Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Compilation

CHIWERAN, ALPINE SUNSHINE A. Constitutional Law 2 Case Digests Compilation

Juris Doctor 1-E

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE A.1 POLICE POWER Police Power, Case No. 1: Batangas CATV, Inc vs. CA, GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004 FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a Community Antenna Television (CATV) system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order (EO) No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. ISSUE: May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? HELD: No, in light of the applicable laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers. The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. However, when the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To rule otherwise is to render the State's policy ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State, LGUs cannot defeat national policies through enactments of contrary measures. But, while LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause is recognized, Resolution No. 210 cannot be sustained. The respondents strayed from the well-recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry. The technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC. Page 1 of 411

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Police Power, Case No. 2: Gerochi v. Department of Energy, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007 FACTS: On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge shall be collected by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund. ISSUE: Whether Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax. HELD: No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru regulation. Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. Under the completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The sufficiency of standard test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form. Page 2 of 411

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Police Power, Case No. 3: Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 602-603, December 21, 1915 FACTS: Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province “quite distance from the road and strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community.” However, defendant Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR), decided to remove the billboards after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls. Act No. 2339 authorized the then CIR to remove after due investigation, any billboard exposed to the public view if it decides that it is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance. In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight." The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs. ISSUE: Whether Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government? HELD: Yes. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, may be suppressed by the State especially those situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics may be regulated by the police power of the state, as long as it is justified by public interest and safety. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power of the State. Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed.

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Police Power, Case No. 4: Rubi v. Provincial Board, GR No. L-14078, March 7, 1919 FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon to decide. ISSUE: Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to the provincial official and a department head. HELD: No. The the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected. However, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order.” As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

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Police Power, Case No. 5: NDC v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257, December 10, 1990 FACTS: The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and created a claims committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that “all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.” Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was filed by PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and invoked that the same was extinguished by PD 1717. ISSUE: Whether Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for payment without prejudice to PD 1717. HELD: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution. The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the private respondent without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of greater number. PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the government should have been created only by general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.

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Police Power, Case No. 6: Ermita-Malate Hotel vs. City Mayor of Manila, GR No. L-24693, July 31, 1967 FACTS: Hotel and motel operators in Manila sought to declare Ordinance 4670 as unconstitutional for being unreasonable, thus violative of the due process clause. The ordinance requires the clients of hotels, motels and lodging house to fill out a prescribed form in a lobby, open to public view and in the presence of the owner, manager or duly authorized representative of such hotel, motel or lodging houses. The same law provides that the premises and facilities of such hotel, motels and lodign houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. It increased their annual licensed fees as well. ISSUE: Whether Ordinance 4670 is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

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Police Power, Case No. 7: White Light Corporation vs. City Mayor of Manila, GR No. 122846, January 20, 2009 FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. ISSUE: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: No. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. In the present case, there are less intrusive measures which can be employed such as curbing the prostitution and drug use through active police force. The ordinance has a lawful purpose but does not have a lawful means, hence, unconstitutional.

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Police Power, Case No. 8: Republic v. Manila Electric Company, GR No. 141314, November 15, 2002 FACTS: Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with petitioner Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules to reflect an average increase in its distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the condition that should the Commission on Audit (COA) thru its audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, all excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set aside the ERB decision. Motions for Reconsideration were denied. ISSUE: Whether the regulation of ERB as to the adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid. HELD: Yes. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.

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Police Power, Case No. 9: OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc., 600 SCRA 617, September 18, 2009 FACTS: Respondents operate or lease out shopping malls that have parking facilities. The people that use said facilities are required to pay parking fees by the respondents. Senate committees conducted an investigation to determine the legality of said practice which the same found to be against the National Building Code. Respondents then received information from various government agencies enjoining them from collecting parking fees and later a civil case against them. Respondents argued that the same constitutes undue taking of private property. OSG argues that the same is implemented in view of public welfare more specifically to ease traffic congestion. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the respondents are obligated to provide for free parking to its consumers and the public. HELD: No. Respondents are not obligated to provide for free parking to the people. Article 1158 of the Civil Code provides that “Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book”. The court does not agree to the petitioner’s reliance on the National Building Code as the same does not expressly provide that respondents are required to provide free parking to the public. Moreover, the court holds that the code regulates buildings and not traffic congestion. Police power is a power to regulate but not to confiscate. Mall owners and operators cannot be validly compelled to provide free parking to their customers because requiring them to do so is beyond the scope of police powers. It unreasonably restricts the right to use property for business purposes and amounts to confiscation of property.

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Police Power, Case No. 10: MMDA v. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009 FACTS: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement. ISSUE: Whether MMDA can exercise police power. HELD: No. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.

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A.2 EMINENT DOMAIN Eminent Domain, Case No. 1: Brgy. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga v. CA, GR No. 150640, March 22, 2007 FACTS: On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for eminent domain against respondent spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan. The subject are parcels of land owned by the spouses and shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder road for the agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for their basic needs. Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value of the property. The Respondent’s lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix David and his wife. The subdivision owner and the barangay captain, who was known to be an agent of the subdivision, had proposed buying a right-of-way for the subdivision across a portion of respondent’s property. ISSUE: Whether the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose. HELD: No. Taking of public property in this case is not for public purpose. The intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga will be benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of respondent’s spouses. In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner's consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation." It is acknowledged as "an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the whole community Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose. Public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed condemnation, government funds would be employed for the benefit of a private individual without any legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute malversation.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 2: Republic v. De Castellvi, GR No. L-20620, August 15, 1974 FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. ISSUE: Whether the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. HELD: The taking should be reckoned as of 1959 and not 1947, and that just compensation should be determined on the basis of the value of the property in 1959. The requisites for taking are: 1. The expropriator must enter a private property; 2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period; 3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities; 4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and 5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. Requisite number 2 is not present, “momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959. Page 12 of 411

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 3: Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998 FACTS: Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept. The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable. The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. HELD: No. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 4: Manosca v. CA, GR No. 106440, January 29, 1996 FACTS: Petitioners inherited a 492-square-meter land when the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture. t passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional. HELD: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. Public use does not necessarily mean “use by the public at large.” Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement. Moreover, that only few people benefit from the expropriations does not diminish it public use character because the notion of public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

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FACTS:

Eminent Domain, Case No. 5: Filstream International Incorporated v. CA, 284 SCRA 716, January 23, 1998

Filstream International is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Antonio Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. On January 7, 1993, it filed an ejectment suit against the occupants (private respondents) of the said parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. The ejectment suit became final and executory as no further action was taken beyond the CA. During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the picture when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition through legal means of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties of Filstream. The said properties were sold and distributed to qualified tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate lands in Antonio Rivera St. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the City. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion to dismiss was premised on the following grounds: no valid cause of action; the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ execution issued by the RTC of Manila in the ejectment suit; violation of the constitutional guarantee against non-impairment of obligation and contract; price offered was too low hence violative of the just compensation provision of the constitution. The RTC denied the two motions. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance, aside from the fact that copies of the pleadings attached to the petition are blurred and unreadable. ISSUES: 1. Whether the City of Manila may exercise right of eminent domain despite the existence of a final and executory judgment ordering private respondents to vacate the lots. 2. Whether the expropriation of Filstream’s lots were legally and validly undertaken. HELD: 1. Yes. There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of this dispute. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision as it had already became final and executory. However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to it under Sec 19 of the Local Government Code. Sec 100 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila further empowers the city government to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program. The city’s right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over the property to be expropriated had already been previously upheld by the court in the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs Panis:

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“The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]). Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing. Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]). 2. No. Local government units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these problems. Constitutional provisions on due process and just compensation for the expropriation of private property must be complied with. Other laws have also set down specific rules in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, to wit: • Sec 19 of LGC provides that such exercise must be pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. • Sec 9 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) provides an order of priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing, with private lands listed as the last option. • Sec 10 of UDHA provides that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition such as community mortgage, land swapping, donation to the government, etc. have been exhausted, and, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted. Compliance with the above legislated conditions is deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to DUE PROCESS when their property is expropriated for public use. There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila complied with the above conditions. Filstream’s properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream’s right to due process. It must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 6: City of Manila v. Estrada, GR No. 7749, September 9, 1913 FACTS: The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its improvements for use in connection with a new market at that time being erected in the district of Paco. A complaint was filed setting forth the necessary allegations, answer joined, and commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing the premises and receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two reports to the court. The court duly rendered its decision, confirming the majority report as to the improvements, but reducing the price of the land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority report, to P15 per square meter. Motions for a new trial having been made by both parties and denied by the court, both parties appealed from that part of the decision fixing the value of the land at P15 per square meter. The record was therefore elevated to this court for a review of the evidence and assigned errors of the parties. This court held that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land, and rendered its decision accordingly. The court justifies such action, first, upon the ground that the great preponderance of the evidence submitted to the commissioners showed that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land taken, and, second, upon the power of the court to revise the report of the commissioners when the amount awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive. ISSUE: What is the proper valuation to be used. HELD: Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land (property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation. To compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. "Just compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. "The exercise of the power being necessary for the public good, and all property being held subject to its exercise when, and as the public good requires it, it would be unjust to the public that it should be required to pay the owner more than a fair indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the public and of the owner and all the circumstances of the particular appropriation should be taken into consideration." (2 Lewis on Em. Dora., § 462.) The compensation must be just to the public as well as to the owners. (Searl vs. School District, 133 U. S., 553; 33 L. ed., 740.) Section 244 of our code says that: "The commissioners shall assess the value of property taken and used, and shall also assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from Page 17 of 411

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such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owners." "To assess" is to perform a judicial act. The commissioners power is limited to assessing the value and to determining the amount of the damages. There it stops; they can go no further. The value and damages awarded must be a just compensation and no more and no less. But in fixing these amounts, the commissioners are not to act ad libitum. They are to discharge the trust reposed in them according to well established rules and form their judgment upon correct legal principles. To deny this is to place them where no one else in this country is placed: Above the law and beyond accountability. After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and the law applicable to the questions raised therein, we are of the opinion that P10 per square meter is a just compensation for the land taken. Without prejudice to filing a more extended opinion in which our reasons will be set forth in full, judgment will be entered accordingly, without costs.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 7: NPC v. CA, GR No. 113194, March 11, 1996 FACTS: In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of a 21,995 square meter land which is a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd116159 situated in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-378-A, under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the President of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974. NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City so that in exchange for the city's waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a financial assistance' of P40.00 per square meter. In 1979, when NAPOCOR started building its Agus I HE (Hydroelectric Plant) Project, Mangondato demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid financial assistance' to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-378-A in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement between NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment made to said city cannot be considered as payment to him. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. ISSUE: At what point in time should the value of the land subject of expropriation be computed: at the date of the "taking" or the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain? HELD: The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of the Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where the Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated Page 19 of 411

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An examination of the undisputed factual environment would show that the "taking" was not really made in 1978. The Court has defined the elements of "taking" as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain, in the following words: "A number of circumstances must be present in the taking' of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property." In this case, the petitioner's entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. 1354. Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. In this case, the respondent Court is correct that the value of the property should be computed as of the date of the taking that is the date of the filing of the complaint despite the increase in the meantime in the value of the property.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 8: Republic v. Sps. Salvador, GR No. 205428, June 7, 2017 FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with a total land area of 229 square meters, located in Kaingin Street, Barangay Parada, Valenzuela City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.V-77660. On November 9, 2011, the Republic, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a verified Complaint before the RTC for the expropriation of 83 square meters of said parcel of land (subject property), as well as the improvements thereon, for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) to McArthur Highway. On February 10, 2012, respondents received two checks from the DPWH representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject property and the cost of the one-storey semi-concrete residential house. RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the Republic but decided to pay an additional amount corresponding to the capital gains tax as consequential damages on the part of the Spouses Salvador. ISSUES: Whether the decision of the RTC is correct. HELD: No. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease on value of the subject property as a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax on the transfer of the subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 9: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform GR No. 78742, July 14, 1989 FACTS: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657. G.R. No. 79777 The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310 This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. G.R. No. 79744 The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation. G.R. No. 78742 Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. ISSUE: 1. Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain 2. Should the compensation be paid in money only? HELD: 1. It is an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. 2. In cases involving CARP, compensation may be in bonds or stocks, for it has been held as a non-traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. It is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited areas is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. It is rather a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 10: Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, GR No. 140160, January 13, 2004 FACTS: The undisputed antecedents show that Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land situated in Nueva Ecija. In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. In November 1991, after the DAR’s evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for P1,342,667.466 was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon review, was modified to P2,280,159.82.7 The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The defendants are ordered to pay the amount of P13,419,082.00 to plaintiff as just compensation for the property acquired and the amount of P29,663,235.00 representing the unrealized profits from the time of acquisition of the subject property and the sum of P8,475,210.00 for every calendar year, until the amount of compensation is fully paid including legal interest which had accrued thereon. On September 22, 1999, however, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due to Wycoco the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic. ISSUE: 1. Whether the Regional Trial Court, acting as Special Agrarian Court, validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for determination of just compensation? 2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, was the compensation arrived at supported by evidence? 3. Whether Wycoco can compel the DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell? 4. Whether the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits valid? HELD: 1. Yes. In the case at bar, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco’s land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990. 2. No. In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco’s land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Inasmuch as the Page 23 of 411

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valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. 3. No. DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the CARP is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DAR’s non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area. 4. Wycoco’s claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, which provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16 (e) of RA 6657. The trust account should be converted to a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals. The just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be determined by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount determined by the Special Agrarian Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of the taking of the property up to the time of actual payment of just compensation. The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted. The amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The claim must be premised upon competent proof or upon the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other documentary proof. None having been presented in the instant case, the claim for unrealized profits cannot be granted.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 11: Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hababag, GR No. 172352, September 16, 2015 FACTS: Alfredo Hababag, Sr. (Alfredo) was the owner of several parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of 82.4927 hectares (has.) situated in Barangays Carriedo, Manapao, and Casili, in the Municipality of Gubat, Sorsogon, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12107. The aforesaid landholdings were voluntarily offered for sale (VOS) to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," but only 69.3857 has. thereof (subject lands) were acquired in 1990. The LBP assails the award of interests by the CA, contending that since the Hababag Heirs were already paid the provisional compensation, no interest can legally accrue to them. Further, it argues that unless there is a final and executory decision, it is under no obligation to pay interests since there could be no delay as of yet in the payment of just compensation. Besides, it maintains that RA 6657 did not provide for the payment of such interests. ISSUE: Whether interest should be paid? HELD: Yes. Suffice it to state that the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property is treated as an effective forbearance on the part of the State. The rationale therefor, as enunciated in the case of Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP,57 is to compensate the landowners for the income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the time of the taking. In other words, the award of 12% interests is imposed in the nature of damages for the delay in the payment of the full just compensation award. In the present case, the LBP had already made the corresponding deposit of their offered valuation in the amount of P1,237,850.00 in cash and in bonds prior to the DAR's possession of the property. This amount is lower than the just compensation awarded and, hence, in view of the above-stated principle, the payment of interests remains in order insofar as the unpaid balance is concerned. Anent the time of accrual, the interests should be computed from the time of the taking of the subject lands. This is based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking." From the time of the taking up until June 30, 2013, the interest must be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. pursuant to Section 261 of Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982, which was the prevailing rule on interest rates during such period. From July 1, 2013 onwards and until full payment, the interest rate should then be pegged at the rate of 6% p.a. Page 25 of 411

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pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, series of 2013, which accordingly amended the old 12% p.a. interest rate. Eminent Domain, Case No. 12: NPC v. Sps. Bernardo, GR No. 184982, August 25, 2012 FACTS: Sometime in 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed high-tension transmission lines to implement the Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project. Respondent Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Pereyras-Saludares are registered owners of a 6,561-squaremeter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109865. On 19 August 1999, respondents filed the instant Complaint against NAPOCOR and demanded the payment of just compensation. They alleged that it had entered and occupied their property by erecting high-tension transmission lines therein and failed to reasonably compensate them for the intrusion. Petitioner averred that it already paid just compensation for the establishment of the transmission lines by virtue of its compliance with the final and executory Decision in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras. Furthermore, assuming that respondent spouses had not yet received adequate compensation for the intrusion upon their property, NAPOCOR argued that a claim for just compensation and damages may only be filed within five years from the date of installation of the transmission lines pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395 ISSUE: Whether the demand for payment of the just compensation has already prescribed. HELD: No. NAPOCOR failed to prove that it had adequately compensated respondents for the establishment of high tension transmission lines over their property. The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear and categorical language that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. Thus, it is ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. It would be a confiscatory act on the part of the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their property. In the normal course of events, before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an action for eminent domain and deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 13: Land Bank v. Lajom, GR No. 184982, August 20, 2014 FACTS: Jose T. Lajom (Lajom) and his mother Vicenta Vda. De Lajom (Vda. De Lajom) were the registered owners of several parcels of land in which portion of the subject land was placed under the government’s operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to PD 27, “Tenants Emancipation Decree” and accordingly the DAR through the Land Bank of the Philippines, offered to pay petitioners the amount as just compensation for the constitutive areas of subject portion. However, record show that despite nonpayment of the offered just compensation, DAR granted twelve emancipation patents in favor of the farmer beneficiaries. Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and instead filed an amended petition for determination of just compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR, the LBP and the said farmer beneficiaries, respondents inter alia, that in computing the amount of just compensation, the DAR erroneously applied the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228, series of 1997, that have been repealed by Section 17 of RA No. 6657. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of RA 6657 should be applied in computing the amount of just compensation instead of PD 27 and EO 228. HELD: Yes. Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, as in this case, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD27 and EO 228 are superseded. As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be determined at the time of the property’s taking. Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the time emancipation patents are issued by the government. As enunciated in LBP v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo. Also, it must be emphasized that while the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the land reform and, accordingly, the just compensation therefor, its valuation is considered only as an initial determination and, thus, not conclusive. Verily, it is well-settled that it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, which should make the final determination of just compensation in the exercise of its judicial function

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 14: EPZA v. Dulay, GR No. 59603, April 29, 1987 FACTS: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. ISSUE: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. HELD: Yes. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. Also, the value of the property must be determined either at the time of taking or filing of the complaint whichever comes first.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 15: Republic v. Lim, GR No. 161656, June 29, 2005

FACTS:

In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948. In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property. On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value". On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. They appealed the CFI’s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value. Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name. On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...” Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932. Page 29 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940. HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete. Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just." Also, when the

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Republic’s failure to pay just compensation is a deliberate refusal on its part recovery of possession is in order.

Eminent Domain, Case No. 16: MIAA and Air Transportation Office v. Lozada, GR No. 176625, February 25, 2010 FACTS: Several parcels of lands located in Lahug, Cebu City were expropriation proceedings filed by the Government for the improvement of the Lahug Airport. The RTC rendered judgment Government and ordered the latter to pay the landowners the fair the land. The landowners received the payment.

the subject of expansion and in favor of the market value of

The other dissatisfied landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO), proposed a compromise agreement whereby the owners of the lots affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their respective appeal in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to an established policy involving similar cases. Because of this promise, the landowners did not pursue their appeal. Thereafter, the lot was transferred and registered in the name of the Government. The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of the said expropriation was never initiated, realized or implemented. Thus, the landowners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of the lands based on the compromised agreement they entered into with ATO. ISSUE: Whether the former owners have the right to redeem the property. HELD: Yes. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the Page 31 of 411

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property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity. Eminent Domain, Case No. 17: Republic v. Heirs of Borbon, GR No. 165354, January 12, 2015 FACTS: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property. The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project. During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal. HELD: Yes. The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use. In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 18: Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, GR No. 119694, May 22, 1995 FACTS: Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The COMELEC space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The COMELEC space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent COMELEC, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. HELD: Yes. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "COMELEC space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to COMELEC for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for COMELEC purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 19: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC, GR No. 132922, April 21, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time. ISSUE: Whether Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 is valid. HELD: Yes. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good. Page 34 of 411

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 20: City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, GR No, L-34915, June 24, 1983 FACTS: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUE: Whether Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: No. It constituted taking of property without just compensation. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Moreover, instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Page 35 of 411

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 21: NPC v. Maria Mendoza San Pedro, GR No. 170945, September 26, 2006 FACTS: For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. NPC contends that they shall only pay easement fee not just compensation. ISSUE: Whether a right of way easement subject to expropriation. HELD: Yes. Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 22: US v. Causby, 328 US 256, May 27, 1946 FACTS: Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted. ISSUE. Whether they are entitled to compensation by reason of taking clause? HELD. Yes. The court agreed with the finding that there had been a taking of respondents' property within the meaning of U.S. Const. amend. V. The court held that a physical invasion of the property was not necessary where there was an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from respondents' full enjoyment and use of the property. Further, the damages were not merely consequential; they were the product of a direct invasion of respondents' domain. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action, however, on the basis that the record was not clear whether the easement taken was temporary or permanent. The court remanded the cause for a determination of the necessary findings regarding the nature of the easement.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 23: Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 670 SCRA 392 (2012) FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkersbeneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.” The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision. ISSUES: (1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? (3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP? (4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP? (5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered? HELD: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.] 1.

YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. Page 38 of 411

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[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.] 2.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.] 3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP. [Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657. However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.] 4.

YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

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[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.] 5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties. [Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.] 6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered. [The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 24: Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Tecson 700 SCRA 243 (2013) and Resolution dated 21 April 2015, SCRA – GR No. 179334, April 21, 2015 FACTS: Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution. ISSUE: Whether the taking of the property without due process should be nullified. HELD: No. The due process requirement, in the context of expropriation, dictates that there be sufficient notice to the landowner before the government can assume possession of his or her land. The filing of the complaint satisfies this notice requirement. Thus, until the condemnation proceeding is initiated, the government does not yet have any valid authority to intrude on the property, regardless of whether or not its intended purpose is for the public good. The failure to initiate the complaint for expropriation before the government assumes possession over the subject lot does not amount to a valid exercise of eminent domain. In this case, it must be emphasized that though the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint for expropriation on October 25, 2005, the actual taking of the property commenced much earlier in 1972. By simple arithmetic, thirty-three (33) years have already elapsed from the time the landowners were deprived of possession of their property until the government took responsibility for its actions. This miserably fails to satisfy the due process requirement and is instead a circumvention of the Constitutional mandates, constitutive of unlawful taking.

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Eminent Domain, Case No. 25: National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656 SCRA60 (2011) FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project to generate electricity for Mindanao. It included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants. On 1997, Respondents sued NPC for recovery of damages of the property and a prayer for just compensation. They alleged that the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds. ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Sangkay have the right to just compensation. HELD: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Hence, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.

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A.3 TAXATION POWER Taxation Power, Case No. 1: Roxas v. CTA, GR No. L-25043, April 26, 1968 FACTS: Antonio, Eduardo and Jose Roxas, brothers and at the same time partners of the Roxas y Compania, inherited from their grandparents several properties which included farmlands. The tenants expressed their desire to purchase the farmland. The tenants, however, did not have enough funds, so the Roxases agreed to a purchase by installment. Subsequently, the CIR demanded from the brothers the payment of deficiency income taxes resulting from the sale, 100% of the profits derived therefrom was taxed. The brothers protested the assessment but the same was denied. On appeal, the Court of Tax Appeals sustained the assessment. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Roxases are liable? HELD: No. It should be borne in mind that the sale of the farmlands to the very farmers who tilled them for generations was not only in consonance with, but more in obedience to the request and pursuant to the policy of our Government to allocate lands to the landless. The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the "hen that lays the golden egg". And, in order to maintain the general public's trust and confidence in the Government this power must be used justly and not treacherously. It does not conform with the sense of justice for the Government to persuade the taxpayer to lend it a helping hand and later on penalize him for duly answering the urgent call. In fine, Roxas cannot be considered a real estate dealer and is not liable for 100% of the sale. Pursuant to Section 34 of the Tax Code, the lands sold to the farmers are capital assets and the gain derived from the sale thereof is capital gain, taxable only to the extent of 50%.

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Taxation Power, Case No. 2: City of Manila v. Coca-cola Bottlers Philippines, GR No. 181845, August 4, 2009 FACTS: Respondent paid the local business tax only as a manufacturers as it was expressly exempted from the business tax under a different section and which applied to businesses subject to excise, VAT or percentage tax under the Tax Code. The City of Manila subsequently amended the ordinance by deleting the provision exempting businesses under the latter section if they have already paid taxes under a different section in the ordinance. This amending ordinance was later declared by the Supreme Court null and void. Respondent then filed a protest on the ground of double taxation. RTC decided in favor of Respondent and the decision was received by Petitioner on April 20, 2007. On May 4, 2007, Petitioner filed with the CTA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review asking for a 15-day extension or until May 20, 2007 within which to file its Petition. A second Motion for Extension was filed on May 18, 2007, this time asking for a 10-day extension to file the Petition. Petitioner finally filed the Petition on May 30, 2007 even if the CTA had earlier issued a resolution dismissing the case for failure to timely file the Petition. ISSUE: Whether the enforcement of the latter section of the tax ordinance constitutes double taxation? HELD: Yes. Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, "taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing." It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once. Otherwise described as "direct duplicate taxation," the two taxes must be imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes must be of the same kind or character. There is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of the tax ordinance since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter — the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose — to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority — petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction — within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods — per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character — a local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the business.

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Taxation Power, Case No. 3: Swedish Match Philippines v. Treasurer of the City of Manila, GR No. 181277, July 3, 2013 FACTS: This is a case filed by the petitioner for Refund of Taxes. In its letter to the City of Manila Treasurer, the petitioner claimed double taxation when it paid business taxes under Sections 14 and 21 of Ordinance No. 7794 which is the Manila Revenue Code. The respondent contends that both sections refer to two distinct objects of tax, hence they are not the same in character and kind that will result in double taxation. The RTC, CTA division and CTA en banc denied the petition for a tax refund filed by the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether both sections of the Manila Revenue Code constitute double taxation. HELD: Yes, there is double taxation. The ELEMENTS OF DOUBLE TAXATION ARE: The taxes are imposed on 1. The same subject matter 2. For the same purpose 3. By the same taxing authority 4. Within the same taxing jurisdiction 5. For the same taxing period 6. The same kind of character While the petitioner is liable for the payment of business taxes to the City of Manila, the fact that it already paid under section 14 of the Manila Revenue Code, it is already precluded from paying the tax imposed under section 21 of the same code. As has been noted by the court, both sections are imposed for the following: 1. for the same subject matter, which is for doing business in the City of Manila 2. for the same purpose, which his to contribute to the city revenues 3. By the same taxing authority, which is the City of Manila 4. Within the same taxing jurisdiction, which is the territory of City of Manila 5. For the same taxing period, which is the same calendar year when both taxes were paid 6. For the same kind of character, which is a local business tax Considering these nature of taxes paid by the petitioner under both sections of the Code, the court held that the petitioner is entitled to a tax refund for the tax it paid under Section 21. Page 45 of 411

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Taxation Power, Case No. 4: CIR v. La Tondena, Inc. and CTA, 5 SCRA 665, July 31, 1962 FACTS: La Tondeña (LT) entered into a merger with SBC, SMCJI and MBWC. So, the assets and liabilities of the absorbed corporations were transferred to LT as surviving corporation. LT requested from the BIR a confirmation of the tax-free nature of the merger process. BIR confirmed that no gain or loss shall be recognized by the absorbed corporations as transferors of all assets and liabilities. Hence, tax-free. However, BIR insisted that the transfer of assets, such as real properties, shall be subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST). BIR posits that DST is levied on the exercise of the privilege to convey real property regardless of the manner of conveyance. LT, on the other hand, contends that DST is imposed only on conveyances, deeds, instruments, or writing, where realty sold shall be conveyed to a purchaser or buyer. ISSUE: Whether the transfer of real property to a surviving corporation pursuant to merger is subject to DST. HELD: No, it is not subject to DST. The DST law under the Tax Code does not include the transfer of real property from one corporation to another pursuant to a merger. In a merger, the real properties are not deemed "sold" to the surviving corporation and the latter could not be considered as "purchaser" of realty since the real properties subject of the merger were merely absorbed by the surviving corporation by operation of law and these properties are deemed automatically transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed. Therefore, the transfer of real properties to the surviving corporation in pursuance of a merger is not subject to documentary stamp tax. In case of doubt, tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly declares.

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Taxation Power, Case No. 5: Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company, GR No. L-23623, June 30, 1977 FACTS: The Acting Commissioner of Customs, the late Norberto Romualdez, Jr., said that the private respondent Manila Electric Company was not exempt for shipment of insulating oil from the payment of special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394. The Meralco claimed that they were exempted from paying tax shipment of insulating oil because under the R.A 1364 of Sec. 6 implied that the exemption from said tax equipment and spare parts for use in industries and also exempts insulators from all taxes of whatever kind and nature. The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are required by law to pay but in consideration of the franchise that the above “exempts it from all taxes of whatever nature, and by whatever authority, with respect to its insulators in consideration for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross earnings.” ISSUE : Whether the insulating oils can be contrued as insulator? HELD: Yes, because the insulating oils imported by petitioner are ‘used for cooling as well as for insulating and when used in oil circuit breakers, they are ‘required to maintain insulation. It is to be admitted, as contended by petitioner, that the Court is committed to the principle that an exemption from taxation must be justified by words too clear to be misread. It has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris." However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. The decision appealed from not being in accordance with law, the same is hereby reversed. Respondent is ordered to refund to petitioner the sum of P995.00 within thirty days from the date this decision becomes final, without pronouncement as to costs.” It was therein made clear that private respondent was not liable for the payment of the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 Page 47 of 411

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Taxation Power, Case No. 6: Ermita-Malate Hotel v. City Mayor of Manila, GR No. L-24693, October 23, 1967 FACTS: Hotel and motel operators in Manila sought to declare Ordinance 4670 as unconstitutional for being unreasonable, thus violative of the due process clause. The ordinance requires the clients of hotels, motels and lodging house to fill out a prescribed form in a lobby, open to public view and in the presence of the owner, manager or duly authorized representative of such hotel, motel or lodging houses. The same law provides that the premises and facilities of such hotel, motels and lodign houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. It increased their annual licensed fees as well. ISSUE: Whether Ordinance 4670 is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Page 48 of 411

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Taxation Power, Case No. 7: Philex Mining Corp. v. CIR, 294 SCRA 687, August 28, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Court of Tax Appeals decision ordering it to pay the amount of P110.7 M as excise tax liability for the period from the 2 nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P120 M plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities. ISSUE: Can there be an off-setting between the tax liabilities vis-a-vis claims of tax refund of the petitioner? HELD: No. Philex's claim is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Evidently, to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. To be sure, Philex cannot be allowed to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain. Hence, a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer. There can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.

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Taxation Power, Case No. 8: People v. Marti, GR No. 81561, January 18, 1991 FACTS: The appellant Andre Marti, together with his common-law wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) parcels of boxes alleged to contained books, cigars, and gloves for his friend Waltier Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland. The attendant, Anita Reyes, received their package and asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. The appellant refused and Anita Reyes no longer insists on examining the packages. It turned out that the package contains dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. An Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Trial court convicted him for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused appealed to the court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and seizures is violated when his parcels were opened without his permission. ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? HELD: No. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, on the cases cited by the SC, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Therefore, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. Page 50 of 411

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In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Taxation Power, Case No. 9: Yrasegui v. PAL, GR No. 168081, October 17, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL. In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989. Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with. On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to. On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same. On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.” ISSUE: Whether petitioner was validly dismissed. HELD: Yes. A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. In fine, the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).” Further, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties Page 51 of 411

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guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals

Taxation Power, Case No. 10: Zulueta v. CA, GR No. 107383, February 20, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence; HELD: No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

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B.BILL OF RIGHTS B.1 FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 1: Carlos Superdrug Corp v. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007) FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic Act (RA) No. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. ISSUE: Whether RA 9257 is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is The Page 53 of 411

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power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses. However, petitioner’s computation is clearly flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

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Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 2: Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, 693 SCRA 141 (2013) FACTS: Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.2 Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements. The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 2175 and 2006 were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive. In response, the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject ordinance. ISSUE: Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power. HELD: No. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, Page 55 of 411

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governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents.

Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 3: Aquino v. Municipality of Malay Aklan, 737 SCRA 145 (2014)

FACTS: Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131. Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. Contentions of West Cove: 1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. 2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition. Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings ISSUE: Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the closure and demolition of the property in question. HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se which can therefore be summarily abated. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive Page 56 of 411

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official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.

Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 4: Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, 760 SCRA 652 (2015)

FACTS: Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance, Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, which will collect 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php 100,000.00. This shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special account to be established for the purpose. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was enacted collecting garbage fees on residential properties which shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City property owner, questions the validity of the said ordinances. ISSUES 1. Whether the Socialized Housing Tax is valid. 2. Whether the ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double taxation. HELD: 1. Yes The SHT is valid. The tax is within the power of Quezon City Government to impose. LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful method. Herein, the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. On the question of inequality, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another. Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit. 2. No. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction. The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, affirms this authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions. Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered. The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity as provided by the same. As opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail. Page 57 of 411

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Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 5: Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 600 SCRA 413 (2009) FACTS: Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is "[t]o establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the health care plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization." Individuals enrolled in its health care programs pay an annual membership fee and are entitled to various preventive, diagnostic and curative medical services provided by its duly licensed physicians, specialists and other professional technical staff participating in the group practice health delivery system at a hospital or clinic owned, operated or accredited by it. ON January 27, 2000, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) sent petitioner a formal demand letter and the corresponding assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency taxes, including surcharges and interest, for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18. Petitioner protested the assessment in a letter dated February 23, 2000. ISSUE: Whether petitioner, as an HMO, engaged in the business of insurance during the pertinent taxable years, and was thus liable for DST? HELD: No. MFR granted. CIR must desist from collecting tax. Section 185 of the NIRC . Stamp tax on fidelity bonds and other insurance policies. – On all policies of insurance or bonds or obligations of the nature of indemnity for loss, damage, or liability made or renewed by any person, association or company or corporation transacting the business of accident, fidelity, employer’s liability, plate, glass, steam boiler, burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland, and fire insurance). Two requisites must concur before the DST can apply, namely: (1) the document must be a policy of insurance or an obligation in the nature of indemnity and (2) the maker should be transacting the business of accident, fidelity, employer’s liability, plate, glass, steam boiler, burglar, elevator, automatic sprinkler, or other branch of insurance (except life, marine, inland, and fire insurance). Under RA 7875, an HMO is "an entity that provides, offers or arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid premium."Various courts in the United States have determined that HMOs are not in the insurance business. One test that they have applied is whether the assumption of risk and indemnification of loss are the principal object and purpose of the organization or whether they are merely incidental to its business. If these are the principal objectives, the business is that of insurance. But if such is incidental and service is the principal purpose, then the business is not insurance. Page 58 of 411

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Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 6: National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, 737 SCRA 305 (2014) FACTS: The City of Cabanatuan (the City) assessed the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of its gross receipts for 1992. NAPOCOR refused to pay, arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise tax. Consequently, on November 9, 1993, the City filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax due plus 25% surcharge and interest of 2% per month of the unpaid tax, and costs of suit. In the order dated January 25, 1996, the trial court declared that the City could not impose a franchise tax on NAPOCOR and accordingly dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether the trial court's order of execution, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, exceeded the judgment sought to be executed. HELD: Yes. Respondent's computation of the surcharge, as sustained by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, varies the terms of the judgment sought to be executed and contravenes Section 168 of the Local Government Code. Taxes and its surcharges and penalties cannot be construed in such a way as to become oppressive and confiscatory. Taxes are implied burdens that ensure that individuals and businesses prosper in a conducive environment assured by good and effective government. A healthy balance should be maintained such that laws are interpreted in a way that these burdens do not amount to a confiscatory outcome. Taxes are not and should not be construed to drive businesses into insolvency. To a certain extent, a reasonable surcharge will provide incentive to pay; an unreasonable one delays payment and engages government in unnecessary litigation and expense.

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Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 7: People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991) FACTS: The appellant Andre Marti, together with his common-law wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) parcels of boxes alleged to contained books, cigars, and gloves for his friend Waltier Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland. The attendant, Anita Reyes, received their package and asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. The appellant refused and Anita Reyes no longer insists on examining the packages. It turned out that the package contains dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. An Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Trial court convicted him for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused appealed to the court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and seizures is violated when his parcels were opened without his permission. ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? HELD: No. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, on the cases cited by the SC, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Therefore, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. Page 60 of 411

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In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Fundamental Powers of the State and the Bill of Rights, Case No. 8: Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD, 25 April 2017 FACTS: The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction due to the reason that claiming it affects the profitability of their business. The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore operation in the Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and regulations for their effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring establishments. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs does not violate the petitioner’s right to equal protection of the law 2. Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are vague and violates the petitioners right to due process of law HELD: 1. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. 2. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and unequivocal. Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled persons" as follows: (a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being[.] On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows: 5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes. This is defined as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in Page 61 of 411

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a manner or within the range considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical 1or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

B. 2 DUE PROCESS Due Process, Case No. 1: South Bell & Co. vc. Natividad, GR No. 15574, September 17, 1919 FACTS: Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. ISSUE:

Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders. HELD: Yes. All persons, whether citizens or aliens without regards to any differences of race, religion, color or nationality, are protected under the due process clause. Private corporations legally existing within the Philippines are ‘persons’ within the scope of the guarantee insofar as their property is concerned. While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision. The limitation of domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining a certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine Islands, and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 No treaty right relied upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional .

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Due Process, Case No. 2: Allegeyer v. Louisianna, 165 U.S 578, January 6, 1897 FACTS: The Plaintiff state had an article in its constitution prohibiting foreign corporations from doing business in the Plaintiff state, unless they had a place of business and an authorized agent within the state. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York (Atlantic) wrote an insurance policy to cover property located within the Plaintiff state. This contract was formed in New York and was outside the jurisdiction of the Plaintiff state. A letter of notification of coverage was written in the Plaintiff state and sent to a local citizen. As a result, the state claimed that the Atlantic was conducting business in the Plaintiff state in violation of the Plaintiff state’s constitution. The Defendant, Allegeyer, purchased the aforementioned marine insurance policy from Atlantic to insure goods shipped from New Orleans. The Defendant was convicted of violating the Plaintiff state’s law and order to pay a fine. The Louisiana court upheld the Defendant’s conviction. ISSUE: Is Article 236 of the Louisiana state constitution a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? HELD: Yes. The statute as written does not provide due process of law because it prohibits an act that the Plaintiff had a right to do under the Constitution. The term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause embraces “the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any likelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.” This is an improper and illegal interference with the conduct of a citizen’s right to contract and carry out the terms of the contract.

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Due Process, Case No. 3: Vivares and Suzara v. St. Theresa’s College G.R No. 202666, September 29, 2014 FACTS: Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vide Suzara, both minors were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. While changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments and were uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan on her Facebook profile. Mylene Theza T. Escudero, a computer science teacher of STC, learned from her students that Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged into their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include Julia and Julienne: a.) drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar, and b.) wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. There were time where access to or the availability of the identified student’s photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user. STC’s Discipline-in-charge penalized the students by barring them from joining the commencement exercises. Angela’s mother Dr. Armenia M. Tan, filed a petition for injunction and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against STC, praying that STC be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises to which Rhonda Ave Vivares, Julia’s mother, joined as intervener. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) allowing students to attend the graduation ceremony. Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites. Thereafter, Vivares filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Data, arguing that the privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends only”. The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas data stating that the Vivares, et al. failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of writ of habeas data. ISSUE: Whether there was an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy of the minors involved so as to warrant the issuance of writ of habeas data? HELD: No. STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights. Parties are bound by the rules governing academic requirements and standards of behavior prescribed by the educational institutions. Resort to court is available to the parties.

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It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone.

Due Process, Case No. 4: Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals G.R No. 81789, December 29, 1989 FACTS: A charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioners. The amended charge alleged that the petitioners refused to register as aliens having been required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such. Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on the ground that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191, series of 1958. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to their arrest, which were denied by the Acting Commissioner. The deportation case was set for hearing, but on the same day, respondents filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for injunctive relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of legal basis and for want of supervisory jurisdiction on the part of the trial court on the particular subject involved. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to the right of due process even if they are aliens. Ruling: Yes. The power to deport an alien is an act of the State.  It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, in pursuant to Section 37(c) of the Rules of Court, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment. It must also be noted that before any charge should be filed in the CID, a preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is a Page 65 of 411

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sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation. The issuance of any kind of warrant and rules of procedure to be followed in deportation cases must be governed by the Rules on Criminal Procedure to insure a speedy, fair and just dispensation of justice.

Due Process, Case No. 5: Domingo v. Scheer G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004 FACTS: Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent visitor of the Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent resident status was granted. In a Letter dated June 29, 1995, Vice Consul Jutta Hippelein informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany, that the respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany. The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1997. In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice Consul on its speculation that it was unlikely that the German Embassy will ISSUE a new passport to the respondent; on the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of the respondent in Palawan. 14 The BOC concluded that the respondent was not only an undocumented but an undesirable alien as well. In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so wanted. At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there HELD in custody while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the respondent’s wife and his employees, the petitioner refused to release the respondent. The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law and that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved despite the lapse of more than six years. The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a permanent resident and a law-abiding citizen. ISSUE: Whether the Summary Deportation Order is valid. HELD: No. Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, provides that no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34, an alien cannot be deported unless he is given Page 66 of 411

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a chance to be heard in full deportation hearing, with the right to adduce evidence on his behalf. The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all. The BOC simply concluded that the respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan without any evidence. The respondent was not afforded a chance to refute the charges. He cannot, thus, be arrested and deported without due process of law as required by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

Due Process, Case No. 6: Mayor Villegas v. Hiu Ching Tsai Pao Hao G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978 FACTS: A City Ordinance number 6537 prohibiting non Filipino Citizens to be employed or to be engaged in any kind business within the city of manila without first securing an employment permit from the mayor of manila was passed. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao, employed in Manila, filed a petition praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring the same ordinance as null and void based on the following grounds: 1) It is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation; 2) It fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers: 3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the judge making the ordinance null and void. Villegas assails the decision, hence this case. ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 6537 violates the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution. HELD: Yes. Ordinance No. 6537 is violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. It does not provide for any standard to guide the Mayor regarding the issuance of working permits thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power whether to grant or deny the same. Such ordinance is invalid for violating the due process clause. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. 

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Due Process, Case No. 7: Tañada v. Tuvera G.R. No L-63915, December 29, 1900 FACTS:  Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, (a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution), as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect; publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. ISSUE:  Whether publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.  Ruling: Yes. Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.  The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.  Page 68 of 411

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The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of substantive due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

Due Process, Case No. 8: City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R No. 118127, April 12, 2005 FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitute a denial of equal protection under the law. Enacted by the City Council, on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled – AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-.MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. In the decision rendered by Judge Laguio declared the Ordinance No. 778, Series of 1993, of the City of Manila null and void. ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of due process. HELD: Yes. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it Page 69 of 411

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can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees.

Due Process, Case No. 9: Pefianco v. Moral G.R No. 132248, January 19, 2000 FACTS: On 26 July 1994, former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents, which were under her control and supervision as Division Chief, and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical documents. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Investigating Committee found the respondent guilty of administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of pilferage of historical documents, to the prejudice of the national library in particular, and the country in general. She was dismissed from service. Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria. Subsequently, Moral filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation Committee Report, supposedly to guide her on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the circumstances. The petition was denied. Respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Petitioner contends that there is no law requiring the DECS to furnish respondent with a copy of the Report of the DECS Investigation Committee. ISSUE: Whether Moral should have been furnished with a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. HELD: No. There is no law or rule that imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, the Court unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. She is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. Page 70 of 411

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The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part, although not controlling, of the basis for the decision. More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and the cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report.

Due Process, Case No. 10: Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015 FACTS: Cadet 1Cl Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa class of 2014 of PMA. Prof Berong issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cudia for being late for two minutes in their English 412 class. When made to explain, he stated that he came directly from OR 432 class and they were dismissed late by the instructor. He was meted out a penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours, hence, clarified about his violation. Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed that he was reported to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence; as a result, he was late for his next class. He submitted an explanation to the HC. Upon recommendation that the case be formalized, the formal investigation ensued. When he was informed of the case against him, he pleaded “not guilty.” The result of the initial was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Upon further deliberation, it was announce that the result was 9-0 for a guilty verdict. Hence, Cudia who has already served nine touring hours was informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code and was immediately placed in PMA Holding Center until resolution of his appeal. An appeal was filed by him. However, the Commandants of Cadets affirmed the HC findings and recommended his separation from the PMA for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code. Special Order No. 26 was issued placing him on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances pending approval of his separation, barring him from future appointment and/or admission a cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA. Claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC, Cudia and his family requested for a reinvestigation. The ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication. CHR’s ruling favored Cudia. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of Cudia is in utter disregard of his right to due process. HELD: No. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus PMS did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of Cadet Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report and was the given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was also informed about his options and Page 71 of 411

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the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.

Due Process, Case No. 11: Garcia v. Molina and Velasco GR Nos. 157383 and 174137, August 10, 2010

FACTS: Respondent Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate Memoranda from the President and General Manager of GSIS charging them with grave misconduct. Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of the respondents for ninety (90) days without pay, effective immediately. Respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to lift the Preventive Suspension Order and a Petition to Transfer Investigation to this Commission. Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve respondents’ motions to lift preventive suspension order to transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC. Hence, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The CA rendered a decision in favour of the respondents. The Court of Appeals declared null and void respondents’ formal charges for lack of the requisites preliminary investigation. In view thereof, the CA disagreed with the CSC that the question of the propriety of the preventive suspension order has become moot and academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise void having emanated from the void formal charges. Consequently, the CA found that respondents were entitled to back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive investigation. ISSUE: Whether the respondents were fully accorded the requisites opportunity to be heard, were in fact heard and being heard, and whether the conduct of preliminary investigation in administrative proceedings is an essential to the conduct of adjudication. Ruling: No. The respondents were not fully accorded the requisite opportunity to be heard. The SC HELD that respondents were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is in the opinion of their superior can compensate for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this case. The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter’s right to due process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at any time. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the Page 72 of 411

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denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.

Due Process, Case No. 12: Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., GR No. L-31195, June 5, 1973 FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police and that they informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company) of their proposed demonstration. The company called a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after learning about the planned mass. The officers confirmed and explain that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Company informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed. The Company appealed to the PBMEO that workers may join the demonstration, but those from the 1st and regular shifts should be excused from the demonstration and should report for work, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining. ISSUE: Whether the case dismissal as a consequence of a procedural fault violates due process. HELD: Yes, the denial by the CIR of the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner for the reason that it was filed 2 days late cannot be sustained. According to SC, such rule is unreasonable as procedural rule should not prevail over constitutional rights. Even the Supreme Court suspends its own rules whenever the purpose of justice require. Page 73 of 411

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While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

Due Process, Case No. 13: Adiong v. COMELEC G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992 FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. HELD: No. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential attributes. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.

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The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable.

Due Process, Case No. 14: Gonzales v. COMELEC G.R No. L-27833, April 18, 1969 FACTS: Petitioners challenged the validity of two new sections in the Revised Election Code, under R.A. No. 4880 which prohibits the too early nomination of candidates  and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. Petitioner Cabigao was an official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected and Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter. They claim that the enforcement of said R.A. No. 4880 would prejudice their basic rights such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purpose not contrary to law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution and that the act is unconstitutional. They asserted that there is nothing in the spirit or intention of the law that would legally justify its passage and enforcement whether for reasons of public policy, public order or morality, and that the enactment of the R.A. No. 4880 under, the guise of regulation is but a clear and simple abridgment of the constitutional rights. They further alleged that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. ISSUE: Whether Republic Act No. 4880 is unconstitutional. HELD: Yes, R.A. No. 4880 is unconstitutional. There are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The “clear and present danger” rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It Page 75 of 411

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provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness.

Due Process, Case No. 15: Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union G.R.No. L-25246, September 12, 1974 FACTS: Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member "Iglesia ni Cristo", has been an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was also member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the Union. In 1962, Since Appellee’s religious sect prohibits affiliation with any labor organization, he presented his resignation to Appellant Union. He claims that as per RA 3350, which amends RA 875, he is an exemption to the close shop agreement. In 1974, when his resignation was acted upon, the Union notified the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. Judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action. Thus, the Union appealed directly to the Supreme Court and questions the constitutionality of RA 3350. ISSUE: Whether RA 3350 is constitutional. HELD: No. The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or Page 76 of 411

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not to join union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

 

Due Process, Case No. 16: Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002 FACTS: In connection with the impeachment proceedings against President Joseph Estrada, five criminal complaints were filed against him, the members of his family, his associates, friends, and conspirators in the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent Ombudsman found probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal information against the former President and the other respondents. One of the information filed was for the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080 and among the respondents was petitioner Jinggoy. Petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: 1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. 7080; and 2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder is proper. HELD: Yes. Contrary to petitioner's contention, he was not charged with the commission of only one act, considering the phrase "on several instances" stated in the Amended Information. Petitioner's contention that R.A. 7080 does not apply to him is principally based on the premise that the amended information charged him with only one act or offense which cannot constitute plunder. However, examination of the information will show that it is divided into 3 parts: 1) first paragraph charges President Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jinggoy Estrada; 2)  second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and 3) the following four sub-paragraphs describe in detail the Page 77 of 411

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predicate acts constitute of the crime of plunder and state the names of the accused who committed each act. The allegation in the information is that petitioner Jinggoy received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances", meaning he committed the predicate act in series. Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, it cannot be said that he was charged with the commission of only one act, considering the phrase "several instances". It was HELD in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (2001) that the words "combination"  or "series" are taken in their popular, not technical, meaning. "Series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances". "Series"  refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. "Combination"  contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items. 2) If conspiracy is proven, the penalty of the petitioner shall be the same as former President Estrada. In the crime of plundering, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. In American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: 1) "Wheel or circle conspiracy," in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and  2) "Chain conspiracy," usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. The case at bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e. the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Under Philippine jurisdiction, conspiracy may be alleged as a mode of committing a crime or as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. When conspiracy is charged as a mode of committing a crime, as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offence charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the Page 78 of 411

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crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all. In the case at bar, the information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/ conspiracy with his co-accused." These words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.

Due Process, Case No. 17: People v. de la Piedra G.R. No. 121777, January 24, 2001 FACTS: Carol M. dela Piedra was charged of illegal recruitment in large scale by promising an employment abroad to Maria Lourdes Modesto y Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, a job to Singapore without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers. Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised employment which did not materialize. Thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum. Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa Ramos. An entrapment was then planned by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) headed by Capt. Mendoza and they successfully arrested the accused-appellant. Later on, in the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto and all of them positively testified that the accused offered them a job to Singapore. The trial found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed on a large scale. ISSUE: Whether Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness or if it violates the due process clause. HELD: No. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is not a vague provision. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its Page 79 of 411

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provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The court cannot sustain the Appellant argument that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

Due Process, Case No. 18: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 FACTS: Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) is the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there were clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. ISSUE: Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague. HELD: No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080 The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless Page 80 of 411

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specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

Due Process, Case No. 19: SPARK v. Et. Al. v. Quezon City G.R. No. 224442, August 8, 2017 FACTS: This case is in relation to the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte implementing a nationwide curfew for minors in the country. As a response to the said campaign, several local governments in Metro Manila, specifically, Navotas City and Quezon City, started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors. This is done through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody”. Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan(SPARK), an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors, filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional. Their arguments were the following:(a) it result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process. More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators, thus fall under the void for vagueness doctrine. ISSUE: Whether the ordinances fall under the void for vagueness doctrine. HELD: No. The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. Petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Page 81 of 411

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Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to secondguess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. Petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.

Due Process, Case No. 20: Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission 442 SCRA 573, 2004 FACTS: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims. ISSUE: 1. Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed. 2. Whether the violation of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing for termination of employees a violation of the Constitutional due process. HELD: 1. No, the petitioners were not illegally dismissed because there was just cause based on Section 2, Book V, Rule XXIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Implementing Rules) specifically provides that for termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 2. No. Constitutional due process is that provided under the Constitution, which involves the protection of the individual against governmental oppression and the assurance of his rights in civil, criminal and administrative proceedings; statutory Page 82 of 411

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due process is that found in the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and protects the individual from being unjustly terminated without just or authorized cause after notice and hearing. The two are similar in that they both have two aspects: substantive due process and procedural due process. However, they differ in that under the Labor Code, the first one refers to the valid and authorized causes of employment termination, while the second one refers to the manner of dismissal. A denial of statutory due process is not the same as a denial of Constitutional due process for reasons enunciated in Serrano v. NLRC.

Due Process, Case No. 21 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council 632 SCRA 146, 2010 FACTS: Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007. KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, alleged that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State." No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law. The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations. KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members. Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, Page 83 of 411

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suffice to cover the IBP or any of its members with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372. ISSUE: Whether RA 9372 is intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad in the definition of the crime of terrorism, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. HELD: No, RA 9372 is not vague and impermissibly broad. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorism effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity. As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible.

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Due Process, Case No. 20: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Commission on Audit Setember 19 2017 FACTS: On May 27, 2005, due to the transfer of Mariam Gayak, from the Cotabato to the Davao Office of the BSP, Verlina Silo and Evelyn Yap were designated as Acting Bank Officers for the BSP Cotabato. On June 7, 2005, Silo transferred her cash accountabilities in the amount of P988,105,695.00 to Yap and six months later, Gayak returned to the Cotabato Branch and Yap had to turn over her cash accountability back to Silo. From December 5, 2005 to January 6, 2006, the COA Yap and Silo’s accounts. On December 22, 2005, Silo sent Dequita, Manager of the BSP, Cotabato Branch, a text message where she admitted misappropriating a portion of Yap's accountability when she still had custody over it. Dequita immediately informed the Audit Team of Silo's text message. This prompted the Audit Team to conduct a piece-by-piece cash count, not just a random sampling count. The Audit Team discovered the irregularity when they counted the P1,000.00 notes and found shortage in the amount of P32,701,600.00 from Yap's cash accountabilities. On December 23, 2005, and January 18, 2016 Silo executed affidavits where she admitted sole responsibility for the cash shortage and that she again admitted repeatedly stealing cash from her accountabilities for a period of about five (5) years. On January 18, 2006, the COA directed Yap to explain and return the cash shortage. Yap denied responsibility for same. The Commission on Audit filed administrative charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, and criminal charges of malversation and violation of Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Dequita, Silo, and Yap before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found Silo liable of the administrative and criminal charges against her but dismissed the charges against Dequita and Yap.

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On March 24, 2008, BSP, sent the Commission on Audit a REQUEST FOR AN EVALUATION of the status of Yap's liability, considering the dismissal of the administrative case against her. On April 12, 2013, the COA issued a Decision denying the request to extinguish Yap's liability in the cash shortage and holding her liable for it and HELD Dequita, as well as the other Cotabato Branch Managers for the period of March 1996 to 2000, and the responsible officer/s who designated Silo to two (2) separate positions at the Cash Operations Unit to be jointly and solidarily liable with Yap. On July 28, 2014, petitioner BSP filed a Petition for Certiorari where it asserts that Silo committed her acts without anyone's assistance ISSUE: Whether there is lack of due process with respondent's issuance of the assailed Decision in response to petitioner's request for opinion. HELD: Yes. While this Court has time and again recognized respondent's mandate, this does not give it the authority to disregard the basic tenets of due process or brush aside its own rules of procedure. It is beyond dispute that Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officials of the BSP were denied due process with the issuance of the assailed COAs Decision. Respondent rendered its Decision in blatant disregard to its own rules, treating the request for opinion as a request for relief from accountability even if the former did not include the required documents and comments or recommendations needed under either the 1997 Rules or 2009 Rules. Furthermore, the request for opinion was filed by petitioner alone, yet the assailed Decision found Yap, Dequita, and other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarily liable, even if they were never parties to the request for opinion or request for relief from accountability. It was an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion to hold petitioners liable without an actual complaint being filed and without giving them the chance to defend themselves. Thus, the assailed Decision violated the basic tenets of due process and must be annulled and set aside, However, in the absence of a complaint, this Court cannot grant petitioner's prayer for this Court to render judgment relieving Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officers from accountability over the cash shortage. Nonetheless, the Office of the Ombudsman has already rendered judgment on Yap and Dequita's liability by dismissing the administrative and criminal charges against them. The Commission on Audit Decision No. 2013-064 dated April 12, 2013 and its En Banc Resolution dated May 6, 2014, holding Evelyn T. Yap, Perry B. Dequita, and the other bank officers of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarily liable for the cash shortage, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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B. 3 EQUAL PROTECTION Equal Protection, Case No. 1: Garcia v. Drilon 699 SCRA 352, 2013 FACTS:  Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The RTC then issued a TPO. Jesus argues that RA 9262 violates the guarantee of equal protection because the remedies against personal violence that it provides may only be invoked only by the wives or women partners but not by the husbands or male partners even if the latter possibly be victims of violence by their women partners. ISSUE: Whether RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: No. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification Page 87 of 411

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under the law. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children. As spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, the State recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children is threatened by violence and abuse. Furthermore, R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.

Equal Protection, Case No. 2: Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services 582 SCRA 254, 2009 FACTS: Gallant Maritime Services (Gallant) hired Antonio Serano (Serano) as a Chief Officer, with a monthly salary of USD 1,400. The contract was for a year. In March 1998, on the day of his departure, Serano’s position was downgraded to Second Officer and his salary to USD 1,000. He was assured that he would be promoted to Chief Officer by April that year. The promotion never came. Serano refused to stay as Second Officer and was sent home in May. Serano filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA). His money claim was at USD 26, 442. 73, his salary for the unexpired term of his contract. (9 months 23 days). This amount includes the salary of a Chief Officer, overtime pay, and leave pay. The LA ruled that Serano was illegally dismissed, but awarded only USD 8,770. The amount is based on Republic Act 8042, which provides that an illegally dismissed employee will be paid an amount equal to the total salary earned from the unexpired term of his contract, or an amount equal to three months’ salary, whichever is lower. The NLRC HELD that Serano was illegally dismissed, but lowered the award. It reasoned that RA 8042 does not include overtime pay in the compensation for illegally dismissed employees. Serano’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Serano filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. He raised the issue of constitutionality of RA 8042. The appellate court affirmed the NLRC but did not rule on the constitutionality of RA 8042. Thus, he brought his case to the Supreme Court. Serano argued that RA 8042 violates the equal protection clause. Illegally dismissed local workers have no limit as to the compensation they can get. But OFWs are limited to an amount equal to their salary for three months. This treatment is unfair because there is no substantial difference between a local worker and an OFW. ISSUE: Whether RA 8042 violate the equal protection clause? Ruling:

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Yes, RA 8042 violated the equal protection clause. The elements of a valid classification are:    

The classification is based on substantial distinctions; It is relevant to the purpose of the law; It is not limited to existing conditions; It applies equally to all members of the class.

In this case, Republic Act 8042 classifies workers into three: local workers, OFWs with an unexpired contract term of a year or more, and OFWs with an unexpired contract term spanning less than a year. The provision of RA 8042 capping the compensation applies to an illegally dismissed OFW who has a year or more remaining in his contract. The employee working in the Philippines will be fully compensated if he is illegally dismissed, no matter how long or short the unexpired term is. OFWs will get different compensations. This discrimination is not relevant to the purpose of the law—which is to protect OFWs. Capping the money claims of OFWs will never promote their welfare or protect them. RA 8042 did not meet the second requisite of a valid classification. Thus, RA 8042 violated the equal protection clause.

Equal Protection, Case No. 3: Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles 732 SCRA 22 (2014) FACTS: Joy Cabiles applied for work in Taiwan in Sameer Overseas Placement Agency. She paid the placement fee and signed a one year contract. She started working on June 26, 1997 and was dismissed on July 14, 1997. She filed a complaint that she was illegally dismissed. NLRC awarded her NT$ 46, 080 or the three-month equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fee and reimbursement of her plane ticket. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC. The basis of the decision is Republic Act 8042 Section 10, “Migrant Workers and Filipinos Overseas Acts of 1995.” It states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid or authorized cause shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with 12% interest per annum, plus salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. The phrase “three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” has been declared unconstitutional in the case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime. However, a new law is passed, Republic Act 10022, reinstating the phrase. ISSUE: Whether the law is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: Yes. It is Unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. Limiting the wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to 3 months is both violative of equal protection and due process clauses.

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Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the state class are treated alike, in terms of privilege of liabilities enforced. Undue favour of individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality are not allowed. Upon scrutiny of past computations prior to RA 8042, workers of whose contract is less than one year are given the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their contracts. Meanwhile, workers with at least one year contract are granted a cap equivalent to 3 months of their salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts. The subject clause in RA 8042 creates a layer of discrimination among O.F.W’s whose contract periods are more than one year. This is because they are only limited to their salaries for 3 months. There is no real and substantial distinction to justify different treatments in terms of computation of money claims. It is not also relevant to the purpose of the law to protect and promote the welfare of migrant workers. The award of the NLRC and Court of Appeals is affirmed but must be increased to the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract.

Equal Protection, Case No. 4: Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 FACTS: During Benigno Aquino’s presidency, he declared his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.” In order for him to transform his campaign slogan into reality, he found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order (EO) No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). According to Executive Order No.1, the truth commission’s task is to primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration, and thereafter recommended the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without a fear or favor. Petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer instituted a special civil action for prohibition. Biraogo assails EO No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the Constitutional authority of the legislative to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. ISSUE: Whether EO No. 1 is constitutional. Ruling: No insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It must be borne in mind that Arroyo administration is but a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past Page 90 of 411

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administration similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted the E.O No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. “The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.” For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him.”

Equal Protection, Case No. 5: Ichong v. Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” In effect, it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: 1.) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnership, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; 2.) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954 who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their license are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act until the expiration of the term in case of juridical persons; 3.) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; 4.) a provision for the forfeiture of license for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; 5.) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually in the retail business of additional stores or branches or retail business; 6.) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their business, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and 7.) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said this Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to the alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. Page 91 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws. HELD: No. The Court hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it provides its own personality and insures its security and future. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exists for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. Further, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency.

Equal Protection, Case No. 6: People v. Cayat G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

FACTS: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. ISSUE: Whether Act is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.   HELD:  No. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon Page 92 of 411

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“accident of birth or parentage,” as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. “The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.” (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Equal Protection, Case No. 7: Garcia v. Drilon G.R No. 179267, June 25, 2013 FACTS:  Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The RTC then issued a TPO. Jesus argues that RA 9262 violates the guarantee of equal protection because the remedies against personal violence that it provides may only be invoked only by the wives or women partners but not by the husbands or male partners even if the latter possibly be victims of violence by their women partners. ISSUE: Whether RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: No. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification Page 93 of 411

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under the law. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children. As spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, the State recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children is threatened by violence and abuse. Furthermore, R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.

Equal Protection, Case No. 8: Imbong v. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819, April 2014 FACTS: The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control. The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR provides that skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives cannot be considered as conscientious obejctors. ISSUE: Whether the provision unconstitutional. HELD: Yes. This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong Page 94 of 411

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to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government. It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association. The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution.

Equal Protection, Case No. 9: Central Bank Employees Association, Inc., v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004 FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management." ISSUE: Page 95 of 411

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Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." HELD: Yes. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The challenged provision of the New Central Bank Act was facially neutral in so far as it did not differentiate between the rank-and-file employees of the BSP and the rank-and-fileof other GFIs, and yet its effect when taken in light of the exemption of the latter employees from the SSL, were discriminatory.

Equal Protection, Case No. 10: Ferrer v. Bautista G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015 FACTS: The City of Quezon passed two ordinances. The first one was the Socialized Housing Tax of QC allowing the imposition of special assessment (1/2 of the assessed value of land in excess of P100k). The second one was Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Collection Fees imposing fees depending on the amount of the land or floor area). The fee imposed for a condominium unit occupant is higher than that of a residential lot owner. ISSUE:  Whether this violate the equal protection clause. HELD:  Yes. For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable. The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of Page 96 of 411

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a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.

Equal Protection, Case No. 11: Concurring Opinion of Justice Leonardo-De Castro in Garcia v. Drilon G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann. The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income. Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262. Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners. Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification. ISSUE: Whether RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause. Ruling: Page 97 of 411

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No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women. RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Equal Protection, Case No. 12: White Light Corporation v. City of Manila G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009 FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of Manila and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC. On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised Manila charter. Operators of drive-in hotels and motels argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Page 98 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is valid. HELD: No. If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The strict scrutiny test refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. Equal Protection, Case No. 13: Central Bank Employees Association Inc v. BSP G.R No. 148208, December 15, 2004 FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management." ISSUE: Page 99 of 411

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Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." HELD: Yes. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The challenged provision of the New Central Bank Act was facially neutral in so far as it did not differentiate between the rank-and-file employees of the BSP and the rank-and-fileof other GFIs, and yet its effect when taken in light of the exemption of the latter employees from the SSL, were discriminatory.

Equal Protection, Case No. 14: Central Bank Employees Association Inc v. BSP G.R No. 148208, December 15, 2004 FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management." ISSUE: Page 100 of 411

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Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." HELD: Yes. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The challenged provision of the New Central Bank Act was facially neutral in so far as it did not differentiate between the rank-and-file employees of the BSP and the rank-and-fileof other GFIs, and yet its effect when taken in light of the exemption of the latter employees from the SSL, were discriminatory.

Equal Protection, Case No. 15: Concurring Opinion of Justice Leonardo-De Castro in Garcia v. Drilon G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann. The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income. Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262. Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners. Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification. ISSUE: Whether RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause. Ruling: Page 101 of 411

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No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women. RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

B.4 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Searches and Seizures, Case No. 1: AAA v. Carbonell 524 SCRA 496, 2007 FACTS: In a rape case, private complainant failed to appear 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that the complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.” ISSUE: Whether Judge Carbonell is correct? HELD: No. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court explained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. “We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon, where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, Page 102 of 411

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not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.” It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be HELD for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor. Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, it was stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 2: Laud v. People 741 SCRA 239, 2014

FACTS: On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims. Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-1440 which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains. On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court; (b)  the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 0914407 which was to be enforced in Davao City; (c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant; (d) the police officers are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains; (e) Page 103 of 411

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the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause; ( f) the rule against forum shopping was violated and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be seized. Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CAG.R. SP. No. 113017. ISSUE/s: 1) Whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407 2) Whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite noncompliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 3) Whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated 4) Whether the applicant for the search warrant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping. HELD: 1) Undoubtedly, there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there was general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge. Finally, Judge Peralta's actual physical possession of the said office is presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not established. Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative impediment. 2) As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule on search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is being applied for in connection with a special criminal case as above-classified already presumes the existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.

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3) There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3 [now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as follows: SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not ISSUE but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific offense that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated. 4) Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering the various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and more importantly, the places to be searched were different that in Manila sought the search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the two applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 3: Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board 570 SCRA 410, 2008 FACTS:  In these petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows: ISSUE/s: 1) Whether Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? 2) Whether paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? HELD: 1) Yes, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a Page 105 of 411

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law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the aforementioned FACTS). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement. Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.” Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. 2) The Court HELD that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause. Page 106 of 411

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The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.  To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy   yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power. As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been HELD, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily  from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and Page 107 of 411

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from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.  The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.”  In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.  When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.  The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 4: Dela Cruz v. People 730 SCRA 655, 2014 FACTS: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman The accused, Jaime De la Cruz is a public officer as PO2 of the PNP. He was arrested by agents of the NBI in an entrapment operation after having been found positive for use of “Shabu”. Jaime is one of the several men, believed to be police officers, allegedly selling drugs. Jaime was nabbed by the officers in a Jollibee branch in Cebu City. He was later brought to the forensic lab of NBI-CEVRO where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing which they later found Jaime positive. Jaime denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail. ISSUE: Whether the drug test upon the petitioner is lawful. HELD:

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No. the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against selfincrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances. The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. The drug test should be made for those who were apprehended under RA 9165, extortion is not one of them. Therefore, the drug test was immaterial to his arrest of extortion. ACCUSED was AQCUITTED.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 5: Pollo v. Constantino-David 659 SCRA 198, 2011 FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charge administratively and was dismissed from the service. Respondent Constantino-David, CSC Chairperson, received an unsigned letter-complaint marked confidential. The letter contained an alleged anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC wherein a CSC Officer has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. Respondent immediately formed a team with a background in IT directing them to backup all the files in the computers found in The Mamamayan Muna and Legal Divisions. After the investigating team finished the task, it was found that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with the administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Respondent thus issued a show-cause order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counteraffidavit within 5 days from notice. Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint and asserted that the unlawful taking of his computer while he was on leave was a violation of his Constitutional right to privacy and protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The CSC charged him with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and violation of Republic Act No. 6713 with which he was found guilty and meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition for Certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration was denied hence he appealed before the Supreme Court. Page 109 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether there was illegal search. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent (CSC). The Supreme Court based their decision on the decided cases relevant to the case at bar where the Government as employer invades the private files of an employee stores in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latter consent and participation. Applying the analysis and principles established by decided cases for warrantless searches involving public employees for work related reasons; two questions are needed to be addressed. First is whether the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files which the SC answered in the negative, for failing to prove the petitioner had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. As to the question whether the search was reasonable; the SC decided that it was since it was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 6: Lucas v. Lucas 650 SCRA 667, 2011 FACTS: Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing). Jesse narrated that, his mother, Elsie, migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with Ate Belen who worked in a nightspot in Manila. One night, Elsie got acquainted with Jesus S. Lucas and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, gave birth to Jesse. The name of Jesse’s father was not stated in his birth certificate. Elsie later on told Jesse that his father is Jesus. Jesus allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and Jesse for about 2 years. When the relationship of Elsie and Jesus ended, Elsie refused to accept offer of support and decided to raise Jesse on her own. While Jesse was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce him to Jesus, but all attempts were in vain. Jesse filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case – granted. Unaware of the issuance of the RTC Order, Jesus filed a Special Appearance and Comment. After learning of the RTC Order, Jesus filed motion for reconsideration (MR). He averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because Jesse could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father. Acting on Jesus’ MR, the RTC dismissed the case and HELD that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba. ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. Page 110 of 411

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HELD: Yes, it is a must to present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity for the courts to issue DNA testing. A court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under the Constitutions, must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. Also, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. Such condition should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. Nonetheless, it was not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-àvis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, RTC just set the said case for hearing. The ruling of CA was dismissed.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 7: HPS Software and Communication Corporation and Yap v. PLDT G.R. Nos. 170217 and 170649, December 10, 2012 FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government prosecutors filed Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. The CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings. ISSUE: Page 111 of 411

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Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights. HELD: No, the SC does not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. This Court has consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be seized. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 8: Stonehill v. Diokno G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967 FACTS: 42 search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners and the corporations of which they were officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the petitioners and/or their premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized. Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having contravened the Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books and things to be seized particularly. ISSUE: Whether the search warrant has been validly issued. HELD: The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners. Page 112 of 411

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The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This is because corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers, directors and stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and seizure purely being personal cannot be availed by third parties. As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches and seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection to this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if based upon probable cause determined personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and (2) the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with particularly. In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s application. The averments of the offenses committed were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine the existence of probable cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the issuance of a valid search warrant. The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with particularity. This is to eliminate general warrants. General warrant is not allowed. It must be issued pursuant to a specific offense.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 9: Bache and Co. v. Ruiz 37 SCRA 823, February 27, 1971 FACTS: Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Misael Vera, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache& Co., herein petitioner corporation for violation of Section 46(a) of the NIRC in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209. Vera authorized, Rodolfo de Leon, his Revenue Examiner, to make and file the application of search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the CFI of Rizal. They brought the following: 1. Vera’s letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; 2. An affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; 3. A deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and 4. A search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge. When the respondents arrived at the court, the respondent Judge Ruiz, was still hearing a certain case. So, by means of a note, the judge instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. When the session was adjourned, the deputy clerk informed the judge that the depositions were taken then the stenographer read to the judge her notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application Page 113 of 411

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for a search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, and the Search Warrant No. 2M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued. Three days later, the agents of BIR served the warrant and seized 6 boxes of documents. The petitioners moved to quash the search warrant, filed for an injunction, and other reliefs prayed for but the respondent judge dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was validly issued. HELD: No. The Court found three (3) defects in the search warrant issued. 1. First, there was no personal examination of the judge. 2. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. 3. Third, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause. This is pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. 1. The first is the violation of Sec. 46 (a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. T 2. He second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). 3. The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and 4. The fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Hence, it is a clear violation of Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the RRC. "Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970." The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. 1. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or Page 114 of 411

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2. When the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or 3. When the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 10: Nograles v. People G.R. No. 191080, November 21, 2011 Facts: Special Investigator Garry Meñez (SI Meñez) of the National Bureau of Investigation applied for a search warrant before the RTC to authorize the searching of the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) and to seize/confiscate and take into custody various materials used in the creation and selling of pornographic internet website. These materials include: Computer Sets, Television Sets, Internet Servers, Fax Machines, Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials, Web Cameras, Telephone Sets, Photocopying Machines, List of clients and, Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime. Judge Alisuag of RTC conducted a hearing wherein SI Meñez and two other witnesses were personally examined. Afterwards, she then granted the application and issued the Search Warrant. Subsequently, SI Meñez submitted a Return of Search Warrant to the RTC manifesting that the said search warrant was implemented in an orderly and peaceful manner in the presence of the occupants of the described premises and that the seized items were properly inventoried in the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized. The items seized were ten (10) units each of: Central Processing Units (CPUs), monitors, keyboards, mouse and AVRs. Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties. Meanwhile, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended that the complaint for violation of Article 201 of the RPC Page 115 of 411

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(Immoral Doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows) against petitioners be dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence and the same was approved by the City Prosecutor. Hence, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Release Seized Properties manifesting that the complaint against them was dismissed, and that, for said reason, the State had no more use of the seized properties. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners but partially granted the motion to release seized properties by allowing the return of the computer sets, however, the CPU and all the rest of the softwares containing obscene materials be retained in the possession of the NBI. The petitioners then sought relief with the CA via a special civil action for certiorari. CA assailed with modification the Order of the RTC that the CPUs and softwares be released to the petitioners with the condition that the hard disk be removed from the CPUs to be destroyed. Petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing that they were the source of pornographic printouts presented by the NBI to the RTC or to the City Prosecutor of Manila. Since the hard disks in their computers are not illegal per se unlike shabu, opium, counterfeit money, or pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful as they are being used in the ordinary course of business, the destruction of which would violate not only procedural, but substantive due process.

ISSUE: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the removal and destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and obscene materials. HELD: No. The CA is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way of permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files. The argument of petitioners is totally misplaced considering the undisputed fact that the seized computer units contained obscene materials or pornographic files. While it may be true that the criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the RPC was dismissed as there was no concrete and strong evidence pointing to them as the direct source of the subject pornographic materials, it cannot be used as basis to recover the confiscated hard disks. At the risk of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the seized computer units belonging to them contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly, petitioners had no legitimate expectation of protection of their supposed property rights. Significantly, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969 is explicit. Thus:

Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints, engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be governed by the following rules: a. Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed. Page 116 of 411

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b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture, paintings or other materials and other articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. The CA was lenient with petitioners in modifying the ruling of the RTC in that the CPUs and softwares, which were initially ordered to be retained by the NBI, should be released in their favor with only the hard disk removed from the CPUs and destroyed. If the softwares are determined to be violative of Article 201 of the RPC, unlicensed or pirated, they should also be forfeited and destroyed in the manner allowed by law. The law is clear. Only licensed softwares that can be used for legitimate purposes should be returned to petitioners. The Court is not unmindful of the concerns of petitioners but their supposed property rights must be balanced with the welfare of the public in general.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 11: United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005 FACTS: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents. UNILAB, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant Page 117 of 411

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was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine. HELD: No. A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating evidence In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officer’s instantaneous sensory perception of the object. The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure. It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents’ motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the Page 118 of 411

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warrant, or any of the petitioner’s representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents. In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 12: Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015 Cites in ABS-CBN Corporation v. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015 FACTS: On 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada two complaints which prayed that criminal proceedings for Plunder be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be furnished with Copies of CounterAffidavits of the Other Respondents. Sen. Estrada’s request was made "pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman). The ombudsman denied Estrada’s request during the preliminary investigation. ISSUE: Whether there was a violation to Estrada’s right to due process upon denial of his request during a preliminary investigation. HELD: None. The Ombudsman’s denial of Sen. Estrada’s Request did not violate his constitutional right to due process. Page 119 of 411

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There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent only. Furthermore, upon reconsideration, the Ombudsman even went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents and granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of his Request happened during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 13: Petron LPG Dealers Association v. Ang G.R. No. 199371, February 3, 2016

FACTS: LPG Dealers Association and Total Gaz LPG Dealer Association filed a lettercomplaint before the NBI-IRO, requesting assistance in the surveillance, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of respondents for alleged illegal trading of LPG products and/or underfilling, possession and/or sale of underfilled LPG products. The NBI-IRO through its agent De Jamil and undercover NBI asset Antonio conducted surveillance and test-buy operations and thereafter they filed two Applications for search Warrant to conduct a search of the Magsingal LPG refilling plant. ISSUE: Whether the personal knowledge of the witnesses of the commission of the illegal trading and underfilling of LPG products is a basis for determining probable cause in search warrant applications? HELD: Yes. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. Page 120 of 411

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The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. Facts discovered during surveillance - on the basis of information and evidence provided by petitioners - constitute personal knowledge which could form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 14: Microsoft Corporation v. Samir Farajallah G.R No. 205800, September 10, 2014 FACTS: Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Sy stems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations organized and existing under the laws of the United States. Microsoft Corporation is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software and the corresponding user’s manuals, and the registered owner of the “Microsoft” “MS DOS” trademarks in the Philippines. Adobe Systems Incorporated is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of Adobe Software. Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Her ce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office at Unit 1603, East Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support, Inc. (OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz) were assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software. Page 121 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause for issuance of a warrant. HELD: Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitions for review by certiorari “shall raise only questions of law.” A question of fact exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it can only be resolved through a reexamination of the body of evidence. Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient and validated. Looking at the records, it is clear that Padilla and his companions were able to personally verify the tip of their informant The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses were able to verify the information obtained from their confidential source. The evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Thus, the requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant and witnesses was clearly satisfied in this case.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 15: People v. Tudtud G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003 FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbours have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.  Relating to the report, the police conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbours, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. At around 4:00 pm that same day, a team of policemen posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await the arrival of Tudtud. About 8:00 pm, 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description. PO1Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud then said Page 122 of 411

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“it was alright” and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. When the bundles were unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves ISSUE: Whether there is a valid search and seizure; and if there is implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s alright”) is considered a waiver. HELD: No. The search and seizure that formed basis to the case against Tudtud is invalid. Additionally, there is no waiver of his constitutional right in his statement “it’s alright” pertaining to the officer’s asking of permission to search the box. The search and seizure is invalid because there is no lawful arrest in this case. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its revision in 2000, Section 12, Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows: SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. In this case, Tudtud were not committing, had just committed, or were about to commit a crime. Nor did the officers have probable cause, aside from the testimony of Solier, that Tudtud is committing a crime. Additionally, an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures is given if the following requisites are present: 1) It must appear that the rights exist; 2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; 3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Page 123 of 411

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 16: People v. Court of Appeals 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998 FACTS: On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan. The search warrant was issued, however, not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store, resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash which were never mentioned in the warrant. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions. Three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents as there was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search. The private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and moved for a quashal of search warrant which was later granted by the judge on the ground that the search was not accomplished in the presence of Page 124 of 411

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the lawful occupants of the place any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time. That the articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself; in fact the return was done after 3 days. ISSUE: Whether a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant. HELD: No, the search warrant was not validly issued. It bears stressing that Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things to be seized., It does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the Page 125 of 411

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sketch of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units -- the place to be searched being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 17: Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College G.R No. 202666, September 29, 2014 FACTS: Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vide Suzara, both minors were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. While changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments and were uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan on her Facebook profile. Mylene Theza T. Escudero, a computer science teacher of STC, learned from her students that Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged into their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include Julia and Julienne: a.) drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar, and b.) wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. There were time where access to or the availability of the identified student’s photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user. STC’s Discipline-in-charge penalized the students by barring them from joining the commencement exercises. Angela’s mother Dr. Armenia M. Tan, filed a petition for injunction and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against STC, praying that STC be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises to which Rhonda Ave Vivares, Julia’s mother, joined as intervener. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) allowing students to attend the graduation ceremony. Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites. Thereafter, Vivares filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Data, arguing that the privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends only”. Page 126 of 411

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The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas data stating that the Vivares, et al. failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of writ of habeas data. ISSUE: Whether there was an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy of the minors involved so as to warrant the issuance of writ of habeas data? HELD: No. STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights. Parties are bound by the rules governing academic requirements and standards of behavior prescribed by the educational institutions. Resort to court is available to the parties. It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 18: Caballes v. Court of Appeals 373 SCRA 221 (2002) FACTS: Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with “kakawati” leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, and appeared nervous. With appellant’s alleged consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). When asked where the wires came from, appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof was valid. HELD: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. Page 127 of 411

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The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle.They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check. The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. Page 128 of 411

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The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 19: Alcaraz v. people G.R. No. 199042, November 17, 2014 FACTS: On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After recording the incident in the police blotter, responding policemen proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him. The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at the police station. They invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram. RTC ruled against the petitioner for violating RA 9165. This petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the alleged shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently, inadmissible. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment stating that the shabu confiscated from petitioner was admissible in evidence against him; that the search conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending officers’ non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal. Page 129 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 despite the illegality of the arrest and the lapses on the part of the police officers in the handling of the confiscated drug. HELD: Yes. The petitioner is acquitted because of the error of the illegality of arrest and evidence. Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person. The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none of the above that would make the warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest. Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot be sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the confiscated drug.

Searches and Seizures, Case No. 20: People v. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994

FACTS: Early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA in Quezon City, together with his team. There was an intelligence report received by the division that the establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. At around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate several ammunitons and explosives (six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov"bombs inside one of the rooms). De Gracia was then caught peeping through the door holding a C-4, along with several other men. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. AccusedAppellant denied all the accusations towards him. Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:

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Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives, and which criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of valuable resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.  HELD: The military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed.  Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. (People v. Malmstedt).

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 21 Fajardo v. People G.R No. 190889, January 10, 2011 FACTS: Fajardo and Valerio were charged of violation of PD 1866 for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation. Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers. ISSUE: Whether the receivers are admissible as evidence in court HELD: Yes, the receivers are admissible as evidence in court. The receivers were seized in plain view. No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article – (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. Page 132 of 411

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 22 People v. Doria G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999 FACTS: Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Members of PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian informants (CI) that one “Jun” who was later identified to be Florencio Doria was engaged in illegal drug activities and decided to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust operation ”Jun” took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, “Jun” revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named “Neneth” (Violeta Gaddao) “Jun” led the police team to “Neneth’s” house. The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house open and a woman inside. “Jun” identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked “Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over “Neneth’s” house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants. Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person. The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.   ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao is valid.   HELD: Yes. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under Section 5 (a), a person may be arrested without a warrant if he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 23 Malacat v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997 FACTS: In response to reports of bomb threats, Rodolfo Yu, was on foot patrol with other police officers at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his companions observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, a fragmentation grenade was found tucked inside petitioners front waist line. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner. Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer, conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapio‘s advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioners uncounselled confession, there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. In its decision, the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866. In his appeal to the CA, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and legal. HELD: No. First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner’s possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an X mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim.Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, the police officer who conducted the examination, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these. Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply Page 134 of 411

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stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioner’s eyes moving very fast. Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid: As to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier, this claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Also, there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast, an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Lastly, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court: When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 24: Valmonte v. De Villa G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989 FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and proving an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. ISSUE: Whether the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. HELD: No. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners” rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up the of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission to establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measure to thwart plots to destabilize the govt., in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search which is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 25: People v. Vinecario G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004 FACTS: On April 10, 1995, fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, or the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700 grams of marijuana violated their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. HELD: No. The Court ruled that searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorist. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. In light then of Vinecario et al.‘s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense. Vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Page 137 of 411

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 26: Sydeco v. People G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014 FACTS: 1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and owner of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136. 2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide member of the Philippine National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual performance of their official duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving and pushing, the hands of said officers while the latter was placing him under arrest for violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. According to the prosecution, on the night of the incident, police officers were manning a checkpoint when they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick-up driven by Sydeco. The team members flagged the vehicle down and asked Sydeco to alight from the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby, before he resumes driving. Sydeco, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Thereafter, Sydeco was arrested and brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issued by that hospital. Sydeco, on the other hand, averred that he, the cook and waitress in his restaurant were on the way home when they were signaled to stop by police officers who asked him to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search. When Sydeco instead opened the vehicle window and insisted on a plain view search, one of the policemen told him he was drunk, pointing to three empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. The officers then pulled Sydeco out of the vehicle and brought him to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting Sydeco as positive of alcoholic breath, although no alcohol breath examination was conducted. Sydeco was detained and released only in the afternoon of the following day when he was allowed to undergo actual medical examination where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath According to the petitioner, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily understood, refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or movement. The act may become punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature of reckless driving. During the stop by officers, according to a Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described this particular event in his “sinumpaang salaysay”, the officer lit a flashlight to take a look inside the car and asked for the passengers to get out. Sydeco resisted by saying “hindi pwede yun..” and stopped passengers from exiting the vehicle. While sydeco was explaining to the officers things excalated One of the police officers took the car keys and another punched Sydeco’s mouth then stuck a gun to Sydeco’s head. Witness begged Page 138 of 411

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for the police not to shoot but was later shown the end of a gun. After being punched Sydeco was then forcibly pulled out of the car and into the streets by the officers while still holding on to their weapons. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid reason for search by the arresting team. HELD: No. Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. He may have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent. There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed. There is nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a “stop and frisk” action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention to invite him to Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation about being physically hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favour of innocence or at least in favor of the milder form of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 27: People v. Leila Johnson G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000 FACTS: Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was alleged to have willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possessed three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug which weighed a total of 580.2 grams when she was frisked by security personnel. Leila was then taken to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellant’s passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the women’s room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col. Castillo. She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines. On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended. Accused-appellant appealed contending that the trial court convicted her: (1) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving the negative allegation in the information;" (2) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride;" (3) "despite violation of her constitutional rights;" and (4) "when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt." ISSUE: Wether the search and seizure was valid. HELD: Yes, the search and seizure was valid. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as "the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him." Page 140 of 411

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The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accusedappellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 28 Pollo v. David G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011 FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charge administratively and was dismissed from the service. Respondent Constantino-David, CSC Chairperson, received an unsigned letter-complaint marked confidential. The letter contained an alleged anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC wherein a CSC Officer has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. Respondent immediately formed a team with a background in IT directing them to backup all the files in the computers found in The Mamamayan Muna and Legal Divisions. After the investigating team finished the task, it was found that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to the petitioner were draft pleadings or letters in connection with the administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Respondent thus issued a show-cause order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counteraffidavit within 5 days from notice. Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint and asserted that the unlawful taking of his computer while he was on leave was a violation of his Constitutional right to privacy and protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The CSC charged him with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and violation of Republic Act No. 6713 with which he was found guilty and meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition for Certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration was denied hence he appealed before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether there was illegal search. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent (CSC). The Supreme Court based their decision on the decided cases relevant to the case at bar where the Government as employer invades the private files of an employee stores in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latter consent and participation. Applying the analysis and principles established by decided cases for warrantless searches involving public employees for work related reasons; two questions are needed to be addressed. First is whether the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files which the SC answered in the negative, for failing to prove the petitioner had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. As to the question whether the search was reasonable; the SC decided that it was since it was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 29 Luz v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012 FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testifies that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet. This prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. PO2 Alteza invited the accused to their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said substation. While PO2 Alteza and SPO1 Brilliante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO2 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted, PO2 Alteza told the accused to take out the contents of his jacket. The accused obliged and put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container, two cell phones, one pair of scissors and one swiss knife. PO2 Alteza asked the accused to open the container. The accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four plastic sachets, 2 of which were empty while the other two contained suspected shabu. The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence this petition. The petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because he was not issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. He claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him. ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid, resulting to a warrantless search. HELD: No. There was no valid arrest, and the resulting warrantless arrest was illegal. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is affected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of the actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and that there be intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. At the time that he was waiting for PO2 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO2 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. It was only for the sake of convenience that PO2 Alteza brought the petitioner to the police sub-station because he was flagged down almost in front of that place. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody. Page 143 of 411

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The following instances when a warrantless search is allowed: 1. A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Search of evidence in plain view; 3. Search of a moving vehicle; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. A “stop and frisk” search 7. Exigent and emergency circumstance. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable in this case. The evidence seized, although alleged to be in advertently discovered, was no in plain view. It was concealed in a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. The evidence was not immediately apparent. Consent to a search must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search. Consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO2 Alteza, it does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. The petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searched and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the Constitutional rights of citizens. For the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible; the drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 30 Republic v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 FACTS: Upon assuming office, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1 (EO 1). The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created; it was tasked to recover ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family and their allies. The AFP Board was also created under PCGG to investigate military officers who were considered subordinates of President Ferdinand Marcos. Among those investigated was Army Major General Josephus Ramas (Ramas). It was alleged that he had a house and lot in Quezon City, and another house and lot in Cebu. The report also alleged that Elizabeth Dimaano is his mistress and that she has in her possession military equipment. Dimaano’s house was raided, based on a warrant for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The seized items were: guns, ammunition, money, communications equipment jewelry, and land titles. During this time, the Freedom Constitution has not yet been effective. The Republic filed a petition to forfeit the equipment and items from Dimaano, based on Republic Act 1379. However, the Republic moved for several postponements. Thus Ramas and Dimaano filed a Motion to Dismiss. They argued that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate military officers merely because of their ranks, without proof that they were President Marcos’s subordinates. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case because the search and seizure done in Dimaano’s house was illegal. The case was referred to the Ombudsman—who had jurisdiction for cases under RA 1379. The items confiscated from Dimaano were also returned. The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Thus, a petition to the Supreme Court was filed. ISSUE: Wether the search and seizure is legal. HELD: No, the search and seizure done at Dimaano’s house was not legal. As leaders of a revolutionary government, the Aquino administration was not bound by any constitution during the interregnum . Thus, the PCGG was not bound to act within the limits granted by the 1973 Constitution. However, the revolutionary government was bound by treaty obligations, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant). The Philippines is a signatory of both. The UDHR and the Covenant both provide that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of property. The revolutionary government did not repudiate both. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government has the responsibility to ensure that the Philippines complied with the UDHR and the Covenant. In this case, the search warrant was for firearms and ammunition. But the raid included items that were not listed in the warrant. Therefore, seizing those items was illegal. The items illegally seized were returned to Dimaano. The case was remanded to the Ombudsman for proper action.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 31 Valeroso v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009 FACTS: Valeroso charged with possession of caliber 38 without license or permit. Warrant of Arrest was issued for kidnapping with ransom to Valeroso to be pursued by the police. The police team conducted surveillance on Valeroso to see his hideout. Eventually, they saw him about to board a tricycle near Integrated National Police. The police team approached Valeroso and put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights and bodily searched him. After the search, they found a charter arms revolver, bearing serial no. 52315 with five pieces of ammunition, tucked in his waist. They brought him to the police station and verified in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame that the firearm was not issued to Valeroso but was licensed in the name of some other person. Defense: On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children and was awakened by armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the house. The men went inside and searched the house and later on told that a gun was found inside. They were armed with a warrant of arrest but no search warrant. He was convicted by the RTC, affirmed by CA and, on petition for review, SC affirmed CA’s decision. MR was denied on June 30, 2008. Valeroso again submitted a letter-appeal to review by the SC the breached of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures. Through that second MR, Solicitor General recommended Valeroso’s acquittal because of violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure. He was, according to SG, arrested in the boarding house of his children where he was arrested, armed men entered, searched the cabinet and found the revolver. ISSUE: Whether there was a volation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure. HELD: Yes. The SC believes the theory of the defense after thorough examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG. Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated; the confiscated firearm and ammunition were inadmissible in evidence against him. Article III Section 2 and 3- with warrant. However, the rule in Article III section 3, par 2 is not absolute. The following are the instances when searches and seizures are allowed even without warrant: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the Page 146 of 411

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police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and] 9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. It would have been lawful for the armed men to search Valeroso on the ground of incidental to a lawful arrest if the purpose was to make themselves free from the possible retaliation of Valeroso. Nevertheless, in this case, what the armed men searched was the cabinet far from the control of Valeroso in order to retaliate. Hence, it is search is untenable. Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. His constitutional right was violated and his conviction should have not attained if not because of the illegally obtained firearm.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 32 People v. Salazar G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997 FACTS: Sgt. Cubillan and Cpl. de Guzman of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) conducted a buy-bust operation where accused, Saturnina Salazar, did then and there and without authority of law, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away five (5) marijuana sticks to Cpl. de Guzman posing as a buyer in consideration of the amount of Five Pesos; and, as a result of the said Buy-Bust operation, confiscated from the control and possession of the accused were six (6) marijuana sticks and five (5) grams, more or less, of dried marijuana leaves in addition to the five (5) marijuana sticks aforestated. Appellant Saturnina Salazar is charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Appellant contends that, because said agents had known of alleged drug-pushing activities in Oroquieta City, they should have obtained a search warrant before intruding into her residence. Appellant alleges violation of her constitutional rights against warrantless search and seizure, and to counsel during custodial investigations. ISSUES: 1. Whether the NARCOM agents conducted an unlawful search and seizure. 2. Whether the NARCOM agents violated the respondent’s right to counsel. HELD: 1. No. In People vs. Figueroa, this Court said: The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. Because the drug pusher had been caught in flagrante delicto, the arresting officers were duty-bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to search her for anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The search, being an incident of a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity. 2. Yes. We find appellant's claim that she was not informed of her right to counsel during custodial investigation to be correct. Moreover, the NARCOM agent's admission that they made her sign and thumb mark the bond paper which they used to wrap the marijuana found in her possession was violative of her constitutional right to counsel. While the bond paper does not appear to have been considered as a pivotal piece of evidence against appellant, such act of the NARCOM agents is worth noting if only to provide guidance to law enforcement operatives. Page 148 of 411

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 33 Disini v. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014 FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of a current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read. And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013, the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders. ISSUES: 1. The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional? 2. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms. 3. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. Page 149 of 411

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4. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press. 5. Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 6. Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. 7. Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications? 8. Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel. 9. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who wilfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression. 10.Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional? 11.Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10175 constitutional? 12.Is Section 8 valid and constitutional? 13.Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional? 14.Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional? 15.Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional? 16.Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and constitutional? 17.Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional? 18.Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and constitutional? 19.Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional? 20.Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid and constitutional? 21.Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional? HELD: 1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemnable act. 2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what Page 150 of 411

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instil such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the evil purpose for which one uses the name that the law condemns. No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The law punishes those who acquire or use identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended. The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for such higher penalty. Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with Page 151 of 411

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the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used here required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of actual malice. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 9. A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. 10.Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communication technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. 11.The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with the exception of the crimes of: Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c) (4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional. 12.Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. 13.Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. 14.Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. There was no undue deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve on orders Page 152 of 411

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of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by reasons of the issuance of such orders. 15.Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention. 16.Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. 17.Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. 18.Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial intervention but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. 19.Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court. 20. and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 34: Rodel Luz v. People G.R No. 197788, February 29, 2012 FACTS: On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, the assigned traffic enforcer, saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet. Alteza flagged down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear a helmet while driving. He invited the accused to the sub-station. While issuing citation ticket, Alteza and SPO1 Brillante noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. The two police officers ordered the accused to take out the contents of his pocket. Inside his pocket was a nickel-like tin or metal container with two sachet of shabu in it, two cellphones, one pair of scissors and one swiss knife. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frameup and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. Rodel Luz y Ong, the petitioner, appealed and raised that the search and seizure of the alleged shabu was invalid and that he claimed that there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. And even assuming that there was a lawful arrest, he claimed that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him. ISSUE: Wether the arrest, search and seizure were invalid. HELD: Yes, the arrest, search and seizure were invalid. The Court held that there was no valid arrest, pursuant to R.A. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the proper procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not arrest but the confiscation of the driver’s license. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: 1. a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. search of evidence in "plain view;" 3. search of a moving vehicle; 4. consented warrantless search; 5. customs search; 6. a "stop and frisk" search; and 7. exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. Page 154 of 411

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 35: Alcaraz v. People G.R. No. 199042, November 17, 2014 FACTS: Petitioner Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Prosecution’s Version: A Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting Resco along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the incident in the police blotter, four police officers together with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the complaint lodged against him and invited him to the police station where he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) was recovered from the left pocket of his pants. Defense’s version: The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when the officers invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then frisked and detained at the police station. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search was legal. HELD: No. A waiver of illegal arrest, however is not a waiver of an illegal search. Records have established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted. These searches include: (1) search of moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation; (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.

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Searches and Seizures, Case No. 36: SJS v. DDB G.R No. 157870, November 3, 2008 FACTS: In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. ISSUE/S: 1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? 2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? HELD: 1. Yes, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution. In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition Page 156 of 411

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sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement. 2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

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B.5 WARRANTLESS ARREST Warrantless Arrest, Case No. 1: Luz v. People G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012 FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testifies that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet. This prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle. PO2 Alteza invited the accused to their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said substation. While PO2 Alteza and SPO1 Brilliante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO2 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted, PO2 Alteza told the accused to take out the contents of his jacket. The accused obliged and put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container, two cell phones, one pair of scissors and one swiss knife. PO2 Alteza asked the accused to open the container. The accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four plastic sachets, 2 of which were empty while the other two contained suspected shabu. The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.The Regional Trial Court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence this petition. The petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because he was not issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. He claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him. ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid, resulting to a warrantless search. HELD: No. There was no valid arrest, and the resulting warrantless arrest was illegal. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is affected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of the actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and that there be intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. At the time that he was waiting for PO2 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO2 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Page 158 of 411

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Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. It was only for the sake of convenience that PO2 Alteza brought the petitioner to the police sub-station because he was flagged down almost in front of that place. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody. The following instances when a warrantless search is allowed: 1. A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Search of evidence in plain view; 3. Search of a moving vehicle; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. A “stop and frisk” search 7. Exigent and emergency circumstance. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable in this case. The evidence seized, although alleged to be in advertently discovered, was no in plain view. It was concealed in a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. The evidence was not immediately apparent. Consent to a search must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search. Consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO2 Alteza, it does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. The petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searched and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the Constitutional rights of citizens. For the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible; the drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

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Warrantless Arrest, Case No. 2: Umil v. Ramos 187 SCRA 311, October 3, 1991 FACTS: RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM. Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in authority." The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a crim. case, who has been released on bail. As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day afterthe shooting incident. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. ISSUE: Whether the arrest of Dural without warrant is justified. HELD: Yes. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)

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Warrantless Arrest, Case No. 3: Rebellion v. People G.R No. 175700, July 5, 2010 FACTS: This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425 (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended). An information was filed charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On July 27, 2000, the Mayor’s Action Command (MAC) team of Mandaluyong witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to his companion Clarito Yanson. Suspecting that that the substance was “shabu,” team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted from their motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because of their arrival. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips of aluminium foil which the former confiscated. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Petitioner denied the charge against him. On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful since he was not committing any crime when he was arrested. On September 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification. The appellate court sustained the validity of the warrantless arrest of petitioner holding that the latter was caught by the MAC team in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of giving to Clarito a plastic sachet of shabu. Petitioner challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest by asserting that at the time he was apprehended, he was not committing or attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner argues that since his arrest was illegal, the eventual search on his person was also unlawful. Thus, the illicit items confiscated from him are inadmissible in evidence for being violative of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest is valid HELD: The Court finds the petitioner guilty of the crime charged. Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. Nowhere in the records did the Court find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he Page 161 of 411

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is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. Also, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made under any of the following circumstances: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. There is sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting team. He was caught by the police officers while he was in the act of handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of “shabu.” Thus, his case comes under the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged. Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority to search on the belongings of the offender and confiscate those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense.

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Warrantless Arrest, Case No. 4: Villamor and Banaobra v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017 FACTS: Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" and possessing a list of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash. Another information was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra with violation of the same law. Version of the Prosecution The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Domingo Tejerero (Tejerero), Provincial Director, Police Superintendent Francisco Peñaflor (PD Peñaflor), SPO4 Severino Malasa, Jr., and PO1 David Adrian Saraspi (PO1 Saraspi). On the same day, same time, PD Peñaflor received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at specifically Bonaobra's residence. The witnesses proceeded to the residence to confirm the report. Upon arrival at the target area, the team parked their service vehicle outside the compound fenced by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the goings on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money bets. When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00 in different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Version of the Defense On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to the latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Florencio inside their house. Villamor gave Bonaobra P2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra then went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the act ka!" Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more men entered the house and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then made to board the service vehicle and brought in for investigation at the police headquarters. On October 25, 2006, The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng." Petitioners are sentenced and the properties used as gambling paraphernalia are confiscated in favor of the state. On June 13, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. The CA brushed aside Bonaobra's argument that his right to due process was violated when he was convicted of a crime different from that with which he was charged. The CA held that the classification of a maintainer, manager, or operator includes a coordinator, controller or supervisor. With respect to Villamor, the CA gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers who were presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions. The CA held that Villamor's denials cannot prevail over the positive assertions of the police officers who caught him in the act of revising and counting bets. Page 163 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and under Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld. HELD: Yes, the decision is upheld. SC finds the Petition meritorious. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said right. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[13] "Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree." Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even without a warrant of arrest in the following instances: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established petitioners had just committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts that constitute the offense. All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

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Warrantless Arrest, Case No. 5: People v. Sy Chua G.R. No. 136066-67, February 4, 2003 FACTS: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Information. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up. Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the incident. Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car. Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken. The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court. ISSUES: Whether the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

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HELD: No. The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”. The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.

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Warrantless Arrest, Case No. 6: People v. Sucro G.R. 93239, March 18, 1991 FACTS: That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, acted as a pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to another and/or distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law have in his possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves to a customer. ISSUE: Whether there was an illegal arrest since there was no warrant of arrest issued to the defendant. HELD: Yes. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states: Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored. Since there was an offense committed in the presence of an officer, wherein he is seeing has seen or will see due to an attempt to commit a crime, the arresting officer may arrest an individual even without an arrest warrant.

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Warrantless Arrest, Case No. 6: People v. Gerente G.R No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993 FACTS: Edna Edwina Reyes testified that appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Appellant allegedly agreed: “Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya.” Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim’s head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. When arraigned the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. The trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder. ISSUE: Whether the Personal Knowledge of the policeman of the crime committed by the accused is justified and valid in arresting the latter without securing an arrest and search warrant. HELD: Yes, “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.” The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of Page 168 of 411

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the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on Gerente’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.” The frisk and search of appellant’s person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

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B.6 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 1: Salcedo-Ortanez v. Court of Appeals 235 SCRA 111, 1994 FACTS: Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.   ISSUE: 1. Whether the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence 2. Whether the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals   HELD: 1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus: Page 170 of 411

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Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . . Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. 2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 2: Zulueta v. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 699, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. HELD: No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 3: Ople v. Torres 293 SCRA 141, 1998 FACTS: The petitioner seek the attention of the court to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, Petitioner prays that the court invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy. ISSUE: Whether the implementation of AO No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy enshrined in the constitution. HELD: Yes, A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its recordkeeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.” 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 4: Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General, National Economic Development Authority 487 SCRA 623, 2006 FACTS: EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads: REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Petitioners in allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy. ISSUE: Whether EO 420 infringes the right to privacy? HELD: The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. The personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as "strictly confidential" under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the "right of the people to information on matters of public concern." Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as "strictly confidential" under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Furthermore, under sec. 5 of EO 420 provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected. Without a reliable ID system, government entities cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws and stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names and identities. Because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards, It does not show how EO 420 will violate the right to privacy. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 5: Lee v. Ilagan 738 SCRA 59, 2014 FACTS: Dr. Joy Margate Lee, petitioner, and Neri A. Ilagan were common law partners. Their relationship started in 2003 but ended in 2011 under disturbing circumstances. Sometime in July 2011, Ilagan visited Lee at her condominium, rested for a while, then afterwards left for his office. After reaching the same, he noticed that his digital camera was missing. Lee discovered a purported sex video of Ilagan and another woman in the camera. She confronted Ilagan regarding the sex video but which he denied and demanded Lee to return the same but to no avail. Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee's head against a wall during the confrontation. Lee thereby utilized said video in filing various complaints against Ilagan which are; (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262 ,otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted. The RTC found Ilagans petition meritorious hence it issued a Writ of Habeas Data. The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people;, the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition. ISSUE: Whether the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan. HELD: No. Lee's petition was granted. The writ of habeas data stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged Page 175 of 411

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in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. All that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends. Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court reversed the RTC Decision and dismissed the habeas data petition.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 6: Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong G.R. No. 82380, April 29, 1988 FACTS: Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and Ayer Productions (his movie production company) envisioned for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos approved the intended film production. However, Enrile would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. He advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, there should be no reference to him or any member of his family, or any matter related to them. Petitioners granted Enrile’s demand. On 23 February 1988, Enrile filed a Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the RTC of Makati, he alleged that the production of the mini-series is without consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. In response, McElroy filed a Motion to Dismiss TRO (preliminary injunction) contending that the mini-series would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. RTC issued a preliminary injunction to the movie-series. In response, petitioner Ayer Productions filed a Petition for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, a day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy also filed separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March 1988. The petitions were consolidated and private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer. Also, in the same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order on the first decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Whether there is a breach of privacy which the respondent is entitled to enjoy? HELD: No, there is none. It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone,” like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put, Page 177 of 411

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the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. A criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test" and “clear and present danger test”. The former principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation". The latter on the other hand, states that a clear and present danger must be shown in order to prohibit a citizen's First Amendment rights (freedom of speech). There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially private concern." "The Four Day Revolution" should limit itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private respondent.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 7: Alejano v. Cabuay G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005 FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings. ISSUE: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights. HELD: No, the SC does not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention Page 179 of 411

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officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 8: Pollo v. David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011 FACTS: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC. On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked “Confidential” and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain “Alan San Pascual” of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents marked “Confidential” are left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David. The letter requested the office of David to investigate the anomaly. Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.” The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters n connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice. ISSUE: Whether the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, valid and constitutional? HELD: Yes. The CSC noted the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latter’s consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of O’Connor v. Ortega as authority for the view that government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons which declared that the federal agency’s computer use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondent’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the employee’s office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope. Page 181 of 411

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 9: Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014 FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of a current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read. And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013, the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders. ISSUES: 22.The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional? 23.Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms. 24.Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using Page 182 of 411

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his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. 25.Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press. 26.Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 27.Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. 28.Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications? 29.Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel. 30.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who wilfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression. 31.Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional? 32.Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10175 constitutional? 33.Is Section 8 valid and constitutional? 34.Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional? 35.Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional? 36.Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional? 37.Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and constitutional? 38.Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional? 39.Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and constitutional? 40.Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional? 41.Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid and constitutional? 42.Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional? HELD: 20.No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemnable act. 21.Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily Page 183 of 411

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sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instil such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. 22.No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the evil purpose for which one uses the name that the law condemns. 23.No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The law punishes those who acquire or use identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section. 24.The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended. 25.The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for such higher penalty. 26.Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. 27.Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; Page 184 of 411

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(c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used here required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of actual malice. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 28.A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. 29.Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communication technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. 30.The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with the exception of the crimes of: Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c) (4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional. 31.Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. 32.Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. 33.Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. There was no undue Page 185 of 411

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deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by reasons of the issuance of such orders. 34.Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention. 35.Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. 36.Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. 37.Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial intervention but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. 38.Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court. 20. and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 10: Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014 FACTS: Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vide Suzara, both minors were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. While changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments and were uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan on her Facebook profile. Mylene Theza T. Escudero, a computer science teacher of STC, learned from her students that Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged into their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include Julia and Julienne: a.) drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar, and b.) wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. There were time where access to or the availability of the identified student’s photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user. STC’s Discipline-in-charge penalized the students by barring them from joining the commencement exercises. Angela’s mother Dr. Armenia M. Tan, filed a petition for injunction and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against STC, praying that STC be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises to which Rhonda Ave Vivares, Julia’s mother, joined as intervener. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) allowing students to attend the graduation ceremony. Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites. Thereafter, Vivares filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Data, arguing that the privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends only”. The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for habeas data stating that the Vivares, et al. failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of writ of habeas data. ISSUE: Whether there was an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy of the minors involved so as to warrant the issuance of writ of habeas data? HELD: No. STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights. Parties are bound by the rules governing academic requirements and standards of behavior prescribed by the educational institutions. Resort to court is available to the parties. It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. Page 187 of 411

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 11: Sps. Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 FACTS: On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaintfor Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners property;that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations; that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property;that respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction;and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy.Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance. In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners construction.They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders. ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy? HELD: Yes. The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities. “It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.” Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." Page 188 of 411

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The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy. In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.In Ople v. Torres,we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 12: Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to his dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. ISSUE: Whether the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. HELD: No. Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The law is clear and unambiguous. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. The instant petition is hereby DENIED. Cost against petitioner.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 13: Gaanan v. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 FACTS: Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). ISSUE: Whether an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between two parties using a telephone line. HELD: No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 14: Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to his dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. ISSUE: Whether the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. HELD: No. Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The law is clear and unambiguous. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. The instant petition is hereby DENIED. Cost against petitioner.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 15: Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008 FACTS: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between thenPresident Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? Held: No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

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Privacy of Communications and Correspondence and Writ of Habeas Data, Case No. 16: People v. Marti, G.R. No. 78109, January 18, 1991 FACTS: The appellant Andre Marti, together with his common-law wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) parcels of boxes alleged to contained books, cigars, and gloves for his friend Waltier Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland. The attendant, Anita Reyes, received their package and asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. The appellant refused and Anita Reyes no longer insists on examining the packages. It turned out that the package contains dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. An Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Trial court convicted him for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused appealed to the court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and seizures is violated when his parcels were opened without his permission. ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? HELD: No. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, on the cases cited by the SC, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Therefore, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Page 194 of 411

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B.7 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Freedom of Expression, Case No. 1: Chavez v. Gonzalez, 545 SCRA 441 (2008) FACTS: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between thenPresident Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? HELD: No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 2: Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 2014 and 723 SCRA 109 (2014) FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of a current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read. And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013, the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders. ISSUES: 43.The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional? 44.Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms. 45.Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. Page 196 of 411

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46.Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press. 47.Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 48.Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. 49.Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications? 50.Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel. 51.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who wilfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression. 52.Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional? 53.Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10175 constitutional? 54.Is Section 8 valid and constitutional? 55.Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional? 56.Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional? 57.Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional? 58.Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and constitutional? 59.Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional? 60.Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and constitutional? 61.Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional? 62.Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) valid and constitutional? 63.Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional? HELD: 39.No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemnable act. 40.Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what Page 197 of 411

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essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instil such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. 41.No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the evil purpose for which one uses the name that the law condemns. 42.No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The law punishes those who acquire or use identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section. 43.The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended. 44.The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for such higher penalty. 45.Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. 46.Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.There is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with Page 198 of 411

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the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used here required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of actual malice. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 47.A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. 48.Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communication technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. 49.The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with the exception of the crimes of: Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c) (4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional. 50.Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. 51.Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. 52.Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. There was no undue deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve on orders Page 199 of 411

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of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by reasons of the issuance of such orders. 53.Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention. 54.Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. 55.Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. 56.Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial intervention but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. 57.Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court. 20. and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 3: Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, 288 SCRA 447 (1998) FACTS: Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution: 1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992; 2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution; 3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution; 4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on Elections” of the Constitution; 5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the selfcorrecting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision. On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions. ISSUE: Whether RA 7056 is unconstitutional? HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of Page 201 of 411

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election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years. R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time”. R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years. The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows: a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election. b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 4: Social Weather Stations, Incorporated v. Commission on Elections, 357 SCRA 496 (2001) FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. ISSUE: Whether Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press. HELD: Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. Page 203 of 411

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 5: GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 734 SCRA 88 (2014) FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances. ISSUE: Whether Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press. HELD: Yes. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 6: Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015) FACTS: The diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURARH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by the diocese as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay” The Election Officer of Bacolod ordered the removal of the 2nd tarpaulin.Claiming it to be election propaganda, the COMELEC issued an order prompting for the removal of the tarpaulin for being oversized. The Diocese assailed the said order of the COMELEC for being violative of their constitutional right to freedom of expression and that it is a violation of the separation of the state and the church. The Diocese likewise assails that the tarpaulins are beyond the regulatory powers of the COMELEC regarding election materials since they are neither candidates nor belonging to any political party. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC order violate the constitutional right of the Diocese of Bacolod to freedom of speech and expression HELD: Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 7: 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-Utak) v. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 441 (2015) FACTS: On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides: SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is unlawful:x x xx (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof. (g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following: x x x x 5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not; 6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like. The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.

Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals. The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 130214, which denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615. ISSUE: Whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional. HELD: Yes. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life. Page 206 of 411

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FACTS:

Freedom of Expression, Case No. 8: Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 755 SCRA 124 (2015)

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. ISSUE: Whether Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press. HELD: Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 9: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010) FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon. ISSUE: Whether the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines? HELD: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly accepted. In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible ”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 10: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265 (2007) {Read Separate Opinion of C.J. Puno} FACTS: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency. Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional HELD: Yes, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads that the Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 11: Bayan v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 226 (2006) FACTS: Petitioners come in three groups. The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,[1] allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. ISSUE: Whether Pambansa No. 880 is unconstitutional. HELD: No. B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound "clear and present danger" standard. Page 210 of 411

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 12: Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, Jr., 613 SCRA 518 (2010) FACTS: The IBP, through its then National President Cadiz, filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. The Office of the Manila Mayor issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari. The Court denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of the case in the CA, and denied the motion for reconsideration. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the MPD earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. The MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. The appellate court ruled and found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate court went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are allowed without permit. Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Yes, the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. In KMP v Ermita, the Court reiterated that the “freedom of assembly” is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 13: Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty Entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,” 644 SCRA 543 (2011) FACTS: SC Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration. UP Law Faculty 37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work. Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. ISSUE: Whether the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Page 212 of 411

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HELD: Yes. The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 14: Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 FACTS: The diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURARH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by the diocese as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay” The Election Officer of Bacolod ordered the removal of the 2nd tarpaulin.Claiming it to be election propaganda, the COMELEC issued an order prompting for the removal of the tarpaulin for being oversized. The Diocese assailed the said order of the COMELEC for being violative of their constitutional right to freedom of expression and that it is a violation of the separation of the state and the church. The Diocese likewise assails that the tarpaulins are beyond the regulatory powers of the COMELEC regarding election materials since they are neither candidates nor belonging to any political party. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC order violate the constitutional right of the Diocese of Bacolod to freedom of speech and expression HELD: Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 15: Pita v. CA, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989 FACTS: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner. HELD: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, it is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that; 1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; Page 215 of 411

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2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;

Freedom of Expression, Case No. 16: Miriam College Foundation v. CA, GR 127930, December 15, 2000

FACTS: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants. ISSUE: Whether the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants. HELD: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.

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FACTS:

Freedom of Expression, Case No. 17: Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999

Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker. During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. At the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. A series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates they were published. Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the "organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns. 4 In a subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, private respondent refuted the matters contained in petitioner Borjal's columns and openly challenged him. ISSUES: 1. Whether there is libel 2. Whether the disputed articles constitute privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability HELD: 1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be Page 217 of 411

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shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity of the conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the subject articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself; when he supplied the information through his letter to the editor. 2. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks." Petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 18: Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008 FACTS: Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed four separate Informations against Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, JocelynBarlizo, and Philip Pichay, accusing them of libel in connection with the publication of articles in the column “Direct Hit” of the daily tabloid Remate. The column accused So of corruption, and portrayed him as anextortionist and smuggler. After trial, the RTC found Tulfo, et al. guilty of libel. The CA affirmed the decision. ISSUES: 1. Why was Borjal v. CA not applied to this case? 2. Whether the assailed articles are privileged. 3. Whether the assailed articles are fair commentaries. HELD: 1. Borjal was not applied to this case because: a. Borjal stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel, and was not a criminal case. b. The ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the complainant. c. The subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject is a public official. d. It was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjalwere “fair commentaries on matters of public interest.” 2. No. The columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official. a. Even with the knowledge that he might be in error, even knowing of the possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So’s name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing. b. Although falsity of the articles does not prove malice, the existence of press freedom must be done “consistent with good faith and reasonable care.” This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public. c. Tulfo had written and published the articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not. The test laid down is the “reckless disregard” test, and Tulfo failed to meet that test. d. Evidence of malice: The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting Atty. So after the commencement of an action. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice. 3. No. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before publication. a. The provided no details of the acts committed by the subject. They are plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. b. Not “fair” or “true” because “fair” is defined as “having the qualities of impartiality and honesty.” “True” is defined as “comfortable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest.” Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations Page 219 of 411

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were baseless. The articles are not “fair and true reports,” but merely wild accusations

Freedom of Expression, Case No. 19: In Re: Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008 FACTS: The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the "Business Circuit" column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles, containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, came out in four (4) issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007. ISSUE: Whether Amado P. Macasaet is guilty of indirect contempt of court. HELD: Yes. Free press is regarded as a key pillar of democracy. Reporters must be free to report, expose, and hold government officials and agencies - including an independent judiciary - accountable. Press attention surrounding the judiciary ensures public accountability. Such publicity acts as a check on judicial competence and integrity, exposes inefficiencies and irregularities, keeps vigil over various public interest cases, and puts pressure on responsible judicial officials. This freedom has been used and has benefited the cause of justice. The press has become an important actor - a judicial watchdog - in the ongoing judicial transformation. When properly validated, its acts are protected speech from an accepted function. Freedom, however, has not guaranteed quality journalism. The press has been vulnerable to a host of legitimate criticisms such as incompetence, commercialism, and even corruption. By disproportionately informing the public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated allegations about corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the public's faith in the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government. Respondent Macasaet's wanton disregard for the truth was exhibited by his apathetic manner of verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered for his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles concerning the alleged bribery of a Lady Justice. His bases for the amount of money, the number of boxes, the date of delivery of the boxes, among other important details, were, by his own admission founded on personal assumptions.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 20: Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008 FACTS: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between thenPresident Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? Held: No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 21: Separate opinion of Justice Mendoza in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed. ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation. Also, facial challenge to a statute is allowed only when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. Invalidation of the statute on its face, rather than as applied, is permitted in the interest of preventing a chilling effect on freedom of expression. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. Page 222 of 411

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 22: KMU v. Ermita, G.R. No. 178554, October 5, 2010 FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon. ISSUE: Whether the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines? HELD: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly accepted. In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible ”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 23: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010 FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon. ISSUE: Whether the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines? HELD: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly accepted. In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible ”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 24: Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969

FACTS:

RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through selfrestraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state. ISSUE: Whether RA 4880 unconstitutional. HELD: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly Page 225 of 411

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established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 25: SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. ISSUE: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional? HELD: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 26: Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak, G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985 FACTS: In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied ISSUE: Whether the rating made with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Both- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern. In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State. Given this constitutional mandate, it will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It Page 228 of 411

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cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

Freedom of Expression, Case No. 27: Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010 FACTS: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. ISSUE: Whether Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III? HELD: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 28: Secretary of Justice v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001 FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners’ request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage. ISSUE: Whether television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed. HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Page 230 of 411

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Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.

Freedom of Expression, Case No. 29: Notice of Resolution, In Re: Petition for Radio and TV Coverage of cases against Zaldy Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, October 23, 2012 FACTS: Almost a year after the Maguindanao Massacre, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe3 filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines5 (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag6 (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court. President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 20108 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out "in support of those who have petitioned to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed "earnest hope that will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation, attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits.” Hence, the present petitions assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. ISSUE: Whether the petitions may be granted. HELD: The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.24 and Estrada v. Desierto,25 that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As Page 231 of 411

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pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

Freedom of Expression, Case No. 30: Soriano v. MTRCB, G.R. No. 165636, April 29, 2009 FACTS: The petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, the host of the television program, Ang Dating Daan, made remarks that were found malicious. Two days, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo(INC), against petitioner in connection with the petitioner’s remarks. After the preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rulesand Regulations (IRR) of P.D. No. 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances in his television show, Ang Dating Daan. ISSUE: 1. Whether the utterance of the petitioner may be considered as a protected form of speech. 2. Whether the television program may be subjected to suspension. HELD: 1. Yes. The Court rules that the petitioner, in his utterance, cannot avail the constitutional protection of free speech. The language of the petitioner was categorized as indecent. The statements said by the petitioner were made in a medium accessible to the children. Under the clear and present danger doctrine, freedom of speech and of press susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect. 2. Yes. The language of the petitioner that was made accessible to the children may lead to failure of the government to protect and promote the welfare of the youth. The State is mandated under Section 13 of 1987 Constitution to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation-building

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 31: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007 FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,” assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. ISSUE: Whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR HELD: The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. “Generally accepted principles of international Page 233 of 411

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law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.

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Freedom of Expression, Case No. 32: Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, January 22, 2008 FACTS: Before September 5, 2005, the MDC had a policy of providing transportation outcounts for inmates wanting to terminate their pregnancies.   On that date, the MDC altered its policy, such that inmates would be transported for abortions only “[i]f [the] abortion is indicated due to threat to the mother's life or health, and if approved by the Medical Director in consultation with the Regional Medical Director.”   The MDC cited security concerns and cost savings motivating the change in policy.   Although treatments for other conditions and injuries may be classified as elective, the attending physician may override the general policy of denying elective medical outcounts and authorize the outcount by determining that the care is in fact medically necessary.   However, under the policy regarding abortions, the MDC determined “[o]utcounts for elective abortions will no longer be authorized.” Plaintiff Roe, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, challenged the legality of this MDC policy in federal district court.   The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Roe, reasoning that under the Turner four-part reasonableness test, the MDC policy was an unreasonable restriction on inmates' Fourteenth Amendment right to terminate a pregnancy.   Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942, 949-53 (W.D.Mo.2006).   The district court also found Roe's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, determining the desire for an elective abortion constitutes a serious medical need to which the MDC officials were deliberately indifferent. ISSUE: Whether the Missouri policy was unconstitutional. HELD: The Missouri policy was unconstitutional. It is evident that a woman exercising her fundamental right to choose to terminate her pregnancy requires medical care to effectuate that choice.   Denial of the required care will likely result in tangible harm to the inmate who wishes to terminate her pregnancy.   Characterization of the treatment necessary for the safe termination of an inmate's pregnancy as “elective” is of little or no consequence in the context of the Estelle “serious medical needs” formulation.   An elective, nontherapeutic abortion may nonetheless constitute a “serious medical need” where denial or undue delay in provision of the procedure will render the inmate's condition “irreparable.”

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B.8 FREEDOM OF RELIGION Freedom of Religion, Case No. 1: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32 (2010) FACTS: Ang Ladlad was a political organisation composed of members of the Filipino LGBT community. In 2006, in accordance with Filipino law, Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the Commission on Elections. The application was denied because the Commission on Elections found that the organisation lacked a substantial membership base. The group applied again in 2009, but the Commission on Elections again dismissed the application, this time on moral and religious grounds. The Commission on Elections found that Ang Ladlad, as an LGBT organisation, “tolerate[d] immorality which offends religious beliefs”. It cited the Bible and the Koran as proof that homosexual activity violated standards of morality, and held that it could only recognise law-abiding parties. The Commission believed that Ang Ladlad’s support of LGBT issues violated several statutes (including Articles 201, 695 and 1306 of the Civil Code of the Republic of the Philippines) that referred to concepts such as “morality,” “mores, good customs,” “public morals,” and “morals”. Additionally, the Commission believed that approving Ang Ladlad would violate the constitutional duty to “promote and protect [the youth’s] physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being”. ISSUE: Whether Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list. HELD: Yes. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted. Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list Page 236 of 411

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system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

Freedom of Religion, Case No. 2: Letter of Tony Valenciano on the Holding of Religious Rituals at the Basement of the QC Hall of Justice, 7 March 2017 FACTS: Valenciano wrote several letters to former Chief Justice Renato S. Puno, complaining about the holding of masses during lunch break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. He claimed that the religious icons placed there, the electric organ and other items related to the celebration of masses therein violated the separation of the constitutional provision on the separation of the Church and State. He also claimed, among others, that the choir rehearsals disturbed the other employees and that the other employees could no longer attend to their personal necessities as they cannot go to the lavatories which are located near the basement. ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the constitutional provision on the separation of the Church and State with the holding of masses during lunch break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. HELD: No. There was no violation. The present controversy did not involve a national or local law in conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. Valenciano was merely questioning the propriety of holding religious masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice. By allowing the holding of masses, the Court could not be said to have established Roman Catholicism as an official religion or to have endorsed the same. It also allowed other religious denominations to practice their religion within the courthouses. Thus, the holding of religious rituals at the Halls of Justice does not amount to a union of Church and State. While the Church and State are separate, the latter still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief system. Such is enshrined in our Constitution. Besides, allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State. In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation - a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the Page 237 of 411

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attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. There is in this case, merely an accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expresslly mandating that judicial employees attend the mass. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative and on their own free will. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lighting and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals being observed. Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel not has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of the faithful. Fifth, the allowance of religious masses has not prejudiced other religions.

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Freedom of Religion, Case No. 3: Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937 FACTS : In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing. The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium. ISSUE: Whether the stamp is constitutional HELD: Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church It appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The Page 239 of 411

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officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people. What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

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Freedom of Religion, Case No. 4: 4Perfecto v. Judge Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015 FACTS: In support of the charges, the complainant alleges that he filed a Petition to Cite for Contempt against one Dalmacio Grafil and a Ven S. Labro. The complainant laments that the case has since been gathering dust in the court of the respondent. He maintains that the respondent should be made administratively liable for her failure to act on the case within a reasonable period of time. On the second cause of action, the complainant claims that he is the publisher and Editor-in-Chief of the Catarman Weekly Tribune (CWT), the only accredited newspaper in Northern Samar. He claims that in Special Proceedings Nos. C-346 (for adoption and change of name) and C-352 (for adoption), the respondent directed the petitioners to have her orders published in a newspaper of national circulation. Through these directives, the complainant posits, the respondent betrayed her ignorance of the law, considering that all judicial notices and orders emanating from the courts of Catarman, Northern Samar should be published only in the CWT, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1079. The Court issued a Resolution re-docketing the case as a formal administrative complaint against the respondent. Respondent advises the Court that she is of the firm belief that the second cause of action for ignorance of the law (non-publication of court orders/notices in CWT) had already been passed upon by the Court (Third Division) in its Decision in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270. ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of ignorance of the law? HELD: Indeed, the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt, she betrayed her unbecoming lack of familiarity with basic procedural rules such as what was involved in the contempt proceedings before her court. She should have known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to move ex parte to have the case scheduled for preliminary conference, the court (through the branch clerk of court) has the duty to schedule the case for pre-trial in the event that the petitioners fail to file the motion. The respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of movement in the case to her staff who, she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding judge, she should account for the anomaly that since the respondents filed their answer, the petition for contempt had been gathering dust or had not moved in the respondent's court. Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards of competence and legal proficiency expected of magistrates of the law in her handling of the petition for Page 241 of 411

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contempt. As in Magpali v. Pardo, she should be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is found LIABLE for gross ignorance of the law. Freedom of Religion, Case No. 5: Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974 FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow “Membership union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by this agreement.” RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows “ but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization” Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee. ISSUE: Whether RA 3350 is unconstitutional. HELD: The constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act – to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.

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Freedom of Religion, Case No. 6: Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993 FACTS: The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students who were expelled from their classes by public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and Department Order No. 8 of the DepEd. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion” which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control ISSUE: Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge. HELD: No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).

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Freedom of Religion, Case No. 7: Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City, A.M. NO. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005 FACTS: In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges: 1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan; 2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year. Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to hold office from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan. However, he expressed some misgivings about the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year. ISSUE: Whether the requests may be granted. HELD: The Court resolved to: 1. GRANT the request to allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 291, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 322; and 2. DENY for lack of legal basis the request that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year. Section 5, Article III of the Constitution provides that, “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.” This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause) embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that, “The right to religious profession and worship Page 244 of 411

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has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.” Freedom to Believe - The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul – in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes. Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs - But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law. The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year. On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. Underlying Section 5,8 Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is the interest of the general public to be assured of continuous government service during office hours every Monday through Friday. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week. To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules for each month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar treatment. The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the Page 245 of 411

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courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.

Freedom of Religion, Case No. 8: Garces v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981 FACTS: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed: a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated. ISSUE: Whether any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated. HELD: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding Page 246 of 411

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separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

Freedom of Religion, Case No. 9: Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 434 Mass. 141, May 16, 2001 FACTS: May the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (church) build a steeple atop its new temple on the highest hill of Belmont where the proposed steeple would rise higher than the dimensional requirements of the applicable Belmont zoning bylaw.   The board of appeals of Belmont (board) said yes, but its decision was annulled by a judge in the Superior Court.   The church appealed. The church's planned temple in Belmont complied with all zoning bylaws but for the height of its proposed steeple:  the steeple would rise eighty-three feet above the roof of the temple, while under the applicable Belmont bylaw the church had a permitted right to build a steeple (projection) of eleven feet, two inches.   Beginning in May, 1996, and continuing over many months, the board held numerous public hearings on the church's application.   On April 28, 1997, the board granted the requested relief.   The board noted that the Dover Amendment requires a degree of accommodation between protected uses and matters of critical municipal concern.   It found that there is “no grave municipal concern in controlling steeple height on churches,” and that it was “hardly accommodating to a protected use to limit the Church to a 12 foot projection.”  The board concluded that the steeple height requested by the church was reasonable “as a Dover type regulation of height.”   The board also concluded that the “benefits” provided by the church outweigh the burdens that could result from the steeple height, and that the height of the steeple requested by the church was reasonable “as a special permit matter.”  The plaintiffs brought an action in the Superior Court challenging the board's decision pursuant to the Zoning Act, G.L. c. 40A, § 17. ISSUE: Whether the temple violated Belmont bylaws. HELD: The height restriction imposed on uninhabited “projections” under § 4.2.2 of the Belmont bylaws may not reasonably be imposed on the church because of the Dover Amendment. The Dover Amendment precludes the adoption of zoning ordinances or bylaws restricting the use of land for religious (and other exempt) purposes, G.L. c. 40A, § 3, second par., but authorizes “reasonable regulation[ ]” of bulk, height, yard size,  lot area, setbacks, open space, and parking requirements.   The amendment “seeks to strike a balance between preventing local discrimination against [a religious] use ․ and honoring legitimate municipal concerns that typically find expression in local zoning laws” (citation omitted).  Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, 415 Mass. 753, 757, 616 N.E.2d 433 (1993).   Local zoning requirements are meant to be applied uniformly.   Consequently, “local officials may not grant blanket exemptions from the requirements to protected uses.”  Campbell v. City Council of Lynn, 415 Mass. 772, 778, 616 N.E.2d 445 (1993).   But they may decide that zoning requirements concerning height and dimension should not be applied to a proposed religious use where it would unreasonably impede the protected use without appreciably advancing critical municipal goals. See Trustees of Tufts College v. Medford, supra at 757761, 616 N.E.2d 433.

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No evidence to the contrary that no municipal concern was served by controlling the steeple height of churches.   It concluded that the height exemption requested by the church was reasonable in light of the function of a steeple, and the importance of proportionality of steeple height to building height.   A rigid application of Belmont's height restrictions for uninhabited “projections” would impair the character of the temple without advancing any municipal concern.

Freedom of Religion, Case No. 10: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, May 20, 1940

FACTS: The petitioners, Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, are members of the religion Jehovah’s Witness. They were arrested in New Haven, Connecticut, and were convicted for the third and fifth count. Section 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut states that: No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the organization whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the county in which such person or organization is located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council. The facts adduced to sustain the convictions on the third count follow. 1. The appellants went from house to house in New Haven equipped with a bag containing books and pamphlets on religious subjects, a portable phonograph, and a set of records, all of which were used to proclaim their religion, Jehovah’s Witness. 2. They asked the people they would interview if they could play their record. If permission was granted, he asked the person to buy the book described, and, upon refusal, he solicited such contribution towards the publication of the pamphlets, as the listener was willing to make. If a contribution was received, a pamphlet was delivered upon condition that it would be read. 3. 90% of the residents in the neighborhood are Roman Catholics. The phonograph record was entitled “Enemies” included an attack on the Catholic religion. The facts adduced to sustain the conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count. 1. Jesse Cantwell stopped two men in the street, asked, and received, permission to play a phonograph record. He played the record “Enemies”, which contained lyrics that attacked the Catholic religion, the religion of the two men. 2. Enraged by the contents of the record, they were tempted to strike Cantwell unless he went away. On being asked to leave, Jesse Cantwell left. There was no evidence that he was personally offensive or entered into any argument with those he interviewed. ISSUE: Page 248 of 411

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1. Whether or not Section 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut is invalid and unconstitutional for violating the freedom of religion. 2. Whether or not the defendant’s conviction of the common law offense of breach of the peace violated the constitutional guarantees of religious liberty and freedom of speech. HELD: 1. Yes. In this case, the statute deprives the appellants of their liberty without due process of law. The statute does not impose a mere ministerial duty on the secretary of the welfare council, but a discretionary one. 2. Yes. The conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count must be set aside. The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts, but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. Having these considerations in mind, we note that Jesse Cantwell had a right to be where he was and had a right to peacefully impart his views to others. There is no showing that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive. He requested of two pedestrians permission to play to them a phonograph record. The permission was granted. It is not claimed that he intended to insult or affront the hearers by playing the record. It is plain that he wished only to interest them in his propaganda. The sound of the phonograph is not shown to have disturbed residents of the street, to have drawn a crowd, or to have impeded traffic. Thus far, he had invaded no right or interest of the public, or of the men accosted.

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Freedom of Religion, Case No. 11: Iglesiani Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996 FACTS: Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program HELD: Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened Page 250 of 411

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harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies

Freedom of Religion, Case No. 12: Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS:

The diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURARH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by the diocese as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay” The Election Officer of Bacolod ordered the removal of the 2nd tarpaulin.Claiming it to be election propaganda, the COMELEC issued an order prompting for the removal of the tarpaulin for being oversized. The Diocese assailed the said order of the COMELEC for being violative of their constitutional right to freedom of expression and that it is a violation of the separation of the state and the church. The Diocese likewise assails that the tarpaulins are beyond the regulatory powers of the COMELEC regarding election materials since they are neither candidates nor belonging to any political party. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC order violate the constitutional right of the Diocese of Bacolod to freedom of speech and expression HELD: Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech. Page 251 of 411

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Freedom of Religion, Case No. 13 Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. ISSUE: Whether the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement. HELD: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the Page 252 of 411

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legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

FACTS:

Freedom of Religion, Case No. 14: Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015

Petitioner was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational institution, as non-teaching personnel. Petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the petitioner's pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school. In a letter dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the termination of employment. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal ISSUES: Whether pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her employment. HELD: No. The fact of the petitioner's pregnancy out enough to characterize the petitioner's conduct must be substantial evidence to establish that consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are immoral

of wedlock, without more, is not as disgraceful or immoral. There pre-marital sexual relations and, indeed considered disgraceful or

The totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct alleged to be disgraceful or immoral must be assessed against the prevailing norms of conduct. Consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and respectable. The right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the Constitution. When the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against "disgraceful or immoral conduct" under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality. Page 253 of 411

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Freedom of Religion, Case No. 15: Dominador Taruc v. Bishop Dela Cruz, GR. No. 044801, March 10, 2005 FACTS: The antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt. On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction HELD: The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. The SC agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, Page 254 of 411

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custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts

B.9 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement, Case 1: Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator v. Macarine, 677 SCRA 1 (2012) FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed the present administrative case against Judge Ignacio B. Macarine (respondent) for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-20031 dated May 20, 2003. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign travels of judges and court personnel, regardless of the number of days, must be with prior permission from the Court. A travel authority must be secured from the OCA Judges must submit the following requirements: (1.) application or letter-request addressed to the Court Administrator stating the purpose of the travel abroad; (2.) application for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably recommended by the Executive Judge; and (3.) certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office, OCA as to the condition of the docket. The complete requirements should be submitted to and received by the OCA at least two weeks before the intended time of travel. No action shall be taken on requests for travel authority with incomplete requirements. Judges and personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the OCA shall be subject to disciplinary action. On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. HELD: Yes. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no Page 255 of 411

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means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates to ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.

Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement, Case 2: Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989) FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. ISSUE: Whether the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. HELD: Yes. The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking Page 256 of 411

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preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return. Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement, Case 3: Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners filed before the court a petition for declaratory judgment with application for temporary restraining order and injunction. It seeks the declaration of nullification of administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act) which was enacted in 1957. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Dept. Order no. 215 declaring the Manila Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities. Petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along NLEX, SLEX, Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) toll Expressway under DO 215. RTC, after due hearing, granted the petitioner’s application for preliminary injunction conditioned upon petitioner’s filing of cash bond in the amount of P100, 000 which petitioners complied. DPWH issued an order (DO 123) allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways). Upon assumption of Hon. Presiding Judge Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to file their Memoranda. The court issued an order dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. RTC ruled that DO 74 is valid but DO 123 is invalid being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution ISSUE: 1. Whether RTC’s decision is barred by res judicata? 2. Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulation contravene RA 2000. 3. Whether AO 1 is unconstitutional. Page 257 of 411

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HELD: 1. No. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues. The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a provisional remedy. 2. Yes. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation issued under them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways. They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or central dividing sections. They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways and not to determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”. The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. 3. No. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public Works and Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act 2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to the DOTC. Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The Administrative Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of their right to use the facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within those limited-access facilities. The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway. Petitioners were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a subject that could validly be limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was heavily regulated. Page 258 of 411

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Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement, Case 4: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988 FACTS: Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. ISSUE: Whether D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power. HELD: “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace. “The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,” but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. Page 259 of 411

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The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement, Case 5: Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006 FACTS: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate. ISSUE: 1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? 2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise? 3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005? HELD: 1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly Page 260 of 411

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diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government. 3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006)

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Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement, Case 6: Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018 FACTS Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon. Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent. However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. ` While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee “in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;” that such directive was “in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command;” and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x” Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then. On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. Page 262 of 411

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Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive. The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. ISSUE Whether E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional? HELD: The Petition is dismissed. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-inchief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and Page 263 of 411

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speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under “house arrest” by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting: “… to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.” As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldier’s speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldier’s ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-inchief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, “all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP],” and points out that he is no longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

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B.10 RIGHT TO INFORMATION Right to Information, Case 1: Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744 (1998) FACTS: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding. ISSUES: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against respondents’ argument that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements are not yet effective and binding. HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten Page 265 of 411

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wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.

Right to Information, Case 2: Re: Request for Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth [SALN] and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justice of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary, 672SCRA 27 (2012) FACTS: In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials. In her Letter, dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher- writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose. Several other letters were submitted for public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary. ISSUE: Whether public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary be granted. HELD: Yes. The right to information, with its companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the people’s right to know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. In this Page 266 of 411

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regard, Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation and prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of government officials and employees. The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents stems from the inherent power of the Court, as custodian of these personal documents, to control its very office to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented; and that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured The Court finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion. The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

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Right to Information, Case 3: IDEALs v. PSALM, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012 FACTS: PSALM is a GOCC mandated by RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 or the EPIRA Law) to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corp. (NPC) over a 25-year period. In the discharge of its said duties, PSALM held a public bidding for the sale of AHEPP, a 246-MW hydroelectric power plant. After evaluating the submitted bids, PSALM awarded the sale to K-Water, a Korean company. But even before K-Water was given the Notice of Award, IDEALS had been sending letters to PSALM to request for copies of documents pertaining to the sale. The first letter requested for copies of the Terms of Reference and proposed bids submitted by the bidders. There was no response because at the time no bids have been submitted yet. Besides, updates about the ongoing bidding were posted on the PSALM website anyway. The second letter requested for information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person, office address, and Philippine registration. Despite press releases announcing K-Water as the winning bidder, PSALM failed to sufficiently provide the petitioners with the information they were asking for, almost as if PSALM officials were trying to hide something. ISSUE: Whether PSALM violated the Constitution in withholding documents of public interest. HELD: Yes. In failing to provide the petitioners with the information they were asking for on their second letter, PSALM violated Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,which provides for the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. The Court ruled that people's right to information is intertwined wth the government's constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, pursuant to Section 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which states a policy of full public disclosure. Both of these provisions are also essential to hold public officials accountable for their actions. An informed citizenry, said the Court, is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. The Court made it clear that the public is entitled to information even on on-going negotiations before a final contract, subject to the following exceptions: privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and similar matters relating to national security and public order. In addition, the Court highlighted the difference between duty to disclose information and duty to access information on matters of public concern. The duty to disclose information is mandatory under the Constitution, but it only covers transactions involving public interest. In the absence of an enabling law for Section 28, Art. II (e.g., Freedom of Information Act, which has been languishing in the congress for more than 20 years), postings in public bulletin boards and government websites will suffice. Page 268 of 411

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The duty to access information, on the other hand, requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of a particular agency. It has a broader scope of information, covering not only transactions of public interest, but also matters contained in official communications and public documents of any government agency. Because of this ruling, PSALM was compelled by the Court to provide all the documents the petitioners were requesting for.

Right to Information, Case 4: Rappler, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 222702, April 5, 2016

FACTS: Rappler, Inc. signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sponsor the Presidential and Vice-Presidential debates. Alleging that it is being discriminated particularly as regards the MOA provisions on live audio broadcast via online streaming, Rappler argues that the MOA grants radio stations the right to simultaneously broadcast live the audio of the debates, even if the radio stations are not obliged to perform any obligation under the MOA. However, the right to broadcast by online live streaming the audio of the debates is denied to the petitioner and other online media entities which also have the capacity to live stream the audio of the debates. Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC Chairman Andres Bautista to nullify MOA provisions on the ground of violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the right to live stream the debates. HELD: Yes, Rappler has the right to live stream the debates because the exercise to do so is its contractual right under the MOA. Under the MOA, as long as it complies with the copyright conditions for the debates, it can live stream the debates. The MOA recognizes the right of other mass media entities, not parties to the MOA, to reproduce the debates subject to the same copyright conditions. The freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio can no longer be infringed or subject to prior restraint. Such freedom of the press to report and disseminate the live audio of the debates is now protected and guaranteed under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that, “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom…of the press.” The petition was partially granted. The COMELEC Chairman was directed to allow the debates to be shown or live streamed unaltered on the petitioner’s website subject to the copyright condition that the source is clearly indicated.

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Right to Information, Case 5: Sereno v. Committee on Tariff and Related Matters of the NEDA, G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016 FACTS: Petitioner wanted to compel respondent (CTRM) to provide him a copy of the minutes of its May 23, 2005 meeting; as well as to provide copies of all official records, documents, papers and government research data under hisConstitutional right of access to information on matters of public concern The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee's composition and the nature of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. The attitude of the CTRM prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring the petition for mandamus in the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and to grant access to the minutes. ISSUE: Whether the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure. HELD: No. The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State's policy of full public disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. In a democratic society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be possible only if the people are provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But the people's right to information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, the constitutional guarantee to information "does not open every door to any and all information." It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Page 270 of 411

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Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

Right to Information, Case 6: Pesigan v. Angeles, G.R. No. L-6427, April 30, 1984 FACTS: Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in the evening of April 2,1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur to Padre Garcia, Batangas. With them are: a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, a permit to transport large cattle, and three certificates of inspection– one from the Constabulary command, one from the Bureau of Animal Industry and one from the mayor of Sipocot. In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was based on the Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed to deserving farmers through dispersalas the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." ISSUE: Whether Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A, which provides for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, may be enforced before publication in the Official Gazette. HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby

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Right to Information, Case 7: Hidalgo v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910, April 15, 2005 FACTS: The complainants, through counsel, filed a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abudanti Cautela6 dated September 24, 2001 identifying themselves as among the major creditors in the inventory prepared by the appointed administratrix, and prayed that the Branch Clerk of Court be required to furnish the petitioners, through their counsel, copies of all the processes and orders issued by the court, and to require the administratrix to serve copies of all the proceedings to their counsel. Pending the resolution of this motion, the complainants also filed urgent pleadings bringing to the attention of the respondent Judge her procedural lapses. However, the respondent Judge issued an Order dated January 2, 2002 refusing to recognize the complainants as interested parties entitled to participate and intervene in the proceedings. This compelled the complainants to file a motion for reconsideration of the said order, which was, likewise, denied by the respondent Judge. ISSUE: Whether access to the judicial records should be granted. HELD: Yes. The presumption that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records attaches to those documents which properly come before the court in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding and which are relevant to the adjudication. Hence, relevant documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the presumption of public access applies. The policy reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings include the public's right to monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby ensuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal system. Such policy reasons apply to the grant of public access to civil cases as well. The importance of access to public records, court records more particularly, was explained in Lantaco, Sr. v. Llamas, where the respondent Judge therein refused to furnish the complainants a copy of his decision. According to the Court, the importance of this right to access to court records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern in which the public has a legitimate interest. It was further explained that while the public officers in custody of control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which such records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit such access, inspection, examination or copying. Page 272 of 411

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Right to Information, Case 8: Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008 FACTS: On September 26, 2007, Neri appeared before the respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was probed further on PGMA’s and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were: 1. Whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project. 2. Whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it. 3. Whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it. The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUE: Whether there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system? HELD: Yes, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution. The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case. In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on a specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked. If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized. Page 273 of 411

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Right to Information, Case 9: AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 FACTS: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).” JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO. The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns. ISSUE: Whether the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto. HELD: Petitioner’s demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents claim of executive privilege being valid. Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners against the application of the ruling therein to the present case have not persuaded the Court. Moreover, petitioners both private citizens and members of the House of Representatives have failed to present a sufficient showing of need to overcome the claim of privilege in this case. That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents Comment to the present petition, and not during the hearings of the House Special Committee on Globalization, is of Page 274 of 411

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no moment, since it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the Executive branch. For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate v. Ermita that executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by order of the President.

Right to Information, Case 10: Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007 FACTS: In his capacity as taxpayer, Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directly for, among other things, access to all documents and information relating to the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (the “Project”), including its underlying Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government body, and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) ( pg. 1-3). With Congress having approved the Project as a boost to infrastructure through its development of low-cost housing projects, a private sector joint venture scheme was pursued in accordance with the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law whereby “the contractor undertakes the construction . . . [for] the government agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay the contractor its total investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of return” (pg. 5-10). After multiple design changes, cost overruns, and corresponding amendments to the JVA, the Project was ultimately suspended, and RBI made demands for payment. A few years later, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council initiated a bidding process for the work remaining on the Project, and the NHA reached a settlement with RBI to terminate the original JVA (pg.39-47). Raising constitutional issues and asserting his right to all information related to the Project, Mr. Chavez filed a petition directly with the Court. ISSUE: Whether the NHA must be compelled to disclose all information related to the Project. HELD: The Court ruled that relief must be granted because the right of the people to information on matters of public concern is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution (pg. 86). Specifically, Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution, taken together as “twin provisions,” adopt a policy of full public disclosure on all transactions involving public interest and acknowledge the people’s right to information. Case law further elucidates these constitutional tenets by stating that “an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people . . . These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights” (pg. 86-87). In defining the limits of these freedoms, the Court noted that such information requests must pertain to definite propositions of the government and that information might be shielded by applicable privileges (e.g. military secrets and information relating to national security) (pg. 88-90). Finally, the Court recognized that because no enabling law exists providing government agencies with the procedural mechanics to disclose such information, the NHA cannot be faulted for an inability to disclose. Page 275 of 411

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Nevertheless, where a duty to disclose does not exist, there still may exist a duty to permit access, and so the Court ordered the NHA to permit access to all information related to the Project (pg. 89-90).

B.11 RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY

FACTS:

Right to Assembly, Case 1: Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983

Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it “to ensure a peaceful march and rally.” Petitioner filed suit for mandamus unaware that permit was denied, because it was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusal of permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for. ISSUE: Whether the denial of permit for the conduct peaceable assembly to the gates of U.S. Embassy may be validly enforced. HELD: No. The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.”. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard. There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the judgment must be confined within the limits of previous decisions. The law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide, So it has been here. While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made. Page 276 of 411

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By way of a summary the applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.

Right to Assembly, Case 2: Evangelista v. Earnshaw, G.R. No. 36453, September 28, 1932 FACTS: This is an action of mandamus brought against the defendant mayor of the City of Manila. The plaintiff alleges tljat he is'the president of the Communist Party in the Philippine Islands, a political group seeking the speedy granting of independence in these Islands and the redemption of the proletariat, numbering over 300,000 men and women in its ranks; that on the 2d of March, 1931, by means of a letter to the defendant mayor of the city, the plaintiff requested the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones in that city, on the afternoon of March 12, 1931, to be followed by a parade through the streets of Juan Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal, Echague, and General Solano in order to deliver to the GovernorGeneral a message from the laboring class; that on the 3d of March, 1931, the mayor of the city denied the plaintiff's petition, instructing his subaltern, the chief of police, to prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist Party throughout the city, because he had revoked their permits and licenses; that consequently, the Communist Party has not been able to hold any private or public meetings in the city since the 6th day of March, 1931; that in refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party within the city, the defendant deprived the Communist Party of a constitutional right. The plaintiff further prays "that a writ of mandamus be issued against the herein defendant compelling him to issue a permit for the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist Party in Manila." The defendant in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of the above-mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal association, or organization, which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of the proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws. ISSUE: Whether the requested permission should have been granted. HELD: No. Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident that he cannot expect that the defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold meetings or parades in the manner herein described. Furthermore, it may be Page 277 of 411

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noted that the complaint of the case is written merely in general terms and calls only for a judicial declaration upon a question which is not at present an issue between the parties to this case. But be that as it may, it must be considered that the respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government," did only the right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as was done, the permit previously issued by him to said Communist Party, in accordance with the power granted him by law-"To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditionsupon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest." (Act No. 2774, sec. 4, amending sec. 2434, par. [m], Administrative Code.) Instead of being condemned or criticised, the respondent mayor should be praised and commended for having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter could do more damage by its revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and utterances of its members.

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Right to Assembly, Case 3: Bayan Karapatan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners come in three groups. The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,[1] allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries. The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. ISSUE: Whether Pambansa No. 880 is unconstitutional. Page 279 of 411

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HELD: No. B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound "clear and present danger" standard. Right to Assembly, Case 4: IBP v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010 FACTS: The IBP, through its then National President Cadiz, filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. The Office of the Manila Mayor issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari. The Court denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of the case in the CA, and denied the motion for reconsideration. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the MPD earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. The MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. The appellate court ruled and found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate court went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are allowed without permit. Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Yes, the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. The respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. In KMP v Ermita, the Court reiterated that the “freedom of assembly” is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole Page 280 of 411

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justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

FACTS:

Right to Assembly, Case 5: Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015

Petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD) is a government-owned and controlled corporation in Davao City. The private respondents (Aranjuez, et al.) are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several administrative cases due to acts committed during the anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore employees' grievances. Members and officers of NAMADACWAD have been staging pickets in front of the DCWD Office during their lunch breaks to air their grievances about the nonpayment of their Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) incentives and their opposition to DCWD's privatization and proposed One Hundred Million Peso Loan. GM Gamboa issued an Office Memorandum addressed to all department managers concerning the different activities that would take place during DCWD's then upcoming anniversary celebration... the officers and members of NAMADACWAD held an Emergency General Assembly and they agreed to wear NAMADACWAD tshirts with inscriptions stating, "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!" on the day of the anniversary As a consequence of their actions, GM Gamboa sent a Memorandum... requiring them to explain the reasons for the attire they wore... the officers and members explained that the Memorandum only required the employees to wear any sports attire, though theirs were with additional inscriptions containing grievances. They countered that the inscriptions were but manifestations of their constitutional rights of free speech and freedom of expression. ISSUE: Whether the appeal of Aranjuez, et al., should have been dismissed by the CSC for non-compliance with Section 46 of CSC Resolu HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition

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DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was done within government office hours, such act was not permissible. Notably, however, a prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 021316 but in Sec. 5 Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action. - As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase "prohibited concerted activity or mass action" shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by... themselves or through their employees organizations, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government. Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited. It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa "to be there" at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.[40] This, then, being the fact, we have to rule against the findings of both the CSC and Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. More importantly we need to refer to GSIS v. Villaviza (GSIS case).[41] It was there ruled that the acts of GSIS employees wearing similarly colored shirts while attending a public hearing inside the GSIS Office, with clenching of fists and orating... against the then President Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a prohibited activity but were only an exercise of their constitutional freedom of expression It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment. A citizen who accepts public employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a... contract for public employment. It is the Court's responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.

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A. 12 RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION Right of Association, Case 1: In Re: Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, 84 SCRA 556 (1978) FACTS: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void. ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent. HELD: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

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Right of Association, Case 2: GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawasa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006 FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events. CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. ISSUE: Whether the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid. HELD: No. The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted activities, including the right to Page 284 of 411

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strike in accordance with law.”. It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security. As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent’s members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase “prohibited concerted activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity. In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring noncrippling activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work Page 285 of 411

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stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel. To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction. Right of Association, Case 3: Samahan ng Manggagawasa Hanjin Shipyard v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 211145, October 14, 2015 FACTS: A certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation with ‘No Union’ winning [NFL lost]. Later however, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment and then affiliatedwith the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU). (SMP-PIILU) wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Permex Producer and was granted. They then entered into a CBA. A year later, NFL filed gain for a petition for certification election but was dismissed. Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees constituting themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force requests the employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two things. First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees’ claim the employer may voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it. The formal written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to represent the employees may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees’ representative or a certification election may be held. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that SAMAHAN cannot form a workers' association of employees in Hanjin and instead should have formed a union, hence their registration as a workers' association should be cancelled. HELD Challenged decision AFFIRMED. The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja is particularly apropos: “. . . Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees — Page 286 of 411

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A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees’ prerogative (not the employer’s) to determine whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be.” In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did not have the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective bargaining. It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself.

B. 13 NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS Non-Impairment of Contracts, Case 1: Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Assoc. v. DILG Secretary, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003 FACTS: On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party. From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan. Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax. ISSUE: Whether there is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between the Philippine and the US Governments? HELD: No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but Page 287 of 411

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the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties. The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein.

Non-Impairment of Contracts, Case 2: Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corp. v. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 178768, November 25, 2009 FACTS: Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers with recreational areas. In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks, the principal amount of which amounted to Six Hundred Forty Million Two Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Four Pesos (P640,225,324.00). In the beginning, PALI's business did very well. However, it started encountering problems when the Philippine Stock Exchange rejected the listing of its shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad signal to the real estate market. This resulted in potential investors and real estate buyers shying away from the business venture. The situation was aggravated by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the decline of the real estate market. Consequently, PALI was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations, both current and those that were about to fall due. One of its creditors, the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), later substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure proceedings on PALI's mortgaged properties. Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed rehabilitation plan and three (3) nominees for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. On September 17, 2004, after finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued a Stay Order and appointed Patrick V. Caoile as rehabilitation receiver. On December 13, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision approving PALI's petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation. Finding the terms of the rehabilitation plan and the qualifications of the appointed rehabilitation receiver unacceptable, EIB filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The rehabilitation plan is contested on the ground that the same is unreasonable and results in the impairment of the obligations of contract. PWRDC contests the following stipulations in PALI's rehabilitation plan: fifty percent (50%) reduction of the principal obligation; condonation of the accrued and substantial interests and penalty charges; repayment over a period of ten years, with minimal interest of two percent (2%) for the first five years and five percent (5%) for the next five years until fully paid, and only upon availability of cash flow for debt service. Page 288 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the non-impairment clause. HELD: No. Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, "rehabilitation" is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. The court finds nothing onerous in the terms of PALI's rehabilitation plan. The Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides for means of execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include, among others, the conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to equity, restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest. The restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation. Moreover, per findings of fact of the RTC and as affirmed by the CA, the restructuring of the debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the interest of PWRDC as a secured creditor. Enlightening is the observation of the CA in this regard, viz.:

There is nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50% reduction of the principal amount when, as found by the court a quo, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquired the credits of PALI from its creditors at deep discounts of as much as 85%. Meaning, PALI's creditors accepted only 15% of their credit's value. Stated otherwise, if PALI's creditors are in a position to accept 15% of their credit's value, with more reason that they should be able to accept 50% thereof as full settlement by their debtor. There is no merit in PWRDC's contention that there is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the general public. Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors, employees, and the economy in general. The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once Page 289 of 411

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approved, is binding upon the debtor and all persons who may be affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not such persons have participated in the proceedings or have opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have been scheduled.

Non-Impairment of Contracts, Case 3: Sangalang v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988 FACTS: The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use. HELD: No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated. Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a “[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

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Non-Impairment of Contracts, Case 4: PNB v. Remigio, G.R. No. 78508, March 21, 1994 FACTS: Remigio obtained from PNB P65,000 loan secured by a real estate mortgage covering 5 parcels of land in Isabela. On November 17, 1970 Remigio defaulted hence PNB extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage and acquired the encumbered assets for P87,082. However the sheriff’s sale was only registered with the register of deeds on October 11, 1972, two years after the said sale. Petitioner bank invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property for P87,082.00 plus interest and other charges. Before that, one day after the foreclosure sale, private respondent already had paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property and made additional payments amounting to a total of P40,000.00. On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree (“P.D.”) No. 27 was enacted into law that mandated an agrarian reform. Pursuant thereto, an “Operation Land Transfer Program” was launched; among the areas it covered were 3 parcels of land to be repurchased by Remigio. On 17 April 1974, private respondent offered to buy the foreclosed property for P284,000.00 which was the market and appraised value thereof fixed by petitioner bank. On 24 December 1974, the Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between petitioner bank and private respondent. Remigio inquired why he was still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00 when he already paid P40,000 of the P87,082 previously offered for its redemption. As of 02 November 1977, private respondent had paid petitioner the total sum of P207,243.85 Private respondent filed an action for “Annulment of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of Money and Damages” at the CFI of Isabela. After trial, the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner bank, declaring respondent as having lost his right to foreclose the property and ratifying the contract to sell. The CA reversed and held that the land should be turned over in favor of Land Bank to fulfill the agrarian reform under P.D. No. 27. ISSUE: Whether application of PD 27 in the case at bar would be a violation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution HELD: No. This Court, in a number of cases has expressed the dictum that police power subordinates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Although P.D. No. 27 had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. There is no question, however, that the land reform Page 291 of 411

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program of the government under P.D. No. 27), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of the state. It is settled that the one limitation on the contract clause arises from the police power; the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights. The situation here, is like that in eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public use, and the only condition to be complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public use. As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation. (Opinion of Secretary of Justice which the Court agreed to and gave respect).

Non-Impairment of Contracts, Case 5: Kuwait Airline Corporation v. PAL, G.R. No. 156087, May 8, 2009 FACTS: 1935 – Philippine Airlines is the grantee of a legislative franchise authorizing it to provide domestic and international air services. Its initial franchise was granted in 1935 through Act No. 4271. 1952 – Republic Act (R.A.) No. 776, or the Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines, which grants the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has the power to regulate the economic aspect of air transportation, [its] general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control over, air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise.” R.A. No. 776 also mandates that the CAB “shall take into consideration the obligation assumed by the Republic of the Philippines in any treaty, convention or agreement with foreign countries on matters affecting civil aviation.” 1959 – The Franchise of Philippine Airlines underwent Substantial amendments through Republic Act No. 2360. 1979 – Philippine Airlines was granted a new franchise in 1979 through Presidential Decree No. 1590, wherein statutory recognition was accorded to Philippine Airlines as the “national flag carrier.” P.D. No. 1590 also recognized that the “ownership, control, and management” of Philippine Airlines had been reacquired by the Government. Section 19 of P.D. No. 1590 authorized Philippine Airlines to contract loans, credits and indebtedness from foreign sources, including foreign governments, with the unconditional guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines. It is well known that the Philippine Airlines was controlled by the Philippine government, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) holding the majority of shares. 1981 – Kuwait Airways and Philippine Airlines entered into a Commercial Agreement. The Commercial Agreement covered a twice weekly Kuwait Airways flight on the route KuwaitBangkok-Manila and vice versa.6 The agreement stipulated that “only 3rd and 4th freedom traffic rights between Kuwait and Manila and vice versa will be exercised. No 5th freedom traffic rights will be exercised between Manila on the one hand and Bangkok on the other.” Kuwait Airways sectors, special prorates for use by Philippine Airlines to specified Kuwait Airways sectors, joint advertising by both carriers in each other’s timetables and other general advertising, and mutual assistance to each other with respect to the development of traffic on the route. Most pertinently of the Commercial Agreement, Kuwait Airways obligated itself to “share with Philippine Airlines revenue earned from the uplift of passengers between Kuwait and Manila and vice versa.”

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April of 1992 – Philippine Airlines was privatized, with a private consortium acquiring 67% of the shares of the carrier.28 Thus, at the time of the signing of the CMU, Philippine Airlines was a private corporation no longer controlled by the Government. April of 1995 – delegations from the Philippines and Kuwait (Philippine Panel and Kuwait Panel) met in Kuwait. The talks culminated in a Confidential Memorandum of Understanding (CMU) entered into in Kuwait on 12 April 1995. Among the members of the Philippine Panel were officials of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), and four officials of Philippine Airlines: namely its Vice-President for Marketing, Director for International Relations, Legal Counsel, and a Senior International Relations Specialist. Dr. Victor S. Linlingan, the Head of the Delegation and Executive Director of the CAB, signed the CMU in behalf of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The two delegations agreed that the unilateral operation and the exercise of third and fourth freedom traffic rights shall not be subject to any royalty payment or commercial arrangements, as from the date of signing of this [CMU]. May of 1995 – Philippine Airlines received a letter from Dawoud M. Al-Dawoud, the Deputy Marketing & Sales Director for International Affairs of Kuwait Airways, addressed to Ms. Socorro Gonzaga, the Director for International Relations of Philippine Airlines. Both AlDawoud and Gonzaga were members of their country’s respective delegations that had met in Kuwait the previous month. The letter stated the Commercial Agreement, pursuant to item 4 of the new MOU concerning royalty for 3rd/4th freedom traffic will be terminated effective April 12, 1995. To this, Gonzaga replied to Kuwait Airways in behalf of Philippine Airlines in a letter dated 22 June 1995. Philippine Airlines called attention to Section 6.5 of the Commercial Agreement that the agreement may be terminated by either party by giving ninety (90) days notice in writing to the other party and any termination date must be the last day of any traffic period which is the 31st March or 31st October. Subsequently, Philippine Airlines insisted that Kuwait Airways pay it the principal sum of US$1,092,690.00 as revenue for the uplift of passengers and cargo for the period 13 April 1995 until 28 October 1995. When Kuwait Airways refused to pay, Philippine Airlines filed a Complaint against the foreign airline with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, seeking the payment of the aforementioned sum with interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Philippine Airlines. The bulk of the RTC’s discussion centered on the Philippine Airlines’ claim that the execution of the CMU could not prejudice its existing rights under the Commercial Agreement, and that the CMU could only be deemed effective only after 31 October 1995, the purported effectivity date of termination under the Commercial Agreement. The rationale for this position of Philippine Airlines was that the execution of the CMU could not divest its proprietary rights under the Commercial Agreement. On this crucial point, the RTC agreed with Philippine Airlines. It asserted the obligatory force of contracts between contracting parties as the source of vested rights which may not be modified or impaired. After recasting Kuwait Airway’s arguments on this point as being that “the Confidential Memorandum of Understanding is superior to the Commercial Agreement[,] the same having been supposedly executed by virtue of the state’s sovereign power,” the RTC rejected the argument, holding that “[t]he fact that the [CMU] may have been executed by a Philippine Panel consisting of representative [sic] of CAB, DFA, etc. does not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that the [CMU] is a superior contract[,] for the exercise of the State’s sovereign power cannot be arbitrarily and indiscriminately utilized specifically to impair contractual vested rights.

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Instead, the RTC held that “[t]he Commercial Agreement and its specific provisions on revenue sharing having been freely and voluntarily agreed upon by the affected parties x x x has the force of law between the parties and they are bound to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated therein.”26 Accordingly, “the provision of the [CMU] must be applied in such a manner that it does not impair the vested rights of the parties.” From this Decision, Kuwait Airways directly filed with this Court the present Petition for Review, raising pure questions of law. ISSUE: Whether the enforcement of the Confidential Memorandum of Understanding violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. HELD: Yes, especially since Philippine Airlines was already under private ownership at the time the CMU was entered into, we cannot presume that any and all commitments made by the Philippine government are unilaterally binding on the carrier even if this comes at the expense of diplomatic embarrassment. While it may have been, prior to the privatization of Philippine Airlines, that the Philippine Government had the authority to bind the airline in its capacity as owner of the airline, under the post-privatization era, however, whatever authority of the Philippine Government to bind Philippine Airlines can only come in its capacity as regulator. In 1981, Philippine Airlines was still owned by the Philippine government. In that context, it is evident that the Philippine government, as owner Philippine Airlines, could enter into agreements with the Kuwait government that would supersede the Commercial Agreement entered into by one of its GOCCs, a scenario that changed once Philippine Airlines fell to private ownership.

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B. 14 RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS Rights of Suspects, Case 1: Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, June 13, 1966 FACTS: The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations. The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (“Mr. Miranda”), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights. The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (“Mr. Vignera”), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (“Mr. Westover”), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (“Mr. Stewart”), was arrested, along with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes. ISSUE: Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants? HELD: Page 295 of 411

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The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court.

Rights of Suspects, Case 2: People v. Lauga, 615 SCRA 548 (2010)

FACTS:

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. ISSUE: Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer admissible in evidence? HELD: No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a staterelated function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in evidence. [People vs Antonio Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010]

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Rights of Suspects, Case 3: People v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the court of appeals affirming the consolidated judgment of the RTC of Palawan where Jerry Rapeza was found guilty of 2 counts of murder sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus indemnity for the heirs of the 2 victims. In 2 separate information, Rapeza together with Regino was charged with the murder of the spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas. Information narrates that on October 21, 1995 around 4pm at Culion, Palawan the accused conspired, confiderating together and mutually helped each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength and feloniously attacked and killed with bladed weapons the victims. Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case was elevated to the CA for review but RTC was affirmed. Prosecution: October 21, 1995 unidentified woman went to Culion and reported a killing that took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. the officer in charge sent to the victims' house, the investigating team saw two blooded bodies, which was later identified as Libas and Ganzon. The autopsy reports show that the common cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of decomposition. Upon information supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes. The appellant was found fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was brought to the police station and later brought to the house of the only available lawyer in the municipality- Atty. Reyes. Because Atty. Reyes is suffering from rheumatism and the typewriter in the police station was out of order, the custodial investigation took place at the house of atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan of cULION, 2 SB officials, interpreter and SPO2 Gapas (officer in charge). Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized. Thereafter, a complaint for multiple murder was files against Regino who was likewise arrested. MTC of Culion conducted preliminary investigation. Finding probable cause only against Rapeza, Regino was ordered released. Provincial prosecutor however reversed the finding of the TC by including Regino in the information, but then the latter had left Culion already.

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Defense: Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing to do with their deaths. Rapeza is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters away from the victims' house.Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the killings took place. Rapeza,, along with Regino and Macabili was asked by the police officer to help load the bodies of the victims kn a banca. Shortly, Rapeza was arrested and brought to the municipal hall. Regino too was arrested with him. While in detention, Rapeza told the police that it was Regino who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a certain document for his release. Because Rapeza cannot sign, the officer took his thumb, dipped it in ink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountain where he was told to go farther, which he refused for fear of being shot. On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTc found him guilty. ISSUES: (1) Whether his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and (2) Whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premediation was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: (1) There is no direct evidence of appellant’s guilt except for the alleged confession and the corpus delicti. Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, we hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded. Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes. Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellant’s arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that he would confess his participation in the killing. In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation. In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession.

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The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights in the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged confession. For another, the prosecution did not present Abad as witness. Abad would have been in the best position to prove that he indeed made the translation from Tagalog to Waray for appellant to understand what was going on. This significant circumstance lends credence to appellant’s claim that he had never met Abad. The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language understood by accused-appellant. (2) The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver. Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be grave doubts as to his competence and independence as appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation. (3) It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. The trial court found that appellant’s bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility. First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves.Second, the prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession. (4) Confession was not sufficiently corroborated. Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed unless they are corroborated. There must be such corroboration so that when considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made or by any other evidence. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellant’s statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they were not presented in court. Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must be resolved in favor of appellant and the confession should be disregarded as evidence. Verily, we are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find the same insufficient bases to hold appellant’s extrajudicial confession admissible against him.

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Rights of Suspects, Case 4: People v. Ting Lan Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005 FACTS: For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus, Jaime Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution was violated. HELD: No. Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that:

Section 12. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The "investigation" under the above-quoted provision refers to a "custodial" investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the Page 300 of 411

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critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. Thus, the flaw in appellant's argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis-à-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPC's audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.

Rights of Suspects, Case 5: Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011

FACTS:

When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage Declaration at the arrival area, she found boxes of chocolate which when she saw inside had white substance. They were then brought to the PNP after the procedures in the airport. The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while affirming the RTC decision took note that their right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: Yes, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by CA sufficiently support petitioner’s conviction. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following: 1. Petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” before boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol; Page 301 of 411

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2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for ₱10,000.00; 3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and 4. Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly anarmalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol. Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the victim. The trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA, as in this case.

Rights of Suspects, Case 6: Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for TRO to annul and set aside the CFI decision against Gamboa. Gamboa: he was arrested for vagrancy without warrant of arrest. He was brought to precinct 2, Manila, booked for vagrancy and then detained. The next day, he was identified as a companion to a robbery. He was arraigned. In the hearing, Gamboa filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence presenting that his constitutional right to counsel and due process was violated. Court denied the motion. Hence this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied his rights to counsel and due process. HELD: No. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. It was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer. On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to Page 302 of 411

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present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.

Rights of Suspects, Case 7: Sebastian, Jr. v Garchitorena, G.R. No 114028, October 18, 2000 FACTS: Some employees of the post office were investigated by the chief postal service officer in connection with missing postage stamps. During interrogation, they submitted sworn statements. The prosecution presented the sworn statements as evidence. Accused claimed that their sworn statements were not admissible in evidence since they were not assisted by counsel. ISSUE: Whether right to counsel is imperative. HELD: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers.

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Rights of Suspects, Case 8: People v Baloloy, G.R. No 140740, April 12, 2002 FACTS: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of 3 August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the girl's unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks that his alleged confession be disregarded for having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside. HELD: Whether the alleged extrajudicial confession of Juanito is admissible. ISSUED: Yes. It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped Page 304 of 411

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GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.

Rights of Suspects, Case 9: People v Tawat, G.R. No 62871, May 25, 1985 FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, finding Felicito Tawat and Leo Tawat guilty of robbery with triple homicide, sentencing Felicito to death and Leo to an indeterminate penalty within the range of reclusion temporal and ordering them to pay solidarily damages of P32,000 to each set of heirs of the three victims, Bernarda Salvador, Lito Siao and Jose Magdaraog. Felicito, in the presence of Leo, confessed to Ogalesco that they were taking refuge in his secluded hut because the night before they had killed at Sitio Banog, Barrio Agban, Baras an old woman and two boys, one of whom was Andrea Siao's son. ISSUE: Whether the oral confession to Ogalesco is admissible. HELD: Yes. His confession to Ogalesco was not taken during custodial interrogation. Ogalesco was not a peace officer. The testimony of Ogalesco on Felicito's oral confession is competent evidence. "The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him" (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)

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"Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused." (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th. Ed., Niblack, sec. 278, p. 551.)

Rights of Suspects, Case 10: People v. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455, August 17, 1994 FACTS: On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a “confidential agent” or informer went to the office of the NCRNU and told them that the informer had revealed that a certain “Jon-Jon” (later identified as the accused) was selling shabu. Capt. Miano then formed a buybust team with himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur-buyer, and the rest, including the informer, forming the support group. Capt. Miano gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill with serial number SN886097 (Exhibit “B”) and which had been dusted with fluorescent powder to be used in the buy-bust operation. The informer introduced Sgt. Latumbo to the accused and told the latter that his companion was interested in buying shabu. The informer then asked the accused if he had any for sale. The accused answered in the affirmative and asked for the quantity to be bought. The accused momentarily left the pair and entered his house. When the accused emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn handed to the accused the P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he received and upon ascertaining that it was really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers then closed in on the accused. They introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested the accused. Upon interrogation by Capt. Miano, the accused voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag of shabu and the P100 marked money. The accused was handcuffed and taken to the NARCOM headquarters. The accused denied the allegations against him and contended that he was framed by the police officers. The trial court promulgated its decision finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. The accused appealed the decision, hence this case. ISSUE: Whether the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when he was subjected to examination for ultraviolet powder that incriminated him in the said crime. HELD: Page 306 of 411

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No, The defense contends that the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an ultraviolet ray examination and that the Chief Chemist Teresita Alberto failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel before subjecting him to the examination are without merit. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to export communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of the accused’s body to ultraviolet radiation, in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel.

Rights of Suspects, Case 11: People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001 FACTS: The crime of murder was charged against accused Endino and accused-appellant Galgarin. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward’s mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. However, accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether admission of videotaped confessions is proper. Page 307 of 411

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HELD: Yes. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation, as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.

Rights of Suspects, Case 12: People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997

FACTS:

AAA was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife’s grandmother should be taken. AAA agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. Policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood, pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as AAA's. Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in xxx attending the birthday party of his nephew. ISSUE: Whether accussed-appellants extrajudicial oral confession unassisted by a counsel is admissible in evidence. HELD: Yes. The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his Page 308 of 411

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uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted.

Rights of Suspects, Case 13: People v. Constancio, G.R. No. 206226, April 4, 2016 FACTS: Constancio and Berry were charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide commiteed against “AAA”. During the trial, Amparo, a news reporter, testified that he personally interviewed Berry. Amparo declared that during his interview, Berry revealed what happened the night “AAA” was killed. Atty. Suarez testified that during the custodial investigation he advised Berry of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his statements. Berry then executed an extrajudicial confession which was embodied in a Sinumpaang Salaysay. However, at the trial, Berry attested that the Sinumpaang Salaysay was false, and claimed that hew was threatened into signing the same HELD: Whether the confession is admissible. ISSUE: Yes. The court believed that Berry’s confession is admissible because it was voluntary executed with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez following Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. In default of proof that Atty. Suarez was negligent in his duties, the Court held that the custodial investigation of Berry was regularly conducted. There was no ample proof to show that Berry’s narration of events to Amparo was the product of intimidation or coercion. Berry’s extrajudicial confession to Amparo, a news reporter is deemed voluntary and is admissible as evidence as it was not made to the police authorities or to an investigation officer.

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Rights of Suspects, Case 14: People v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, January 16, 1998 FACTS: Marites Nas Atienza, a housewife whose husband was abroad, was residing at No. 224 Malambing St., Amparo Subdivision, Kalookan City. On the eve of November 5, 1989, she was asleep with her 1 1/2-year old daughter, Erica Dianne Atienza, inside her room at her house. Approximately two steps away from her bed, Luzviminda Aquino, Marites' housemaid, was sleeping on a sofa. At around 1:15 o'clock on the morning of November 5, 1989, a man suddenly barged into the house of Marites by destroying the kitchen door and removing the lawanit wall thereof, thus enabling him to reach the lock inside. The man suddenly poked a 6-inch kitchen knife on the right side of Marites' neck. This awakened her. She was told not to shout, otherwise she would be killed. Then the man placed masking tape on her mouth and ordered her to bring out her money and jewelry. At the point of the knife, Marites, while carrying her baby, went to the cabinet outside the room, took cash amounting to P1,000.00, a Seiko watch worth P1,500.00, a lady's wristwatch with the trademark "Chanel" (also referred to in the records as "Channel") worth P850.00, a bracelet worth P500.00, and a ring worth P500.00, and gave them to the man. Afterwards, they went back inside the bedroom and Marites sat on her bed, still cuddling her baby (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 7-8, 11-12, 40; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 19, 30, 31). The man then proceeded to rape Luzviminda. He then stabbed Cericos, Marites neighbor, who came to help. Upon apprehension by the police, accused-appellant admitted that the other things he took from Marites were inside a plastic bag at the factory building. Also, at the police station he admitted his guilt and pointed to Jaime Mabingnay, Marites' brother-in-law, as the one who asked him to commit the crime. However, upon trial, accused-appellant argues as his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He stresses the following arguments, to wit: (1) that the medico-legal officer said several times that the sexual intercourse occurred three months before Page 310 of 411

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the incident complained of; (2) that verbal admissions are inadmissible against the accused; (3) that the bracelet and the "Chanel" watch and even the "improbable" shoestring were the products of a poisonous tree, not having been the fruits of a lawful warrantless arrest; and (4) that his identification based on his built and voice is not an effective one. HELD: Whether his verbal admission are admissible. ISSUE: Yes. In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental requirements needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing his confession (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 9). Although this assertion is uncorroborated, accused-appellant's free will and volition in signing his confession will not cure the defect that it was made without assistance of counsel. An admission made without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence. (People vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482 [1995]). Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given (People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Cabintoy, 241 SCRA 442 [1995]). In contrast, accused-appellant's verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, however, admissible in evidence. The case in point is People vs. Andan (G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that the accused's verbal confession made in a private meeting with the municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is admissible in evidence since it is not covered by the requirements of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime - as in the case at bar.

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B.15

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED Rights of Accused, Case 1: Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 767 SCRA 282 (2015)

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances. ISSUE: Whether Enrile is entitled to bail. HELD: Yes, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds. Page 312 of 411

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The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to: x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

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Rights of Accused, Case 2: Heras Teehankee v. Rovira, G.R. No. L-101, December 20, 1945 FACTS: Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government, pursuant to the Proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, dated 29 December 1944. She was one of the petitioners in case No. L-44, "Raquiza vs. Bradford," of the Supreme Court. She is now confined in the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government since October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government. On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions of Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, dated 3 September 1945, she prayed that her immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid executive order, and upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing the officer having official custody of her person to immediately release her. On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People's Court, entered an order referring the petition for provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division of the People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in my opinion, it should be denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order disposing of said petition and denying the same "in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release." Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court, through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of certiorari and mndamus on 19 October 1945 with the Supreme Court. Page 314 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or information is filed against him. HELD: Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to the provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although already arrested or detained.

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Rights of Accused, Case 3: Joselito v. Narciso v. Flor Marle Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000 FACTS: After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. RomanaNarciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutor's resolution [before] the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. Joselito Narciso moved for reconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ. Failing before DOJ, the accused on February 6, 1992, filed in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an "Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted and the case was set for reinvestigation by another prosecutor. Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was assigned for reinvestigation, found no reason to disturb the findings of the previous prosecutor and recommended the remand of the case to the court for arraignment and trial. On August 3, 1992, accused filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail". The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00. ISSUE: Whether the grant of bail given without due process. HELD: Yes. Sec. 13, Article III of the Constitution, provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even Page 316 of 411

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when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution." Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail — summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor. Additionally, the court's grant or refuse of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail. Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.

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Rights of Accused, Case 4: Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997 FACTS: A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed when (1) he granted bail in murder cases without hearing (People v. Duerme, et al., Criminal Case 07893 for murder; People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-866 for murder); (2) he reduced the bailbond granted by the provincial prosecutor from P180,000 to P30,000 without hearing (Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda’s Criminal Case 11-6250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm); (3) he granted a bailbond of P14,800 in a homicide case (Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera); and (4) he acquitted Jimmy Siriban, the rumors spreading that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban’s house to get the envelop. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the complainant that would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against the judge. ISSUE: Whether Judge Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866. HELD: As held in Basco vs. Rapatalo, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where theprosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused. The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the evidence Page 318 of 411

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is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal. The fact that Criminal Case 07874 was subsequently dismissed by Judge Alameda does not completely exculpate Judge Catral. The judge is not bound by the recommendation of the prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay statements which could hardly be the basis for determining whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The procedural lapse of the judge is aggravated by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal Case 07-874 (People v. Ahmed Duerme), have yet to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. The right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. In sum, Judge Segundo B. Catral is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases 07-874 and 08-866 without having conducted the requisite hearing.

Rights of Accused, Case 5: Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007 FACTS: On June 20, 1997, Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong effect an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Juan Antonio Muñoz charged before the Hong Kong Court of 3 counts in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999: warrants of arrest were issued against him. On September 13, 1999: DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest - granted and NBI arrested him. ISSUE: Whether there is a right to bail in extradition proceedings. HELD: Yes. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty under Section II, Article II of our Constitution. These remedies include the right to be Page 319 of 411

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admitted to bail. Exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. The Court relied in Mejoff case upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Rights of Accused, Case 6: Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, 652 SCRA 1 (2011) 7 N L See also Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 October 2012

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Rights of Accused, Case 7: Go v. People, 677 SCRA 213 (2012)

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Rights of Accused, Case 8: Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 746 SCRA 452 (2015)

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Rights of Accused, Case 9: Janet Lim Napoles v. Sandiganbayan, 7 November 2017 FACTS: On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons, including Napoles, former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes (Reyes). NBI recommended to prosecute Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and several other named individuals for the crime of Plunder for essentially misappropriating former Senator Enrile’s Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were selected without the required bidding procedure. Thus, in an Information dated June 5, 2014, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Information stated that: the accused unlawfully amassed P172 Million pesos through a combination or series of overt criminal acts: repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions funded from Enrile’s PDAF targeting Napoles’s NGOs as recipients which turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain and taking undue advantage of their official positions to the prejudice of the Republic. A petition for Bail was filed by Napoles on July 7, 2014, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistleblowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these whistleblowers are inadmissible against her. In view of Napoles’ application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The Sandiganbayan denied the petition for Bail for lack of merit. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Court. Page 323 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles’ application for bail HELD: No. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that evidence of Napoles’ guilt of the crime is strong. This right to bail is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, except when the accused is charged with a capital offense. While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of the accused, those charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong. The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of the accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the prosecution’s evidence on the guilt of the accused. In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the parties’ evidence at a hearing duly scheduled for this purpose. The prosecution and the accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove their respective positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, and on the part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary and limited to the determination of the weight of evidence for purposes of granting or denying bail. Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of the prosecution and the defense. It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused is entitled to provisional liberty before conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well as from the trial court, effectively defeats the purpose of the proceeding. The Court ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that Napoles participated in the implied conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile. Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence supply interlocking pieces of information that when taken together, provide a complete picture of the indispensability of the participation of Napoles in the scheme to misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select individuals, by using the NGOs as conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The directions and instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a clear evidence of her active participation, not mere acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy. Thus, the petition for bail was correctly denied. Page 324 of 411

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Rights of Accused, Case 10: People v. Austria, G.R. No. 55109, April 8, 1991 FACTS: In the morning of August 10, 1975, the police dug out of the ground in a sugarcane field in sitio Palanas, Sagay, Negros Occidental, the lifeless body of Tomas Azuelo. Found near his grave were the traces of blood and a bloodstained piece of wood. Post mortem examination showed that Tomas Azuelo's skull was fractured and his body sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds, fifteen (15) of which were fatal. The payroll, together with the sum of P771.40 intended for the wages of laborers of Hacienda Austria, of which Azuelo was the overseer, was missing. Four suspects for the death of Tomas Azuelo were picked up by the police working together with the Philippine Constabulary. One of the suspects, Pablo Austria, was the last person who was seen with Tomas Azuelo. They boarded a tricycle together, on August 9, 1975 at about 3:30 p.m., from the poblacion of Sagay and alighted at about 4:00 p.m. at crossing Tupas. The other suspects were implicated based on the sworn statement dated September 17, 1975 of Pablo Austria, who imputed to his son Eduardo, his brother-in-law Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla, the commission of the crime. In his sworn statement, Pablo Austria stated that while he and Tomas Azuelo were on their way home on August 9, 1975, Eduardo Austria, Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla suddenly appeared and pulled Tomas Azuelo toward the sugarcane field. Thereafter, Jaime de la Torre struck the victims on the head with a piece of wood while Leopoldo Abanilla stabbed Tomas Azuelo in different parts of his body. Jaime de la Torre got the money inside Tomas Azuelo's pocket and together, they buried the victim. ISSUE: Whether the extra-judicial confessions to establish guilt of the accused. HELD:

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No. Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be considered. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. Aside from the extra-judicial confessions of the deceased appellants, there is neither direct evidence nor actual witness to the commission of the crime. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 133, there must. be (a) more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The series of circumstances proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. To warrant conviction in criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence, it must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence do not prove an unbroken link of events that could give rise to a reasonable and fair conclusion that appellant committed the imputed offense.

Rights of Accused, Case 11: People v. Andaya, G.R. No. 183700, October 13, 2014

FACTS:

Accused Pablito Andaya was charged with violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for selling shabu. The RTC and CA found him guilty of the crime charged. A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills both duly marked “X” were recorded in the police blotter. Upon reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different positions where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablito’s house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked money. The asset received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached Pablito and the asset introduced themselves as police officers and arrested accused. ISSUE: Whether the non-presentation of the confidential informant fatal to the prosecution’s case. HELD: YES, the non-presentation of the confidential informant is tantamount to saying that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher. The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person. Proof of the transaction must be Page 326 of 411

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credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur-buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur-buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential informant/ poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur-buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur-buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction. The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could be excused because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it was different, because the poseur-buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur buyer’s testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya. The members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur-buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to the poseur-buyer. Moreover, the arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur-buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur-buyer who supposedly gave it. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove accused Andaya’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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Rights of Accused, Case 12: People v. Colcol., Jr., 219 SCRA 107, February 19, 1993 FACTS: Anacleto Colcol, Jr. allegedly committed rape against Nora Escalona. It was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on November 11, 1987, on the basis of her original complaint dated December 19, 1986. After arraignment, trial was conducted successively by Judge Alfredo P. de Vera, Judge Benito A. Dacanay, and finally Judge Alicia G. Decano, who wrote the decision of the court. Anacleto was at the time of the alleged incidents 24 years old and engaged in his family's business of duck farming. Nora was 14 and a second year high school student. They were neighbors in Barangay Sobol, Asingan, Pangasinan, living within a stone's throw of each other. The complainant testified that sometime in the first week of March 1986, at about 6:30 in the morning, she was walking along the barangay road leading to her school when Anacleto confronted her. Without much ado, he dragged her into the bushes nearby and raped her. The rape was repeated. Nora said she became pregnant as a result of the rapes but she never told anyone about her condition, not even Anacleto. Incredibly, her parents did not notice her pregnancy until only on December 4, 1986, the very day she started laboring and delivered her baby. The boy died five weeks later and she named him in the death certificate as Joel Escalona Colcol, after Anacleto. She did this on her lawyer's advice. There was no medical evidence of her rapes because the doctor presented by the prosecution testified only to the fact of her delivery and estimated that it must have been conceived sometime in March 1986. Nora's father, Saturnino Escalona, affirmed on the stand that he really learned of her pregnancy only on the day she delivered. Anacleto derided the charges against him and said he was in Lumayao, San Quintin, Pangasinan, at the time of the alleged rapes. He stayed there from February to April 30, 1986, attending to the pasturing of the ducks in their farm with his live-in partner, Bonifacia Caramat, whom he later married. Juanito Antonio testified that the couple resided in his house and never left Lumayao during that period. This was corroborated by Santos Badua, the caretaker of the compound near the alleged scene of the crime, who said he saw no one when the rapes were supposedly committed. Page 328 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether his conviction, claiming that the evidence for the prosecution is implausible and should not have been given credence by the trial court is correct. HELD: Yes. The evidence is less than substantial and far below the quantum required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. It cannot be said often enough that the accused is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence which may overcome only with proof beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty. His conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. Stated otherwise, it is for the prosecution to prove that he is guilty, not for the accused to prove that the is innocent. It is part of the rule that if the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, with the inevitable consequence that the accused must be set free.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

Rights of Accused, Case 13: People v. Solis, 182 SCRA 182, February 14, 1990 FACTS: On or about the 5th day of August, 1984, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila Philippines, the above- named accused, together with Danilo Vidal alias 'Danny' who is still-at-large and the preliminary investigation against him is still pending with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Malolos, armed with a bladed weapons (sic) and blunt instruments, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and violence, take, rob and carry away with them the cash amounts of P118,318.00 belonging to Rita Kho, P30,000.00, Sanyo Cassette assembly, and a gold-plated 'Citizen' wristwatch of unknown value, all belonging to Johnny Sai Tung to the damage and prejudice of said Rosita Kho and Johnny Sai Tung in more than P148,318.00; and by reason of and during the occasion of the said robbery, the said above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab Demetrio Paranada and Johnny Sai Tung with the bladed weapons and blunt instruments they were then provided hitting them on the different parts of their body which directly caused their death. That the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength are present during the commission of this crime. ISSUE: Whether the the trial court gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the theory of the defense. Page 329 of 411

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HELD: No. It is ruled that the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility and in this respect, the relative weight which the trial court assigns to the testimony of witnesses must, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on record be accepted (People v. Artieda, L-38725, May 15, 1979, 90 SCRA 144). The record does not support the above excuses given by Cabug, Joveniano and Vidal. The said appellants did not show by a clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to go to the scene of the crime and return to their place (People v. Perante, Jr., 143 SCRA 50). Additionally, appellants failed to present corroborative evidence to prove that they were actually in the places mentioned. The testimony of defense witness Marciano Mangunay is likewise dubious. If his statements were true, then he could have readily apprised the authorities of the truth. Yet he bided his time without justifiable reason. We have held that alibi is weak where it is established mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relatives such as his father, and not by credible persons who would, in the natural order of things be best suited to support the tendered alibi (People v. Cabanit, G.R. Nos. 62030-31, October 4, 1985, 139 SCRA 94). Besides, Joveniano, Cabug and Vidal were positively Identified by state witness Lomo as the perpetrators of the crime. The records do not show that Lomo was prompted by any ill motive in implicating the appellants. His positive testimony is, thus, credible. Rights of Accused, Case 18: Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo "Lenny" Villa) of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The rites were scheduled to last for three days. The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." survived their first day of initiation.

They

On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays, play rough basketball, and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk that he had to be carried to the carport. The initiation for the day was officially ended. They then slept at the carport. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling Page 330 of 411

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cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. The criminal case against the remaining nine accused commenced anew. The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. One accused had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused: 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries. 3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUES: 1) Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual participation. 2) Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries. 3) Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide. HELD: 1) NO. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, the Court is constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity members. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. 2) YES. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion. The accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.

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Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. 3) NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Instead, the Court adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.

Rights of Accused, Case 19: People v. Lumague, G.R. No. L-53586, January 30, 1982 FACTS: Early in the morning of July 25, 1977, Antonio A. Regalado, 39, a credit investigator of the Social Security System, was maliciously killed in the Marikit Sub. division, Marikina, Rizal. The postmortem examination revealed that he had fourteen incised wounds, two lacerated wounds, ten punctured wounds and ten stab wounds, or thirty-six wounds in all, eight of which were fatal because they affected his vital organs like his lungs, liver, heart and intestines. The wounds were located in different parts of his body: front and back, head, arms, legs, abdomen, knees, chest and shoulders. Obviously, he had been assaulted by more than one person. As a result of the investigation, the four Lumague brothers, Ponciano, Jr., 27, Rolando, 25, Mario, 23, and Juanito 21, and their brother-in-law, Rodolfo de la Cruz, were charged with murder for the killing of Regalado. Ponciano, Rolando and Mario were arrest on August 20, 1977. Juanito was arrested on October 10, 1977 when the prosecution had already finished the presentation of its evidence against his three brothers. De la Cruz is at large. ISSUE: Whether conviction without being given right to testify and to present additional evidence is correct. HELD: Page 332 of 411

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No. An accused has the constitutional right "to be heard by himself and counsel" and the right "to testify as a witness in his own behalf ". The denial of such rights is a denial of due process. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. "No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right."

Rights of Accused, Case 20: People v. Enanoria, 209 SCRA 577, June 8, 1992 FACTS: At around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of May 7, 1988, while he was at the Davao Medical Center where he was brought after his arrest. Enanoria executed an "antemortem" statement before P/Cpl. Cerilo S. Solana, Jr. in the presence of Mayor Duterte and Lt. Col. Calida. Although he claimed that he would still survive inspite of his wound, he admitted having been shot because he was involved in the kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He informed the police that one alias Amil shot Mrs. Dakudao and that they were not able to get the P50,000.00 ransom they had demanded. Four days later or on May 11, 1988, Enanoria executed a sworn statement before P/Cpl. Solana at the Talomo Patrol Station of the Davao City Metrodiscom. After he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel of his own choice, he admitted involvement in the kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He claimed, however, that he did not know that he was participating in a kidnapping as he was merely picked up in Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao by Amil and one alias Totong. According to Enanoria, Amil and Totong each carried a .38 caliber revolver and it was Amil who shot Mrs. Dakudao only once at around 1:30 a.m. of May 7, 1988. ISSUE: Whether the right of the accused to counsel was violated. HELD:

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No. It is already beyond dispute that he was actively assisted by a lawyer in the person of Atty Jacom. The latter’s presence adequately fulfilled the constitutional requirement. It must be reiterated at this point that the right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Verily, whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.

Rights of Accused, Case 21: Carbonel v. CSC, G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010 FACTS: On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost the original copy of her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as certificate of rating). Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification slip. The Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioner’s personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. Because of these discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation. In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement before Atty. Rosalinda S.M. Gepigon, admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she accepted the proposal of a certain Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS Career Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating. This prompted her to secure another copy from the CSCRO IV. Hence, the formal charge against petitioner. Page 334 of 411

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Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her Answer, traversed the charges against her. She explained that after filling up the application form for the civil service examination, she asked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother. Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite her failure to take the test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the certificate of rating but to check the veracity of the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of counsel. After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25, 2002 Decision No. 020079 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed on her. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November 14, 2003. Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed almost three years from receipt of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioner’s explanation that she failed to timely appeal the case because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the other members of the law firm, petitioner’s counsel of record, could have timely appealed the decision. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 072049 dated November 5, 2007. Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November 24, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the decisions and resolutions of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on April 29, 2009. Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds: ISSUE: Serious error of fact and law amounting to grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision dated November 24, 2008 because petitioner’s finding of guilt was grounded entirely on her unsworn statement that she admitted the offenses charged and without the assistance of a counsel. HELD: The petition is without merit. Petitioner faults the CSC’s finding because it was based solely on her uncounselled admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated because she was not afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken. It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioner’s uncounselled statements and, partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document. However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the Page 335 of 411

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exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CSC and the CA. The written admission of petitioner is replete with details that could have been known only to her. Besides, petitioner’s written statement was not the only basis of her dismissal from the service. Records show that the CSCRO IV’s conclusion was reached after consideration of all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the parties during the formal investigation. Rights of Accused, Case 22: Gamboa v. Judge Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for TRO to annul and set aside the CFI decision against Gamboa. Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy without warrant of arrest. He was brought to precinct 2, Manila, booked for vagrancy and then detained. The next day, he was identified as a companion to a robbery. He was arraigned. In the hearing, Gamboa filed a motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence presenting that his constitutional right to counsel and due process was violated. Court denied the motion. Hence this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980. HELD: The police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. It was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.

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On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.

Rights of Accused, Case 25: People v. Larrañaga, G.R. No. 138874-75, February 3, 2004 FACTS: On July 16, 1997 at about 10 o’clock more or less in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the said accused all private individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive Marijoy Chiong and Jacqueline Chiong, of their liberty and on the occasion thereof, and in connection, accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have carnal knowledge against them with the use of force and intimidation and subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof, accused with intent to kill did then and there inflict physical injuries and threw Marijoy into a deep ravine which caused her death. ISSUE: Whether the witness who is also one of the perpetrators is a credible witness for the crime charged. HELD: Yes. Rustia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that positive identification of an accused by a credible as the perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi, the much abused sanctuary of felons. Rusia’s testimony was corroborated by several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victim’s family. As we received closely the transcript of stenographic notes, we could not discern any motive on their part why they should testified falsely against the appellants. In the same vein, Page 337 of 411

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it is improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives. Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are not convinced, Rusia testified that Josman instructed Rowen “to get Rid” of Marijoy, and following such instruction, Rowen and Ariel pushed her into the deep ravine. Furthermore, inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse matched those of Marijoy. The packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained. The body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted. The members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy which they eventually buried. They erected commemorative at the ravine, cemetery, and every place which mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that it was the body of Marijoy that was found in the ravine.

Rights of Accused, Case 28: People v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015

FACTS:

The victim was 13 years old when the accused committed the rapes in June, July, August and September of 2005. She resided in the house of her grandmother wherein the accused, her paternal uncle, also lived. On June 25, 2005, as the victim was about to sleep, the accused laid down beside her. She tried to escape, but he pulled her by the hair, slapped her, and punched her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, she noticed that her panties had blood. The accused warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone, threatening to kill her and her family if she did so. The victim finally reported the four rapes to her mother in October 2005. The accused denied having raped and imputed ill motives to the victim insisting that the victim’s mother had wanted to get back at him after he had told his brother, the victim’s father, that he had caught the victim’s mother with a paramour. Both the RTC and CA found the accused guilty of four counts of rape. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the minority of the offended party when the same was not indicated in the information. HELD: No, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended party. The Revised Penal Code provides that Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or intimidation; Page 338 of 411

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(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; (d) When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances above be present. The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the information defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female against her will through force or intimidation. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. Secondly, the Prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt the charges of rape against the accused. The victim positively identified the accused as her rapist. Her account of his crimes was candid, and her demeanor revealing. She could not control herself but cried in the course of her testimony whenever she was made to recall her traumatic experiences at his hands. The testimony of a rape victim that is consistent with the medical findings constitutes sufficient basis to conclude that carnal knowledge occurred. Hence, the court a quo did not gravely err in appreciating the minority of the offended party.

Rights of Accused, Case 29: Teves v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004 FACTS: On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and Teresita Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) imposing upon them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum; and (3) ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the Government, as well as perpetual disqualification from public office. The conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds that (a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his pecuniary interest in said cockpit; (b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the "owner/licensee" of the cockpit; and (c) since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from 1983 until 1992, their property relations as husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of the conjugal partnership of gains. Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners have pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. (Teves vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 154182 December 17, 2004) ISSUE: Page 339 of 411

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Whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for unlawful intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license in favor of a business enterprise in which he has a pecuniary interest may be convicted, together with his spouse, of violation of that same provision premised on his mere possession of such interest. HELD: The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. (Teves vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 154182 December 17, 2004) Rights of Accused, Case 30: Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015 FACTS: On November 8, 2011, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City filed two (2) Informations against petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q1 1-173056, respectively.2 Said cases were raffled to Branch 227, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, presided by herein respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban. Court hearings were set for the subject cases, however, the prosecution's principal witness PO2 Nelson Villas (PO2 Villas), one of the arresting officers, failed to attend said scheduled hearings, specifically on October 22, 2012 and October 25, 2012. Thus, during the May 16, 2013 hearing, respondent judge issued an Order provisionally dismissing the cases with the express consent of the accusedpetitioner. ISSUE: Whether the provisional dismissal of criminal cases nos. Q-1 1-173055-56 with the consent of the accused but predicated on failure to prosecute which violates the right of the accused to speedy trial is not equivalent to an acquittal, such that its revival would constitute double jeopardy. HELD: Page 340 of 411

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No. When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013, stresses in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to present its evidence. There was nothing in the records showing the accused's opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law.

Rights of Accused, Case 31: Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the PGH Security Division as Special Police Captain.Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned at UP-PGH. Private respondent Abutal filed a complaint with then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner Capt. Roquero. The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the instant case.The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the completion of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before16 July 1999. The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the period agreed upon. Thereafter, when the case was called, only petitioner and his counsel appeared. The prosecution repeatedly failed to appear. Later, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant (private respondent herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her exhibits since complainant was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days. The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to the unreasonable delay, petitioner filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of the administrative case against him based on the following reasons: that the prosecution had not formally offered its evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed; that the Page 341 of 411

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unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were filed just to harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case. Later, the prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits had been filed of which a copy was received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel per registry return receipt. However, petitioner has not filed his comment to the said Formal Offer. In its petition for certiorari, the CA denied the petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. Roquero moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated. ISSUE: Whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero's Motion which he seasonably filed and order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the constitutional right of the petitioner to a speedy disposition of cases? HELD: The Supreme Court granted the petition. Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service states that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall be considered as waiver thereof, the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution to present its formal offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January 2004. Starting on that date, petitioner was presented with the choice to either present his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion. While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, the same however should not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: Page 342 of 411

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[1] [2] [3] [4]

the the the the

length of delay; reasons for the delay; assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and prejudice caused by the delay.

Applying the doctrinal rulings in the case at bar, the violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage. The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile. CA DECISION IS REVERSED.

Rights of Accused, Case 32: Almeda v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016 FACTS: In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DepEd), Surigao del Norte, and several other public officers and employees were charged administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman, in connection with the alleged improper use and disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted to petitioner's co-respondent Constantino H. Navarre, Jr. (Navarro), Surigao del Norte Congressman, and implemented through the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the DepEd. The criminal charges were consolidated and docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0183. On March 19, 2003, a Resolution was issued in said case by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. dela Cruz-Likit (dela Cruz-Likit), to the effect that probable cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-accused for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019.[6] This Resolution was disapproved in part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Marcelo), who made minor modifications and instructions thereto. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then took over the case, and it prepared the corresponding Information against petitioner, which was approved by then Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio and Marcelo. On May 19, 2003, the Information was forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, who in turn indorsed and forwarded the same, together with the Ombudsman's Resolution, to the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte on June 3, 2003, for appropriate filing in court.[ (Almeda vs. People G.R. No. 204267 July 25, 2016) ISSUE: Page 343 of 411

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Whether there was a violation of her right to speedy trial. HELD: Yes. The right includes within its comtemplation the periods before, during and after trial, such as preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Further, this right applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies and not limited to the accused in criminal proceeding but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature.

Rights of Accused, Case 33: In Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao Governor ZaldyAmpatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, October 23, 2012 FACTS: Almost a year after the Maguindanao Massacre, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe3 filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines5 (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag6 (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court. President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 20108 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out "in support of those who have petitioned to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed "earnest hope that will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation, attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits.” Hence, the present petitions assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. Page 344 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the petitions may be granted. HELD: The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.24 and Estrada v. Desierto,25 that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

Rights of Accused, Case 34: Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000

Facts: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Article III, §5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-9770866 to Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had sexual intercourse with complainants Page 345 of 411

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who had been "exploited in prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and that the accused is entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997, Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-9770866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23 May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against Lavides, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his presence during the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted. HELD: In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be Page 346 of 411

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to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at thearraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights.

Rights of Accused, Case 35 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015 FACTS: Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudia Arabia when he learned that police officers of Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused of 57 counts of murder for the Maguindanao Massacre. He went to the police station to clear himself and presented his passport, airline boarding passes and other documents to prove his absence from the country during the incident. The police destroyed his passport, arrested him and detained him. He filed an urgent petition for habeas corpus the legality of his detention and deprivation of liberty. The Warden argued that the Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest therefore, Habeas Corpus could not be availed. Salibo countered, the Information, Warrant of Arrest and Alias Warrant of Arrest point to Butukan S. Malang and not Datukan Malang Salibo, hence, he was not validly arrested. ISSUE: Whether petition for habeas corpus should be granted. HELD: Yes. The petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The Rules provide that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Here, Salibo was arrested and Page 347 of 411

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detained without a warrant; he was deprived of his right to liberty without due process of law for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.

Rights of Accused, Case 36: Martinez v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 153795, August 17, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners are the mother and wife, respectively, of Michael Martinez, a resident of 4570 Cattleya Road, Sun Valley Subdivision, Parañaque City, who was allegedly abducted and taken away by seven (7) persons around 7:30 in the morning of November 19, 2001 while he was walking along Magnolia Street, on his way to his mother's house at 3891 Marigold Street of the same subdivision. In the evening of November 19, 2001, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) presented before the media a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a statement confessing to his participation in the killing of Dorothy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca, naming Michael Martinez as the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren Strunk, the husband of Nida Blanca and alleged mastermind in her killing. Medel narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame where he was being detained, and which the former allegedly reiterated when he talked to Robert Paul Martinez, a brother of Michael, on November 27, 2001 and he even described the clothes Michael was then wearing, which were the same clothes worn by him when he was abducted. In view thereof, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Quezon City against respondents PNP Director General Leandro Mendoza; Chief Superintendent Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG; Senior Superintendent Leonardo Page 348 of 411

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Espina, Sr. and Senior Superintendent Jesus Versoza of the CIDG and members of Task Force Marsha, which is investigating the Nida Blanca murder case, for them to produce before said court the person of Michael Martinez or to justify the continued detention of his liberty. Respondents submitted a RETURN wherein they vehemently and categorically denied any participation or involvement in the alleged abduction or disappearance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never confined and detained by them or in their custody at any given time. At the hearing conducted by the court a quo, respondents reiterated their claim that Michael Martinez is not and was never in their custody. On the other hand, petitioners presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw Michael Martinez inside a room at the CIDG where he was brought before midnight of November 19, 2001 or the wee hours of November 20, 2001, that Sr. Supts. Verzosa (sic) and Espina were also in said room and that the latter even boxed Michael in the stomach. Finding that respondents denial pale beside Medel's positive assertion that Michael Martinez is in their custody, the court a quo, in a Decision dated December 10, 2001 directed respondents to produce the body of Michael Martinez before it on December 11, 2001 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the Petition for habeas corpus. HELD: Petitioner’s anchor for the present case is the disappearance of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely consequential to his disappearance. His disappearance has been established. However, the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." If the respondents are neither detaining nor restraining the applicant or the person on whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus has been filed, then it should be dismissed. This Court has ruled that this remedy has one objective to inquire into the cause of detention of a person: "The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited."

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When forcible taking and disappearance not arrest and detention have been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings. Abduction or kidnapping is a crime punishable by law. Investigations with regard to crimes are first and foremost the duty of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), not the courts. There are instances when members of the PNP the agency tasked with investigating crimes are suspected of being responsible for the disappearance of a person, who is the subject of habeas corpus proceedings.This fact will not convert the courts into or authorize them through habeas corpus proceedings to be forefront investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners all at the same time. This proceeding for habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a thorough criminal investigation. In view of the established fact of Michael's suspiciously felonious disappearance, we exhort the NBI and the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) to continue their investigation into the matter, so that all persons responsible can be prosecuted for whatever crime they have committed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Rights of Accused, Case 37: Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985 FACTS: On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. Thereafter, two other petitioners were arrested for the same cause. This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases. On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May 23, 1985. Respondents contend that the lawyers were arrested due to basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985 and that the lawyers played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. ISSUE:

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Whether the petitioners herein were denied of their constitutional right to due process and the benefit of a preliminary investigation. HELD: If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So is it explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court. The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted. The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate Court. Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides: SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person. However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

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B. 16 WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, AMPARO, HABEAS DATA, AND KALIKASAN Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 1: Gamboa v. Chan, 677 SCRA 385 (2012) FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security. HELD: Page 352 of 411

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No. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 2: Yusay v. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014 FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. ISSUE: Whether writ of Amparo is the proper remedy available to the Petitioner. HELD: No. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she Page 353 of 411

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is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 3: Reyes v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009 FACTS: Fr. Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege, 30th of November, 2007 and they were temporarily held at Camp Crame. A Hold Departure Order (HDO) for the petitioner and to the other accused was issued by the DOJ upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government. Probable cause was found during investigation and petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC however dismissed the charge against him but the HDO was still in effect. Petitioner requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner argued that a writ of amparo should be issued against the respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in the Constitution, specifically, his right to travel. ISSUE: Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. HELD: No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or Page 354 of 411

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entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 4: Sec. of National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008 FACTS: The brothers Raymond and Reynald Manalo, farmers from Bulacan were abducted, detained in various locations, tortured by Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of restrained liberty, torture, and other dehumanizing acts, were able to escape. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to prevent military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Existing petition was treated as Amparo petition. The Supreme Court granted the Writ of Amparo and ordered the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not statements from the victims is sufficient for amparo petitions. 2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary to invoke the right to security of a person HELD:

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1. Yes. Much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. 2. Yes. Covered by the privilege of the writ, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Moreover, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 5: Mison v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015 FACTS: The Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request to petitioner, Hon. Siegfried Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigation (BI) for the immediate arrest and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Pursuant to Summary Deportation Order, Ku was arrested and detained at the BI detention center. Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos granted the petition. ISSUE: Whether the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Section 1 of the Rule in the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:

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Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The Amparo rule was intended to address the intractable problem of the “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law. As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of the RA 9851, to wit: (a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or political organization; (c) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d)That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. In probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA 9851. Guided by the parameters of RA 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation. The RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar. Page 357 of 411

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Wherefore, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to deny the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 6: Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009 FACTS: The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait. On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance. More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Page 358 of 411

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Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet. Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men. According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI. She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband. Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial help from friends and relatives. She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ. In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance. ISSUE: 1. Whether the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be granted to protect Engr. Morced Tagitis. 2.Whether the Amparo petitionfiled by Mary Jean Tagitisis sufficient in form and substance. HELD: 1. Yes.The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus,the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ Page 359 of 411

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ofAmparoprovides for the following causes of action:Section 1.Petition. -The petition for a writ ofAmparois a remedy available to any person whoseright to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violationby an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.The writ shall cover extralegal killings andenforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied).The UN Declaration definedenforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.The fact of Tagitis’disappearance was proven although there was no direct evidence indicating howhe actually disappeared. He was last seen going out of the ASY pension house but never to be seen nor heard again. The undisputed conclusion, therefore, is that Tagitis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. 2. Yes.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 7: De Lima v. Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226 (2013) FACTS: In January 2012, De Lima removed Gatdula from the NBI after his alleged involvement in an alleged kidnapping and extortion attempt involving a Japanese woman in December 2011. Petitioner Esmeralda replaced him. In February 21, 2012, Esmeralda survived an ambush by a riding-in-tandem convoy. Gatdula said he got a tip that a fake witness would tag him as the incident’s mastermind. He also said he could be killed in a “rub-out.” This is a background story that is not mentioned in the case. Thus, Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC-Manila against the Petitioners. The docket was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. Counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.

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Judge Pampilo insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing. Even without a Return or an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their memoranda. After these, the Judge rendered a “Decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. MR denied. Petitioners thus went to SC assailing the RTC Decision through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether Judge Pampilo is correct in applying the Rules in Summary Procedure to a Petition for a Petition for a Writ of Amparo. HELD: No. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer. Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order: Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule. Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply. Section 5. Answer Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the following circumstances: SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: A. Civil Cases: (1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x. (2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x. B. Criminal Cases: (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations (2) Violations of the rental law (3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x. Page 361 of 411

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It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 8: Caram v. Segui, 732 SCRA 86 (2014) FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced. Page 362 of 411

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On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together. On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD. ISSUE: Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. HELD: No. The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced disappearance in this case. As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit: 1) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; 2) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; 3) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, 4) That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Page 363 of 411

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Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 9: CIDG-PNP v. Regina Cayanan, 7 November 2017 FACTS: Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo, her husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG. She contended that a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo without any warrant of arrest, and had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame; and that despite repeated demands, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo. The CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. The CIDG filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus. Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended her petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued the writ of amparo. Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection order and witness protection order, and it was granted. Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered explanations for his nonappearance. Page 364 of 411

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The RTC issued an order maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG to continue its investigation into the disappearance of Pablo; directing respondent SPO1 Pascua to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary protection order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina in the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. The CIDG filed an MR, but it was denied. Hence, the CIDG filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. It contended that there was no sufficient evidence to support the writ of amparo; and that a mere accusation accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground for the court to issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued effectivity. Pascua, on his part, contended that Regina failed to establish by the required burden of proof that he caused the “forced disappearance” of Pablo Cayanan within the ambit protected by the rule on the writ of ampar; that following Mexico’s Amparo, it is [an] essential requirement for the supposed victim to establish where he is being held; that Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers “public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity,” which evidently precludes a government institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP; and that enforced or forced disappearance means that it must be established that agents of the state perpetrated its commission. ISSUES: 1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the RTC. 2. Whetherthe CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. 3. Whether the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo was defective. 4. Whether the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua’s right to the presumption of his innocence. HELD: Although a Petition for Review on Certiorari is usually limited to the determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the review by the SC of questions of fact or of law or of both. 1. Yes, the SC held that Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the writ of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on the writ of amparo the observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies should be tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Here, Regina fully discharged her Page 365 of 411

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duty to present substantial evidence in support of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo. Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay before the NBI, whereby an eyewitness detailed the events of the abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon was consistent and credible in itself. Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction. Yet, he did not furnish details of the abduction that would have given to the investigators firm leads to quickly corner the perpetrators as well as to determine and locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His omission was fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his part in the abduction by issuing a blanket denial. It is significant that his denial was already doubtful in light of Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the leader of the perpetrators of the abduction. Thirdly, Pascua’s version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no consideration. For one, he could not even mention the type and the color of the vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered to board. Such inability was uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him. Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses to corroborate the allegation on the occurrence of the abduction. Such other witnesses also identified Pascua as the person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez. 2. No, the SC held that the CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence. The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its various operating divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly continuous searches had been conducted.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard. 3. No, the SC held that the petition for the writ of amparo was not defective. Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in the petition for the writ of amparo. The said section did not require a petition to state the probable whereabouts of the victim. The SC clarified that the application and implementation of the rule of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at best. Despite its being patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other countries, particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent on how those other rules of amparo have operated, or have been implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of emulation, are only best practices to be considered and optionally relied upon, if at all. Page 366 of 411

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4. No, the SC held that the issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair Pascua’s right to the presumption of innocence. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 10: In Re: Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in Favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011 FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol). The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until Page 367 of 411

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they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree. On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila. Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them. On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT. On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels. Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president). Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition. CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from suits. ISSUE: 1. Whether President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her presidential immunity from suit. 2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and habeas data cases. HELD: 1. CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from Page 368 of 411

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suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.” “A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.” Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during their tenure (and not term). “It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.” 2. Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. “In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.” “Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.” SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

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Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo, Habeas Data, and Kalikasan, Case 11: Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, 7 March 2017 FACTS: To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through EO 774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads: Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train). In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus: Page 370 of 411

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SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF - In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall initiate and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines. Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions: (a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train). Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change. Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter-foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%).Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition. The Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in tum represent "Children of the Future, and Carowners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos. Petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process of law. They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment condition - through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban RePage 371 of 411

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Greening Programs. These projects are individually and jointly implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on the environment.Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they consider the impact of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine National Implementation Plan on Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions, greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector. In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the Petition. ISSUE: Whether a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue. HELD: The petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue. Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing mandamus as follows: RULES 8 : WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus. Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated a principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary,and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms Page 372 of 411

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provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino - made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus. In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to improve air quality.

B.17 SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 1: People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, September 30, 1987 FACTS: In the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975, in the Municipality of Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and acting upon the direction and instruction of ANACLETO Q. OLVIS who master-minded the bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to execute the conspiracy and who, armed with boloes and a hunting knife, with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and for a consideration of a price or reward, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one DEOSDEDIT BAGON, thereby inflicting upon him multiple incised (hack) and stab wounds which caused his instantaneous death. While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and Page 373 of 411

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September 25, 1975, the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as principal by inducement, who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each. In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National Bureau of Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis’ involvement in the killing. ISSUES: 1. Whether these statements, as any of the extrajudicial confession can stand up in court. 2. Whether Villarojo’s claim of self-defense tenable. HELD: 1. No. The three accused-appellants' extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.The confessions in the case at bar suffer from a Constitutional infirmity. In their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not assisted by counse lwhen they "waived" their rights to counsel. The lack of counsel makes statement in contemplation of law, ‘involuntary’ even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically.” Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the proceedings below, says: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinableby simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from his body, or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth, or making her submit to a pregnancy test, or a foot printing test or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases." In each case, the accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel. But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession. It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody when they Page 374 of 411

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took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the Constitution holds a strict application. Any statement he might have made thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty. In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel. 2. The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a sharp instrument. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated from hisbody. This indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense. In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, superior strength or nocturnity is unfound. In the absence of any otherproof, the severity and number of wounds sustained by the deceased are not, by themselves, sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo should be liable for plain homicide, and accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 2: US v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145, September 7, 1912 FACTS: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Page 375 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination. HELD: No. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a witness — it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. The evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body itself. The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 3: US v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735, August 3, 1917 FACTS: Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. ISSUE: Whether forcing an accused to discharge morphine from his mouth compelling him to be a witness against himself. HELD: No, the accused was not compelled to be a witness against himself. No case exactly in point can be found. But, by analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. vs. Tan Tan ([1912] 23 Phil.. 145), following leading authorities, and the persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the Page 376 of 411

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same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 4: People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 333, 399-401, December. 9, 1999 FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

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(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. ISSUE: Whether the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as evidence against him HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 5: Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968

FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of qualified theft of motor vehicle. During his trial, he was presented as a witness for the prosecution. His counsel objected but later submitted after being assured by the court that petitioner will not be compelled to answer any question that would incriminate him. The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.

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ISSUE: Whether the accused may refuse to take the witness stand. HELD: Yes. An ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person “to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.”

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 6: Dela Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655 (2014) FACTS: Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. Complainants were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Station. They met “James” at the Police Station, who demanded from them P100,000.00 which was later lowered to P40,000.00, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The accused was later brought to the forensic laboratory where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs. ISSUE: Whether the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. Page 379 of 411

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HELD: No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. The drug test was in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs.

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 7: Bermudez v. Castillo, Prec. Rec. No. 714-A, July 26, 1937 FACTS: In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the SolicitorGeneral against the respondent, in connection with this administrative case, said respondent filed, in addition to other evidence in support of this defense, the six letters which, for purposes of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He then contended, as he now continues to contend, that said six letters are the complainant's, but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. She admitted, however, that the letters marked as Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were in her own handwriting. As the respondent believed that the three letters admitted by the complainant to be hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with those questioned in this case and as he was determined to show that said Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were the complainant's, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The complainant, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 and the other letters already in the respondent's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The investigator, upholding the complainant, did not Page 380 of 411

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compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying the respondent's petition. As respondent did not agree to this decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to require and compel the complainant to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying said Exhibits 32 to 37 for that purpose. ISSUE: Whether the complainant may be compelled to furnish new specimen of her handwriting. HELD: No. The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury, inasmuch as it would be warranted by article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 8: Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929 FACTS: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. ISSUE: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Page 381 of 411

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HELD: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

Self-Incrimination Clause, Case 9: Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. PCG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987 FACTS: The corporation known as BASECO was owned or controlled by President Marcos during his administration, through nominees, by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his powers, authority, or influence, and that it was by and through the same means, that BASECO had taken over the business and/or assets of the National Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc., and other government-owned or controlled entities. As evidence found in Malacanang shortly after the sudden flight of President Marcos were certificates corresponding to more than ninety-five percent (95%) of all the outstanding shares of stock of BASECO, endorsed in blank, together with deeds of assignment of practically all the outstanding shares of stock of the three (3) corporations above mentioned (which hold 95.82% of all BASECO stock), signed by the owners thereof although not notarized. While the petitioner's counsel was quick to dispute this asserted fact, assuring the Court that the BASECO stockholders were Page 382 of 411

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still in possession of their respective stock certificates and had never endorsed them in blank or to anyone else, that denial is exposed by his own prior and subsequent recorded statements as a mere gesture of defiance rather than a verifiable factual declaration. In accordance with Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2 promulgated by President Corazon Aquino, PCGG through its commissioners and agent ordered sequestration, takeover and other provisional orders affecting BASECO. Commissioner Diaz invoked the provisions of Section 3 (c) of Executive Order No. 1, empowering the Commission —To provisionally takeover in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities. ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the right against self-Incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures. HELD: No. The right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.

B.18 IMMUNITY FROM STATUTES Immunity from Statutes, Case 1: Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994 FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices. However he was granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However, the record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the Page 383 of 411

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prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force. HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG. In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is being tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy the requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault. Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which under the law has the power to grant immunity. TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED: 1. Transactional Immunity - is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. 2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

Immunity from Statutes, Case 2: Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010 FACTS: On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio, as an executive in the latter's companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Page 384 of 411

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Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the Republic's application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify before it. Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the PCGGs power to grant immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing evidence in court. The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened the state's policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President Marcos. The Republic further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads: Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony, Disini, despite the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony in such other cases. For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from revoking the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. ISSUE: Whether the PCGG act within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement. HELD: No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair. The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This applies with more reason in this case where Disini already Page 385 of 411

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complied with the terms of the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Immunity Agreement at a late stage would run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The Court should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The Immunity Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to get the best concessions out of it. The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it was free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair. It has been a settled rule that by seeking affirmative relief, voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan constitute waiver on the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the case. PCGG's revocation of the questioned immunity and Sandiganbayan's denial of Disini's motion to quash the subpoena were both annulled.

Immunity from Statutes, Case 3: Galman v. Pamaran, G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985 FACTS: On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside thepremises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidenceeither in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt.Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.

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Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground. The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985, the Tanodbayan having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing, the Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. On 3 June1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the saidResolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the proceeding before the Agrava Board. HELD: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the proceedings." Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and coparticipants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. Among Page 387 of 411

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this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were right away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows "That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.

B. 19 EXCESSIVE FINES AND CRUEL AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS Excessive Fines and cruel and Inhuman Punishments, Case 1: Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 FACTS: Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days. The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz. Corpuz argued as follows: a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

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b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy. c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved. d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction ISSUES: 1. Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence) 2. Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence? 3. What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence? 4. May a sole witness be considered credible? HELD: 1. Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. 2. No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information: 1. The designation of the offense by the statute; 2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; 3. The name of the offended party; and 4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. 3. Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: Page 389 of 411

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(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was tantamount to a demand. 4. Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. Excessive Fines and cruel and Inhuman Punishments, Case 2: Leo Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998 FACTS: The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659. The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international Page 390 of 411

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covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground. The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections. The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegaray’s arguments. The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition. Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory. ISSUE: Whether death by lethal injection is a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. HELD: No. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel. Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials. Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. Page 391 of 411

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First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

B. 20 DOUBLE JEOPARDY Double Jeopardy, Case 1: People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA 207 (2000) FACTS: Three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide - were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed. Page 392 of 411

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On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law. The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt. Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concept of double jeopardy have been sourced from American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United States and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course. ISSUE: Whether double jeopardy should be allowed. HELD: No. No person shall be twice put in Jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act [Section 21, Art III of the Constitution] The Court held that the petition shall be dismissed on two grounds: (1) Honorato Galvez is already dead so the petition become moot and academic, and (2) Petitioner has failed to show that public respondent had acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rule 65: Review on errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion Rule 45: Review on evaluation of evidence and factual findings Page 393 of 411

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The acquittal must be valid in order for the judgment to end the case and could not be appealed or reopened without being put in double jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy, Case 2: Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 635 SCRA 191 (2010) FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless Page 394 of 411

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imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MeTC: denied the motion to quash RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty. ISSUE: Whether Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property 1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes. 2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-offense Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

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3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

Double Jeopardy, Case 3: People v. Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987) FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed Page 396 of 411

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against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia. ISSUE: Whether the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code. HELD: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.

Double Jeopardy, Case 4: People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1995 FACTS: On or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, the accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.

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Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the second crime. ISSUE: Whether double jeopardy may be invoked. HELD: No. The SC held then that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes — one for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and two, for homicide or murder. In the meantime, however, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8294, 27 which lowered the penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Further, Section 1, third par. of R.A. No. 8294 provides — If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Double Jeopardy, Case 5: Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015 FACTS: Accused was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165), but during the trial, the witness of the prosecution failed to appear, thus, the court issued an order dismissing the information provisionally with the express consent of the accused. There was a motion to re-open the case explaining that the reason for the witness’ failure to appear was due to the sudden death of his father-in-law which was granted. Accused questioned the order contending that the provisional dismissal amounted to his acquittal. ISSUE: Whether the provisional dismissal of criminal cases nos. Q-1 1-173055-56 with the consent of the accused but predicated on failure to prosecute which violates the Page 398 of 411

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right of the accused to speedy trial is not equivalent to an acquittal, such that its revival would constitute double jeopardy. HELD: When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the period provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. In no uncertain terms the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to present its evidence. There was nothing in the records showing the accused’s opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law. Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused’s motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto.

Double Jeopardy, Case 6: Lejano v. People, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, December 14, 2010 FACTS: The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted accused, namely: Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses." Page 399 of 411

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ISSUE: Whether a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered. HELD: No, as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered for it places the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible, but the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Althou complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. He did not specify that violations of due process and acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. Vizconde did not also alleged that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. What the complainant actually questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility. That the court committed grave error in finding Alfaro as not a credible witness. The complaint wants the court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such evaluation which is not constitutionally allowed and therefore, the judgment of acquittal can no longer be disturbed.

Double Jeopardy, Case 7: Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017 FACTS: On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision disposing: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit. On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration of the decision. In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the charge against Page 400 of 411

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them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Court to deny the motion for reconsideration. In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied its day in court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations against them. ISSUE: Whether the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. HELD: Yes. Granting the motion for reconsideration would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution states that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment. In the present case, the Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition. It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.

Double Jeopardy, Case 8: Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777, and De Asis Delfin v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172792, October 19, 2011

FACTS: This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally Go) accusing petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of having committed the crime of bigamy. On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two children. Later, Sally Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco." Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. Page 401 of 411

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The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to Sally Go.The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-66783. After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the prosecution presented and offered its evidence. On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. This was granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003. On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt. His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show that he and the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married Resally, were one and the same person. In its December 3, 2003 Order, the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence. It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with Resally. Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because the prosecution failed to establish that Resally married Benjamin, Jr. Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.'s admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship. The CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge. Petitioners' motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 22, 2006. ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire into the factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the constitutional right of herein petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. (Bangayan vs. Go G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011) Page 402 of 411

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HELD: Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred from appealing the RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy. They insist that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the lower court for further proceedings because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on the prosecution of the accused for the same offense. On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of discretion, rendering the same null and void. A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy. The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights (Article III) contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit: (1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. (2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where Page 403 of 411

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the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication. In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial court's order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy. (Bangayan vs. Go G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011)

Double Jeopardy, Case 9: Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, September 17, 2014 FACTS: On August 12, 2005, the private respondents, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and Aderito Z. Yujuico, both directors and officers of STRADEC, filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (B.P. 68), against the petitioners and a certain Giovanni Casanova, then accountant of STRADEC. After preliminary investigation, the petitioners were charged under two (2) Informations for violation of Section 74of B.P. 68. The first criminal information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89723; while the second, was docketed as CriminalCase No. 89724. These cases were raffled to Branch 69 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasig City, presided by Judge Jacqueline J. Ongpauco-Cortel. Page 404 of 411

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On the same date, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest Pending Determination with the MTC. The petitioners asserted that the private respondents failed to adduce evidence to support a finding of probable cause against them. They also alleged that their act of refusing to turn over STRADEC’s stock and transfer books to the private respondents was not punishable under the Corporation Code. While G.R. No. 180416 remains pending before Supreme Court, the MTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724 on June 18, 2007 (Order of Dismissal), pursuant to the RTC-Branch 154’s Order. ISSUE: Whether reinstatement or revival of Criminal Case No. 89724 place the petitioners in double jeopardy. HELD: There is no double jeopardy because the MTC, which ordered the dismissal of the criminal case, is not a court of competent jurisdiction. Since the MTC clearly had no jurisdiction to issue the Order of Dismissal and the Order of Revival, there can be no double jeopardy. Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended provides: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. x xx Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.18 In this case, there is no question that the first four requisites are present in the case at bar. However, in view of the nullity of the Order of Dismissal and the Order of Revival, the fifth requisite – that the accused be acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent – is absent.

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Double Jeopardy, Case 10: People v. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014 FACTS: On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation was filed before the charging siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie) and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information contained the following accusatory allegations: That on or about September 21, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating together with one malefactor whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence, and intimidation,to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board his car and travelling along C.M. Recto Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , this City, by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the latter his beltbag; that on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein accused, Page 406 of 411

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in pursuance of their conspiracy, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse of superior strength upon the said JAIME M.ESPINO and that when the latter resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed weapons on x x x different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and afterwhich, divest, take, rob and carry away a beltbag, wallet, necklace, watch and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to said JAIME M. ESPINO. ISSUE: Whether the accused can be held liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide instead of murder. HELD: Yes. The appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. "Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent togain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing ismerely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery’. It is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to death. However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was to commit robbery against Espino.This intention was confirmed by the accused’s taking of Espino’s belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death. The killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason oron occasion of the robbery.

B.21 EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER

FACTS:

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder, Case 1: Valeroso v. People, 546 SCRA 450 (2008)

On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person. The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the Page 407 of 411

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room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt. Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid HELD: No. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within the area of his immediate control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be “in his immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder, Case 2: Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Carpio Morales, 740 SCRA 368 (2014) FACTS: Petitioner seeks recourse from this Court, arguing that contrary to the decision of the Ombudsman, the offense under Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has not yet prescribed. Petitioner insists that the prescriptive period should only commence to run on January 6, 2003 when it filed the Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, and not on January 4, 1993 when the crimes were discovered. This argument, according to petitioner, is based on Section 2 of Act No. 3326 which states that "[prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." Moreover, Section 11 of RA 3019 Page 408 of 411

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sets the prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen (15) years, not ten (10) as held by the Ombudsman. ISSUE: Whether the prescription of the offense is fifteen years. HELD: No. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA 3019. Following Our pronouncements in People v. Pacificador,[6] the rule is that "in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted." As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Big. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time.

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder, Case 3: Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) v. Teves, 661 SCRA 589 (2011) FACTS: On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria Page 409 of 411

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and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. (BOCEA vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589)

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder, Case 4: United State v. Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde, G.R. No. L-18208, February 14, 1922 FACTS: On December 30, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the defendants a contract evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed from the latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said contract, the said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day of January, 1916.

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On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120 and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law. ISSUE: Whether the defendants violated Act No. 2655. HELD: No. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its validity, construction, or discharge. In the present case, making Act No. 2655 applicable to the act complained of which had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, would give it an ex post facto operation. An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal. Ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant. The decision of the lower court is revoked and the complaint dismissed.

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