use simply to persuade or seduce others into false belief (emotion as rhetoric, rhetoric as style without content). Such a view constructs emotion as a possession, at the same time that it presumes that emotions are a lower form of speech. This presumption in turn elevates reasonableness or detachment into a better address, one that does not seek to stir up trouble . I have offered an alternative view of emotions as operating precisely where we don’t register their effects in the determination of the relation between signs, a relation that is often concealed by the form of the objects, but with ‘signs’ and how they work on and in relation to bodies. Of course,

relation: the metonymic proximity between signs. In Chapter 4, I called this determination ‘stickiness’, examining how ‘signs’ become sticky or saturated with affect. My discussion of emotive language was not then a discussion of a special class or genre of speech, which can be separated from other kinds of speech. Rather this model of ‘sticky

language works as a form of power in which emotions align some bodies with others, as well as stick different figures together, by the way they move us. If emotions are not possessions, then the terrain of (in)justice cannot be a question of ‘having’ or ‘not having’ an emotion. Interestingly, in moral and political philosophy, those who argue that emotions are relevant to justice, often do so via a model of character and virtue. Robert C. Solomon, for example, signs’ shows us how

following from a classical view of justice as virtue, and David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s concept of moral sentiments, argues that: ‘Justice is first of all a function of personal character, a matter of ordinary, everyday

Justice becomes a form of feeling, which is about ‘fellow-feeling’, a capacity to feel for others, and to sympathise with their pain (Solomon 1995:3, see also feeling’ (Solomon 1995:3).

Smith 1966:10). We have already seen the risks of justice defined in terms of sympathy or compassion: justice then becomes a sign of what I can give to others, and works to elevate some subjects over others, through the reification of their capacity for love or ‘fellow-feeling’ (see Chapters 1 and 6). But we must also challenge the view that justice is about having the right kind of feelings, or being the right kind of subject. Justice is not about ‘good character’. Not only does this model work to conceal the power relations at stake in defining what is good-in-itself, but it also works to individuate, personalize and privatize the social relation of (in) justice. Character is, after all, an effect rather than

Emotions then cannot be installed as the ‘truth’ of injustice, partly as they do not simply belong to subjects. a ground of social life.

Pain and sufering cannot be separated from political methodology – their attempt to links to the 1AC Ahmed 4 (Sara, Australian and British academic working at the intersection of feminist theory, queer theory, critical race theory and postcolonialism “The Cultural Politics of Emotion”, http://books.google.com/books? hl=en&lr=&id=QT8YAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Emotion+Pain+Spectacle&ots

=G1xGus-RMD&sig=WTOzM5XSx5ggYFmCKBHpZj4aW-g#v=onepage&q=Emotion %20Pain%20Spectacle&f=false) The relation between injustice and feeling bad is complicated. Lauren Berlant has argued that injustice cannot be

Although pain and injustice cannot be reduced, they also cannot be separated: the fact of suffering, for example, has something to do with what is ‘wrong’ about systematic forms of violence, as relations of force and harm (see Chapter 1). The effects of violence arc something to do with why violence can be judged as ‘bad’. Now, reduced to pain, or feeling bad (Berlant 2000: 35).

this is not to say that what makes violence bad is the other’s suffering. To make such a claim is dangerous: it makes the judgement of right and wrong dependent upon the existence of emotions. The reduction of judgements about what is bad or wrong to experiences of hurt, pain or suffering would be deeply problematic. For the claim would allow violence to be sustained in the event that the other claimed not to suffer, or that I claimed the other did not

some forms of violence remain concealed as violence, as effects of social norms that are hidden from view. Given this, violence itself could be justified on the grounds of the absence of consciously-felt suffering . The reduction of injustice to emotions also ‘justifies’ claims of access to the inferiority of the feelings of others. We have probably all heard arguments that justify power relations through the claim that suffer. We must remember that

this other is in fact ‘not hurting,’ or might even be ‘content,’ or ‘happy’. Indeed, I could make this claim about

emotions are not transparent and they are not simply about a relation of the subject to itself, or even the relation of the subject to its own history. myself: ‘I do not hurt, I am happy, therefore it is not wrong.’ But

2AC Abelism There’s no alternative—reclaiming language solve—voting af in light of their k solves Vidali, Dept of English U of Colorado-Denver, 10 [Amy, “Seeing What We Know: Disability and Theories of Metaphor,” Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, v4, #1, pp33-54]

This process has made it obvious that

there is no possibility of breaking the links between

metaphor and disability, which is emphasized in a recent discussion of disability metaphors on the Society for Disability Studies listserv (which generated 19 posts).'5 In discussing the metaphorical concept of "paralysis," Stephen Kuusisto argued that "disability as a cognitive metaphor is always pejorative and its use as a trope represents a failure of critical and/or imaginative thinking." In response, Cynthia LewieckiWilson suggested that there is little "'pure' language without metaphor " and that perhaps we can "trope it for new ends." Growing from this, Anne Finger claimed that she is not incapable of motion because her right leg is paralyzed, but rather, as she says, "it means I have to find other, out of the ordinary ways of moving," and she suggests we avoid taking the "red pencil to all such language about disability" (Kuusisto, Lewiecki-Wilson, and Finger). This exchange reflects the difficulty of drawing attention to disability metaphors, as identification can lead to avoidance

phrases like totally lame might best be weeded out of language, but writing off a metaphor like understanding is grasping, because it assumes a body that can grasp, misses an opportunity to consider the often ignored kinesthetic ways that many of us learn. The imperative, then, is not simple avoidance of the knowing is seeing metaphor and other metaphors, but a willing embrace of the opportunity to diversify our writing to represent a wider range of bodily and cognitive experience. For example, we can ask students to find the "scents" of previous course ideas while and the "red pencil," rather than thoughtful engagement. To be sure,

reading a new article, as an exciting alternative to asking them to "see" the main point. We might suggest that colleagues taste and digest a new subject, in order to encourage bodily ways of knowing and interacting that go

Changing the verb from see/highlight/envision to a new sensory experience not only recognizes, but creates, new ways of knowing. In Talking Sketching Moving: Multiple Literacies in the Teaching of Writing, Patricia Dunn argues that we must engage "visual, aural, spatial, emotional, kinesthetic, or social ways of knowing " (1). Similarly, so must the language of Disability Studies scholarship and teaching —and the metaphors we use— represent this diversity, rather than relying on "seeing." As May and Ferri note, the disability community must always be "re-deploying disability metaphors in ironic or agential ways that disrupt simplistic equivalences between disability and social death" (124). And in a piece on theater and disability, Carrie Sandahl similarly argues, " Exerting some control over metaphorical representation in language, theory, politics, and artistic practice is a vital strategy for radical disability culture," and she importantly critiques the metaphors that manifest in her own stage productions (13, also see Tolan). While a mere policing of language is not helpful, disability communities must actively challenge ableist models and reclaim disability metaphors. Such shifts are more than playful language: like the impact of she or she or he as third-person pronouns that replace the supposedly neutral he, these revised metaphors do matter and can facilitate change and awareness, most immediately in our own communities.'7 beyond "witnessing" texts.'6

Everything we say is embedded with unintended meaning because oppressive structures are subliminally embedded in each of us – we must willing to make mistakes and learn to combat oppression Brown 11

, Artist Initiative Grantee at Minnesota State Arts Board Senior Academic Adviser for the College of Education and Human Development at University of

Minnesota Steering Committee at Education Abroad Network at University of Minnesota Volunteer Coordinator for Social Inclusion and Bullying Prevention at Marcy Open School see less Past 2012-2013 Buckman Fellow at Buckman Fellowship Travel and Study Grantee at Jerome Foundation Loft Mentor Series Award Winner for Poetry at The Loft Literary Center Institute on Community Integration Post-graduate Certificate Graduate Student at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota College of Education and Human Development/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota University Honors Program Academic Advisor at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota Learning Abroad Center/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota Foreign Lecturer--English Studies, Cultural Awareness, Humanities at Hokkaido University of Education Educational Technologies postgrad certificate program at University of British Columbia, Vancouver Adjunct Lecturer--Japanese Language at Wayne County Community College Adjunct Lecturer--English Composition at Wayne State University Foriegn Lecturer--English Studies, Creative Writing, English Literature at Sophia University--Tokyo, Japan ‘Screw normal’: Resisting the myth of normal by questioning media’s depiction of people with autism and their families, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gara0030/iggds/Screw%20Normal_FINAL_Dosch%20Brown.pdf

In sum, none of us in society, no matter what labels society gives us, are immune to the silent machinery that is ableism, or racism, or any ism‘. This is the crux of the argument essential to dismantle the messages the media sends to us about autism—the media teaches us silently and we learn well and treat Others based on what we are taught. So, we all therefore must be cautious about the silent power of the messaging inside us and be willing to unveil the hidden news frames that put ableist machinery to work in our society and in our beliefs. We need to risk making mistakes as we grow better at seeing what has been left silent for so long because ableism is deeply and subliminally embedded within the culture‖ (Campbell, 2008, p. 153), and it is also deeply and subliminally embedded‘ within every one of our minds

*2AC Nietzsche K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations Nietzsche is wrong:

A. Cause for Joy. You can’t just order someone to be happy – it requires a reason. Victor Frankl, Holocaust survivor; M.D., PH.D.; Visiting Professor, Harvard University; received over 29 honorary doctorate degrees, Search for Meaning.”

2K, “Man’s

Let us first ask ourselves what should be understood by "a tragic optimism." In brief it means that one is, and remains, optimistic in spite of the "tragic triad," as it is called in logotherapy, a triad which consists of those aspects of human existence which may be circumscribed by: (1) pain; (2) guilt; and (3) death. This chapter, in fact, raises the question. How is it possible to say yes to life in spite of all that? How, to pose the question differently, can life retain its potential meaning in spite of its tragic aspects? After all, "saying yes to life in spite of everything," to use the phrase in which the title of a German book of mine is couched, presupposes that life is potentially meaningful under any conditions, even those which are most miserable. And this in turn presupposes the human capacity to creatively turn life's negative aspects into something positive or constructive. In other words, what matters is to make the best of any given situation. "The best," however, is that which in Latin is called optimum—hence the reason I speak of a tragic optimism, that is, an optimism in the face of tragedy and in view of the human potential which at its best always allows for: (1) turning suffering into a human achievement

deriving from life's transitoriness an incentive to take responsible action. / It must be kept in mind, however, that optimism is not anything to be commanded or ordered. One cannot even force oneself to be optimistic indiscriminately, against all odds, against all hope. And what is true for hope is also true for the other two and accomplishment; (2) deriving from guilt the opportunity to change oneself for the better; and (3)

components of the triad inasmuch as faith and love cannot be commanded or ordered either. / To the European, it is a characteristic of the American

again and again, one is commanded and ordered to "be happy." But happiness cannot be pursued; it must ensue. One must have a reason to "be happy." Once the reason is found, however, one becomes happy automatically. As we see, a human being is not one in pursuit of happiness but rather in search of a reason to become happy, last but not least, through actualizing the potential meaning inherent and dormant in a given situation. culture that,

B. Ontology of Freedom. Seeking to better the world is the best reason – it articulates a fresh way of being. Todd May, Ph.D.; Professor of Philosophy @ Clemson University, 200 5, Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (5-6)

This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with

you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is

Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take MerleauPonty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, dangerous.

then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings.

Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free

the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back , invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . .

is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 hat are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom.

There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives.

that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this And

time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the

there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable ; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside,

our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both

That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it. waged and resolved.

AND – this ontology solves life-affirmation even in the face of total failure to reduce sufering. Mitchell Smolkin, M.D., 1989, Understanding Pain: Interpretation and Philosophy, p. 75-9 For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world.

Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and to find meaning in living. They desire to feel at home in the universe. Despite these natural needs, man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He is surrounded by irrational destructiveness, and by the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He [Humanity] hears his “nights and days filled always, everywhere with the eternal cry of human pain.”56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with

how does one avoid merely “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy? . This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. Camus criticizes “Nietzsche, at least in his theory of super-humanity, and Marx before him, with his classless society, [who] both replace The Beyond by the Later On.”62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and

above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder in the name of vague future goals. “Revolution consists in loving[those] a man who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] men who do exist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these

What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67

denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so

man needs to exert all his effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers in the world. Killing existing men for a questionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with the sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by stoical acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to renounce murder completely and work for justice and for a decrease in suffering. Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, one should take the victim’s side and “share with his fellow citizens the only certitude they have in common — love, exile, suffering.”68 What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus’ goals are modest. He realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”69 in that death, finitude and suffering will always conquer him. He realizes that after [humanity] man has mastered everything in creation that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society. Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. He who dedicates himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, to the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed and sustains the world again and again. Those whose desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to pursue his own search for meaning. Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”74 “It is time to forsake our age and much suffering. Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people]

its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] men. The rebel must “reject divinity in order to

Redemption is impossible. Human dignity and love can intermittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague bacillus that “never dies or disappears for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76 share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”75

C. Value-Creation. Compassionate sufering is key to true creativity. Michael Fraser, B.A., Ph.D.; Assistant Professor @ Harvard University, 200 6, “The Compassion of Zarathustra.”

This conventional interpretation of the close of Nietzsche's epic, however, is surely incorrect. A close examination of the passage in question reveals that Zarathustra never “overcomes” his compassion in the sense of ridding himself of it once and for all. There is no indication that our hero will fail to experience compassion upon further encounters with suffering, or even that he has ceased to feel compassion for the

Achieving “mastery” over a virtue or sentiment, remember, necessarily implies retaining it in one's psyche, not abandoning it. Rather than ridding himself of all sympathetic sentiments once and for all, Zarathustra affirms his feelings for the higher men as having had their “time” as an essential component of his destiny. Compassion may cause him real misery, but, when properly harnessed, it helps rather than hinders Zarathustra's creativity. Indeed, as tightly bound as sympathetic feelings are with the possession of knowledge and the faculty of imagination, they are necessarily present in any creative psyche. Remembering, then, that the telos of human striving is not happiness but creation (more specifically value-creation), the experience of compassion is nothing to be regretted. / While Rosen acknowledges that “the pitiful must be accepted as a natural part of human existence,” he nonetheless interprets higher men.

Nietzsche to maintain that “it must also be destroyed in order for the creation of higher values that will themselves exclude or minimize pity by the

valuecreation does not require the “destruction” of compassion; it requires affirmation of the imaginative strength which allows the wise to share suffering with the objects of their allencompassing knowledge. A mere brute warrior may not need to experience compassion, but a warrior-artist and value-creator surely must, albeit without allowing this suffering to interfere with his work. Though the weak may be unable to withstand even the slightest pain, the strong and creative not only withstand their suffering and their sympathetic suffering— they positively embrace them. Such suffering is of no imposition of a natural hardness that … is for Nietzsche the indispensable complement to the birth of a race of warrior-artists.”48 Yet

“matter” to them, for it is no hindrance in their creative task, only a hindrance to the pursuit of happiness undertaken by the “last man” and other such

Compassion, Zarathustra concludes, is an unbearable burden only for those who mistakenly believe the true goal of human existence to be contentment rather than creation. / Elsewhere, speaking of his philosophical honesty, Nietzsche reasons that, despite this honesty's regrettable aspects, “supposing that this degenerates (See Z I Prologue 5, p. 129).

is our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits—well, let us work on it with all our malice and love and not weary of ‘perfecting’ ourselves

sympathetic suffering is inseparable from his imaginative creativity, and then returning to his destined task with the glow of a healthy soul ready to use all his faculties— in our virtue” (JGB VII:227, p. 345).49 Zarathustra treats compassion similarly, realizing that

including compassionate imagination—in pursuit of his chosen task.50 This, remember, is how value-creation first appears, as a great self-affirmation on the part of the naturally noble (see GM I:2, p. 462).

Such a value-creator seizes the right to call even his propensities for

sympathetic suffering of Mitleid—by the name of virtue. The virtue so chosen will inevitably shine forth as a sign of his strength, and be put to service in the advancement of life. suffering—including a propensity for the

They are an essentialist understanding of oppression – only the af solves Hutchinson – ‘99 – Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law (Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Winter, 1999, “Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,” 47 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, lexis)

scholars and activists engaged in the development of strategies to combat social inequality must recognize the inherent complexity of systems of oppression (e.g., patriarchy, white supremacy and heterosexism) and the social identity categories around which social power and disempowerment are distributed (e.g., race, gender and sexual orientation). Multidimensionality and Intersectionality: Similarities and Differences / In a prior article, I argued that

n25 Placing legal theory and politics concerning issues of homosexuality and heterosexism at the focal point of my

social identity categories and systems of oppression are "inextricably and forever intertwined, " n26 that the failure of gay and lesbian legal theorists to interrogate and challenge racial and class subordination produces [*10] essentialist theories that invariably reflect the experiences of class and race-privileged gays, lesbians and bisexuals , n27 and that gay and lesbian essentialism precludes adequate political, legal and theoretical responses to the contingent and varying effects of heterosexist oppression. n28 Having analysis, I asserted that the various

demonstrated the experiential diversity of gay and lesbian existence, I urged gay and lesbian legal theorists and

employ "multidimensionality" as a theoretical framework for challenging heterosexist subordination. Within the gay and lesbian context, multidimensionality serves as "a methodology by which to analyze the impact of racial and class oppression (or other sources of social inequality) upon sexual subordination and gay and lesbian experience and identity and to cease treating these forces as separable, mutually exclusive, or even conflicting phenomena." n29 By offering political activists to

multidimensionality to law and sexuality scholars, I hoped to provoke a discourse on the intricacy of sexual subordination and to help reshape legal theory to account for this complexity. n30 More generally,

multidimensionality posits that individual acts of discrimination and the various institutions of oppression are complex and multilayered , owing their existence to a host of interlocking sources of advantage and disadvantage. / My analysis arose, primarily, out of an impressive body of feminist and critical race literature that has painstakingly countered the notion that sources of oppression operate in isolation from one another. n31 This scholarship has criticized, most extensively, feminist and antiracist legal theory and politics for failing to examine how the convergence of racial oppression and gender hierarchy often creates unique experiences for women of color - experiences that essentialist theories either submerge or fail

Applying a theoretical approach commonly [*11] referred to as "intersectionality," these scholars have proposed several public policy and doctrinal reforms that would make civil rights law responsive to the needs and experiences of women of color. n33 / Although I locate my work on the interlocking nature of race, class and sexuality within established scholarship on the synergistic nature of oppression, I also view my writing as both a substantive and conceptual extension and redirection of this literature . While the multidimensionality paradigm differs substantively and conceptually from the intersectionality scholarship, the insightful observations of intersectional scholars created the conditions to explain accurately. n32

for the development and evolution of multidimensionality and of other theoretical extensions and rearticulations of

intersectionality. n34 / My analysis represents a substantive extension of the prevailing literature on the "intersectionality" of oppression because this latter work has been limited, almost exclusively, to understanding and exploring the operation of just two sources of oppression - patriarchy and racism - in the lives of women of color.

My analysis builds upon - yet [*12] differs from - this work because it explores the social meaning of sexual identity (along with race, gender and class ), a topic which, recent scholarship notwithstanding, remains largely unexplored in the intersectionality corpus n35

and in legal theory generally. n36 / Conceptually, my analysis differs from the pre-existing body of intersectional

it attempts to complicate the implication of this latter work that social identity categories or systems of oppression only "intersect" in the lives of persons burdened by multiple sources of disempowerment, such as women of color . The idea that "intersecting" systems of oppression only affect limited categories of individuals is implied by statements in several writings in the race and gender line of analysis. n37 These scholarship because

statements, together with the almost exclusive focus the literature has given to experiences of women of color rather than those of white women and men of color - suggest a limited relevance of intersectionality. n38 Nevertheless, white women and men of color also experience "multi-dimensional" oppression . Men of color and white women, [*13] however, may not typically conceive of their subordination as a combination of gender and racial hierarchy because "maleness" and "whiteness," privileged and dominant categories in a patriarchal and white supremacist society, are rarely acknowledged to exist but, nevertheless, form the invisible foundation for social policy, civil rights strategies and critical theory. n39 Although some race-gender scholars have

n40 they have not explored signi [*14] ficantly the dimensions of these experiences but have limited their analyses primarily to uncovering the multidimensionality of women of color and their historical experiences with subordination . n41 / Placing the emergence of intersectionality acknowledged the multiplicity of white women and men of color experiences,

into an historical context provides a basis for understanding its heavy emphasis on issues of women of color, which, perhaps unintentionally, helped to create a false implication that only women of color experience multilayered subordination. When intersectionality was first introduced to legal theory, there were virtually no analyses of the unique effects of subordination on women of color in feminist legal theory and traditional civil rights scholarship; furthermore, judicial decision-making demonstrated a remarkable misunderstanding of or lack of appreciation for the ways in which women of color were affected by racial hierarchy and patriarchy. n42 Thus, by centering their analyses on women of color, the intersectionality scholars filled (and continue to fill) a tremendous void in civil

While the intersectionality critiques have provided substantial insight into the complexity of oppression, the limited (explicitly and implicitly) nature of the critiques leaves the intersectional paradigm open to a charge that it only applies to a specific category of individuals (e.g., women of color or poor white lesbians). n44 Consequently, rights jurisprudence. n43 /

skeptics can disparage or question the importance of argu [*15] ments concerning the complexity of oppression and regarding

the need for more sophisticated paradigms for confronting social

inequality. In the gay and lesbian context, for example, white gay male critic Richard Mohr has dismissed demands by lesbian feminists and people of color that gay political organizations challenge issues of racial subordination and patriarchal oppression and form coalitions with anti-racist and feminist groups. Mohr criticizes such efforts as an "unnecessary and... wasteful drain on the movement." n45 Because intersectionality and related scholarship imply that the multiplicity of identity and oppression has limited relevance and significance, these works may actually leave the impression that claims such as Mohr's are correct in a very limited, but troubling, sense. If, for instance, multilayered identities and oppression only implicate women of color and their experiences, then an examination of the "intersectionality" of race and gender might indeed be a "wasteful" - or at least less relevant - venture for white women and men of color. /

2AC Intersectionality K Intersectionality must be replaced with multidimensionality in order to generate pragmatic theory that faces the reality of the interconnection of everyone’s identity and oppression. Hutchinson – ’97 – Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law (Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Winter, 1997, “Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse,” 29 Conn. L. Rev. 561, lexis) B. Sources of Multidimensional Thought: Critical Race Theory and Feminist Legal Theory / Lesbian theorists and a small group of race theorists have introduced anti-essentialism into gay and lesbian legal theory. The most extensive anti-essentialist critiques in equality jurisprudence, however, have occurred in critical race theory and feminist legal theory. n318 Women

of color, and other scholars, writing in these areas have generated a sizeable body of literature that analyzes "intersectional" oppression, specifically racism and sexism, and that exposes the inadequacies of essentialist theories of equality. These critics argue for the development of equality theories that confront multiple forms of disempowerment--theories that respond to the complexity of subordination. Their scholarship has greatly

informed this Article and offers gay and lesbian scholars and activists guidance for the task of recentering gay and lesbian political discourse and legal theory away from essentialism and toward multidimensionality. / Kimberle Crenshaw, for example, explores the interactions of race and gender utilizing "intersectionality." Crenshaw states that "in examining the intersections of race and gender, I engage the dominant assumptions that these are essentially separate . . . ." n319 In addition, Mari Matsuda observes that "working in coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping us to realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone." n320 Matsuda encourages legal scholars to "ask the other question," that is, to examine what multiple forms of subordination a particular act or structure of exclusion may involve. n321 Similarly, Angela Harris, criticizing "the attempt to extract an essential female self and voice from the diversity of women's experience," argues that the survival of feminist legal theory depends upon its proponents' ability "to root out and examine [their] differences . . . ." n322 Harris thus argues that feminist legal scholars must "subvert [legal theory] with . . . accounts of the particular, the different, and the hitherto silenced." n323 Finally, Elvia Arriola “rejects the idea of arbitrarily separating out categories to address discrimination in our society. Instead [she] understands discrimination as a problem that arises when multiple traits and stereotypes constructed around them converge in a specific harmful act. Traditional categories then become points of departure for a deeper, more subtle analysis that explores the historical relationships between certain special groups, as well as an individual's experience within each of these groups.” n324 / These

critics challenge legal scholars and activists to endeavor toward discovering the multiple perspectives of the oppressed by employing "intersectionality," n325 "multiple consciousness," n326 and "holistic" n327 liberation theories. They counter, moreover, the notion that we can adequately examine or dismantle any one form of subordination without considering its interaction with other sources of disempowerment. n328 Their scholarship therefore serves as a model for moving gay and lesbian legal theory away from essentialism. / C. Multidimensionality: An Extension of Intersectional Analysis / This Article prescribes multidimensionality for gay and lesbian legal theorists. I see multidimensionality as a methodology by which to analyze the impact of racial and class oppression (or other sources of social inequality) upon sexual subordination and gay and lesbian experience and identity and to cease treating these forces as separable, mutually exclusive, or even conflicting phenomena. Multidimensionality exposes the various layers of social power that inform heterosexism and homophobia. Multidimensional analysis also reveals the multiple dimensions of social identity categories and offers a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing sexual subordination that neither "destroys" nor "fragments" n329 our lives. / Multidimensionality does not require every piece of scholarship to reflect everyone's personal histories. This is an impossible task. Rather, multidimensionality demands that we make explicit the racial and class (and other) assumptions that undergird our theories, realize these assumptions might (and likely do) limit the application of our theories, strive to discover the vast differences among individuals in oppressed social groups, and learn how these differences should (and do) affect theory and politics. Ultimately, I view multidimensionality as a discursive project aimed at unveiling the complexity of subordination and identity and reshaping legal theory to reflect and respond to this complexity. / The extensive, pre-existing body of anti-essentialist legal scholarship on race and gender and on the general connections between multiple oppressions is most commonly referred to as "intersectionality" by commentators, including Kimberle Crenshaw, its most notable theorist (and, perhaps, founder). Some readers may then wonder why I have chosen a new term--"multidimensionality"--to represent my analysis. I have done so for the following reasons. / First, I believe that the

terms "gay," "lesbian," "woman," "person of color," "racism," "sexism," and "homophobia" possess multiple dimensions and contextual layers. "Gay," for example, has racial, gender, and class dimensions. Therefore, "gay" may describe a poor, Latino male, a black, lesbian feminist, or a white, middle-class male--depending on the context of its usage. I also believe that these various dimensions are inextricably and forever intertwined. Multidimensionality

accurately captures this reality. / "Intersectionality," by contrast, subtly implies a convergence, particularly in the lives of people of color, of otherwise separate and independent categories. The term "intersectionality" thus suggests a separability of the host of identities and forces that define social groups and social power. I therefore prefer multidimensionality because it more effectively captures the inherent complexity and irreversibly multilayered nature of everyone's identities and of oppression. While the term intersectionality suggests a separability of identities and oppressions, the scholarship in this area has forcefully taught us otherwise. Crenshaw, for example, wishes "ultimately" to "disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable categories." n330 Accordingly, she views "intersectionality" as a "provisional" or "transitional concept that . . . can be replaced as our understanding of each category becomes more multidimensional." n331 Viewed in this context, multidimensionality is not a wholly alternative paradigm. Rather it can be seen as drawing upon, extending, and developing intersectionality by pushing legal theorists and political actors toward a "more multidimensional" understanding of social identity categories and subordination.

AT: Irigaray Irigaray’s politics of “two sexes” leads to the oppression of intersex and transsexual people and relinks them to heterosexuality Lisa Guenther, xx-xx-2010, “Other Fecundities: Proust and Irigaray on Sexual Difference,” http://www.academia.edu/302807/Other_Fecundities_Proust_and_Irigaray_on_Sexual_Difference Even in a feminist utopia, it is not clear that each and every woman would identify with Irigaray’s account of our “real” natures, nor is it clear that everyone who identifies as a woman would count as such for Irigaray. The conviction that there are two and only two sexes marginalizes an experience of bodily multiplicity that is just as phenomenologically real and compelling as the experience of sexual duality (Luce 85, 112–13). Irigaray’s repeated suggestion that the only genuine encounter with difference can happen between the two sexes enforces a heterosexual paradigm that marginalizes same-sex relationships (Luce 7, 48, 189–90, 221–22) and makes it impossible for Irigaray to account for intersex or transsexual bodies without characterizing them as aberrant or unnatural (Luce 49, 113–21).

AT: Asian Women Colonialism is the root cause Card Sunny Woan, Spring, 2008, J.D., Public Interest and Social Justice Law, emphasis in Critical Race Theory, Santa Clara University School of Law, “WHITE SEXUAL IMPERIALISM: A THEORY OF ASIAN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE,” 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 275, Lexis

the underlying cause of sexual-racial inequality between White men and non-White women is White sexual imperialism. This principle holds that the history of Western political, military, and economic domination of developing n5 nations compelled women of these nations into sexual submission by White men. Moreover, at the global level, the vestige of Western imperialism has left women of color subordinate to White men even today. The White sexual imperialism principle applies to the prevailing rationale for social inequality whenever: (1) the sexual-gender dynamic involves a White male and a non-White female, and (2) the non-White female descends from a culture or community that has been historically colonized by European or Anglican nations. This Article will focus specifically on how this theory applies to Asian feminist jurisprudence and the This Article proposes a new framework for studying the intersection of feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory. It claims that

experiences of Asian and diasporic n6 Asian women. / The first part of the Article reviews the stereotype of the Asian woman as hyper-sexualized yet demure and submissive, and traces its origins back to White heterosexual male presence in East Asian wars, particularly the Philippine-American War, World War II, and the Vietnam War. n7 The following parts of this Article tackle some of the most crucial issues that Asian feminist jurisprudence confronts, such as the portrayal of Asian women in pornography, n8 the rise in popularity of mail-order brides, n9 the "Asian fetish" syndrome, n10 and the underreported rates of sexual violence against Asian women, n11 all through the context of White sexual imperialism. Briefly, the Article also will

the problem of inequality can be addressed today through recognition of White sexual imperialism as a theory in both feminist and critical race jurisprudence. n12 / II. An American History of Hyper-Sexualizing Asian Women / White sexual imperialism permeates through all events in history involving U.S.-Asian relations. also show how dominance theory affirms the principle of White sexual imperialism and how

The first part of this section discusses the stereotype of the hyper-sexed Asian woman. n13 The second part then briefly revisits the history of Western imperialism in the East and the interplay of it with Orientalism and sexism. n14 Finally, the third part expands on the correlation between rape and war and the role of that dynamic in shaping White-Asian relationships. n15 / A. "Me Love You Long Time" and the Hyper-sexed Asian Woman / The Asian woman of White male sexual fantasies toddles into view--"small, weak, submissive and erotically alluring," n16 her "eyes almond-shaped for mystery, black for suffering, wide-spaced for innocence, high cheekbones swelling like bruises, cherry lips." n17 She not only exemplifies hyper-sexuality, but hyper-heterosexuality, male-centered and male-dominated. n18 She is presented as the perfect complement to the exaggerated masculinity of the White Man, existing solely to serve men and be sexually consumed by them. n19 Oriental Girls, an article published in Gentleman's Quarterly (GQ), described the Western male's fantasy n20 of the Asian female: / When you get home from another hard day on the planet, she comes into existence, removes your clothes, bathes you and walks naked on your back to relax you . . . She's fun you see, and so uncomplicated. She doesn't go to assertiveness-training classes, insist on being treated like a person, fret about career moves, wield her orgasm as a non-negotiable demand. . . . She's there when you need shore leave from those angry feminist seas. She's a handy victim of love or a symbol of the rape of third world nations, a real trouper. n21 / The dominant class often pits one marginalized group against another, compelling one group to feel inadequate in comparison to the other for not possessing a certain attribute or behaving in a manner that pleases the dominant class. This strategy incites enmity between the two groups, setting them as rivals who ought to battle for the approval of the dominant class. n22 In the end, though, this strategy only serves to both discipline and maintain the supremacy of the dominant class. / For example, mainstream white America often uses the "model minority" n23 myth associated with Asian Americans to overemphasize and blame black Americans for their "non-model" attributes and behavior, mainly their political activism, resistance, and civil disobedience. n24 Similarly, the direct comparison in the passage above between Asian women and white women serves to denigrate white women for "go[ing] to assertiveness-training classes, insist[ing] on being treated like a person, fret[ting] about career moves," or "wield[ing] her orgasm as a non-negotiable demand." n25 In other words, for pursuing sex equality. n26 As Professor Sumi K. Cho phrased it, "Asian Pacific women are particularly valued in a sexist society because they provide the antidote to visions of liberated career women who challenge the objectification of women." n27 Their sexuality, viewed as "naturally excessive and extreme against a [w]hite female norm," clearly exists not only within a sexual construct but within a racial construct as well. n28 Furthermore, this sexual-racial stereotype emerged as a direct result of the colonial encounter of war, n29 presenting the Asian woman as an "object for western consumption and the satisfaction of western desires." n30 / While contemporary media and the arts portray women generally as objects for consumption, they cast Asian women into the most inferior of all positions, below the white woman. Portrayals of the interrelationships between white American GIs n31 who go overseas, the Asian women they meet there, and the white American women back home show this dynamic. The 1989 musical Miss Saigon n32 epitomizes the subordinate and objectified position of Asian women. In the musical, an American marine arranges a one-night-stand with Kim, a Vietnamese bar-girl in Saigon shortly before the fall of the city. n33 After the destruction of her village, Kim flees to Saigon fantasizing about finding a "strong GI to protect her." n34 The American marine then leaves Vietnam, stranding Kim in Ho Chi Minh City with their son, Tam. n35 The marine returns home to the United States where he marries a white woman. n36 He continues with his life happily. n37 Meanwhile, Kim tries to escape and reunite with the marine. n38 She ends up in Bangkok, Thailand with her son, where she works at a massage parlor, n39 a consistent affirmation that Asian women in her position have no more function than to provide sexual services to men. The marine and his white wife meet Kim in Saigon. n40 When Kim realizes her American lover has no intention of marrying her, she commits suicide, leaving Tam under the care of the marine and his new wife, n41 quietly suggesting, perhaps, that Kim represents an unfit mother while the marine's wife, a white woman, is better suited to raise Tam. Lea Salonga, a Filipina singer-actress, became the first Asian to take on the leading role as Kim in the production. n42 Due to her immense popularity and success, producers of the show now hold regular casting calls in Manila and, in fact, anywhere with a sizable Asian female population. n43 Interestingly, the leading role as Kim is almost always played by a Filipina. n44 This casting suggests rather flippantly that all Asian women in this kind of situation are interchangeable and usable body parts, or "messy complications behind the male games of military history and foreign affairs." n45 Miss Saigon became an icon—an icon of the sex tour industry that

Said n47 described "Orientalism" n48 as a "Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient." n49 He noted the confluence of Orientalism and Sexism: "[Orientalism] view[s] itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders. . . . [The local] women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing." n50 Moreover, "[w]hen women's sexuality is surrendered, the nation is more or less sprouted in Asia as a result of American military presence. n46 / B. Imperialism, Orientalism, Sexism / In the late 1970s, Edward

conquered." n51 Thus, the sexual conquest of Asia's women correlates with the conquest of Asia itself. / In 1899, Rudyard Kipling dubbed the West's imperialist campaign in the East as "the White Man's burden." n52 He coined the term in a poem written to rouse Americans to colonize and rule the Philippines. n53 One former U.S. President took this message to heart. From 1894 until his

Theodore Roosevelt wrote and lectured widely on taking up Kipling's "White Man's burden." n54 He called imperialism a "manly" duty that American men must take up. n55 Civilized men had a "manly duty to 'destroy and uplift' lesser, primitive men," namely Asians, "for their own good and the good of civilization." n56 Roosevelt's express and blatant collocation of colonizing Asia and labeling that act as "manly" illustrates how throughout American history imperialism in and even Western scholarship on Asia has been viewed in a sexualized context. n57 presidency in 1901,

/ [*283] During the Philippines' revolt against Spanish inquisition in the late 1800s, the Americans came, promising to help. n58 Though the Filipinos hesitated at first, fearing the U.S. might try to colonize their country, President William McKinley gave his word that the U.S. "had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest." n59 Thus, the Filipinos accepted help from the United States and together they defeated the Spanish. n60 Before a Republic of the Philippines could be established, however, the United States issued the Proclamation of Benevolent Assimilation in which President McKinley "announced the U.S.'s intention to annex the Philippines. To make it legal, the United States paid Spain twenty million silver

The Filipinos resisted American colonization and the PhilippineAmerican war raged on for more than a decade, murdering over 250,000 Filipinos. n62 Famine and disease decimated entire towns, as the United States Army slashed-and-burned its way through villages. n63 More than half the country lay in waste from American-caused destruction. n64 / While occupying the islands, the American soldiers referred to the Filipinas as "little brown fucking machines powered by rice." n65 A sex industry sprang up to cater the U.S. military men, offering "a girl for the price of a burger." n66 It was the imperialistic conquest of the islands by the Americans that jump-started the sex entertainment industry in the Philippines. n67 During the Vietnam War, five U.S. military bases stationed in Thailand sheltered 40,000 to 50,000 American GIs at any given time. n68 Between 1966 and 1969, as many as [*284] 70,000 U.S. soldiers came to Thailand for "Rest and Recreation" ("R&R") n69 and ignited a sex industry. n70 R&R facilities have been, and continue to be, a vital component of the U.S. military policy. n71 With pervasive disregard for human rights, the military accepts access to indigenous women's bodies as a "necessity" for American GIs stationed overseas. n72 / After the Vietnam War ended, "there was a major campaign on tourism" targeting White men to sustain Thailand's sex industry. n73 By the early 1990s, several million tourists from Europe and the United States visited Thailand annually, many of them specifically for its sex and entertainment industry. n74 In 1995, for example, a study reported that sixty-five percent of tourists to Thailand "were reportedly single men on vacation." n75 The White conquest of Asia is "far from being 'a thing of the past' but is a lived experience of many." n76 As result of White imperialism, "Asians and members of the Asian Diasporas have existed and still exist through a colonized pesos--or two silver pesos per Filipino." n61

experience." n77 / C. Twin Pillars of White Male Domination: Rape and War / Sexual violence against women functions as a fundamental “tool of war.”79 In wartime, the rape of women by armed and uniformed state forces pose the greatest direct threat to civilian women.80 Often, combatants view the women of the conquered land as a “legitimate spoil of war.”81 Rape and sexual violence of indigenous women by military men have been tolerated “precisely because it is so commonplace.”82 Battle-hardened or brutalized soldiers, who are often removed from access to the usual outlets for sexual frustration, are especially likely to become rapists.83 Moreover, chiefly characteristic of Western armies, group machismo evolves in close-knit combat units where sexual performance is prized just as highly as combat performance.84 In the first and second conflicts in Iraq, U.S. troops were

While prostitution may be seen around any U.S. military base generally, military prostitution in Asia instituted by the U.S. occur within a colonial context, which distinguishes it from the nature of prostitution that takes place within the U.S. or Western European locations.86 Western societies often view Asian societies as less developed or underdeveloped, less sophisticated in comparison, and thus inferior to the West. 87 These perceptions in turn color the interactions between U.S. servicemen and Asian women, which are further exacerbated by sexually denigrating stereotypes the West casts on Asian women.88 The narratives of many Asian women reveal the denigrating treatment they received from American soldiers.89 Filipina sex workers , frequently shown violent pornography by their superiors to increase aggression.85 /

for example, frequently report “being treated like a toy or a pig by the American [soldiers] and being required to do ‘three holes’ – oral, vaginal and anal

The systems of prostitution perpetuated around U.S. military bases in Asia reaffirm the West’s perception of Asian women as sex objects. 91 In these contexts, Asian sex workers are registered and tagged like domestic pets, further relegating them to a less than human status. 92 Despite significant improvements in racial and sex equality over the last few decades, U.S. military men’s treatment of women in Asia have failed to progress. As recent as the mid- 90s, international controversy flared sex.”90

over an incident in Japan where two U.S. Marines and a U.S. Navy seaman gang-raped a 12-year-old Japanese girl in Okinawa, Japan.93 They watched the girl enter a stationary store and decided to ambush her.94 The two Marines bound the girl with tape, pulled her shorts and underwear down to her ankles, and after the three men raped her, remarked that the girl looked like she enjoyed it.95 To filter an analysis of the Okinawa incident through either sex inequality or racial inequality exclusively fails to convey fully why this 12-year-old girl suffered. While many scholars see the convergence of sex and race stereotypes as the root cause of the incident, examination of these two components only is not enough.96 To realize the gravity of harm

caused by sexual-racial disparities between White men and Asian women, a tripartite inquest of colonial history along with the intersection of sex- and

race- related forces must be applied. / F irst, the legacy of imperialism explains why the U.S. servicemen occupied Japan. / After the Allies defeated

World War II, the United States took it upon itself to meddle in East Asian political affairs, namely, regulating Japan to prevent it from engaging in imperialism. A sense of White supremacy meant the world could fall complacent to the idea that White imperialism was somehow “better” than Asian imperialism. Thus, while Japanese military presence in East Asia posed a threat to the world, American military presence would not. / Second, the prevailing attitude that Asian the Axis powers in

women occupy an inferior position to White women and, even more so, White men, assuaged the consciences of these three servicemen enough for them to not only rape the girl, but also express belief that she enjoyed the sexual conquest. Recall that, in the eyes of White men, Asian women seem to exist solely for their sexual gratification as hyper-sexed and unconditionally submissive creatures.97 The stereotype of Asian women as always consenting to sex allowed the three servicemen to deny the act as a rape. It is this potent triple combination of imperialist thought, racial inequality, and sexual inequality that perpetuate violence against Asian women by White men. Had these components not come together under White sexual imperialism, the Okinawa incident would never have occurred. III. Revealing the Undercurrent of White Sexual Imperialism in Contemporary Asian Feminist Issues / Asian a nd diasporic Asian women face higher risks of racial and sexual harassment than their White female peers. One of the main

the Asian experience cannot escape the stain of sexual imperialism, a stain which simply does not apply to the White woman's experience. n96 Although the theory of intersectionality n97 theories behind this is that

between race and gender alone cannot fully articulate Asian and diasporic Asian women's lives; rather, the concurrent operation and interactive mutual dependency between race, sexuality, and dimensions of colonialism expound on their subordination. n98 / This section comments on the present-day ramifications of White male exploitation and domination of Asian women and the feminist issues raised by the grievous legacy of White sexual imperialism left in both Asia and Asian America. The first part surveys Joo v. Japan, n99 a recent court decision where Asian women, who were the victims of atrocious war and sex crimes, brought suit in U.S. courts. n100 The omission of an analysis through White sexual imperialism may explain why the court ruled against the women. n101 The second part then shows how White sexual imperialism provides a compelling rationale for several contemporary issues of sexual-racial inequality facing Asian and diasporic Asian women. n102 / A. Joo v. Japan: A Case Exemplifying How the Invisibility of White Sexual Imperialism Affects Asian Women / 1. When is Prostitution Not a Commercial Activity? / In Joo, fifteen women n103 from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines brought suit against Japan in federal district court pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). n104 Under the ATCA, federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil claims by aliens for torts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." n105 The women alleged that Japanese soldiers routinely raped, tortured and mutilated them during World War II and that such acts by the Japanese government caused a direct effect on the United States. n106 In response, the defendant, Japan, argued that the plaintiffs lacked personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), n107 which bars plaintiffs from bringing a cause of action against a sovereign nation. n108 / FSIA does not apply, however, if, "the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on . . . outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States." n109 The plaintiffs contended that Japan's acts of prostituting the women to its military men constituted a "commercial activity" n110 within the meaning of the FSIA exception. n111 Furthermore, plaintiffs brought forth substantial evidence indicating that U.S. military men subsequently used the same prostituted "comfort women" for their own sexual gratification, thereby "caus[ing] a direct effect in the United States." n112 / The district court held that Japan's conduct did not constitute "commercial activity," and therefore FSIA immunity applied. Since the court found that the defendant's conduct was not "commercial activity," the court chose not to address the issue of direct effect by way of the American military men using the same "comfort women" after the Allies defeated Japan. / In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit heard the case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. n113 It affirmed the district court's decision "on the ground that Japan would have been afforded absolute immunity from suit in the United States at the time of the alleged activities." n114 In 2006, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, n115 and it seems no semblance of justice will likely be afforded to these women. / 2. Criticisms of the Joo Decision / Scholars argue that "court precedents and legislation concerning the proper inquiry for what constitutes a commercial activity strongly support an argument that commodified sexual slavery qualifies as a 'commercial activity' under Section 1605(a)(2)." n116 Furthermore, the framers of the FSIA recognized that "states increasingly enter[ed] the marketplace [to] compete with private market players." n117 Thus, despite the theory of foreign sovereign immunity, the Act wanted to make sure foreign states would not be "immune for suits based on their commercial or private acts." n118 To level the market playing field between private players and states acting as private players, the Act wanted to make sure states would not be absolved from liability for torts. n119 / In making its case, the District of Columbia District Court "compared Joo to a prior Supreme Court [decision], Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, n120 to demonstrate how the activities conducted by the Japanese did not constitute 'commercial activity' under the FSIA." n121 In Nelson, the Saudi government arrested the plaintiff at the government hospital he worked at, took him to a prison, and allegedly tortured him. n122 The plaintiff then brought suit against Saudi Arabia, claiming the commercial activity exception under FSIA against Saudi Arabia's sovereign immunity. n123 The Supreme Court, however, held that the alleged act came at the "hands of the Saudi police, and not in connection with the hospital" where the plaintiff worked. n124 Thus, "the nature of his arrest did not qualify as a commercial activity." n125 / The Joo court applied Nelson to justify why Japan's operation of comfort women stations did not fall within the FSIA commercial activity exception. It reasoned that the act of kidnapping women from their homes was not enough to invoke the commercial activity exception. n126 Even though the Japanese military used and regulated the comfort women stations, required soldiers to pay a fee for use, a fee which depended on the woman's nationality and his length or time of visit based on his ranking, and even received a substantial portion of the revenue from these exchanges, the court nonetheless found Japan's activities to be non-commercial. n127 Critics of the Joo decision argue that the court did not properly distinguish Joo from Nelson and misapplied precedent to fit a conclusion it desired. n128 They note the striking similarity in arguments and word choice between the court's opinion and the Statement of Interest submitted by the U.S. State Department. n129 This suggests that perhaps the court "succumbed to the pressure of the Bush administration to dismiss the case." n130 / Finally, one compelling aspect of the World War II comfort women case recently surfaced. In the aftermath of the war, when American troops entered Japan, the U.S. soldiers used the same comfort women stations Japan had set up. n131 The "GIs paid upfront and were given tickets and condoms. . . . [T]he charge for a short session with a prostitute was fifteen yen, or about a dollar, roughly the cost of half a pack of cigarettes." n132 First, ignoring the court's ruling against the women, the opinion referred to the acts committed by the Japanese soldiers as a "violation of 'both positive and customary international law,'" human rights violations and war crimes. n133 It remained entirely silent, however, on the contention the women raised about American GIs using the comfort women stations. n134 What the Japanese men did to the plaintiffs seemed patently abhorrent to the women; however, when American soldiers were charged with the same crime against the same women, the court declined to find a violation of either customary or international law. n135 / B. What Happens In Asia Does Not Stay In Asia: Consequences of

American military men stationed in Asia brought back to the stereotypes of Asian women as "cute, doll-like, and unassuming, with extraordinary sexual powers," which then became an expectation White men had of all women of Asian descent. n136 This section addresses the negative, and often dark, ramifications caused by the hyper-sexed stereotype has caused. / 1. White Sexual Imperialism on Diasporic Asian Women / United

States their

Asian Women in American Pornography / Few mediums reveal the White sexual imperialistic exploitation of Asian women more so than pornography. n137 In a 2002 study conducted by Jennifer Lynn Gossett and Sarah Byrne, out of thirty-one pornographic websites that depicted rape or torture of women, more than half showed Asian women as the rape victim and one-third showed White men as the perpetrator. n138 The study further uncovered a strong correlation between race and pedophilia, advertising with titles such as "Japanese Schoolgirls" or "Asian Teens." n139 Furthermore, images of Asian women in pornographic forms consistently came up through a keyword search for "torture." n140 / Many scholars warn that race-specific

pornography contributes to race-specific sexual violence. n141 Since the overwhelming majority of violent pornography features Asian women in particular, it follows that Asian women are at even greater risk of sexual violence due to their role in violent pornography. n142 Helen Zia, a noted social activist, suggests a direct connection between racial-sexual stereotyped pornography and actual violence against Asian women. n143 Additionally,

Kandice Chuh argues that "because Asian/American women are depicted as always consenting, they cannot be raped in the eyes of the law ." n144 / Pornography leads to other alarming sexual-racial trends involving Asian women as well. For example, depictions of Filipinas as sexual commodities on the Internet have been linked to the bride industry in Australia. n145 Researchers further speculate that online sexual commodification of Filipinas may at least partially explain why Filipinas experience disproportionate levels of domestic violence compared to non-Filipina women. n146 / White men's fascination with Asian women in pornography stems from early

To colonize the Asian nations, countries such as the United States flooded Asia with military forces. n148 As an inevitable result of military presence, prostitution centers consisting of local civilian women sprung up to cater to the White servicemen. n149 With these sexual experiences as their main, if not only, encounters with Asian women, White servicemen returned home with the generalization that Asian women are hyper-sexualized and always willing to comply with White man's prurient demands. n150 This germinated even more interest in Asian women as sexual objects. n151 To sustain this increased interest, the Asian sex tour industry developed. n152 Asian sex tourism further perpetuates the stereotype of Asian women as hyper-sexualized and always willing. n153 If Asian women are perceived as hyper-sexual, it understandably follows that sexually nineteenth century Western imperialism. n147

explicit materials, pornography for example, would include a preponderance of Asian women. n154 The next two subsections on the Asian fetish syndrome and mail-order brides will discuss how depictions of Asian women in pornography have produced gravely detrimental consequences on the Asian and diasporic Asian woman's experience. / 2. Bartering for Mail-Order Brides / In the 1970s when conservative White men grew discontent with the American feminist movement and White women's ensuing push for liberation, they turned to the mail-order bride industry in East Asia. n155 Believing American women to be too radical and career-oriented, many American men turned to mail-order bride companies for Asian wives who are "loyal and undemanding." n156 Guided by sexual stereotypes of Asian women as subservient, these men saw Asian mail-order brides as the muchwelcomed antithesis to the White American woman. n157 Where the White feminist woman actively resisted subjugation, the Asian woman was portrayed as enjoying it. n158 While these perceptions of Asian women originated from the colonial era, they have endured through the decades, haunting the experiences of Asian women even today. n159 / 3. Case of the Asian Fetish Syndrome / Michael Lohman, a third-year doctoral student at Princeton University, ranked in the top of his class in the applied and computational mathematics department. n160 In March 2005, the state charged him with reckless endangerment, tampering with a food product, harassment, and theft. n161 Lohman had surreptitiously cut locks of hair from at least nine Asian women and poured his urine and semen into the drinks of Asian women more than fifty times in Princeton's graduate student dining hall. n162 When investigators entered Lohman's apartment, which he shared with his wife, an Asian woman, they found stolen women's underwear and mittens filled with the hairs of Asian women, which they believe Lohman used to masturbate. n163 When the University released e-mail notifications of the incident to the student body, it failed to mention that Lohman's victims were all Asian women. n164 While the institution*n treated the case as an

Yin Ling Leung, organizational director of the National Asian Pacific American Women's Forum ("NAPAWF"), contended that the University misidentified the problem. n165 Leung argued that isolated instance of a psychologically unstable man,

the Asian fetish syndrome triggered Lohman's behavior. n166 Activists in the Asian American community complained about the fact that the University ignored how Lohman specifically targeted Asian women and clearly harbored a sexual fetish for them. For example, Leung said that to protect Asian

stated: "Sexual assault of Asian women on college campuses is a major issue. You get a room of five Asian American women together, and they all have stories about sexual harassment." n168 Mainstream America shrugs off the American female students, the University should have been more "culturally competent." n167 Leung further

notion of Asian fetishes, believing men who have such fetishes "are harmless." n169 However, Leung warns, "It's not as innocent as it looks." n170

Helen Zia, a Princeton graduate, commented: "It's the image of Asian American women being exotic and passive and won't fight back and speak up. Predators think they have free rein with Asian American women." n171 In another and even more disturbing case, David Dailey and Edmund "Eddie" Ball abducted, handcuffed, and blindfolded two Japanese schoolgirls, ages eighteen and nineteen, in Spokane, Washington. n172 The two girls were taken to a house and raped repeatedly over a span of seven hours. n173 Eddie Ball, the mastermind behind the crime, professed an avid fascination in bondage, sadomasochism, and Japanese culture. n174 He collected Japanese bondage videos and was an expert in Japanese rope-tying techniques. n175 At his home, police found numerous Japanese-language books. n176 Ball specifically targeted Japanese students because he believed them to be submissive and thus, less likely to report the rapes. n177 However, he believed wrongly. n178 The students reported the crime and aided police in catching the perpetrators. n179 Dailey and Ball faced sentences of twenty-one to twenty-eight years in prison. n180 Then there was the case of Lili Wang, a North Carolina State University ("NCSU") graduate student, who became the victim of what may have been a racially-motivated crime. n181 Richard Borelli Anderson had a strong sexual preference for Asian women because, as Anderson allegedly said, "they study hard, and they're very nice, soft speaking." n182 In October of 2002, Anderson fired four gunshots into Wang, killing her before turning the gun on himself. n183 Police found his body five feet away from Wang. n184 Professor Andrew Chin maintained that this was a hate crime, but the NCSU police disagreed. n185 "There is no evidence to suggest that the offender, Richard Anderson, acted on any bias against Lili Wang because of her race," said John Daily, deputy director of the NCSU Police Department. n186 Professor Chin contended, "[I]f you view the chain of events and link the events together, including what may appeared to have been unwanted advances on a married woman [Wang], which lead to the murder, this may be a form of racial discrimination against an [Asian] woman." n187 Chin believed the victim did nothing to bring about the senseless act, other than being an Asian woman. n188 / 4. On Violence Against Asian and Diasporic

During a U.S. Bureau of Justice statistical study on victimization and race that took place over the course of five years, n189 thirty-five percent of Asian victims of violence n190 reported the race of their offenders to be White. n191 Twenty-six percent of the Asian victims reported their offenders to be Black and thirty percent reported their offenders as "Other." n192 The greatest proportion of perpetrators on Asians were non-Asian, which is not the case for White and Black victims, where both groups reported the greatest proportion of perpetrators to be members of their own race. n193 Thus, while Blacks most often fall victim to Black offenders and Whites most often fall victim to White offenders, Asians most often fall victim to White offenders, not Asian. Asian Women /

For rape and sexual assault rates among women, the Bureau of Justice Statistics Study reported that Asian females had the lowest rate of rape and

sexual assault. n194 The frequency of rapes and sexual assaults among women by race, however, is highly contested from study to study. n195 Some studies, like the one conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, report no significant variation in the prevalence of rape among different ethnic groups. n196 Other studies, however, suggest considerable variations, finding that Asian women appear to have lower incidences of rape. n197 A 2001 psychological study by Rozee and Koss on rape hypothesized that the conflicting results of these studies could be due to "methodological differences in the studies," "lack of disclosure due to mistrust of police," "language barriers," and "differences in defining rape." n198 / Increasingly, however, scholars and researchers realize that perhaps one crucial reason for the lower rate of reported rapes among Asian women comes from cultural differences. n199 Generally, Asian victims are the least likely to disclose their experiences of sexual victimization to authorities and even to friends or family. n200 Asians, both men and women, tend to hold much more negative attitudes toward rape victims and believed more strongly in rape myths than their White counterparts. n201 / Also, the Bureau of Justice study found that, at higher rates than any other race, Asians said the reasons they chose not to report violence to the police were because either there was small or no loss, lack of proof, or it was inconvenient. n202 One recent and haunting example of Asian women's hesitancy to come forward about rape and sexual assault is the Japanese women sexually exploited by American GIs in Japan after World War II. n203 In 2007, historical documents and records surfaced revealing how American authorities permitted official brothel systems to operate in Japan despite internal reports that the Japanese women were being coerced into prostitution to the U.S. servicemen. n204 Despite the blatant sexual exploitation and often violence perpetrated on these women, not one Japanese woman has come forward to seek compensation or an apology. n205 Under such astounding circumstances that would shock any conscience, Asian women still opt not to report the sex crime. Thus, the tremendously low numbers of reported sex crimes against Asian women not only seems unsurprising, but also leaves an indelibly strong suspicion that the numbers are inaccurate. / IV. White Sexual Imperialism Within Existing Theoretical and Social Constructs / A. Revisiting

Women are sexually assaulted because they are women: not individually or at random, but on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender. Forty-four percent of women in the United States have been or will be victims of rape or attempted rape at least once in their lives. Women of color experience disproportionately high incidence rates. n206 / The dominance approach to feminist theory frames the question of equality as "a MacKinnon: Dominance Theory Applied to Asian Feminist Jurisprudence /

question of the distribution of power." n207 Thus, gender equality, as a question of power, scrutinizes "male supremacy and female subordination."

For the Asian woman at the intersection of gender and race, achieving equality means overthrowing not only male supremacy or White supremacy, but specifically White male supremacy. Since "sexuality appears as the n208 Following this logic, racial equality scrutinizes White supremacy and non-White subordination.

interactive dynamic of gender as an inequality" n209 and "aggression against those with less power is experienced as sexual pleasure, an entitlement of masculinity," n210 it is the White male's sexual dominance over the Asian female which emerges as the source of inequality that the Asian female

"colonial and military domination are interwoven with sexual domination." n211 The Western military's involvement in Asia, both in colonial and neo-colonial history, has led to Asia's sex tourism industry. n212 This is an industry where the buyers of bodies for sexual pleasure are predominantly White men and the sellers of their bodies for sexual pleasure are predominantly Asian women. No other fact or condition confirms the imbalanced power relations between the East and the West. This imbalance of power came from White men imperializing Asia n213 and, in the course of conquest, the taking of Asian women's bodies as their spoils. n214 The pervasiveness of sexual objectification establishes in the minds of Westerners a stereotype of Asian women as hyper-sexualized, since their only utility to Westerners for centuries came from their sexual submission. n215 / B. Where Do We Go From Here? / The U.S. recognizes the profound suffers. / Moreover, for Asian feminist jurisprudence,

harms that the institution of slavery caused during the early parts of American history which still endure today. Yet what about imperialism? Students read of it from textbooks in neutral language. No sense of penance comes with the recounts of U.S. occupation in Asia. Considering the general trends of the Asian and diasporic Asian communities enumerated in this essay, chiefly, severe underreporting of violent crimes inflicted upon them and a lack of scholarship examining the role imperialism played in the subjugation of Asian women, it comes as no surprise that history, through America's eyes, would white-wash the imperialized experience Asians endure even well into this century. Asian men feel emasculated from the American media's portrayal of them as effeminate, and many Asian women's subconscious preference for dating White men over Asian men--a trend which has become increasingly popular. White men display the "Asian fetish" syndrome, a symptom of not only the desire for male dominance, but also the imported stereotype that Asian women want to be dominated. The mail-order bride industry flourishes, capitalizing on the "Asian fetish." Then, the overrepresentation of Asian women in pornography perpetuate the entire cycle of White sexual imperialism as experienced by Asian women today. /

The action this Article calls for is humble, but significant: recognition. Recognize the pervasiveness of White sexual imperialism, understand its roots and where the branches pan out, and see how firmly implanted it is in the lives of those in the Asian community. The author asks for little more for now: merely recognition.

Irigaray’s critique ignores the role of race in shaping gender relations – whiteness takes the place of masculinity Hom, ’13. SABRINA L. HOM, Lecturer of Philosophy at Georgia College. “Between Races and Generations: Materializing Race and Kinship in Moraga and lrigaray.” Hypatia vol. 28, no. 3 (Summer 2013) – clawan Mary Bloodsworth-Lugo argues that “to claim an ontological status for sexual difference is to construct sexual difference as unmarked by race” (Bloodsworth-Lugo 2007, 45); this claim is plausible only if sexual difference is taken as fixed rather

than dynamic, and it fails to acknowledge the ways in which race is materialized on and through the sexed body. With Irigaray and Seshadri-Crooks, I will take sex as an irre- ducible, ontological difference, but I will argue that it is marked and transformed through racialization. Seshadri-Crooks argues for a Lacanian conception of race that at once acknowledges the intricate relation between race and sex and recognizes important differences between the workings of the two. She acknowledges that race is not like sex in that sex “is indeterminate and exceeds language” (Seshadri-Crooks 2000, 4) and is “in the Real,” sexual difference is significant and existent in human bodies before cultural meaning is imposed upon them, as humans are always gener- ated on the condition of the existence of at least two sexes of human being, and 426 Hypatia always already marked by this difference. Whereas Irigaray argues persuasively that we should take sex as irreducible difference, the genesis of race in the history of colo- nialism attests obviously to its arbitrariness.3 As theorists like Evelynn Hammonds and Sander Gilman demonstrate, race is attributed through sexed means such as the miscegenation taboo and the myth of black hypersexuality (among other means) (Gilman 1985; Hammonds 1994). We should note, then, that Seshadri-Crooks agrees with the first clause of Irigaray’s notoriously problematic claim in I Love to You that sexual difference “is an immediate natural given ... the problem of race is a secondary problem” (Irigaray 1995, 47). It is the second claim, that race can then be analyti- cally separated from sex and subordinated as a problem , that fails to comprehend the ways that racialization morphs the sexed body . Seshadri-Crooks argues that race should be understood both as functioning through sexual difference and as a consolation for the disappointments of sex (or, more precisely, that whiteness is a consolation for the disappointments of masculinity) (SeshadriCrooks 2000, 43; 59).4 Seshadri-Crooks and I follow theorists such as Lacan in taking phallogocentric and racial dominance to be rooted in the specular; sexual and racial hierarchies depend largely on visible differences, always read as lacks. In clas- sical psychoanalytic thought, the woman is always marked by the nothing to see, the visible lack of a phallus. Sexual difference offers an inferior other that promises to shore up the male ego, but since the spectacle of castration is simultaneously anxiety- producing (as castration looms as a threat to masculinity) and mysterious (since the female sex is marked not by a lack but by a genuine difference, one that may not be immediately visible but that is nonetheless present as a troubling excess to the phallic system), sexual difference is not fully successful as a means of assuring male wholeness and value. Where language necessarily fails to capture the excess of sex, racial differen- tiation and the logic of colonialism promise to present an other who can be wholly mastered . Although the phallic ideal of power and hardness is ultimately impossible to sustain even for a man, whiteness is posited as a new form of specular assurance . Here whiteness signifies precisely the wholeness, value, and purity that, as Irigaray argues, the imperfectly flat mirror of woman fails to project (Irigaray 1985). Femininity repre- sents lack because to specular logic women have nothing to see; the enigma of the female sex, however, which would be better said to exceed the gaze, can of course be reappropriated as a threat to phallic specularity. The rhetoric of race as visibility, how- ever, promises an unambiguous visual signifier of inferiority in the other; the inade- quacy of the nonwhite subject is to be immediately and fully disclosed to the eye.5 Rather than

taking race as a secondary adjunct or perfect analog to sex, Seshadri- Crooks argues that whiteness functions as a master signifier in its own right, signifying civilization, dominance, reason, beauty, value, wholeness, and purity. This argument demands that psychoanalytic feminists theorize race as well as sex, and that that these differences be theorized intersectionally rather than assimilated to a single axis of hier- archy (that is to say, a logic of the same). Clearly the addition of an other so-called phal- lus to the hierarchy of sexual difference is transformative to the work of post-Lacanian theorists like Irigaray; as with the recognition of other axes of difference, the hierarchy and array of subject positions produced therein are greatly multiplied and complicated. Sabrina L. Hom 427 At least in our time, cognizant of our colonial location, we cannot speak of women, for instance, or of relations between men and women, without recognizing that race and sex together shape these in ways that exceed Irigaray’s account . Although many axes of difference similarly index the field of sexual difference, probably few will do so as deeply as does race, which at least in the current under- standing has a stronger claim than, say, class to be in the body not only as a visible mark but as a heritable quality in the blood.6 This, after all, is the truth of any con- ventional description of racial passing: he may look and act white, but he’s really not —that is to say, one or both of his parents were non-white, and this characteristic is inherited in his blood if not on his skin. Hence the importance of the rhetoric of purity as an element of whiteness (Haney-Lopez 2006); this rubric is sometimes used to disavow and disinherit the children of mixed-race relationships under the one-drop rule, at other times to juridically “whiten” mixed children (see Lawrence 2003). At any rate, it functions, along with the miscegenation taboo, to make sense of the otherwise obscure truth of blood that is, in the colonial context, always already mixed. These legal conventions, along with the tortuous discourse around authentic race in the blood, demonstrate that racialization is dependent on controlling and rationalizing blood.

*2AC Security K notes for security: 1) it doesn’t link 2)Perm it in the 2ac 1AR ---- Extend the permutation – The alternative hardly differs from the 1ac and in the ways it does there are no differences in solvency. The aff and the alt can easily exist together.

*2AC Psychoanalysis K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations C) No prior questions to problem oriented IR – empirical validity is best *emphasis on metaphysical hurdles destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and guiding action. Owen 02 – [David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3, p. 655-7]

‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that

often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars

The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise by motivating this philosophical turn.

that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of

It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful collective action are foregrounded.

in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that

if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us . In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and,

‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’ .6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’— namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

2. Case outweighs and turns the kritik – 4. Our !’s are happening now and there are no phantasmal aspects of our affirmative. 5. Vote af despite prior questions—impact timeframe means you gotta act on the best info available Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, 2008 (Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213) Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study), in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch out the reasons for which a pragmatic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the The lesson seems clear.

more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness –

a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas. Firstly,

act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information. Pre- cisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions , and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge.

since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” someone, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem . Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge , and the necessary diagnostic will A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly,

involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal

there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions . Besides, “timing” seems to flaw. Moreover,

be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

7. Perm do the plan and 8. Presupposing desires fails – the permutation is critical to establish a point of dialogue within ideology Frank Summers , Supervising and Training Analyst Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis Chicago, IL, USA and Associate Professor of Clinical Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences Northwestern University Medical School,

‘8 [“Theoretical insularity and the crisis of psychoanalysis” Psychoanalytic Psychology, 0736-9735, 2008, Vol. 25, Issue 3] jm

The paradigm debate which surfaces on occasion in analytic journals and conferences is not dialogue, but mutual ripostes designed to damage or destroy the other, as in the aforementioned JAPA issue, or even worse, degenerates into personal attack as happened in a recent issue of Psychoanalytic Psychology

(Hoffman, 2007; Messler-Davies, 2007; (Mills, 2005). By contrast, dialogue elevates the thought of both parties to the discussion by forcing examination of presuppositions. This is the meaning of the Greek “educate,” paidea, to bring one out of oneself, that is, to broaden one's awareness. Recall that Socrates, ever the gadfly, was a midwife who set about to bring out the knowledge in the other he believed him to possess. Because an other is required to ask the questions that thematize one's presuppositions, for the ancient Greeks dialogue was key to education. And that is why psychoanalysis needs dialogue, not sectarian warfare. That is also why the tolerance of opposing viewpoints is insufficient; it is the willingness to engage the bases of one's own and the other's thought in dialogue that advances knowledge, not the recognition that people have different ideas, even if differences are accepted with the utmost politeness. Criteria for the value of analytic claims to knowledge can emerge out of the critique of each position. While the parties may not agree on which theory fits best in any particular instance, the criteria on which to base such a judgment have the opportunity to emerge. The difference between science and religion is that science has a method and criteria for adjudicating among disparate beliefs. For those who would reject the word “science,” I submit that what matters is the legitimacy of the psychoanalytic claim to knowledge. A rejoinder from some contemporary analytic camps is that those who would attack the fragmentation of the field are applying an outmoded and inappropriate positivism to a human science, and that incommensurable theories may be defended on the grounds of epistemological relativism and postmodernism. However, no sweeping imposition of relativist epistemology can avoid the need to justify knowledge claims. It is not positivism to suggest that a field of inquiry needs criteria for the adjudication among competing ideas. To contend that analytic truths are “relative,” not “objective” either means there is no way to judge any

interpretation as more true or useful than any other, in which case psychoanalysis must yield its claim to knowledge , or criteria are invoked to make such judgments, and those criteria are not relative (Summers, 2006). Anyone who denies the existence of such criteria has no means for judging one interpretation over another, in which case psychoanalysis is reduced to the taste of each individual, and is thereby erased as a field. No psychoanalyst can practice without criteria for understanding, and those criteria undermine any relativist position. Many contemporary analysts shudder at any critique of relativism because they believe the only alternative is objectivism, and, as these critics correctly note, psychoanalytic knowledge is not objective. However, these analysts make interpretations to their patients without any relativist qualification. They have no choice; they could not be analysts if they did not. Analysts in the other camp shudder with equal dread at the critique of objectivism because they believe the only alternative is relativism, and, as they correctly note, relativism reduces psychoanalytic claims to the biases of individual analysts.

It is unfortunate, indeed, that psychoanalysis has fallen into the antiquated relativist/objectivist antinomy because neither applies to the human sciences in general and certainly not to the understanding of the other. Significant trends in contemporary philosophy have transcended the dichotomy between relativism and objectivism (Bernstein, 1983; Gadamer, 2000). The understanding of any

individual patient is never objective, nor is it relative to any particular context. When we listen best to patients, we allow their way of Being to penetrate us, so that we gain a sense of their experience in the context of their world view. By entering into their presuppositions and meanings we “under stand,” that is, we take a stand from which the patient's conflicts and destructive patterns emanate; we see how those patterns fit the experience of their lives. Such understanding is won through the immersion in what Husserl (1970) called the Lifeworld of the patient. As we attempt to understand why the patient is doing something, we look at the bases on which the patient is acting, bases that she usually does not know she has. This comprehension is a “making sense,” and the sense we make of what has been mysterious is what we call understanding. So, the criterion for the value of an analytic interpretation is just what it is in all hermeneutic understanding: its coherence, what best fits the data of the patient's life. The network of meanings, each of which is understood by its fitting into the other, is the hermeneutic circle characteristic of the human sciences (Bernstein, 1983; Gadamer, 2000). The sense we can make of the patient's symptoms and patterns is neither objective nor relative. Because its criterion is coherence, any proffered understanding is judged according to the degree to which it brings to light the meaning of what we are trying to grasp. If new phenomena appear that do not fit, then new sense has to be made, a new coherence achieved. This process is an example of what Dilthey (1989) meant by a science of understanding as opposed to a science of explanation. The “sense” we make appears as we gain the context within the patient's life for what was previously not understandable. Such an understanding is a meeting of Lifeworlds, what Gadamer (2000) called a “fusion of horizons.” This understanding, this making sense of phenomena in the patient's world, is a hermeneutic. That is not my opinion or political stance; it is a statement about what psychoanalysis most fundamentally is. Whenever we go beyond what is said or presented to what is meant, we are engaged in hermeneutics. The very nature of psychoanalysis is hermeneutic. To say psychoanalysis is a hermeneutic discipline is to say it is about understanding people. Because the criteria of such understanding are transcendent categories does not mean there are not other understandings possible; there are, but each must make sense. And this criterion of “making sense” transcends the viewpoint of the observer. It is the very essence of both Heideggerean and Gadamer's hermeneutics that understanding of the thing itself, grasping what it is, is always open. There are always more possibilities, but that does not diminish the understanding that has been won. If other interpretations also make sense, each interpretation has to be brought into dialogue the others. Alternative understandings may each

highlight some important component of the patient's symptoms and problems, or they may be incommensurable. And, if the latter, they must confront each other. But, different ways of looking at the patient's issues must each be judged by how they fit the patient's life and what data in that life can be understood by the proferred interpretation. It is the criterion of all hermeneutics to bring out meaning, to call forth the unexplained, and that is the analytic task. Of the different interpretive possibilities that may fit, the analyst makes a clinical decision to use the understanding that she believes will have the greatest impact, but that is a clinical decision that does not vitiate the truth claims of different understandings.

9. perm solves: The state can always be challenged through attempts to recognize the social fantasy and assume the role of bare life. Edkins, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, 2003 [Jenny, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 216] At the point at which changes in the political ordering of the state are demanded, protests move to the sites that are central to the current structure . The protests reclaim memory and rewrite it as a form of resistance. The story is never finished: the scripting of memory by those in power can always be challenged, and such challenges are found at moments and in places where the very foundations of the imagined community have been laid out. They play on, and demand a recognition of, the contingency of political community and its structure as social fantasy. protests are insistently non-violent

For the most part, these . As such they have a particular effectiveness in their appeal against the structures of sovereign power put into place by the treatment of life as bare life that was discussed in the previous chapter. In a sense that I

The protesters, in refusing violent means, expose the violence of the state. This exposure is particularly poignant and powerful when it takes place in the face of the memorials to state violence. shall explore in this chapter, they assume, or take on, bare life.

10. Psychoanalysis is little more than placebo-efect categorized as science – it doesn’t hold up to criticism Grunbaum ‘7 (Adolf, Prof. @ U. of Pittsburgh, “THE RECEPTION OF MY FREUDCRITIQUE IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC LITERATURE” Psychoanalytic Psychology, Vol. 24.3, pp. ) This slanted biographical remark, in turn, then leads him to a topsy-turvy misdepiction in which he wrongly inverted the order of how the behavior of bulk matter is actually explained in physics on the basis of laws governing its

Lothane believing erroneously that he can contrast explanatory physical subsumption with psychoanalytic explanations focusing on individual persons But Hartmann pointed this is a pseudo-contrast the aim of these studies is to develop lawlike propositions which then transcend indi- vidual observations constituent atoms, rather than conversely, as he claims.

.

offers his misdepiction,

the analyst Heinz

(1959, p. 9)

out nearly half a century ago that

contrast

indeed

: It is true . . . that most analytical knowledge has been gained in the psychoanalytic interview and that the concern with developmental problems refers primarily to the history of

individuals. But this should not obfuscate the fact that

(besides its therapeutic purpose)

, of course,

[emphases added] (Hartmann, 1959, p. 9). More

fundamentally, Lothane’s grandiloquent declamation about repression vis-a`-vis gravitation is undermined by an array of further blunders: A. For openers, Lothane disregards that in my 1984 Foundations book, which is his avowed target, I issued a very nuanced caveat concerning Freud’s concept of repression: Plainly, the very occurrence of repression—in the psychoanalytic sense of banishing a thought from consciousness and/or denying it entry (Freud,

the bare existence of the is still a far dream-instigator

1915/1957b, p. 147)—is a necessary condition for the cardinal and protean causal role that Freud attributed to it. Yet, it must not be overlooked that

psychic mechanism of repression cry from its Freudian role as a generic pathogen

—which was asserted speculatively before Freud by Herbart and Schopenhauer [references omitted]— , as a

, and as a begetter of parapraxes [italics in

original] (Gru ̈nbaum, 1984, p. 188). Clearly, therefore, I incurred no inconsistency at all in doing both of the following: (1) Challenging the purported crucial role of unsuccessful repression in psycho-pathogenesis, dream-generation, and the begetting of sundry kinds of slips, and (2) declaring that “I find some empirical plausibility in the psychoanalytic theory of defense mechanisms [of which repression is, of course, the paragon], for example, denial and rationalization, reaction- formation, projection and identification,” each of which more or less employ repression (Gru ̈nbaum, 1986b, p. 281). Thus, I countenanced the mechanism of repression, though just qua agency that banishes ideas from consciousness. But Lothane rides roughshod over my careful distinction between the mere mechanism of repression and its supposed etiologic role. In the manner of demagogic journalism, he speaks fatuously of “. . .Gru ̈nbaum’s pharmacologically bound and positivistically reduc- tive philosophy,” and he trots out the red herring of “Gru n ̈ baum’s repudiation of repres- sion, the single most important contribution to psychology since Aristotle” (Lothane, 1999, p. 165). In items F and G of this section below, I shall deal with the charge that my philosophy is “pharmacologically bound,” which Lothane articulates. But he does nothing to elaborate on just how my philosophy is “positivistically reductive.” So I can only presume that he believes this epithet will sit well with other name-callers. And just before then, he had thundered histrionically: “Gru ̈nbaum declares war to the death on Freud’s discovery of a) repression, . . .” (p. 164). But this remark is also historically uninformed: Before Freud’s birth, the early 19th century philosopher Johann Herbart employed the notion of repression in his psychology, and Freud was exposed to it in a Herbartian textbook as a Gymnasium student. And, as Freud himself acknowledged, Schopenhauer was a precursor (Freud, 1914/1957, p. 15). B. As Lothane opined superciliously, I supposedly “forgot that we do not see gravitation

He can hardly deny that Newton’s or Einstein’s theory of gravitation commands an abundance of such evidence; yet contrariwise Freud’s etiologic theory of unsuccessful repression is woefully ill-supported any more than we see repression.” But here he just conflates the epistemological significance of invisibility, on the one hand, with the absence of cogent supportive evidence, on the other.

—as I have argued meticulously—

, qua cause of at least three sorts of compromise-formations,

(Gru ̈nbaum, 1984, chap. 3; 1997a, subsection B, pp. 338–344; 2002, pp.

124–128; 2006, pp. 269–274). But, besides conflating invisibility with lack of evidence, Lothane’s tu quoque rebuke to me “that we do not see gravitation any more than we see repression” is simply beside the point, if only because (a) I would, of course, never reason that x-rays, for example, (or other waves in the invisible portion of the electromagnetic spectrum) do not exist, merely because “we do not see” them in Lothane’s crude literal sense, and (b) a fortiori, nor is my skepticism concerning the repression-etiology based on the idiocy that “we do not see it [repression]” in the optical sense! In short, Lothane’s apparent complaint that I give no credence to the etiologic role of repression, merely because we cannot see it, is just a clumsy red herring. C. Relatedly, he surely ought to have known that I was in no need whatever to be admonished to heed the salutary imperative and familiar maxim that the methods for assessing the evidential probity of a theory are to be carefully tailored to the theory’s particular subject-matter. The repetitive deprecatory insinuation, by him and other Freud- ians, that I violated this injunction is of-apiece with the canard that I misextrapolated the epistemology of physics to psychoanalysis. Even if my graduate education had been confined to physics, I would have been mindful of the platitude, for example, that its methods of observation and measurement are honed to its subject matter: For example, a mineralogist who is concerned to gauge the relative hardness of minerals uses the so-called scratch test to do so, but obviously not, say, Geiger counters or thermometers. D. In his 1999 article, Lothane devoted a section (pp. 162–168) to “The Work of Adolf Gru ̈nbaum,” where he introduced me rather appreciatively to the reader, saying: “Widely known for his diligent reading of Freud, his prolific writing and fiery rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic, he has spearheaded a movement, nay, an industry.. . . But I propose to show where Gru ̈nbaum is brilliantly euphonious but basically erroneous, due to an insufficient understanding of what Freud really meant.” It will be noted how well “euphonious” rhymes with “erroneous,” displaying Lothane’s poetic flair. As he reports most recently (Lothane, 2006, p. 298), he had disputed me “at a plenary panel held on May 9, 1998 at the X International Forum of Psychoanalysis in Madrid and in the published text” (Lothane, 2001). But in the latter 20-page article, he had eschewed his 2006 indignation, and struck a temperate, collegial note about me, though as my being “a representative” of psychoanalytic “iconoclasm.” Thus, in his Preamble, he declared: .. . . Grunbaum is a commentator supreme and his knowledge of Freud’s Standard Edition is encyclopedic and the envy of many a psychoanalyst.. . . As a debater he is brilliant and challenging, as an orator fiery and at times so confrontational that he infuriates those who see in him a sworn enemy of psychoanalysis. First, he was embraced by the “orthodox” analysts, nay, put on a pedestal, but he then proceeded to put psychoanalysis on a sort of intellectual trial (p. 113). Indeed, the “Concluding Remarks” of his entire article culminate in a quasiencomium: “Gru ̈nbaum’s is a powerful voice of challenge and an inspiration to self- critical inquiry. For his effort and eloquence we [psychoanalysts] owe him an undying debt of gratitude” [italics added] (2001, p. 131). E. But let us turn to the nub of his aforecited very recent complaint that “the central argument” of my 1984 critique “is pharmaceutical rather than philosophical” (2006, p. 298). There, he quotes correctly, but altogether uncomprehendingly and

the whole of the clinical psychoanalytic enterprise is haunted by the mortal threat from the very live possibility of placebo effec t out of context, the statement in my 1984 book that “

” (p. 180). And this quotation prompts the following

grossly ill-conceived and painfully jumbled response from him, which issues in a deplorable fulmination: The word placebo is not to be found in Freud. As a ‘research professor of psychiatry,’ with ties to the heavily biologically oriented and antipsychoanalytic Department of Psychiatry and to the Department of Pharmacology at the Pittsburgh Medical School, Gru ̈nbaum crafted a euphonious but erroneous argument by analogy based on the difference between the “pure” active drugs and the “dirty” placebo or fake drugs. If the personal relationship between doctor and patient be classed as a placebo effect, then one cannot deny the role it plays in psychiatry, for the effect of administering true drugs cannot be disentangled from the allegedly “phony” admixture of placebo, certainly, not where the prescribed drug regimens is [sic] concerned. Freud was acutely aware of such contamination and was not Gru ̈nbaum’s fool (Lothane, 2006, p. 298). It behooves me, alas, to try to disentangle the components in this tissue of his arrant incomprehension of the role of the placebo concept in my argument: His unfortunate ignorance of the literature on the placebo concept and of my contributions to that literature, from his ad hominem psycho-diagnosis of the source of my purported error, from his terminological quibble, and from his patronizing canards. F. Ironically, starting in the 1960s, it was Lothane’s departmental colleague Arthur K. Shapiro at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine who wrote trail-blazing papers about the generalization of the placebo concept from its historical origin in

using Shapiro’s articles as a point of departure, I substantially revamped, corrected, and refined his explication of the generalized concept pharmacology to across all of medicine and psychiatry. And,

in my article “The

Placebo Concept in Medicine and Psychiatry,” (1986a) which has since been reprinted in four books. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 of my 1993 psychoanalysis book, a volume in the IUP Psychological Issues Series that Lothane cites repeatedly in his two sets of References (1999, 2001), I enlarged upon my 1986 placebo article and wrote: It is a commonplace that the placebo concept . . . is a generalization of the traditional pharmacological notion. Yet just this

One need only look at the received jargon of the medical and psychiatric literature on placebo therapies to notice that it is conceptually bewildering to the point of being a veritable Tower of Babel, rife with confusions more inclusive concept cries out for clarification:

[as I then

illustrate plentifully]” (Gru ̈nbaum, 1993, pp. 69–70). And I go on to say: “. . . it now behooves me to offer the desired elucidation of the family of notions consisting of placebo therapy, placebo effect, and placebo control. In so doing, I shall give some illustrations from psychoanalysis while ranging broadly over somatic medicine and psychiatry” (p. 70). As we shall see, contrary to Lothane’s commission of the genetic fallacy, there is nothing inherently pharmacologic in the generalized placebo concept, although the original concept arose in pharmacology! Similarly, students of elementary physics learn that, although the concept of energy as a temporally conserved quantity originated historically in the theory of motion under the action of a force, this conceptual ancestry does not militate, in the least, against the familiar generalized notions of, say, thermal or electromagnetic energy. In the case of a placebo therapy or treatment, my explication begins by taking note of the need to relativize that concept to a target disorder D, and to a therapeutic theory, among other things. Thus, intuitively speaking, the proverbial sugar pill is a placebo for certain sorts of pains, but not for hypoglycemia. A therapeutic theory T may recommend a particular treatment (intervention, modality) or therapy t for a particular target disorder D. Now, t has a spectrum of constituent factors among which I distinguish “characteristic” components from “incidental” ones, because T picks out the former as the defining characteristics of t. And the presence of the characteristic factors provides the main grounds on which T recommends the use of t to treat D. But if a treatment t for D succeeds therapeutically only in virtue of its incidental factors rather than because of its characteristic ones, then t qualifies as a generic placebo for D relatively to the therapeutic theory T: After all, in that case, T had recommended t in the mistaken belief that its characteristic factors are indeed efficacious, although it had allowed that the incidental ones may enhance that alleged efficacy. And if it thus succeeds placebogenically, the improvement in D wrought by it is denominated a “placebo effect.” Though the interested reader should consult my 1993 book (Chapter 3), it is evident from my Precis here that, as promised, there is nothing inherently pharmacologic in the generalized placebo concept, and that Lothane’s ad hominem account of my use of it is, alas, a travesty. In fact, if he had read the aforecited Introduction to that book by the noted psycho- analytic psychologist Philip Holzman, he would have seen Holzman’s declaration there, that, in that book, I “offer a new systematization of the theory of placebogenic phenomena not only in psychiatry but in medicine in general” (Holzman in: Gru ̈nbaum, 1993, p. xx). And, in a review of an anthology on philosophical issues in psychopathology in which my 1986 Placebo paper was reprinted, the reviewing physician P. R. Sullivan wrote: “Adolph [sic] Gru ̈nbaum’s paper, ‘The Placebo Concept in Medicine and Psychiatry’ should be read by any and every medical experimenter” (1996). G. We can now turn to the relevance I attributed to the rival hypothesis of placebo effect in my appraisal of Breuer’s and Freud’s logically two-tiered argument in the crux of their 1893 Preliminary Communication (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, pp. 6 –7). First, let us be clear on the substance of their twotiered argument. There, they argue for two crucial foundational claims—which I shall label (A) and (B) respectively—apropos of their cathartic treatment via hypnosis (Gru ̈nbaum, 2006, pp. 269–270). (A) The first, their therapeutic hypothesis, pertains to the process-dynamic that, they insist, is operative in achieving positive outcome by means of their treatment. And it asserts (Gru ̈ nbaum, 1984, pp. 177–180; 2006, pp. 269 –270) that the cathartic lifting of the repressions of traumatic memories of events that occasion symptoms—an insightful cathartic process that includes the patient’s verbalization of the negative affect accompanying the original trau- ma—is to be credited therapeutically with the disappearance of the symptoms. (B) Their second, historic foundational claim, their etiologic hypothesis, is in my wording: “An ongoing [unsuccessful!] repression, accompanied by affective suppression, is causally necessary for the initial pathogenesis and persistence of a neurosis” (Gru n ̈ baum, 2006, p. 270). Astonishingly, in Lothane’s endeavor to discredit my reasoning (Lothane, 1999, p.165), he obtusely turned a blind eye to Breuer’s and Freud’s explicit use of the word “evidence” (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, p. 6), when they declared: “. . . we find the evidence for this [pathogenic action of the unsuccessfully repressed memory of the trauma] in a highly remarkable [therapeutic] phenomenon” [emphasis added] (ibid.), whereupon they reported in italics the therapeutic finding I have codified under (A) above. Now, in my 1984 book (p.178), I first paraphrased and then quoted their passages without singling out the word “evidence” itself separately by the use of quotation marks. But, four pages later, in paraphrasing these authors again, I placed just the word “evidence” in quotation marks, when I wrote: “. . .as they [Breuer and Freud] tell us (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, p. 6), the ‘evidence’ for their epoch-making etiologic postulate was furnished by the remedial efficacy of [abreactively] lifting adult repressions having the

I was being textually faithful in putting my finger on the epistemological nerve of the inductive etiologic inference drawn by our cathartic practitioners from their presumed therapeutic finding. whether their reported therapeutic finding was good enough or cogent as evidence to sustain their etiologic inference I answered very unfavorably specified affinity to the symptoms” (Gru ̈nbaum, 1984, p. 182). The innocent purpose of my thus placing the word “evidence” in quotation marks in that context, and also in my 2006 article (p. 270), was to remind the reader that

But, in so doing, I left it open at that juncture,

,a

question that

then

only thereafter. Alas, Lothane, having a hypersuspicious mindset about my critique of Freud, rashly takes my use of quotation marks

not to be neutrally descriptive but to bespeak my being sarcastic, and thereupon he mangles my reasoning beyond recognition: Gru ̈nbaum is wrong again to assert that the “evidence” (a double mockery, expressed by the quotation marks and by the fact [sic] that the word evidence is not found on page 6 [of Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, p. 6] but is insinuated by Gru ̈nbaum like “placebo” earlier) for repression has been furnished by lifting adult repressions (Lothane, 1999, p. 165). In a Freudian slip of the eye, Lothane mysteriously just failed to see Breuer’s and Freud’s use of the word “evidence” on their page 6, where it can incontestably be found. Nor was I engaged in “mockery” in citing it in quotation marks. Let me point out the rationale of my disapproving verdict on the founding etiologic inference drawn by the two pioneers. As we saw, Breuer’s and Freud’s presumed therapeutic finding is of the form (A) The removal of X issues causally in the disappearance of Y. And their etiologic hypothesis is of the form: (B) The presence of X is causally necessary for the presence of Y. Now, if (B) is granted, then (A) is validly deducible from it, so that (B) can rightly be held to explain (A). But the converse deducibility does not obtain: (A) does not entail (B). Indeed, more importantly, (A) does not even license (B) inductively. Thus, even if the attribution of the reportedly positive therapeutic outcome to the abreactive lifting of the patient’s repression in (A) is taken to be unproblematic, the inductive inference of

not get off the ground!

the repression-etiology just does

Now, Lothane willfully grasps at polemical straws by irrelevantly questioning an essentially pedagogical example which I gave to drive home just my valid point that (A)

does not inductively warrant (B). Lothane (2001, p. 129) quotes my example from my 1998 article (p. 189), but offers an objection in which the probative point of my analogy there was completely lost on him: I had plainly stated as the relevant “analogous fact,” that, in the example, the actual therapeuticity of aspirin for some tension headaches “does not lend any support” to the deliberately outlandish etiology I had cooked up, just as (A) does not license (B) inductively in the Breuer-Freud case. Thus, Lothane’s remarks about some disanalogies in the example are simply irrelevant. But worse, I plainly did not make the puzzling statement that “the evidence for repression has been furnished by lifting adult repressions,” which he misattributed to me (Lothane, 1999, p. 165). Instead, I reported the Breuer-Freud avowal that their presumably therapeutic lifting of the patient’s repression supports evidentially their etiologic hypothesis that repression is pathogenic, in the sense of (B) as I formulated it above and in my 2006 article (pp. 269–270). Why, I ask, does Lothane feel entitled to take public issue with me, when his reading is so patently undisciplined? Exasperatingly, he sneakily begs the etiologic question, as shown by my bracketed amplifications below, while chiding me fallaciously for supposed topsy-turvy logic. And he makes a hodge-podge both of the lucid

Breuer-Freud exposition and of my exegetically faithful reconstruction of it, saying: It is the other way around, a different logic: because [the mechanism of] repression is a ubiquitous phenomenon and a dynamism of defense found on a continuum both in health and disease, the process of undoing repressions is a precondition for uncovering the repressed event, [that is, the repressed memory of the repressed trauma, the ASSUMED pathogen] the precipitating cause. Therefore [that is, given this postulated etiology], any method that will lift repression will be therapeutic inasmuch as it will make the repressed, that is, unconscious, available to consciousness and thereby [that is, by removing the PRESUMED cause (patho- gen)] dissolve the symptom [emphases added] (Lothane, 1999, p.165). In this clumsy, convoluted statement of his, my italic lettering exhibits his tacit question-begging assumption of the etiology. It thus becomes clear that he gives a statement only of how the assumed etiology can explain the therapeutic gain, but not of how—according to Breuer and Freud—that outcome inductively supports the etiology! As we saw in my direct citations from Breuer and Freud, and in my exegetically faithful reconstruction, they did not reason in Lothane’s jumbled way. Why then his conceit that he improved on their exposition, and that my reconstruction of it is logically topsy-turvy vis-a`-vis his (Lothane, 1999, p. 165)? Plainly, the shoe is on the other foot. H. Now that we are very clear on the substance (A) and (B) of Breuer’s and Freud’s two-tiered 1893 argument, we can proceed to consider my explicit reason for having deemed the hypothesis of placebo effect—in the generalized, trans-pharmacological but literal sense of the placebo concept, which I have articulated above—to be fundamentally relevant to the appraisal of their therapeutic claim (A). As we recall, (A) asserts (Gru ̈nbaum, 2006, pp. 269–270) that the cathartic lifting of the repressions of traumatic memories of events which occasion symptoms is to be credited therapeutically with the disappearance of the symptoms. Significantly, as cited in my 2006 article (p. 269), Breuer and Freud were very concerned to rule out a major challenge to their claim (A), when they wrote: It is plausible to suppose that it is a question here of unconscious suggestion: the patient expects to be relieved of his sufferings by this procedure, and it is this expectation, and not the verbal utterance [that is, the catharsis or insightful verbalization of the negative affect accompanying the original trauma], which is the operative factor. This, however, is not so (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, p. 7). According to this stated challenge or rival hypothesis, treatment factors other than cathartic insight into the patient’s repressions, notably the doctor’s arousal of the patient’s expectation of symptomatic improvement, are responsible for that improvement (Gru ̈nbaum, 1993, p. 235; 1997a, pp. 343–344; 2006, p. 272). And, our founding fathers clearly appreciated that this rival hypothesis was ominous (Gru ̈nbaum, 1984, pp. 179– 180) For unless it could be cogently gainsaid, it would undermine their thesis (A), and would thereby totally abort their inductive inference of their repression-etiology (B) from (A), an inductive inference which they believed to be sound, as set forth in their (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, p. 6). Thus, even if (B) were well-founded inductively on (A)— which it was not—the inability of (A) to trump the rival hypothesis as to the dynamic of the treatment-gains would undermine the etiology (B) by undermining its premise (A). And these considerations have great added significance, because as late as 1924, Freud paid tribute to the quasi-paradigmatic status of the cathartic method, declaring that the . . . cathartic method [of therapy and clinical investigation] was the immediate precursor of psychoanalysis; and, in spite of every extension of experience and of every modification of theory, is still contained within it as its nucleus (Freud, 1923/1924, p. 194). Moreover, as we know, in

enunciated further The theory of repression stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests. Movement,” he

:“

Freud is the corner-

’s “On the History of the Psychoanalytic

[notably its etiology of the psychoneu- roses]

It is the most essential part of it. . .” (Freud, 1914/1957, p. 16). And,

in a later retrospect, he wrote importantly: The theory of repression became the corner-stone of our understanding of the neuroses. A different view had now to be taken of the task of therapy. Its aim was no longer to “abreact” an affect which had got on to the wrong lines but to uncover repressions and replace them by acts of judgment which might result either in the accepting or in the condemning of what had formerly been repudiated. I showed my recognition of the new situation by no longer calling my method of investigation and treatment catharsis but psycho-analysis [italics in original]. It is possible [fn. omitted] to take repression as a center and to bring all the elements of psycho-analytic theory into relation with it [italics added] (Freud, 1924/1925, p. 30). For these reasons alone, there is good reason to reject Charles Hanly’s (1988, p. 523) cavil that my “reading of Freud seems to be oddly preoccupied with Freud’s very early work.” Indeed, as we shall see later in some detail a` propos of Hanly’s further views, I took issue head-on for example, with Freud’s later etiologic theory of transference and of the transference

Hanly offers no cogent evidence at all that Freud’s later formulations escape any of the sort of basic objections I raised against his early foundational ones. neurosis (Gru ̈nbaum, 1993, pp. 152–158; 2006, pp. 272–274) not to speak of his 1937 paper “Constructions in Analysis” (Gru ̈nbaum, 1984, Chapter 10). Besides,

But, in 1893, in the face of the threat from the rival therapeutic hypothesis,

Breuer and Freud offered an argument (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, p. 7), which they thought had successfully discredited that portentous challenge. Yet, as I showed (1993, p. 238; 1997a, p. 340; 2006, p. 269), their argument simply does not pass muster. Now, the rival hypothesis had asserted, in effect, that treatment-factors other than psychoanalytic insight provided the therapeutic dynamic of cathartic intervention. And according to my explication of the generalized placebo concept, the rival hypothesis amounts to the claim that the patient-improvements after cathartic treatment constitute placebo effects in the literal sense with respect to that procedure’s underlying therapeutic theory, not—as Lothane charges (2006, p. 298)—in the sense of a pharmacologic metaphor by analogy. Evidently, my formulation of the rival therapeutic hypothesis fits my explication like a glove (Gru ̈nbaum, 1993, p.

precisely because the etiologic theory of repression is the avowed cornerstone of Freud’s edifice, there is good reason for my claim that “the whole of the clinical psychoanalytic enterprise is haunted by the mortal threat from the very live possibility of placebo effect” 235)! Thus, this placebo challenge stands unrefuted, and it undermines the etiology (B) by undermining its therapeutic premise (A). By the same token,

(Gru n ̈ baum, 1984,

p. 180). Was I just parroting the pharmacologically prejudicial ethos of the Department of Psychiatry at my University, as Lothane would have it? Hardly. Against these conclusions, Lothane also raised a terminological quibble in a hollow salvo: “The word placebo is not to be found in Freud” (2006). But I retort with Shakespeare: “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other word would smell as sweet” (Romeo & Juliet, Act II, Scene 2, 1–2). True, the term “placebo” had been coined in pharmacology as early as 1811, decades before Freud’s birth in 1856. Yet, during his lifetime, that word was not used trans-pharmacologically in the therapeutic literature of psychiatry. Thus, Lothane is making a dull, conceptually unavailing point by noting that it was not in Freud’s psychoanalytic discourse. The wrong-headedness of Lothane’s verbal point concerning Freud becomes very plain, when we note that precisely the locutions which Breuer and Freud used to state the rival therapeutic hypothesis that they were keen to reject are actually used nowadays in quotidian parlance to state a “placebo effect” in nationally syndicated articles in the lay press, such as the Sunday supplement magazine Parade. As we saw, the founding fathers spoke (unfavorably) of the “plausible,” supposition that “the [therapeutically] operative factor” is not the patient’s abreactive regimen, but rather his [her] “expectation” that he [she] will “be relieved of his [her] sufferings by this procedure” [italics added] (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1955a, p. 7). Specifically, in a very recent article “Does Acupuncture Really Work?” it is reported that “The expectation of relief alone may induce the same [beneficial] response in the brain [as endogenous opioids do].—the placebo effect” [emphases added] (Rosenfeld, 2006, p. 1). Again, in a discussion of the use of acupuncture wristbands to control nausea in cancer patients receiving chemotherapy, the same author wrote: “They [the researchers] discovered that the bands were more helpful to patients who believed [expected] that the devices would ease their nausea. This is a classic example of ‘the placebo effect’ in medicine” [emphases added] (Rosenfeld, 2004). So much for Lothane’s misbegotten triumphalist hurrah that “The word placebo is not to be found in Freud.” Here as everywhere else, Lothane is wide of the mark in claiming “to show where Gru ̈nbaum is . . . basically erroneous, due to an insufficient understanding of what Freud really meant” (1999, p. 162). We need only recall the difference between my documented exegesis of the Breuer-Freud therapeutic argument for their repression-etiology and the jumble that Lothane had made of it! (1999, pp. 162–163). But his dialectical malfeasance is not confined to the above blunders. He makes a further attempt to discredit my articulation of the placebo challenge. And he does so by wantonly transforming a patently conditional statement of mine into a categorical one that I had clearly not made. Toward that end, he slyly disfigured my pertinent assertion by excising from it my vital apodosis word “then,” and replacing it by three dots of omission, as if its omission were substantively innocuous. To boot, he further misleads the reader by not giving even a hint of the crucial antecedent context on which my conditional avowal was predicated. Before becoming specific, let me provide some relevant context. Freud had distinguished between a mere “symptom cure,” in which the neurotic symptoms were extinguished without resolution of the presumed underlying latent con- flict, on the one hand, and a radical cure, in which that conflict was eradicated via lifting its repression, on the other (Gru ̈nbaum, 1984, p. 156). Hence analysts expected that, if a symptom were merely extinguished “cosmetically,”—say by behavioristic desensitiza- tion— one or more new symptoms or compromiseformations would arise to take its place. This psychoanalytically expected process was called “symptom substitution.” But to the discomfiture of its partisans, such symptom substitution typically failed to materialize (pp.162–163). Now, in my 1984 book (p. 163), I gave an account of how analysts tried to cope with this difficulty for their theory of symptom-maintenance by introducing the so-called “ghost symptom hypothesis”: As Edward Erwin [reference omitted] has noted, some pro-Freudian writers have proposed to accommodate this dearth of symptom substitution, . . . by postulating that there are indeed remissions of neuroses without benefit of psychoanalytically mediated insight as follows: though all symptoms are initially generated defensively, in a good many cases their underlying conflicts are resolved by spontaneous ego maturation, and in such instances . . . the symptoms [can survive] as “ghosts” of the erstwhile neurosis. Hence, when a symptom is only a relic of a spontaneously conquered neurosis, the behavioristic extinction of the latter’s “ghost” ought not to issue in any substitute for it. Such replacement by a new symptom ought to occur only when the vanished one was a manifestation of an ongoing conflict, rather than a ghost. In order to develop the psychoanalytically untoward consequences of the ghost symptom hypothesis, I wrote (p. 164): Furthermore, note that the ghost-symptom hypothesis explains the low incidence of symptom substitution by the high prevalence of ghost symptoms. For just this reason, the hypothesis ironically provides theoretical grounds for deeming psychoanalytic therapy very largely superfluous, at least for all those nosologic categories of patients which featured the sparsity of symptom substitution. And, then I stated my pie`ce de re ́sistance, which

[Psycho-] Analysis is then reduced to being the treatment of choice for only that small minority of psychoneurotics who are now presumed to be afflicted by nonghost symptoms. In the great majority of cases, psychoanalysis must then be deemed a placebo therapy Lothane grievously misrepresented:

[emphasis added] (p. 165)

11. Alt fails - Structure of the international system and the material reality of weapons makes deep devaluation impossible Martin 13 (Susan B. Martin, Kings College London, PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, Deputy Director for Education and Research Seminars in the Centre for Science and Security Studies, “The Continuing Value of Nuclear Weapons: A Structural Realist Analysis,” Volume 34, Issue 1, 2013) DOI:10.1080/13523260.2013.771042 The argument presented here is embedded in a structural realist understanding of international politics. Structural realism emphasizes the constraints that the anarchic nature of the international system imposes on states. Kenneth Waltz argues that because of anarchy, states exist in a situation of pervasive insecurity.

The constant possibility of attack that exists in anarchy compels states to seek security, to provide as best they can for their own defence.9 As Avery Goldstein has explained, ‘Competition among states coexisting in a condition of insecurity …  encourages each to exploit the most strategically effective forms of military power it is able to deploy’.10 States who fail to do this, or who do this less well than others, may pay costs for doing so.11 Structural realism thus rejects the notion that weapons are, as Alexander Wendt said in relation to anarchy, what states make of them.12 The material characteristics of a weapon are an important determinant of its strategic effectiveness, and weapons cannot be stripped of their military value by changes in how we think about or act in relation to them. Nuclear weapons will continue to have value as long as states are constrained by the competitive nature of an insecure international system. Thus, the argument presented here is firmly in the camp of what Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler have called ‘structural nuclearism’.13 The material reality of nuclear weapons imposes two limits: first, on the existence of a nuclear world; and second, on the role that nuclear weapons play in this world. The first point is widely acknowledged: there is no way to erase nuclear weapons from the world. As Schelling argues, a world of former nuclear powers is really just a world of latent nuclear powers.14 Even if the weapons themselves are dismantled, the knowledge of their possibility will continue to influence international politics. Second, because of their material characteristics, nuclear weapons are able to serve as an effective strategic deterrent (and are not very useful in other roles).15 To see this, it is necessary to examine what is required for a weapon to serve as a deterrent. Deterrence can be defined as an attempt to stop someone from doing something by threatening or frightening them; strategic deterrence refers to the deterrence of an attack upon a country's vital interests.16 In its pure form, deterrence simply requires the ability to impose costs on the state to be deterred, but for deterrence to be effective, the ability to impose this punishment must exist no matter what counter action is taken.17 If the state to be deterred can eliminate or significantly lessen the deterrer's ability to impose punishment, the deterrent threat is unlikely to succeed. This suggests that to serve as an effective strategic deterrent, a weapon must have immense destructive power, in order to impose costs that outweigh the benefits that could be gained through an attack. It also suggests that the weapon must have the ability to overcome defences, so that the potential aggressor cannot block the threatened retaliation, and that the deterrent force must be invulnerable to pre-emption. Together these three characteristics ensure that retaliation can be inflicted no matter what evasive action the aggressor takes. A fourth requirement for an effective deterrent weapon can also be identified: the ability of the weapon to impose costs must be predictable and clear, in order to minimize the danger of miscalculation and wishful thinking (the ‘crystal ball’ effect). If a potential aggressor can convince itself that the weapon may not work, then deterrence is more likely to fail.18 Nuclear weapons possess these characteristics; in their essence, nuclear weapons are deterrent weapons. Most obviously, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons is unmatched by any other weapon. The Office of Technology Assessment reports that a single missile carrying a fusion bomb of one megaton TNT equivalence would cause approximately 570,000 to 1,900,000 deaths.19 This overwhelming destructive power complicates any attempt by an aggressor to ward

off a retaliatory blow through defence or pre-emption, as even a small margin of error entails the prospect of suffering immense destruction. It also means that it is very difficult to miscalculate the costs of nuclear use; the destructive power of nuclear weapons makes it very difficult for an aggressor to convince itself that it could profit from a war that might trigger nuclear retaliation.20 The destructive power of nuclear weapons is part of their essence. While smaller, less destructive nuclear weapons have been made, the potential threat of escalation is inherent in the very possibility of more destructive versions. This limits the ability of nuclear weapons to serve as anything other than a strategic deterrent. If social constructivism meets its limits anywhere, it surely does so with nuclear weapons. As George Quester has argued, ‘one cannot make nuclear weapons “unimportant” by the simple psychology of how one chooses to think about them’.21 In contrast, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald argue that nuclear weapons have been constructed as deterrent weapons, with the implication that their value is mutable.22 Similarly, Ritchie argues that ‘the value of nuclear weaponry is not objective or pre-determined’, and Booth and Wheeler argue that ‘transformations can occur if enough people, in the right place, change their minds’.23 But the material characteristics of nuclear weapons bound and constrain their essential value in important ways. To see this, it is necessary to recognize that the constructivist claim of mutability implies that we can reconstruct nuclear weapons in multiple ways, not only by devaluing them but also by attaching other kinds of value to them, including other kinds of military value – for example, by seeing nuclear weapons as ‘conventional’ weapons. But we cannot change the military utility of nuclear weapons just by changing the way we think about them. While it is true that nuclear weapons could be used for many of the same missions for which we use conventional weapons (nuclear landmines and artillery shells have been developed, for example), such use would not be possible over the long term. Societies can continue to exist and function when they fight wars with conventional weapons, and they cannot continue to exist and function when they fight nuclear wars. The destructive effects of nuclear weapons are too immense. Once any nuclear weapon is used, no matter how small, there is a risk of nuclear retaliation and of escalation to full-scale nuclear war. Nuclear war-fighting is not a strategy for state survival, and I do not see how we can socially construct a world in which it is. While some of the values attached to nuclear weapons, for example the presumed status associated with overcoming the technological challenges of acquiring nuclear weapons, may be subject to social (de)construction , their value as a strategic deterrent is not.24 The physical capabilities of nuclear weapons impose a fundamental constraint on how they can be used and therefore on their value; in particular, the destructive power of nuclear weapons means that they are not useful war-fighting weapons, but that they can serve as an effective deterrent.25 Contra those who argue for a no first use policy, this value is not limited to the deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons.26 While there are limits on the kinds of evidence that can be provided for the causes of a non-event such as the lack of major power war since 1945, it is clear that the existence of nuclear weapons made the leaders that possessed them more cautious. Lawrence Freedman emphatically argues that ‘to one who has spent some time researching the views of policy-makers during the most tense moments of the cold war, the suggestion that the fear of nuclear war

was of scant importance in inducing caution and designing policies is preposterous. On this point the documentary record is clear’.27 That both sides were well aware of the danger of nuclear use is clear from an anecdote about a Soviet exercise involving a possible nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union, where Brezhnev asked for repeated reassurance that pushing the button provided to launch a retaliatory strike would not ‘have any real world consequences’.28 While a particular state's interest in nuclear weapons may rise and fall with the specific security threats it faces, including the balance of conventional forces, unless there is a transformation of the international system that includes a marginalization of the role of force, some states will want nuclear weapons because of their ability to induce caution and deter possible aggressors. And it would be a mistake to think that the value of nuclear weapons is enjoyed only by their possessors. While the central nuclear stalemate between the US and the USSR may have led to the ‘outsourcing’ of their competition to peripheral areas with a resulting increase in local armed conflict, World War I and II provide ample evidence of the ability of conventional conflicts to endanger lives across the globe as well.29 Many within the international system have shared the benefits of nuclear peace among the major powers. The fact that nuclear weapons are a strategic as opposed to simply an in-kind deterrent prevents their complete devaluation and elimination, and this is recognized in much of the devaluing literature as well as the literature on the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world.30 In comparison, the devaluation and elimination of weapons that serve only as an in-kind deterrent is relatively straightforward. Because such weapons serve mainly to deter the use of the same type of weapon, disarmament requires ‘only’ the negotiation of adequate verification and enforcement provisions. To devalue and eliminate weapons that serve additional ends such as strategic deterrence requires either the abandonment of those ends or the creation of alternative and superior means to the same end.31 This means that nuclear weapons will continue to be valued as a strategic deterrent as long as states can resort to the use of force to threaten the interests of other states.

*2AC Consumption K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations 2. Epistemology is secondary to policy Jarvis 00 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-9)

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly

intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

3. Case outweighs and turns the kritik – 5. No link – the af doesn’t advocate for any extra consumption. No topical plan links to this k.

6. Perm – do the plan and engage in a social and critical analysis of energy production 7. The alternative’s passive refusal leaves prevailing worldviews intact – af is a prerequisite *The Af’s a prerequisite to the Alt – only innovative responses to tech-induced environmental destruction enable reconceptualizations of technology as more than an instrument and of nature as more than standing reserve.

Feenberg 7 (Andrew, Canada Research Chair in the Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Volume 42, “Between Reason and Experience,” p. 24-27, http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/books/Between_Reason_and_Experience_DYP42.pdf) Political protests arise as feedback from disastrous technical projects and designs reaches those excluded from the original networks of control . These protests are often based on scientific knowledge of the devastation caused by technology designed in indifference to human needs. This is the point at which objective facts enter experience as motives for distrust and fear of technology and technical authority . The subjects become aware of the contingency of the technically structured world on choices and decisions that do not proceed from a supposedly pure rationality . The lifeworld reacts back on technology through the objective contents of knowledge of its side effects. There have been many attempts to articulate the implications of this new situation. My approach is closest to that of Ulrich Beck. Like him I argue that we are entering a new phase of technological development in which the externalities associated with the prevailing technologies threaten the survival of the industrial system (Beck, 1992). This threat has begun to force redesign of many technologies and changes in the disciplines and training underlying the technical professions . Beck explains the transition from a capitalism based on distinct spheres with little interaction, to a “reflexive modernity” in which interaction between spheres becomes the norm . Multiple approaches and cross disciplinary conceptions increasingly shape the design process in response . He develops As I reformulate this social version of the technical revealing, it has political consequences.

the social consequences of the resultant changes while I have focused primarily on the technological dimension of

innovations emerge designed to accommodate a wider range of social influences and contextual factors .12 As design is pulled in different directions by actors attempting to impose their differing functional requirements on devices, the winning design strategies are often those that reconcile multiple functions in simple and elegant structures capable of serving them all. Examples abound: hybrid engines in automobiles, refrigerants and propellants that do not damage the ozone layer, substitutes for lead in consumer products, and so on. In the process of developing these technologies environmental, medical and other concerns are brought to bear on design by new actors excluded from the original technological the new phase. In this phase, what Gilbert Simondon calls “concretizing”

regime. Of course, no small refinements such as these can resolve the environmental crisis, but the fact that they are possible at all removes the threat of technological regression as a major alibi for doing nothing . The emergence of a radically new technical politics requires us to rethink the basic concept of rationality that has supplied the existing industrial society with its highest philosophical sanction. Heidegger and Marcuse help us to understand the limitations of the prevailing concept. They remind us that the hypostatization of a reason fragmented into specializations and differentiated from a broader cultural and normative context is not inevitable but belongs to a specific historical era, an era that may well be approaching its end. A new understanding of rationality is possible based not on a return to a teleological worldview in which we can no longer believe but on recognition of the complexity of experiences that have been cast in artificially narrow instrumental schemas. Concrete experience is thus the touchstone of this ontology because it is only there that the world reveals itself in its multifarious and unpredictable connections and potentialities . From this new standpoint specialization and differentiation will not disappear, but they will be treated as methodologically useful rather than as ontologically fundamental . The resultant breaching of the boundaries between disciplines and between the technical realm and the lifeworld responds to the crisis of industrial society . We may learn to bound the cosmos in modern forms by attending to the limits that emerge from the unintended interactions of domains touched by powerful modern technologies. This is the form in which the lived world we have discovered in the thought of Heidegger and Marcuse becomes active in the structure of a rationality that still has for its mission the explanation of objective nature . The discovery of a limit reveals the significance of that which is threatened beyond it. This dialectic of limitation is most obvious in the case of threats to human health or species survival. On the one side, the experienced world gains a ground in respect for an object, in this case the human body or a threatened species . On the other side, a concrete technical response is solicited employing the means at hand in new combinations or inventing new ones. From this standpoint no return to a qualitative science is possible or necessary. Modern science objectifies and reifies by its very nature but it could operate within limits standing in for the lost essences of antiquity and like them referring us to an irreducible truth of experience . As we encounter this truth we are reminded of the necessity of restraint. This must be a productive restraint leading to a process of transformation , not a passive refusal of a reified system. The forward looking Janus face is fundamental and grants hope not by rejecting scientific-technical achievements but by revealing their essential nature as processes in which human action can intervene .13 Innovative responses to the new limits can serve in the reconstruction of both technical disciplines and technology. To be sure, the process character and full complexity of reality cannot be reflected immediately in the scientific-technical disciplines, but the disciplines can be deployed in fluid combinations that reflect the complexity of reality as it enters experience through humanly provoked disasters of all sorts and through the consciousness of new threats of which we ourselves are the ultimate source . The goal is not merely to survive but to reconstruct modern technology around a new model of wealth that is environmentally compatible and that draws on

human capacities suppressed or ignored in the present dispensation. Marcuse interpreted this in terms of the surrealist “hazard objectif,” the rather fantastic notion of an aesthetically formed world in which “human faculties and desires ... appear as part of the objective determinism of nature – coincidence of causality through nature and causality through freedom” (Marcuse, 1969: 31).

10. Perm do the plan and the alt in every other instance — either the alt overcomes the residual link or it’s insufficient to overcome the status quo 11. Consumption focus fails---government action key Bryant 12—prof of philosophy at Collin College (Levi, Black Ecology: A Pessimistic Moment, larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/03/19/black-ecology-a-pessimistic-moment/)

while environmentalists prescribe all sorts of action we need to take to avert the climate catastrophe, it seems to me that in failing to engage in an ecology of social and political institutions they are whistling past the graveyard by failing to address the question of the conditions under which action is possible . Here’s the part where everyone gets angry with me. Given the way in which government and corporations are today intertwined, I don’t think there’s much we can do to avert the coming catastrophe . As Morton says, referring to logical time, “the catastrophe has already happened ”. So what would it mean, I wonder, to take Morton’s thesis So why is this an issue? It’s an issue because

seriously? Here I know Tim will disagree with me. When I look at environmental discussions in popular media and from many around me, I see the discussion revolving almost entirely

We’re told that we have to consume differently to solve this problem . I agree that I don’t see any feasible way in which driving fuel efficient cars, using less heat and AC, eating less meat, etc will solve these problems . This is because the lion’s share of our climate change problems arise from the production and distribution end of the equation, rather than the consumption end. They are problems arising from agricultural practices, factories, and how we ship goods throughout countries and the world. The problem is that given the way in which governments and corporations are intertwined with one another, and given the way in which third world countries are dependent on fossil fuels for their development, and given the fact that only governmental solutions can address problems of production and distribution, we’re left with no recourse for action . We can only watch helplessly while our bought and sold around consumers.

we need to consume differently, but

politicians continue to fiddle as

10. Case is a disad to the alt 11. Alt fails – maximizing energy production is human nature and reducing consumption doesn’t solve their impact Datschefski 4 (Edwin – BioThinking International, “Consumption is Good ? !”, January, http://www.biothinking.com/consume.pdf) it's natural to use energy, and the more the better. Ecologists like Lotka (1922) and Odum and Pinkerton (1955) suggested that the biological systems that survive are those that develop the most power inflow and u se it to best meet their needs for survival . It seems that

Schneider and Kay (1994) proposed that a better description of these "power laws" would be that biological systems develop in a manner as to "increase their degradation rate, and that biological growth, ecosystem

As ecosystems develop or mature they tend to increase their total dissipation , and develop more complex structures with greater diversity, more cycling, more energy flow and more hierarchical levels. So ecological theory shows us that a complex adaptive system like the current industrial system will inherently evolve to maximise throughput of energy development and evolution represent the development of new dissipative pathways."

and materials. I'm not disputing the benefits of efficiency, or the limits to growth. But there does seem to be a lot of (in my view) futile effort directed at encouraging people to consume l ess . People are natural-born shoppers. I defy anyone reading this to claim that they have deprived themselves of that hifi, boat, shoes, camera, etc. that they really fancied. You also can't solve environmental problems by simply using less. There is a fundamental package of food and goods that a household requires, and while it's possible to make the footprint of that package smaller, we're still looking at about 7 tonnes of stuff per household per year, which is about 140 tonnes including embodied energy and mass. You can avoid this shooting up to 10 or 15 tonnes of stuff by renting and buying durable products and so on, but even the thriftiest household will still have

The focus for improvement must therefore be on changing product and process design so that materials flow is more systemic . All products are a basic consumption requirement.

ultimately disposable. We just need all of them to be designed to go back and become food for another system. So don't feel guilty about buying the products you have to get. Buy with caution and respect for the materials used. And divert the energy of your concerns into action -- tell the manufacturer of your new camera / car / bed etc. about how they can make it better. Most manufacturers think they are doing perfectly OK if they are complying with the law and have no -one demonstrating outside their head office. Going 100% cyclic solar and safe simply isn't on the agenda yet. So what if every member of every environment group (that's about 5 to 50% of the population, depending what country you live in) asked the manufacturers of the myriad of products that they

12. No impact threshold – tech and calculation have existed forever – and the world is getting better

13. Growth is sustainable and solves resource depletion Emerson 10 (Patrick, Associate Professor of Economics – Oregon State University, “Economic Growth: The Planet's Poor Need Sustainable Expansion,” Oregon Live, 87, http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/08/economic_growth_the_planets _po.html) Does economic growth represent the biggest threat to the planet, or its salvation? In a recent op-ed ("The fallacy of

Hart argues that the goal of economic growth is antithetical to a sustainable world. Hart's views reveal a wealthy-country bias about what growth means and fail to appreciate the perspective of poor countries. His characterization of growth is also inaccurate and perpetuates a common misconception about economic growth -growth in a finite world," Aug. 1), Jack

that it necessarily means resource depletion. Finally, his anti-growth agenda would leave the world more imperiled:

Economic growth represents the world's best hope to meet the challenges of the future. What does growth mean for the stark realities of life in a low-income society? High-income countries enjoy an average life expectancy of almost 80 years, while in low-income countries it's just 53 years. In developing countries an estimated 900 million people do not have enough food, 1 billion people have no access to safe drinking water, 2.4 billion people have inadequate sanitation and 10,000 children die every day from diseases caused by contaminated water. The infant mortality rate in high-income countries is 7 per 1,000, compared with 114 in lowincome countries. These sobering facts of poverty result from a lack of growth. What economic growth has brought to those of us fortunate to live in a wealthy country is not just big TVs and fancy cars, but a safe, secure and long life for ourselves and our children. These statistics are real measures of despair for most of the world's population. The myth of the happy peasant is an arrogant conceit of the wealthy that has existed for centuries to justify income inequality, and it is no truer today than it was in feudal times. Hart argues that the growth of the 19th and 20th

Growth does not mean resource depletion, however; this is but one way to accomplish growth. Becoming more efficient -- in other words, conserving our resources -- is another. Anything that provides value produces growth. A better, more energy-efficient light bulb, a time-saving personal computer and a better electric car are all ways through which growth can be achieved. Poverty and population growth are highly correlated because poor families in developing countries need children to centuries has come largely through the depletion and degradation of the earth's natural resources.

provide the social safety net that their governments do not. Societies that have experienced economic growth, however, have seen population growth rates decline precipitously. And more people doesn't necessarily represent a problem; it represents a challenge, an incentive and a resource. More people means an increased emphasis on finding more efficient ways to live ; it means more potential talent -- brainpower and creativity -- to help solve the very problems we face. Not only does growth

creating more efficient technologies is necessarily growthenhancing. This is why growth represents the hope of the future, not the challenge to it. Much of the recent growth in developed countries has been achieved not through resource depletion but through the microcomputer and information technology revolution, through designing more efficient buildings and machines, and through substantial improvements in transportation efficiency. This is what will typify 21st century growth: doing more with less. High-income countries, led by the United States, do use the not mean resource depletion, but

lion's share of the world's energy. But the U.S. produces a lot more value per unit of energy than does China. And

high-income countries are making the biggest investment in renewable-energy technology, because our wealth causes us to place increased value on the environment.

14. The alt cedes the political to the right, risking extinction -- letting being be paves the way for rabid anti-environmentalists to ravage the earth Wapner, 08 -

Associate Professor and Director of the Global Environmental Politics Program in the School of International Service at American University (Paul, Global Environmental Politics, February, “The Importance of Critical Environmental Studies in the New Environmentalism,” Project Muse) To many readers, such questions probably sound familiar. Efforts to rid the world of war, poverty, human rights abuses and injustice in general are perennial challenges that require heightened compassion and a commitment that transcends one's time on earth. The questions are especially relevant, however, to environmentalists. They represent the kind of challenges we constantly pose to ourselves and to those we try to convince to join

Environmental issues are some of the gravest dangers facing humanity and all life on the planet. At their most immediate, environmental problems undermine the quality of life for the poorest and are increasingly eroding the quality of life of even the affluent. At the extreme, environmental challenges threaten to fracture thefundamental organic infrastructure that supports life on Earth and thus imperil life's very survival. What to do? Environmental Studies is the academic discipline charged with trying to figure this out. Like Feminist and Race Studies, it us.

emerged out of a political movement and thus never understood itself as value-neutral. Coming on the heels of the modern environmental movement of the 1960s, environmental studies has directed itself toward understanding the biophysical limits of the earth and how humans can live sustainably given those limits. As such, it has always seen its normative commitments not as biases that muddy its inquiry but as disciplining directives that focus scholarship in scientifically and politically [End Page 6] relevant directions. To be sure, the discipline's natural scientists see themselves as objective observers of the natural world and understand their work as normative only to the degree that it is shaped by the hope of helping to solve environmental problems. Most otherwise remain detached from the political conditions in which their work is assessed. The discipline's social scientists also maintain a stance of objectivity to the degree that they respect the facts of the social world, but many of them engage the political world by offering policy prescriptions and new political visions. What is it like to research and teach Environmental Studies these days? Where does the normative dimension of the discipline fit into contemporary political affairs? Specifically, how should social thinkers within Environmental Studies understand the application of their normative commitments? Robert Cox once distinguished what he calls "problem-solving" theory from "critical theory." The former, which aims toward social and political reform, accepts prevailing power relationships and institutions and implicitly uses these as a framework for inquiry and action. As a theoretical enterprise, problem-solving theory works within current paradigms to address particular intellectual and practical challenges. Critical theory, in contrast, questions existing power dynamics and seeks not only to reform but to transform social and political conditions.1

Critical environmental

theory has come under attack in recent years. As the discipline has matured and further cross-pollinated with other fields, some of us have become enamored with continental philosophy, cultural and communication studies, high-level anthropological and sociological theory and a host of other insightful disciplines that tend to step back from contemporary events and paradigms of thought and reveal structures of power that reproduce social and political life. While such engagement has refined our ability to identify and make visible impediments to creating a greener world, it has also isolated critical Environmental Studies from the broader discipline and, seemingly, the actual world it is trying to transform. Indeed, critical environmental theory has become almost a sub-discipline to itself. It has developed a rarefied language and, increasingly, an insular audience. To many, this has rendered critical theory not more but less politically engaged as it scales the heights of thought only to be further distanced from practice. It increasingly seems, to many, to be an impotent discourse preaching radical ideas to an already initiated choir. Critical

Environmental Studies is also sounding flat these days coming off the heels of, arguably, the most anti-environmentalist decade ever. The Bush Administration's tenure has been an all-time low for environmental protection. The Administration has installed industry-friendly administrators throughout the executive branch, rolled back decades of domestic environmental law and international environmental leadership, politicized scientific evidence and expressed outright hostility to almost any form of environmental regulation.2 With the US as the global hegemon, it is hard to overestimate the impact these actions have had on worldenvironmental affairs. Being a politically engaged environmental scholar has been difficult during the past several years. In the US, instead of being proactive, the environmental community has adopted a type of rearguard politics in which it has tried simply to hold the line against assaults on everything from the Endangered Species Act, New Source Review and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

Outside the US, the environmental community has had to struggle for pronounced relevance in similar issues as it has operated in the shadow of an environmentally-irresponsible hegemon. Much of the academic world has followed suit, as it were. In the US, it has found itself needing to argue for basics like the knowledge of environmental science, the wisdom of enforcing established law, the importance of holding violators accountable and the significance of the US to remain engaged in international environmental affairs. Outside the US, the academic community has fared only marginally better. For instance, to the Kyoto Protocol and international cooperative efforts to curb deforestation and loss of biological diversity.

many in Europe, who have long advanced analyses of the formation and implementation of regimes, found themselves backpedaling as they wrestled with

the space for what was considered politically-relevant scholarship has shrunk dramatically; what used to be considered problem-solving theory has become so out of touch with political possibility that it has been relegated to the margins of contemporary thought . Put the significance of international regimes absent hegemonic participation. The result is that

differently, the realm of critical theory has grown tremendously as hitherto reasonable ideas have increasingly appeared radical and previously radical

As we enter the final stretch of the Bush Administration and the waning years of the millennium's first decade, the political landscape appears to be changing. In the US, a Democratic Congress, environmental action at the municipal and state levels, and a growing sense that a green foreign policy may be a way to weaken global terrorism, enhance US energy independence and re-establish US moral leadership in the world, have partially resuscitated and re-energized environmental concern.3 Worldwide, there seems to be a similar and even ones have been pushed even further to the hinterlands of critical thought.

more profound shift as people in all walks of life are recognizing the ecological, social and economic effects of climate change, corporations are realizing that environmental action can make business sense, and environmental values in general are permeating even some of the most stubborn societies.

The "perfect storm" of this combination is beginning to put environmental issues firmly on the world's radar screen. It seems that a new day is arising for environmentalism and, by extension, Environmental Studies. What role should environmental scholarship assume in this new climate? Specifically, how wise is it to pursue critical Environmental Studies at

Is it strategically useful to study the outer reaches of environmental thought and continue to reflect on the structural dimensions of environmental degradation when the political tide seems to be turning and problem-solving theorists may once again have Notwithstanding the promise of the new environmental moment for asking fundamental questions, many may counsel caution toward critical Environmental Studies. The political landscape may be changing the ear of those in power? Is now the time to run to the renewed, apparently meaningful center or to cultivate more incisive critical environmental thought? but it is unclear if critical Environmental Studies is prepared to make itself relevant. Years of being distant from political influence has intensified the insularity and arcane character of critical environmental theory, leaving the discipline rusty in its ability to make friends within policy circles. Additionally, over the past few years, the public has grown less open to radical environmental ideas, as it has been fed a steady diet of questioning even the basics of environmental issues. Indeed, that the Bush Administration enjoyed years of bulldozing over such an opportune moment?

environmental concern without loud, sustained, vocal opposition should give us pause. It suggests that we should not expect too much, too soon. The world is still ensconced in an age of global terror; the "high" politics of national security and economic productivity continue to over-shadow environmental issues; and the public needs to be slowly seasoned to the insights and arguments of critical theory before it can appreciate their importance—as if it has been in the dark for years and will be temporary blinded if thrown into the daylight too soon. From this perspective, so the logic might go, scholars should restrict themselves to problem-solving theory and direct their work toward the mainstream of environmental thought. Such prudence makes sense.

However, we should remember that problem-solving theory, by working within existing paradigms, at best simply smoothes bumps in the road in the reproduction of social practices. It solves certain dilemmas of contemporary life but is unable to address the structural factors that reproduce broad, intractable challenges. Problem-solving theory, to put it differently, gets at the symptoms of environmental harm rather than the root causes. As such, it might slow the pace of environmental degradation but doesn't steer us in fundamentally new, more promising directions. No matter how politically sensitive one wants to be, such new direction is precisely what the world needs. The last few years have been lost time, in terms of fashioning a meaningful, global environmental agenda. Nonetheless, we shouldn't kid ourselves that we were in some kind of green nirvana before the Bush Administration took power and before the world of terror politics trumped all other policy initiatives. The world has faced severe environmental challenges for decades and, while it may seem a ripe time to reinvigorate problem-solving theory in the new political climate, we must recognize that all the problemsolving theory of the world won't get us out of the predicament we've been building for years. We are all familiar with the litany of environmental woes. Scientists tell us, for example, that we are now in the midst of the sixth great extinction since life [End Page 9] formed on the planet close to a billion years ago. If things don't change, we will drive one-third to one-half of all species to extinction over the next 50 years.4 Despite this, there are no policy proposals being advanced at the national or international levels that come even close to addressing the magnitude of biodiversity loss.5 Likewise, we know that the build-up of greenhouse gases is radically changing the climate, with catastrophic dangers beginning to express themselves and greater ones waiting in the wings. The international community has embarked on significant efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions but no policies are being debated that come even close to promising climate stabilization—including commitments to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP, as advanced by the US government, and to reduce GHG emissions globally by 5 percent below 1990 levels, as specified by the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists tell us that, to really make a difference, we need reductions on the order of 70–80 percent below 1990 levels.6 Such disconnects between high-level policy discussions and the state of the environment are legion. Whether one looks at data on ocean fisheries, fresh water scarcity or any other major environmental dilemma, the news is certainly bad as our most aggressive policies fall short of the minimum required. What is our role as scholars in the

Many of us can and should focus on problem-solving theory. We need to figure out, for example, the mechanisms of cap and trade, the tightening of rules against trafficking in endangered species and the ratcheting up of regulations surrounding issues such as water distribution. We should, in other words, keep our noses to the grindstone and work out incremental routes forward . This is important not simply because we desperately need policy-level insight and want our work to be taken seriously but also because it speaks to those who are tone-deaf to more radical orientations. Most of the public in the developed world apparently doesn't like to reflect on the deep structures of environmental affairs and certainly doesn't like thought that recommends dramatically changing our lifestyles. face of such a predicament?

Nonetheless, given the straits that we are in, a different appreciation for relevance and radical thought is due—especially one that takes seriously the normative bedrock of our discipline. Critical theory self-consciously eschews value-neutrality and, in doing so, is able to ask critical questions about the direction of current policies and orientations. If there ever were a need for critical environmental theory, it is now—when a thaw in political stubbornness is seemingly upon us and the stakes of avoiding dramatic action are so grave. The challenge is to fashion a more strategic and meaningful type of critical

We need to find ways of speaking that re-shift the boundary between reformist and radical ideas or, put differently, render radical insights in a language that makes clear what they really are, namely, the most realistic orientations these days. theory.

Realism in International Relations has always enjoyed a step-up from other schools of thought insofar as it proclaims itself immune from starry-eyed utopianism. By claiming to be realistic rather than idealistic, it has enjoyed a permanent seat at the table (indeed, it usually sits at the head). By analogy,

problem-solving theory in Environmental Studies has likewise won legitimacy and appears particularly attractive as a new environmental day is, arguably, beginning to dawn. It has claimed itself to be the most reasonable and policy-relevant. But, we must ask ourselves, how realistic is problem-solving theory when the numbers of people currently suffering from environmental degradation—either as mortal victims or environmental refugees—are rising and the gathering evidence that global-scale environmental conditions are being tested as never before is becoming increasingly obvious. We must ask ourselves how realistic problem-solving theory is when most of our actions to date pursue only thin elements of environmental protection with little attention to the wider, deeper and longer-term dimensions. In this context, it becomes clear that our notions of realism must shift. And, the obligation to commence such a shift sits squarely on the shoulders of Environmental Studies scholars. That is, communicating

For too long, environmental critical theory has prided itself on its arcane language . As theoreticians, we have scaled the heights of abstraction as we have been enamored with the intricacies of sophisticated theory-building and philosophical reflection. In so doing, we have often adopted a discourse the realistic relevance of environmental critical theory is our disciplinary responsibility.

of high theory and somehow felt obligated to speak in tongues, as it were. Part of this is simply the difficulty of addressing complex issues in ordinary language. But another part has to do with feeling the scholarly obligation to pay our dues to various thinkers, philosophical orientations and so forth. Indeed, some of it comes down to the impulse to sound unqualifiedly scholarly—as if saying something important demands an intellectual artifice that only

Such practice does little to shift the boundary between problem-solving and critical theory, as it renders critical theory incommunicative to all but the narrowest of audiences. In some ways, the key insights of environmentalism are now in place. We recognize the the best and brightest can understand.

basic dynamic of trying to live ecologically responsible lives. We know, for example, that Homo sapiens cannot populate the earth indefinitely; we understand that our insatiable appetite for resources cannot be given full reign; we know that the earth has a limit to how much waste it can absorb and neutralize. We also understand that our economic, social and political systems are ill-fitted to respect this knowledge and thus, as social thinkers, we must research and prescribe ways of altering the contemporary world order. While we, as environmental scholars, take these truths to be essentially selfevident, it is clear that many do not. As default critical theorists, we thus need to make our job one of meaningful communicators. We need to find metaphors, [End Page 11] analogies, poetic expressions and a host of other discursive techniques for communicating the very real and present dangers of

Resuscitating and refining critical Environmental Studies is not simply a matter of cleaning up our language. It is also about rendering a meaningful relationship between transformational, structural analysis and reformist, policy prescription. Yes, a realistic environmental agenda must understand environmental degradation. We need to do this especially in these challenging and shadowy times.

itself as one step removed from the day-to-day incrementalism of problem-solving theory. It must retain its ability to step back from contemporary events

it also must take some responsibility for fashioning a bridge to contemporary policy initiatives. It must analyze how to embed practical, contemporary policy proposals (associated with, for example, a cap-and-trade system) into transformative, political scenarios. Contemporary policies, while inadequate themselves to engage the magnitude of environmental challenges, can nevertheless be guided in a range of various directions. Critical Environmental Studies can play a "critical" role by interpreting such policies in ways that render them consonant with longer-range transformative practices or at least explain how such policies can be reformulated to address the root causes of environmental harm. This entails radicalizing incrementalism— specifying the relationship between superstructural policy reforms and structural political transformation. and analyze the structures of power at work. It must, in other words, preserve its critical edge. Nonetheless,

*2AC Anthropocentrism 1. We get to weigh plan enactment A) Competitive equity – any other framework excludes the entire 1ac – we get no ofense B) Education – if the k doesn’t implicate political action it’s not relevant to anything C) Burden of the rejoinder – the plan is a thesis statement, if they don’t disprove it they haven’t disproven our 1ac and we win D) Alternative frameworks are anthropocentric – they circumscribe the discussion to questions of human thought and ignore how we act and influence the world around us – debating action is critical to ethical and responsible politics, anything else is just as exlcusive of the non-human as the squo 2. Case outweighs – Structural violence – even if the human isn’t a FIRST priority, it’s a LEGITIMATE priority – no explanation of how the alt STOPS violence in any capacity. 3. Perm do both – we can overcome residual link even with a human-centered ethics Hwang 2003 Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University [Kyung-sig, “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm]

there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory.[4] The third view, which will be defended here, is that

In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely

much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment , changes such as the important effects of man's actions, that

extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to

Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated.

and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation , and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail

Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A human-centered theory of environmental ethics holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth 's environment and its non-human concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains.

habitants.[5]

4. The state is inevitable and an indispensable part of the solution to global environmental problems Eckersley 4 Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8 While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological

I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation .10 As Bull argued, given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it ."" degradation,

rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological In any event,

destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.

it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change . Nonetheless, while the state Of course,

constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains,

the political power concentrated

in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities ."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis . Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world ."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power. Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable

The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment. ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings.

although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can match the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more In short,

amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global

There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17 economy.

5.Legal restrictions are efective policy tools and the af’s technical approach is the best heuristic for mediating ethical concerns and legal manipulability--the alt’s moralism fails Ioannis Kalpouzos 7, Professor of Law at The City Law School, "David Kennedy, Of War and Law", J Conflict Security Law, (2007) 12 (3): 485492, jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/3/485.full It is important, however, not to sweepingly and debilitatingly generalise discontent about the current situation. The structural disconnects of the legal system do not mean that law and legal language cannot be part of the solution. Actions and motives are abstracted in logical categories that seem to reflect a normative consensus or a structural status quo. Admittedly, the intercession of the law-creating process by the structural and

The often-described weaknesses of the international system, the absence of a sovereign to impose formal validity and the often-disheartening problems of enforcement are very real difficulties that plague international law conceptual wall of sovereignty differentiates it from the equivalent process in national legal orders.

and, especially, the laws of war. The stakes there may seem higher and the scrutinising process

Such problems are sometimes intimidating for legal analysis, but should not be offputting and they should not lead to disregard of the importance of law as a tool in the international system. To the extent that war is the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means, and that politics is the interaction between different actors in society, legal regulation of such an interaction, in peace or war, is possible and, indeed, necessary. The task might be discouragingly complex but the better the use of legal tools, the more accurate the observation of practice, and the more legitimate the processes of legal abstraction are, the more the rules will be valid and effective.¶ Ultimately, Kennedy's diagnosis warrants a prescription. The question that arises is, to which extent focusing on ‘lawfare’ holds interpretative value in order to address the issues at hand. Although the conflicts within legal concepts and among legal institutions cannot, of course, be resolved once and for all and although there willalways be room for manipulation and instrumentalisation of the rules, any approach should seek to clarify the interrelations between concepts and actors. Kennedy does provide interesting insights on this interrelation, but he does so at a rather macroscopic level. The diagnosis of structural and conceptual confusion warrants a technical legal approach for dealing with the specific issues that arise from it. Formal legal thoroughness will never substitutepersonal moral choices, but it can be an important tool in the effort to minimise the uncertainty in the use of the rules and the weakness of the institutional structure. The law or even a formal expert consensus will never substitute the necessary choices by soldiers on the ground or by politicians deciding to wage war, but legal language provides a formal platform for claims to be supported and actions to be justified. This will not substitute the important moral choices, but it can ground them in a legal structure that reflects substantive core values and provides useful tools to assess them.¶ Furthermore, there is a fear that by focusing on ‘lawfare’ one can come very close to accept it. Accordingly, the relativisation of the formal validity of legal claims can clear the way for supporting utterly subjective decisions, allowing more powerful actors to manipulate the loopholes. The structural and substantive loopholes of the legal system are real enough, and Kennedy is right to point that out, but by accepting the practice of ‘lawfare’, a degree of unwarranted justification can be attached to the exploitation of these loopholes. This, arguably, will not work in favour of the cohesiveness of the legal system, especially in an area as legally contentious as the laws of war. Kennedy's disenchantment with the expert consensus and its practical use is perhaps understandable, and his exhortation to ‘experience politics as our vocation and responsibility as our fate’ (p. 172) is altogether laudable, but we need more than that.We need to know exactly how to assess decisions and actions on the ground, and professionalism in ‘lawfare’ and moral exhortations are not substitutes for legal analysis . Both the strengths and weaknesses of this book reinforce the need for a clearer understanding of the relevant legal rules, their interaction and the nature of the existing legal regime . weaker.

6. Alt alone fails – disregarding humanity tanks political potentiality Light 2 associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University [Andrew, “Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy 33.4, July]

A second problem with this overall approach is political. As advice to environmentalists, the approach would be politically suicidal. To the extent that such considerations as utility benefits for preservation or development are a reasonably persistent part of the discussion over whether to develop the Amazon, adopting an approach that conveniently skirts around such issues ensures that environmentalists will be excluded from such discussions, or at least easy to ignore. To come to the bargaining table armed with a theory “making questions of human benefit and satisfaction irrelevant,” when issues of human benefit and satisfaction are necessarily on the table, and when representatives of those interests are the only ones who are at the table and able to articulate those interests, would make bargaining irrevocably caustic if not impossible. To negotiate environmental priorities from the point of view of an irreconcilable and intractable moral view opposing human interests is not to engage in negotiations but simply to make demands from a presumed superior moral position. To the extent that it is difficult for environmentalists even to find themselves with a voice at a forum where such decisions are made, this approach would be, at the very least, naïve and imprudent. It also stands against the substantial amount of research that has been done on negotiations and policy making (for an application to similar cases see de-Shalit 2001).

7. Perm do the alt 9. Strategic binaries turn - anthro is inevitable because all theory eminates from a human standpoint, so erasing human/nonhuman divides is the root cause of all violence toward the nonhuman – only keeping the two ethically separate and unequal can check violence – turns and outweighs the K – we can go for this alone MIKULAK 8 MICHAEL

is a PhD candidate in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 200

[“The Rhizomatics of Domination: From Darwin to Biotechnology”, published in An [Un]Likely Alliance:

Thinking Environment[s] with Deleuze|Guattari, by Cambridge Scholars Publishing] /sbhag 7.30.2014

language is inherently anthropocentric, and we are linguistic creatures , how can we ever understand a world outside ourselves and respect the goals of nonhuman nature? Should we perhaps be seeking a stronger distinction between humans and the world, rather than collapsing the two ? the material world is not anthropocentric but language is so , the mind cannot be held to truly encompass and analyze the properties of the world that lie about it However, if

hope to

of

Is biocentrism even a tenable position?

Or is this perceived separation simply a linguistic

artifact? How can we speak of/within Nature if language predisposes us towards all sorts of humanistic biases? Does this even matter? Gillian Beer asks: "If

" (Darwin's Plots 45). Darwin seems very aware of this, frequently bringing attention to the

linguistic limitation of his own theories. In The Origin of Species, he states that "I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and metaphoric sense, including dependence of one being on another" (62). Donna Haraway argues that "

biology is not a culturefree universal discourse also

, for all that it has considerable cultural, economic, and technical power to establish what will count

as nature throughout the planet Earth" (Vampires 323). Darwin seems painfully aware of this, and perhaps for this reason, avoids mentioning humanity in the Origin of Species. However, precisely because Darwin is trying to explain

because description necessarily results in transformation of the thing observed any theory that does not take into account its production as a human discourse is dangerous even seeking a nonanthropocentric theory, to avoid the human is to obfuscate the ideological, economic, and political conditions of emergence that necessarily shape any theory to look at human beings ecologically has something that exceeds the anthropocentric focus of language, the discourse of evolution can easily be manipulated to serve various political ends. Moreover, observation

the

the act of

being

and

,

of nature

and

hugely problematic. Thus,

if one is

of nature or culture. It is irresponsible and naive at best, and incredibly dangerous and fascistic at worse. For example, Earth First!ers tend , or as one more "natural population" that

exceeded the carrying capacity of its range; hence, like rabbits, algae, deer, or

locusts in similar circumstances, there must be a catastrophic crash or mass die-off to re-equilibrate networks of ecological exchange. The most famous and problematic incarnation of this position was an article in the Earth First!

argued AIDS wa good because it would reduce the pressures of human population on the earth, and consequently, governments should do nothing to help African countries with the epidemic Although they equate all life they exclude humans and thus cannot address issues of environmental justice and the role of hierarchical and exploitative social and political ecologies that produce the conditions of environmental degradation journal that

that

sa

thing

. Although this statement was later retracted, the Earth First! tendency to take a virulently anti-humanist stance has problematic

ramifications for the ethico-political communities of kinship they imagine.

embrace a profoundly ecological view that

s

,

tend to

from many of their accounts,

. Chim Blea, a pseudonym for a member of Earth First!, argues that: "We as Deep

Ecologists recognize the transcendence of the community over any individual, we should deal with all individuals—animal, plant, mineral, etc. – with whom we come into contact with compassion and bonhomie" (Ecocritique 23). The

fascistic tendencies emerge in the complete subsumption of the individual to an imagined community without a framework being established for adjudicating how, what, and where one organism should live, and another die. If everyone is truly equal, then what does it matter if nature dies in order for humanity to survive? (eco)

,

In a strange way, any biocentric theory must take a detour through anthropocentrism. And in this sense, Darwin is a key figure. He was instrumental in shattering the Arcadian view of nature based on a

Romantic concept of pastoral harmony. His focus on struggle and violence unsettled people's notion of a benevolent creator and creation in place for humankind. Popular kinship imaginaries now had to contend with a natural world that was decidedly inhumane and violent, denuded of a benevolent original mover that provided all life with the means to survive, and the divine right for human domination. What emerged, according to Donald Worster, was a

decentring humanity provide the ideological naturalization of violence, competition, and hiearchalized human superiority. "dismal science" of nature red in tooth and claw, even though Darwin himself placed a high degree of emphasis on mutual aide and cooperation. This had the effect of

and

thus providing the necessary first steps towards a biocentric environmental ethic of rhizomatic interconnectivity. However, it also tended to

The same act of

decentring had profoundly antithetical consequences in terms of humbling and aggrandizing humanity within the networks of worldly kinship, making humans on the one hand, just one member of the great chain of being, and on the

to dwell on the violence and suffering in Nature was, from the midnineteenth century on, to be 'realistic' other, the rightful conquerors and creators of an earthly garden of Eden (cf Merchant). Thus, "

" (Nature's Economy 128).

10. Humans are at least a bit more important – only we can control and reverse instincts Linker, 5 (Damon, “Animal Rights: Contemporary Issues (Compilation),” pg. 23-25) That such arguments have found an audience at this particular cultural moment is not so hard to explain. Our popular and elite media are saturated with scientific and quasi-scientific reports claiming to prove the basic thesis of the animal-rights movement. Having once believed ourselves to be made in the image of God, we now learnfrom the human genome project, the speculations of evolutionary psychologists, and numerous other sources-that humankind, too, is determined by genetic predispositions and the drive to reproduce. We are cleverer than other animals, to be sure, but the difference is one of degree, not of kind. As Verlyn Klinkenborg wrote on the editorial page of the New York Times, "Again and again, after starting from an ancient premise of radical differences between humans and other creatures, scientists have discovered profound similarities." But have they? Genetics and evolutionary biology may be, indeed, extremely effective at identifying the traits we share with other species. But chemistry, for its part, can tell us about the ways in which we resemble chunks of charcoal, and physics can point to fundamental similarities between a man and all the matter in the universe. The problem with these observations is not that they are untrue. It is that they shed no light whatsoever on, or rather they are designed to obfuscate, what makes humanity unique as a species-the point on which an answer to the likes of Peter Singer and Steven Wise must hinge. For his part, Singer commits the same error that John Stuart Mill found in the system of Jeremy Bentham: he makes no distinction among kinds of pleasure and pain. That animals feel emotions can hardly be doubted; but human beings experience life, even at its most "animalistic" level, in a way

that fundamentally difers from other creatures. Thus, Singer can account for the pain that humans and animals alike experience when they are hungry and the pleasure they feel when they eat, but he cannot explain, for example, a person's choice to starve himself for a cause. He understands that human beings, like animals, derive pleasure from sex and sometimes endure pangs of longing when they are deprived of it, but he cannot explain how or why, unlike animals, some choose to embrace celibacy for the sake of

its noble purity. He is certainly attuned to the tendency we share with animals to fear and avoid pain and bodily

he is incapable of understanding a man's willingness to face certain death on the battlefield when called upon to do so by his country. Still less can he explain why stories of such sacrifice harm, but

sometimes move us to tears. In much the same way, the evidence adduced by Steven Wise to suggest that primates are capable of forming rudimentary plans and expectations fails to demonstrate they are equal to human beings in any significant sense. Men and women use their "autonomy" in a world defined not by the simple imperatives of survival but by ideas of virtue and vice, beauty and ugliness, right and wrong. Modern scientific methods, including those of evolutionary psychology, have so far proved incapable of detecting and measuring this world, but that does not make any less real the experience that takes place within it. Western civilization has tended to regard animals as resembling things more than human beings precisely because, like jnanimate objects, and unlike the authors of the real Magna Carta, animals have no perception of morality. Until the day

when a single animal stands up and, led by a love of justice and a sense of self-worth,insists that the world recognize and respect its dignity , all the philosophical gyrations of the activists will remain so much sophistry . Putting Human Interests First None of this, of course, exempts human beings from behaving decently toward animals, but it does provide a foundation, when necessary, for giving pride of place to the interests of human beings . This has particular relevance for biomedical research. Among the most vociferous critics of the USDA's capitulation to the animal-rights movement were the nation's leading centers of medical science. The National Association for BiOlnedical Research estimated that the new regulations would cost universities alone as much as $280 million a year. Nor is the issue simply one of dollars. As Estelle Fishbein, counsel for Johns Hopkins University, recently argued in the SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE THE SAME STATUS AS PEOPLE? Journal of the American Medical Association, Genetic research promises to bring new therapies to alleviate human suffering from the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, Parkinson's disease and other neurological diseases, and virtually all other human and animal diseases. However, the promise of this new era of medical research is highly dependent on the ready availability of mice, rats, and birds. 2S Far from being a mere administrative hassle, she concluded, the new regulations would "divert scarce grant funds from actual research use, distract researchers from their scientific work, and overload them with documentation requirements. II Serious as this threat is, a still more troubling one is the effect that the arguments of animal-rights proponents may have, in the long term, on our regard for human life itself. Peter Singer's apPOintment at Princeton caused a stir not because of his writings about animals but because of his endorsement of euthanasia, unrestricted abortion, and, in some instances, infanticide. But all of his views, as he himself maintains, are of a piece. The idea that "human infants and retarded adults II are superior to animaLs can only be based, he writes, on "a bare-faced-and morally indefensible-prejudice for members of our own species. II In much the same way, Steven Wise urges us to reject absolute demarcations between species and instead focus on the capacities of individual humans and individual apes. If we do that, we will find that many adult chimpanzees and bonobos are far more "human" than newborn and mentally disabled human beings, and thus just as worthy of being recognized as IIpersons." Though Wise's inference is the opposite of Singer's-he does not wish to deprive underdeveloped humans of rights so much as to extend those rights to primates-he is playing the same game of baitand- switch: in this case projecting the noblest human attributes onto animals while quietly limiting his sample of human beings to newborns and the mentally disabled. When raising animals to our level proves to be impossible, as it inevitably must, equal consideration can only be won by attempting to lower us to theirs.

*2AC Ecofeminism K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations 2. Placing representations and discourse first trades of with concrete political change and makes no diference to those engaged in political struggles. Taft-Kaufman, Professor of Speech at Carnegie Mellon University, 5 [Jill, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”, Proquest]

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics --conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and soc\iety falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are

appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure.

3. Case outweighs and turns the kritik – Our impacts are happening as we speak 5. Permutation do the plan and - it solves Warren and Cheney 91 (Karen J., Professor of Philosophy at Macalester College, and Jim, Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Waukesha, "Ecological Feminism and Ecosystem Ecology", Hypatia, Vol. 6, No. 1 , Ecological Feminism, Spring, pp. 179-197) Ecofeminism welcomes appropriate ecological science and technology. Environmental problems demand scientific and technological responses as part of the solution. These "data" represent a piece of the ecological pie. What ecofeminists insist on is that the perspectives of women and indigenous peoples with regard to the natural environment also be recognized as relevant " data." As a feminism, ecofeminism insists that relevant "data" about the historical and interconnected twin exploitations of women (and other oppressed peoples) and nature be included in solutions to environmental problems; as an ecological feminism,

ecofeminism insists upon the inclusion of appropriate insights and "data" of

scientific ecology. What ecological feminism opposes is the practice of one without the other.

6. The alt fails – theoreization only reinforces other dominant hierarchies Karla Armbruster, Webster State Professor of English, 1999, “’Buffalo Gals, Won’t You Come Out Tonight’: A Call for Boundary-Crossing in Ecofeminist Literary Criticism”, Google Books The path between continuity and difference that ecofeminist theorists must walk is so narrow and difficult not because of inadequacies in the theorists or the theories, but because of the complexity of their task. Ecofeminism explic- itly works to challenge dominant ideologies of dualism and hierarchy within Western culture that construct nature as separate from and inferior to human culture (and women as inferior to men)? While many ecofeminists identify such ideologies primarily as masculine, such a characterization is overly sim- plistic; as Val Plumwood explains, “it is not a masculine identity pure and sim- ple, but the multiple, complex cultural identity of the master formed in the context of class, race, species and gender domination, which is at issue” (5). The ideologies of dualism and hierarchy that ground all these dominations are such pervasive forces within our culture that even a movement with the most subversive motives and concepts cannot help but reflect their influence. Within ecofeminism, an unproblematized focus on women's connection with nature can actually reinforce the “master” ideologies of dualism and hierarchy by constructing yet another dualism: an uncomplicated opposition between women's perceived unity with nature and male-associated culture's alienation from it. On the other hand, an unbalanced emphasis on differences in gender, race, species, or other aspects of identity can deny the complexity of human and natural identities and lead to the hierarchical ranking of oppressions on the basis of importance or causality. Although many ecofeminist theorists are keenly aware of the pervasiveness of dominant ideologies of dualism and hierarchy, they are far more likely to note the ways that other fields manifest the influence of such forces than to search for their traces in ecofeminist discourse itself.‘ Thus, they risk unconsciously reinforcing the very cultural beliefs and attitudes that they wish to transform. To help fulfill the political potential of ecofeminism. ecofeminist literary crit- ics must become more conscious of the ways that ecofeminist theory can be subtly diverted into the traps of continuity or difference and thus recontained by the pervasive force of dominant ideologies of dualism and hierarchy. And to make a significant impact on literary criticism and theory, ecofeminist liter- ary critics must offer a perspective that complicates cultural conceptions of human identity and of human relationships with nonhuman nature instead of relying on unproblematized visions of continuity or difference.

7. Perm do the non-mutually exclusive part of the alternative – if the alternative can overcome the links to the status quo than it can overcome the links to the plan

7 & ½. Cede the political - Their method can’t create institutional change- the AFF is a DA to the alt and only the perm solves- AFF is a better strategy Kundnani, 2012 (Arun, Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University, and teaches terrorism studies at John Jay College. The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, p. 284-285) But as even the Stasi eventually discovered, no system of surveillance can ever produce total knowledge. Indeed, the greater the amount of information collected, the harder it is to interpret its meaning. The relevant information in the majority of recent US terrorist attacks was somewhere in the government's systems, but its significance was

what is obscured by the demands for ever greater surveillance and information processing is that security is best established through relationships· of trust and political empowerment. A society that has blocked a section of its population from shaping a process of political transformation is one that has hollowed out its democracy until what's left is an empty, technocratic consensus in which real politics is disavowed. When radical political contestation is suffocated, the processes by which societies reinvent themselves and resolve their social tensions are neutered, and in the absence of a genuinely emancipatory alternative, the only possible outlet for the impulses generated by social and economic marginalization is the fake radicalism of armored identity politics, conspiracy theories, and apocalyptic fantasies. lost amid a morass of useless data. More significantly,

8. Tons of DAs to the ecofeminist movement -disempowerment because fail to challenge institutions -not intersectional -causes Hobbesian anarchism that re-entrenches patriarchy -causes population growth that furthers domination

Lewis 94 (Professor of Environmental Studies, Martin, Assistant Professor in the School of Environment and the Center for International Studies @ Duke, Green Delusions, pg. 35-36)

In more pragmatic ways as well, radical eco-feminism and, to a lesser extent, marxist eco-feminism have profoundly antifeminist implications in practice. The former movement advises women to turn away from existing means of wielding public power. Since large-scale institutions are, by definition, irredeemably patriarchal and exploitative, women are called away from existing positions of public power (Plant 1989:187). Instead, all feminists (men as well as women) are enjoined to retreat into separatist, autonomous communities. Marxist eco-feminists do not demand such hermetic exclusion, but their philosophy too calls ultimately for struggle against rather than participation within capitalist society. Since institutional science, corporations, and large public institutions are, despite radicals’ fondest hopes, well entrenched, such withdrawal risks disempowering women still further. A refusal to seek positions in such

imperfect institutions as presently exist would relegate women to the role of sideline critics, undermining their opportunity to be participants—and indeed leaders—in the ongoing restructuring of society. In its effort to avoid the appearance of cultural imperialism, radical eco-feminism also flirts with an ethical relativism that could conceivably undermine the feminist agenda at the global scale . To posit that "[wjhat counts as sexism, racism, or classism may vary cross-culturally " (K. Warren r990:139) is to ignore a huge array of deeply sexist practices existing in numerous non-Western cultures. Finally, the successful realization of the radical eco-feminist

dream would threaten women in a very immediate sense. In the anarchic world they envision, men—who are certainly more physically powerful than women and appear to be more inclined toward violence as well—could easily arrogate power at the local level and devise neo-patriarchies . Anarchists argue that humankind's inherent good would prevent this—a view accessible only to those wearing the deepest of psychological blinders. As will be shown in chapter three, many primal societies, contrary to eco-romantic fantasies, were unabashedly patriarchal.

9. No alt solvency - ecofeminism has no direct action Leila R. Brammer, professor of Communication Studies at Gustavus Adolphus College, Paper presented at the National Communication Association 19 98 Convention, New York, NY.“ECOFEMINISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS” Access at: http://homepages.gac.edu/~lbrammer/Ecofeminism.html One of the areas where ecofeminism is found lacking in the traditional paradigm of social movements is the area of action. The common view is that social movements engage in protest and direct action; however, ecofeminism calls for consciousness raising, healing, and a communion with nature. There is little direct action. Some call for concern and to be involved in crucial issues. Others call for intellectual work to form a holistic conception of ecofeminism (Diamond and Orenstein, xii). Furthermore, there is no group of ecofeminists, no declared leader, and no vague form of organized activity (other than a few intellectual conferences and books). A few organizations have included the word "ecofeminism" in their title, such as Ecofeminists for Animal Rights, but they are not a subgroup of the larger Ecofeminists (Morgan, p. 10). In addition, most groups that can be identified as ecofeminist in nature do not identify themselves as ecofeminist. Ecofeminists do participate in the formation of ideology and recruitment in that conferences and books are explicitly for the development and spread of ecofeminist thought. The message has spread. More and more people identify themselves with ecofeminism, conferences are held, articles are written, and books are published and bought. But, ecofeminism has not resulted in collective action in the way Black Power as a philosophy did. This issue is one that is shared by many environmental groups, and, through an examination of ecofeminism, new ways of thinking about other such groups can also be pursued.

10. TURN--Associating women with care dangerously limits the ethico-political possibilities for women MacGregor 4 (Sherilyn MacGregor is a postdoctoral fellow in the Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy at Lancaster University, UK. “From Care

to Citizenship Calling Ecofeminism Back To Politics,” Ethics & the Environment 9.1 (2004) 56-84)

One of the themes in contemporary ecofeminist literature is that women's carerelated perspectives on human-nature relations should be adopted as a generalized normative stance, a form of ecological civic virtue or "a universal public caring" (Salleh 1997). This argument is supported by those ecofeminist theorists who portray caring relationships as models for sustainable living and as important sources of political empowerment for women in the larger social sphere . The women who appear in the narratives that inform ecofeminist alternative visions are variously referred to as grassroots women, housewife activists and "re/sisters" (Salleh 1997)) who work voluntarily to sustain life and to fight against the powers that put that life in jeopardy. The vision that their experiences inspire consists of an integration of diverse political struggles into one overarching movement for survival that is grounded in everyday material practices at the local level. So grounded, it is a vision that is fundamentally different from right-wing ideologies that embrace global capitalism as well as from the philosophies of postmodernism that are said to privilege discourse and discourage activism. While there are important aspects to ecofeminist valuations of women's caring—particularly in light of the way non-feminist ecopolitical discourse ignores the work of care—I argue that there are also political risks in celebrating

women's association with caring (both as an ethic and a practice) and in reducing women's ethico-political life to care . In view of these risks, to be discussed herein, I think a degree of skepticism is in order. I question whether care is a wise choice of metaphor around which to create a feminist political project for social and ecological change. How can societal expectations that women be caring or the exploitation of women's unpaid caring labor under capitalism be challenged at the same time that the specificity of women's caring stance towards the environment is held up as an answer to the ecological crisis? What does it mean, moreover, for women to enter the realm of the political through a window of care and maternal virtue? How is this feminist? And how, if at all, is it political? It is my position that ecofeminists should see caring through less-than-rosy-glasses, as a paradoxical set of practices, feelings, and moral orientations that are embedded in particular relations and contexts and socially constructed as both feminine and private. Revaluing care in the way many ecofeminists seem to do results in an affirmation of gender roles that are [End Page 57] rooted in the patriarchal dualisms that all feminisms, on my definition at least, must aim persistently to resist and disrupt. I support my position by drawing on the work of some of the feminist philosophers, political economists, and political theorists who have argued that the positive identification of women with caring ought to be treated cautiously for it obscures some of the negative implications of feminized care and narrows our understanding of women as political actors . In the first part of the discussion, I cast doubt on ecofeminist ideas about the "feminine principle" by highlighting some of the critiques of care ethics made by feminist moral philosophers. I then subject ecofeminist celebrations of caring labor to questions raised by feminist political economists about its exploitation in globalizing capitalist societies. I also question whether claims that women are empowered through their care-inspired eco-activism have been accompanied by a sufficient consideration of feminist political transformation. That discussion leads into the final part of the paper where I look to feminist theorists of citizenship to develop the argument that ecofeminists would be better served by using

the language of citizenship instead of the language of care to understand and theorize women's engagement in ecopolitics.

11. The alternative misidentifies consumption problems – lets government and MNCs of the hook Scott 7 – (Austin Scott, Professor @ Florida, Austin E. Scott, University of Florida, Concerning Consumption: The Ecofeminist Reply to Citizens as Consumers, 2007 WPSA Annual Meeting, Las Vegas NV, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/6/1/1/pages176 113/p176113-1.php)

The above discussion is not meant to dismiss all citizen responsibility when it comes to environmental issues. If individuals believed nothing was their fault, it could lead to a nihilistic view of ameliorating the environment. My intent is to draw attention to the

overwhelming tendency to cast responsibility for the environment through individualized consumer acts. What is problematic from an ecofeminist account is when women are unfairly made out to be the saviors of the environment through consumption.

Placing the principle and value of environmentalism onto the backs of women simultaneously alleviates the influences that government, corporations, and patriarchy has in our environmental struggle . More generally, any attempt to couch “earthcare” in consumption terms is usually done so at the expense of structural and systemic political change. Nurturing citizen responsibility is acceptable as long as it does not neglect the importance of addressing the dominant patriarchal culture that benefits from keeping political transformation out. 45 John Barry argues that the sphere of consumption could be a place where one can practice ecological virtue; the goal is to cultivate mindful, not mindless, consumption. 46 After all, he maintains, “one of the most powerful and radical political acts an individual or group can do in modern, consumptionoriented societies is to refuse to consume.” 47 I think this is an important point to consider from an ecofeminist viewpoint. Women, as the principal domestic

consumers, cannot simply refuse to consume since they are responsible for much of their family’s needs. They must consider the needs, even wants, of other individuals and consume accordingly. A flat-out refusal to consume is a radical act, absolutely, but lacks viability. Furthermore, if we consider Kasser’s contention that some consuming activity is akin to addiction, quitting consumption is much more complicated than Barry acknowledges.

12. Alt fails – reverses the error and can’t build transformational theory Caprioli 4 (Mary, Professor of Political Science – University of Tennessee, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis”, International Studies Review, 42(1), March, http://www.blackwellsynergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076)

If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female

centered analysis seems equally biased . Such research would merely be gendercentric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of i nternational r elations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would ofer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of i nternational r elations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world.

*2AC Ecomanagerialism K (ify block + there’s no link) 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations C) The state is inevitable and an indispensable part of the solution to global environmental problems

Eckersley 4 Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8 While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological

I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation .10 As Bull argued, given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it ."" degradation,

rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological In any event,

destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.

it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change . Nonetheless, while the state Of course,

constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains,

the political power concentrated

in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities ."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis . Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world ."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power. Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16 In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable

The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment. ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings.

although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can match the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more In short,

amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global

There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17 economy.

2. Case outweighs and turns the kritik –

4. No link to managerialism – energy consumption is intrinsic to humans

Datschefski 4 (Edwin – BioThinking International, “Consumption is Good ? !”, January, http://www.biothinking.com/consume.pdf) it's natural to use energy, and the more the better. Ecologists like Lotka biological systems that survive are those that develop the most power inflow and u se it to best meet their needs for survival . It seems that

(1922) and Odum and Pinkerton (1955) suggested that the

Schneider and Kay (1994) proposed that a better description of these "power laws" would be that biological systems develop in a manner as to "increase their degradation rate, and that biological growth, ecosystem

As ecosystems develop or mature they tend to increase their total dissipation , and develop more complex structures with greater diversity, more cycling, more energy flow and more hierarchical levels. So ecological theory shows us that a complex adaptive system like the current industrial system will inherently evolve to maximise throughput of energy and materials. I'm not disputing the benefits of efficiency, or the limits to growth. But there does seem to be a lot of (in my view) futile effort directed at encouraging people to consume l ess . People are natural-born shoppers. I defy anyone reading this to claim that they have deprived themselves of that hifi, boat, shoes, camera, etc. that they really fancied. You also can't solve environmental problems by simply using less. There is a fundamental package of food and goods that a household requires, and while it's possible to make the footprint of that package smaller, we're still looking at about 7 tonnes of stuff per household per year, which is about 140 tonnes including embodied energy and mass. You can avoid this shooting up to 10 or development and evolution represent the development of new dissipative pathways."

15 tonnes of stuff by renting and buying durable products and so on, but even the thriftiest household will still have

The focus for improvement must therefore be on changing product and process design so that materials flow is more systemic . All products are a basic consumption requirement.

ultimately disposable. We just need all of them to be designed to go back and become food for another system. So don't feel guilty about buying the products you have to get. Buy with caution and respect for the materials used. And divert the energy of your concerns into action -- tell the manufacturer of your new camera / car / bed etc. about how they can make it better. Most manufacturers think they are doing perfectly OK if they are complying with the law and have no -one demonstrating outside their head office. Going 100% cyclic solar and safe simply isn't on the agenda yet. So what if every member of every environment group (that's about 5 to 50% of the population, depending what country you live in) asked the manufacturers of the myriad of products that they

5. Permutation do the plan and

6. Perm solves – combining tech thought and their ontological reorientation opens spaces for new interpretations of being Sawicki 87 --- Faculty of Philosophy @ Williams College

(Jana, “heidegger and foucault: escaping technological nihilism”, Philosophy Social Criticism, 13:155, Sage Publishing)//trepka

Heidegger also responds to the danger of technology by reviving the pre-modern understanding of technology as craft or art (techné). His reference to the Greek definition of techné as a form of poi6sis (bringing forth) may be interpreted in several ways. An interpretation that links his method to Foucault’s would suggest that Heidegger refers to pre-modern technology simply to highlight and

circumscribe modern technology and thereby release us from its grasp. But there is also a basis in Heidegger’s writings for interpreting the revival of techné as a call for us to supplement and enrich modern technological ways of revealing with those of an artful praxis that is both technical and contemplative. As Don lhde has pointed out, artistic technologies reveal objects without reducing them to serviceability. They defamiliarize the real and utilize imagination to proliferate the possibilities for how things can appear.2°

7. Engaging with the standard operation of technology first is key to efectively engage essence Pistone 10 --- Faculty, Writing Program, Rutgers University (Renee, “A Critical Examination of Heidegger’s Thoughts: Technology Places Humanity in Shackles Hindering Our Natural Thinking Process and Our Connection to Being”, http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/cis/article/view/5182/4782)//trepka 3.1 Technology and Superficiality Rojcewicz (2006) chronicles the use of language to describe technology and its superficiality in the seminal work entitled, The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger. Clearly, Heidegger desires to carefully articulate his reasoning that technology is an obstacle to humans re-connecting with Being (Rojcewicz, 2006). Heidegger defines technology utilizing specific words as one scholar suggests, “ Heidegger

believes that we need to understand the correct or standard definition of technology before we can grasp the true definition of technolog y (Godzinski, 2005). The use of words, or etymological source for words, helps us clarify key definitions for words; therefore, our language serves to explain the meaning of technology , in relation to Being. Certainly, our language demonstrates the superficial nature of technology in our world. We can use language to help describe the complexity and to communicate meanings and definitions. Heidegger looks at the word techne and notes, “for the Greeks, techne meant a revelation of something, an uncovering or a bringing-forth (Heidegger, 1977). Catherine Frances Botha’s, “Heidegger, Technology, and Ecology” explores the concept of techne as knowing (Botha, 2003). Therefore, Botha would likely agree that technology is an essence that is revealing.

8. Only the perm solves – a shift to green managerialism is a pre-requisite to the alt Luke 10 – Timothy W. Luke is University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University *Cites Buckminster Fuller – a renowned American neo-futuristic architect, systems theorist, author, designer, inventor, and was the second president of Mensa from 1974 to 1983. (9/13/2010, Timothy W. “Ephemeralization as Environmentalism: Rereading R. Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth”, Organization & Environment, DOI: 10.1177/1086026610381582, http://oae.sagepub.com/content/23/3/354 // SM)

Fuller’s own notions about design-science initiatives are a “green governmentality” project (Luke, 1999) that presume a very radical change in humanity’s relationship s with the nonhuman natural and artificial worlds will occur only to the extent that they become a new managerial mode of social and political life. And, yet, all these gains must be based on his general systems thinking approach to management tied to maintaining much of the urbanized world’s already realized fundamental changes in industrial production and consumption. While not trusting wholly in managerialism, Fuller also believes his synergetic enhancements for the cycles of industrial production and consumption will boost both economic efficiency and environmental justice. Treating Dobson’s approved forms of ecologism as the only real ecological politics is a major strategic mistake, since Fuller puts his considerable genius , as a managementoriented and design-science initiator, to work in full recognition of “the finitude of the planet,

the need to restrict growth, and the consequent need to reduce consumption” (Dobson, 2007, p. 73). Even though it is often not understood in Fuller’s unconventional terminological codes for

today’s sustainability science is essentially rooted in a technocratic faith in his style of engineered efficiency and designed development— all executed in a register of ecology as economy. always doing much more with much less,

9. Instrumental rationality is inevitable and good---rejecting it results in incoherent stances incapable of dealing with existential crises Bronner 4—Professor of Political Science, Comparative Literature, and German Studies at Rutgers University (Stephen Eric, Reclaiming the Enlightenment, 159-60) Much has been written about the need for a " new science" no longer defined by instrumental rationality and incapable of reifying the world. But these new understandings always seem to ignore the need for criteria of verification or falsification; science without such criteria is, however, no science at all. Contempt for "instrumental" scientific rationality, moreover, undermines the possibility of meaningful dialogue between the humanities and the sciences. And that is a matter of crucial importance: popular debates are now taking place on issues ranging from the eco-system to cloning, the assumptions of western medicine to the possibilities of acupuncture, using animals for experiments to state support for space travel. ¶ This shows ethical progress, again perhaps not in the sense that people have become more "moral," but surely in the sense that more questions of every-day life have become open to moral debate.

Science has not eroded ethics . The Frankfurt School misjudged the impact of science from the beginning. It is still the case that science plays a crucial role in subverting religious authority--considering only the battle between evolutionists and the Christian coalition--and fostering political equality by enabling each to judge the veracity of truth claims. There is also nothing exaggerated in the claim that "the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was perhaps the single greatest influence on the

Critics of the Enlightenment may have correctly emphasized the price of progress, the costs of alienation and reification, and the dangers posed by technology and scientific expertise for nature anda democratic society. Even so, this does not justify romantic attempts to roll back technology. They conflate far too easily with ideological justifications for rolling back the interventionist state and progressive legislation for cleaning up the environment. Such a stance also pits the Enlightenment against environmentalism: technology, instrumental rationality, and progress are often seen as inimical to preserving the planet. Nevertheless, this is to misconstrue the problem. ¶ Technology is crucial for dealing with the ecological devastation brought about by modernity. A redirection of technology will undoubtedly have to take place: but seeking to confront the decay of the environment without it is like using an umbrella to defend against a hurricane . Institutional action informed by instrumental rationality and guided by scientific specialists is unavoidable . Investigations are necessary into the ways government can influence ecologically sound production , provide subsidies or tax-benefits for particular industries, fund particular forms of knowledge creation, and make “risks” a matter of public debate. It is completely correct to note that: “neither controversial social development of the idea that political resistance is a legitimate act."6 ¶

issues nor cultural concerns can be settled simply by scientific fiat, particularly in a world where experts usually disagree and where

No laboratory can dictate what industrial practices are tolerable or what degree of industrialization is permissible. These questions transcend the crude categories of technical criteria and slide- rule measurements.”7 science can be compromised by institutional sponsors.

*2AC Frontier K (don’t think anyone will run this) 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations 2. Inevitability of the state creates an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical — solvency isn’t a question Simmons 99 (William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics .55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let universality rule.

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state

to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for and his followers.’61

the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself , trying to be more just. It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

3. Case outweighs and turns the kritik – 5. No link –AP’s have nothing to do with the concept of the frontier and consumption mentalities ensure that its inevitable 6. Permutation do the plan and 7. The alternative’s framing of imperialism is false – their criticism only reifies dominant structures while obscures oppressive practices of imperial regional powers Shaw 2 (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, April 7, 2002, “Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era,” http://www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm, NC)

It is fashionable in some circles, among which we must clearly include the organizers of this conference, to argue that the global era is seeing 'a new imperialism' - that can be blamed for the problem of 'failed states' (probably among many others). Different contributors to this strand of thought name this imperialism in different ways, but novelty is clearly a critical issue. The logic of using the term imperialism is actually to establish continuity between contemporary forms of Western world power and older forms first so named by Marxist and other theorists a century ago. The last thing that critics of a new imperialism wish to allow is that Western power has changed sufficiently to invalidate the very application of this critical concept. Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world

power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, sufering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key postimperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to home. I shall return to these political issues at the end of this paper.

*2AC Luke K Notes: The premise of the luke k is that the aff discursively frames it’s environment advantage makes the Earth seem like an object that needs to be controlled, one that needs to be preserved only because it will be useful to humanity in the future. The plan, which is meant to solve for the environmental problems in some way, should be popular with companies that wish to take advantage of it for personal gain. These companies are able to benefit from the plan because the plan has "solved for the environment". This makes it possible for them to seize land and resources in order to market it to the people of the world. Thus, the companies are able to gain control over the health and such of the world. Further, the plan could never really solve for the environment in the first place because it just shifts the way in which we destroy the planet. There's also some stuff about how biopolitics can end the world and all. THE MAIN POINT OF

ALL THIS IS THAT WE DON’T LINK. Ask them in cx how we link, they wont answer, then you go up and explain why we don’t link and say cx checks. You don’t even need to read the block just explain the no link arg.

1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations C) Epistemology is secondary to policy

Jarvis 00 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-9)

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be

judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

2. Case outweighs and turns the kritik – 4. No link – the alternative doesn’t eradicate institutionalized consumption which is the root cause of ecomanagerialism

5. Perm – do the plan and 6. Perm solves – combination of critical ecology theory and sustainable development are necessary to solve current environmental challenge Luke 10 – Timothy W. Luke is University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University *Cites Buckminster Fuller – a renowned American neo-futuristic architect, systems theorist, author, designer, inventor, and was the second president of Mensa from 1974 to 1983. (9/13/2010, Timothy W. “Ephemeralization as Environmentalism: Rereading R. Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth”, Organization & Environment, DOI: 10.1177/1086026610381582, http://oae.sagepub.com/content/23/3/354 // SM)

Fuller was one of the 1960s’ most public, and truly peripatetic, regarded his Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth as an accessible argument in favor of finding a more ecological and truly sustainable future for humanity’s ongoing industrial development (Castro, 2004; Gottlieb, 1993). At the time, John Cage While he is not as widely recognized today, intellectuals, and he

(1971) predicted the 21st century would regard this revolutionary era in the 1960s as one defined by Buckminster Fuller. Seeing his own writings as works of clarification addressed to all humanity, which he regarded and called “fellow earthians” (Fuller, 1969/2008a), Fuller delighted himself with the role of serving as a “prognosticator” and

this foundational work should be revisited by anyone interested in how a once cheerful, dauntless, and energetic appraisal of living ecologically has changed in the hands of the green movement’s reprocessing of “sustainable development” (Brown, 2009; de Geus, 2002) into the currently more dour, highest, and most necessary expression of capitalism. Fuller’s good cheer about the Earth’s bounty is harder to accept in times marked by increasingly “forecaster” (Fuller, 1969/2008a, pp. 22-23). Consequently,

serious global warming trends and huge unchecked deep-water oil spills; but, even granted these tough realities, Fuller should not be ignored today.

7. Shift to green managerialism is a pre-requisite to the alt Luke 10 – Timothy W. Luke is University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University *Cites Buckminster Fuller – a renowned American neo-futuristic architect, systems theorist, author, designer, inventor, and was the second president of Mensa from 1974 to 1983. (9/13/2010, Timothy W. “Ephemeralization as Environmentalism: Rereading R. Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth”, Organization & Environment, DOI: 10.1177/1086026610381582, http://oae.sagepub.com/content/23/3/354 // SM)

Fuller’s own notions about design-science initiatives are a “green governmentality” project (Luke, 1999) that presume a very radical change in humanity’s relationship s with the nonhuman natural and artificial worlds will occur only to the extent that they become a new managerial mode of social and political life. And, yet, all these gains must be based on his general systems thinking approach to management tied to maintaining much of the urbanized world’s already realized fundamental changes in industrial production and consumption. While not trusting wholly in managerialism, Fuller also believes his synergetic enhancements for the cycles of industrial production and consumption will boost both economic efficiency and environmental justice. Treating Dobson’s approved forms of ecologism as the only real ecological politics is a major strategic mistake, since Fuller puts his considerable genius , as a managementoriented and design-science initiator, to work in full recognition of “the finitude of the planet, the need to restrict growth, and the consequent need to reduce consumption” (Dobson, 2007, p. 73). Even though it is often not understood in Fuller’s unconventional terminological codes for

today’s sustainability science is essentially rooted in a technocratic faith in his style of engineered efficiency and designed development— all executed in a register of ecology as economy. always doing much more with much less,

8. Perm do the plan and alt in every other instance — either the alt overcomes the residual link or it’s insufficient to overcome the status quo

9. Alt fails – maximizing energy production is human nature and reducing consumption doesn’t solve their impact Datschefski 4 (Edwin – BioThinking International, “Consumption is Good ? !”, January, http://www.biothinking.com/consume.pdf) it's natural to use energy, and the more the better. Ecologists like Lotka biological systems that survive are those that develop the most power inflow and u se it to best meet their needs for survival . It seems that

(1922) and Odum and Pinkerton (1955) suggested that the

Schneider and Kay (1994) proposed that a better description of these "power laws" would be that biological systems develop in a manner as to "increase their degradation rate, and that biological growth, ecosystem

As ecosystems develop or mature they tend to increase their total dissipation , and develop more complex structures with greater diversity, more cycling, more energy flow and more hierarchical levels. So ecological theory shows us that a complex adaptive system like the current industrial system will inherently evolve to maximise throughput of energy development and evolution represent the development of new dissipative pathways."

and materials. I'm not disputing the benefits of efficiency, or the limits to growth. But there does seem to be a lot of (in my view) futile effort directed at encouraging people to consume l ess . People are natural-born shoppers. I defy anyone reading this to claim that they have deprived themselves of that hifi, boat, shoes, camera, etc. that they really fancied. You also can't solve environmental problems by simply using less. There is a fundamental package of food and goods that a household requires, and while it's possible to make the footprint of that package smaller, we're still looking at about 7 tonnes of stuff per household per year, which is about 140 tonnes including embodied energy and mass. You can avoid this shooting up to 10 or 15 tonnes of stuff by renting and buying durable products and so on, but even the thriftiest household will still have

The focus for improvement must therefore be on changing product and process design so that materials flow is more systemic . All products are a basic consumption requirement.

ultimately disposable. We just need all of them to be designed to go back and become food for another system. So don't feel guilty about buying the products you have to get. Buy with caution and respect for the materials used. And divert the energy of your concerns into action -- tell the manufacturer of your new camera / car / bed etc. about how they can make it better. Most manufacturers think they are doing perfectly OK if they are complying with the law and have no -one demonstrating outside their head office. Going 100% cyclic solar and safe simply isn't on the agenda yet. So what if every member of every environment group (that's about 5 to 50% of the population, depending what country you live in) asked the manufacturers of the myriad of products that they

10. No impact threshold – tech and calculation have existed forever – and the world is getting better

11. The alt cedes the political to the right, risking extinction -- letting being be paves the way for rabid anti-environmentalists to ravage the earth Wapner, 08 -

Associate Professor and Director of the Global Environmental Politics Program in the School of International Service at American University (Paul, Global Environmental Politics, February, “The Importance of Critical Environmental Studies in the New Environmentalism,” Project Muse) To many readers, such questions probably sound familiar. Efforts to rid the world of war, poverty, human rights abuses and injustice in general are perennial challenges that require heightened compassion and a commitment that transcends one's time on earth. The questions are especially relevant, however, to environmentalists. They represent the kind of challenges we constantly pose to ourselves and to those we try to convince to join

Environmental issues are some of the gravest dangers facing humanity and all life on the planet. At their most immediate, environmental problems undermine the quality of life for the poorest and are increasingly eroding the quality of life of even the affluent. At the extreme, environmental challenges threaten to fracture thefundamental organic infrastructure that supports life on Earth and thus imperil life's very survival. What to do? Environmental Studies is the academic discipline charged with trying to figure this out. Like Feminist and Race Studies, it us.

emerged out of a political movement and thus never understood itself as value-neutral. Coming on the heels of the modern environmental movement of the 1960s, environmental studies has directed itself toward understanding the biophysical limits of the earth and how humans can live sustainably given those limits. As such, it has always seen its normative commitments not as biases that muddy its inquiry but as disciplining directives that focus scholarship in scientifically and politically [End Page 6] relevant directions. To be sure, the discipline's natural scientists see themselves as objective observers of the natural world and understand their work as normative only to the degree that it is shaped by the hope of helping to solve environmental problems. Most otherwise remain detached from the political conditions in which their work is assessed. The discipline's social scientists also maintain a stance of objectivity to the degree that they respect the facts of the social world, but many of them engage the political world by offering policy prescriptions and new political visions. What is it like to research and teach Environmental Studies these days? Where does the normative dimension of the discipline fit into contemporary political affairs? Specifically, how should social thinkers within Environmental Studies understand the application of their normative commitments? Robert Cox once distinguished what he calls "problem-solving" theory from "critical theory." The former, which aims toward social and political reform, accepts prevailing power relationships and institutions and implicitly uses these as a framework for inquiry and action. As a theoretical enterprise, problem-solving theory works within current paradigms to address particular intellectual and practical challenges. Critical theory, in

Critical environmental theory has come under attack in recent years. As the discipline has matured and further cross-pollinated with other fields, some of us have become enamored with continental philosophy, cultural and communication studies, high-level anthropological and sociological theory and a host of other insightful disciplines that tend to step back from contemporary events and paradigms of thought and reveal structures of power that reproduce social and political life. While such engagement has refined our ability to identify and make visible impediments to creating a greener world, it has also isolated critical Environmental Studies from the contrast, questions existing power dynamics and seeks not only to reform but to transform social and political conditions.1

broader discipline and, seemingly, the actual world it is trying to transform. Indeed, critical environmental theory has become almost a sub-discipline to itself. It has developed a rarefied language and, increasingly, an insular audience. To many, this has rendered critical theory not more but less politically engaged as it scales the heights of thought only to be further distanced from practice. It increasingly seems, to many, to be an impotent discourse preaching radical ideas to an already initiated choir. Critical Environmental Studies is also sounding flat these days coming off the heels of, arguably, the most anti-environmentalist decade ever. The Bush Administration's tenure has been an all-time low for environmental protection. The Administration has installed industry-friendly administrators throughout the executive branch, rolled back decades of domestic environmental law and international environmental leadership, politicized scientific evidence and expressed outright hostility to almost any form of environmental regulation.2 With the US as the global hegemon, it is hard to overestimate the impact these actions have had on worldenvironmental affairs. Being a politically engaged environmental scholar has been difficult during the past several years. In the US, instead of being proactive, the environmental community has adopted a type of rearguard politics in which it has tried simply to hold the line against assaults on everything from the Endangered Species Act, New Source Review and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

Outside the US, the environmental community has had to struggle for pronounced relevance in similar issues as it has operated in the shadow of an environmentally-irresponsible hegemon. Much of the academic world has followed suit, as it were. In the US, it has found itself needing to argue for basics like the knowledge of environmental science, the wisdom of enforcing established law, the importance of holding violators accountable and the significance of the US to remain engaged in international environmental affairs. Outside the US, the academic community has fared only marginally better. For instance, to the Kyoto Protocol and international cooperative efforts to curb deforestation and loss of biological diversity.

many in Europe, who have long advanced analyses of the formation and implementation of regimes, found themselves backpedaling as they wrestled with

the space for what was considered politically-relevant scholarship has shrunk dramatically; what used to be considered problem-solving theory has become so out of touch with political possibility that it has been relegated to the margins of contemporary thought . Put the significance of international regimes absent hegemonic participation. The result is that

differently, the realm of critical theory has grown tremendously as hitherto reasonable ideas have increasingly appeared radical and previously radical

As we enter the final stretch of the Bush Administration and the waning years of the millennium's first decade, the political landscape appears to be changing. In the US, a Democratic Congress, environmental action at the municipal and state levels, and a growing sense that a green foreign policy may be a way to weaken global terrorism, enhance US energy independence and re-establish US moral leadership in the world, have partially resuscitated and re-energized environmental concern.3 Worldwide, there seems to be a similar and even ones have been pushed even further to the hinterlands of critical thought.

more profound shift as people in all walks of life are recognizing the ecological, social and economic effects of climate change, corporations are realizing that environmental action can make business sense, and environmental values in general are permeating even some of the most stubborn societies.

The "perfect storm" of this combination is beginning to put environmental issues firmly on the world's radar screen. It seems that a new day is arising for environmentalism and, by extension, Environmental Studies. What role should environmental scholarship assume in this new climate? Specifically, how wise is it to pursue critical Environmental Studies at

Is it strategically useful to study the outer reaches of environmental thought and continue to reflect on the structural dimensions of environmental degradation when the political tide seems to be turning and problem-solving theorists may once again have Notwithstanding the promise of the new environmental moment for asking fundamental questions, many may counsel caution toward critical Environmental Studies. The political landscape may be changing the ear of those in power? Is now the time to run to the renewed, apparently meaningful center or to cultivate more incisive critical environmental thought? but it is unclear if critical Environmental Studies is prepared to make itself relevant. Years of being distant from political influence has intensified the insularity and arcane character of critical environmental theory, leaving the discipline rusty in its ability to make friends such an opportune moment?

within policy circles. Additionally, over the past few years, the public has grown less open to radical environmental ideas, as it has been fed a steady diet of questioning even the basics of environmental issues. Indeed, that the Bush Administration enjoyed years of bulldozing over environmental concern without loud, sustained, vocal opposition should give us pause. It suggests that we should not expect too much, too soon. The world is still ensconced in an age of global terror; the "high" politics of national security and economic productivity continue to over-shadow environmental issues; and the public needs to be slowly seasoned to the insights and arguments of critical theory before it can appreciate their importance—as if it has been in the dark for years and will be temporary blinded if thrown into the daylight too soon. From this perspective, so the logic might go, scholars should restrict themselves to problem-solving theory and direct their work toward the mainstream of environmental thought. Such prudence makes sense. However, we should remember that problem-solving theory, by working within existing paradigms, at best simply smoothes bumps in the road in the reproduction of social practices. It solves certain dilemmas of contemporary life but is unable to address the structural factors that reproduce broad, intractable challenges. Problem-solving theory, to put it differently, gets at the symptoms of environmental harm rather than the root causes. As such, it might slow the pace of environmental degradation but doesn't steer us in fundamentally new, more promising directions. No matter how politically sensitive one wants to be, such new direction is precisely what the world needs. The last few years have been lost time, in terms of fashioning a meaningful, global environmental agenda. Nonetheless, we shouldn't kid ourselves that we were in some kind of green nirvana before the Bush Administration took power and before the world of terror politics trumped all other policy initiatives. The world has faced severe environmental challenges for decades and, while it may seem a ripe time to reinvigorate problem-solving theory in the new political climate, we must recognize that all the problemsolving theory of the world won't get us out of the predicament we've been building for years. We are all familiar with the litany of environmental woes. Scientists tell us, for example, that we are now in the midst of the sixth great extinction since life [End Page 9] formed on the planet close to a billion years ago. If things don't change, we will drive one-third to one-half of all species to extinction over the next 50 years.4 Despite this, there are no policy proposals being advanced at the national or international levels that come even close to addressing the magnitude of biodiversity loss.5 Likewise, we know that the build-up of greenhouse gases is radically changing the climate, with catastrophic dangers beginning to express themselves and greater ones waiting in the wings. The international community has embarked on significant efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions but no policies are being debated that come even close to promising climate stabilization—including commitments to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP, as advanced by the US government, and to reduce GHG emissions globally by 5 percent below 1990 levels, as specified by the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists tell us that, to really make a difference, we need reductions on the order of 70–80 percent below 1990 levels.6 Such disconnects between high-level policy discussions and the state of the environment are legion. Whether one looks at data on ocean fisheries, fresh water scarcity or any other major environmental dilemma, the news is certainly bad as our most aggressive policies fall short of the minimum required. What is our role as scholars in the

Many of us can and should focus on problem-solving theory. We need to figure out, for example, the mechanisms of cap and trade, the tightening of rules against trafficking in endangered species and the ratcheting up of regulations surrounding issues such as water distribution. We should, in other words, keep our noses to the grindstone and work out incremental routes forward . This is important not simply because we desperately need policy-level insight and want our work to be taken seriously but also because it speaks to those who are tone-deaf to more radical orientations. Most of the public in the developed world apparently doesn't like to reflect on the deep structures of environmental affairs and certainly doesn't like thought that recommends dramatically changing our lifestyles. face of such a predicament?

Nonetheless, given the straits that we are in, a different appreciation for relevance and radical thought is due—especially one that takes seriously the normative bedrock of our discipline. Critical theory self-consciously eschews value-neutrality and, in doing so, is able to ask critical questions about the direction of current policies and orientations. If there ever were a need for critical environmental theory, it is now—when a thaw in political stubbornness is seemingly upon us and the stakes of avoiding dramatic action are so grave. The challenge is to fashion a more strategic and meaningful type of critical

We need to find ways of speaking that re-shift the boundary between reformist and radical ideas or, put differently, render radical insights in a language that makes clear what they really are, namely, the most realistic orientations these days. theory.

Realism in International Relations has always enjoyed a step-up from other schools of thought insofar as it proclaims itself immune from starry-eyed utopianism. By claiming to be realistic rather than idealistic, it has enjoyed a permanent seat at the table (indeed, it usually sits at the head). By analogy,

problem-solving theory in Environmental Studies has likewise won legitimacy and appears particularly attractive as a new environmental day is, arguably, beginning to dawn. It has claimed itself to be the most reasonable and policy-relevant. But, we must ask ourselves, how realistic is problem-solving theory when the numbers of people currently suffering from environmental degradation—either as mortal victims or environmental refugees—are rising and the gathering evidence that global-scale environmental conditions are being tested as never before is becoming increasingly obvious. We must ask ourselves how realistic problem-solving theory is when most of our actions to date pursue only thin elements of environmental protection with little attention to the wider, deeper and longer-term dimensions. In this context, it becomes clear that our notions of realism must shift. And, the obligation to commence such a shift sits squarely on the shoulders of Environmental Studies scholars. That is, communicating

For too long, environmental critical theory has prided itself on its arcane language . As theoreticians, we have scaled the heights of abstraction as we have been enamored with the intricacies of sophisticated theory-building and philosophical reflection. In so doing, we have often adopted a discourse the realistic relevance of environmental critical theory is our disciplinary responsibility.

of high theory and somehow felt obligated to speak in tongues, as it were. Part of this is simply the difficulty of addressing complex issues in ordinary language. But another part has to do with feeling the scholarly obligation to pay our dues to various thinkers, philosophical orientations and so forth. Indeed, some of it comes down to the impulse to sound unqualifiedly scholarly—as if saying something important demands an intellectual artifice that only

Such practice does little to shift the boundary between problem-solving and critical theory, as it renders critical theory incommunicative to all but the narrowest of audiences. In some ways, the key insights of environmentalism are now in place. We recognize the the best and brightest can understand.

basic dynamic of trying to live ecologically responsible lives. We know, for example, that Homo sapiens cannot populate the earth indefinitely; we understand that our insatiable appetite for resources cannot be given full reign; we know that the earth has a limit to how much waste it can absorb and neutralize. We also understand that our economic, social and political systems are ill-fitted to respect this knowledge and thus, as social thinkers, we must

research and prescribe ways of altering the contemporary world order. While we, as environmental scholars, take these truths to be essentially selfevident, it is clear that many do not. As default critical theorists, we thus need to make our job one of meaningful communicators. We need to find metaphors, [End Page 11] analogies, poetic expressions and a host of other discursive techniques for communicating the very real and present dangers of

Resuscitating and refining critical Environmental Studies is not simply a matter of cleaning up our language. It is also about rendering a meaningful relationship between transformational, structural analysis and reformist, policy prescription. Yes, a realistic environmental agenda must understand environmental degradation. We need to do this especially in these challenging and shadowy times.

itself as one step removed from the day-to-day incrementalism of problem-solving theory. It must retain its ability to step back from contemporary events

it also must take some responsibility for fashioning a bridge to contemporary policy initiatives. It must analyze how to embed practical, contemporary policy proposals (associated with, for example, a cap-and-trade system) into transformative, political scenarios. Contemporary policies, while inadequate themselves to engage the magnitude of environmental challenges, can nevertheless be guided in a range of various directions. Critical Environmental Studies can play a "critical" role by interpreting such policies in ways that render them consonant with longer-range transformative practices or at least explain how such policies can be reformulated to address the root causes of environmental harm. This entails radicalizing incrementalism— specifying the relationship between superstructural policy reforms and structural political transformation. and analyze the structures of power at work. It must, in other words, preserve its critical edge. Nonetheless,

*2AC Baudrillard K (doesn’t link) 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations 2. Inevitability of the state creates an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical — solvency isn’t a question Simmons 99 (William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics .55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let universality rule.

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state

to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for and his followers.’61

the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself , trying to be more just. It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

3. Case outweighs and turns the kritik 5. Permutation do both – only this copes with life at the borderline. A strategy of rational abstraction overcomes Baudrillard’s obsession with rupture and places critical theory in a workable context Kellner 89 [Douglas. Prof Education at UCLA. “Boundaries and Borderlines: Reflections on Jean Baudrillard and Critical Theory” Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol 9. 1989. Ebsco//GBS-JV] against a radical implosive postmodernism such as one finds in Baudrillard -- and Arthur Kroker's and David Cook's The Postmodern Scene (1986) is an even more extreme case -- I would argue for the need to draw boundaries, or conceptual distinctions, and to make what Marx calls "rational abstractions" rather than leaping into the delirious postmodern implosion of all boundaries, abstractions, and distinctions in the vertiginous flux of the hyperreal. As Wittgenstein and Derrida attacked metaphysical abstractions which dissolved differences in unifying schemes, we should undertake to criticize ideological- metaphysical abstractions yet should also draw distinctions which make connections and which conceptualize important differences. As Marx put it in his introduction to the Grundrisse: "It might seem, therefore, that in order to talk about Yet

production at all we must either pursue the process of historic development through its different phases, or declare beforehand that we are dealing with a specific historical epoch such as e.g. modern bourgeois production, which is indeed our particular theme. However, all epochs of production have certain common traits, common characteristics. Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction insofar as it really brings out and fixes a common element" (i.e. in different modes of production). Yet Marx goes on to insist that: "Still, this general category, this common element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits into different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few" (Marx 1976, p. 106). Thus, while there are general "determinations valid for production as such," and so for all epochs, we must not, he warns, obscure "their essential differences" (Marx 1976, p. 101).¶ Consequently, for Marx "rational abstraction" fixes a "common element" that plays a constitutive role in various situations and contexts. The "concrete" in this analysis is itself a product of many determinations, many relations, and "rational abstraction" thus designates specific determinations in a multiple and multi-dimensional relational chain.

"Bad abstraction" is thus overcome by situating abstractions back into a specific

set of differential relations, contextualizing one's concepts and analyses within a set of historically specific and complex social relations . This is what, I maintain, we need to do in the postmodernism debate: we should grasp the differences between the old and the new stages of society (or art, philosophy, etc.), and the continuities between the previous and new stage of society -- a continuity constituted precisely by the continuing primacy of capitalist relations of production in the current organization of society .[4] Thus, against postmodernists who celebrate the radically "new" -- and rupture, discontinuity, and difference, -- I would argue that we need to characterize both the continuities and the discontinuities in the historical process and that this involves both pointing to ruptures and breaks in recent history as well as continuities.¶ Consequently, while New French Theory has attempted to cross the borderline and to chart out the terrain of the new, their claims for an absolute break between modernity and postmodernity are not always convincing. Although we may be living within a borderline, or transitional space, between the modern and the postmodern, and may be entering a terrain where old modes of thought and language are not always useful, it seems at this point in time that in many ways, New French Theory is itself flawed and not of much use in helping us to understand and resolve many of the crucial theoretical and political problems that we currently face (i.e. moving beyond the current age of conservative hegemony, learning to use and live with new technologies in ways that will enhance human life, and understanding and dealing with a wide range of social problems from technological unemployment to AIDS). Thus while we clearly need new theories and politics to understand the conflicts, problems, and developments of the

we need new concatenations of Marxism, Critical Theory, and New French theory to solve the theoretical and political problems which confront us today. contemporary era I believe that

6. Perm solves best---refusal to recognize the empathic consequences of disaster consumption is epistemic colonialism---there needs to be space for both using and eschewing catastrophe

Recuber 11 Timothy Recuber is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the Graduate Center of the City. University of New York. He has taught at Hunter College in Manhattan "CONSUMING CATASTROPHE: AUTHENTICITY AND EMOTION IN MASSMEDIATED DISASTER" gradworks.umi.com/3477831.pdf Yet many more engage in precisely these types of activities each time a disaster strikes. Even The Onion recognized this by asserting that over 12 million people had “capitalized” on the events of 9/11 in

If watching a disaster on television or visiting a disaster site makes one a voyeur, if reacting to a disaster emotionally is insincere, if using a disaster to make a political point is exploitative, and if creating a product, service, or work of art that responds to a disaster is simply a way to capitalize on tragedy, then very few Americans would have escaped the last decade ethically untarnished. The simple fact is that most Americans, and many others across the globe, rely on mass media and consumer culture to provide the resources through which we experience, understand, and respond to pain, tragedy, and loss—even, or perhaps especially, when they occur on a massive scale. In a decade that saw the September 11 some fashion, and thus deserved the sarcastic inclusion of their names on an honorific plaque. An actual tally of implicated Americans might have resulted in a much higher number, however.

attacks followed by the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, then the horror of the Virginia Tech shootings, and finally the near-collapse of the financial services industry that initiated a massive global

each of us has had to negotiate a stunning variety of images, texts, products, and services addressing the harrowing realities of disaster, crisis, and catastrophe. These negotiations, and the moral condemnations that sometimes accompany them, suggest that the norms concerning appropriate personal, commercial, and political economic downturn from which we have yet to recover,

responses to disasters are in the process of shifting, and that a consensus on these matters has yet to emerge. Norms are the codes of conduct that delineate culturally acceptable behaviors, and that mark certain ways of seeing the world as legitimate or appropriate. “Just as sets of mutually consistent norms help regulate behavior, so sets of inconsistent or rapidly shifting norms… are often regarded as a symptom, if not a cause, of social unrest” (Hechter and Opp, 2001, p. xi). It makes sense, then, that a period in which Americans of every age, gender, race, religion, and social class had their senses of personal safety and economic security shaken would expose rifts and fractures in normative structures concerning not only disasters, but the role of mass media and consumer culture in American life in

general.

This dissertation explores the interwoven fabric of news, entertainment, advertising, commodities, and other services

through which Americans

have come to experience and understand disasters over the past decade. Within this fabric are threaded the strands of a variety of norms concerning the moral, aesthetic, emotional, commercial, and political responses to disasters. These are often complementary, occasionally contradictory, and sometimes directly clash with one another. Yet from this densely woven tapestry, it is possible to pick out certain new or ascendant norms that explain the contemporary appeal of disaster consumption and spectatorship. Though many Americans are bothered by the consumerism of disaster, many more actively participate in it, and perhaps more accurately, those two groups

need

not be seen as mutually exclusive. Instead, individuals today are tasked with navigating the shifting cultural standards concerning forms of disaster spectatorship and consumerism that they may experience as morally appropriate, emotionally resonant, or in extreme cases, ethically repugnant. 7. Take a leap of faith – we should attempt to build truth even if everything revolves around simulation─ Fawver, 8 [Kurt, Master of Arts Engilsh – Cleveland State University, “ DESTRUCTION IN SEARCH OF HOPE: BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATION, AND CHUCK PALAHNIUK’S CHOKE,” August 2008, http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Fawver %20Kurt%20D.pdf?csu1219269969] If Palahniuk’s Choke was merely an excellent resource for understanding Baudrillardian theory, it would still be a valuable text. As it stands, however, Choke expands on the ideas of simulation and mediation and struggles to free itself from the snares of Baudrillard’s ultimate unreality. Through a regime of breakdown and disorder, the text fights to emerge from “the end or disappearance of… the real, the social, history, and other key features of modernity” (Best 133). It attempts to create a meaningful correspondence between signifiers and signifieds, between images and meanings. While Baudrillard posits that “everything can and has been done, and all we can do is to assemble the… pieces of our culture and proceed to its extremities,” Choke resists such reasoning and, in fact, runs through stages of assembly and extremism to demonstrate how utterly futile and pointless they are (Best 137). Choke seeks to blow apart those very reproductions that Baudrillard claims cause the implosion of meaning. Essentially, the text advocates a clean sweep of communication, a discarding of all mediated reality. In Choke, as in many other Palahniuk novels, the flow of true meaning can only return to society and individuals once all mediated, simulated, reproduced “meanings” are razed. Thus, the text does glorify destruction, but it is destruction in search of hope, destruction that will, presumably, lead to creation. Victor’s eventual identity collapse, and his subsequent rebuilding, is paradigmatic of Choke’s anti-Baudrillardian philosophy. Victor begins by compiling the persona of a dysfunctional, perpetually orphaned child-cum-adult from mediated symbols of “dysfunction.” His sex addiction and his compulsion to simulate choking in

restaurants are symptoms of this poor attempt at constructing a workable identity. When the “traumatized child-now-in-adulthood” simulation fails, Victor turns to new mediated identities: Christ and Antichrist. These personas also lack any depth or connection to Victor’s core being and are, subsequently, discarded. As the text progresses, Victor drops all attempts at creating his identity from the palette of society’s mass-produced conceptions. He pleads for someone to “just show me one thing in this world that is what you’d think” (Choke 205). But, as no inherent realness exists in contemporary society, no one can show Victor a thing or an individual with inherent meaning. Therefore, his only option is to extricate himself from the culture of simulation by cutting himself off from his own history and other individuals’ mediated perceptions of his past. In a moment of clarity, Victor realizes that he must reduce his identity to its simplest, most immediate terms because “There’s no way you can get the past right. You can pretend. You can delude yourself, but you can’t re-create what’s over” (Choke 273). Thus, by the end of the novel, Victor is more a blank page than a fully fleshed character. Rather than continuing to allow his identity to be an ever-evolving reactive simulation that forms in reference to external mediation, he becomes a clean slate on which he can write his own self-generated identity. He slakes off most of the factors that traditionally 26 inform self; familial expectation, personal history, and even conventional emotion are all missing from his identity at the text’s close. As Victor explains, “For the first time in longer than I can remember, I feel peaceful. Not happy. Not sad. Not anxious. Not horny. Just all the higher parts of my brain closing up shop…. I’m simplifying myself” (Choke 282). The implication is that, in order to escape simulation, Victor must revert to a more primitive state. His thoughts are of an essentially basic order; he no longer seeks out “deeper” meanings or alternate referentials. Instead, events, feelings, people, and things simply are what they appear to be, without connection to external mediation. For Victor, the universe of multiple signified meanings for any given signifier is no longer relevant . He has destroyed his perception of alternate reference and, therefore, has limited his field of meaning to exclusively intrinsic values. Such perception comes at a price, however. Victor has to sacrifice a world of possibility, of variable signification, for concrete meaning. He can no longer ponder whether an image means one thing or another; rather, an image will, to Victor, always be fixed to one referent. In a sense, then, he has given up the parts of his “higher brain,” namely a rigorous intellect and boundless creativity, in order to gain a foothold into solid reality and flee Baudrillard’s infinite simulatory spiral. Whereas Baudrillard “critiques… representational thought which is confident that it is describing reality as it is,” Victor embraces such thoughts with open arms (Best 140). Victor is intelligent enough to understand that choosing a path of selfimposed communicative primitivism is the only measure of prevention against accruing a new body of simulacra. The polar opposite of Victor is Tracy, the woman to whom he loses his virginity. She is the prime example of an individual forever lost in Baudrillardian post27 structuralism, representing everything that Victor, or any person, may become when nihilistic acceptance of simulation has infiltrated every aspect of self.

Victor meets her on an airplane, in an unlocked bathroom. She takes flights, enters the restroom, leaves the door unlocked, then waits until someone walks in on her and attempts to engage them in a sexual encounter. When Victor questions her aberrant behavior, she replies that “the answer is there is no answer… when you think about it, there’s no good reason to do anything. There is no point… people… don’t want an orgasm as much as they just want to forget. Everything.” (Choke 2567). Clearly, life in the Baudrillardian void has taken its toll on this woman. Tracy ponders “Why do I do anything? …I’m educated enough to talk myself out of any plan. To deconstruct any fantasy. Explain away any goal. I’m so smart I can negate any dream.” (Choke 257). She is the essence of Baudrillard’s postconstructionist theory; in her, the text introduces an embodiment of hyper-intellectualism that has cut away all the joy, fulfillment, and meaning from life and reality and, subsequently, sees only a vacuum underlying all existence. Her nihilism leads into a quest for extrication from the ultimate emptiness and, thus, works as the catalyst for her sexual addiction. She wants to find meaning and absolute reality but will always be forced, due to her intelligence and her deconstructive ability, to undermine the very goal she is trying to achieve. For Tracy, meaning is impossible not because it has objectively disappeared, but because she cannot accept simple truths or non-multiplicitous signifiers. She thrives on the complexity of reality and, therefore, will never be satisfied by a simplistic interpretation, even if the simplistic interpretation is that for which she yearns. Through Tracy’s unsatisfied, perpetually-wandering nature, the text puts forth the implication that 28 maintaining such an unflinching post-constructionist mindset has no future other than disappointment, dysfunction, and existential despair. Indeed, Choke implicitly attacks Baudrillard’s blasé acceptance of simulation and attempts to show the ramifications of such acceptance. Hence, while the critical perspective from which Baudrillard’s theory stems is akin to a scalpel, cutting deeper and deeper into the body of reality to reveal unending layers of nothingness, Choke advocates a return to a bandaged surface; it strives toward the revitalization of easily accessible signifieds, and, thus, shuns Tracy’s (see also Baudrillard’s) system of thought that only seeks to forever prove the disappearance of meaning. Therefore, the text is ultimately moving beyond Baudrillard by “emphasizing creation over destruction” and promoting the deemphasization of post-constructionist critical inquiry as a means of understanding reality (Kavadlo 12). To further illustrate the resurrection of meaningful signifiers and images, the text introduces Denny, Victor’s best friend. Denny is a recovering sex addict who, throughout the text, earnestly seeks rehabilitation. As sex addictions in Choke seem to be symptomatic of a fatalistic surrender to the simulatory world, Denny is the one character who consistently seeks out a means of resistance. Strangely enough, this resistance takes the form of thousands of rocks. As the novel progresses, Denny builds an enormous rock collection and, with those rocks, embarks on the construction of a mystery structure in an empty field. He enlists Victor’s help and, when a local reporter comes to interview Victor and Denny about the construction project, Victor’s responses are veiled in a haze of ignorance. Victor

recalls the dialogue between himself and the reporter, saying that she asked: “‘This structure you’re building, is it a house?’ And I say we don’t know. 29 ‘Is it a church of some kind?’ We don’t know. …‘What are you building, then?’ We won’t know until the very last rock is set. ‘But when will that be?’ We don’t know.” (Choke 263-4). Victor’s reticence with the reporter is not due to any particular stigma or grudge against the media. Rather, his unforthcoming answers are a result of a new (or perhaps ancient) mode of perception and, thus, communication. Instead of focusing on the possibilities of the stone structure or its eventual outcome, Denny instructs Victor to focus on the process of building, alone. He says that “the longer we can keep building, the longer we can keep creating, the more will be possible. The longer we can tolerate being incomplete,” the better (Choke 264). Initially, this statement appears to echo Baudrillard’s sentiments, with a perpetual process of building that leads nowhere and creation that actually creates nothing. Yet, precisely the opposite is true. By compelling the rock structure to remain a workin-progress without a definitive end, Denny has squashed any simulatory nature the building may possess. He and Victor are not putting stones atop one another to create any of the long-mediated structures of society. The stone building is not a house or a church or any other structure of convention and, therefore, is not founded upon any previous referent. Denny’s rock building is not trying to simulate any other structure; it is simply allowed to rise and become whatever it eventually becomes. With the stone structure, Denny is attempting to introduce a product that holds inherent, unmediated meaning. As soon as Denny or Victor would conclude that the building is a house or a church, then it would, necessarily, begin to take on aspects of those structures. It would begin to simulate a house or a church. But, by allowing the structure to grow almost organically, Denny has set the 30 groundwork for a signifier that may finally be connected with an inherent meaning, with a concrete undeniable reality. The price for cultivating an unmediated, unsimulatory reality is high, however. Both Denny and Victor must discard the realm of speculation and conjecture. In order to maintain a sense of the real, all possibility outside a thing’s readily apparent meaning must vanish. Denny and Victor do not know what the stone building will be because they don’t want to know until it is finished. They choose a path of ignorance so that realness may reassert itself within the structure without being crushed by external mediated “reality.” Basically, Denny and Victor must become simple, single-minded individuals who have no need for multiplicitous signs and no desire for a constant outgrowth of discourse. Theirs is a reality that requires no mediation, no simulation, and, hence, no emptiness. Such a lifestyle choice flies in the face of our contemporary world, where formulating variable meanings for signifiers and expanding the possible field of referentials for images is secondnature. The very fiber of critical theory, or of practically any academic discipline, hinges on increased speculation, on infinitely sprawling discourses, and on the complication of texts, signifiers, and reality itself. Choke’s solution for escaping Baudrillard’s simulation is to escape that same incisively critical manner of thinking. In doing so, Denny and Victor become primitive postpostmodern men. The

duo simultaneously evolve and devolve communication; they usher reality back into a signifier but cause the collapse of complexity. Indeed, “many of the seemingly random transgressive acts perpetrated by the characters in Palahniuk’s fiction,” such as Denny and Victor’s intentional ignorance, “fall within an understanding of entropy as a force for renewal and meaning” (Sartain 32). Thus, while Denny may 31 have set society on a course for a neo-stone age, his rock structure may actually be something that simply “is what it is.” Victor’s mother, Ida, is an individual who also manages to cut ties with simulation, but in a much different, and arguably more destructive, manner. Her perspective on reality, like the neo-primitivism of Victor and Denny, strives to attain communion with a long-lost realness. However, Ida takes a much more direct and assertive approach. She uses drugs to “simplify” her state of mind. As Ida explains, “Trichloroethane… All my extensive testing has shown this to be the best treatment for a dangerous excess of human knowledge” (Choke 148). She is attempting to clear away the debris of contemporary society’s all-consuming media (and with it mediation and simulation) by chemically altering her consciousness, thus allowing her to ignore its multiplicity of disembodied voices and images that would, otherwise, crush her unmediated, individual perception of reality. Ida claims that she can see things as they truly are when she is on drugs. She says that the trichloroethane makes the world appear “without the framework of language. Without the cage of associations… without looking through the lens of everything she knew was true…” (Choke 149). Through her druginduced highs, Ida is stripping away mediation and, therefore, making simulation impossible. Without a vast body of mediated meanings to draw upon, Ida is forced to view the world as it actually is, in its simplest terms. She has rid herself of simulation and allowed realness to seep back into images. However, the reality is fleeting and dissipates back into the cacophony of Baudrillard’s simulatory universe as soon as Ida is clean once more. Even worse, the constant drug use takes its toll on Ida; over the course of the text, she ends up with a perpetual bloody nose and, ultimately, is reduced to a 32 feeble, emaciated skeleton. Idea proves that, while escaping Baudrillard’s simulation may be possible in a number of ways, the return to reality can come at an indescribably steep price. Ida is also critical to understanding Choke’s postulation on the manner in which society may be galvanized into forsaking simulation. It is “Ida’s ideology of adventure, her belief in the restorative power of chaos [that] serves to unbalance comfortable homogeneity. She… seeks to create meaning and potential for change through random chaotic acts” (Sartain 33). Ida vandalizes merchandise in stores, kidnaps children, and causes public disturbances all in the service of disrupting complacent adherence to mediated reality. She knows that “a fire alarm is never about a fire, anymore” and tries to disseminate this knowledge across society, albeit obliquely and illegally (Choke 161). Ida challenges simulation by creating real panic and real excitement. Her acts of destruction are aimed squarely at bringing a sense of reality back into a populace that, normally, experiences events and emotions in a heavily mediated environment. Ida causes people to feel true fear, to experience events that are precisely what they appear to be: actual, unsimulated danger. However, there is no proof that Ida’s regime of

philosophy-based crime alters the perception or behavior of anyone but Victor over the long term. For a brief moment, the victims of Ida’s crimes may experience a true, unmediated, unsimulated event, but as soon as the danger has been resolved, the contemporary culture of mass media creeps back in and continues to suffocate with its hollow signifiers. Therefore, Ida’s attempts to empower society may be entirely pointless. While her personal freedom from Baudrillard’s simulatory world is assured, she cannot force others to choose the same path of informed, intelligible ignorance. 33 Indeed, Ida’s failure to enact social change exhibits the textual implication that release from simulation must begin in the most intensely personal and introspective realms and radiate outward. Perhaps meaning can be reconnected with images, but, as Choke demonstrates, such reconnection must be instituted at the individual level long before it can solidify into an absolute reality upon which everyone agrees. If Choke’s resolution to the Baudrillardian dilemma seems somewhat perfunctory or abrupt, it would be in keeping with the theoretical concerns of the text. In a simulatory reality, where all information is produced and mediated to individuals at a hyperkinetic speed, it would be logical for a solution or paradigmatic rebellion to arise just as quickly, given that this solution would still, necessarily, have a point of emergence within a system that is unable to slow the production of information, images, and signifiers. Thus, the text’s resolution – an idea that works as a competing perception of reality – appears as quickly and as suddenly as any other random image or information structure; the system of mindless, endless generation has unwittingly generated its own demise. That Choke ends without much exploration of its resolution to simulatory reality is also reasonable, given that such an open-ended future is antithetical to the very principle of Baudrillardian nihilism. The text fights despair and a defeated acceptance of missing reality with unabashed romanticism. With the novel ending shortly after the characters have lain in place their newfound adherence to knowing ignorance, the future is uncertain. Anything could happen to reality following the close of the text; a reunion of images and meaning is as possible as the continuation of hollow simulation. Victor and Denny’s plan for identity-formation and reality-perception may lead to the eventual destruction of all simulacra or it may be entirely useless. The reader is left in a state of 34 unknowing, of hope for meaning-filled future. Such a conclusion is impossible in a Baudrillardian scheme of reality. Under Baudrillard’s critical eye, the world has reached a point where struggle against the forces of simulation is impossible. In Baudrillardian theory, there is no hope for the retrieval of meaning; rather, the process of simulacra will continue, unabated. In answer to this bleak nihilistic view, Choke presents an open space, an ending that is more the beginning of a competing discourse than a summation of all that has come before it. There is no definite success at the end of the text, nor is there assured defeat. The text’s concluding indeterminacy, its allowance for hope, separates it from Baudrillard’s nihilism and reinforces the supposition that escape from simulation is, in fact, possible.

9. Baudrillard’s alternative is politically paralyzing. Wolin, 06 (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

In the epitome of postmodern political fatalism, the only strategy Baudrillard has to recommend is "death” solely by aping the information society's own lifelessness and inertia-a practice he refers to as "crystal revenge" does one stand a chance, argues Baudrillard, of escaping its enervating clutches. Thus, according to Baudrillard, the implosions of media society portend the collapse of the emancipatory project in general. His verdict on the impossibility of progressive historical change reiterates one of the commonplaces of reactionary rhetori c: the socalled futility thesis, according to which attempts to transform society are condemned a priori to failure. The nihilistic implications of Baudrillard's approach have been confirmed by the unmitigated schadenfreude with which he responded to the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks. In his view the assault represented a justified response to the challenge of American global hegemony. Although terrorist groups based in the Middle East may have been nominally responsible for executing the attacks, in truth it was an act that fulfilled the longings and aspirations of people all over the world. As Baudrillard observes, "haven't we dreamt of this event, hasn't the entire world, without exception, dreamt of it; no one could not dream of the destruction of a power that had become hegemonic to such a point. . . . In essence, it was [the terrorists] who committed the deed, but it is we who wished for it.

11. Repeated meta-analyses prove fear appeals motivate adaptive behavior. Witte and Allen ’00

(Kim, Prof. Comm. – MSU, and Mike, Prof. Comm. – U. Wisconsin Milwaukee, Health Education & Behavior, “A MetaAnalysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns”, 27:5, October, Sage Journals)

At least three meta-analyses have been conducted on the fear appeal literature . Boster and Mongeau8 and Mongeau9 examined the influence of a fear appeal on perceived fear (the manipulation check; i.e., did the strong vs. weak fear

They found

appeals differ significantly in their influence on measures of reported fear), attitudes, and behaviors. that on average, fear appeal manipulations produced moderate associations between reported fear and strength of fear appeal (r = .36 in Boster and Mongeau and r = .34 in Mongeau)

modest but reliable relationships between the strength of a fear appeal and attitude change (r = .21 in Boster and Mongeau and r = .20 in Mongeau) and the strength of a fear appeal and behavior change (r = .10 in Boster and Mongeau and r = .17 in Mongeau). Sutton7 used a different meta-analytic statistical method (z scores) and reported significant positive effects for strength of fear appeal on intentions and behaviors. None of the meta-analyses found support for a curvilinear association between fear appeal strength and message acceptance. Overall, the previous meta-analyses suggested that fear appeal manipulations work in producing different levels of fear according to different strengths of fear appeal messages. Furthermore, the meta-analyses suggest that the stronger the fear appeal, the greater the attitude, intention, and behavior change. and

12. Baudrillard’s wrong – we do know the diference between simulation and reality – taking action in this context is key March 95 James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, 95, Critique, Action, and Liberation, pp. 292-293

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true , that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5 We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the “great communicator.” Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan’s policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.6 To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the “public sphere,” in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for

alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.7

*2AC Fiat Double Bind K 1. Perm do both

2. Inevitability of the state creates an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical — solvency isn’t a question Simmons 99 (William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics .55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an universality rule.

ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is and his followers.’61

necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself , trying to be more just. It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

3. The only way to transcend the state is to strengthen its positive elements in the short term against a conservative rollback Chomsky, 1997 (Noam, Canadian Dimension, 5/14, Factiva) By visions, I mean the conception of a future society that animates what we actually do, a society in which a decent human being might want to live. By goals, I mean the choices and tasks that are within reach, that we will pursue one way or another guided by a vision that may be distant and hazy. On all such matters, our knowledge and understanding are shallow; as in virtually every area of human life, we proceed on the basis of intuition and experience,

Goals and visions can appear to be in conflict, and often are. There's no contradiction in that, as I think we all know from ordinary experience. Let me take my own case, to illustrate what I have in mind. My personal visions are fairly traditional anarchist ones. According to this hopes and fears. Goals involve hard choices with very serious human consequences.

anarchist vision, any structure of hierarchy and authority carries a heavy burden of justification, whether it involves personal relations or a larger social

though it runs directly counter to my goals. My short-term goals are to defend and even strengthen elements of state authority which, though illegitimate in fundamental ways, are critically necessary right now to impede the dedicated efforts to 'roll back' the progress that has been achieved in extending democracy and human rights. State authority is now under severe attack in the more democratic societies, but not because it conflicts with the libertarian vision. Rather the opposite: because it offers (weak) protection to some aspects of that vision. In today's world, I think, the goals of a committed anarchist should be to defend some state institutions from the attack against them, while trying at the same time to pry them open to more meaningful public participation - and ultimately, to dismantle them in a much more free society; if the appropriate circumstances can be achieved. order. If it cannot bear the burden - sometimes it can - then it is illegitimate and should be dismantled. I share that vision,

4. Refusing to use the state empowers its worst aspects Barbrook, 97- professor at the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 1997 (Richard, message to a list serve, http://www.nettime.org/ListsArchives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html) I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, we have real social problems of deprivation and

poverty which, in part, can only be solved by state action. This does not make me a statist, but rather an anti-anti-statist. By opposing such intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are tacitly lining up with the neo-liberals. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties. I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. It is great for artists and others to adopt a marginality as a life style choice, but most of the people who are economically and socially marginalised were never given any choice. They are excluded from society as a result of deliberate policies of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. During the '70s, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then we learnt the hard way that voting did change things and lots of people suffered if state power was withdrawn from certain areas of our life, such as welfare and employment. Anarchism can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

5. No passivity – Antonio is wrong A) We don’t forget who we are – diferent roles allows us to consider different points of view which develops our own beliefs – defending heg bad and heg good allows us to realize what argument we think is best B) No ressentiment – this part of the card is underhighlighted and you should reject it but we don’t covet USFG power – our development of personal advocacy skills means that we still can change our futures C) Debaters who have ventured into policymaking disprove this piece of evidence – policymaking creates change

Arguing that a current government policy is bad is not roleplaying Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in

This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor.

should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated . I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does . I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made

If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in during the NCAA tournament.

debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

Analysis of policy is particularly empowering, even if we’re not the USFG Shulock 99 Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY --- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership & Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999) As interesting as our politics might be with the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of participatory and critical policy analysis, we do not need these changes to justify our investment in policy analysis. Policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and afects policy outcomes. The problem is not that In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary.

policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to resonate through the

those critics who see policy analysis as a tool of the power elite might be less concerned if they understood that analysts are only adding to the debate—they are unlikely to be handing ready-made policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for policy environment.10¶ Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But

implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients

the cynics disdainful of the purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that they are seeking not truth, but to elevate the level of debate with a compelling, evidence-based presentation of their perspectives. Whereas critics call, unrealistically in my view, for analysts to present competing perspectives on an issue or to “design a discourse among multiple perspectives,” I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this acted upon their proposed solutions. And

when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their

Policy analysis is used, far more extensively than is commonly believed. Its use could be appreciated and expanded if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accurately, not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but as a contributor to informed discourse. For years Lindblom [1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990] clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.¶

has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is—just one of several routes to social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. Lindblom sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of

even with these limitations, policy analysis can have a major impact on policy. Ideas, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas. Baumgartner, Jones, and others into the dynamics of policy change, see that

DEBATE roleplay specifically activates agency Hanghoj 8 http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddann else/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (LKIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular

goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

*2AC Spanos K (watch out for benny) 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations 2. Inevitability of the state creates an ethical responsibility to STRIVE toward making it ethical — solvency isn’t a question Simmons 99 (William Paul, Prof @ U of Arizona, Formerly ASU and Bethany College, The Third: Levinas’ Theoretical Move from An-Archical Ethics to the Realm of Justice and Politics, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 25(6), p. 83-104, http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/levinas/1-levinas.pdf)//LA

We should also say that all those who attack us with such venom have no right to do so, along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of ‘me’ but of those

I’d call such a defence a politics, but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics .55 Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish close to me, who are also my neighbors.

tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can

Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justification.

think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’

Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny , absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. Levinas finds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other.

If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the first philosophy At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transfixed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, unThe norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman.

face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let

Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an universality rule.

ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler

Both ethics and politics have their own justification. The justification for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justification for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for and his followers.’61

the liberal state. The Levinasian state According to Levinas, the move from the Other to the Third is the begin- ning of all violence. In the realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh others in the name of justice, but this process reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, justice is un-ethical. When justice is uni- versalized into laws and institutions it moves yet another step away from the an-archical responsibility for the Other. The necessary universaliza- tion of ethical responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, the institutions of the state treat the Other as an inter- changeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying the transcendent element in man. Even when the state functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed to ethics. For me, the negative element, the element of violence in the state, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy functions perfectly, when every- one submits to universal ideas. There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the necessity of the reasonable

Vigilance against violence in the state is essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked by the ethical relationship with the Other. In order for everything to run along smoothly and freely, it is absolutely necessary to affirm the infinite responsibility of each, for each , before order. There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: the tears of the Other.62

each... As I see it, subjective protest is not received favourably on the pretext that its egoism is sacred, but because the I alone can perceive the ‘secret tears’ of the Other which are caused by the functioning – albeit reasonable – of

The state must be constantly reminded of its inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-critical state in the modern liberal state. The liberal state ‘always asks itself whether its own justice really is justice’. What qualities does the liberal state possess that make it self-critical? the hierarchy.

First, there is the freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the government, to speak out against injustice. You know the prophets of the bible; they come and say to the king that his method of dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet doesn’t do this in a clandestine way: he comes before the king and he tells him. In the liberal state, it’s the

the leader is not above the people, but is chosen from among the people. A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees humanity through the Other’s eyes. Against the Platonic formulation that the press, the poets, the writers who fulfill this role. Second, in the liberal state,

best ruler is the one who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical relationship with the Other. ‘The State, in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if the divine

the most important component of the liberal state is its call for a ‘permanent revolution’. The Levinasian liberal state is always trying to improve itself , trying to be more just. It is ‘a rebellion that word enters into it; the prince is educated in this knowledge.’ However, for Levinas,

begins where the other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins’.

Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a

Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted – alongside the written law – human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally ideal state.69 Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical state which holds justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.

there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other . Levinasian heteronomic political responsibility for the Other justice and

thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions.

Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical

Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure. individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020

3. Case outweighs and turns the kritik – 4. No link – AP’s are apart of the imperial project, but the af gets rid of them lel.

5. Their criticism only reifies dominant structures while obscures oppressive practices of imperial regional powers Shaw 2 (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, April 7, 2002, “Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era,” http://www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm, NC)

It is fashionable in some circles, among which we must clearly include the organizers of this conference, to argue that the global era is seeing 'a new imperialism' - that can be blamed for the problem of 'failed states' (probably among many others). Different contributors to this strand of thought name this imperialism in different ways, but novelty is clearly a critical issue. The logic of using the term imperialism is actually to establish continuity between contemporary forms of Western world power and older forms first so named by Marxist and other theorists a century ago. The last thing that critics of a new imperialism wish to allow is that Western power has changed sufficiently to invalidate the very application of this critical concept. Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new

political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, sufering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key postimperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to home. I shall return to these political issues at the end of this paper.

7. Permutation – do the plan and

8. Af solves the impact – exceptionalism exists in the status quo 9. Turn – to make the US equal to all other nations would crush American hegemony – the alternative is worse than the status quo Kagan 98 (Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Robert, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, summer)

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too

seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously . In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level,

there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today , a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its ow n. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively

foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget —- even if most of the rest of the world does not —- just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity . World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling. generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present.

In other words,

*2AC Buddhism K 1. Framework – the af gets to weigh the enactment of the plan against a competitive alternative. That’s best: A) Fairness – allowing the neg to change the focus of the debate moots the 1AC B) Education – forces the debate to be about plan implementation instead of representations C) Policy focus key to education – McClean 1 [David E., member of the American Philosophical Practitioners Association, M.A. in Liberal Studies with a concentration in philosophy from New York University, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion %20papers/david_mcclean.htm]

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some

These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations" (italics mine).(1) Or neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . .

as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." ¶ Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another

members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion , i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain.¶ Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of attribute of the Cultural Left is that its

Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the

the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of words of King, and with reference to the American society,

the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate

We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism.

cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences . This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class." the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" ¶

2. Permutation – do both – engage in both ontological strategies but don’t reject the 1AC –the permutation is the best example of cooperative interaction – claims of mutual exclusivity reinforce dualisms that make alternative solvency impossible Nelson 11 [PhD in Economics, Professor of Economics @ UC-Davis, most known for her application of feminist theory to questions of the definition of the discipline of economics, and its models and methodology Julie, “Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation – A Buddhist Approach,” p. 29-30]

The vision of a better world – at its best, a fully peaceful society, founded on localism,communalism, small-scale non-profit enterprise and spiritual values, and populated by wise and compassionate enlightened people – runs through a number of Buddhist writings. (3) And it has its place in motivating certain kinds of change. But it can also be a dangerous delusion, if held too tightly. Does our vision of the kind of economy we want bring us more into the world, or distract us from it? Zen, and the general practice of

living in the now instead of some imagined future, warns us against being distracted by our thoughts, and by our imagined requirements about how the world should be.¶ While we cancertainly criticize the over-individualism of the neoclassical view of economics actors as radically autonomous, self-interested and suited for a highly competitive and global economy, we should be careful about flipping to the oppo- site extreme of assuming that people are radically connected, altruistic and suited for a highly cooperative and local economy. Such thinking, in fact, merely stays inside common, age-worn dualisms. In certain traditions of Western marriage, for example, the man was supposed to be the visible, individuated, achieving, instrumental- oriented party, who ventures out in the “wide world” to compete in (presumably) dog-eat-dog commerce. Meanwhile, the woman was supposed to put the interests of the family before her own, and (invisibly) concentrate on expressive work, within her very small sphere of (presumably) cooperative family relations. (4) Breaking out of this sort of dualist association requires noticing that that the identification of men with only individuality, and of women with only intimacy, are distorting and unhealthy on both sides. We are all, in fact, both individuated and connected in relationships. Or, as put by Robert Aitken in a Buddhist context,¶ You and I come forth as the possibilities of essential nature, alone and independent as stars, yet reflecting and being reflected by all things. My life and yours are unfolding realization of total aloneness and total intimacy. The self is completely autonomous, yet exists only in resonance with all other selves. (Aitken 1984, 13)¶ Notice that this does not come with caveats that it applies only to men, or only to women, or only to people in selected aspects (e.g., noneconomic ones) of our lives. To imagine an economy in only local, altruistic, cooperative terms denies our indi- vidual and expansive side, just as much as conventional economic thinking denies our communal and nurturing side. ¶ While the notion of separate spheres for men and women was supposed to lead to harmonious families, it too often led to unhappiness, oppression and even abuse. Just because an organization is presumably motivated by love does not mean that it will actually be loving and nurturing – or even merely fair and nonlethal, as daily news of domestic violence reminds us. There are similar problems with the prescription that economic organizations be small and/or non-profit. Anyone with experience in a non-profit or community group (as well as a family) has likely observed that such structures do not necessarily foster wisdom and compassion, and certainly do not make people immune to greed, anger and ignorance. Yet the arguments for utopian¶ societies often seem to border on denigrating spiritual values, by arguing for “struc- tural” solutions to economic problems in such a way that value issues are essentially made moot.¶ The idea thatstructures should be local in order to increase accountability, has some rationale to it. But I also detect an overtone here of demanding that Indra’s Net (6) somehow become tiny, because we individually feel more secure when we can personally observe what we want to control. One endpoint of this path is the gated community, where we achieve a semblance of local harmony only by segregating ourselves away from the rest of the world. I worry about the damage a one-sided emphasis on localism could do to some

of the economically marginal areas of the world. In some places, where trade and tourism now support a larger population than a country could otherwise support. Too much emphasis on localism could, in some cases, cause harm. Even a goal of organic agriculture can be grasped overly tightly. There are many debates about what “organic” actually means, and many good practices that are not covered by this term.¶ Issues of scale and structure need to be addressed as we deal with economic life and global pain as it presents itself. But simply reacting to dogmatic neoliberal globalization, marketization and dreams of technological progress with an equally dogmatic localism, communalism and idolization of “the natural” causes us to miss opportunities. These are the opportunities to authentically respond, in ways that work for the whole human person and the whole of Indra’s Net.

3. The Af’s use of Buddhism resolves the worst harms Zizek 1 Slavoj, On Belief (Thinking in Action), New York City: Routledge, 2001, 12-3 The ultimate postmodern irony is thus the strange exchange between Europe and Asia: at the very moment when,

at the level of the “economic infrastructure,” “Euro pean” technology and capitalism are triumphing world-wide, at the level of “ideological superstructure,” the Judeo Christian legacy is threatened in the European space itself by the onslaught of the New Age “Asiatic” thought , which, in its different guises, from the “Western Buddhism” (today’s counterpoint o Western Marxism, as opposed to the “Asi atic” Marxism—Leninism) to different “Taos,” is establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism.’ Therein resides the highest speculative identity of the opposites in today’s global civilization: although

“Western Buddhism” presents itself as the remedy against the stressful tension of the capitalist dynamics, allowing us o uncouple and retain inner peace and Gelassenheit, it actually functions as its perfect ideological supplement . One should mention here the well-known topic of “future shock.” i.e. of how, today, people are no longer psychologically able to cope with the dazzling rhythm of technological development and the social changes that accompany it — things simply move too fast. Before one can accustom oneself to an invention, it ¡s already supplanted by a new one, so that more and more one lacks the most elementary “cognitive mapping.” The

recourse to Taoism or Buddhism offers a way out of this predicament which definitely works better than the des perate escape into old traditions: instead of trying to cope with the accelerating rhythm of technological progress and Social changes, one should rather renounce the very endeavor - retain control over what goes on, rejecting it as the expression of the modern logic of domination - one should, instead, "let oneself go," drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance of this accelerated process, a distance based on the insight that all this social and technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances which do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being … One is almost tempted to resuscitate here the old infamous Marxist cliché of religion as the "opium of the people," as the imaginary supplement of the terrestrial misery: the

"Western Buddhist" meditative stance is arguablythe most efficient way, for us, to fully participate in the capitalist dynamic while retaining the appearance of mental sanity . If Max Weber were alive today, eh would definitely write a second, supplementary, volume to his Protestant Ethic, entitled The Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of Global Capitalism. 7

4. Alternative doesn’t solve-

A. re-entrenches hierarchies that’s the reason there’s inaction in the squo the 1AC Jones evidence impacts this—says policymakers and intellectuals have to come together B. does not resolve the problem of trafficking post alt millions die out of a justification for further meditative thought

5. Focusing on the inner self trades of with the fight against global injustice Zizek 1 Slavoj, On Belief (Thinking in Action), New York City: Routledge, 2001, 13-5 “Western

Buddhism” thus perfectly fits the fetishist mode of ideology in our allegedly “post-ideological” era, as opposed to its traditional symptomal mode, in which the ideological lie which structures our perception of reality is threatened by symptoms quo “returns of the repressed,” cracks in the fabric of the ideological lie. Fetish is effectively a kind of inverse of the symptom. That is to say, the symptom is the exception which

fetish is the embodiment of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth . disturbs the surface of the false appearance, the point at which the repressed Other Scene erupts, while

Let us take the case of the death of a beloved person: in the case of a symptom, I “repress” this death, I try not to think about it, but the repressed trauma returns in the symptom; in

the case of a fetish, on the contrary,I “rationally” fully accept this death, and yet I cling to the fetish, to some feature that embodies for me the disavowal of this death. In this sense, a fetish can play a very constructive role in allowing us to cope with the harsh reality: fetishists are not dreamers lost in their private worlds, they are thoroughly “realists,” able to accept the way things effectively are – since they have their fetish to which they can cling in order to cancel the full impact of reality. In Nevil Shute’s World War II melodramatic novel Requiem For a WREN, the heroine survives her lover’s death without any visible distress, she goes on with her life and is even able to talk rationally about the lover’s death – because she still has the dog who was the lover’s favored pet. When, some time after, the dog is accidentally run over by a truck, she collapses and her entire world disintegrates. In this precise sense, money is for Marx a fetish – I pretend to be a rational, utilitarian subject, well aware how things truly stand – but I embody my disavowed belief in the money-fetish . . . Sometimes, the line between the two is almost indiscernable: an object can function as the symptom ( of a repressed desire) and almost simultaneously as a fetish (embodying the belief which we officially renounce). For instance, a relic of the dead person, a piece of his/her clothing, can function as a fetish (in it, the dead person magically continues to live) and as a symptom (the disturbing detail that brings to mind his/her death). Is this ambiguous tension not homologous to that between the phobic and the fetishist object? The structural role is in both cases the same: if this exceptional element is disturbed, the whole system collapses. Not only does the subject’s false universe collapses if he is forced to confront the meaning of his symptom; the opposite also holds, i.e. the subject’s “rational” acceptance of the way things are dissolves when his fetish is taken away from him. So,when

we are bombarded by claims that in our post-ideological cynical era nobody believes in the proclaimed ideals, when we encounter a person who claims he is cured of any beliefs, accepting social reality the way it really is, one should always counter such claims with the question: OK, but where is the fetish which enables you to (pretend to) accept reality “the way it is”? “Western Buddhism” is such a fetish: it enables you to fully participate in the frantic pace of the capitalist game while sustaining the perception that you are not really in it, that you are well aware how worthless this spectacle is – what really matters to you is the peace of the inner self to which you know you can always withdraw…(In a further specification, one should note that fetish can function in two opposite ways: either its role remains unconscious – as in the case of Shute’s heroine who was unaware of the fetish-role of the dog – or you think that the fetish is that which really matters, as in the case of a Western Buddhist unaware that the “truth” of his existence is the social involvement which he tends to dismiss as a mere game.”

6. Policy is a tool to resolve our impacts not paralyze ours Shove & Walker 7 - *Sociology @ Lancaster, **Geography @ Lancaster Elizabeth “CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management” Environment and Planning C 39 (4) For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The

more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexivetransition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, we

are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an ‘illusion of agency’ , and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary.The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberateintervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues ‘illusions are productive because they motivate action and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the dynamics of change: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are necessary to processes within. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

7. The permutation is the best example of cooperative interaction – claims of mutual exclusivity reinforce dualisms that make alternative solvency impossible Nelson 11 [PhD in Economics, Professor of Economics @ UC-Davis, most known for her application of feminist theory to questions of the definition of the discipline of economics, and its models and methodology Julie, “Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation – A Buddhist Approach,” p. 29-30] The vision of a better world – at its best, a fully peaceful society, founded on localism, communalism, small-scale non-profit enterprise and spiritual values, and populated by wise and compassionate enlightened people – runs through a number of Buddhist writings. (3) And it has its place in motivating certain kinds of change . But it can also be a dangerous delusion, if held too tightly. Does our vision of the kind of economy we want bring us more into the world, or distract us from it? Zen, and the general practice of living in the now instead of some imagined future, warns us against being distracted by our thoughts, and by our imagined requirements about how the world should

be.¶ While

we cancertainly criticize the over-individualism of the neoclassical view of economics actors as radically autonomous, self-interested and suited for a highly competitive and global economy, we should be careful about flipping to the oppo- site extreme of assuming that people are radically connected, altruistic and suited for a highly cooperative and local economy. Such thinking, in fact, merely stays inside common, ageworn dualisms. In certain traditions of Western marriage, for example, the man was supposed to be the visible, individuated, achieving, instrumental- oriented party, who ventures out in the “wide world” to compete in (presumably) dog-eatdog commerce. Meanwhile, the woman was supposed to put the interests of the family before her own, and (invisibly) concentrate on expressive work, within her very small sphere of (presumably) cooperative family relations. (4) Breaking out of this sort of dualist association requires noticing that that the identification of men with only individuality, and of women with only intimacy, are distorting and unhealthy on both sides. We are all, in fact, both individuated and connected in relationships. Or, as put by Robert Aitken in a Buddhist context, ¶ You and I come forth as the possibilities of essential nature, alone and independent as stars, yet reflecting and being reflected by all things. My life and yours are unfolding realization of total aloneness and total intimacy. The

self is completely autonomous, yet exists only in resonance with all other selves. (Aitken 1984, 13)¶ Notice that this does not come with caveats that it applies only to men, or only to women, or only to people in selected aspects (e.g., non-economic ones) of our lives. To imagine an economy in only local, altruistic, cooperative terms denies our indi- vidual and expansive side, just as much as conventional economic thinking denies our communal and nurturing side. ¶ While the notion of separate spheres for men and women was supposed to lead to harmonious families, it too often led to unhappiness, oppression and even abuse. Just because an organization is presumably motivated by love does not mean that it will actually be loving and nurturing – or even merely fair and nonlethal, as daily news of domestic violence reminds us. There are similar problems with the prescription that economic organizations be small and/or non-profit. Anyone with experience in a non-profit or community group (as well as a family) has likely observed that such structures do not necessarily foster wisdom and compassion, and certainly do not make people immune to greed, anger and ignorance. Yet the

arguments for utopian¶ societies often seem to border on denigrating spiritual values, by arguing for “struc- tural” solutions to economic problems insuch a way that value issues are essentially made moot.¶ The idea that structures should be local in order to increase accountability, has some rationale to it. But I also detect an overtone here of demanding that Indra’s Net (6) somehow become tiny, because we individually feel more secure when we can personally observe what we want to control. One endpoint of this path is the gated community, where we achieve a semblance of local harmony only by segregating ourselves away from the rest of the world. I worry about the damage a one-sided emphasis on localism could do to some of the economically marginal areas of the world. In some places, where trade and tourism now support a larger population than a country could otherwise support. Too much emphasis on localism could, in some cases, cause harm. Even a goal of organic agriculture can be grasped overly tightly. There are many debates about what “organic” actually means, and many good practices that are not covered by this term.¶ Issues of scale and structure need to be addressed as we deal with economic life and global pain as it presents itself. But simply reacting to dogmatic neoliberal globalization, marketization and dreams of technological progress with an equally dogmatic localism, communalism and idolization of “the natural” causes us to miss opportunities. These are the opportunities to authentically respond, in ways that work for the whole human person and the whole of Indra’s Net.

8. Prefer the permutation --- multiple net benefits A. Engagement – its key to avoid the negative’s impact Nelson 11 PhD in Economics, Professor of Economics @ UC-

Davis, most known for her application of feminist theory to questions of the definition of the discipline of economics, and its models and methodology Julie, “Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation – A Buddhist Approach,” p. 32 Sometimes I am accused of being Pollyannaish (7) about large corporations, because I do not firmly condemn “greedy global corporate capitalism”. But this is not so. Rather, I am an equal-opportunity skeptic.

I do not

believethat any sort of¶ institution – business, government, non-profit, local enterprise,

community, family or, alas, even sangha – has an essential “nature” that makes

it automatically serve human (and ecological) ends, people being who we are. Our poisons, our thirst, our suffering, cannot be made to magically disappear by some perfection of system, structure or scale. Yet, in each moment, we have an opportunity to respond.¶ A key contribution of Buddhism, I believe, is inreminding us about nonattachment, and warning us against latching onto us-versus-them thinking. Applied to economic suffering, this does not mean inactivity, and does not mean that attempts at transformation, including through local community action, must be abandoned. But the teachings of the Middle Way, I suggest, should also encourage us to be alert to the temptations of self-righteousness and to be more open to wide and deep engagement with businesses, governments and the larger, painful world.

B. Economic pluralism Essen 11 – PhD in Cultural Anthropology, Professor @ Soka Juliana, “Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation – A Buddhist Approach,” p. 75-76 One last point for consideration is that while concerned scholars, practitioners and global citizens may find

Buddhist economic ethics quite appealing, this essay does not suggest facilely replacingthe dominant neoliberal economic model with a Buddhist one. Instead, economic pluralism is advocated, consisting of the myriad approaches to material and social wellbeing that are culturally and environmentally appropriate. In fact, Buddhist economic ethics’ core condition of mental develop- ment presupposes such an approach. This is essential for a vital global economy¶ because, quite simply, different problems require different solutions. Nevertheless, actors in community, national and global economies might learn from alternative economic models so that we may achieve not merely universal freedom to survive, as Shiva hopes, but universal freedom to be well.

C. Spiritual and Material Dharmakosajarn 11 (Dr. Phra Dharmakosajarn, Venerable Professor at Mahachulalongkornrajvidyalya University, Chairman at ICDV & IABU, Rector at MCU, Buddhist Virtues in Socio-Economic Development, p.71, May 2011, BG) There has been increasing inequality both within and across countries. Progress has varied and people in some regions have experienced periods of regress. The

root cause for sufferings and socioeconomic inequalities lies in craving, which is a characteristic of a materialistic society. And eventually craving leads to greed and suffering, the reality of materialistic society. This results in increasing gap between the rich and the poor, imbalanced social structure and sufferings. The answer to most of the socio-economic problems of the day is the eradication of craving through embracing Buddhist virtues, precepts, principles and Buddhist economics. The Noble Eightfold path is ~u driving force of Buddhist economics. In Buddhism, the spirituality and the socio-economic development go together. Buddhism's middle path balances both spiritual and materialism to lead a contended life without harming others interests on the principles of sharing and caring for the welfare of the society. The chariot model of holistic development implies that the spirituality

would guide the humanity to establish socio-economic equality and development and strives to

achieve a balance. If, there is more emphasis on materialistic development, it would lead to social and if there is an emphasis only on spirituality development alone then there would be no material progress, and this condition would lead to poverty, health and deteriorate standard of living. This shows that spiritual development alone or material development alone is not adequate to lead a happy life, both are important . The Buddhist virtues, precepts principles and values help in establishing harmony of spiritual and material side of life, leading to socio-economic equality and development. economic problems as it is widely evident in the today's world, due to more and more craving and greed. Similarly,

Theory

Conditionality

2AC: Conditionality is a voting issue –

The 2AC is impossible because they can cross-apply ofense They destroy clash which kills advocacy skills. Strategically screwing the 2AC creates an unequal playing field that disproportionately leans neg C/I they get one conditional world – reject the argument and the team

1AR Overview: Conditionality is a voting issue – extend our counter-interpretation – they get one conditional advocacy. We have several net benefits to our interpretation:

A) Strategy Skew – the 2AC is the nexus point of the debate and sets the stage for future speeches. It’s impossible to read ofense on one of the flows because they can just kick out of it and cross apply it on another flow – this disincentives us from making our best arguments. The negative becomes a moving target – it’s impossible to know what the 2NR’s going to go for. The 2AC’s the most crucial speech of the round and outweighs neg flex – one conditional world provides enough flexibility with the status quo but multiple is abusive and skews 2AC strategy – creates a neg side bias. B) Advocacy Skills – multiple conditional advocacies will just be used as a crutch by teams who’ll read them in the 1NC to skew the 2AC – one incentivizes researching and developing arguments. Research and advocacy defense are portable skills – they’ll stay with us even after we leave debate – this turns their generic fairness and education arguments.



At: Time Skew Even if time skew is inevitable to some extent conditionality will only exacerbate its efects because it spreads the 2AC too thin.

AT: Harder Debate is Better Debate This argument is bad – if I went over and broke the other team’s laptop the debate would be harder but not better. The debate isn’t educational when the af is too skewed to be able to engage. Having in depth discussions over one world is probably more challenging but is key to developing advocacy and research skills

AT: Neg Flex Our counter-interpretation solves this – we provide the flexibility of one conditional world and the status quo. They don’t need more to compete. Additional worlds isn’t flexibility, it’s just abusive – they already have an infinite number of kritiks or counterplans they could run. Our interp forces them to pick the best one instead of just running whatever they might stick. Advocacy skills and 2AC focus outweigh neg flex.

AT: Af Side Bias First and last speech doesn’t matter when the debate is skewed from the 2AC – multiple worlds moots the benefits of being af. The neg block checks this – having numerous worlds to skew the 2AC plus thirteen minutes of straight negative ofense makes the 1AR more difficult than it already is.

AT: Perms Check Permutations don’t check - they’re a test of competition, advocated perms justify intrinsicness.

AT: Best Policy Option One conditional advocacy solves this because it forces teams to research and advocate the best possible position against an affirmative – more worlds justifies teams reading as many advocacies as possible in the 1NC just to see what sticks to skew the affirmative.

AT: More Real World/Educational Policymakers don’t just propose an infinite number of bills and have to defend the legislation they propose – running things just to kick out of them promotes lazy debating because strategic considerations are what influence 2NR choice. One world allows for in-depth discussion and the development of a portable skills.

AT: Potential Abuse Potential abuse is a voter – it’s not always about what you do, it’s about what you justify. Potential abuse has to be a voter – there was genuine abuse by reading multiple conditional advocacies, and voting them down prevents contradiction and abuse in future rounds by setting a precedence.

2AR Overview: Conditionality has to be a voting issue – otherwise it becomes a no-risk option for the negative but still harms affirmative strategy. Rejecting the argument is what conditionality is. A loss is the only fair punishment.

(ethos moment)They have CONCEDED ________ (our strat skew offense, etc.)

We have two clear disads to their interpretation – First is strategy skew:

It’s impossible for me to read ofense against one of the advocacies in the 2ac because they can use it against us on another flow. In a world of one conditional counterplan, we would get to read our ofense against the counterplan. If they use it against us, that would not be as bad because we would get to leverage our ofense against the status quo, however, because they have read two conditional advocacies, they can force us to read ofense against one then kick out of that advocacy and cross-apply and use it against us on another flow

Here’s a couple examples:

1A)They could read a deterrence counterplan and a security kritik – we would read an addon that solved the impact to the counterplan but they would concede that, kick the counterplan at no cost to them, and supercharge the link to the kritik. This is a scenario unique to TWO conditional advocacies because if they just read the security k and a deterrence DISAD, they would be stuck with their arguments against the status quo. In other words, we could concede the link to the disad and use that as a link turn – as a reason why we aren’t securitizing. In any case, we can stick them to their arguments in a world of 1 conditional advocacy

1B)(pick either this or the first one) They could read the cap K and a privatization counterplan. If we say privatization is bad, we don’t get to impact turn the k, and if we read an add-on that solves the economy, they can obviously kick the counterplan and cross-apply that add-on, at no risk to them. This is a scenario unique to TWO conditional advocacies because if they just read the cap k and an econ DISAD, they would be stuck with

their arguments against the status quo. In other words, we could link turn the disad and impact turn the k, or we could even concede the link to the disad to link-turn the k – in any case, we can stick them to their arguments in a world of 1 conditional advocacy.

2)The neg could also read a counterplan that conditions the plan on Russia saying “yes” and another one that conditions the plan on Russia saying “no” – they would guarantee 100% solvency and probably get some trivial net benefit because if we say “Russia says no” to answer one counterplan, that gives them easy solvency on the other counterplan

They did this IN ROUND when they ___________ (insert fleshed-out explanation of what they did that was similar to the examples above)

The second argument is advocacy skills:

It’s a disad to their interpretation – conditionality means they are bad advocates of their position. In a world where they have to defend one conditional option, they have to learn to research it more, and learn to advocate it better – research and advocacy skills are the ONLY portable skills – this means we also turn any education arguments they might have.

(in-round example)We could’ve had a sweet debate about _______, whether it should be ____ or _____

However, they have bypassed the entire debate because they were scared of debating us and the fact that they had multiple conditional advocacies means they did not have to engage in the substance of that debate and I did not get to ________ (argue x, go for y, etc.)

(this part is less generic, don’t just spew this) They have fundamentally MESSED UP the counterinterpretation – 1 condo solves their ofense. The 2ac is a little bit easier, there is no risk of infinite regression, and they still get sufficient negative flexibility compared to 2 condo

Conditions Counterplans

2AC: Conditioning CPs are a Voting Issue –

a) Creates an artificial net-benefit by taking away uniqueness and link arguments. Discourages in depth debate by allowing the neg to win with a small risk of a contrived impact

b) Creates an unfair side bias by stealing the entirety of the af which is the only predictable basis for ofense

c) Kills topic education - we focus on minute, infinitely regressive implementation questions.

d) Reject the argument and the team

1AR Overview: Conditioning counterplans are a voting issue –

The affirmative is the nexus point of the debate – the counterplan results in the af which uniquely skews the debate.

Conditioning is infinitely regressive – there are an infinite number of actors who they could claim an advantage of of conditioning the af – shifts the goal post from debating the topic to unnecessary questions of normal means implementation.

The permutation is a net benefit to this argument – if the counterplan meets the condition then it’s a reason as to why the affirmative mandates are true anyway – if the condition is refused then it’s a solvency deficit to the CP.

International Fiat

2AC: International fiat is a voting issue—

1. Rational policy making—there is no actor that has a choice between the US and another country acting 2. Infinite regression—forces the af to cut answers to 196 countries 3. Af ground—steals ofense about the outcome of the plan and forces us to only defend the agent 4. Not reciprocal— af gets one actor, so should neg, reciprocity is the baseline for switch-side debate

Our interpretation is that the negative can only fiat US action

1AR Overview: International fiat is a voter and a reason to reject the team –

It destroys limits – there are functionally infinite actors they could counterplan with making it impossible to prepare on the af, this destroys fairness and turns their education arg because if debate is skewed few people will participate at a high level to get education – even if we can read disads to other actors it doesn’t check that there’s no literature on them – af isn’t the same because individual senators can’t implement policies – this should be about what they justify, forcing the neg to defend our actor solves

They’re unpredictable and not real world – there’s no literature comparing the plan to the counterplan which should be the standard for education – makes search for the best policy option impossible because no policymaker could choose – also means it’s impossible to defend the USFG as key – net benefits check back because all the lit is about the disad links, not the counterplan

50 State Fiat

2AC: 50 State fiat is illegitimate-

1. Reciprocity- the CP’s fiat isn’t reciprocal to USFG action.

2. It’s not real world- no policymaker can choose between federal action and the 50 States acting in unison- there’s no literature about the counterplan, and it’s anti-educational.

3. Ground- the CP does the plan’s mandates and there’s no reason why it’s key to negative ground.

4. Voting issue- reject the argument and the team.