Ep Hse Sg 02 12_ep Hse Technical Standard For Hse Case Rev 1 (3) (1)
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TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
ii
DISTRIBUTION LIST Copy No.
Title
Location
1 2
PDP P&E HSE
KL KL
3 4 5
PM PI CHSE
KL KL KL
6
ODO
KL
7 8 9 10
ODT BD PD SD
KL SKO PMO SBO
11 12 13
MO (Country Manager) VO (Country Manager) TO (Country Manager)
Myanmar Vietnam Turkmenistan
14 15
IO (Country Manager) PSE
Iraq PMO
16 17
PPD PRE
PMO PMO
18
PME
PMO
19 20 21
PWE PSM BSE
PMO PMO SKO
22
BPD
SKO
23 24
BRE BME
SKO SKO
25 26 27 28
BWE BSM SSE SPD
SKO SKO SBO SBO
29 30 31 32
SRE SME SWE SSM
SBO SBO SBO SBO
NOTE: Copies are kept in each region’s online DARS and EDAS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
iii
AMENDMENT SUMMARY This sheet must be completed in detail at each revision once this document has been approved. Details must include revision number, description and indication of which pages and paragraphs have been revised, date of revision approval, approvers title and signature. Rev. 0
Description Issue of Initial Draft
Date Jan 13
Approver Title Head of E&P HSE
Name En. M Tarmizi B. Munir
Notes: 1) Document Custodian to update Amendment Record as and when amendments/new revisions are received. 2) For description of amendment the Document Custodian should indicate correction, modification, and update or delete issue. 3) Document Custodian to enter their company reference number, sign and date the record of entry. 4) Where part amendments are issued, the relevant page(s) will be identified with a lower case letter in the revision status line in the header
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ........................................................................ I DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................. II AMENDMENT SUMMARY ..................................................... III 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 8 1.1 1.2
Purpose ............................................................................................. 8 Scope ............................................................................................... 8
1.3 1.4 1.5
General Definitions ................................................................................ 9 Requirement for HSE Case...................................................................... 9 Drilling Units........................................................................................ 9
1.6
Offshore and Onshore Production facilities ................................................... 9 1.6.1 1.6.2 1.6.3
Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) ............................. 9 HSE Case Purpose ................................................................. 10 HSE Cases ........................................................................... 10
1.6.4 1.6.5 1.6.6
CIMAH and the HSE Case requirement ......................................... 11 PETRONAS HSE Case ............................................................ 12 PETRONAS HSE Cases and Third Party Operations ......................... 12
1.6.7
Temporary Changes / Mode of Operation ....................................... 12
1.6.8
HSE Case for HSE-Critical Operations .......................................... 13
2 HSE CASE AND TECHNICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS SAFETY (TIPS) .............................................................................. 14 2.1 2.2
Major Accident Hazards ........................................................................ 15 Risk Acceptance Criteria ....................................................................... 17 2.2.1 Individual Risk ....................................................................... 18 2.2.2 Societal Risk ......................................................................... 19
2.3 2.4
Critical Drawings ................................................................................ 19 Independent Verification ....................................................................... 20
3 CONCEPT SELECT HSE CASE ........................................... 22 3.1
Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 22 3.1.1 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Custodian ................................... 22 3.1.2 HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 22 3.1.3 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser .................................... 23 3.1.4
Project Manager ..................................................................... 23
4 DESIGN HSE CASE ......................................................... 24 4.1
Brownfield Projects ............................................................................. 26
4.2 4.3 4.4
Accelerated Projects ............................................................................ 26 Workforce Involvement ......................................................................... 27 Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 27 4.4.1 Design Phase HSE Case Custodian ............................................. 27 4.4.2 4.4.3
HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 27 HSE Case Endorser ................................................................ 28
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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4.4.4 4.4.5
HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 28 Project Manager ..................................................................... 28
4.4.6 4.4.7
Technical Authorities ............................................................... 28 Maintenance Team ................................................................. 28
5 OPERATIONS HSE CASE .................................................. 30 5.1 5.2
Workforce Involvement ......................................................................... 32 Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 32 5.2.1 Operation Phase HSE Case Custodian ......................................... 32 5.2.2 HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 33 5.2.3
HSE Case Endorser ................................................................ 33
5.2.4 5.2.5 5.2.6
HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 34 Project Manager ..................................................................... 34 Technical Authorities ............................................................... 35
5.2.7
Operations and Maintenance Team .............................................. 35
6 MOTHBALLING / DECOMMISSIONING / DISPOSAL HSE CASE .. 36 6.1
Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 36 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4
Decommissioning Phase HSE Case Custodian ................................ 36 HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 37 HSE Case Endorser ................................................................ 37 HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 37
6.1.5 6.1.6 6.1.7
Project Manager ..................................................................... 37 Technical Authorities ............................................................... 37 Operations and Maintenance Team .............................................. 37
7 DRILLING UNITS HSE CASE .............................................. 39 7.1
Drilling Roles and Responsibilities ........................................................... 41 7.1.1 Head of Drilling, E&P ............................................................... 41 7.1.2 Head of Drilling (Technology & Engineering), DRE ............................ 41 7.1.3 7.1.4
Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) ............................................. 41 Head of Drilling Operations (DRO) ............................................... 41
8 HSE CASE STRUCTURE ................................................... 42 9 PART 1: OVERVIEW ........................................................ 43 9.1
Facilities Description ............................................................................ 43 9.1.1 Overview of the Installation ........................................................ 44 9.1.2
9.2 9.3
10
Facility and Process Description .................................................. 44
Remedial Action Plan (RAP) .................................................................. 45 Statement of Fitness ............................................................................ 45
PART 2: MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS .......................... 48
10.1 10.2
HEMP ............................................................................................. 48 Major Accident Hazards Identification ....................................................... 50
10.3
Hazard Inventory ................................................................................ 50
10.4
Facility Hazard and Effects Register ......................................................... 51
10.5 10.6
Safety Critical Elements ........................................................................ 51 Bowtie Assessment ............................................................................. 56
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10.6.1 Barrier and Control Effectiveness ................................................ 60 10.7 Performance Standards ........................................................................ 62 Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) ............................... 63 Hazard Control Picture and Sheets .......................................................... 64
10.8 10.9
10.9.1
ALARP Demonstration ............................................................. 64
10.9.2 Hazard and Barrier Assessment .................................................. 67 10.10 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) 69 10.10.1 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) ....................................... 69 10.10.2 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)............................................. 69 10.10.3 10.10.4 10.11
11
MOPO and SIMOPS Workshops ................................................. 70 MOPO and SIMOPS template .................................................... 71
Operational Envelope........................................................................... 72
PART 3: CONTROL OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS ....... 74
11.1 11.2
Barriers and Safety Critical Elements ........................................................ 74 Identified facility SCEs.......................................................................... 76
11.3
Safety Critical Features ........................................................................ 77
11.4
Technical Integrity ............................................................................... 77
11.5
Safety Critical Element Register .............................................................. 78
12
PART 4: SYSTEMS .................................................... 79
12.1
HSE Critical Activities........................................................................... 79
12.2 12.3 12.4
Activity Sheets ................................................................................... 84 Competency to undertake activities for managing major hazards ....................... 84 Essential Procedures to Manage MAH ...................................................... 85
12.5
Critical Activity Matrix ........................................................................... 85 12.5.1 Function of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix .......................................... 86 12.5.2 Development of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix .................................... 86
13
MAIN SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR THE HSE CASE .... 87
13.1 13.2
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Requirements .......................................... 87 Scope of Assessment .......................................................................... 87
13.3
FSA Tools ........................................................................................ 88
14 14.1 14.2 14.3
HSE CASE REVIEW ................................................... 92 HSE Case Communication .................................................................... 92 Review Requirement ........................................................................... 92 Frequency of Review ........................................................................... 92 14.3.1 14.3.2 14.3.3
Major Modification to the facilities and operations ............................. 93 Findings from Other HSE Risk Assessments ................................... 93 Findings from Assurance Exercise ............................................... 93
14.3.4
Lesson Learnt........................................................................ 93
REFERENCES ................................................................... 94
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS The abbreviations and acronyms used in this document shall have the following meaning: AC .......................... Alternating Current ACD ........................ Accelerated Competency Development AIV ......................... Acoustic Induced Vibration ALARP ..................... As Low As is Reasonably Practicable BA .......................... Breathing Apparatus BS .......................... British Standards BTEX ....................... Benzene Toluene Ethylbenzene and Xylene CFD......................... Computational Fluid Dynamics CIMAH ..................... Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards CO .......................... Carbon Monoxide DCS ........................ Distributed Control System DoE......................... Department of Environment DOSH ...................... Department of Occupational Safety and Health DOSO ...................... Demonstration of Safe Operation DP .......................... Dynamic Positioning DRD ........................ Drilling Development DRE ........................ Drilling Exploration DRI ......................... Drilling Intervention DRO ........................ Drilling Operations DRX ........................ Drilling Exploration EDG ........................ Emergency Diesel Generator EDP......................... Emergency Depressurisation EERA ....................... Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis EIA ......................... Environmental Impact Assessment EEMUA .................... Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association EN .......................... European Norm EPS ......................... Early Production System ERP ......................... Emergency Response Plan ESD ........................ Emergency Shutdown ESDV....................... Emergency Shutdown Valve ESSA ....................... Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis ETA ......................... Event Tree Analysis FAT ......................... Factory Acceptance Test FEED ....................... Front End Engineering Design
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REVISION 1.0
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FERA ....................... Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment FPSO ....................... Floating Production Storage and Offloading FRED ....................... Fire Radiation Explosion and Dispersion FSA ......................... Formal Safety Assessment FSO......................... Floating Storage and Offloading FTA ......................... Fault Tree Analysis FW .......................... Fire Water GHSED .................... Group Health Safety and Environment Department HAC ........................ Hazardous Area Classification HAZID ..................... Hazard Identification HAZOP..................... Hazard and Operability HC .......................... Hydrocarbon HCS ........................ Hazard Control Sheets HCU ........................ Home Country Unit HEMP ...................... Hazard Effect and Management Process HIPPS ...................... High Integrity Pressure Protection System HIV ......................... Human Immunodeficiency Virus HRA ........................ Health Risk Assessment HSE......................... Health Safety and Environment HSEMS .................... Health Safety and Environment Management System HVAC ...................... Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning IADC ....................... International Association of Drilling Contractors ICB ......................... Independent Competent Body IPF .......................... Instrumented Protective Function IRPA........................ Individual Risk Per Annum ISO ......................... International Organisation for Standardisation ITPM ....................... Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance JHA ......................... Job Hazard Analysis JV ........................... Joint Venture KPI ......................... Key Performance Indicators LNG ........................ Liquefied Natural Gas LOPA ....................... Layers of Protection Analysis LPG ......................... Liquefied Petroleum Gas MAE ........................ Major Accident Event MAH ........................ Major Accident Hazard MATTE ..................... Major Accident To The Environment MEK ........................ Methyl Ethyl Ketone
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MH .......................... Major Hazard MODU...................... Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit MOPO ...................... Manual of Permitted Operations MS .......................... Management System MSDS ...................... Material Safety Data Sheet MTBE....................... Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether NA .......................... Not Applicable NDT ........................ Non Destructive Testing NFHA....................... Non Flammable Hazard Assessment NGL ........................ Natural Gas Liquids OP .......................... Operating Procedures OPU ........................ Overseas Production Unit P&E HSE .................. Projects and Engineering HSE PETRONAS ............... Petroliam Nasional Berhad PFP ......................... Passive Fire Protection PHA......................... Process Hazard Analysis PHAST ..................... Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool PLL ......................... Potential Loss of Life POB ........................ Persons on Board PS ........................... Protection Systems PTS ......................... PETRONAS Technical Standard PTW ........................ Permit To Work QRA ........................ Quantitative Risk Assessment RAM ........................ Risk Assessment Matrix RAP ......................... Remedial Action Plan SAT ......................... Site Acceptance Test SCE......................... Safety Critical Element SIL.......................... Safety Integrity Level SIMOPS ................... Simultaneous Operations SIPCON ................... Simultaneous Production and Construction SIPCOM ................... Simultaneous Production and Commissioning SIPROD ................... Simultaneous Production and Drilling SISO ....................... Specific Instruction for Simultaneous Operations SME ........................ Subject Matter Expert SSIV ....................... Subsea Isolation Valve TEMPSC ................... Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft TIPS ........................ Technical Integrity Process Safety
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Exploration and Production
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TR........................... Temporary Refuge TRSIA...................... Temporary Refuge Smoke Ingress Assessment UK .......................... United Kingdom UPS......................... Uninterruptable Power Supply
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
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INTRODUCTION
1.1
Purpose
8
This document details the requirements for both the purpose and contents of the HSE Case and provides guidance on its development. The document aims to:
Define the business accountability in delivering HSE case across the asset lifecycle
Define what the HSE case requirements are and how it is to be used during each lifecycle phase of the asset
Reference the relevant PETRONAS PTS documents associated with the implementation of this standard
Develop an understanding of how HSE case reports are to be delivered.
The HSE Case shall be a demonstration that major accident hazard risks associated with PETRONAS E&P operations are adequately managed throughout the lifecycle of the asset, and do not pose harm to personnel working at the facility, as well as to the nearby community, where relevant. The HSE Case shall serve as an official document that can be used to demonstrate that the facility is designed, operated and maintained so that the risk exposure to the personnel working at the facility, as well as to the nearby community, is broadly acceptable or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The ALARP demonstration standard used for the assessments shall be acceptable to PETRONAS E&P and in accordance with best current industry practice. The contents of the HSE Case shall be comprehensive, incorporating descriptions of the facility, the potential hazards due to the facility’s operations, as well as relevant risk assessments evaluating the adequacy of control and mitigation for major accident hazards (MAH).
1.2
Scope The requirements defined in this standard shall be applicable throughout PETRONAS E&P global operations, including Company owned facilities operated by the Contractors and Sub-contractors. Additionally, the requirements specified in this technical standard shall be complied with for facilities shared with other Operators (JV operations). However, if the other Operator has equivalent HSE Case requirements then these may be adopted provided:
All the essential elements in minimizing the risks associated with the facility have been addressed
The requirements made under this standard are met or exceeded.
In these situations, this standard shall be the minimum acceptable standard.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
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DATE:
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This standard specifically excludes the completion of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). This shall be the subject of a separate study / document. All facilities shall complete an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in accordance with the requirements detailed in PTS 60.3206 Environmental Impact Assessment Guideline [7]. However, the HSE Case shall also demonstrate adequate management of any Major Accident To The Environment (MATTE) event that is identified and appropriate to the facility operations. In addition, occupational health risk assessments shall be identified during consideration of the Health Hazards during the HAZID study (PTS 60.2004) [5] and further analysed in accordance with the PETRONAS standard PTS 60.1400.01 Health Risk Assessment [6].
1.3
General Definitions The intent of the following words are:
1.4
Shall, Will, Must means that the action is mandatory across PETRONAS facilities
Should, Would, If possible means that an action is not mandatory but is recommended
May means that an action is optional and no recommendation is made as to whether or not it should be implemented.
Requirement for HSE Case The HSE Case document, including the associated safety studies, shall be developed for the following facilities for all phases of the asset lifecycle;
1.5
Drilling Units in accordance with IADC Guidelines [10][11]
Onshore and Offshore Production Facilities, including FSO, FPSO, Oil and Gas Terminals, intra and inter-field pipelines, pipelines, block valve stations, etc.
Drilling Units The Drilling Contractor shall demonstrate to PETRONAS E&P that its organization is committed to manage, control and mitigate all risks inherent with drilling activities through development of HSE Case for the drilling unit.
1.6
Offshore and Onshore Production facilities
1.6.1
Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) HEMP is a structured methodology for the identification of HSE hazards and assessment of the associated risks, with the development of control and recovery measures that reduce the HSE risks to ‘acceptable’ or As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels, see Figure 2-3. HEMP must show that all HSE hazards have been systematically identified in
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
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the Hazards & Effects Register, inclusive of relevant risk classification (e.g. High, Medium and Low). Guidelines for HEMP are provided in the PETRONAS Technical Standard (PTS) PTS 60.0401 [3]. It should be noted that whilst HEMP may include consideration of security risks, these are not required to form part of the HSE Case submission.
1.6.2
HSE Case Purpose The HSE Case must demonstrate in relation to the subject site or facility:
That all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) have been identified in the Hazards and Effects Register and suitable control, mitigation and recovery measures are provided/ implemented (for existing facilities or operations). It must be demonstrated that operation can be achieved within the PETRONAS quantitative criteria for risk tolerability and that risk exposure has been reduced to ‘acceptable’ or ALARP levels.
That all HSE risks - including those resulting from Medium and Low Risk Hazards - will be managed and controlled via the PETRONAS or project/ site/ operations specific HSE Management System.
That Emergency Response Plans (on-site and off-site where necessary) in relation to Major Accident Hazards have been prepared based on credible emergency scenarios, with the necessary stakeholder consultation.
All production facilities, including those operated by Contractors, shall have an HSE Case prior to commencement of the operations. The HSE Case shall, as a minimum, comply with:
The regulatory requirement of the Country where the subject site or facility operates
The PETRONAS Company requirements as set out in this standard.
It is required that this Technical Standard shall be a minimum standard or where there are local regulatory requirements, the more stringent shall be adhered to. In cases where the production operations’ facilities are operated by a Contractor within a field e.g. FPSO, an HSE Case shall be required. However, it shall be developed separately from the Company operatedfacilities. The HSE Case shall meet the minimum requirements stipulated in this standard.
1.6.3
HSE Cases An HSE Case is a living document that considers the full lifecycle of project, facilities and operations. It must address the safety impacts in each of the life cycle phases i.e. project conception, design, tender, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning, abandonment and site restoration of a project.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
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REVISION 1.0
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Figure 1-1 – Project Life Cycle and HSE Case Reports
1.6.4
CIMAH and the HSE Case requirement The HSE Case required by this standard shall be considered to be in addition to the requirements of the Malaysian DOSH or any other national legislation that may be in-force at the facility location. HSE Case Onshore and offshore facilities are required by this standard to demonstrate how safe operation of the facility is achieved. The frequency of the HSE Case review cycle shall be no more than at an interval of 5-years. However, a review and update of the facility HSE Case will be required when any major modification to the facility occurs. CIMAH Report Malaysian onshore facilities are required by the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulation 1996 [16] and/or equivalent Host Country requirement to complete a Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) report that demonstrates the safe operation of the facility. The frequency of the CIMAH report review and submission is every three (3) years, with the exception for any major modification to the facility which requires CIMAH Report to be updated. The HSE Case requirements set out by this document shall be met by the incorporation of an addendum to the CIMAH report that contains the additional information required. For onshore facilities in Malaysia that do not require submission of a CIMAH report but require completion of a Demonstration of Safe Operation (DOSO) may still be capable of posing a Major Accident Hazard. Therefore, the requirements set out in this standard shall be met either as an addendum to the DOSO report or as a separate HSE Case.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
1.6.5
DOCUMENT NO :
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PETRONAS HSE Case Specifically for the preparation of the HSE Case, PETRONAS identifies the following four stages as they relate to sequential time windows and a HSE Case is required for each of these:
1.6.6
Stage 1: Concept Select Phase
Stage 2: Detailed Design.
Stage 3: Operation.
Stage 4: Mothballing / Decommissioning / Abandonment / Disposal.
PETRONAS HSE Cases and Third Party Operations Table 1-1 details the requirements for compliance with this standard when the asset is either not owned or operated by PETRONAS or is linked in some way to a third party asset such as a Floating Storage Unit (FSU) or pipeline, etc. Table 1-1 – HSE Case requirements PETRONAS HSE Case (inc. FSA) and HSE MS PETRONAS owned operated assets
and
PETRONAS owned operated by 3rd Party
asset
PETRONAS operated owned by 3rd Party
asset
Contractor HSE Case and HSE MS with Acceptance by PETRONAS (inc. FSA)
Required Required Required
3rd Party owned and operated assets (e.g. FSU, FSO, FPSO, pipeline, etc.)
Required
In the situation where the PETRONAS asset is linked or connected to a third party owned and operated facility, then the HSE Case Approver for the PETRONAS facility shall as a minimum review and accept the adequacy of the HSE Case developed by the third party that covers their assets / facilities. In addition, the Formal Safety Assessment and HSE MS must be reviewed and accepted by the HSE Case Approver as being adequate.
1.6.7
Temporary Changes / Mode of Operation In the situation where there are temporary changes to be made to an existing facility and / or operation, the HSE Case shall be updated to reflect the changes made to the facility or its altered mode of operation. For example, if a normally producing well head platform is changed to a water injection platform for later enhanced oil recovery then the HSE
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
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Case shall be updated to reflect the temporary mode of operation / configuration.
1.6.8
HSE Case for HSE-Critical Operations For complete hazard management, consideration within the HSE Case should be given for non-process related HSE-Critical Operations, such as:
Aviation Operations
Road and Marine Operations
Seismic Operations
As well as any other critical activities that may pose any major hazards to the operations.
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HSE CASE AND TECHNICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS SAFETY (TIPS) The aim of TIPS is to put into operation the PETRONAS Mandatory Control Framework. This is achieved by focusing on defining and confirming that assets are performing their required function effectively and efficiently whilst safeguarding life, assets, environment and the company reputation. The TIPS process can be represented as a 5 stage TIPS flowchart, and is shown in Figure 2-1 below. Figure 2-1 – Technical Integrity Process Safety (TIPS) Flowchart STAGE 5 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES STAGE 1 IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS •Likelihood •Consequence •Risk
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
STAGE 2 IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
MAH SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT QRA, EERA, ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRSIA, F&G Mapping, HAC, etc.
SCE SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT REVIEW, SCHEDULED UPDATES, AND CHANGE CONTROL PROCEDURES
•Avoid •Prevent •Control / Mitigate •Emergency Response
STAGE 3 DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
VERIFICATION SCHEME
FACILITY HSE CASE
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Functionality •Availability •Reliability •Survivability •Interactions / Dependencies
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 4 DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT ASSURANCE PROCESSES
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Test •Inspect •Maintain
STAGE 5 MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Identify •Manage Interim Risk Until Resolution •Repair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
The TIPS program has five main stages:
Identification of Major Accident Hazards
Identification of Safety Critical Elements, management of Major Accident Hazards
involved
in
the
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Identification of Performance Standards for these Safety Critical Elements
Identification of the Assurance processes that maintain or ensure the continued suitability of the Safety Critical Elements, and that these are meeting the Performance Standards
Verification that all steps have been undertaken, and this that Major Accident Hazards are being controlled
The HSE Case and associated Performance Standards shall be in accordance with the TIPS program and as a minimum shall describe the MAH, SCEs and appropriate Performance Standards for each phase of the project life cycle.
2.1
Major Accident Hazards The HSE Case is the principal document that is used to identify the Major Accident Hazards (MAH) and consequently identify and confirm the barriers that are in place that prevent or mitigate the consequences of the MAH. A Major Accident Hazard is typically a low probability, high consequence event, which requires a different approach to the occupational safety management processes. Occupational safety management programmes are associated with the higher frequency but lower consequence type of events such as falls from height. The basic reason for this is that while single failures can cause dangerous occurrences, Major Accidents do not generally happen as a result of a failure of one piece of equipment or one wrong action by an individual. Instead, they are epitomised by a series of failures of plant, personnel functions, processes and procedures. Following a major accident, it is not unusual for personnel within a company to reflect that all the signs of the likelihood of the eventual accident were evident. However, the operating company and personnel had been unable to recognise this and make the necessary changes to plant, people and processes, which become obvious and natural to do, after such an accident. The UK HSE Case Regulations [13] defines a MAH as an incident which leads to extensive damage to an asset, major impact to company reputation and / or severe or catastrophic consequences to people. These include:
Fire, explosion or other release of a dangerous substance involving death or serious injury
Any event involving major damage to the structure or loss of stability
Helicopter collision
Failure of diver systems
Any other work activity event involving death or serious injury to more than one person
This definition does not deal with the protection of the marine and/or onshore environment from the consequences of a major accident.
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16
However, safeguarding the integrity of installations and reducing the risks to people from MAHs will also help to reduce threats to the marine and onshore environment from the accidental release of hydrocarbons or process fluids. Therefore, in addition to the above definition, a Major Accident will be considered to have occurred if it:
Results from the uncontrolled developments at the facility / site
Leads to serious danger to people or to the environment, both on and off site
Uncontrolled developments may be due to on and off site factors that are unable to be influenced or the opportunity to control or influence has been lost. Offsite factors may be adverse weather conditions, sea state, earthquakes, etc. Onsite factors are events that escalate so that they are beyond the normal span of the operating envelope over which control can be exercised. A Major Accident must have the potential to cause serious danger but it is not necessary for that danger to be realised. Serious danger to people means a risk of death, serious physical injury or harm to health. Serious danger to the environment should be considered as an accident having the potential to result in:
The death or adverse effects on local populations of species or organisms
Significant contamination of drinking water supplies, ground or ground water
Damage to designated areas, habitats or populations within the areas
Permanent or long term damage to widespread habitats
Significant or long term damage to marine or aquatic environment
It is important to note that the HSE Case shall only consider Major Accidents that have the potential to cause harm from the occurrence of a single, unexpected and unplanned, acute exposure, release or event (e.g. fire, explosion). This Technical Standard specifically excludes from the HSE Case any occupational health hazards and environmental discharges other than those that are considered to represent a MATTE event. Typically, the Hazard Identification study (HAZID) shall identify the occupational and environmental hazards using the guidewords listed in Appendix 1 of the PTS 60.2004 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Guideline [5] or the Generic Hazard List shown in Appendix 3. These occupational and environmental hazards shall be the subject of separate assessments in accordance with the relevant PETRONAS Technical Standards. For example, PTS 60.3202 Environmental Aspects and Impacts Assessment Guide [7], PTS 60.1400.01 Guideline Health Risk Assessment [6], etc. The classification of hazards as MAH is determined by risk ranking using PETRONAS Risk Assessment Matrix. Major Accident Hazards are represented by risks ranked as Red – VERY HIGH (E4, E5, D5), Orange –
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
17
HIGH (B5, C5, D4, E3) and Yellow (A5) as shown in the bounded region of Figure 2-2 below. Figure 2-2– PETRONAS E&P HSE Risk Matrix [12]
LIKELIHOOD
IMPACT
Severity
1 Insignificant
2 Minor
3 Moderate
4 Major
5 Catastrophic
People
Slight Injury
Minor Injury
Major Injury
Single Fatality
Multiple Fatalities
Asset
Slight Damage
Minor Damage
Local Damage
Major Damage
Extensive Damage
Environment
Slight Impact
Minor Impact
Localized Impact
Major Impact
Massive Impact
Reputation
Slight Impact
Limited Impact
Major National Impact
Major International Impact
Considerable Impact
E Almost Certain
Happens several times per year at location
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
D Likely
Happens several times per year in company
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
C Possible
Incident has occurred in our company
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
B Unlikely
Heard of incident in industry
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
A Remotely likely to happen
Never heard of in industry
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
2.2
Risk Acceptance Criteria PETRONAS E&P has adopted risk acceptance criteria to assess the acceptability of onsite and offsite risk level posed by PETRONAS E&P facilities. These risk acceptance criteria are expressed in terms of individual risk and societal risk.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
2.2.1
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
18
Individual Risk The HSE Case must be able to demonstrate via the Formal Safety Assessment (typically the Quantitative Risk Assessment) that the facility can be designed and operated so that it poses an acceptable risk to workers and offsite population or members of the public. The acceptable risk levels are often expressed as individual risk per annum (IRPA) to worker groups or to the public. The acceptable limits for these groups are shown in Figure 2-3 below. Risk figures between the Unacceptable and Acceptable Regions require a demonstration that the risk is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risk reduction measures may be recommended, and assessed for their practicability. If none are identified or deemed practicable then the risk is deemed acceptable. The evaluation of the risk levels is typically completed as a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The HSE Case need not contain the QRA, which shall form part of the Formal Safety Assessment, but should make reference to it as appropriate. The QRA shall be completed in accordance with the PETRONAS E&P Technical Standard EP HSE SG 06 14 [9] and PTS 60.2210 [2]. Figure 2-3 – Individual risk acceptance criteria
For offshore installations the maximum tolerable limit of 10 -3 per year shall include personal (occupational) and transport accidents. Where the frequency is close to 10-3 per year acceptance that further risk reduction measures are grossly disproportionate should be only on the basis of a very rigorous demonstration. In addition to the above risk acceptance criteria, onshore facilities in Malaysia shall comply with the DoE risk acceptance criteria [20] that the 10-5 per year Location Specific Individual Risk contour must not extend beyond the site boundary. For all onshore facilities the 10 -6 per year LSIR contour shall not reach residential areas, or public buildings where vulnerable populations will be located such as schools, hospitals etc.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
2.2.2
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
19
Societal Risk For PETRONAS E&P onshore facilities only it is proposed that the Hong Kong Planning Department societal risk guidelines are used [17]. The societal risk guidelines are shown in Figure 2-4. Two f-N risk lines are used to determine what represents ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’ societal risks. It is considered unacceptable for any facility to be capable of causing greater than 1000 fatalities due to single incident irrespective of the likelihood of that particular event. An ALARP region is also incorporated which is to ensure that all practicable and costeffective measures which can reduce risks will be considered. PETRONAS E&P do not propose any group risk criteria for offshore installations. Figure 2-4 – Societal Risk Acceptance Criteria [17] 1.00E-02
Frequency of N or more Fatalities (per year)
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
Unacceptable 1.00E-05
ALARP
1.00E-06
1.00E-07
Acceptable 1.00E-08
1.00E-09 1
10
100
1000
10000
Number of Fatalities, N
2.3
Critical Drawings Critical drawings are those drawings that are required to be maintained to support implementation of any changes to the facility. They are necessary to ensure that the risks associated with the major accident hazards are adequately managed.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
20
A list of critical drawings shall be for each facility. All critical drawings shall be stored in an easily accessible database and they shall reflect the current design and status of the facility appropriate to the lifecycle of the asset. For example, during Operations Phase the drawings shall be ‘As Built’ versions. During Design phase the drawings shall be the latest available revision. The use of the easily accessible database is to ensure that personnel have reliable and up to date information to allow accurate planning and scoping of work operations and management of change. The list of critical drawings shall include but not limited to the following:
2.4
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)
Cause and Effect Matrix
Hazardous Area Classification
Facility plot plans
Site/ field layout
Escape Routes
Safety Equipment Layout
Critical Valve List including all Locked Open and Locked Closed valves
Fire and Gas detector layouts
Fixed Fire Fighting Equipment layouts
Heat and Material Balance
Fire water and deluge layout
Independent Verification PETRONAS may appoint an Independent Verification Body (IVB) to develop an effective verification scheme that ensures accurate identification of the safety critical elements (SCEs) for the installation and the adequacy of their association performance standards. In order to ensure management of the MAHs is undertaken comprehensively, it is necessary to have an integrated compliance verification process. This is to be undertaken through a process of independent verification by a defined Independent Competent Body (ICB). This ICB will be responsible for:
Challenging the identification of Major Accident Hazards
Challenging and commenting on the SCEs
Creating or being consulted in the creation of the Verification Scheme and its periodic review
Performing verification activities as defined by the Verification Scheme
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
21
Essentially the ICB is providing an independent view of the initial and on-going suitability of the SCEs to manage the risks through the means defined in the HSE Case and translated through the Performance Standards.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
3
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
22
CONCEPT SELECT HSE CASE The Concept Select HSE Case Report essentially demonstrates that the HEMP process has been systematically applied during the concept phase of the project for each of the options being considered. The purpose of the Concept Select HSE Case is to demonstrate that the lowest risk option considered during this phase has been selected. If the lowest risk option has not been selected then the Concept Select HSE Case shall demonstrate that the lowest risk concept was grossly disproportionate to the level of benefit attained. The Concept Select HSE Case shall include but not be limited to the following:
3.1
Reference to the descriptions of the options being considered
An overview of anticipated hazards, their impact and associated risk levels
A summary of the key assumptions made in the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Summaries of the philosophies and measures implemented during this phase to reduce the residual risk level to ALARP
Justification that the selected option represents the lowest overall risk or that the lowest overall risk represents is grossly disproportionate in relation to the level of benefit obtained
Recommendations regarding HSE issues to be addressed in subsequent phases of the project i.e. issues to be included in the design phase (FEED) and studies/analysis that can only be conducted meaningful during or after detailed design
Roles and responsibilities The Concept Select Phase HSE Case is required prior to progression of the selected option into Conceptual Engineering Phase and Front End Engineering and Design (FEED).
3.1.1
Concept Select Phase HSE Case Custodian He/ she is responsible for managing the relevant HEMP studies and preparing the risk tolerability and ALARP assessments. He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Concept Select Phase HSE Case report. The Concept Select Phase HSE Case custodian shall be the Project HSE engineer lead.
3.1.2
HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the relevant HEMP studies. An example of the Manager/Manager.
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
3.1.3
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
23
Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser The Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the Concept Select Phase HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P requirements. The HSE Case endorser shall be the Head of HSE Division.
3.1.4
Project Manager The Project Manager shall identify the requirement for the Concept Select Phase HSE Case. He/ she ensures that suitable and sufficient HSE resources are identified and appointed, including the Concept Select HSE Case custodian. The Project Manager is responsible for the approval of the Concept Select Phase HSE Case including the conclusions, recommendations and acceptance of the selected option.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
4
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
24
DESIGN HSE CASE The Design HSE Case Report should be completed at the end of the FEED phase and updated as appropriate during the detailed design phase to reflect any changes made. The Design HSE Case is to demonstrate that the HEMP has been systematically applied during the design phase of the project and that risks have been actively reduced to ALARP. The design HSE Case shall include but not be limited to the following aspects:
The elements of the Hazards and Effects Register that are considered to be Major Accident Hazards, which shall include an assessment of the risks associated with each hazard including the key assumptions
A summary of the HEMP studies completed including results
That all HSE risks have been identified and that Medium and Low risks that are not considered Major Accident Hazards are managed and controlled by the PETRONAS or project/ site/ operations specific HSE Management System.
The representation of each major accident hazard using Bowties or barrier analysis to enable identification of the Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) and equipment. The bowtie analysis should also identify the critical activities that ensure the identified SCE integrity.
Description of the facilities and operations.
Detailed Performance Standards covering the design, procurement, fabrication, QA/QC, installation and commissioning phases for the SCE identified sufficient for the development of Inspection Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs)
A summary of the philosophies and measures that have been implemented during the FEED phase to reduce risks to ALARP
An ALARP demonstration for considered risk reduction options and reasons for acceptance or rejection
A register of where, and providing justification as to why, the design has deviated from the PETRONAS Technical Standards
Details of how workforce involvement has been achieved in the development of the Design HSE Case
The Design HSE Case shall also identify and detail those activities, with cross reference to procedures where appropriate, that are critical for the integrity of the identified SCEs. This is to ensure that all Safety Critical Elements are designed, purchased, built, installed, operated, inspected and maintained in a manner to guarantee their continued effectiveness. The Performance Standards should detail those acceptance criteria, assurance activities and verification tasks that are applicable and appropriate to demonstrate that the facility is designed and built for HSE integrity. For example, the SCE Performance Standards may require welder’s certificates, material certificates to ensure that they are fabricated by the vendor appropriately during the fabrication phase. It may also be necessary to have Factory Acceptance Tests and Site Acceptance Tests that provide assurance that the SCE is in accordance with its Performance Standard.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
25
The Design HSE Case should be updated to address the major accident hazards during the Construction Phase of the project. It is envisaged that this will only be significant when there is likely to be simultaneous production and construction / commissioning, for example for Brownfield projects. This Design HSE Case update for construction phase should involve the generation of an addendum that provides the following as a minimum:
Construction Phase HAZID which reviews the construction methods to be used e.g. hot tapping / stoppling, heavy lifts, etc.
Construction Phase MOPO, SIMOPS and /or SISO providing information on the operation or activity operating envelope and safe operating limits during the construction phase.
For Brownfield projects only it may be beneficial to undertake a Construction Phase Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to determine the most appropriate construction and commissioning strategy e.g. facility shutdown against simultaneous construction, commissioning and operation. It may also be of use to determine the lowest risk strategy for the commissioning hazardous facilities. The construction phase QRA will typically require the existing platform risk profile and knowledge of the construction phase manning levels. It should be noted that a construction phase HAZID and SISO / SIMOPS / SIPCON / SIPCOM may be considered sufficient as a construction phase risk assessment. The requirement for conducting a construction phase QRA shall be determined by PETRONAS Projects and Engineering (P&E) HSE to ensure that the construction workers are not exposed to an unacceptable level of risk during simultaneous production and construction / commissioning.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
26
Figure 4-1 – Asset Integrity Life Cycle – Design Stage Performance Standards
4.1
Brownfield Projects Brownfield project may be categorised as follows:
Development of a new platform/ facilities that tie-in to existing production facilities
Modification of the existing facilities including infill drilling activities, power upgrade, etc.
For Brownfield projects such as development of new facilities that are to be implemented onto, or tie into, existing PETRONAS owned assets a Design HSE Case is required to be completed for the additional new project facilities. This Design HSE case shall then be incorporated into the existing Operations HSE Case prior to commissioning of the brownfield facilities by the Operations team. For modifications such as infill drilling, it may just require the update of the existing Operations HSE Case and associated FSA (e.g. QRA to include the additional risk associated with the new wells and flowlines, etc.)
4.2
Accelerated Projects For accelerated programme projects, which may be either an unconventional way of project completion or represented by a copy of an
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
27
already existing design e.g. incorporation of additional identical trains, etc. A single HSE Case may be developed that covers both the design and the operations phases of the asset. For example, the bowtie diagrams shall detail the escalation factor controls and critical activities that ensure that the facility is designed with HSE integrity. The HSE Case shall be handed over to Operations during the commissioning phase.
4.3
Workforce Involvement For Design HSE Cases, workforce involvement can be demonstrated by ensuring that the relevant staff representatives, including Operations team representatives, have been involved in the design. This may be done by ensuring they participate directly in the design activities such as HAZIDs, HAZOPs, etc. and by participating in project assurance reviews such as design reviews and audits.
4.4
Roles and responsibilities The Design Phase HSE Case should be completed by the project team at the end of the Front End Engineering phase.
4.4.1
Design Phase HSE Case Custodian He/ she is responsible for identifying and managing the relevant HEMP studies to assess the hazards and risks associated with the development. Identifies risk reduction strategies, Safety Critical Elements and defines their Performance Standards in conjunction with the SCE Technical Authorities. Ensures that there is a suitable and robust ALARP demonstration in place. Reviews and approves all action items raised for correct detail, action party and completion date. He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Design Phase HSE Case report. The Design HSE Case Custodian shall be the Lead Technical Safety Engineer.
4.4.2
HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the safety studies and the recommended control and mitigation measures to ensure the risks are ALARP. An example of the Manager/Manager.
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
4.4.3
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
28
HSE Case Endorser HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P HSE Case requirements. The HSE Case Endorser is the Head of HSE Division.
4.4.4
HSE Case Approver HSE Case Approver is responsible for approving the HSE Case, including the safety studies carried out and the recommended controls/remedial action plans arising from those studies. He/she shall also provide the required leadership and commitment in the development of HSE Case as well as implementation of any recommendations to ensure risk levels are ALARP. The HSE Case approver shall also jointly approve together with the Project Manager, the Design HSE Case. The HSE Case Approver shall be the Asset Manager or the Head of Country/Region e.g. Senior General Manager of Sarawak Operations. Where there is an inter-connection of PETRONAS facilities with facilities owned and operated by a third party, the third party facility HSE Case and FSA shall be submitted to PETRONAS and accepted as being adequate by the HSE Case Approver.
4.4.5
Project Manager The Project Manager shall identify the requirement for the Design Phase HSE Case. The Project Manager shall appoint the Design Phase HSE Case Custodian and assigns responsibilities. The Project Manager shall approve the recommendations or findings that may result from the ALARP demonstration for incorporation into the design. He / she ensures that there has been sufficient consultation with relevant parties through the Design HSE Case Development e.g. Technical Authorities, Maintenance, etc. The Project Manager shall develop the Statement of Fitness for the asset and shall also jointly approve, together with the HSE Case Approver, the Design HSE Case.
4.4.6
Technical Authorities Technical authorities are responsible for approving the Safety Critical Element listing and confirm the adequacy of the associated Performance Standards.
4.4.7
Maintenance Team The maintenance team for the facility are responsible for the development and implementation of the Assurance plan and activities
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
29
for the identified Safety Critical Elements in accordance with their Performance Standards. In addition the verification tasks should be identified.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
5
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
30
OPERATIONS HSE CASE The Operations HSE Case Report is to demonstrate that Major Accident Hazards are managed during operations so that risks remain tolerable and ALARP. The Operations HSE Case should describe the emergency response systems provided and should review the emergency response plan to confirm that the plan and systems provided adequately cover the identified major accident hazards. The Operations HSE Case shall describe the list of SCE Critical Tasks that must be performed to ensure that the protection and mitigation measures provided remain effective. The critical task list should also define roles and responsibilities for performing the identified activity. The Operations HSE Case is to be developed from and make reference to the Design HSE Case. The Design HSE Case shall be updated during detailed design to become the initial Operations HSE Case prior to facility handover and shall be based on ‘As Built’ documentation where necessary. The Operations HSE Case shall include, but not be limited to the following:
An introduction, a description of the facilities and operations that are covered by the HSE Case.
A Matrix Of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) together with a description of how the relevant management system is implemented. These shall be derived using the templates provided in Appendix 11.
Details of the hazards and their sources and controls associated with the operation. This should reference the Design HSE Case, risk reduction measures, the identified Safety Critical Elements and their Performance Standards.
Detailed Performance Standards covering the operational phase for the identified SCEs sufficient for the inclusion into specific asset maintenance and inspection plans / routines.
Details of the SCE Critical Tasks that have to be performed to ensure that the Performance Standards are met for the SCEs. This shall include inspection, maintenance activities (e.g. preventative), frequency of inspection, etc.
Details of the emergency response systems provided and a review of the facility emergency response plan.
The Operations HSE Case Report must review the facility Emergency Response Plan and facilities to ensure that all the identified Major Accident Events are addressed and adequate provisions made for the successful escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel.
Details of how the workforce involvement has been achieved in the development of the Operations HSE Case
The performance standards should consider the Functionality, Availability, Reliability, Survivability and Inter-dependencies (FARSI) of the SCE. They should detail the minimum acceptance criteria, assurance
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
31
activities and verification tasks that are applicable and appropriate under FARSI to demonstrate that the facility can be operated for HSE integrity. Figure 5-1 – Asset Integrity Life Cycle – Operations Stage Performance Standards
The Operations HSE Case essentially should describe how to operate to maintain HSE Integrity. The following requirements must be considered:
The Operations HSE Case Report must address all HSE aspects of routine and non-routine operations and must be based on finalised construction, which may include modifications from earlier detailed design and/or late changes in predicted impacts.
The Operations HSE Case Report is essentially an update of the earlier Design HSE Case Report.
The Operations HSE Case Report must be reviewed and updated every 5 years or when major equipment modifications significantly alter the HSE impacts and/or hazards within the 5-year interval.
The Operations HSE Case must be reviewed and updated when there are significant changes to the process conditions e.g. if a new well / reservoir is to be linked to an existing platform which has higher pressures or sour service when previously sweet.
The Operations HSE Case shall be reviewed and updated when it is required to operate the asset beyond its design life. The Operations HSE Case must clearly demonstrate on what basis continued safe operation beyond the design life has been made.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
32
The Operations HSE Case shall include the production of a video, to be used as a training video for operations staff on the facility that describes as a minimum the following:
What are the Major Accident Hazards for the facility
How these hazards are being managed to ALARP levels or lower
How the HSE Case is implemented by the facility.
As part of the HSE Case submission suitably sized posters (for example A1 size) shall be provided for all the Bowties, and the MOPO / SIMOPS for display at the facility control room. For new assets the video shall be produced / commissioned by the Operations team, once the facility has been handed over from projects.
5.1
Workforce Involvement The HSE Case shall demonstrate that the workforce have been part of the development and review of the HSE Case. Workforce in this context is the front line operations and maintenance staff that are directly involved in the day to day running of the facility. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that front line staff have:
Knowledge of the major accident hazards that have been identified for that particular facility
Awareness of the controls and barriers that are in place to manage these hazards, specifically SCEs, their performance standards, MOPO etc.
Knowledge of how these controls and barriers are managed i.e. ITPMs
Operations HSE Cases shall be communicated to the operations and maintenance teams on the site or platform. The focus shall be on what the case means to them and what impact is it likely to have. In addition, representatives from current operational, engineering and maintenance teams shall be included in the regular reviews of the HSE Case.
5.2
Roles and responsibilities During detailed design phase of the project the design team shall be responsible for the initial completion of the Operations HSE Case, which shall be handed over to Operations during the Commissioning phase. Thereafter the Asset Manager shall be responsible for the subsequent HSE Case revisions either due to facility modifications or in line with the periodic revisions as set out by this standard.
5.2.1
Operation Phase HSE Case Custodian The Operations Phase HSE Case custodian shall ensure that the Operations HSE Cases are developed and maintained for the assets in accordance with the latest requirements.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
33
He/ she is responsible for validating the HEMP studies undertaken during the previous phase to confirm that the studies remain relevant, and that no additional studies are required. The Operations HSE Case custodian shall ensure participation in development, awareness and proper use of the HSE Case. In conjunction with a multidisciplinary team to develop, review and update the Safety Critical Elements listing. He/she is responsible for the development and/or review of the Performance Standards for the SCEs. The Performance Standards may require updating following changes associated with the codes and standards on which they were based, changes in operating parameters e.g. more wells, higher POB, etc., or when significant changes are made to the asset. He/ She is responsible to confirm and monitor that the Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPM) are in line with the Performance Standards and that inspection and maintenance is being conducted as per the ITPM and at the required frequency and schedule. He / She is responsible for the review of the emergency response plans against the identified Major Accident Hazards. The HSE Cases custodian is responsible for the maintenance and accuracy of the Operations HSE Case, so that it continues to reflect the management of Major Hazards on the facility. He / she is responsible for preparing and maintaining the content of the Operations Phase HSE Case report when there is major modification or as a minimum, once in every five (5) years. The Operations HSE Case custodian shall ensure that updates to the HSE Case are communicated to all personnel when necessary. The Operations HSE Case Custodian shall be the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) or equivalent for the onshore terminals. The OIM shall also be heavily involved in the production of the facility video.
5.2.2
HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the safety studies and the recommended control and mitigation measures to ensure the risks are ALARP. An example of the Manager/Manager.
5.2.3
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
HSE Case Endorser HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P HSE Case requirements. The HSE Case Endorser is the Head of HSE Division.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
34
The HSE Case Endorser shall also review and approve the HSE Case video content.
5.2.4
HSE Case Approver The asset manager shall be the Operations HSE Case approving authority for the contents of the Operations Phase HSE Case including the associated safety studies and the recommended controls / remedial action plans arising. He/she shall also provide the required leadership and commitment in the development of HSE Case as well as implementation of any recommendations to ensure risk levels are ALARP. He / she shall:
Ensure the on-going compliance, implementation, periodic review and update of the Operations HSE Case in accordance with these guidelines.
Develop the Statement of Fitness for the Asset.
Approve the outcome of the HEMP Studies undertaken as part of the HSE Case and Formal Safety Assessment.
Ensure that the facility is operated according to the Operations HSE Case.
Be accountable to the PETRONAS leadership for ensuring that major hazards management is in accordance with the measures described in the HSE Case.
Where there is an inter-connection of PETRONAS facilities with facilities owned and operated by a third party, the third party facility HSE Case and FSA shall be submitted to PETRONAS and accepted as being adequate by the HSE Case Approver.
5.2.5
Project Manager The Project Manager initiates the development of the initial Operations Phase HSE Case in accordance with this standard. For the initial Operations HSE Case only the Project Manager shall appoint the Operations Phase HSE Case Custodian and assigns responsibilities. The Project Manager shall identify and liaise with the SCE Technical Authorities. He / she ensures that Design Phase HSE Case is maintained and updated to reflect any changes made during detailed design. The Project Manager shall also jointly approve together with the HSE Case Approver, the initial Operations HSE Case, which is the HSE Case completed as part of the project handover documentation to the Operations team.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
5.2.6
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
35
Technical Authorities Technical authorities are responsible for approving the Safety Critical Element listing and confirm the adequacy of the associated Performance Standards. Technical authorities are responsible for managing the Safety Critical Elements listing. They are responsible for the development, review, update, and implementation of strategies and Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) through which the Performance Standards of the SCEs will be maintained.
5.2.7
Operations and Maintenance Team The operations and maintenance team for the facility are responsible for the development, review and update of the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS).
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
6
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MOTHBALLING / DECOMMISSIONING / DISPOSAL HSE CASE The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case Report is to demonstrate that major accident hazards are managed during mothballing, decommissioning and disposal so that risks remain tolerable and ALARP. The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case shall describe the list of SCE Critical Tasks that must be performed to ensure that the required protection and mitigation measures provided remain effective during and after shutdown of the facility. The critical task list should also define roles and responsibilities for performing the identified activity. The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case shall include, but not be limited to the following:
A description of the facilities that are covered by the HSE Case.
A description of how the implemented to control risks.
Details of the hazards, their sources and controls associated with the decommissioning and disposal. This should reference any risk reduction measures, the identified Safety Critical Elements and their Performance Standards
Details of the SCE Critical Tasks that have to be performed to ensure that the Performance Standards are met for the SCEs.
relevant
management
system
is
The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case is to essentially describe how HSE Integrity will be maintained during and after shutdown of the facility. The report must include all HSE considerations of shutdown, decommissioning, mothballing and/or removal or discontinuation of an operation, including site restoration. Equipment items that are to be decommissioned on an existing asset, but the facility remains in production, shall be considered as a modification, and the facility HSE Case shall be updated accordingly, either as part of the modification or as part of the ongoing HSE Case review cycle.
6.1
Roles and responsibilities
6.1.1
Decommissioning Phase HSE Case Custodian He/ she is responsible for managing the relevant HEMP studies and preparing the risk tolerability and ALARP assessments. Identifies risk reduction strategies, any new or existing Safety Critical Elements which may be required following decommissioning, and defines their Performance Standards. He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Mothballing / Decommissioning Phase HSE Case report.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
6.1.2
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HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the safety studies and the recommended control and mitigation measures to ensure the risks are ALARP. An example of the Manager/Manager.
6.1.3
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
HSE Case Endorser HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P HSE Case requirements. The HSE Case Endorser is the Head of HSE Division.
6.1.4
HSE Case Approver HSE Case Approver is responsible for approving the HSE Case, including the safety studies carried out and the recommended controls/remedial action plans arising from those studies. He/she shall also provide the required leadership and commitment in the development of HSE Case as well as implementation of any recommendations to ensure risk levels are ALARP. The HSE Case Approver is the Asset Manager or the Head of Country/Region e.g. Senior General Manager of Sarawak Operations.
6.1.5
Project Manager Project Manager shall initiate the Mothballing / Decommissioning Phase HSE Case for the facility and ensure that it shall be developed in accordance with this guideline prior decommissioning.
6.1.6
Technical Authorities Technical authorities are responsible for approving the Safety Critical Element listing and confirm the adequacy of the associated Performance Standards for the mothballed / decommissioned facility. Technical authorities are responsible for managing the Safety Critical Elements listing. They are responsible for the development, review, update, and implementation of strategies and Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) through which the Performance Standards of the SCEs will be maintained.
6.1.7
Operations and Maintenance Team The operations and maintenance team for the mothballed / decommissioned facility are responsible for the review and update of the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
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(SIMOPS) and on-going inspection, maintenance and testing of the SCEs.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
7
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FEBRUARY 2014
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DRILLING UNITS HSE CASE The Drilling Contractor engaged with the Company shall have in place an HSE Case developed in accordance with the latest revision of the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) HSE Case guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU) or Land Units [10][11], whichever is applicable. The HSE Case for the drilling unit shall:
Demonstrate that there is an effective HSE management system in place for managing major hazards, other workplace hazards and environmental aspects
Identify all potential hazards, including major accident hazards
Identify, assess and manage the risks associated with these hazards and demonstrate that residual risks have been reduced to tolerable levels.
The drilling unit HSE Case shall contain the following as a minimum:
Drilling contractor’s management system
Drilling unit description and supporting information
Risk management
Emergency response
Performance monitoring
As part of their HSE Case development, the Drilling Contractor shall adhere to the regulatory requirement of the Country where it is intended to be operated as well as the Company that it is engaged to, by incorporating the relevant requirement in the HSE Case studies. The Drilling Contractor shall declare if the HSE Case has been approved by any external authority or party. The HSE Case for the drilling units shall be submitted to PETRONAS E&P Drilling Division for review and check of adequacy. The Drilling Contractor shall ensure that the identified hazards, its associated controls and mitigation measures are communicated to all relevant parties. If a formal HSE case that is fully compliant with the IADC HSE Case guidelines is not available then formal written approval for dispensation to engage that particular drilling contractor must be obtained from the Head of Drilling. The Drilling Contractor’s HSE Case shall be part of the documents to be reviewed during Contractor selection process, which will depend on the type of drilling which is undertaken. The type of drilling may be:
Exploration, where there is typically no other installed facilities other than the drilling unit itself
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
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Development, where the facility or platform is existing, and may be producing where an Early Production System (EPS) has been installed
Production, where the facility or platform is existing and producing
For drilling activities the required documentation shall be required in addition to the IADC HSE Case Table 7-1 – Documentation requirements for Drilling types Type of Drilling
Required Documentation / Safety Studies
Exploration
IADC HSE Case
Development without EPS
IADC HSE Case
Development with EPS
IADC HSE Case Bridging Document SIPROD SISO
Production
IADC HSE Case Bridging Document SIPROD SISO
The bridging document shall be used to align the Drilling Unit HSE management systems and that of PETRONAS E&P. The purpose of the bridging document shall be to ensure that there is clear definition of how all shared activities will be managed in a safe manner. It shall include but not limited to the following:
HSE Objectives
Organisation chart together with roles and responsibilities
Safety processes including communications, PTW, MOC, Inductions, Shift Handovers, HSE meetings, etc.
Emergency Response and Notification
Manning levels and training requirements
Worksite inspections
Safety drills
Health and hygiene
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
7.1
Drilling Roles and Responsibilities
7.1.1
Head of Drilling, E&P
41
The Head of Drilling Division shall provide the required leadership and commitment in ensuring the availability and adequacy of the HSE Case by Drilling Contractors.
7.1.2
Head of Drilling (Technology & Engineering), DRE The Head of Drilling (DRE) shall ensure that the Drilling Contractor’s HSE Case is available and adequate, and if an HSE Case is not available shall provide formal written dispensation for the engagement of that particular drilling contractor. The dispensation shall provide justification as to why the drilling contractor should be engaged and what measures, systems, and barriers, etc., are in place in the absence of the HSE Case to prevent major accidents hazards from being realised.
7.1.3
Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) Depending on the drilling type of project; either exploration, development or intervention, the Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) for the respective drilling rig shall ensure development and review of HSE Case in line with latest IADC requirements [10][11].
7.1.4
Head of Drilling Operations (DRO) The Head of Drilling Operations for the respective drilling rig shall track and monitor the implementation of recommendations / remedial action plan by Drilling Contractors.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
8
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HSE CASE STRUCTURE The HSE Case shall be required for facilities that have the potential to cause a Major Accident Event (MAE), e.g. drilling facility and production facility. Each HSE Case shall be specific to the facility and to the facility / project phase (e.g. Concept, Design, Operations or Decommissioning / Disposal), demonstrating that the risks associated with the particular facility and phase are managed to ALARP. The HSE Case may be developed for a Field. However, the detail description, including the assessment of risks, MAHs, Bowties, SCEs and Performance Standards shall be specific for each and every facility within the Field e.g. Samarang HSE Case covers for all platforms within the Samarang Field. Drilling unit HSE Case development shall be the responsibility of the drilling contractor, and the structure of the HSE Case shall follow the requirements within the IADC guidelines [10][11]. The HSE Cases, irrespective of the asset lifecycle phase, shall be in line with the following format.
Book 1 o
Part 1 – Overview
o
Part 2 – Major Accident Hazards
o
Part 3 – Control of Major Accident Hazards
o
Part 4 – Systems
Book 2 o
Appendices
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
9
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PART 1: OVERVIEW Part 1 of the HSE Case shall:
Define the objectives of the HSE Case assessment
Describe the contents of the HSE Case
Describe the facility features that are relevant to HSE and the emergency management of the facility
Explain the key accountabilities for the HSE Case, i.e. the person who is responsible for the implementation and management of the HSE Case
Explain the HSE Case change control i.e. when it is required to be updated
Highlight the number of remedial action plans according to the category of findings e.g. Very High, High, Medium and Low
Explain the management of tracking and monitoring of the remedial action plans
Conclude the statement of fitness for safe operation of the facility based on the result/analysis from the risk assessments, or the selected option for the concept phase HSE Case represents the lowest risk concept, or that it has been demonstrated that the cost/ effort to adopt the lowest risk is grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained
For Contractor facilities, Part 1 of the HSE Case shall also include the information below o
Explanation on the facilities operated;
o
Key interfaces between the Contractor and PETRONAS E&P; and
o
Roles and responsibilities for each party involve in HSE Case development
Part 1 shall also detail the HSE Case boundary limits and interfaces. For example, it should detail what facilities, platforms, pipelines, etc., that are included or excluded from the assessment. The HSE Case should detail what operational modes are included within the assessment e.g. Normal Operations, SIMOPS, Well Services (e.g. workover, wire-lining, etc.), logistics operations (e.g. Helicopter take off / landing, marine operations within 500m of platform) Some activities and their associated hazards are not entirely confined to the facility and these interactions with other PETRONAS or Contractor HSE Cases shall be identified.
9.1
Facilities Description Part 1 shall describe accurately the essential features of the facility that are relevant to the HSE and emergency management of the facility,
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REVISION 1.0
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based on the level of detail/ knowledge at that particular phase of the asset lifecycle. When the scope of the HSE Case comprises several facilities in a field e.g. main platform and satellite platforms, each facility shall be described separately in detail. The description of the facilities shall detail the equipment and operations which are expected to be functioning during an emergency. The facility description shall consist of two main sections:
9.1.1
Overview of the installation
Facility and process description.
Overview of the Installation For offshore facilities the overview of the installation shall include:
Field layout
Exact location
Facilities in the field.
For onshore facilities the overview shall include:
9.1.2
Facility location
Facility layout
Description of the surrounding area, with respect to land use, population, environmentally sensitive areas, etc.
Facility and Process Description The facility description shall include a detailed description of the asset(s) within the scope of the HSE Case. The level of detail shall be commensurate with the phase of the asset lifecycle. The essential elements that shall be described in this section include:
Structural design of the facility
Facility production capacity
Main process equipment
Facility operating parameters; this should include operational envelopes which shall provide data on the structural limits for items whose failure could lead directly to a major accident occurring. Typically, this will include Sub-sea structure and topsides structures which if they fail may lead directly to structural collapse.
Process flow description, including Process Flow Diagrams (PFD)
Meteorological conditions or Metocean data for offshore facilities
Utilities system e.g. electrical, power, diesel, etc.
Manning philosophy as per the design philosophy
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
9.2
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Remedial Action Plan (RAP) The Remedial Action Plan (RAP) is a compilation of recommendations identified during HSE Case assessments which include:
Recommendations on the inadequacy of facility HSEMS
Recommendations from all associated safety studies for the facility
All recommendations shall be reviewed and accepted by the HSE Case Custodian. The recommendation shall be prioritized according to the risk level using PETRONAS E&P Risk Assessment Matrix (Figure 2-2):
Intolerable or High Risks represented by risks ranked as Red equate to P1-Serious;
Tolerable if ALARP Risks with a severity impact of 5 equates to P1High;
Tolerable if ALARP or Medium Risks with a severity less than 5 equates to P2; and
Broadly Acceptable or Low Risks represented by risks ranked as Green equates to P3.
The requirements relating to timeline to close the recommendations are as follows:
P1-S shall be fully mitigated immediately and corrective action completed within 6 to 12 months
P1-H shall be closed within 6 months
P2 shall be closed between 6 to 12 months
P3 shall be closed within the revision cycle of the HSE Case.
Fully mitigated means that alternative measures shall be incorporated immediately prior to continuing facility operation. The suitability and effectiveness of the mitigation measures provided shall be based on approval of the appropriate Technical Authority. The HSE Case Custodian will appoint action parties and target completion based on the prioritization. In addition, the recommendations shall be tracked to closure via a formal action tracking system (e.g. HSE Online, iHSE etc.) to ensure it is properly monitored. Sample template for Remedial Action Plan is shown in Appendix 8.
9.3
Statement of Fitness A statement of fitness shall be developed for the assets prior to the prestart up audit for the project, before starting or commissioning a new
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
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asset or a modification to an existing asset. represents the conclusion of
The statement of fitness
The demonstration of the lowest risk option having been selected, or that the cost/ effort required to adopt the lowest risk option represents a grossly disproportionate investment to the level of risk reduction achieved.
The demonstration of safe operations for the facility
The demonstration of safe abandonment of the facility
Typically, the statement should:
Confirm compliance to PETRONAS E&P HSE Management System in terms of hazard identification
List the identified Major Accident Hazards (MAH), including associated Major Accident Event (MAE) arising from Bowtie risk assessment
Summarise the risk contribution (in terms of %) from Quantitative Risk Assessment, which can be typically represented in a pie chart
Summarise the key Safety Critical Elements (SCE) in managing MAH, including the management of SCE integrity and reliability
Confirm that the risks associated with the facility and activities are minimized to ALARP and the facility is safe to be operated
Confirm that all recommendations included in the Remedial Action Plan have been reviewed and accepted.
The Table 9-1 details the various elements that must be addressed in the statement of fitness and how compliance is demonstrated. Table 9-1 – Statement of Fitness Requirement
Demonstration
Process Safety Risks have been identified, documented and are managed to ALARP
HSE Risk studies including HAZOP, HEMP, FERA, and bowties have been completed. ALARP demonstration has been made for the asset SIMOPS and developed
MOPO
matrices
have
been
Hazards and Effects Register An Emergency Response Plan addressing each of the identified Major Accident Hazards has been developed and is routinely tested Employees or Contractors executing HSE Critical Activities are competent and fit to work
Operator competence assurance plans with HSE Critical Roles identified in Job Descriptions Personnel in HSE Critical Roles are fit to work TA approval framework is in place
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REVISION 1.0
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Requirement
Demonstration
Safety Critical Equipment meets its Technical Integrity Requirements
SCEs have been identified, documented and included in the HSE Case
Design and Construction of new assets and modifications to existing assets meets design and engineering requirements
Compliance with all PTS requirements and a non-conformance register where requirements cannot be satisfied
Performance Standards have been developed for all identified SCEs and approved by TAs
Critical drawings and documents are prepared and approved Well handover document is completed
Procedures are in place to operate Safety Critical Elements within its operational limits The asset register, Safety Critical Elements (SCEs), SCE related Performance Standards (PS) acceptance criteria and maintenance / inspection routines are identified and loaded into the maintenance management system (SAP)
Operating procedures are in place Integrity operating envelopes catalogues are completed
and
alarm
Trip settings are in place, including wells Performance Standards and maintenance / inspection routines are current and uploaded into SAP Asset Register is current and uploaded into SAP Corrosion Management Plans are in place Well integrity management is in place
Modifications are complete and have been managed via the Management of Change process
Management documented
of
Change
(MOC)
process
is
Staff in HSE Critical Positions are trained and a log maintained MOC procedures are in place and in use A change register is maintained
HSE Audit and inspection programmes test compliance with the inspection and maintenance regime and HSE Case
Audits are scheduled and completed as per plan Audit findings are internally communicated to all levels in the organisation and a RAP developed
The acceptance of the HSE Case by HSE Case Custodian, Endorser and Approver shall be indicated on this page. A sample template for statement of fitness is shown in Appendix 1.
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
10
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PART 2: MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS During the Concept phase, Part 2 of the HSE Case shall describe the following:
The HEMP and how it has been applied for the assessment of Major Accident Hazards in the HSE Case
The process by which the Major Accident Hazards have been identified and how these have been ranked on the PETRONAS Risk Ranking Matrix
The applicable Major Accident Hazards and their hazard identification number obtained from the Generic Hazard List (see Appendix 3)
The Hazard and Effects register sheets for all identified Major Accident Hazards, and reference to all HSE hazards listed in the Hazard and Effects Register developed as part of the HEMP
For all other phases of the Asset lifecycle Part 2 of the HSE Case shall also include the following, in addition to the above:
10.1
A review of the facility HSE Management System to ensure that the non-MAHs are adequately controlled
The application of Bowties to the identified Major Accident Hazards, and the developed bowties for the facility
Hazard and barrier assessment that should also make reference to, confirm validity, and summarise the main findings of the group of technical HSE studies specifically focused on Major Accident Hazards. These technical HSE studies form part of the Formal Safety Assessment and may include QRA, FERA, etc.
An assessment of barrier and control effectiveness
Operational Envelopes that include the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and the safe limits, or operational envelope, for systems where the failure of a single Safety Critical Element could result in the Major Accident Event. For example, structural collapse may occur in the event of subsea structure or topside structure failure. Therefore, the HSE Case shall detail the safe working envelope or limitations that prevent the failure of that particular SCE. For structural limits that may include but not be limited to platform deck loading, soft mooring pull from boats/ ships, helideck loading, crane lifting capacity, environmental conditions (max wave height, maximum wind speed, etc.)
HEMP The completion of the HEMP shall be in accordance with the PETRONAS Technical Standard PTS 60.0401 [3]. The Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) is a structured and systematic analysis methodology involving the identification, assessment, and control of hazards and the recovery from the effects caused by a release of the hazards. HEMP is an iterative process. The four stages may partially overlap or may have to be carried out more than once. HEMP is illustrated in Figure 10-1 below.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
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Figure 10-1 – Hazard and effect management process
The principle of 'identify', 'assess', 'control' and ‘recover’ are the basis of HEMP as below:
Identify all hazards associated with comprehensive and structured process
the
facility
through
a
Assess the likelihood (how often the hazardous event could occur?), the size of the consequences (e.g. how big is the fire?), and the severity of the outcome (what sort of damage / harm could occur?)
Determine what needs to be in place to remove the hazard from the business, or reduce the likelihood of it occurring, or reduce the size of the consequence and severity
Provide measures that allow people to get away from the location of the hazard (e.g. lifeboats to abandon a platform) or re-establish normal operations after the incident.
To ensure that the four key elements of the HEMP process are applied effectively in the management of Major Accidents Hazards a comprehensive set of assessment activities shall be undertaken. These activities shall include:
Major Accident Hazards Identification
Bowtie Assessment
Hazard and Barrier Assessment and Risk Reduction Philosophies
Barrier / Control Effectiveness
ALARP Risk Management for Major Hazards
Operational Envelope
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REVISION 1.0
10.2
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Major Accident Hazards Identification The first step in Hazard and effect management process is identification of hazards. A Hazard Identification study (HAZID) is the primary tool used to identify and document hazards. The HAZID should be based on a “Hazard Inventory”, which is a structured list of potential hazards and covers hazards ranging from loss of hydrocarbon containment to general slips, trips and falls. The HAZID shall be conducted in accordance with the PETRONAS Technical Standard PTS 60.2004 [5]. The HAZID study shall be a multi-disciplinary team facilitated by an experienced leader and the team shall identify those hazards that are relevant to the specific facility or asset under consideration. Ideally the team should comprise site / facility management, operations, HSE, maintenance and engineering disciplines. The PETRONAS risk ranking matrix Figure 2-2 shall be used to assess the hazards, their severity and frequency of occurrence. Hazards that are assessed as having a severity of 5 or high risk are then modelled further using bowtie methodology to demonstrate how these hazards are managed and controlled. For low and medium risk hazards the controls for these hazards may be typically related to operating integrity i.e. Permit to Work, Job Hazard Analysis, Operating Procedures and Process Safety Information, Management of Change, etc. All the major accident hazards are assessed for their overall risk levels using a technical HSE study such as the Quantitative Risk Assessment, which will form part of the facility Formal Safety Assessment. Major Accident Hazards to the Environment and Occupational Health risks shall also have been identified in the HAZID. The impact of facility emissions/ discharges shall be the subject of the facility Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), in accordance with the requirements detailed in PTS 60.3206 Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment [8] and PTS 60.3202 Environmental Aspects and Impacts Assessment [7]. Control of the identified Major Accidents To The Environment (MATTE) events shall be demonstrated via the HSE Case. Other environmental hazards shall fall within the remit of the EIA. In addition, the occupational risk assessment shall be completed in accordance with the PETRONAS standard PTS 60.1400.01 Health Risk Assessment (HRA) [6]. The control of Occupational Health Risks shall be demonstrated in the HRA.
10.3
Hazard Inventory Hazard inventory is a compilation of process and non-process hazards developed specific for the facility prior further assessments on the inherent risk for each of the hazard. The hazard inventory may either be identified during HAZID exercise or extracted from a generic list of hazards applicable for PETRONAS E&P production facilities.
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REVISION 1.0
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The hazard inventory register shall include below information:
Hazard category e.g. Hydrocarbons
Hazard code number e.g. H01.01, etc.
List of hazards by respective category e.g. Crude Oil under pressure, etc..
The hazards identified from the studies undertaken (e.g. HAZID studies during concept stage and detailed design stage, Health Risk Assessment, Environmental Impact Assessment) shall be recorded in a Hazard and Effects Register, which is a complete record of all hazards, their threats, consequences, and risk ranking. A generic “Hazard Inventory” list is as shown in Appendix 3.
10.4
Facility Hazard and Effects Register The hazards and their potential effects on people, environment, assets and PETRONAS’ reputation shall be identified and listed for the full asset lifecycle from design to operations and eventually decommissioning. The hazards are typically identified in a facility hazard identification study (HAZID) which is subsequently used to develop the Hazards and Effects Register (HER). The HER is a tabulation of information related to each hazard. The information that shall be included in the hazard and effects register are:
Hazards and its code as per the hazard inventory
Source of each hazard i.e. specific location where the hazard exists
Threats that may cause the release of the hazard
Top Event, which is the first event when the hazard is released
Consequences to people, environment, asset and reputation as a result due to the release of hazard
Evaluation of inherent risk to people, environment, asset and reputation based on PETRONAS Risk Assessment Matrix
Identification of relevant documents in managing the hazards
Determination of the hazard representing a MAH based on the MAH criteria described in section 10.2.
An example of Hazard and Effects Register is as shown in Appendix 4. The Hazards and Effect Register is a deliverable from HEMP [3], the HSE Case shall reproduce the Hazard and Effects sheets that represent the identified Major Accident Hazards.
10.5
Safety Critical Elements Safety critical elements can be represented as barriers between the hazard and the consequence following the release of the hazard. This is illustrated in Figure 10-2 below. There are often holes present in the barriers that may be permanent or temporary. For example, a design error may lead to an area of poor fire and gas detection coverage, or a maintenance activity may require the barrier to be partially isolated.
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These holes reflect a path or route through which the hazard is released and the consequences of that released hazard are realised e.g. fire, explosion leading to fatalities. Figure 10-2 – Safety Critical Elements
The UK Offshore HSE Case Regulations 2005 [13] defines Safety Critical Elements as any structure, plant, equipment, system (including computer software) or component part whose failure could cause or substantially contribute to a major accident, as are any which are intended to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident. Examples of SCEs and relevant associated equipment (sometimes referred to as sub-elements) include but are not limited to: Structural Integrity (SI)
Critical structures whose failure could lead to a multiple fatality accident, e.g. offshore jackets, accommodation unit topside support structures
Structures supporting equipment where loss of integrity could result in an escape of hazardous material with the potential to cause fatality and/or damage the environment
Structures designed to protect other structures or equipment from the full force of an impact which otherwise has the potential to cause major accidents e.g. boat fenders / riser guards
Lifting equipment and systems, jacking systems whose failure could lead to or contribute to a major accident
Process Containment (PC)
Equipment, piping and pipelines where loss of integrity could result in an escape of fluid under pressure or hazardous material with the potential to cause harm to people and /or the environment
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Integrity protection systems such as relief valves, instrumented protective systems, and bursting discs that protect the plant from loss of containment as a result of exceeding design conditions.
Ignition Control (IC)
Area classification systems and procedures designed to prevent ignition in case of an escape of flammable material. This also includes ventilation systems that may be necessary to maintain the correct area classification.
Miscellaneous ignition control components such as flame arrestors, spark arrestors, etc.
Detection Systems (DS)
Detection equipment and systems designed to alert the operators of an escape of hazardous material and possibly to initiate various control actions.
Portable gas monitoring and gas testing equipment, used either to supplement, or to complement fixed equipment and systems, or for certifying safe conditions of work, e.g. prior to undertaking hot work or confined space entry under Permit to Work (PTW).
Protection Systems (PS)
Fire and explosion suppression equipment and systems where people could otherwise be at risk
Fire fighting equipment and systems
Incident control equipment such as water sprays, foam systems
Equipment and systems designed to mitigate the consequences of fire and explosion such as fire walls, blast walls and passive fire protection
Other equipment and systems, which play a significant role in preventing major accidents, such as navigational aids.
Shutdown Systems (SS)
Release control equipment and systems such as emergency shutdown, non-return valves, and blowdown, which are designed to limit the quantity of hazardous material involved in an incident.
Well isolation equipment such as the SCSSSV, SSV, etc.
Drilling well control equipment such as Blowout Preventer, Mud weight control, etc.
Emergency Response (ER)
Emergency power equipment and systems (emergency generators, switch gear, Uninterruptable Power Supplies (UPS), etc.
Communications equipment and systems that alert people that an incident has occurred and which can be used to provide instruction as to further action
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Equipment and systems that allow communication between emergency response teams and the emergency control centre
Equipment and systems that expedite the removal of people to a place of safety such as emergency lighting, escape routes, offshore platform evacuation systems and standby vessels.
Equipment and systems that allow communication with external agencies that can provide assistance in dealing with the incident.
Secondary containment equipment and systems designed to restrict hazardous materials spreading from a spillage location into other areas.
Weighing and measuring equipment and systems whose failure could lead to or contribute to a major accident such as gas meters, pressure/ temperature/level gauges, weighbridges.
Life Saving (LS)
Personnel protective equipment for general use in an emergency such as life jackets, breathing apparatus, and search and rescue equipment, etc.
Evacuation facilities such as life boats, TEMPSC, life rafts, knotted ropes, scramble nets, boat landing etc.
The Safety Critical Element not only includes the specified equipment, but also any other SCE required for the equipment to perform its specified safety function, including electric and hydraulic power supplies and connections. Figure 10-3 below shows a typical SCE barrier diagram [18] and typical barrier sub groups.
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Figure 10-3 – Typical SCE Barriers diagram [18] Structural Integrity
Safe Operation
Process Containment Ignition Control
Detection Systems
Protection Systems
Shutdown Systems
Emergency Response Lifesaving
Escalating Consequences
SI001
SI002
SI003 SI004
SI005 SI006 SI007 SI008 SI009
Structure (Jacket / Vessel Hull/ GBS / Foundation / Weathering Enclosure / Piles etc.) Topsides Primary Structure (Incl. Helidecks, Crane Pedestals, Bridges, Flare Tower etc.) Heavy Lift Cranes and Mechanical Handling Stability systems(Incl. Ballast, Bilge, Cargo, FPSO offloading, Computer Management systems) Road Vehicles Mooring Systems Drilling Systems Bridge connections to support Vessel Station Keeping / Propulsion / Dynamic Positioning / Thrusters
PC001 PC002 PC003 PC004
PC005 PC006 PC007 PC008 PC009 PC010 PC011 PC012
PC013
PC014
Pressure Vessels Heat Exchangers Rotating Equipment Tanks (Incl. IBC's) Containing hazardous (flammable, toxic etc.) fluids Hydrocarbon Piping Pipelines and Risers Relief System (PRV, PSV etc.) Wells' Hydrocarbon Containment Fired Heaters Gas Tight Floors and Walls Tanker Loading Systems Helicopter Refueling Equipment Well Intervention / Well Control Equipment (Incl. BOP System / Connector / Diverter, Cement System, Ramrig, Drilling Instrumentation, Well Control Equipment) Moveable and Temporary Equipment
IC001 IC002 IC003
IC004 IC005
IC006 IC007 IC008
IC009
Hazardous Area Ventilation Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation Certified (Exrated) Electrical Equipment Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System Electrical Earthing Continuity (Earth Bonding) Fuel Gas Purge System Inert Gas Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components (hot surface protection, inert gas) Flare Tip Ignition System
DS001
Fire and Gas Detection
DS002
Security Systems Water in Condensate / Gas
DS003
PS001 PS002
PS003 PS004
PS005 PS006
PS007 PS008 PS009 PS010 PS011 PS012 PS013 PS014 PS015 PS016
Deluge Systems Explosion Protection including Blast Barriers and Venting Provisions Helideck Fire Fighting Systems Fire Water Pumps (Incl. Caissons, Tank and Supports) Fire Main and Other Distribution System Passive Fire Protection (Incl. Doors, Walls and Penetrations) Gaseous Fire Protection Systems Fine Water Spray Systems Sprinkler Systems Power Management System Fixed Foam Systems Sand Filters Chemical Injection Systems Navigation Aids (Aircraft) Navigation Aids (Marine) Metocean Data Gathering Systems
SD001
SD002
SD003
SD004 SD005
SD006
SD007
SD008
SD009
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System Emergency Depressurisation (Blowdown) High Integrity Pressure Protection Systems (HIPPS) Well Isolation Pipeline Isolation Valve (Riser) Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDV) Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV) System Drilling well Control Equipment Utility Air
ER001
ER002 ER003 ER004
ER005
ER006
ER007
ER008
ER009 ER010
ER011
Temporary Refuge (TR) / Primary Muster Areas Escape Routes Emergency / Escape Lighting Internal, External and Emergency Communication Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) Helicopter Facilities (Incl. Markings, Nets, Obstacle Marking / Lighting etc.) Emergency Power (Incl. Generation and Distribution) Manual Fire Fighting Equipment Process Control and Alarms Bunding and Drains (Hazardous and Non-Hazardous) Oil Spill Contingency (Oil Booms and Dispersants)
LS001 LS002
LS003 LS004
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE) Rescue Facilities (Incl. Standby Vessel / Man Overboard boat / Fast Rescue Craft TEMPSC / Lifeboats Alternate Means of Escape (Liferafts, Scramble Nets and Ladders to Sea)
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Bowtie Assessment The bowtie is a model that represents how a hazard can be released i.e. the threats, escalate to their associated consequences, and how they are controlled. The Hazards and Effects Register documents all hazards associated with the facility and that control and mitigation measures have been identified. Hazards that are assessed as having a severity level of 5 or considered high risk shall be modelled using bowties. The purpose of the bowtie analysis is to identify and ensure the adequacy of controls and recovery barriers for the facility hazards. The bowtie analysis shall allow for:
Identification of the hazard release, escalation and consequence scenarios
Identification of controls e.g. barriers and escalation factor controls required to manage the hazards
Categorisation of controls into inherent safety, safety critical element (hardware) or critical activity (procedures, processes, operator action)
A clear visual representation to facilitate the ALARP demonstration
An aid to the incident review process if an occurrence of such a major incident occurs
The bowties shall comply with the requirement of the PETRONAS Bowtie Guidelines PTS 60.xxxx [4]. Figure 10-4 graphically presents the Bowtie analysis process.
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Figure 10-4 – Generic Bowtie Diagram format
Safety Critical Elements
HSE Critical Tasks - Engineering (Design and Installed for HSE Integrity) - Maintenance (Maintain for HSE Integrity) - Operations (Operate for HSE Integrity)
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The following definitions shall apply to the bowtie analysis. Hazard is something with the potential to cause harm, which may include ill health or injury, damage to property, products, production losses or increased liabilities. The concept is that the hazard has the potential for something undesirable to happen rather than the actual event itself. Top Event or hazardous event occurs when the hazard is released. It is important to realise that the top event is not the catastrophe yet, but the dangerous characteristics of the hazard are now in the open. For example oil or gas is outside of the pipeline (loss of containment). Therefore it is not yet a disaster but if not mitigated correctly then it can result in unwanted events i.e. consequences. Figure 10-5 – Hazard & Top Event as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Threats are those factors that could cause the top event. Each threat should be sufficient to cause the top event on its own. For example corrosion of the pipeline can lead to loss of containment. Figure 10-6 – Threat as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Consequences are the potential events resulting from the release of the hazard which results directly in loss or damage. Consequences represent the unwanted events that PETRONAS wants to avoid by all means.
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Figure 10-7 – Consequence as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Barriers comprise proactive barriers and reactive barriers. Proactive barriers are required to prevent a hazard being released and appear on the left hand side of the bowtie diagram. Reactive barriers are designed to prevent top event resulting in the unwanted events or consequences being realised, and appear on the right hand side of the bowtie diagram. Figure 10-8 – Barriers as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Escalation factors are conditions that make a particular barrier fail. It is the condition that leads to increased risk by defeating or reducing the effectiveness of a control. Escalation factors may also be termed as defeating factors or barrier decay mechanism. In a similar way to Threats, there may be controls in place that prevent the escalation factor being realised. For example, if a barrier relates to protection from overpressure by manual response to a high pressure alarm, an escalation factor might be ‘operator not trained in correct response’, ‘control room unmanned’, etc. Each escalation factor requires to be provided with a control mechanism in the same way as threats and consequences. Figure 10-9 – Escalation Factors as typically shown on the Bowtie Diagram
Controls are the barriers in place that prevent the escalation factor from arising. For example, the escalation factor for a shutdown valve may be ‘fails to close’ and the control that helps prevent its failure to close may be preventative maintenance system.
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The Bowtie analysis shall be completed using PETRONAS approved software, such as BowTieXP. The Facility Bowtie assessment shall contain the same threats, top event and consequences as identified in the Hazard and Effects Register. Subsequently, the required barriers and recovery barriers shall then be identified in managing the hazards. For facility risks, the barriers should contain Safety Critical Equipment (hard barriers), while the escalation factor controls may be either soft or hard barriers. Examples of hard barriers are pressure safety valve, firewater pumps, pressure vessel, life boats, escape routes, etc. Meanwhile examples of soft barriers are anchor pattern, first aid, operating procedure, etc. A bowtie workshop shall be held to ensure that the barriers, escalation factors, controls, activities and roles have been correctly identified. The escalation factors and the associated escalation controls for each of the barriers and recovery barriers shall be identified to ensure the integrity and reliability of the barrier. Any recommendation arising from the Bowtie analysis and its associated workshop, to further reduce the risk, shall be recorded in the Remedial Action Plan. A sample of Facility Bowtie is as shown in Appendix 5.
10.6.1
Barrier and Control Effectiveness The Bowtie assessment identifies the required barriers and the Formal Safety Assessment should confirm that any barrier has been designed appropriately. However, the safety of personnel at the facility depends on how successful the barriers are functioning in the operational phase and this is directly related to the effectiveness of the escalation control barrier. For example, a barrier to the Over-pressure threat may be a Pressure Relief Device. This device has an escalation factor e.g. that it fails to open, with the control barrier to that escalation factor being preventative maintenance. This is illustrated in the figure below.
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Figure 10-10 – Barrier / Control Effectiveness Schematic
These controls are managed through systems and processes such as inspection, competency assurance, etc. Determining the effectiveness of the controls is important and relies on the feedback from operations and maintenance personnel. This is best achieved in a workshop environment taking informed opinion from personnel, and any relevant audits or assessments available. The Bowtie diagram shall also reflect the control effectiveness, with identified escalation controls being colour coded as follows: Effective – the control always works as intended Partially Effective – the control works most of the time but there are some weakness or performance issues Ineffective – the control is not present or if present is not suitable for the required function If a control is ranked as partially effective or ineffective then there is a risk that the barrier that it supports will fail leading to the potential for a major accident (or the inability to recover from one). To correct for this weakness a remedial action plan shall be raised that identifies the necessary actions needed to be undertaken to reinstate that particular control to full effectiveness. The barrier effectiveness shall be summarised in the Hazard Control Sheets (see Section 10.9).
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Performance Standards Performance standards shall be prepared for all Safety Critical Elements. The performance standards are the parameters that are measured or assessed so that the suitability and effectiveness of each SCE can be assured and verified. They are the essential requirements that the SCE must maintain in order to fulfil its intended function. Performance standards shall be produced for all equipment and systems that:
Protect people and the environment from a major hazard involving fire, explosion and the release of flammable and /or toxic gases and fumes
Ensure effective escape form affected areas of the site, evacuation of the site or transfer of people to a place of safety.
For a Performance Standard to be suitable it should satisfy all of the following conditions:
The goal or function of the SCE
The functional performance requirement for the following criteria; Functionality, Availability / Reliability and Survivability
Any dependencies on other SCEs
The pass or fail acceptance criteria by which performance of the SCE will be measured and recorded
The reference material from which the acceptance criteria should be derived
Any contingency actions that may be taken into consideration when performance criteria are not met
During the operational phase of the installation, the Performance Standard has to reflect how it shall be assured that the SCE is maintained in the minimum acceptable condition, or minimum acceptance criteria, and how it is being verified. This may not be the same as the design criteria, for example an acceptable level of degradation should be defined, if appropriate. For static or passive systems such as structures, containment (vessels, piping, pipelines), lifting equipment etc., measurable criteria for operational suitability may be expressed as the maximum allowable degradation that is acceptable. This may be derived from international standards, industry guidelines or other best practice. For active systems it is likely that performance can be clearly quantified and confirmed by functional testing (e.g. active fire system discharge rates, instrument alarm and trip set points, ESD valve closure time and leakage rates, etc.,). Detailed functional analysis may be required to determine the failure modes (including computer systems) which lead to loss of critical functionality and the means of identifying them. Equipment that is self-testing may make functional failure evident.
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For SCEs such as personal survival or escape equipment where continual suitability is primarily achieved by original design specification, it may be more practical to define periodic service or recertification intervals. Defining a fixed life for equipment replacement may also be appropriate. The following shall Standards:
10.8
be observed in
the setting of Performance
Each criteria, including minimum acceptance criteria shall be justified
It should be encouraged to use and reference design standards and codes where this is relevant. For example, the Code used to design the SCE, or that governs the testing frequency e.g. API RP 520 for sizing of relief valves, EEMUA 188 for establishing operating periods of relief valves. This may be relevant throughout the asset lifecycle.
HSE Case supporting studies such as Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) should be reflected in the Performance Standard criteria, e.g. FERA shall provide information for the required fire water demand in respect to the largest potential scenario.
Clearly measurable criteria, which can be confirmed during operations, maintenance, testing or inspection is needed. acceptance criteria are obscure or ambiguous they practicably be assured. This can lead to confusion and confidence in the SCE management process
Lifecycle phases shall be separately considered, but shall be combined into a single Performance Standard document this is to provide traceability across the entire lifecycle of the SCE. However, there shall be a single Performance Standard document for each SCE that covers each lifecycle phase of the asset. The Performance Standards should be updated to cover design, procurement, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning for example as appropriate. However, in the operations phase more concise, specific and measurable criteria are required.
It is required to ultimately align maintenance activities directly to the performance standard criteria ensuring specific failure limits are defined within the routines. These activities should be programmed into the maintenance management system and their compliance with the performance standard verified. Therefore, the means by which the Performance Standard criteria are assured should be identifiable from the Performance Standard.
routine Where cannot loss of
Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) The assurance processes contained within the Performance Standard for each SCE are to be incorporated into the Specific Equipment Reliability Plan (ITPMs) process. The ITPMs must provide clear demonstration that the SCE is meeting its respective Performance Standard. The
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implementation of the Performance Standard should be a goal setting evidence based regime. It should be noted that ITPMs are not part of the HSE Case, but shall be linked to the HSE Case via the Safety Critical Elements and their Performance Standards. ITPMs are not necessarily required during the FEED stage of the project, although ability to maintain may form part of the equipment selection. However, they shall be developed towards the end of the detailed design, or EPC, phase of the asset lifecycle. These developed ITPMs shall be handed over to Operations team as a baseline ITPM document. For Brownfield projects the baseline ITPM document will be limited to the additional facilities. During the operational phase of the asset the ITPMs shall be maintained and updated as necessary by the Operations team. Additional equipment added during the facility operations phase shall have ITPMs developed by either the brownfield project team or by the Operations team.
10.9
Hazard Control Picture and Sheets Part 2 of the HSE Case shall include the Hazard Control Picture and Sheets that shall describe the hazard, the threats and their control barriers, the possible consequences and their control barriers including escalation likelihood and control, risk reduction measures and any remedial action required. A typical Hazard Control Picture and Sheets are shown in Appendix 2. The Hazard Control Sheets shall contain the following information as a minimum:
10.9.1
Hazard type from the generic hazard list (Appendix 3) e.g. H-01 Hydrocarbons, H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure
Description of the Top Event and its risk ranking according to People, Assets, Environment and Reputation
Description of the Hazard and location
Assessment of the threats that may cause the hazardous top event, and the measures in place to prevent it from being realised
Assessment of the consequences that may occur if the top event arises and the control and mitigation measures in place that minimise its impact. This should include immediate consequences and escalation likelihood and control
ALARP demonstration and risk reduction measures considered, including barrier effectiveness assessment. At the concept stage in the asset lifecycle the barrier effectiveness assessment is not required.
ALARP Demonstration Risk assessment via the HAZID and associated risk assessment techniques such as QRA determine whether risks are broadly
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acceptable, tolerable or intolerable by comparison with the PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria and the PETRONAS Risk Ranking Matrix. The demonstration of ALARP requires a judgement to be made that determines whether or not risk levels are as low as is reasonably practicable. ALARP is demonstrated when the level of effort or complexity of any risk reduction measure, its cost and the time required to implement it are disproportionate to the level of risk reduction that may be achieved. To demonstrate ALARP it is necessary to identify all risk reduction measures and assess whether or not a particular measure represents a disproportionate level. Those identified risk reduction measure that are considered as proportionate shall be included on the remedial action plan for the facility. For information on the determination Typically the ALARP demonstration shall form part of the QRA study. However, it is required to be summarised in the HSE Case. All hazards shall be managed and controlled, and all hazard management techniques shall be considered for each stage of the asset lifecycle. The hazard management techniques to be considered shall follow the principles of inherent safety.
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Figure 10-11 – Hazard Management Hierarchy Hazard Management Control MOST EFFECTIVE
ELIMINATE
SUBSTITUTE
LEAST EFFECTIVE
Eliminate the hazard Substitute using processes or materials with lower risk impact
ISOLATE / SEPARATE
Segregate hazards and/or targets
ENGINEER
Prevention – design to prevent unwanted event Recovery – Design to mitigate harmful consequences
ORGANISATION
Training, Competency, Communication
PROCEDURE
PPE
Examples
- Aqueous based hydraulic fluids rather than oil based. - Use of MEG instead of Methanol for hydrate formation prevention Reduce hazardous inventories and vessel sizes Prevention – Design a vessel to withstand the maximum upstream pressure. Use of corrosion resistant materials e.g. SS rather than CS Recovery – Provide a relief device to mitigate the flow from a high pressure source.
Operating procedures, work instructions, PTW, ERP, Maintenance Regimes Protect the person
The strategy that is selected for managing a hazard will differ depending on the project phase, and this shall form part of the evaluation when making an ALARP demonstration. Focus shall be on
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elimination or substitution of hazards during the early design phases when the potential for making changes in the facility design is greatest. Later in the project design there will be less opportunity to elimination or substitution hazards and the focus should be more reflecting of the isolate/ separate and engineer hazard management strategy. Once the facility is operational the hazard management strategy will tend to be largely organisational and procedural controls. PPE is to be regarded at the last resort of hazard management and represents the least effective strategy. In most situations the decision as to whether HSE risks have been reduced to ALARP involves a comparison between the control measures a project is proposing and the measures PETRONAS would expect to see in such circumstances i.e. compliance with the relevant PTS, International Standards and Industry Recommended / Best Practices. Compliance to the relevant PTS, International Standards and Industry Recommended / Best Practices is considered to be an essential step in demonstrating ALARP. ALARP demonstration shall be carried out for each HSE Case as the asset lifecycle develops, with the exception of the Concept Select Phase.
10.9.2
Hazard and Barrier Assessment The hazard and barrier assessment shall essentially provide a summary of the technical HSE studies that comprise the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) as part of the HEMP implementation. The FSA, and the typical technical HSE studies that comprise the FSA, are discussed in more detail in Section 13. These technical HSE studies are conducted for one or more of the following reasons:
Assess in depth, the potential impacts from MAH on people, environment and assets including determination of the magnitude of consequences and frequency of occurrence
Provide input into the design of the facility and selection of equipment
Confirm that the risk management approach through the design complies with the philosophies e.g. HSE philosophy and strategies such as Fire and Explosion strategy that are established at the start of the project or development
Confirm that the engineered barriers i.e. Safety Critical Elements, have a level of functionality and reliability that reduces the risks from the hazards down to ALARP.
Confirmation of the engineered barriers having the required level of functionality and reliability shall be achieved by performing a qualitative review of the Bowties developed for the Design, Operations and Decommissioning HSE Case hazards. The review shall be led by an experienced facilitator and the review team shall comprise experienced staff from the following areas of expertise:
Engineering
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Each of the threat lines in the bowties shall be reviewed in turn and the discussion should cover such questions as:
Does the industry best practice state what should be done or make recommendations?
Can a benchmark exercise be undertaken against other operators and similar controls implemented?
Where are the gaps/ shortfalls and what action needs to be taken to address these gaps/ shortfalls?
Is there sufficient quantity and quality of barriers?
Is there anything else that can be done to further reduce the risk?
Both barrier effectiveness and the number of barriers contribute to the overall effectiveness of control, although in general the effectiveness of individual barriers is more critical e.g. structural integrity. The number, independence and reliability of the control and recovery measures shall be appropriate with the level of risk. By approaching the bowtie review in this systematic fashion, the barriers can be challenged in terms of completeness, adequacy and gaps identified and addressed so that the review team is satisfied that the risks are reduced to ALARP. This process enables an ALARP argument to be formulated although the number, quality, performance and location of the barriers must be verified to complete the ALARP demonstration. The verification of the safeguards shall be obtained via the maintenance activities, audits, reliability assessment In addition, the key assumptions on which the technical HSE studies have been completed shall be detailed in the HSE Case. This should include assumptions made on occupancy of the facility, modes of transportation, process conditions, etc., that may alter the findings of the FSA. A summary of the QRA results shall be provided that identifies the largest risk contributors and a comparison of the results with the PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria, together with any recommendations made. A summary of the risk reduction measures that were identified by the technical HSE studies and were implemented during the life cycle of the project, together with a discussion on the implications of these risk reduction measures duration the operational phase shall be made.
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It should be highlighted that the incorporation of any future modification shall not compromise or exceed the safe limits of the risk reduction measure provided. For example, future expansion and associated construction activities must ensure that platform risers and subsea pipelines are not exposed to unacceptable risk due to dropped objects.
10.10 Manual of Permitted Operations Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
(MOPO)
and
The MOPO and SIMOPS are tools designed to assist Supervisors and Line Managers during the planning and co-ordination of operations and activities by providing information on:
The operation or activity operating envelope and safe operating limits
Actions to be taken if or when certain situations arise that could compromise the safe operation of the asset
Both the MOPO and SIMOPS shall be readily available in a suitable format i.e. poster size and laminated, and displayed in the facility Control Room and any other operational and job planning or coordination room. They shall be referred to during both routine work planning and in determining the response to any unforeseen conditions. The development of the SIMOPS matrix shall make reference to the PETRONAS Carigali Guideline [19].
10.10.1 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) is a guide to define the limit of safe operations or activities that are permitted if control and/or mitigation measures are reduced and/or removed e.g. SCEs in terms of threat controls, recovery preparedness and escalation factors are partially present or not present.
10.10.2 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) is a guide to define the limit of safe operations, both normal and abnormal operations that are permitted to occur concurrently. Abnormal conditions include:
Concurrent high-risk activities such as maintenance of equipment located adjacent to live plant e.g. production sampling while corrosion coupon removal, pigging while topping up chemical tanks, etc.
External influences such as extreme weather conditions (high wind, sea swell, lightning, etc.), visibility, security issues and interfaces with adjacent fields / platforms / facilities
Organisational issues, such as absence or unavailability of key personnel e.g. ER – first aider, ER – Fire Fighting Team, Radio operator, etc.
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Concurrent activities or simultaneous activities (production/ construction/ maintenance), operations outside the design envelope, severe weather, etc., are limited in accordance with the SIMOPS. Issue of a permit to work (PTW) is a means of implementing the SIMOPS. Variations of SIMOPS are:
SIPCOM simultaneous production whilst commissioning activities are undertaken
SIPCON simultaneous production whilst construction activities are being completed
SIPROD simultaneous operation whilst drilling activities are being completed.
10.10.3 MOPO and SIMOPS Workshops Prior to conducting the MOPO and SIMOPS workshop(s) and agreed Terms of Reference document shall be produced that details the following:
Introduction including facility description
The MOPO and SIMOPS objectives and scope
Proposed Agenda
MOPO and SIMOPS workshop methodology o
List of Activities
o
List of Influences
o
List of SCE Impairment
o
List of Critical Manpower Unavailability
o
List of Assumptions to be confirmed during the workshop
Documentation required for the workshop team members e.g. plot plans, etc.
Workshop participants
The team to develop or review the MOPO and SIMOPS shall comprise personnel from the following areas who are familiar with the operation of and required activities at the facility:
Operations
Maintenance
HSE
Management
The workshop shall be chaired by an experienced facilitator and shall:
Confirm the list of operations and activities that could compromise the safe operating limits
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Develop the MOPO and SIMOPS utilising the matrices provided in Appendix 7 as a guidance
Identify those activities that are not permitted, and those that are permitted and if so under what circumstances using a traffic light system of red / amber / green
Provide the supporting guidance notes for those activities identified as being permitted with additional control requirements i.e. amber. This is to assist the Supervisors if and when the situation arises
Collectively review the matrices and ensure that they reflect the current practise and give clear guidance for action to be taken under specific circumstances
10.10.4 MOPO and SIMOPS template A template MOPO and SIMOPS for both onshore and offshore facilities are show in Appendix 7. These matrices shall be used as the basis for the construction of the asset specific MOPO and SIMOPS or for the review of the existing MOPO and SIMOPS if available. Where there are deviations to the prohibited operations identified in the matrices, these shall be fully justified in the facility HSE Case. A number of assumptions have been made in developing this template MOPO and SIMOPS, which are:
The SIMOPS shall assume that two or more activities e.g. production, well intervention are simultaneously being performed in the same location or area.
The MOPO shall assume that the operation or activity is in the vicinity of, or within the area affected by the impaired SCE.
The MOPO shall define the minimum level failure mode assessed as having an impact on or more of the high level activities or operations. If the failure mode is less than this shall be the subject of a specific risk assessment and remedial action plan.
When SCEs are in test mode, alternative controls shall be put in place to ensure that their functionality is provided. Testing of these systems is not generally considered to be impairment for MOPO purposes.
In cases where multiple barriers are unavailable or impaired then the combined effect of the simultaneous failure on the activities shall be the subject of a separate risk assessment.
Where the field comprises multiple facilities covered by a single HSE Case then it may be required to have several MOPO / SIMOPS matrices to cover satellite and main platform facilities.
Construction phase activities shall be subject to a separate MOPO and SIMOPS study.
Additional controls required as indicated in the MOPO and SIMOPs (coloured amber) shall be listed. All work shall only be carried out under the formal control of the Permit to Work (PTW) system, including component elements such as plant isolation certificates, vessel entry
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certificates, hot work permits, etc. All applicable procedures and work instructions relating to the work to be undertaken shall be complied with. In certain cases, the specific operation is not directly impacted by the barrier that is impaired, but consideration shall be given to proceeding with non-essential work that could increase the risk. Where necessary, the requirement for undertaking risk assessment shall be noted. Measures shall be taken to maintain risks at ALARP and the effectiveness of the measures shall be verified. All actions involving bypassing the safeguarding systems shall be authorised by the appropriate Technical Authority. The notes within the MOPO are intended to support rather than supersede any specific risk assessments that may be required. For a MOPO to be effective it must provide clear concise information to the Operator of immediate action to be taken under the specified conditions, e.g. if working at height is on-going and wind speed increases, he needs to be able to quickly see when to stop the activity in question.
10.11 Operational Envelope Facilities are generally designed to tolerate a degree of deviation from normal operating conditions e.g. fluid composition, GOR, operating pressure and temperature. The safe operation of the facility is dependent on remaining within a defined operational envelope that is assessed as providing a suitable level of control. For example, process alarms, trips and pressure relief devices will define the safe process operating pressure limits and ensure that these limits are not exceeded. However, there will be circumstances where the operating envelope must not be exceeded e.g. structural limitations. Typically it will take a number of barriers or SCEs to fail before a major accident occurs. However, the HSE Case shall detail the operational limits that apply where the failure of a single barrier could lead directly to a major accident occurring. For example, this applies to the Structural Integrity barriers, Subsea structures, and Topside Structures, or any onshore structure, which if it fails can lead directly to structural collapse. Typical operating envelope data for structural integrity barriers may include but not be limited to the following:
Deck loading restrictions e.g. allowable live loads for each deck, laydown area, etc.
Soft Mooring e.g. the maximum allowable soft mooring pull on each jacket leg
Helideck loading e.g. restrictions on the maximum allowable helideck loading
Crane capacity e.g. maximum allowable crane load
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Environmental conditions e.g. maximum wave height, wind speed, sea current, etc.
Marine operations e.g. Maximum wave height for attendant boats, maximum boat weight and approach speed.
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PART 3: CONTROL OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS Part 3 of the HSE Case shall contain
11.1
A register of Safety Critical Elements and their associated Major Accident Hazard Bowtie
A brief description of the identified barriers or Safety Critical Elements
A list of the safety critical features
A description of how the technical integrity of the identified barriers is to be maintained throughout the applicable project phase e.g. design, operations, abandonment. This should include descriptions of systems, procedures and responsibilities associated with the process of ensuring barrier effectiveness.
A review of the facility emergency response plan to ensure that it adequately addresses the consequences of the identified major accident hazards.
Barriers and Safety Critical Elements The bowtie assessment required in Part 2 of the HSE Case will identify the required barriers to prevent and recover from a Major Accident. The barriers detailed in the bowties which are structure, plant or equipment (hardware) are Safety Critical Elements (SCEs). In PETRONAS there are 8 general barrier groups or categories as shown in Figure 10-3. These barrier groups are either proactive or reactive. Proactive barriers are those barriers designed to prevent the hazard being released. Reactive barriers are those that are designed to control the hazard, limit the size of the consequences that may arise and enable personnel to escape. The bowtie assessment can be used to broadly identify the applicable SCE groups and sub-groups, see Figure 10-3. Whereas the flowchart shown in Figure 11-1 below may be used to assist in the identification of SCEs at the asset tag number level. Each step in this flowchart (Figure 11-1) procedure is described in more detail below. Contains hydrocarbon or hazardous substance
If the element in a system that contains flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous substance then there is the potential that failure could result in a major accident or MATTE event. Therefore, these items would be considered as an SCE. Typically these items would include process pipework and vessels containing hydrocarbons, and represent the process containment barrier grouping.
Part of a Control, Shutdown, Alarm or Mitigation System
If the element is part of a control, shutdown, alarm or mitigation system then there is the potential that its function is to provide
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protection against a major accident and their consequences. This would be the case if it was designed to protect process equipment from catastrophic failure. Typical examples are the facility Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD) and Passive Fire Protection (PFP). This identifies those SCEs that are part of the Detection, Protection and Shutdown systems barrier grouping. Can failure lead to Upstream or Downstream release?
The failure of an element may result, for example, in upset conditions that lead to over-pressurisation of pipework or vessels if they are not designed to withstand the event. This would lead to a major accident due to loss of containment in the upstream or downstream systems. An example of this type of system is a High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS). This type of system falls into the Shutdown Systems barrier grouping.
Can failure result in a major accident or inability to prevent, control or mitigate?
This would be a consideration for systems that are generally not considered part of the process. For example, structural failure on a mobile offshore facility may lead to loss of stability and a Major Accident. In addition, systems such as the navigational aids help prevent ship collision. Similarly cranes or lifting equipment may cause a Major Accident in the event of their failure due to dropped objects. This should identify the Structural Integrity barrier group and also the Protection Systems grouping for elements such as navigational aids, collision avoidance systems, etc.
Does the element prevent harm to people?
This would include items that: o
Protect people and the environment from a major accident hazard involving fire, explosion and the release of toxic gases and fumes.
o
Ensure effective escape from affected areas of the site, evacuation of the site or transference of people to a place of safety.
This identifies SCEs that are part of the Emergency Response and Life Saving barrier groupings
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Figure 11-1 – SCE identification Flowchart
11.2
Identified facility SCEs The HSE Case shall include a description under each general barrier group the applicable SCEs that have been identified within the facility that are linked to a particular Major Accident. This section must demonstrate the clear link between the facility MAH (and bowties) and the hardware barrier that is considered to be an SCE for that facility. It should be noted that equipment may fall into the barrier groups or categories. However, it may not be classified as an SCE because there is no Major Accident Hazard that requires its presence as a barrier.
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Safety Critical Features Safety Critical Features are elements of the design and the facility that inherently limit the risk although they are not linked with any of the hardware barrier groups or categories. Typical examples of safety critical features are:
11.4
Plant layout to minimise explosion over-pressures due to level of congestion, equipment orientation
Boat landing located away from risers. Note that Riser Guards are considered to be a Safety Critical Element. The orientation and layout of the platform such that the risers are distant from the boat landing is a Safety Critical Feature
Normally unmanned operations
HVAC intake location preventing smoke, flammable and/or toxic gas ingress
Refuge / muster points located upwind
Minimisation of flanges and instrument connections to reduce leak frequency
Platform orientation with respect to prevailing wind direction, with operator shelters located up wind
Location of life rafts, life jackets, TEMPSC etc., at an easily accessible position from the primary muster point.
Minimisation of hydrocarbon inventory and vessel sizes
Minimisation of ignition sources
Safety design margins
Technical Integrity It is only by ensuring the Technical Integrity of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ safety barriers that the safety of the facility can be maintained. The HSE Case shall provide an overview of how the identified hardware barriers or SCEs will be designed, procured, fabricated, installed, commissioned, operated, inspected and maintained in a manner that ensures its technical integrity during that particular phase of the asset life cycle. The TIPS process encompasses the HSE Case. However, the purpose of the HSE Case is to identify the Major Accident Hazards and the Safety Critical Elements required to control Major Hazards and to detail the specific performance requirements. Therefore, Performance Standards must be developed based on the HSE Case that are fully defined and agreed by the appropriate Technical Authority, for each phase of the project life cycle. These Performance Standards are not considered to be part of the HSE Case but are to be developed based on the HSE Case findings.
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The Performance Standards report for the SCEs will detail how they have been developed and what critical assurance tasks are required to ensure that technical integrity is maintained. It is required that the identified SCEs are always able to perform to 100% of their required functionality. However, there will be times when this is not possible due to breakdown or other causes. The Performance Standards report shall detail the processes that are in place that controls any deviations in SCE performance in a safe manner. This represents essentially a management of change procedure. The Performance Standards report shall also detail the process to be followed in the event of modification to the SCEs. For example, deviations in materials of construction during the fabrication phase of the SCE, performance issues during operational phase, incorrect design standard followed at the design stage, etc.
11.5
Safety Critical Element Register For better management of the safety critical devices, each Safety Critical Element shall be assigned a unique number as an SCE code according to the category e.g. for fire fighting deluge system that falls under the category of Protection System, the SCE number would be PSXXX. A record must be made of the SCEs identified; the record should state why the element is considered safety critical and how it relates to specific major hazards. The register must demonstrate the clear link between the facility MAH (and bowties) and the hardware barrier that is considered to be an SCE for that facility. The HSE Case shall contain a list of the SCEs identified in the bowtie diagrams as per the example SCE register provided in Appendix 6. The SCE Register must show each SCE against the MAH bowties where that particular SCE appears as a hardware barrier. The SCEs and their performance standards must be traceable in the maintenance management system.
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PART 4: SYSTEMS Part 4 of the HSE Case is to document those activities, people, competencies and procedures that impact the barriers required to manage the Major Accident Hazards. Part 4 of the HSE Case shall contain
12.1
HSE Critical Activities
Activity Sheets
Competency assessment description
Essential procedures that manage Major Accident Hazards
HSE Activity Matrix
HSE Critical Activities Having identified the barriers required to manage Major Accident Hazards Part 4 of the HSE Case (with the exception of the Concept Select Phase), shall describe how during that particular phase of the asset lifecycle e.g. Design, Operations, etc., their performance and integrity will be assured and maintained. This is to be achieved by identifying the SCE Critical Activities, which are those activities that must be carried out to ensure that the SCE is suitable, has the design integrity and will continue to perform its intended function. The SCE critical integrity activities shall be identified for all SCEs and for the entire asset lifecycle, they may include:
Critical design, construction, installation, commissioning, maintenance, operation, modification and repair activities.
Periodic testing of SCEs including testing of Instrumented Protected Functions (IPFs) and systems
Certification activities
Independent inspection, examination and testing
Administrative aspects such as training, auditing, etc..
Figure 12-1 shows the relation of Critical Activities to SCEs / barriers and controls.
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Figure 12-1 – How activities relate to barriers
In order to assist in the identification of SCE critical integrity activities it is recommended that asset groups are segregated along with the life cycle processes for these assets, and upon which the SCE Critical Integrity Activities should be identified. Figure 12-2 is a flowchart to assist in the identification of SCE Critical Integrity Activities. This will also assist in the identification of the organisational aspects to manage the SCE Critical Integrity Activities during that particular phase of the life cycle. It should be noted that SCE Critical Integrity Activities shall also include SCE Integrity Audits that are carried out by the Independent Competent Body and is used to confirm that all the SCE Critical Integrity Activities have been identified and are performed.
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Figure 12-2 – Methodology for identifying SCE Critical Integrity Activities
SCE Critical Integrity Activities
PROCESSES
ACTIVITIES
ASSETS
DESIGN
WELLS
PROCURE
FLOWLINES & PIPELINES
BUILD
STRUCTURES
QA/QC INSTALL / COMMISSION OPERATE
TESTING PROCEDURES RECORDS TRAINING REPORTING AUDIT ETC.
TANKS & VESSELS PIPEWORK & VALVES ROTATING EQT
INSPECT
BOILERS & HEATERS
CORROSION MGMT
ELECTRICAL EQT
MAINTAIN
INSTRUMENTS
REVIEW / IMPROVE
HVAC & AC
CHANGE
EMERGENCY & LIFE SAVING
DISPOSE
INTEGRITY ASSURANCE OF SCEs
For example, SCE Critical Integrity Activities and assurances that are identified during the design phase may include reviews that ensure that the designer has taken account of:
The expected working life of the asset
The properties of the materials handled
Corrosive environments
Extreme operating conditions, including start-up, shutdown, and reasonably foreseeable fault or emergency conditions
The need for asset examination and testing to ensure continued integrity throughout the design life
Foreseeable changes to design conditions of equipment that may be connected to the asset, including those operated by third parties
Protection against system failure using suitable measuring, control and protecting devices
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Provision of door safety devices to prevent opening of equipment whilst pressurised
Interlocking devices to ensure availability of pressure relief devices and emergency depressurising valves
Suitable material for each component part compatible with service and operating conditions
External forces exerted on the asset including thermal, seismic, wind, and wave loadings
Safe access for operation, maintenance, and activities associated with integrity assurance
Indelibly marking of equipment with safe operating limits and other safety information
This may simply be achieved by the normal project design procedures, and assured via technical safety studies such as HAZOPs. During the fabrication, construction, installation and commissioning phase the HSE Case should identify the activities and assurances that those doing the installation have the required training, skills, and experience and that they:
Provide adequate supervision, taking into account the complexity of the system being installed. Critical stages of fabrication / installation activities such as welding procedures, testing, material laboratory analysis and NDT requirements should be witnessed.
Prepare suitable foundations to support the equipment, taking into account the nature of the ground, equipment weight, and other internal loads and external forces
Decide on the most suitable method of lifting and handling sizeable loads to avoid harm to people and accidental damage.
Check for signs of damage to equipment during transit and prior to delivery to site for installation
Protect the SCEs from the environment including adverse weather before and during installation
Ensure that hot work such as welding or cutting will not affect the integrity of the SCE
Ensure that protective devices are clear of obstruction, operate correctly without hindrance or blockage and that the discharge is routed to a safe place
Ensure that access doors / hatches are clear of obstruction and operate correctly
Ensure that any labels or markings attached to the SCE are clearly visible
Provide adequate access for maintenance and examination purposes
Provide suitable protection against mechanical damage such as accidental impact by vehicles
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Have the installation work checked and approved upon completion by a suitably qualified and competent person
It is likely that these may all be achieved by the normal project construction, installation, pre-commissioning and commissioning procedures. For the Operations Phase the HSE Case shall demonstrate how persons operating the SCEs are provided with adequate instructions covering the safe operation and actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, and that the SCEs are operated in accordance with these instructions. The operating instructions must contain all information needed for safe operation of the SCEs including appropriate limits within which it is to be operated and the environmental conditions in which it may safely operate, see section 10.11. The instructions shall typically also include:
Normal start-up and shutdown procedures
Equipment procedures
Precautions for standby operation
Function and effect of controls and protective devices
Likely fluctuations expected in normal operations
Requirements to ensure that the SCEs are adequately protected against operating outside their design envelop at all times
Maximum loads which may safely be imposed on parts of the structure
Procedures in the event of an emergency
Reporting and recording of critical information which should include equipment failure reports for root cause analysis.
preparation
for
maintenance
and
re-instatement
The HSE Case shall identify those aspects of the operating manual that are applicable to the management of SCEs, and their assurance processes. In addition during the Operational phase the SCEs must be maintained and repaired so as to prevent danger or a major accident. The type and frequency of the maintenance for the SCE must be assessed and the suitable maintenance programme planned. It is essential to maintain the desired functionality of the SCE during the operation and maintenance phases, which are characterised by their long term nature and where controls are difficult to maintain at the same level. Processes that support these phases must be addressed, for example:
Monitoring SCEs against their Performance Standards
Condition or reliability approach for maintenance
Preventative maintenance approach
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Use of appropriate support software
Spare parts strategy
Examining SCE failure modes and their consequences
Activity Sheets With the exception of the Concept Phase, the HSE Case shall include the activity sheets. The purpose of the activity sheet is to clearly summarise the following:
An overview of the activity which links the activity to how it ensures that barriers are adequate and effective.
Hazard management objectives of the activity which gives the background as to how the activity either creates or maintains adequate controls and barriers and how it manages hazards
Description of tasks which is a list of the key sub tasks that form an overall activity
Accountable and responsible personnel / competency criteria – these are the job positions accountable and / or responsible for the task being done appropriately. An ‘accountable’ person is not necessarily the person performing the task but is answerable for its adequacy (generally supervisor / management level). The ‘responsible’ person is the person that does the task.
Company systems – these are the systems functioning within PETRONAS that help in undertaking the task (either by planning it or recording the results).
Verification of the satisfactory performance of the task will take place either by internal audits or by use of an Independent Verification Body. An example Activity Sheet is provided in Appendix 10.
12.3
Competency to undertake activities for managing major hazards An important factor in ensuring barrier effectiveness is the presence of a person with the right competencies being available to undertake the task specified in the activity sheets. In order to ensure the presence of a person with the right competency it is necessary to:
Identify each task or activity and match the task to a specific position within the company and this position represents the accountable and responsible persons for that particular task or activity being done satisfactorily.
The required competencies for a position are defined either in the positions Job Competency Profile or in a detailed job description
An assurance system is in place to demonstrate that the person who is working in a position has the right competency, or has a plan in place to close any competency gaps.
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The Operations HSE Case shall include a description of how competency is assessed and maintained to ensure that the barriers identified remain effective.
12.4
Essential Procedures to Manage MAH A procedure is considered essential if any inadequacies in the procedure or failure to follow it could lead directly to a barrier being ineffective or a major accident hazard occurring. The Operational HSE Case shall identify those essential or critical control procedures. The Operational HSE Case shall include a training matrix for the critical control procedures against job position or function, so that it can be ensured that relevant people are adequately trained in these critical control procedures. Typical critical control procedures are:
12.5
PTS 60.2001 Permit to work system – specifies the application of Permit to Work within PETRONAS operations
Emergency Response Procedure – emergency response for the facility
Job Hazard Analysis – describes the requirements of the job hazard analysis as a tool to manage hazards and risk analysis in the execution of all work at the work place
PTS 60.2201 Management of Change – provides guidelines for managing proposed modifications to existing onshore and offshore facilities and structures to ensure that the changes are practical with added values and no additional risk whether or not it involves change in the process
PTS 60.2212 Bypassing of Safety Critical Equipment / Safety System Isolation – Describes the requirements for defeat or override or bypass of an automatic control or protection system when it is required to be deliberately rendered inoperable for the purpose of start-up, testing and maintenance
Operating deviations – stipulates the hazard management requirements for continuing operations when integrity assurance activities or corrective maintenance cannot be executed
MOPO/ SIMOPS procedure – Defines the standards to be applied to safely manage multiple activities being performed simultaneously at a location.
provides
the
guidance for
Critical Activity Matrix The HSE Case shall present the organogram for the facility and the manning levels in place with details of shift rotation. The job positions identified shall be used to form the Critical Activity Matrix along with the identified critical activities.
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Function of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix The SCE-Critical Activity Matrix is a tabulation of critical activities and its corresponding parties who are responsible and accountable to perform the critical activities. The SCE-Critical Activities are activities that shall be carried out to ensure the effectiveness of the identified barrier (e.g. scheduled maintenance to maintain the hard barriers). In general, the SCE-Critical Activities are the escalation controls identified in the Bowtie assessment. The responsible parties for the respective SCE-Critical activities may vary from the Management level to the Technician level at site. However, the accountable parties should be limited to Management and Supervisory level. Note: A single party may be responsible or accountable for more than one critical activity.
12.5.2
Development of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix The SCE-Critical Activity Matrix shall be developed after completion of Bowtie risk assessment where the hard barriers for both facility hazards have been identified and confirmed. The identification of SCE-Critical Activity and their corresponding responsible and accountable parties should be developed by a team comprising various disciplines as described below, but not limited to:
Operations
Maintenance
HSE
Integrity Engineering
Well Engineering
Project Management
Leadership
Pipeline Engineering.
As a minimum, the personnel involved in the development of the matrix should be the Subject Matter Expert (SME) in the respective discipline. Sample template for Critical Activity Matrix is as shown in Appendix 9.
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13
MAIN SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR THE HSE CASE
13.1
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Requirements The HSE Case shall demonstrate that the risks associated with the major accident hazards (MAH) are managed to ALARP. Process facilities risks shall be evaluated via various techniques i.e. quantitative risk assessments, semi-quantitative risk assessments and qualitative risk assessments. The scope for formal safety assessment during FEED and detailed design phase are more detailed and comprehensive where the results are used in finalizing the possible design options and the requirement for and incorporation of risk reduction measures. During the later phases of the Asset Lifecycle a revalidation of the technical HSE studies as part of the HSE Case may be sufficient. However, the FSA should be reviewed and updated as required in line with the HSE Case report revision. All technical HSE studies shall be completed in accordance with the appropriate PETRONAS Technical Standards e.g. PTS 60.2210 for Quantitative Risk Assessment, PTS 60.2209 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), PTS 60.2204 Process Hazard Analysis, etc. As part of the assessments, the adequacy of the control and mitigation measures shall be evaluated in minimizing the risks to ALARP. Additionally, recommendations shall be made should these controls and mitigation measures be found to be insufficient and shall be recorded in the HSE Case Remedial Action Plan. For Contractors facilities, the facilities shall also be subjected to the comprehensive safety studies in demonstrating that the risks posed by the facilities operations are at ALARP and the required controls and mitigation measures are adequately identified and in placed. The requirement to conduct comprehensive FSA shall be specified as part of the contract provision. The formal safety assessment shall be reviewed in cases of any major modifications done on the facility which may impair the existing controls, or if the reliability and integrity of the existing controls are in doubt. Subsequently, the HSE Case shall also be updated for any change in the safety studies to reflect the current risk exposure.
13.2
Scope of Assessment The scope of the FSA in HSE Case shall include process hazards and non-process hazards that may lead to Major Accident Event (MAE). The Process Hazards shall include the assessment of potential leaks for all process equipment, including flowlines and pipelines.
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Non-process Hazards shall include the assessment of transportation hazards, lifting hazards, ship collision, occupational hazard and structural failure. The FSA shall cover all the facilities within the field, including all satellite facilities. The exposure of hazard shall take into account the maximum personnel onboard the facility, including Contractors and visitors.
13.3
FSA Tools The FSA tools in HSE Case shall consists of qualitative, semiquantitative and quantitative assessment as elaborated below:
Qualitative Risk Assessment is a study/assessment which is based on conservative assumptions particularly where uncertainties exist. In this method, a single person or team can gather information and brainstorm on the causes, control and consequence. Examples include Hazard Identification (HAZID), Structured What-if Techniques (SWIFT), Hazard Operability Study (HAZOP), etc.
Semi-quantitative Risk Assessment is a more detailed study/assessment to evaluate in detail on the key risk/issues identified in a qualitative risk assessment. This method is useful especially when quantification of risk is difficult and the qualitative interpretation is too subjective. Examples include Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Instrumented Protective Function (IPF) study, etc. and
Quantitative Risk Assessment is a study/ assessment to numerically determine the frequency of various adverse events and their consequences to establish the risk to life that the particular facility poses. The consequence modelling undertaken as part of the Quantitative Risk Assessment shall utilize the relevant programme/software e.g. FRED, PHAST, etc.
Other similar studies include Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA), Radiation, Dispersion and Plume Study, Non-Flammable Hazard Analysis (NFHA), etc.
Below are typically the minimum safety studies required to evaluate facility risks necessary to complete the HSE Case. These studies are initially undertaken in detail during the design phase of the facility. Therefore, during subsequent phases of the asset lifecycle i t may only be necessary to revalidate the basis, assumptions, recommendations, and to identify if any significant changes have been made from the previous study. This may include, for example, that the muster point location remains in the same location as originally intended, that process conditions and materials remain the same as those used in the consequence modelling, that the location and type of fire fighting and/or EER facilities remain the same and in the same location as detailed in the previous study, that all fire and gas detectors are located as per the Fire and Gas Layout drawings, etc. Therefore, for the Operations HSE Case it is expected that site visits shall be undertaken
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to confirm the applicability and / or validate the assumptions and findings of the previous FSA.
Qualitative Risk Assessments may be required to assist in the determining the credible scenario before proceeding with Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). Examples of the assessments that may be conducted are Hazard Identification (HAZID), Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP), Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment and verification, etc.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) o
An assessment to identify and quantify the exposure to process hydrocarbon fire and explosion hazards on the facility. This study usually yields the quantification of fatality risk to personnel working on the facility.
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a detailed hazard analysis where the purpose is to identify the possible hazard scenarios of the process, assess the existing safeguards and where necessary, provide recommendations to ensure that the risk is managed to ALARP level. The detailed analysis is divided into qualitative, semi qualitative and quantitative analysis depending on the aim of the study. The most widely used technique is the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. Other detailed analysis techniques are Structure What-If Technique (SWIFT), Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), etc. The analysis shall be in accordance with the PTS 60.2204 Process Hazard Analysis. However, it is envisaged that during the design phase of the project that the Emergency Mitigation Facilities Review (EMFR) checklist is completed. For subsequent phases only a review of the EMFR Checklist is required as more detailed analysis will be provided by associated studies such as EERA, ESSA, FRA, QRA, etc.
Fire Risk Assessment and Thermal Radiation: o
Gas Dispersion, Plume Study and Blast Study: o
An assessment on fire risk and thermal radiation to establish hazardous thermal radiation contours for the facility. The purpose of the study is to assess the impact of thermal radiation, on personnel, facility and operation. An assessment on flammable gas dispersion and plume, to establish safe cold vent locations, or flare stack height based on flame out scenario. An assessment of delayed ignition of a flammable vapour cloud causing an explosion and blast to assess the maximum realistic overpressure levels at various locations. This may require the use of CFD modelling, particularly for offshore structures.
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA): o
An assessment on the emergency system with the objective to identify and determine the availability of the critical emergency system, assess the vulnerability to withstand major accident emergency condition (e.g. fire and explosion), as well as determining the survivability of the emergency system.
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Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA): o
An assessment to ensure safe escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel in the event of major accident. The intent of EERA is to ensure the safety of personnel at all time while retreating from the effect of hazardous situation with due consideration of likely hazardous scenario, its duration, and severity as well as the predicted responses of individual under threat.
o
It should be noted that the EERA study is an offshore assessment which is not required for onshore facilities. However, for onshore facilities a Safe Access and Layout review study may be beneficial during the design phase. A typical proposed methodology of this type of study is illustrated in the Figure 13-1. However, the scope of the review can be adjusted depending on the intended purpose of the study. This type of study is envisaged to be only of practical use during the design phase of the asset / facility.
Figure 13-1 – Safe Access and Layout Review
Temporary Refuge Smoke Ingress Assessment (TRSIA): o
An assessment to identify the position of the Temporary Refuge (TR), determine the integrity of the TR and the extent
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of impairment and survivability of personnel in cases of any major accident hazards.
Hazardous Area Classification (HAC): o
An assessment to classify the areas around equipment handling or storing flammable fluids. It provides a basis for the correct selection of fixed electrical equipment and the location of other fixed sources of ignition in those areas. Hazardous area classification is essential for the control of ignition sources, and hazardous area rated electrical apparatus are considered as SCEs.
Buildings Risk Assessment: o
For occupied buildings and/ or functionally significant buildings, a buildings risk assessment may be required to confirm that the building location or design does not place the occupants at undue risk.
In cases where there are specific concerns on the adequacy of safety systems on the facility, the suitable safety studies may also be conducted on a case by case basis e.g.:
Acoustically Induced Vibration (AIV) Study; o
Fire and Gas Mapping; o
An assessment of piping systems that may be at risk of failure due to acoustic induced vibration caused by high capacity gas let down facilities. This may apply to relief and blow down systems. An assessment to identify location, number and type of detector (including its voting strategy) to be used based on potential source of gas release and fire. The output shall be indicated on the master plan of a fire and gas safety system.
SIL Assessment and Verification o
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction provided by a safety function, or to specify a target level of risk reduction. SIL is a measurement of performance required for a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). SIL Verification is the demonstration that the installed SIF achieves it required performance.
The detail reports from all formal safety assessments shall be referenced in the HSE Case.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
14
HSE CASE REVIEW
14.1
HSE Case Communication
92
The revised/new HSE Case shall be communicated to all relevant parties working on the facilities and/or involved in the HSE-Critical activities. During the communication session, it is essential to highlight:
14.2
The fitness of the facility to be operated
The risk exposure by personnel working on the facility
Information Assessment
The SCE-Critical activities, including the accountable and responsible parties, required in maintaining the effectiveness of hard barriers for all MAH
Information that is important as reference for the safe conduct of HSE-Critical activities e.g. HSE-Critical Activity Bowtie Risk Assessment.
with
regards
to
MAH
e.g.
Facility
Bowtie
Risk
Review Requirement A HSE Case is intended to be a live document and shall always be kept up to date to ensure that the information and the risks exposed to personnel are current. The review shall examine the basic assumptions made in HSE Case as well as its entire content. To ensure accuracy of the review, detail information with regards to the facility and operations shall be made available to the appointed party in charge for reviewing/developing the HSE Case. This is essential as the facts and information given to be the basis of the studies will reflect the results and findings of the HSE Case. It is vital that before changes are made to the facility or the way it is operated that the HSE Case is consulted as part of the change decision making process.
14.3
Frequency of Review A HSE Case shall be regularly reviewed and revised at least every five (5) years, provided there is no change made to the facilities and/or activities. However, where the review and revision frequency is determined by local legislation e.g. Malaysian DOSH CIMAH report, then the review and revision cycle shall be in accordance with the prevailing local legal requirement.
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Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
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93
The following will require the HSE Case to be updated:
Material changes to the facility, its organisation or mode of operation
Changes that affect the key assumptions used in the HEMP analysis
The review of HSE Case shall also be conducted to reflect:
14.3.1
Major modification to the facilities and operations
Findings from Other Risk Assessment
Findings from Assurance Exercise
Lesson Learnt.
Major Modification to the facilities and operations For any major change in process facilities (e.g. installation of new process equipment, pipeline tie-in, or change in operating conditions (composition, pressure, temperature, etc.)), a thorough review and update of the safety studies shall be conducted to evaluate the new hazards and risks e.g. new source of leak, potential impact due to fire/explosion from the new source of leak, dispersion of toxic gas, etc. In addition, in cases where there is change to the manning philosophy, the assumptions of the safety studies (e.g. QRA, EERA, ESSA, etc.) shall be reviewed in determining the actual risk exposure to personnel.
14.3.2
Findings from Other HSE Risk Assessments The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect findings from other HSE risk assessment exercise e.g. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), Facility/HSE-Critical Activity Risk Assessment, Fire and Gas Mapping, etc., as and when required to ensure the completeness of the control and/or recovery barriers identified in the safety studies.
14.3.3
Findings from Assurance Exercise The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect findings from HSE assurance exercise as and when required. The new recommendation and/or area for improvement with regards to HSE Case shall be incorporated in the revised HSE Case with view to minimize the risk to ALARP.
14.3.4
Lesson Learnt The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect lesson learnt from incident investigation as and when required. The new recommendation and/or area for improvement shall be incorporated in the revised HSE Case with view to minimize the risk to ALARP. Any discrepancy to the defective and/or missing barriers shall be re-assessed and to be replaced with an effective barrier.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
94
REFERENCES [1]
PTS 60.0303 Documenting a HSEMS and HSE Case, Rev. 1, June 2006
[2]
PTS 60.2210 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), Rev 1, June 2006
[3]
PTS 60.0401 Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP), Rev 2, October 2012
[4]
PTS 60.XXXX Draft Guideline for Bowtie
[5]
PTS 60.2004 Guideline for Hazard Identification (HAZID), Rev 2, 2011
[6]
PTS 60.1400.01, Guideline Health Risk Assessment, March 2012
[7]
PTS 60.3202, Environmental Aspects and Impacts Assessment Guide, Rev 0, June 2006
[8]
PTS 60.3206, Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment, Rev 2, September 2012
[9]
PETRONAS E&P Technical Standard for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), EP HSE SG 06 14 February 2014
[10] International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Health Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU), Issue 3.3 1 Dec 2010 [11] International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Health, Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Land Drilling Units, Issue 1.0.1, 27 July 2009 [12] Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore production installations – Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment, BS EN ISO 17776:2002 [13] L30 A Guide to the Offshore Installations (HSE Case) Regulations, 2005 [14] L111 A Guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations, 1999 [15] UKOOA Fire and Explosion Guidance, Issue 1, 2007 [16] P.U.(A) 39/96, Occupational Safety and Health (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulations 1996 [17] Hong Kong Planning Department, Chapter 12 Miscellaneous Planning Standards and Guidelines, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/ch12/ch12_tex t.htm [18] EP OE MAN SCE Safety Critical Elements Manual, Rev 0, August 2013 [19] PETRONAS Carigali, Simultaneous Operations Guidelines, WW ALL O 05 001 Rev 1, 2013 [20] EG 1/04, Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Assessment, Department of Environment (Malaysia), 2004
Risk
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 1 Typical Statement of Fitness
95
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Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
96
Major Accident Hazards Describe the Major Accident Hazards that have been identified for the facility. This should be referenced against the generic hazard list. For example: The Major Accident Hazards that have been identified for the facility are: H01.01 Crude Oil under Pressure – leading to fire/ explosion due to loss of containment of hydrocarbon H01.02 Hydrocarbons in formation – leading to blowout and fire / explosion following loss of containment of hydrocarbon H01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas – leading to fire / explosion due to loss of containment of hydrocarbon H06.03 Overhead Equipment – leading to dropped object and subsequent fire / explosion from loss of containment of hydrocarbon H07.02 Objects under compression – leading to platform structural failure / collapse H08.02 On Water Transport (boating) – leading to ship collision H08.03 In air transport (flying) – leading to helicopter accidents Technical HSE Assessment This section shall illustrate that an assessment has been carried out to identify the threats, their likelihood of occurrence, the possible consequences that may arise and the provision of suitable and sufficient barriers and controls as part of the HSE Case. Design Assessment – Describe the HSE studies that have been undertaken in relation to the facility. Detail the continued validity of these studies and any salient findings. Bowtie Analysis – Insert a paragraph related to the development of the Bowtie diagram and any identified shortfall in barriers or controls. SCEs – Insert a paragraph relating to the identification of SCEs and the assessment of their effectiveness Largest Risk Contributors – Insert a pie chart to show biggest risk contributor e.g. see pie chart below. 5.00%
1.00%
5.00% 10.00%
6.00%
15.00%
48.00% 10.00%
HC under pressure - HC in formation
HC under pressure - Risers and Pipelines
HC under pressure - Topsides piping and equipment
Dropped Object
Occupational
Helicopter Accidents
Platform Structural Failures
Ship Collision
Risk levels – Insert a table detailing the PLL and IRPA values for the facility and that they are within the PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria
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Barriers and Control Effectiveness A statement should be provided that describes how the effectiveness of the barriers was ascertained. In addition, it should describe the identification of the escalation factors and there controls in place that ensure the continued effectiveness of identified SCEs. The statement should make due reference to the performance standards being met and clear HSE Critical Roles and Responsibilities being identified. ALARP Management of Risks The key risk reduction measures identified and incorporated into the design should be described. In addition a summary of the ALARP demonstration should be provided.
Remedial Actions This section should summarise the remedial actions. Signatures As managers for the facility, we fully endorse the contents of this HSE Case. We are committed to ensure that the integrity of the facility is maintained and that operation described or referenced will be safe. We will address the shortfalls as documented in the Remedial Action Plan and aim to deliver continuous improvement in HSE Performance. We have concluded that the xxxx facilities are safe to operate and Major Hazards can be managed in accordance with the requirements set out in this HSE Case.
Title
Signature
Reviewed by
Regions Senior Manager, HSE
HSE Case Custodian
Head of Production or Offshore Installation Manager
Endorsed by
General Manager, HSE Division
Approved by
Asset Manager or Head of Operations
Regions
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 2 Typical Hazard Picture & Control Sheet
98
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HAZARD PICTURE HAZARD: Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside Equipment
HAZID REFERENCE: [H-01-03, H-01-05, H-01-06] BOW-TIE 01 Hydrocarbon under pressure in topside equipment
THREATS Overpressurisation of facilities / Equipment Underpressure Temperature (high and low) Deterioration of hoses (weather, mechanical, etc.) Corrosion (internal and external) Erosion (sand and debris management program) Breaking into the process (opening pressurized equipment, launchers, receivers or piping) Material deterioration / fatigue / equipment vibration, e.g. pulsation dampeners, structural mounting, etc Seal failure / degradation External Impact e.g. Swinging load Internal explosion
PREVENTIVE BARRIERS SI003 Heavy Lift Cranes & Mech Handling Equipment PC001 Pressure Vessel PC002 Heat Exchanger PC003 Rotating Equipment PC004 Tanks PC005 Piping System PC007 Relief System IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
IC008 Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components DS003 H2O in Condensate PS012 Sand Filters PS013 Chemical Injection System SD001 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) SD006 Process Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs) ER009 Process Control & Alarm
TOP EVENT Loss of Containment
CONTROL & MITIGATIVE BARRIERS IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation IC002 Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment IC005 Earth Bonding IC008 Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components SD001 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) SD002 Depressurisation System SD004 Operational Well Isolation SD005 Pipeline Isolation Valve SD006 Process Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES Explosion Jet fire Pool fire Smoke Hydrocarbon spill ESCALATED CONSEQUENCES Damage to critical structure/platform collapse Impairment of EER provisions Failure of riser and/or well flowline
PS001 Deluge System PS002 Fire & Explosion Protection PS003 Helideck Foam System PS004 Firewater Pump PS005 Firewater Ringmain PS007/8/9/11 Fire Protection Systems PS010 Power Management System SI001 Structures Subsea / Vessel / Hull / GBS / Foundation Structures SI002 Topside Structure
DETECTION DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
RECOVERY Escape Muster Evacuation by lifeboat/liferaft
EER MEASURES ER001 Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Area ER002 Escape and Evacuation Routes ER003 Emergency / Escape Lighting ER004 Communication System ER005 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) ER006 Helicopter Facilities ER007 Emergency Power) ER010 Open Haz./Non-Haz. Drains
LS001 Personal Survival Equipment (PSE) LS002 Rescue Facilities – Standby Vessel LS003 Lifeboats / TEMPSC LS004 Alternative Means of Escape
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Hazard Control Sheet
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas A HAZARD DESCRIPTION
The Yetagun Complex produces export gas and condensate. It comprises of three platforms, namely: • Yetagun “A” Wellhead Platform, a four leg, 20 slot drilling platform which was installed in March 1998; • Yetagun “B” Production Platform, an eight leg production, compression and living quarters platform which was installed in April 1999; and • Yetagun “C” Booster Compressor Platform, a 4 leg, separation and 3 train booster compression platform which was commissioned in April 2012. Well fluids from Yetagun A production flow line are choked to 37 barg before routed to the production header or the test header and then routed across the bridge to the Yetagun B platform for three phase separation. The gas is routed to the booster compression facility at Yetagun C where it is compressed to circa 70 barg and then it is routed to Yetagun B for water and hydrocarbon dew point suppression and then the sales gas compressors to 160barg and cooled to 63°C before export to shore. Condensate routed to the condensate stabilization unit at Yetagun B where the condensate needs to be stabilized to reduce the volatility of the condensate to 14.5 psia (1 bar) true vapor pressure at 100°F (9.7 RVP predicted) before being sent to the FSO. Releases of gas and condensate could potentially lead to fire and/or explosion causing injuries/fatalities, and severe asset damage. Uncontrolled hydrocarbon releases within the furnace can potentially cause fire/explosion of the furnace leading to similar scale of casualties and losses. In addition, condensate release can also have environmental effect though it is not as severe as crude oil releases due to the lighter components evaporating with less chance of prolonged environmental impact. Hazard locations: The primary locations likely to give rise to this top event are: Yetagun A Cellar deck – wellheads and production manifold/headers Main deck – gas pig launcher Yetagun B Cellar deck – production separator, condensate pumps and propane package Main deck – sales gas compressors Upper deck – separators, sales gas coolers & compressors and propane package Yetagun C Cellar deck – separator Main deck – sales gas booster compressors
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
B THREAT AND CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT Consequence:
Threats/Causes:
Overpressurisation of facilities / Equipment Underpressure Temperature (high and low) Deterioration of hoses (weather, mechanical, etc.) Corrosion (internal and external) Erosion (sand and debris management program) Breaking into the process (opening pressurized equipment, launchers, receivers or piping) Material deterioration / fatigue / equipment vibration, e.g. pulsation dampeners, structural mounting, etc Seal failure / degradation External Impact e.g. Swinging load Internal explosion
The threats leading to this events are controlled through the following Bow-Tie: Hydrocarbon Equipment
Under
Pressure in
Ignited release • • • • • •
Immediate ignition leading to jet fire Explosion or flash fire from delayed ignition of gas cloud Pool fire on the topsides or on sea-surface generating smoke Asphyxiation of personnel due to smoke Impairment of the escape and evacuation systems Damage to critical structural members
Unignited release • • •
Asphyxiation of personnel due to gas cloud Personnel injuries caused by escape and evacuation from incident site Environmental impact
These consequences from this Hazard are controlled through the following Bow-Tie: •
All Hazards (excl air transportation) – Consequence only
Topside
C THREAT AND CONSEQUENCE CONTROL This hazard is assessed in the following technical studies, which is explained in Section xxx of the HSE Case:
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA) Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
The summary for each of these studies is within Section xxx Formal Safety Assessment of the HSE Case and the recommendations/gaps for these studies are listed in the Remedial Action Plan.
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas Immediate Consequences
The technical studies show those jet fire and vapour cloud explosions are the main threats for Yetagun Complex from process topsides failure, with major accident consequences on people and asset. It is important to understand the following about jet fires:
Fatalities to personnel in the event of immediate ignition occur before personnel have the chance to make safety arrangements or escape from the affected area; and Detection and shutdown systems generally do not offer much protection to people for these types of events; the most effective way to reduce the risks to personnel is to prevent/stop the leak and minimize the ignition.
For Yetagun B topsides, the small, medium and large hydrocarbon releases from IP Separator, Gas / Glycol Exchanger, Cold Gas / Gas Exchanger, Refrigeration Vessel Package Skids (Propane Bullets), LP Compressors and Fuel Gas System on Upper Deck, Main Deck and Cellar Deck could result in jet fire scenario with initial flame length longer than the critical distances to the firewall separating the LQ and the process area. For HP Separators and Sales Gas Compressors, only medium and large releases could result in similar jet fire scenario. However, the length of the jet fire will decrease once isolation and blowdown starts and for large and medium release, the duration of the jet fire is very short to cause impingement to the nearest firewall. The explosion dimensioning accidental load (DAL) side on pressure for the Yetagun B process area is 0.15 barg for a fairly short duration of 121 milliseconds. The explosion DAL reflection overpressure is 0.21 barg and this pressure is applicable to the interior of the process area, such as the firewall. The explosion drag pressure for the modules is 0.08 barg and this pressure is applicable to smaller piping inside the area and for the larger piping and equipment the effect of both pressure and drag has to be combined. The main contributors to this explosion DAL overpressure are release from HP Separators, Gas Exchangers and the LP Compressors. The following list the critical SCEs for controlling immediate consequences: Barrier type Preventive
Detection Control and Mitigative Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Roles Process Containment (PC001, PC002, PC003, PC004, PC005, PC007) to minimize loss of containment through good technical integrity management, and Protection System (PS012, PS013) to protect against degradation Not effective for controlling immediate consequences Ignition Control (IC006, IC008) to minimize ignition probability Not effective for controlling immediate consequences
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
Escalation Likelihood and Control Upon occurrence of MAH, the management strategy for preventing escalation is to rely on effective detection method to be followed by activation of shutdown/isolation and blowdown. Barriers are put in place to prevents the following types of escalation consequences:
Impairment of muster shelter and evacuation provisions that allows safe escape and evacuation of personnel; and Escalation within the platform that pose a bigger consequence than the initial event.
The following list the critical SCEs for controlling escalation: Barrier type Preventive Detection Control and Mitigative
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Roles Not effective for controlling escalation consequences Detection System (DS001) to provide quick alert to incident Shutdown System (SD001, SD002, SD004, SD005, SD006) for emergency shutdown and blowdown Protective System (PS001, PS002, PS003, PS004, PS005, PS007/8/8/11, PS010) to provide effective fire protection and fire fighting Emergency Response (ER001, ER002, ER003, ER004, ER005, ER006, ER007) to provide provisions for safe access to muster and evacuate via Life Saving (LS001, LS002, LS003, LS004)
D ALARP & RISK REDUCTION The demonstrate ALARP, the Operational HSE Case maps out the barriers effectiveness in controlling MAH during operations. Barrier Effectiveness In the SCE assessment done together with the operational personnel, the effectiveness level of the SCE was determined accounting for the current operational state of the barrier. From the Bow-Tie, the identified SCEs that do not have ‘Effective’ rating are summarized below:
THREAT
BARRIER
RATING
REMEDIAL ACTION
SI002 – Topsides Structures
Partially Effective
Confirm on the deck plate structural remaining strength is within the acceptable limits.
Discovery of pinhole corrosion on deck plate.
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
SI003 - Heavy Lift Cranes & Mechanical Handling Equipment
Partially Effective
Provide limit switches to restrict crane travel preventing possible dropped object on live plant e.g. Production Cooler at Yetagun C.
Partially Effective
Expedite recruitment of experienced and competent Inspection Engineer or utilize 3rd party expertise for inspection and maintenance of pressure vessel and heat exchangers.
Partially Effective
Expedite recruitment of experienced and competent Inspection Engineer or utilize 3rd party expertise for inspection and maintenance of pressure vessel and heat exchangers.
Partially Effective
Confirm CBM monitoring program complies with CIMG requirement for all rotating equipment.
Partially Effective
Identify a mechanism for ascertaining the internal condition of the diesel / water storage legs and establish the min. acceptable wall thickness
Partially Effective
Identify an inspection plan to cover pipework hot spot locations that are susceptible to corrosion.
To maintain suitable integrity so that loads, or any lifting components, does not fail in a manner that could cause or contribute to a major accident. PC001 - Pressure Vessel To maintain integrity of the pressure containment system.
PC002 - Heat Exchangers To maintain integrity of the pressure containment system.
PC003 - Rotating Equipment To maintain leak tight integrity. To ensure no catastrophic failure of component parts that could result in a major accident. PC004 – Tanks To maintain leak tight integrity.
PC005 – Piping System To maintain the integrity of pipework.
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
Hazard Control Sheet
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
105
H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas PS001 - Deluge Systems
To mitigate the consequence of fire & explosion. PS004 - Firewater pumps To provide fire water on demand to extinguish or limit the spread & effects of a fire. PS005 - Firewater Ring main & Other Distribution Systems
Partially Effective
Confirm maintenance & inspection requirements for FRP piping.
Partially Effective
Ensure the auto start on firewater pump P-1301 A is rectified to provide designed level of reliability.
Partially Effective
Carry out hydraulic analysis on FW ringmain to prevent the observed vibration with P-1302 in operation
Partially Effective
Confirm the required frequency for PAGA system PMR.
Partially Effective
Confirm the UPS system to deliver emergency power meets the designed performance requirements.
Partially Effective
Carry out overdue recertification of Yetagun A lifeboats
To distribute sufficient fire water to all fire water systems. ER004 - Communication Systems To ensure that all personnel on board or at site at any location are made aware of any need for mustering or abandonment once the decision has been made. To ensure that the communication systems & information required for emergency response control, plant evacuation, & with all external parties identified in the emergency plan, are available. ER005 - Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) To provide uninterruptable power supply to the vital services during a major incident when normal power fails. LS003 - Lifeboats / TEMPSC To facilitate a secondary means of evacuation of personnel, independent of external resources, when the primary means is unavailable.
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Appendix 3 Generic Hazard List
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
01
Hydrocarbons
01.01
Crude Oil under pressure
Flowlines, pipelines, pressure vessels and piping
01.02
Hydrocarbons in formation
Oil wells especially during well drilling and entry / workover operations
01.03
LPGs (e.g. Propane)
Process fractionating equipment, storage tanks
01.04
LNGs
Cryogenic plants, tankers
01.05
Condensate, NGL
Gas wells, gas pipelines, gas separation vessels
01.06
Hydrocarbon gas
Oil/ gas separators, gas processing plants, compressors, gas pipelines
01.07
Crude Oil at low pressure
Oil storage tanks
01.08
Wax
Filter separators, well tubular, pipelines
01.09
Coal
Fuel source, mining activities
02
Refined Hydrocarbons
02.01
Lube and seal oil
Engines and rotating equipment
02.02
Hydraulic Oil
Hydraulic pistons, hydraulic reservoirs and pumps
02.03
Diesel fuel
Engines, storage
02.04
Petroleum spirit / Gasoline
Storage
03
Other Flammable Hazards
03.01
Cellulosic materials
Packing materials, wood planks, paper rubbish
03.02
Pyrophoric materials
Metal scale from vessels in sour service, scale on filters in sour service, iron sponge sweetening units
04
Explosives
04.01
Detonators
Seismic operations, pipeline construction
04.02
Conventional explosives
Seismic operations, pipeline construction, platform decommissioning
04.03
Perforating gun charges
Well completion activities associated with drilling rigs and workover operations
05
Pressure Hazards
05.01
Bottled pressure
gases
Sources
under
Welding and metal cutting, laboratory gas sources
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
Sources
05.02
Water under pressure
Water disposal, water floods and injection operations, strength testing of pipeworks, well fracturing and treatments
05.03
Non-hydrocarbon gas under pressure in pipeworks
Purging and leak testing of facilities
05.04
Air under high pressure
Seismic air guns and related piping
05.05
Hyperbaric (diving)
Undersea operations
05.06
Decompression (diving)
05.07
Oil and Hydrocarbon under pressure
06
Hazards associated with differences in height
06.01
Personnel at height >2m
Work involving scaffolding, suspended access, ladders, platforms, excavations, towers, stacks, roofing, working overboard, working on monkey board
06.02
Personnel at height <2m
Slippery/ uneven surfaces, climbing / descending stairs, obstructions, loose gratings
06.03
Overhead equipment
Objects falling while being lifted/ handled or working at a height over people, equipment or process systems, elevated work platforms, slung loads
06.04
Personnel under water
Objects falling onto divers from overhead operations
07
Objects under induced stress
07.01
Objects under tension
Guy and support cables, anchor chains, tow and barge tie-off ropes, slings
07.02
Objects under compression
Spring loaded devices, such as relief valves and actuators, and hydraulically operated devices
08
Dynamic situation hazards
08.01
On water transport (boating)
Boat transport to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products, marine seismic operations, barges moving drilling rigs and workover rigs
08.02
In air transport (flying)
Helicopter and fixed wing travel to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products
operations
Undersea operations gas
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REVISION 1.0
Hazard Number
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
109
Hazard Description
Sources
08.03
Boat collision hazard to other vessels and offshore structures
Shipping lane traffic, product transport vessels, supply and maintenance barges and boats, drifting boats
08.04
Equipment with rotating parts
Engines, motors, compressors, stems, thrusters on DP ships
08.05
Use of hazardous hand tools (grinding, sawing)
Workshop, construction sites, maintenance sites, rotating equipment
08.06
Use of knives, machetes and other sharp objects
Galley, seismic line clearing, grubbing operations
08.07
Transfer from offshore platform
Basket transfer, rope transfer
09
Physical Environment Hazards
09.01
Weather
Winds, temperature extremes, rain, etc.,
09.02
Sea state / river currents
Waves, tides or other sea states
09.03
Tectonic activity
Earthquakes or other earth movement activity
10
Hot surfaces
10.01
Process piping equipment 60 – 150°C
and
Oil well piping, piping in fractionation systems, glycol regeneration
10.02
Process piping equipment over 150°C
and
Hot oil piping, piping associated with stills and reboilers
10.03
Engine and turbine exhaust systems
Power generation, gas compression, refrigeration compression, engine driven equipment such as forklifts
10.04
Steam piping
Sulphur plants, power boilers, waste heat recovery systems, heat tracing and jackets
11
Hot fluids
11.01
Temperatures between 100 and 150°C
Glycol regeneration, low quality steam systems, cooling oils, galley
11.02
Temperatures greater than 150°C
Power boilers, steam generators, sulphur plants, waste heat recovery units, hot oil heating systems, regeneration gases used with catalysts and desiccants
12
Cold surfaces
12.01
Process piping between -25 °C and -80°C
Cold ambient climate, Joule-Thomson expansions (process and leaks), propane refrigeration systems, LPG gas plants
12.02
Process piping less than 80°C
Cryogenic plants, LNG plants, LNG storage vessels including tankers, vapour lines off liquid nitrogen storage
moving /
boat
to
drill
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
110
Hazard Number
Hazard Description
13
Cold Fluids
13.01
Oceans, <10°C
14
Open Flame
14.01
Heaters with fire tube
Glycol reboilers, amine reboilers, salt bath heaters, water bath heaters (line heaters)
14.02
Direct fire furnaces
Hot oil furnace, Claus plant reaction furnace, catalyst and desiccant regeneration gas heaters, incinerators, power boilers
14.03
Flares
Pressure relief and blowdown systems
15
Electricity
15.01
Voltage > 50V to 440 V in cables
Power cables, temporary electrical lines on construction sites
15.02
Voltage > 50 V to 440 V in equipment
Electric motors, electric switchgear, power generation, welding machines, transformer secondary
15.03
Voltage > 440 V
Power lines, power generation, transformer primary, large electrical motors
15.04
Lightning discharge
Major lightning prone areas
15.05
Electrostatic energy
Non-metallic storage vessels and piping, product transfer hoses, wiping rags, unearthed equipment, aluminium / steel, high velocity gas discharges
16
Electromagnetic Radiation
16.01
Ultraviolet radiation
Arc welding, sunshine
16.02
Infrared radiation
Flares
16.03
Microwaves
Galley
16.04
Lasers
Instrumentation, surveying
16.05
E/M radiation: High voltage AC cables
Transformers, power cables
17
Ionizing Radiation – Open Source
17.01
Alpha, Beta – open source
Well logging, radiography, densitometers, interface instruments
17.02
Gamma rays – open source
Well logging, radiography
17.03
Neutron – open source
Well logging
seas
and
Sources
lakes
Northern and Southern oceans and lakes
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
Hazard Number
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
111
Hazard Description
Sources
17.04
Naturally occurring ionising radiation
Scales in tubulars, vessels and process plant fluids (especially in C3 reflux streams)
18
Ionizing Radiation – Closed Source
18.01
Alpha, Beta – closed source
Well logging, radiography, densitometers, interface instruments
18.02
Gamma rays – closed source
Well logging, radiography
18.03
Neutron – closed source
Well logging
19
Asphyxiates
19.01
Insufficient atmospheres
19.02
Excessive CO2
Areas with CO2 fire fighting systems such as turbine enclosures
19.03
Drowning
Working overboard, marine operations, water transport
19.04
Excessive N2
N2 purged vessels
19.05
Halon
Areas with halon fire fighting systems such as turbine enclosures and electrical switchgear and battery rooms
19.06
Smoke
Welding / burning operations, fires
20
Toxic gases
20.01
H2S, Sour Gas
Sour gas production, bacterial activity in stagnant water, confined spaces in sour operations
20.02
Exhaust fumes
Enclosed spaces
20.03
SO2
Component of H2S flare and incinerator flue gas
20.04
Benzene
Component of crude oil, concentrated in glycol vent emissions and Wemco units
20.05
Chlorine
Water treatment facilities
20.06
Welding Fumes
Construction and metal fabrication / repair, welding toxic metals (galvanised steel, cadmium coated steel), metal cutting, grinding
20.07
Tobacco smoke
Accommodation, office buildings, boats, aircraft
20.08
CFCs
Air Conditioning, refrigeration, aerosol sprays
Oxygen
Confined spaces, tanks
seismic
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
112
Hazard Number
Hazard Description
21
Toxic Liquid
21.01
Mercury
Electrical switches, gas filters
21.02
PCBs
Transformer cooling oils
21.03
Biocides (gluteraldehyde)
Water treatment systems
21.04
Methanol
Gas drying and hydrate control
21.05
Brines
Hydrocarbon production, well kill fluid, packer fluids
21.06
Glycols
Gas drying and hydrate control
21.07
Degreasers (terpenes)
Maintenance shops
21.08
Isocyanates
Two-pack paint systems
21.09
Sulphanol
Gas sweetening
21.10
Amines
Gas sweetening
21.11
Corrosion Inhibitors
Additive to pipelines and oil/gas wells, chromates, phosphates
21.12
Scale inhibitors
Cooling and injection water additive
21.13
Liquid Mud Additives
Drilling fluid additive
21.14
Odorant (mercaptans)
Custody transfer facilities for gas, LPG and LNG
21.15
Alcoholic beverages
21.16
Non-prescribed drugs
21.17
Used engine oils (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons)
Used engine oils
21.18
Carbon tetrachloride
Plant laboratory
21.19
Grey and / or black water
Septic systems, camps, detergents
22
Toxic Solid
22.01
Asbestos
Thermal insulation and construction materials, old roofing (encountered during removal)
22.02
Manmade mineral fibre
Thermal material
22.03
Cement dust
Oil well and gas well cementing, civil construction
22.04
Sodium hypochlorite
Drilling fluid additive
22.05
Powdered mud additives
Drilling fluid additive
22.06
Sulphur dust
Sulphur recovery plants
22.07
Pig trash
Pipeline cleaning operations
additives
Sources
insulation
and
construction
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
113
Hazard Number
Hazard Description
Sources
22.08
Oil based muds
Oil and gas well drilling
22.09
Pseudo oil based muds
Oil and gas well drilling
22.10
Water based muds
Oil and gas well drilling
22.11
Cement slurries
Oil and gas construction
22.12
Dusts
Grit blasting, (dumping, drumming)
22.13
Cadmium compounds other heavy metals
22.14
Oil based sludges
23
Corrosive Substances
23.01
Hydrofluoric acid
Well stimulation
23.02
Hydrochloric acid
Well stimulation
23.03
Sulphuric acid
Wet batteries, regenerant for reverse osmosis water makers
23.04
Caustic soda
Drilling fluid additive
24
Biological Hazards
24.01
Food borne bacteria (e.g. E Coli)
Contaminated food
24.02
Water borne bacteria (e.g. Legionella)
Cooling systems
24.03
Parasitic insects (pin worms, bed bugs, lice, fleas)
Improperly cleaned food, hands, clothing, living sites (pin worms, bed bugs, lice, fleas)
24.04
Cold and flu virus
Other people
24.05
Human Immune deficiency Virus (HIV)
Contaminated blood, blood products and other body fluids
24.06
Other diseases
Other people
25
Ergonomic Hazards
25.01
Manual materials handling
Pipe handling on drill floor, sack handling in sack store, manoeuvring equipment in awkward locations
25.02
Damaging noise
Release from control valves
25.03
Loud, dB(A)
steady
and
drilling,
plant
sand blasting, catalyst screening, removal,
Welding fumes, handling coated bolts Oil storage tank cleaning
communicable
noises
well
>85
systems,
relief
domestic
valves,
water
pressure
Engine rooms, compressor rooms, drilling brake, air tools
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
Hazard Number
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
114
Hazard Description
Sources
25.04
Heat stress (high ambient temperatures)
Near flare, on the monkey board under certain conditions, in open exposed areas in certain regions of the world during summer
25.05
Cold stress (low temperatures)
Open areas in winter in cold climates, refrigerated storage areas
25.06
High humidity
Climates where sweat evaporation rates are too low to cool the human body, personal protective clothing
25.07
Vibration
Hand tool vibration, maintenance and construction worker, boating
25.08
Work stations
Poorly designed office furniture poorly laid out workstations
25.09
Lighting
Work areas requiring intense light, glare, lack of contrast, insufficient light
25.10
Incompatible hand controls
Controls poorly positioned in workplace requiring workers to exert excessive force, lacking proper labels, handoperated control valves, for example in driller house, heavy machinery, control rooms
25.11
Awkward location of workplaces and machinery
Machinery difficult to maintain regularly due to their awkward positioning, for example, valves in an unusually high or low position
25.12
Mismatch of work to physical abilities
Requiring older workers to maintain a high level of physical activity over the course of an 8/12 hour day, heavy construction work performed by slight individuals
25.13
Mismatch of work cognitive abilities
to
Requiring individuals to monitor a process without trying to reduce their boredom by giving them a higher task load, asking a worker to supervise something he/ she is not qualified to do
25.14
Long and irregular working hours / shifts
Offshore locations utilising long shift cycles, overtime, night shifts, rollover shifts
25.15
Poor organisation and job design
Ambiguity of job requirements, unclear reporting relationships, over/under supervision, poor operator / contractor interfaces
25.16
Work planning issues
Work overload, unrealistic targets, lack of clear planning, poor communications
ambient
and
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
Hazard Number
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
115
Hazard Description
Sources
25.17
Indoor climate (too hot / cold / dry / humid, draughty)
Uncomfortable climate for permanently manned areas
26
Psychological Hazards
26.01
Living on the job /away from family
Homesickness, missing family and social events, unable to be involved in community, feeling of isolation and missing part of life.
26.02
Working and living on live plant
Awareness that mistakes can be catastrophic, vulnerable to the mistakes of others, responsible for the safety of others. Awareness of difficulty of escape in an emergency. Awareness of risks in helicopter travel, adverse weather
26.03
Post traumatic stress
Serious incidents, injuries to self and others
26.04
Fatigue
Physically demanding or arduous work, long or excessive working hours
26.05
Shift work
Construction, operations or drilling activities involving 24 hour working, saturation diving operations, changing rest and sleep patterns associated with activities
26.06
Peer pressure
Pressure from others at the work location to behave in a manner which may affect well-being of the individual
27
Security Related Hazards
27.01
Piracy
27.02
Assault
27.03
Sabotage
27.04
Crisis (military action, civil disturbances, terrorism)
27.05
Theft, pilferage
28
Use of natural resources
28.01
Water
Cooling water
28.03
Air
Turbines, combustion engines (pump and compressor drivers)
29
Medical
29.01
Medical unfitness
Medically unfit staff for the task
29.02
Motion sickness
Crew change operations
on
water,
marine
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
116
Hazard Number
Hazard Description
30
Noise
30.01
High level noise
Plant areas e.g. turbines, compressors, generators, pumps, blowdown, etc.
30.02
Intrusive noise
Intrusive noise in sleeping areas, offices and recreational areas
31
Entrapment
31.01
Fire / explosion
Blockage of routes to muster location or contamination of muster area
31.02
Mechanical damage
Objects blocking access / escape routes
31.03
Diving
Snagging of lines / umbilicals
Sources
Considered to be a Major Hazard under ISO 17776. However, this may not constitute a Major Accident Hazard that is the focus of the HSE Case, e.g. falls from height, electrical voltage etc., are considered to be health hazards and shall be the subject of a separate health risk assessment.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 4 Typical Hazards and Effects Register
117
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
118
RISK RANKING ACCORDING TO RAM
Ref No.
L
Hazard Description
Source
Threats
Top Event
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
Consequence P
A
E
R
R
Barriers (HSE Controls)
Barrier Effectiveness
Remedial Action to achieve ALARP
Risk
H-01 Hydrocarbons (Unrefined)
H01.01
H01.05
H01.06
Crude under Pressure
Oil
Condensate, NGL
Hydrocarbon Gas
Flowlines Pipelines Pressure Vessels Piping
Pressure, Vacuum Corrosion Erosion Temperature Material Fatigue Seal failure Overfilling Environmental Loads jack ups / rigs / lift barges etc adjacent to the platform Structural support apparatus failure External impact / boat collision
Pressure Vessels Piping
Corrosion Erosion Overpressure Temperature Fatigue Seal / Connection failure Maintenance External Impact
Pipelines Pressure Vessels Piping
Corrosion Erosion Overpressure Vacuum Temperature Fatigue Maintenance Seal & Connection failure External Impact
Loss of Containment
Fire Explosion Injury / fatality Severe environmenta l impact Structural loss / damage
C
5
C
5
C
5
C
5
Facility Case
HSE
M H
Loss of Containment
Fire Explosion Environmenta l impact Injury Structural loss / damage Loss of stability
C
5
C
5
C
1
C
4
Facility Case
HSE
M H
Loss of Containment
Fire Explosion Environmenta l impact Injury Structural loss / damage Loss of stability
C
5
C
5
C
1
C
4
Facility Case
HSE
M H
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
119
RISK RANKING ACCORDING TO RAM
Ref No.
Hazard Description
L Source
Threats
Top Event
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
Consequence P
A
E
R
R
Barriers (HSE Controls)
H-02 Hydrocarbons (Refined)
H02.01
H02.04
Lube and Seal Oil
Diesel fuel
Engines and rotating equipme nt (gas compress or, pumps, etc)
Mishandling Inadequate packaging / container Maintenance Corrosion Gaskets / joints mechanical failure Tank leak Human error
Diesel Storage Engines (EDG, FW Pump)
Mishandling External impact Corrosion Erosion Gasket / mechanical failure Faulty equipment Maintenance Level control failure
Spill
Irritation to skin / eyes Irritation to respiratory tract Fire
D
1
D
1
D
1
D
1
Health Risk Assessment
Loss of Containment
Fire Irritation to skin / eyes Irritation to respiratory tract Chronic health effect Environmenta l impact
D
1
D
1
D
1
D
1
Health Risk Assessment
Barrier Effectiveness
Risk
Remedial Action to achieve ALARP
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 5 Example Bowtie Analysis
120
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
121
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
122
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
123
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 6 Example list of Safety Critical Elements
124
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
125
PS Code
Safety Critical Elements
Present on Facility
DS001
Fire and Gas Detection
√
DS002
Security Systems
NA
DS003
Water in Condensate / Gas (Dewpoint) Measurement
NA
ER001
Temporary Areas
√
ER002
Escape and Evacuation Routes
√
ER003
Emergency / Escape Lighting
√
√
ER004
Communication Systems
√
√
ER005
Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)
√
SCE Group
Consequence
H01.02 Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon in Formation (Platform wells)
H01.01a Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside equipment H01.01b Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Pipelines and Risers
H08.03 Loss of Control – Marine Collision / Impact
H07.02 Object Under Compression – Topside, Jacket and Substructure
MAH Bowties
√ Detection Systems
√ √ √
Emergenc y Response
Refuge
/
Primary
Muster
References e.g. Operating Manual
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
126
Safety Critical Elements
Present on Facility
ER006
Helicopter Facilities
√
ER007
Emergency Power
NA
ER008
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment
NA
ER009
Process Controls and Alarms
NA
√
ER010
Open Hazardous Drains System
√
√
ER011
Open Non-Hazardous Drains System
√
IC001
Hazardous Area Ventilation
NA
IC002
Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation
√
IC003
Certified Electrical Equipment
√
SCE Group
PS Code
Consequence
H01.02 Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon in Formation (Platform wells)
H01.01a Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside equipment H01.01b Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Pipelines and Risers
H08.03 Loss of Control – Marine Collision / Impact
H07.02 Object Under Compression – Topside, Jacket and Substructure
MAH Bowties
√
√ √
Ignition Control
References e.g. Operating Manual
Consequence
REVISION 1.0
H01.02 Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon in Formation (Platform wells)
H01.01a Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside equipment H01.01b Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Pipelines and Risers
H08.03 Loss of Control – Marine Collision / Impact
H07.02 Object Under Compression – Topside, Jacket and Substructure
Exploration and Production TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12 DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
SCE Group PS Code
IC004
127
MAH Bowties
Safety Critical Elements Present on Facility
Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System NA
References e.g. Operating Manual
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 7 Example Manual Of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
128
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
129
LEGEND A Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW P Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval N Activity not permitted in these circumstances NA Not applicable
Containment Integrity compromised (known leaks such that gas tight walls / floor fails to meet
Containment Integrity compromised (known leaks in tanker loading system) - FPSO offtake unit
Containment integrity Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable
Observed or detected defect in the well intervention / Well control equipment e.g. Rams, load
Ventilation impaired - loss of gas detection and end element (dampers / fan(s)) resulting in
Hazardous Area Ventilation unavailable - (fans / dampers / detectors etc not working)
HVAC Shutdown - loss of gas detection and end element resulting in impaired functionality e.g. 2ooN in
HVAC Shutdown - unavailable (dampers / detectors etc not working)
Certified Electrical Equipment fails to meet the PS requirement resulting in increased risk of ignition
Cargo tanks inert gas system unavailable resulting in increased risk of ignition
Earth Grounding and Bonding fails to meet PS requirements resulting in increased risk of ignition
Inability to provide fuel gas purge flow to the flare header resulting in air ingress to the flare
Inability to provide the required gas blanket flow to individual equipment resulting in increased risk
Total loss of gas blanket system resulting in increased risk of ignition
Loss of Gas (Toxic) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting
Total loss of F&G Detection system
Loss of access control to facilities
Deluge system - Local (area) unavailabilty
Observed or detected defect in the blast wall resulting in increased risk of failure in the event of an MAH.
Helideck FW/Foam supply unavailble
FW Supply - Loss of redundancy (
FW Supply unavailable - all pumps not available, loss of FW tank, caisson etc
FW Delivery - local unavailability of the FW distribution main
Passive Fire Protection - locally unavailable - (damaged, removed, etc)
Loss or unavailability of Gaseous Fire Suppression System
Fine Water Spray system - local unavailability
Loss of sprinkler system - local unavailability
Total loss of sprinkler system
Loss of Power Management System leading to increased risk of loss of main power supply
Loss of sand filters leading to increased erosion rates
Inability to provide the required chemical injection flow leading to increased corrosion rate
Navigational Aids unavailable
Collision Avoidance System unavailable
PC009 Fired Heaters
PC010 Gas Tight Floor / Walls
Tanker Loading Systems PC011 Floating Production Storage Offtake (FPSO) unit
Helicopter Refueling Equipment
Well Intervention / Well Control Equipment
IGNITION CONTROL
IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
IC007 Inert Gas Blanket System
IC007 Inert Gas Blanket System
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS002 Security Systems
PS001 Deluge Systems
Explosion protection including PS002 blast barriers and venting provisions
PS003 Helideck Fire Fighting Systems
Gaseous Fire Suppression System
PS004
PS004
PS005
PS006
PS007
PS008 Fine Water Spray systems
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
PS010 Power Management System
PS011
PS012 Sand Filters
PS013 Chemical Injection Systems
PS014 Navigational Aids
PS015 Collision Avoidance System
METOCEAN Data Gathering System
IC008
IC009 Flare Tip ignition System
Passive Fire Protection (incl. doors, walls and penetrations)
IC002
IC005 Earth Bonding
Fire Water Ring Main and Other distribution system
IC002
IC004 Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System
Fire Water Pumps (inc. Caissons, Tank and support)
IC
IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment
Fire Water Pumps (inc. Caissons, Tank and support)
PC013
IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation
Non Hazardous Area Ventilation
PC012
IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation
Non Hazardous Area Ventilation
PC009
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N A A P N A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N A A A A A NA A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N N A P N P N N N N N A N A N P A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
N N A P N P N N N N N A N A N P A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
N P A A N P N N N A N A P A A N A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
N A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P
N P A A N P N N N A N A P A A N A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
N P A N N P N P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P P A A
N P A A N P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
N N A A N P N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
N P A A N P A A P A A A P A A A A A P A N A P A A A A A P P
P P A A N P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A P N P N P P A P A P A A A A P P A P A A P P P P A P P
N N A P N N N N N A P A P A A A A N P A P A A P P P P A P P
N P A P N P N P P A P A P A A A A P P A P A A P P P P A P P
N N A P N N N N N A P A P A A A A N P A P A A P P P P A P P
P A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A N A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A A A
N N P N N N N N N P P A N A N N P A A A N A N A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A P P P P P N N P A A A A P A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A P P P P P P P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
P P N P P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
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N A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P N A N N A N A N A A A A A P A A A P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
N A N A A N P N A N N A A N N A N N N N N N N N P N A A A N N N N N N P -
N A N A A N P N A N N A A N N A N N N N N N N N P N A A A N N N N N N P -
N A A A P A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N A N A A A N A A N P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P P A N A A A A A A A A A P P A -
N A A A P A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N A N A A A N A A N P N A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N P P P P N P P N A A A A A N A A N P N A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A N A A A A A N A A N P P A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A N P A N A A A A A N A A N P N A -
P A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A P P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A A P N A -
P A A A P P P P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
N A A A P N N P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
P A A A P P P P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
N A A A P N N P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P A N A A A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
N A A A P N N A A A A A A A A A N N N N P A A N A P A A A A A A A P N A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A N N N N A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A P A A A A A A A N P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N N -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A -
P A P A A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A P P P P -
P P P N N
P P P P N
A A A A N
P P P NA N
P P N N N
P P P P N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
A A A A N
P P A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N A N
A A A A N
A A N A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N N N
A A A A N
A A N P N
NOTES
PS016
PROTECTION SYSTEMS PS
Fixed Process Area Foam System
Water in condensate / Gas (dewpoint) measurement DS003
DETECTION SYSTEMS (FIELD) DS
Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components
Fired Heaters (Burner Management System)
PROCESS CONTAINMENT PC
Bilge, Ballast and Cargo Management Systems
METOCEAN Data Gathering System unavailable
Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks, reduced furnace tube wall thickness beyond
PC008 Operational Well Containment
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Process Area FW/Foam supply unavailable
Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks in completion string, casing / liner,
PC007 Relief System
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Loss of Water in condensate / Gas dew point measurement resulting in increased corrosion rate, increased risk of hydrate formation causing SCE FAILURE MODE
Unavailability of Relief at design flow rateresulting in increased risk of MAH due to overpressure
PC003 Process Containment
N P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
Rotating Equipment Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks, seal failure, etc.,)
PC001/6 Process Containment
N P A P N N N N N A A A N NA A P A N P A A A A A A A N N P P
Loss of primary and secondary flare ignition systems resulting in flare out
Pig Launcher / Receiver Containment Integrity - Compromised (pressure gauge / transmitter faulty or
PC001-6 Process Containment
N P A P N P N N N N N N N A N N N P N A N A P N N N N N P P
Observed or detected defect in the ignition control equipment e.g. Flame / Spark Arrestor element damaged, plugged, or missing, hot
Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable
SI007 Drilling Systems
N P A P N P N N N N N N N A N N N P N A N A P N N N N N P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Observed or detected defect to drilling systems structural integrity e.g. derrick, heave compensation
SI006 Mooring Systems
N P A P N P N N N N N N N A N N N P N A N A P N N N N N P P
Observed or detected defect or Unavailability of the BMS / IPS resulting in increased risk of
Observed or detected defect in the mooring system (e.g. anchor handling system failure) resulting in
SI004
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Observed or detected stuctural / mechanical defect resulting in increased risk of MAH due to Heavy Lift Cranes and SI003 Mechanical Handling Equipment
P P A A P P P P P N P N P P N N N P P A P A P P P P P P P P
Loss of bilge / ballast control leading to impaired vessel stability and increased risk of MAH
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH, e.g. pipe / vessel supports,
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P NA P P P P P P P P
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH
A A A A A A A A A N N A P P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
Structures subsea / Vessel hull / GBS / Foundation Structures
SI002 Topside Structure
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A14 Bunkering (potable water) A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) B4 Radiography work B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B8 Coldwork B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) B12 Diving operations in close proximity B13 ROV B14 Choke Valve bean up or down B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) B26 Hook up and commissioning B27 Manned presence on NUI B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Working at Heights B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval B36 Local Venting B37 Black Start Up B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Extended stay over night C3 Night Helicopter Operations C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc)
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SI
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
SI001
HSE CASE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
Loss of F&G (fire and flammable gas) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in nonvoting system Loss of F&G detection - fusible plug loop unavailable leading to loss of fire detction in specific area
SAFETY CRITCAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
130
Total loss of HIPPS system
Loss of well isolation - inability to isolate steam / water / gas / WAG injection well or annulus resulting in
Loss of operational well isolation SCSSV, SSV not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly
SDV (Riser) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing
SSIV - not meeting performance standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
Loss of Drilling Well Control - loss of BOP, insufficient mud weight, loss of mud pump, incorrect mud weight
Local or partial loss of Utility / Instrument Air
Total loss of Utility / Instrument Air
SCE FAILURE MODE
Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Area - unavailable / compromised (structural damage, muster areas not clear etc)
Alternate Muster Points unavailable / compromised (structural damage, muster areas not clear, etc)
Escape route - locally unavailable
Evacuation route - unavailable
Emergency lighting - locally unavailable
PAGA system - Loss of redundancy (one of the systems not available)
PAGA system - unavailable
VHF Channels - unavailable
Shore Communications - unavailable
Marine Radio - unavailable
UPS - Loss of redundancy - (one of the 2x100% systems not available)
UPS - Unavailable - Inability to provide emergency power supply to essential systems
Helicopter facilities observed or detected damage / defective or unavailable markings, lighting, nets, etc.
Emergency Power Supply - Loss of redundancy (
Emergency Power Supply unavailable - all generators not available, loss of distribution etc
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment Hose reels / monitors / portable extinguishers locally unavailable
Individual Process SIF unavailable e.g. low low level trip, etc
Audio Visual Alarms - unavailable
Basic Process Control system (BPCS) unavailable
Life Buoys below minimum level or damaged
Insufficient number or inadequate type of Chemical PPE available
Safety Shower / eyewash stations not available or inoperable
TEMPSC - unavailable - (all units not available)
Alternate Means of Escape - locally unavailable - liferafts / Scramble nets / Ladders / knotted ropes /
Temporary Refuge (TR) / ER001 Primary Muster Areas
ER002 Escape Routes
ER003 Emergency / Escape Lighting
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
Helicopter facilities (inc. ER006 markings, nets, obstacle marking / lighting etc)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER010
ER010
ER010
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
Personal Survival Equipment LS001 (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER010
ER011 Oil Spill Response
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER008
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER007
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER007
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
LIFE SAVING
ER004
ER005 Uninterruptable Power Supply
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment
ER004
ER005 Uninterruptable Power Supply
Emergency Power (inc generation and distribution)
ER004
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Emergency Power (inc generation and distribution)
ER004
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
ER001
ER002 Escape Routes
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
ER
LS001
LS001
Rescue Facilities (Medical / LS002 first aid facilities)
Rescue Facilities (in. Standby Standby vessel (inc crew boat) LS002 Vessel / Man Overboard boat / unavailable - (not present or Fast Rescue Craft) response time too slow)
TEMPSC - loss of redundancy - (one boat not available in a 2x100% or 3x50% configuration)
SD009 Utility Air
Temporary Refuge (TR) / Primary Muster Areas
SD008
SD009 Utility Air
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Open Drain System - Totally and Non-hazardous) Unavailable
Life Jackets below minimum level or damaged (e.g. light not working etc)
Drilling Well Control Equipment
SD006
SD007 Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV)
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Open Drain System - locally and Non-hazardous) unavailable
Portable BA sets below minimum level (SCBA and Rescue Sets)
SD005 Pipeline Isolation Valves
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Closed Drain System - Unavailable and Non-hazardous)
Portable BA sets / Smoke Hoods below minimum level or faulty (escape sets)
SD004 Operational Well Isolation
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Closed Drain system - locally and Non-hazardous) unavailable
Personal H2S monitors below minimum level or faulty
SD004 Operational Well Isolation
Tank bunding observed or detected Bunding and Drains (Hazardous ER010 defect resulting in loss or impaired and Non-hazardous) secondary containment
SCE FAILURE MODE
High Integrity Pressure Protection System SD003
LS003 TEMPSC / Lifeboats
LS003 TEMPSC / Lifeboats
Alternate Means of Escape LS004 (Liferafts, scramble nets and ladders to sea)
N N A N N N N N N N N A N A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
N N A N N N N N N N N A N A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
N N A N N N N N N N N A N A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N N A N N P P P P N P A A A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
N N A N N N N N N N N A N A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
P P A N N P P P P N P A A A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A NA A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A P P P P P P A A A P A A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A
N N A N N P N N N A A A P A A P A N A A A A A A A A P P A A
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N
N N N P N N P N P P P A P P P P P P P N P A P N N P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P A P A A P A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A A A P A P P A A P A P A A P P P P A A A
N P A A N N P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N N A P N N N N N A A A P P A A A P A A A A A A A A P A P P
N N A P N N N N N A A A P P A A A P A A A A A A A A P A P P
P P A A N N A P P A A A P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N A P P A A A P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A P P A A A P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A P P A A A P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A P P A A A P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P N N N N N N N A P P P P A A P N A A A A A N N A N N A A
N P N N N N N N N A P P P P A A P N A A A A A N N A N N A A
N P N N N N N N N A P P P P A A P N A A A A A N N A N N A A
P P P N N N N N N A P P P P A A P N A A A A A N N A N N A A
P P P N N N N N N A P P P P A A P N A A A A A N N A N N A A
P P N N N N N N N A P A P A A A A P A A N A A N N N N N P P
P A P P P P P P N A P A P A A A A P A A A A A N N N N N P P
N P N N N N N N N N N P N A N N N N N A N A N N N N N N N N
N P N N N N N N N N N P A A N N N N P A N A N N N N N N P P
P P A P P P P P P P P P A A P P A P P A A A A P P P P P A A
N P P N N N N N N N N P A A N N N N P A N A N N N N N N P P
N P P N N N N N N N N P A A N N N N P A N A N N N N N N P P
P A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A N N N N A A A N A A A A A A A A P P N P -
N A A A P P A A A P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
P A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A P P P P A A A N A A A A A A A A P P N P -
N A A A P P A A A P P A A P P P P P P P P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
N A A A P P A A A P P A A P P P P P P P P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
N A A A P P A A A P P A A P P P P P P P P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A -
N A A A P P A A A P P A A P P P P P P P P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
N A A A P P A A A P P A A P P P P P P P P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
N A A A P P A A A P P A A P P P P P P P P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A NA A NA NA NA NA A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A -
P A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P P P P P P P N A P A A A P A P P P N P -
P A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P P P P N A P A A A N A P P P N P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N N -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
N N N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N N -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A P N P A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A P A N A A A A A A A A A P N A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P A P A N A A A A A A A A N P N A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P A P A N A A A A A A A A N P N A -
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P P A -
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P P A -
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P P A -
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P P A -
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A -
N P A P N N N N N N N P P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P P A P N N N N N P -
N P A P N N N N N N N P P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P P A P N N N N N P -
N P A P N N N N N N N P P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P P A P N N N N N P -
N P A P N N N N N N N P P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P P A P N N N N N P -
N P A P N N N N N N N P P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P P A P N N N N N P -
N P A N N N N N N N A A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P A P N N N N N P -
N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A P A P A A A P A P P P P P -
N N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
N N N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N P N N -
P P A P A P P P A P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A N P P P P P N P -
N N N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N P N N -
N N N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N P N N -
A A A P N
A A A P N
A A A P N
A A A P N
A A A P N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A P N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P P P P N
P P P P N
N N N N N
N N P P N
P P P P N
P P P P N
P P P P N
P P P P N
P P P P N
P P P P N
P P P P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P N A A N
P N A A N
P N A A N
P N A A N
P N A A N
P N A A N
P N A A N
N N N N N
N N N N N
A A P A N
N N N N N
N N N N N
LEGEND A Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW P Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval N Activity not permitted in these circumstances NA Not applicable
Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
Medical Response cannot be met e.g. on-site burns treatment facilities insufficent or unavailable
HIPPS system not meeting the performance standard (loss of redundancy in SDV, Pressure Transmitters, etc) High Integrity Pressure Protection System SD003
N P A P N P P P P P P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A A
Spill Containment (e.g. booms) unavailable
Total loss of the EDP system Emergency Depressurisation System (Blowdown) SD002
N N A N N N N N N N N A N A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
LS
Local or partial loss of the EDP (Topsides / onshore) system not meeting the performance standards Emergency Depressurisation SD002 System (Blowdown)
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A14 Bunkering (potable water) A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) B4 Radiography work B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B8 Coldwork B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) B12 Diving operations in close proximity B13 ROV B14 Choke Valve bean up or down B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) B26 Hook up and commissioning B27 Manned presence on NUI B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Working at Heights B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval B36 Local Venting B37 Black Start Up B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Extended stay over night C3 Night Helicopter Operations C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc)
Aviation VHF radio - unavailable
Total loss of ESD system Emergency Shutdown (ESD) SD001 Control System
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
EMERGENCY RESPONSE - EER
Local or partial loss of the ESD system Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System SD001
P P A P N P P P P P P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A A
HSE CASE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
SDV (Topsides / Onshore) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
SCE FAILURE MODE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS SD
SAFETY CRITCAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
LEGEND A P N NA
Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
NOTES
B26 Hook up and commissioning
B27 Manned presence on NUI
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval
B29 Working at Heights
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing
B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial)
B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain
B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out
B34
B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval
B36 Local Venting
B37 Black Start Up
N N A P A A A A A A P A A A A
N A P A P A P A A P A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A N A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A
A A A A A A
A A A A A
A A A A
A A A
A A
A
P A A N P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P P P NA N -
A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A -
N N N N N N N N N N N P P N N N N N N N N N N N P P N P N N N N N N N N -
N N N N N N N P N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P N P A N -
N N N N P P P P N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P N P A P -
A A A N A P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A P A P P A A A A A P P A P P N -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A P A P P A A A A A P P A P A N -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A P P A P A N -
A A A N A A A A P P A P P A A A A P A A A A A A P A A N N A P A A P A N -
P P A N P P P P A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P A P P P P A -
A A N P A A A A P P A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P A A -
A A N N A P P A P P A N N A A A A A A A P P P P P A A P P A A A A P A N -
A A N N A P P A P P A N N A A A A A A A P P P P P A A P P A A A A P A N -
A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A P A A N P A A A A P A A -
A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A N P A A A A P A A -
A A N N A A A A P P A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A N P A A A A P A N -
A A A N A N N N N N A P P N N N N N N N N N N N P A A P N A P P A P N N -
A A A N A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P N N -
A A A N A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A -
A A A N A N A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A A A A A N P N A -
A A A N P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A A P A A P P P P -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A A A A A P P P P -
A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A P A P -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A N A P P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A N A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A P P A P A N -
A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N N N -
P A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P A A A A P A A A P N N -
A A A A A A A P P P P P P P A P P P P P A A A P A A N P N A -
A A A A A A P P P P P P P A P P P P P A A A P A A N P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P N N -
P P P A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A P P A A -
P P A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A P A A A A P A P -
N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P N A A A A P N N -
A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P N A A A A P N N -
P P N N N N A P P P P P A A A P P P P P P A -
A N N N N A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N N N N A P A P P A A A A P A A P P N A -
N N N A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
N N A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
N A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
-
-
P P P P P A A A P P P P P N A -
P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P A A A A A A P P P A -
P P A A P P N P N P P N -
P P P P P P P P P P P -
A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A -
A A A A A P P A -
A A A A P N N -
P P P P P A -
A P P N N -
P P N A -
P N N -
P P -
N -
-
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N N N
A A P P N
A A P P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A NA N
A A A N N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P A N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A N N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A P N
N A A P N
A A A P N
A A A P N
-
-
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P P P P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
P P P P N
P P N N N
N P A N N
-
A A A N
A A N
A N
N
C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc)
B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines)
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A P P
C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring
B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic)
P A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P P
C3 Night Helicopter Operations
B23
P P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A P P
C2 Extended stay over night
B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
A P P A A A P P A P A P P P P P P P P
C1 Night Time Working
B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
A A N N A A N A P A A A A A A A A A P P
Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc)
A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B39
B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations
A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation
A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A
B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out
B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal
3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc)
B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure
P A N A P A A A A A A A A N N A N P P P A N P P
Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing
B15
Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc)
B14 Choke Valve bean up or down
W6 High swells - Alert Level (xx m < h < xx m)
W3 High winds - Alert Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
W2 High Ambient Temperature (>50°C)
B13 ROV
P P P P N
B12 Diving operations in close proximity
P P P P N
B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring)
P P P P N
B9 Abseiling (working above open sea)
P P P P N
B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work)
A A A A N
B8 Coldwork
A A A A N
B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc)
A A A A N
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc)
P P N N N
B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry)
P P N N N
B4 Radiography work
A A N N N
B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work)
N N N N N
B2 NDT
P P P N N
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent)
A A A P N
A P N N A P A A A P P A P A N N A N N N N P N P P
A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel
N N N N N
A A N N N A P P N A N N A P A N N A N N N N P N P P
OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party)
P P N N N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson
P P P P N
A A A A A A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A P A A
A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops
A A A A N
PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc
P P P P N
A27
P P P P N
A26
P N N N N N N N N N P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N P N N N P N N -
A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc)
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc)
N P P P N N N N P P P P A N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P N N N N N N N N -
Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone
P N N N N N N N N N P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N P N N N P N N -
A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps
P A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A P P P A -
A22
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump)
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise
P P N N P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P N N -
A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc)
P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N -
A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV
A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A N -
A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling)
P P N P P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P N N -
A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off)
A A N A A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P P N -
A14 Bunkering (potable water)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring
N P N N P N P P N N N N N P P P N N N N N N N N P N N N N P P P N P N N -
A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc)
P P N P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N -
A12
P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A -
A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts)
P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P N P P P P N P N -
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment A A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A4 Function Testing of ESD system A A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A A7 Well production testing A A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A A9 Pigging Operations P A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) A A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) P A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A A14 Bunkering (potable water) A A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) N A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) N A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) N A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops P A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel A OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P B2 NDT A B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) A B4 Radiography work N B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) N B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) P B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) P B8 Coldwork P B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) A B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) A B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) A B12 Diving operations in close proximity A B13 ROV A B14 Choke Valve bean up or down A B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) A B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure A B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal N B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation N B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations N B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) N B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing N B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) N B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) N B26 Hook up and commissioning N B27 Manned presence on NUI P B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval A B29 Working at Heights A B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing P B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) A B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain A B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out P B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) P B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval N B36 Local Venting P B37 Black Start Up NA B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out N B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working A C2 Extended stay over night A C3 Night Helicopter Operations A C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring A C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc) N
A9 Pigging Operations
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
4
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts)
P P A N N N P N P N N P N P P P N N P N N P N N N N P N P P
3
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required)
A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
2
A7 Well production testing
N P N N N N N N N P N P N A A N A N N A N A P N N N N N N N
1
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations
P P A N N N P N P N N P N P P P N N P N N P N N N N P N P P
3
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations
P P A P P P P A P A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A
2
A4 Function Testing of ESD system
P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
1
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection
P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment
11 P P P P A P P P P N P N N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P
9
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
10 P P P P A P P P P P P P P P N N P P A P P P P P P P P P P P
8
Activities and Influences XXXX Operations
M4
A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
7
CRITICAL MANPOWER UNAVAILABILITY
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
6
HSE CASE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS)
A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment
Local Emergency Crisis Center LECC - Competent persons not available to fill LECC positions or LECC not available
M3 ER Team Members - Competent persons not available to fill ER team member position
M2 ER Medic - Insufficient number of medics available on the facility
M1 HSE Critical Position - Competent persons not available to fill HSE Critical Position
Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Planned shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Unplanned Shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Emergency / incident on other facility affecting O3 operations
P P P P P P P P P N P N N N P P N P P N P P P P P P P P P N
5
O2
A A A P P P A A A P A P P P A A P A A A A P A A A A A A P P
4
O1
W11 Low Visibility - Almost Zero Visibility Level (l < xx m)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
3
FIELD INTERFACES
P P P P P P P P N N N N N P N N P P N N N N N N N N N N N N
2
W9 Low Visibility - Degraded Level (xx m < l < xx m)
A A A P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
1
W7 High swells - Warning Level (xx m < h < xx m)
A A P P P P P P P P P A P P A A A P P P P A P P P P P P P P
1
W4 High winds - Warning Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
P P P P P P P P P N N P N P P N P P P N P P P P P P P P P P
P1 Intrusion (500m zone)
W10 Low Visibility - Severely Impaired Operations (xx m < l < xx m)
W8 High swells - Cease Operations / Abandon Platform Level (h < xx m)
W5 High winds - Cease Operations / Abandon Platform Level (V < xx m/s)
W1 Adverse Weather (including monsoon (heavy rain), lightning, etc)
ACTIVITIES
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
ADVERSE WEATHER
PUBLIC
INFLUENCES
131
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
132
LEGEND A P N NA
Process Area FW/Foam supply unavailable
Loss of sand filters leading to increased erosion rates
Inability to provide the required chemical injection flow leading to increased corrosion rate
Navigational Aids unavailable
HIPPS system not meeting the performance standard (loss of redundancy in SDV, Pressure Transmitters, etc)
Total loss of HIPPS system
Loss of well isolation - inability to isolate steam / water / gas / WAG injection well or annulus resulting in potential back flow of HC
Loss of operational well isolation - SCSSV, SSV not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly
SDV (Beach Valve, Block Valve Station) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
Process SDV (Onshore) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
Loss of Drilling Well Control - loss of BOP, insufficient mud weight, loss of mud pump, incorrect mud weight
Local or partial loss of Utility / Instrument Air
Total loss of Utility / Instrument Air
Power Management System
Fixed Process Area Foam System
Chemical Injection PS013 Systems
PS014 Navigational Aids
High Integrity Pressure Protection System
Drilling Well Control Equipment
SD003
Operational Well SD004 Isolation
Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
SD003
Operational Well SD004 Isolation
Pipeline Isolation Valves
PS011
PS012 Sand Filters
High Integrity Pressure Protection System
PS010
SD005
SD006
SD008
SD009 Utility Air
SD009 Utility Air
A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N A A A A A P A A A A A A A N A P N N N N A N A P A A A P A A A P A
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N P P
A A A A N A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A P A A A A P A
A A A A N A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A A A A A A A N N N N N N N A N N N P P
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A A A A A A A N N N N N N N A N N N P P
A A A A A A N N N P N N N N A A A A A A A P N N N P N N A N N N P N
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A N A N N N N P N N N P N P A P P P P P
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A P P
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A P P
N A A A P N P P N A N P A A N N A N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N
N A A A P N P P N A N P A A N N A N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N
N A A P P A N A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N N A A N A A N P P
N A A P P A N A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N N A A N A A N P P
N A A A A A P A A A A A A A N A N P P P P N P P N A A A N A A N P P
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A N A A A N A A N P P
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A N P A N A A A N A A N P P
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A P A A A A P A P A A A A A A A P A A A P A A A P P
P A A P P P P P P A A A A A P P P N N N N P P P N P A A P A A P P A
N A A P P N N N P P P A P P P P P N N N N P P P N P A A P A A P P P
P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N N N N P P P N P P A P A A P P P
N A A P P N N N P P P N N P P P P N N N N P P P N P P A P A A P P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P A N A A A A A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P P
N A A P P N N N A A A A A A A A A N N N N P A A N P P A A A A A P N
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A N N N N A A A P A A A A A A A P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A P A A A A A A A P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P A A A A A A A P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P P P
P A A A A A N A A A P A A A P A A N N N N A A A N A P A A A A P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P N N N N P P P N P N A P A P P P N
P A A A A A N A A A P A A A P A A P P P P A A A N A P A A A A P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P N A P A P P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P A A P A P P P A
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P A A P A P P P A
A A A A A A P A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A P A A A A A P N
A A A A A A N A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A N A A A A A P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P N A P A P P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P N A P A P P P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A NA A NA NA NA NA A A A A A P A A A A A P N
P A A A A A P A A A A A A A P P A P P P P P P P N P A A P A P P P A
P A A A A A N A A A A A A A N P P P P P P P P P N P A A N A P P P A
A A A A N
A A A A N
A P A A N
A N N A N
A A A A N
N N A P N
N N A P N
N N A P N
N N A P N
A A A A N
N N N P N
P A A A N
P A A A N
P NA NA NA N
N NA NA NA N
N N A P N
N N A N N
P P P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P A A A N
P A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A P N
A A A N N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
NOTES Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
PS
Helideck Fire Fighting Systems
PROCESS CONTAINMENT PC
P P A P N P P P P P P P A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P A A A
N N A N N N N N N N N N A A P A A A N A A A N A P P P N P A A
N P A P N P P P P P P P A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P A A A
N N A N N N N N N N N N A A P A A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
Meteorological Data Gathering System is unavailable
Total loss of the EDP system
Loss of Power Management System leading to increased risk of loss of main power supply
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
Local or partial loss of the EDP (Topsides / onshore) system not meeting the performance standards (not opening, or insufficient blowdown rate)
Total loss of sprinkler system
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
Emergency SD002 Depressurisation System (Blowdown)
Loss of sprinkler system - local unavailability
Fine Water Spray systems PS008
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
Total loss of ESD system
Fine Water Spray system - local unavailability
Gaseous Fire PS007 Suppression System
P P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A
Emergency SD002 Depressurisation System (Blowdown)
Loss or unavailability of Gaseous Fire Suppression System
Passive Fire Protection PS006 (incl. doors, walls and penetrations)
N N A N N P N N N A A P A P A A A A N A A A A A A A A P P A A
Local or partial loss of the ESD system
Passive Fire Protection - locally unavailable (damaged, removed, etc)
Fire Water Ring Main PS005 and Other distribution system
P P A P P P P P P A A P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N P A A A A A A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System
FW Delivery - local unavailability of the FW distribution main
Fire Water Pumps (inc. PS004 Tank, FW Supply and support)
N A A A A A A A A A P A A A P P A A NA A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A P A A N A A A A A A A P A N A P A A A A A A A
SD001
FW Supply unavailable - all pumps not available, loss of FW tank, loss of supply source, etc
Fire Water Pumps (inc. PS004 Tank, FW supply and support)
P P A P N P P P P P P P A A A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
N N A A N P N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
FW Supply - Loss of redundancy (
PS003
N N A N N P P P P N N N A A N N A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
N P A A N P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System
Observed or detected defect in the blast wall resulting in increased risk of failure in the event of an MAH. Observed or detected defect in explosion Explosion protection PS002 including blast barriers and venting provisions
N P A A A A P A A A N A A A N N A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A N N P N P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P P P P
SD001
Deluge system - Local (area) unavailabilty PS001 Deluge Systems
N P A A A A A A A A P A A A P P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P N N N P P N A N A A A A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS
Loss of Water in condensate / Gas dew point measurement resulting in increased corrosion rate, increased risk of hydrate formation causing blockage, Water in condensate / DS003 Gas (dewpoint) measurement
N N A N N N N N N N A N A A A A A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
N P A A N P N N N N P N A N A A A A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
SD
Loss of access control to facilities DS002 Security Systems
N N A N N N N N N N A N A A A A A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
N N A P N P N N N N P P N P A A A A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
Meteorological Data Gathering System
Total loss of F&G Detection system DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
P P A A P P P A P P A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A
N N A P N P N N N N P P N P A A A A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
PS016
Loss of Gas (Toxic) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in non-voting system DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
A A A A A A A A A P A P N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Helideck FW/Foam supply unavailble
Loss of F&G detection - fusible plug loop unavailable leading to loss of fire detction in specific area DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
PROTECTION SYSTEMS SCE FAILURE MODE
Loss of F&G (fire and flammable gas) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in non-voting system
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Loss of primary and secondary flare ignition systems resulting in flare out
P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
DETECTION SYSTEMS (FIELD)
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Flare Tip ignition System
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC009
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
DS
N P A A P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Observed or detected defect in the ignition control equipment e.g. Flame / Spark Arrestor element damaged, plugged, or missing, hot surfaces or hot
N P A A N P A A P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Total loss of gas blanket system resulting in increased risk of ignition
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P N A A A A A A A
Miscellaneous Ignition IC008 Control Components
N N P N N N N N N P P N N N P A A A A A A N P N A A A A A A A
Inert Gas Blanket System
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A A A
IC007
A A A A A N A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Inability to provide the required gas blanket flow to individual equipment resulting in increased risk of ignition
P P A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Inability to provide fuel gas purge flow to the flare header resulting in air ingress to the flare
P P A A N P P P P P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Inert Gas Blanket System
P P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC007
P A A A P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
N N A P N N N N N P A P A A A A P A N P A P P A P P P P A P P
Earth Grounding and Bonding fails to meet PS requirements resulting in increased risk of ignition e.g. earthing cable missing or damaged, temporary
N P A P N P N P P P P P A A P A P P P P A P P A P P P P A P P
Certified Electrical Equipment fails to meet the PS requirement resulting in increased risk of ignition
N N A P N N N N N P A P A A A A A A N P A P P A P P P P A P P
Earth Grounding and IC005 Bonding
N P A P N P N P P P A P A A A A A A P P A P P A P P P P A P P
HVAC Shutdown - unavailable - (dampers / detectors etc not working)
N A A A A A NA A A A N A A A N A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A
Certified Electrical Equipment
N A A P N A A A A A N N P N N A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Non Hazardous Area Ventilation
N P A P N P A A A A N P A A N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC003
Containment integrity - Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable limits, without approved temporary repairs (wraps / Helicopter Refueling Equipment PC012
N P A P N P NA A A A NA P NA NA NA NA N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC002
Tanker Loading Systems Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks in PC011 -Road Tanker Loading tanker loading system) Systems
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A P A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
HVAC Shutdown - loss of gas detection and end element resulting in impaired functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system
Tanker Loading Systems Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks in PC011 -Single Buoy Mooring tanker loading system) - SBM systems
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Hazardous Area Ventilation - unavailable - (fans / dampers / detectors etc not working)
Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks such that gas tight walls / floor fails to meet the PS requirement PC010 Gas Tight Floor / Walls
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Non Hazardous Area IC002 Ventilation
Observed or detected defect or Unavailability of the BMS / IPS resulting in increased risk of Explosion e.g. failure of BMS to carry out heater fire box purge, Fired Heaters (Burner Management System) PC009
N P A A A A P A A A N A A A N A N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
Hazardous Area Ventilation
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks, reduced furnace tube wall thickness beyond allowable limits, etc) PC009 Fired Heaters
N P A P N N N N N A N N A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A N N P P
IC001
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks in completion string, casing / liner, production packer, pressure in the annulus etc) Operational Well PC008 Containment
N P A P N N N N N N N N A A N A N N A N A N A P N N N N N P P
Ventilation impaired - loss of gas detection and end element (dampers / fan(s)) resulting in impaired functionality, inability to meet PS requirements
Unavailability of Relief at design flow rateresulting in increased risk of MAH due to overpressure PC007 Relief System
N P A P N P N N N N N N A A N A N N N N A N A P N N N N N P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Tank containment integrity - Compromised (known leaks, Primary and Secondary seal failure on Floating Roof Tanks, known pontoon leaks leading to PC004 Process Containment
N P A P N P N N N N N N A A N A N N N N A N P P N N N N N P P
Hazardous Area Ventilation
Rotating Equipment Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks, seal failure, etc.,) PC003 Process Containment
N P A P N P N N N N N N A A N A N N N N A N P P N N N N N P P
IC001
Pig Launcher / Receiver Containment Integrity Compromised (pressure gauge / transmitter faulty or unavailable, door leaking/ not sealing, etc.,) PC001/ Process Containment 6
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A
Observed or detected defect in the well intervention / Well control equipment e.g. Rams, load measurement and increased risk of well release /
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable limits, without approved temporary repairs (wraps/ clamps)) PC001Process Containment 6
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IGNITION CONTROL
Observed or detected defect to drilling systems structural integrity e.g. derrick, etc. SI007 Drilling Systems
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Well Intervention / PC013 Well Control Equipment
Observed or detected vehicle defect resulting in increased risk of RTA or increased consequence if one were to occur e.g. brake failure / no ABS, tyres SI006 Road Vehicles
A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC
Observed or detetced structural defect to onsite road impact barriers protecting process plant resulting in increased risk of MAH SI006 Road Vehicles
P P A A P P P P P P A P A A A A A P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting A11 Fork Lift Operations A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A18 Working on Tall Structures A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A23 Marine Operations - SBM A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Radiography work B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Hot tapping / stoppling B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B9 Coldwork B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck B13 Road Maintenance / Grading B14 Excavation activities / shoring B15 Choke Valve bean up or down B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) B27 Hook up and commissioning B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval B35 Local Venting B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements C4 Night Helicopter Operations C5 Night Heavy Lifts
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SCE FAILURE MODE SI
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
Heavy Lift Cranes and SI003 Mechanical Lifting
HSE CASE ONSHORE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
Civil Structures / SI002 Structural Support (vessels, piping /
SAFETY CRITCAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
133
Evacuation route - unavailable
PAGA system - Loss of redundancy (one of the systems not available)
PAGA system - unavailable
VHF Channels - unavailable
Shore / Offshore Communications - unavailable
Marine Radio - SBM - unavailable
Aviation VHF radio - unavailable
Emergency Power Supply - Loss of redundancy (
Emergency Power Supply unavailable - all generators not available, loss of distribution etc
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment - Hose reels / monitors / portable extinguishers locally unavailable
Individual Process SIF unavailable e.g. low low level trip, etc
Audio Visual Alarms - unavailable
Basic Process Control system (BPCS) - unavailable
Tank secondary containment / bunding observed or detected defect resulting in loss or impaired secondary containment
Closed Drain system - locally unavailable
Closed Drain System - Unavailable
Open Drain System - locally unavailable
Open Drain System - Totally Unavailable
Spill Containment - unavailable
SCE FAILURE MODE
Personal H2S monitors below minimum level or faulty
Portable BA sets / Smoke Hoods below minimum level or faulty (escape sets)
Portable BA sets below minimum level (SCBA and Rescue Sets)
Life Jackets below minimum level or damaged (e.g. light not working etc) at jetty
Life Buoys below minimum level or damaged at jetty
Insufficient number or inadequate type of Chemical PPE available
Safety Shower / eyewash stations not available or inoperable
Medical Response cannot be met - e.g. on-site burns treatment facilities insufficent or unavailable, Hosiptal resonse time cannot be met
Fire Fighting Response cannot be met - e.g. fire fighter / brigade within specified time frame
Alternate Means of Escape - locally unavailable liferafts / Scramble nets / Ladders / knotted ropes / Escape chutes etc
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Uninterruptable Power UPS - Unavailable - Inability to provide emergency Supply power supply to essential systems
Emergency Power (inc ER007 generation and distribution)
Process Control and Alarms
Process Control and Alarms
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
ER011 Oil Spill Response
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER009
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER009
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER009
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER008
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
LIFE SAVING
ER005
Emergency Power (inc ER007 generation and distribution)
Process Control and Alarms
ER005
Helicopter facilities ER006 (inc. markings, nets, obstacle marking /
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment
ER003
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Uninterruptable Power UPS - Loss of redundancy - (one of the 2x100% Supply systems not available)
Helicopter facilities observed or detected damage / defective or unavailable markings, lighting, nets, etc.
ER002 Escape Routes
LS
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
Rescue Facilities LS002 (Medical / first aid facilities)
LS002 Rescue Facilities
Alternate Means of LS004 Escape (Liferafts, scramble nets and
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A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
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A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A P A
P A A P P N N P A A A P A A A A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A P A N A A A A A A A P A
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P A P A N A A A A A A N P A
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P A P A N A A A A A A N P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
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P P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
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P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
P A A A N
P A A A N
N N N N N
P A A A N
N A A N N
P A A A N
P P P A N
P P P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
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A A A A N
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N N A A N
N P A A N
P P A A N
LEGEND A P N NA
Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
Emergency / Escape Lighting
Emergency lighting - locally unavailable
Escape route - locally unavailable ER002 Escape Routes
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting A11 Fork Lift Operations A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A18 Working on Tall Structures A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A23 Marine Operations - SBM A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Radiography work B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Hot tapping / stoppling B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B9 Coldwork B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck B13 Road Maintenance / Grading B14 Excavation activities / shoring B15 Choke Valve bean up or down B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) B27 Hook up and commissioning B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval B35 Local Venting B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements C4 Night Helicopter Operations C5 Night Heavy Lifts
Temporary Refuge (TR) Alternate Muster Points - unavailable / compromised / Primary Muster Areas (structural damage, muster areas not clear, etc)
P P A P P P P P P P A P A P A A P P P A P A A A P P P P P P P
ER
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
EMERGENCY RESPONSE SCE FAILURE MODE EER Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Area Temporary Refuge (TR) ER001 unavailable / compromised - (structural damage, / Primary Muster Areas muster areas not clear etc)
HSE CASE ONSHORE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
ER001
SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
LEGEND A P N NA
Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
B33
B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval
B35 Local Venting
A N N A A A A P A A A A A P P A P P A A
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A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A
A A A A A A
A A A A A
A A A A
A A A
A A
A
P A N N N P A P P A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A P P A P P N P N
P A N P P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P A P A A P P P P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A N A A A A A P N
N N N N N N N N N P N A A A N N N N N N N N N N N P N P P N N N N N
N N N N N N N N P P N A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P A P P N P N
N N N P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P A P P P P N
A A N A A P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A N A P A N A A P P A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A N A P A N A A P P A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A P P A P N
P P N P P P N P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P A P P P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A P P P A A P A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A N A A A N A P A A A P N
A A N A A N N N N N N A A A N N N N N N N N N N N A N A A P P A P N
A A N A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P N A A A A A P N
A A N P P N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P N A P A A P P N
A A N A P N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P N A P A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A N A P A A A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
A P N A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P P P N A N A P A A A P N
P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P N A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A N A A A A A P P P P A P P P P N A P A A N P N
A A N N A A A N P P P P P P P N N N P N A P A A N P N
A A A P A A A A A P P P P A P P P P N A P A A N P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A P P N
P P A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
P P N N N N A P P P P N A P P P P P N
A N N N N A P A P A N A A A A A P N
N N N N A P A P A N A P A A P P N
N N N A P P P A N A A A A A P N
N N A P P P A N A A A A A P N
N A P P P A N A A A A A P N
A P P P A N A A A A A P N
-
-
P P P P N A P P P P P N
P P P N P P P P P P N
P P N A A A A A P N
P N A P N P N P N
N A A A A P P N
N N N N N N N
A A A A P N
P P P P N
A P P N
P P N
P N
N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A P A N
A A P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A N N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
N A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
N A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
-
-
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N N N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
NOTES
N N N N N
A A A N
A A N
A N
N
C5 Night Heavy Lifts
B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out
N P N N P A P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
C4 Night Helicopter Operations
B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain
N P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing
A N P A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements
B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting
A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A
C1 Night Time Working
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval
P A N N P A A A A A A P P A N N A N P P P A N P P
B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads
B27 Hook up and commissioning
A P N N N P A P P A A A P P A N N A N N N N P N P P
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines)
3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc)
B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic)
A A N N N P A A N N A A A A P A N N A N N N N P N P P
Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B24
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc)
A A A A A A P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A P A A
A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel
A A A A A A A P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N A P A A
OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party)
B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc
B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
P P P P N
B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc)
P P P P N
B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations
P P P P N
B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation
P P P P N
B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal
A A A A N
B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure
A A A A N
B16
A A A A N
B15 Choke Valve bean up or down
P P N N N
B14 Excavation activities / shoring
P P N N N
B13 Road Maintenance / Grading
A A N N N
B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck
N N N N N
B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold
P P N N N
B9 Coldwork
A A A P N
B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures)
A A A A N
B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc)
P P P P N
B7 Hot tapping / stoppling
P P P P N
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc)
P N N N N N N N N N N N P N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N P N
B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry
P P P P P N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry)
N P P N N N N N N P P N P P N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N P N N N N
B3 Radiography work
P N N N N N N N N N N N P N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N P N
B2 NDT
P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P N
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent)
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops
P P N P P P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N
A28
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N
A27
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc)
N P N P P N P P P N N P P P P P P N N N N N N N N N N N P P P N P N
A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
A23 Marine Operations - SBM
P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump)
P P P P P P P P P P P N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P N N
A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting A11 Fork Lift Operations A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A18 Working on Tall Structures A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A23 Marine Operations - SBM A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Radiography work B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Hot tapping / stoppling B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B9 Coldwork B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck B13 Road Maintenance / Grading B14 Excavation activities / shoring B15 Choke Valve bean up or down B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) B27 Hook up and commissioning B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval B35 Local Venting B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements C4 Night Helicopter Operations C5 Night Heavy Lifts
A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc)
P P A N N N P N P N P P P P A A A A N P N N P N N N N P P P P
A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV
A A A P P P P P P P P P P P A A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A18 Working on Tall Structures
N P N N N N N N N N N N A N A A N P N N A N P P N N N N N N N
A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc)
P P A N N N P N P N P P P P A A A A N P N N P N N N N P P P P
A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot
P P A P P P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A
A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot
A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling)
A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off)
P P P P A A P P P N N P N N N N P N P P P P N P P P P P P P P
A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc)
4
P P P P A A P P P P P P N N P N P P P A P P N P P P P P P P P
A11 Fork Lift Operations
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
M4 3
A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A
A9 Pigging Operations
2
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting
1
Local Emergency Crisis Center LECC - Competent persons not available to fill LECC positions or LECC not available
M3 ER Team Members - Competent persons not available to fill ER team member position
M2 ER Medic - Insufficient number of medics available on the facility
M1 HSE Critical Position - Competent persons not available to fill HSE Critical Position
3
P P P P P P P P N N N P P N P P P P P N N N N N N N N N N N N
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required)
2
A A A P P P A A P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A7 Well production testing
1
CRITICAL MANPOWER UNAVAILABILITY
Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Planned shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Unplanned Shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Emergency / incident O3 on other facility affecting operations O2
O1
FIELD INTERFACES 8
A A P P P P P P P P P P A A A A P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations
7
A A P P P P P P P N N P P N P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations
6
W8 Low Visibility - Almost Zero Visibility Level (l < xx m)
W7 Low Visibility - Severely Impaired Operations (xx m < l < xx m)
W6 Low Visibility - Degraded Level (xx m < l < xx m) 5
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A4 Function Testing of ESD system
4
Activities and Influences XXXX Operations
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection
3
W5 High winds - Cease Operations Level (V < xx m/s)
W4 High winds / Shamal (Dust Storm) - Warning Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
W3 High winds - Alert Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s) 2
HSE CASE ONSHORE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS)
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment
1
ACTIVITIES
A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment
1
W2 High Ambient Temperature (>50°C)
W1 Adverse Weather (including monsoon (heavy rain), lightning, etc)
P1 Intrusion (within perimeter fence)
ADVERSE WEATHER
PUBLIC
INFLUENCES
134
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 8 Template for Remedial Action Plan
135
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
136
Target Completion
Description of Action N o (example)
Priority
Action Party
(example)
(example)
Action 11
P1-S
xIE
dd/mm/yy
Action 22
P1-H
xRM
dd/mm/yy
Action 33
P2
xSE
dd/mm/yy
Action 44
P3
xPD
dd/mm/yy
(example)
Remarks
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 9 Example SCE Critical Activity Matrix
137
SAFETY CASE ACTIVITIES, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES MATRIX
A = Accountable
Legend
R = Responsible
EXECUTION PARTY 1 Operations Manager 2 OIM 3 Country HSE manager 4 Corporate HSE Department - Oil Spill Response Co-ordinator 5 ER Team Member 6 Logistics Manager 7 Logistics Team Leaders 8 Line HSE advisors 9 Asset Manager 10 Audit Team Member 11 Head of Marine Services 12 Head of Aviation Service 13 Radio Operator 14 Boat Landing Officer 15 Crane Operator 16 Marine Vessel Captain 17 Helicopter Landing Officer 18 Helicopter Pilot 19 HSE Systems & Competency Manager 20 HSE Capability Co-ordinator 21 HSE Contractor Advisor 22 Safety Manager 23 Technical Safety Advisor 24 Metocean Team Leader 25 Metocean Engineer 26 Project Manager 27 Projects Technical Authority 28 Project Engineer 29 Project HSE Advisor 30 Commissioning Lead Engineer 31 Construction Lead Engineer 32 Pipelines & Subsea Engineer 33 Works Supervisor 34 Operations Technician 35 Maintenance Engineering Discipline Manager 36 Maintenance Engineering Discipline Team Leaders 37 Maintenance Strategy Manager 38 Maintenance Strategy Team Leaders 39 Maintenance Execution Team Leader 40 Maintenance Execution Engineers 41 Scheduler 42 Site Analyst 43 Chief of Well Services 44 Well Integrity Engineer 45 Head of Well Services 46 Well Services Supervisor 47 Technical Authority 1 48 Technical Authority 2 49 Well Services Engineer A R A R A A R
R
A R A
A R A A A A
R R R
Provide a full range of support in the areas of HSE global processes, and contractor HSE management Development and maintenance of HSE competence assessment, development, and assurance
PROVIDE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT
Evaluate deck capacity versus demand during loading / unloading
Co-ordinate marine operations both scehduled and unscheduled with due regard to HSE Co-ordinate aviation/ helicopter operations both scehduled and unscheduled with due regard to HSE Provide emergency response coverage. Manage, administer ER equipment and resources Review meteorological data and verify integrity of operations against adverse weather policy Carry out marine unloading of people and cargo (including crane lifts) with due regard to HSE
MANAGE LOGISTICS
Carry out helicopter unloading of people and cargo with due regard to HSE
A
R A R A A A
R R R
A R
A R A R A R A A A R
R R R
A A
R R R
A
R R A R A R
A
A R R A R A R R
A
A R A
R R R
R R R
A R A R A R A
R A R A R A R A R A R A R A A R
Refer to Pipeline Safety case, pipeline management group and supporting documentation
ASSURE PIPELINE INTEGRITY
Examine SCEs status to comply with Performance Standards
Critical drawings and documentation shall be maintained AS BUILT
ASSURE WELL INTEGRITY
Examine SCEs status to comply with Performance Standards
Critical drawings and documentation shall be maintained AS BUILT
ASSURE SURFACE FACILITIES
Refer to pipeline management group and supporting information
PLAN AND EXECUTE PIPELINE MAINTENANCE
Establish maintenance and integrity tasks to be performed based on defined strategies and facility specific performance standards Maintain maintenance planning system and activities defined in the SERP guide including the adoption of key HSE MS processes and management of operations personnel competence assurance Monitor and control the execution of facilities maintenance including implementation of safe systems of work raising required corrective actions Ensure all deviations of safety critical elements are formally recorded and authorised by the appropriate technical authority
PLAN AND EXECUTE FACILITIES MAINTENANCE (WELLHEAD ROUTINES)
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Monitor and control the execution of facilities maintenance including implementation of safe systems of work raising required corrective actions Ensure all deviations of safety critical elements are formally recorded and authorised by the appropriate technical authority
Prepare the wells, topsides processing and utilities for production processing (including purging operations if required) Performing root cause identification and corrective action following shutdowns Carry out process monitoring and control to ensure the facilities are maintained within the design operating envelope Perform process intervention operations as required including sampling, chemical injection, venting, isolation Undertake corrective actions following defined HSE controls when wells, topsides processing and utilities equipment does not perform to the defined operational performance criteria Carry out first line maintenance of production processing and utility systems equipment PLAN AND EXECUTE FACILITIES MAINTENANCE (STANDARD ROUTINES, MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING ROUTINES) Establish maintenance and integrity tasks to be performed based on defined strategies and facility specific performance standards Maintain maintenance planning system and activities defined in the SERP guide including the adoption of key HSE MS processes and management of operations personnel competence assurance
PRODUCTION OPERATIONS (PRODUCE HYDROCARBONS)
Identify major HSE risks, prepare mitigation plans and demonstrate that HSE risks are ALARP during design Prepare specifications, plans and design complying with Petronas, legal and industry regulations and codes Prepare performance testing requirements and acceptance criteria for precommissioning and commissioning activities Construct and install jacket and topside facilities including all required hook up and testing to manage HSE issues Design and construct pipelines and subsea flowlines to meet required standards for integrity and prevention of major accidents
Define the technical integrity management framework for facilities
Define Performance Standards including Safety Critical Elements
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF FACILITIES
Refer to Drilling HSE Case and supporting interface documentation
DESIGN, DRILL, SERVICE, AND ABANDON WELLS (excluding routine wireline and stimulation operations)
Manage / update design and operational criteria
Manage operational forecatsing
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
Manage real time data acquisition and data archiving
MANAGE METOCEAN DATA
Provide technical safety advice in the development and maintenance of Safety Cases and supporting technical studies Provision of safety advice and services with respect to asset emergency preparedness Provision of advice and services with respect to oil spill emergency preparedness
Provide support and advice on contractor engagement and HSE management
Support and co-ordination of incident management and investigation
A
Provide advice and services for all aspects of HSE hazard and risk studies
R A
Perform audits and reviews including pre-start up audit to manage HSE risks to ALARP
Prepare and resource assurance plan
AUDIT AND REVIEW
REVISION 1.0
The operation of the defined change management process (including the assessment of risk) for both permenant and temporary changes, in people, facility hardware and procedures
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
Provide logistics emergency response coverage. Manage, administer ER equipment and resources Provision of HSE advice and services with respect to asset emergency preparedness
Carry out emergency repsonse to oil spills at sea
Carry out emergency reposne to health, safety and environmental events
A R
Ensure ER preparedness including housekeeping carry out and assess the effectiveness of ER drills and exercises
Produce and maintain Oil Spill Response Plans (OSR)
Produce and maintain Emergency Response Plans (ERP)
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT - CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING
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TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 10 Example Activity Sheet
139
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ACTIVITY SHEET PXX-XX-XXX DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF FACILITIES Overview of the Activity The facility systems and structure must be capable of withstanding the design loads to which they will be exposed to as a result of normal and anticipated upset conditions. The correct design of the facility allows for these loads and the subsequent fabrication, construction and / or installation of the facility in accordance with the design will result in the potential for equipment or structural failure leading to a major accident hazard being reduced. This activity includes the modification, decommissioning and/or removal of existing plant and any operations in which it is intended to operate plant outside its stated design limits Hazard Management Objectives of the Activity To ensure the implementation of Design Integrity principles and risk management strategies through all phases of the project to reduce risk levels to ALARP HSE Tasks and Responsibilities PETRONAS Key Tasks
Execution Party (Competency Criteria) Accountable
Responsible
Define performance standards including Safety Critical Elements
Project Manager
Project Technical Authorities i.e. discipline leads
Define the technical integrity management requirements for facilities
Project Manager
Project Engineer
Identify major HSE risks, prepare mitigation plans and demonstrate that HSE risks are ALARP during design
Project Manager
Project HSE Advisor
Project Manager
Project’s Technical Authorities i.e. discipline engineers
Prepare specifications, plans and design, complying with PTS, legal and industry regulations and
Guidelines, Processes and Documentation
Mandatory Control Framework PETRONAS Technical Standards Project Basis of Design
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
codes Prepare performance testing requirements and acceptance criteria for precommissioning and commissioning activities
Project Manager
Construct and install jacket and topsides facilities including all required hook up and testing to manage HSE issues
Project Manager
Design and construct pipelines and subsea flowlines to meet required standards for integrity and prevention of major accidents
Project Manager
Commissioning Lead Engineer
Commissioning Lead Engineer Construction Lead Engineer
Pipelines and Subsea Engineer
Verification As built drawings Data sheets and specifications Audits and reviews during design construction and installation Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) or Site Acceptance Test (SAT) PETRONAS Process Owner: Engineering Manager
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TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 11 Typical Information Required
142
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
143
Item
Description
1.0
Section 1 – Hazardous Substances
1.01
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for all raw materials and products
1.02
Complete list of hazardous substances inventory and data (location, facilities, average storage capacity, maximum anticipated storage)
1.03
Type of leak detection system on-site i.e. fire and gas detection
1.04
Latest JKKP-5 form – Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) 1996 Notification of Industrial Activity Form (Malaysia only)
2.0
Section 2 – Installation Information – “As Built” version
2.01
Map / Layout showing location and surrounding areas / facilities (for onshore – updated version since last submission to DOSH)
2.02
Facilities layout (updated version), Overall Field Layout Drawing and Pipeline routing layout
2.03
Site specific layout plans within each facilities (sub-unit) showing locations and maximum inventory of hazardous substances (updated version)
2.04
Latest offsite population data (onshore only)
2.05
Latest manning levels for personnel on-site and their occupancy factors in identified areas / facilities / platforms. For offshore, maximum and average POB, manning levels on each deck / area
2.06
Total number of wells, number of operating wells including current closed in tubing head pressure, flow rate, flowing temperature, etc) and number of wells that are shut in.
2.07
Design life of each platform, date start of operation and asset integrity assessment of the facility, Details of any asset life extension studies
2.08
Frequency of visit of operators to satellite platforms, duration of each visit
2.09
No. of dedicated supply vessels / standby vessel / FRC
2.10
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) / Utility Flow Diagram (UFD)
2.11
Heat and Material Balance
2.12
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing (P&IDs)
2.13
Cause and Effect Matrix (Process) / API RP 14C SAFE Chart
2.14
Equipment Layout (Plan view and Elevation view)
2.15
Safety Equipment, fire fighting and escape route layouts
2.16
Hazardous Area Classification drawing
2.17
Functional shutdown logic block diagram
2.18
ESD kill knob loop schematic
2.19
Telecommunication system overall block diagram
2.20
PAGA system block diagram
2.21
Equipment list
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2.22
Facility HAZID Report
2.23
Facility HAZOP Report
2.24
Latest revision of the facility HSE Case
2.25
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report
2.26
Heath Risk Assessment (HRA) Report
2.27
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) / Simultaneous Operations, Hazards and Effects Register (HER) and Critical Activities Catalogue (CAC)
2.28
Close out reports on recommendations raised in all HSE Studies / Assessments / Reports
3.0
Section 3 – Actual Photographs of Facility
3.01
Photograph of helicopter operations
3.02
Photograph of crew transfer operation via boat
3.03
Photograph of lifting activities involving crane and supply boat
3.04
Aerial photographs of the various sides of the facility
3.05
Close up photographs of safety systems / safety critical elements on the facility e.g. firewalls, gas detectors, fire detectors, firewater system and pumps, lifeboats, life rafts, abseiling ropes, etc
3.06
Snap shots of the platform at various angles (elevation view, top, each deck)
4.0
Section 4 – Philosophies – “As Built” version
4.01
HSE / Safety Philosophy
4.02
Basis of Design
4.03
Operating and Maintenance Philosophy
4.04
Escape and Evacuation Philosophy
4.05
Relief, Vent and Blowdown Philosophy
4.06
Shutdown System Philosophy
4.07
Structural Design Basis
4.08
Firewater Protection Philosophy
4.09
Fire and Gas System Philosophy
4.10
Fire Fighting Philosophy
4.11
Process Control System Philosophy
4.12
Safety Instrumented System Philosophy
4.13
Operations Philosophy
5.0
Section 5 – Safety Management System
5.01
Organisation structure / chart at plant level including responsibilities and accountabilities of the management and personnel as provided in the organisation structure
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5.02
HSE committee (as formal communication of HSE issues from the company to other parties) details e.g. function, members, roles and responsibilities, structure, operation, etc
5.03
HSE Plan
5.04
Emergency Response Manual / Arrangements including Platform Emergency Response Plan, Oil Spill Response Plan, Typhoon / Cyclone Response Plan, emergency response team, emergency drills and exercises conducted / planned etc.
5.05
Training details including records (e.g. training needs, type of training conducted, frequency, personnel competency, safety passports, etc)
5.06
Specific courses / permit / certificate for conducting HSE critical work including records
5.07
Risk management documentation e.g. documentation on HSE hazards identification, records, controls and management
5.08
Incident reporting and follow up procedures, records and communication
5.09
HSEMS Audit – HSE elements, frequency, personnel involved, function
5.10
HSE Management System Standard / Manual (not limited to key safety responsibilities, design and operating standards, contractor management, safety committee, training matrix and competence assurance, monitoring and audit, health programmes, security programmes, etc)
5.11
Latest signed HSE Policies, drug and alcohol abuse policy, etc
6.0
Section 6 – Potential Major Accidents
6.01
Risk assessment report for plant modifications, HAZID study report
6.02
Safety and fire fighting equipment layout for all units
6.03
Layout drawing for all EER facilities
6.04
Temporary Refuge Impairment Assessment (TRIA) / Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)
6.05
Evacuation information (muster time, time to prepare lifeboat) based on emergency drill reports
6.06
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) report
6.07
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
6.08
Ship collision study
6.09
Fire and Gas Mapping Study
6.10
All calculation files for all the formal safety assessments e.g. spreadsheets, consequence modelling files, etc
6.11
Fire rating and blast rating specification
6.12
Blast Protection Report
6.13
Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study
6.14
Fire and Gas Detection Study
6.15
Firewater and deluge layouts
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6.16
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
6.17
Dropped Object Study
6.18
Fire and Gas Detection System Layout
6.19
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment and verification reports
6.20
Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV) Report
7.0
Section 7 – Others
7.01
Complete list of plant / platform modifications since last HSE Case / CIMAH submission
7.02
Comments / correspondence between PETRONAS and DOSH since last CIMAH submission to DOSH (onshore only)
7.03
Performance Standards for Safety Critical Elements
7.04
Noise Study Report
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 12 Verification Examination Level
147
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
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SCE Verification Examination Level The SCE Register will include a “Verification Examination Level”, based on the nature of the asset and the perceived consequence of failure. This examination level will be categorized into three groups 1, 2 and 3, based on the function of the SCE (i.e. inherent safety, prevention, control, mitigation or emergency response), the propensity of failure to escalate the incident, and the extent to which an alternative system can compensate for the failed SCE. The examination level is based on a scoring system with: SCE Verification Examination Level = F x C x A Function Score ‘F’ The distinction between each function is made on the basis that hazard elimination or prevention is more effective than control, which in turn is more effective than mitigation of effects or emergency response. On this basis the following score set has been used: Table A1– Function Score ‘F’ Function
Description
Score
Inherent Safety
Elimination and minimisation of hazards by design
3
Prevention
Reduction of likelihood of occurrence of accidents
3
Control
Limitation of scale, intensity and duration of accidents
2
Mitigation
Protection from effects
1
Emergency Response
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
1
Therefore, typically Structural Integrity and Process Containment barrier groupings will represent examples of inherent safety barriers. Ignition Control, SCEs such as Navigational Aids etc., may represent an example of Prevention. Control and Mitigation functions are typically represented by the Detection, Protection and Shutdown systems. For example, a fire water system, PFP are considered to represent a mitigation function as they offer protection from the effects. However, fire and gas detection, ESD and blowdown systems are Control measures as they will limit the scale and duration of the accident.
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Consequence Score ‘C’ The potential for escalation of an incident due to failure of SCE is scored as follows: Table A2 – Consequence Score ‘C’ Function
Description
Score
Moderate
Failure of the SCE function would not solely contribute to an increase in severity of the consequences.
1
Failure of the SCE function would or could lead to escalation of the consequences, or Significant
Items whose failure could lead to major hydrocarbon release and escalation affecting more than one module or compartment.
2
Failure of the SCE function would or could lead to major escalation of the consequences, or Major
Items whose failure would lead to direct impairment of the TR or emergency escape and rescue (EER) systems including associated support structure.
3
Alternative Score ‘A’ The extent to which an alternative SCE can take over the function of the failed SCE is scored as follows: Table A3 – Alternative Score ‘A’ Alternative
Description
Score
No
There is no SCE that can reasonably duplicate the function of the SCE subject to failure.
2
Yes
There is an alternative SCE that can carry out a similar function to the SCE subject to failure.
1
Verification Examination Level The verification examination level of each SCE is based on the ranges of the examination level scores presented below:
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
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DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
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Table A4 – Verification Examination Levels Level
Score
1
12 to 18
2
6 to 11
3
1 to 5
The verification examination levels may be typically defined as follows:
Examination Level 1 – High consequence of failure, and little or no level of redundancy. Its failure during normal operation could immediately result in a major incident i.e. single barrier to the Major Accident Hazard
Examination Level 2 – Significant consequence of failure, and at least one level of redundancy but could not immediately result in a major incident i.e. two or more barriers to the Major Accident Hazard
Examination Level 3 – Minimal immediate consequences of an individual failure, and having several levels of redundancy i.e. many barriers to the Major Accident Hazard.
The verification examination level of the SCE may influence the frequency of inspection, testing and verification, when considered in conjunction with the likelihood of its failure and the required reliability or availability. However, the verification examination level should be considered in the development of a verification scheme. For example, a high examination level item such as the jacket should attract more verification checks than a less critical item for example a fire water pump. Hence, as the examination levels will impact the verification scheme, it is essential that the methodology adopted for the SCE verification examination levels are agreed with the Independent Verification Body. It should be noted that the Verification Examination Level does not reflect the overall importance of the SCE or distinguish between the importance of one SCE compared to another.
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
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ii
DISTRIBUTION LIST Copy No.
Title
Location
1 2
PDP P&E HSE
KL KL
3 4 5
PM PI CHSE
KL KL KL
6
ODO
KL
7 8 9 10
ODT BD PD SD
KL SKO PMO SBO
11 12 13
MO (Country Manager) VO (Country Manager) TO (Country Manager)
Myanmar Vietnam Turkmenistan
14 15
IO (Country Manager) PSE
Iraq PMO
16 17
PPD PRE
PMO PMO
18
PME
PMO
19 20 21
PWE PSM BSE
PMO PMO SKO
22
BPD
SKO
23 24
BRE BME
SKO SKO
25 26 27 28
BWE BSM SSE SPD
SKO SKO SBO SBO
29 30 31 32
SRE SME SWE SSM
SBO SBO SBO SBO
NOTE: Copies are kept in each region’s online DARS and EDAS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
iii
AMENDMENT SUMMARY This sheet must be completed in detail at each revision once this document has been approved. Details must include revision number, description and indication of which pages and paragraphs have been revised, date of revision approval, approvers title and signature. Rev. 0
Description Issue of Initial Draft
Date Jan 13
Approver Title Head of E&P HSE
Name En. M Tarmizi B. Munir
Notes: 1) Document Custodian to update Amendment Record as and when amendments/new revisions are received. 2) For description of amendment the Document Custodian should indicate correction, modification, and update or delete issue. 3) Document Custodian to enter their company reference number, sign and date the record of entry. 4) Where part amendments are issued, the relevant page(s) will be identified with a lower case letter in the revision status line in the header
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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FEBRUARY 2014
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ........................................................................ I DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................. II AMENDMENT SUMMARY ..................................................... III 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 8 1.1 1.2
Purpose ............................................................................................. 8 Scope ............................................................................................... 8
1.3 1.4 1.5
General Definitions ................................................................................ 9 Requirement for HSE Case...................................................................... 9 Drilling Units........................................................................................ 9
1.6
Offshore and Onshore Production facilities ................................................... 9 1.6.1 1.6.2 1.6.3
Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) ............................. 9 HSE Case Purpose ................................................................. 10 HSE Cases ........................................................................... 10
1.6.4 1.6.5 1.6.6
CIMAH and the HSE Case requirement ......................................... 11 PETRONAS HSE Case ............................................................ 12 PETRONAS HSE Cases and Third Party Operations ......................... 12
1.6.7
Temporary Changes / Mode of Operation ....................................... 12
1.6.8
HSE Case for HSE-Critical Operations .......................................... 13
2 HSE CASE AND TECHNICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS SAFETY (TIPS) .............................................................................. 14 2.1 2.2
Major Accident Hazards ........................................................................ 15 Risk Acceptance Criteria ....................................................................... 17 2.2.1 Individual Risk ....................................................................... 18 2.2.2 Societal Risk ......................................................................... 19
2.3 2.4
Critical Drawings ................................................................................ 19 Independent Verification ....................................................................... 20
3 CONCEPT SELECT HSE CASE ........................................... 22 3.1
Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 22 3.1.1 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Custodian ................................... 22 3.1.2 HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 22 3.1.3 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser .................................... 23 3.1.4
Project Manager ..................................................................... 23
4 DESIGN HSE CASE ......................................................... 24 4.1
Brownfield Projects ............................................................................. 26
4.2 4.3 4.4
Accelerated Projects ............................................................................ 26 Workforce Involvement ......................................................................... 27 Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 27 4.4.1 Design Phase HSE Case Custodian ............................................. 27 4.4.2 4.4.3
HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 27 HSE Case Endorser ................................................................ 28
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4.4.4 4.4.5
HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 28 Project Manager ..................................................................... 28
4.4.6 4.4.7
Technical Authorities ............................................................... 28 Maintenance Team ................................................................. 28
5 OPERATIONS HSE CASE .................................................. 30 5.1 5.2
Workforce Involvement ......................................................................... 32 Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 32 5.2.1 Operation Phase HSE Case Custodian ......................................... 32 5.2.2 HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 33 5.2.3
HSE Case Endorser ................................................................ 33
5.2.4 5.2.5 5.2.6
HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 34 Project Manager ..................................................................... 34 Technical Authorities ............................................................... 35
5.2.7
Operations and Maintenance Team .............................................. 35
6 MOTHBALLING / DECOMMISSIONING / DISPOSAL HSE CASE .. 36 6.1
Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 36 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4
Decommissioning Phase HSE Case Custodian ................................ 36 HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 37 HSE Case Endorser ................................................................ 37 HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 37
6.1.5 6.1.6 6.1.7
Project Manager ..................................................................... 37 Technical Authorities ............................................................... 37 Operations and Maintenance Team .............................................. 37
7 DRILLING UNITS HSE CASE .............................................. 39 7.1
Drilling Roles and Responsibilities ........................................................... 41 7.1.1 Head of Drilling, E&P ............................................................... 41 7.1.2 Head of Drilling (Technology & Engineering), DRE ............................ 41 7.1.3 7.1.4
Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) ............................................. 41 Head of Drilling Operations (DRO) ............................................... 41
8 HSE CASE STRUCTURE ................................................... 42 9 PART 1: OVERVIEW ........................................................ 43 9.1
Facilities Description ............................................................................ 43 9.1.1 Overview of the Installation ........................................................ 44 9.1.2
9.2 9.3
10
Facility and Process Description .................................................. 44
Remedial Action Plan (RAP) .................................................................. 45 Statement of Fitness ............................................................................ 45
PART 2: MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS .......................... 48
10.1 10.2
HEMP ............................................................................................. 48 Major Accident Hazards Identification ....................................................... 50
10.3
Hazard Inventory ................................................................................ 50
10.4
Facility Hazard and Effects Register ......................................................... 51
10.5 10.6
Safety Critical Elements ........................................................................ 51 Bowtie Assessment ............................................................................. 56
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10.6.1 Barrier and Control Effectiveness ................................................ 60 10.7 Performance Standards ........................................................................ 62 Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) ............................... 63 Hazard Control Picture and Sheets .......................................................... 64
10.8 10.9
10.9.1
ALARP Demonstration ............................................................. 64
10.9.2 Hazard and Barrier Assessment .................................................. 67 10.10 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) 69 10.10.1 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) ....................................... 69 10.10.2 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)............................................. 69 10.10.3 10.10.4 10.11
11
MOPO and SIMOPS Workshops ................................................. 70 MOPO and SIMOPS template .................................................... 71
Operational Envelope........................................................................... 72
PART 3: CONTROL OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS ....... 74
11.1 11.2
Barriers and Safety Critical Elements ........................................................ 74 Identified facility SCEs.......................................................................... 76
11.3
Safety Critical Features ........................................................................ 77
11.4
Technical Integrity ............................................................................... 77
11.5
Safety Critical Element Register .............................................................. 78
12
PART 4: SYSTEMS .................................................... 79
12.1
HSE Critical Activities........................................................................... 79
12.2 12.3 12.4
Activity Sheets ................................................................................... 84 Competency to undertake activities for managing major hazards ....................... 84 Essential Procedures to Manage MAH ...................................................... 85
12.5
Critical Activity Matrix ........................................................................... 85 12.5.1 Function of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix .......................................... 86 12.5.2 Development of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix .................................... 86
13
MAIN SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR THE HSE CASE .... 87
13.1 13.2
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Requirements .......................................... 87 Scope of Assessment .......................................................................... 87
13.3
FSA Tools ........................................................................................ 88
14 14.1 14.2 14.3
HSE CASE REVIEW ................................................... 92 HSE Case Communication .................................................................... 92 Review Requirement ........................................................................... 92 Frequency of Review ........................................................................... 92 14.3.1 14.3.2 14.3.3
Major Modification to the facilities and operations ............................. 93 Findings from Other HSE Risk Assessments ................................... 93 Findings from Assurance Exercise ............................................... 93
14.3.4
Lesson Learnt........................................................................ 93
REFERENCES ................................................................... 94
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS The abbreviations and acronyms used in this document shall have the following meaning: AC .......................... Alternating Current ACD ........................ Accelerated Competency Development AIV ......................... Acoustic Induced Vibration ALARP ..................... As Low As is Reasonably Practicable BA .......................... Breathing Apparatus BS .......................... British Standards BTEX ....................... Benzene Toluene Ethylbenzene and Xylene CFD......................... Computational Fluid Dynamics CIMAH ..................... Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards CO .......................... Carbon Monoxide DCS ........................ Distributed Control System DoE......................... Department of Environment DOSH ...................... Department of Occupational Safety and Health DOSO ...................... Demonstration of Safe Operation DP .......................... Dynamic Positioning DRD ........................ Drilling Development DRE ........................ Drilling Exploration DRI ......................... Drilling Intervention DRO ........................ Drilling Operations DRX ........................ Drilling Exploration EDG ........................ Emergency Diesel Generator EDP......................... Emergency Depressurisation EERA ....................... Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis EIA ......................... Environmental Impact Assessment EEMUA .................... Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association EN .......................... European Norm EPS ......................... Early Production System ERP ......................... Emergency Response Plan ESD ........................ Emergency Shutdown ESDV....................... Emergency Shutdown Valve ESSA ....................... Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis ETA ......................... Event Tree Analysis FAT ......................... Factory Acceptance Test FEED ....................... Front End Engineering Design
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FERA ....................... Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment FPSO ....................... Floating Production Storage and Offloading FRED ....................... Fire Radiation Explosion and Dispersion FSA ......................... Formal Safety Assessment FSO......................... Floating Storage and Offloading FTA ......................... Fault Tree Analysis FW .......................... Fire Water GHSED .................... Group Health Safety and Environment Department HAC ........................ Hazardous Area Classification HAZID ..................... Hazard Identification HAZOP..................... Hazard and Operability HC .......................... Hydrocarbon HCS ........................ Hazard Control Sheets HCU ........................ Home Country Unit HEMP ...................... Hazard Effect and Management Process HIPPS ...................... High Integrity Pressure Protection System HIV ......................... Human Immunodeficiency Virus HRA ........................ Health Risk Assessment HSE......................... Health Safety and Environment HSEMS .................... Health Safety and Environment Management System HVAC ...................... Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning IADC ....................... International Association of Drilling Contractors ICB ......................... Independent Competent Body IPF .......................... Instrumented Protective Function IRPA........................ Individual Risk Per Annum ISO ......................... International Organisation for Standardisation ITPM ....................... Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance JHA ......................... Job Hazard Analysis JV ........................... Joint Venture KPI ......................... Key Performance Indicators LNG ........................ Liquefied Natural Gas LOPA ....................... Layers of Protection Analysis LPG ......................... Liquefied Petroleum Gas MAE ........................ Major Accident Event MAH ........................ Major Accident Hazard MATTE ..................... Major Accident To The Environment MEK ........................ Methyl Ethyl Ketone
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REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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MH .......................... Major Hazard MODU...................... Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit MOPO ...................... Manual of Permitted Operations MS .......................... Management System MSDS ...................... Material Safety Data Sheet MTBE....................... Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether NA .......................... Not Applicable NDT ........................ Non Destructive Testing NFHA....................... Non Flammable Hazard Assessment NGL ........................ Natural Gas Liquids OP .......................... Operating Procedures OPU ........................ Overseas Production Unit P&E HSE .................. Projects and Engineering HSE PETRONAS ............... Petroliam Nasional Berhad PFP ......................... Passive Fire Protection PHA......................... Process Hazard Analysis PHAST ..................... Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool PLL ......................... Potential Loss of Life POB ........................ Persons on Board PS ........................... Protection Systems PTS ......................... PETRONAS Technical Standard PTW ........................ Permit To Work QRA ........................ Quantitative Risk Assessment RAM ........................ Risk Assessment Matrix RAP ......................... Remedial Action Plan SAT ......................... Site Acceptance Test SCE......................... Safety Critical Element SIL.......................... Safety Integrity Level SIMOPS ................... Simultaneous Operations SIPCON ................... Simultaneous Production and Construction SIPCOM ................... Simultaneous Production and Commissioning SIPROD ................... Simultaneous Production and Drilling SISO ....................... Specific Instruction for Simultaneous Operations SME ........................ Subject Matter Expert SSIV ....................... Subsea Isolation Valve TEMPSC ................... Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft TIPS ........................ Technical Integrity Process Safety
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REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
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FEBRUARY 2014
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TR........................... Temporary Refuge TRSIA...................... Temporary Refuge Smoke Ingress Assessment UK .......................... United Kingdom UPS......................... Uninterruptable Power Supply
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Purpose
8
This document details the requirements for both the purpose and contents of the HSE Case and provides guidance on its development. The document aims to:
Define the business accountability in delivering HSE case across the asset lifecycle
Define what the HSE case requirements are and how it is to be used during each lifecycle phase of the asset
Reference the relevant PETRONAS PTS documents associated with the implementation of this standard
Develop an understanding of how HSE case reports are to be delivered.
The HSE Case shall be a demonstration that major accident hazard risks associated with PETRONAS E&P operations are adequately managed throughout the lifecycle of the asset, and do not pose harm to personnel working at the facility, as well as to the nearby community, where relevant. The HSE Case shall serve as an official document that can be used to demonstrate that the facility is designed, operated and maintained so that the risk exposure to the personnel working at the facility, as well as to the nearby community, is broadly acceptable or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The ALARP demonstration standard used for the assessments shall be acceptable to PETRONAS E&P and in accordance with best current industry practice. The contents of the HSE Case shall be comprehensive, incorporating descriptions of the facility, the potential hazards due to the facility’s operations, as well as relevant risk assessments evaluating the adequacy of control and mitigation for major accident hazards (MAH).
1.2
Scope The requirements defined in this standard shall be applicable throughout PETRONAS E&P global operations, including Company owned facilities operated by the Contractors and Sub-contractors. Additionally, the requirements specified in this technical standard shall be complied with for facilities shared with other Operators (JV operations). However, if the other Operator has equivalent HSE Case requirements then these may be adopted provided:
All the essential elements in minimizing the risks associated with the facility have been addressed
The requirements made under this standard are met or exceeded.
In these situations, this standard shall be the minimum acceptable standard.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
9
This standard specifically excludes the completion of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). This shall be the subject of a separate study / document. All facilities shall complete an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in accordance with the requirements detailed in PTS 60.3206 Environmental Impact Assessment Guideline [7]. However, the HSE Case shall also demonstrate adequate management of any Major Accident To The Environment (MATTE) event that is identified and appropriate to the facility operations. In addition, occupational health risk assessments shall be identified during consideration of the Health Hazards during the HAZID study (PTS 60.2004) [5] and further analysed in accordance with the PETRONAS standard PTS 60.1400.01 Health Risk Assessment [6].
1.3
General Definitions The intent of the following words are:
1.4
Shall, Will, Must means that the action is mandatory across PETRONAS facilities
Should, Would, If possible means that an action is not mandatory but is recommended
May means that an action is optional and no recommendation is made as to whether or not it should be implemented.
Requirement for HSE Case The HSE Case document, including the associated safety studies, shall be developed for the following facilities for all phases of the asset lifecycle;
1.5
Drilling Units in accordance with IADC Guidelines [10][11]
Onshore and Offshore Production Facilities, including FSO, FPSO, Oil and Gas Terminals, intra and inter-field pipelines, pipelines, block valve stations, etc.
Drilling Units The Drilling Contractor shall demonstrate to PETRONAS E&P that its organization is committed to manage, control and mitigate all risks inherent with drilling activities through development of HSE Case for the drilling unit.
1.6
Offshore and Onshore Production facilities
1.6.1
Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) HEMP is a structured methodology for the identification of HSE hazards and assessment of the associated risks, with the development of control and recovery measures that reduce the HSE risks to ‘acceptable’ or As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels, see Figure 2-3. HEMP must show that all HSE hazards have been systematically identified in
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
10
the Hazards & Effects Register, inclusive of relevant risk classification (e.g. High, Medium and Low). Guidelines for HEMP are provided in the PETRONAS Technical Standard (PTS) PTS 60.0401 [3]. It should be noted that whilst HEMP may include consideration of security risks, these are not required to form part of the HSE Case submission.
1.6.2
HSE Case Purpose The HSE Case must demonstrate in relation to the subject site or facility:
That all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) have been identified in the Hazards and Effects Register and suitable control, mitigation and recovery measures are provided/ implemented (for existing facilities or operations). It must be demonstrated that operation can be achieved within the PETRONAS quantitative criteria for risk tolerability and that risk exposure has been reduced to ‘acceptable’ or ALARP levels.
That all HSE risks - including those resulting from Medium and Low Risk Hazards - will be managed and controlled via the PETRONAS or project/ site/ operations specific HSE Management System.
That Emergency Response Plans (on-site and off-site where necessary) in relation to Major Accident Hazards have been prepared based on credible emergency scenarios, with the necessary stakeholder consultation.
All production facilities, including those operated by Contractors, shall have an HSE Case prior to commencement of the operations. The HSE Case shall, as a minimum, comply with:
The regulatory requirement of the Country where the subject site or facility operates
The PETRONAS Company requirements as set out in this standard.
It is required that this Technical Standard shall be a minimum standard or where there are local regulatory requirements, the more stringent shall be adhered to. In cases where the production operations’ facilities are operated by a Contractor within a field e.g. FPSO, an HSE Case shall be required. However, it shall be developed separately from the Company operatedfacilities. The HSE Case shall meet the minimum requirements stipulated in this standard.
1.6.3
HSE Cases An HSE Case is a living document that considers the full lifecycle of project, facilities and operations. It must address the safety impacts in each of the life cycle phases i.e. project conception, design, tender, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning, abandonment and site restoration of a project.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
11
Figure 1-1 – Project Life Cycle and HSE Case Reports
1.6.4
CIMAH and the HSE Case requirement The HSE Case required by this standard shall be considered to be in addition to the requirements of the Malaysian DOSH or any other national legislation that may be in-force at the facility location. HSE Case Onshore and offshore facilities are required by this standard to demonstrate how safe operation of the facility is achieved. The frequency of the HSE Case review cycle shall be no more than at an interval of 5-years. However, a review and update of the facility HSE Case will be required when any major modification to the facility occurs. CIMAH Report Malaysian onshore facilities are required by the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulation 1996 [16] and/or equivalent Host Country requirement to complete a Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) report that demonstrates the safe operation of the facility. The frequency of the CIMAH report review and submission is every three (3) years, with the exception for any major modification to the facility which requires CIMAH Report to be updated. The HSE Case requirements set out by this document shall be met by the incorporation of an addendum to the CIMAH report that contains the additional information required. For onshore facilities in Malaysia that do not require submission of a CIMAH report but require completion of a Demonstration of Safe Operation (DOSO) may still be capable of posing a Major Accident Hazard. Therefore, the requirements set out in this standard shall be met either as an addendum to the DOSO report or as a separate HSE Case.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
1.6.5
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
12
PETRONAS HSE Case Specifically for the preparation of the HSE Case, PETRONAS identifies the following four stages as they relate to sequential time windows and a HSE Case is required for each of these:
1.6.6
Stage 1: Concept Select Phase
Stage 2: Detailed Design.
Stage 3: Operation.
Stage 4: Mothballing / Decommissioning / Abandonment / Disposal.
PETRONAS HSE Cases and Third Party Operations Table 1-1 details the requirements for compliance with this standard when the asset is either not owned or operated by PETRONAS or is linked in some way to a third party asset such as a Floating Storage Unit (FSU) or pipeline, etc. Table 1-1 – HSE Case requirements PETRONAS HSE Case (inc. FSA) and HSE MS PETRONAS owned operated assets
and
PETRONAS owned operated by 3rd Party
asset
PETRONAS operated owned by 3rd Party
asset
Contractor HSE Case and HSE MS with Acceptance by PETRONAS (inc. FSA)
Required Required Required
3rd Party owned and operated assets (e.g. FSU, FSO, FPSO, pipeline, etc.)
Required
In the situation where the PETRONAS asset is linked or connected to a third party owned and operated facility, then the HSE Case Approver for the PETRONAS facility shall as a minimum review and accept the adequacy of the HSE Case developed by the third party that covers their assets / facilities. In addition, the Formal Safety Assessment and HSE MS must be reviewed and accepted by the HSE Case Approver as being adequate.
1.6.7
Temporary Changes / Mode of Operation In the situation where there are temporary changes to be made to an existing facility and / or operation, the HSE Case shall be updated to reflect the changes made to the facility or its altered mode of operation. For example, if a normally producing well head platform is changed to a water injection platform for later enhanced oil recovery then the HSE
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
13
Case shall be updated to reflect the temporary mode of operation / configuration.
1.6.8
HSE Case for HSE-Critical Operations For complete hazard management, consideration within the HSE Case should be given for non-process related HSE-Critical Operations, such as:
Aviation Operations
Road and Marine Operations
Seismic Operations
As well as any other critical activities that may pose any major hazards to the operations.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
2
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
14
HSE CASE AND TECHNICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS SAFETY (TIPS) The aim of TIPS is to put into operation the PETRONAS Mandatory Control Framework. This is achieved by focusing on defining and confirming that assets are performing their required function effectively and efficiently whilst safeguarding life, assets, environment and the company reputation. The TIPS process can be represented as a 5 stage TIPS flowchart, and is shown in Figure 2-1 below. Figure 2-1 – Technical Integrity Process Safety (TIPS) Flowchart STAGE 5 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES STAGE 1 IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS •Likelihood •Consequence •Risk
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
STAGE 2 IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
MAH SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT QRA, EERA, ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRSIA, F&G Mapping, HAC, etc.
SCE SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT REVIEW, SCHEDULED UPDATES, AND CHANGE CONTROL PROCEDURES
•Avoid •Prevent •Control / Mitigate •Emergency Response
STAGE 3 DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
VERIFICATION SCHEME
FACILITY HSE CASE
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Functionality •Availability •Reliability •Survivability •Interactions / Dependencies
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 4 DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT ASSURANCE PROCESSES
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Test •Inspect •Maintain
STAGE 5 MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Identify •Manage Interim Risk Until Resolution •Repair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
The TIPS program has five main stages:
Identification of Major Accident Hazards
Identification of Safety Critical Elements, management of Major Accident Hazards
involved
in
the
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
15
Identification of Performance Standards for these Safety Critical Elements
Identification of the Assurance processes that maintain or ensure the continued suitability of the Safety Critical Elements, and that these are meeting the Performance Standards
Verification that all steps have been undertaken, and this that Major Accident Hazards are being controlled
The HSE Case and associated Performance Standards shall be in accordance with the TIPS program and as a minimum shall describe the MAH, SCEs and appropriate Performance Standards for each phase of the project life cycle.
2.1
Major Accident Hazards The HSE Case is the principal document that is used to identify the Major Accident Hazards (MAH) and consequently identify and confirm the barriers that are in place that prevent or mitigate the consequences of the MAH. A Major Accident Hazard is typically a low probability, high consequence event, which requires a different approach to the occupational safety management processes. Occupational safety management programmes are associated with the higher frequency but lower consequence type of events such as falls from height. The basic reason for this is that while single failures can cause dangerous occurrences, Major Accidents do not generally happen as a result of a failure of one piece of equipment or one wrong action by an individual. Instead, they are epitomised by a series of failures of plant, personnel functions, processes and procedures. Following a major accident, it is not unusual for personnel within a company to reflect that all the signs of the likelihood of the eventual accident were evident. However, the operating company and personnel had been unable to recognise this and make the necessary changes to plant, people and processes, which become obvious and natural to do, after such an accident. The UK HSE Case Regulations [13] defines a MAH as an incident which leads to extensive damage to an asset, major impact to company reputation and / or severe or catastrophic consequences to people. These include:
Fire, explosion or other release of a dangerous substance involving death or serious injury
Any event involving major damage to the structure or loss of stability
Helicopter collision
Failure of diver systems
Any other work activity event involving death or serious injury to more than one person
This definition does not deal with the protection of the marine and/or onshore environment from the consequences of a major accident.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
16
However, safeguarding the integrity of installations and reducing the risks to people from MAHs will also help to reduce threats to the marine and onshore environment from the accidental release of hydrocarbons or process fluids. Therefore, in addition to the above definition, a Major Accident will be considered to have occurred if it:
Results from the uncontrolled developments at the facility / site
Leads to serious danger to people or to the environment, both on and off site
Uncontrolled developments may be due to on and off site factors that are unable to be influenced or the opportunity to control or influence has been lost. Offsite factors may be adverse weather conditions, sea state, earthquakes, etc. Onsite factors are events that escalate so that they are beyond the normal span of the operating envelope over which control can be exercised. A Major Accident must have the potential to cause serious danger but it is not necessary for that danger to be realised. Serious danger to people means a risk of death, serious physical injury or harm to health. Serious danger to the environment should be considered as an accident having the potential to result in:
The death or adverse effects on local populations of species or organisms
Significant contamination of drinking water supplies, ground or ground water
Damage to designated areas, habitats or populations within the areas
Permanent or long term damage to widespread habitats
Significant or long term damage to marine or aquatic environment
It is important to note that the HSE Case shall only consider Major Accidents that have the potential to cause harm from the occurrence of a single, unexpected and unplanned, acute exposure, release or event (e.g. fire, explosion). This Technical Standard specifically excludes from the HSE Case any occupational health hazards and environmental discharges other than those that are considered to represent a MATTE event. Typically, the Hazard Identification study (HAZID) shall identify the occupational and environmental hazards using the guidewords listed in Appendix 1 of the PTS 60.2004 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Guideline [5] or the Generic Hazard List shown in Appendix 3. These occupational and environmental hazards shall be the subject of separate assessments in accordance with the relevant PETRONAS Technical Standards. For example, PTS 60.3202 Environmental Aspects and Impacts Assessment Guide [7], PTS 60.1400.01 Guideline Health Risk Assessment [6], etc. The classification of hazards as MAH is determined by risk ranking using PETRONAS Risk Assessment Matrix. Major Accident Hazards are represented by risks ranked as Red – VERY HIGH (E4, E5, D5), Orange –
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
17
HIGH (B5, C5, D4, E3) and Yellow (A5) as shown in the bounded region of Figure 2-2 below. Figure 2-2– PETRONAS E&P HSE Risk Matrix [12]
LIKELIHOOD
IMPACT
Severity
1 Insignificant
2 Minor
3 Moderate
4 Major
5 Catastrophic
People
Slight Injury
Minor Injury
Major Injury
Single Fatality
Multiple Fatalities
Asset
Slight Damage
Minor Damage
Local Damage
Major Damage
Extensive Damage
Environment
Slight Impact
Minor Impact
Localized Impact
Major Impact
Massive Impact
Reputation
Slight Impact
Limited Impact
Major National Impact
Major International Impact
Considerable Impact
E Almost Certain
Happens several times per year at location
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
D Likely
Happens several times per year in company
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
C Possible
Incident has occurred in our company
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
B Unlikely
Heard of incident in industry
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
A Remotely likely to happen
Never heard of in industry
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
2.2
Risk Acceptance Criteria PETRONAS E&P has adopted risk acceptance criteria to assess the acceptability of onsite and offsite risk level posed by PETRONAS E&P facilities. These risk acceptance criteria are expressed in terms of individual risk and societal risk.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
2.2.1
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
18
Individual Risk The HSE Case must be able to demonstrate via the Formal Safety Assessment (typically the Quantitative Risk Assessment) that the facility can be designed and operated so that it poses an acceptable risk to workers and offsite population or members of the public. The acceptable risk levels are often expressed as individual risk per annum (IRPA) to worker groups or to the public. The acceptable limits for these groups are shown in Figure 2-3 below. Risk figures between the Unacceptable and Acceptable Regions require a demonstration that the risk is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risk reduction measures may be recommended, and assessed for their practicability. If none are identified or deemed practicable then the risk is deemed acceptable. The evaluation of the risk levels is typically completed as a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The HSE Case need not contain the QRA, which shall form part of the Formal Safety Assessment, but should make reference to it as appropriate. The QRA shall be completed in accordance with the PETRONAS E&P Technical Standard EP HSE SG 06 14 [9] and PTS 60.2210 [2]. Figure 2-3 – Individual risk acceptance criteria
For offshore installations the maximum tolerable limit of 10 -3 per year shall include personal (occupational) and transport accidents. Where the frequency is close to 10-3 per year acceptance that further risk reduction measures are grossly disproportionate should be only on the basis of a very rigorous demonstration. In addition to the above risk acceptance criteria, onshore facilities in Malaysia shall comply with the DoE risk acceptance criteria [20] that the 10-5 per year Location Specific Individual Risk contour must not extend beyond the site boundary. For all onshore facilities the 10 -6 per year LSIR contour shall not reach residential areas, or public buildings where vulnerable populations will be located such as schools, hospitals etc.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
2.2.2
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
19
Societal Risk For PETRONAS E&P onshore facilities only it is proposed that the Hong Kong Planning Department societal risk guidelines are used [17]. The societal risk guidelines are shown in Figure 2-4. Two f-N risk lines are used to determine what represents ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’ societal risks. It is considered unacceptable for any facility to be capable of causing greater than 1000 fatalities due to single incident irrespective of the likelihood of that particular event. An ALARP region is also incorporated which is to ensure that all practicable and costeffective measures which can reduce risks will be considered. PETRONAS E&P do not propose any group risk criteria for offshore installations. Figure 2-4 – Societal Risk Acceptance Criteria [17] 1.00E-02
Frequency of N or more Fatalities (per year)
1.00E-03
1.00E-04
Unacceptable 1.00E-05
ALARP
1.00E-06
1.00E-07
Acceptable 1.00E-08
1.00E-09 1
10
100
1000
10000
Number of Fatalities, N
2.3
Critical Drawings Critical drawings are those drawings that are required to be maintained to support implementation of any changes to the facility. They are necessary to ensure that the risks associated with the major accident hazards are adequately managed.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
20
A list of critical drawings shall be for each facility. All critical drawings shall be stored in an easily accessible database and they shall reflect the current design and status of the facility appropriate to the lifecycle of the asset. For example, during Operations Phase the drawings shall be ‘As Built’ versions. During Design phase the drawings shall be the latest available revision. The use of the easily accessible database is to ensure that personnel have reliable and up to date information to allow accurate planning and scoping of work operations and management of change. The list of critical drawings shall include but not limited to the following:
2.4
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)
Cause and Effect Matrix
Hazardous Area Classification
Facility plot plans
Site/ field layout
Escape Routes
Safety Equipment Layout
Critical Valve List including all Locked Open and Locked Closed valves
Fire and Gas detector layouts
Fixed Fire Fighting Equipment layouts
Heat and Material Balance
Fire water and deluge layout
Independent Verification PETRONAS may appoint an Independent Verification Body (IVB) to develop an effective verification scheme that ensures accurate identification of the safety critical elements (SCEs) for the installation and the adequacy of their association performance standards. In order to ensure management of the MAHs is undertaken comprehensively, it is necessary to have an integrated compliance verification process. This is to be undertaken through a process of independent verification by a defined Independent Competent Body (ICB). This ICB will be responsible for:
Challenging the identification of Major Accident Hazards
Challenging and commenting on the SCEs
Creating or being consulted in the creation of the Verification Scheme and its periodic review
Performing verification activities as defined by the Verification Scheme
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
21
Essentially the ICB is providing an independent view of the initial and on-going suitability of the SCEs to manage the risks through the means defined in the HSE Case and translated through the Performance Standards.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
3
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
22
CONCEPT SELECT HSE CASE The Concept Select HSE Case Report essentially demonstrates that the HEMP process has been systematically applied during the concept phase of the project for each of the options being considered. The purpose of the Concept Select HSE Case is to demonstrate that the lowest risk option considered during this phase has been selected. If the lowest risk option has not been selected then the Concept Select HSE Case shall demonstrate that the lowest risk concept was grossly disproportionate to the level of benefit attained. The Concept Select HSE Case shall include but not be limited to the following:
3.1
Reference to the descriptions of the options being considered
An overview of anticipated hazards, their impact and associated risk levels
A summary of the key assumptions made in the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Summaries of the philosophies and measures implemented during this phase to reduce the residual risk level to ALARP
Justification that the selected option represents the lowest overall risk or that the lowest overall risk represents is grossly disproportionate in relation to the level of benefit obtained
Recommendations regarding HSE issues to be addressed in subsequent phases of the project i.e. issues to be included in the design phase (FEED) and studies/analysis that can only be conducted meaningful during or after detailed design
Roles and responsibilities The Concept Select Phase HSE Case is required prior to progression of the selected option into Conceptual Engineering Phase and Front End Engineering and Design (FEED).
3.1.1
Concept Select Phase HSE Case Custodian He/ she is responsible for managing the relevant HEMP studies and preparing the risk tolerability and ALARP assessments. He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Concept Select Phase HSE Case report. The Concept Select Phase HSE Case custodian shall be the Project HSE engineer lead.
3.1.2
HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the relevant HEMP studies. An example of the Manager/Manager.
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
3.1.3
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
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Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser The Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the Concept Select Phase HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P requirements. The HSE Case endorser shall be the Head of HSE Division.
3.1.4
Project Manager The Project Manager shall identify the requirement for the Concept Select Phase HSE Case. He/ she ensures that suitable and sufficient HSE resources are identified and appointed, including the Concept Select HSE Case custodian. The Project Manager is responsible for the approval of the Concept Select Phase HSE Case including the conclusions, recommendations and acceptance of the selected option.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
4
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
24
DESIGN HSE CASE The Design HSE Case Report should be completed at the end of the FEED phase and updated as appropriate during the detailed design phase to reflect any changes made. The Design HSE Case is to demonstrate that the HEMP has been systematically applied during the design phase of the project and that risks have been actively reduced to ALARP. The design HSE Case shall include but not be limited to the following aspects:
The elements of the Hazards and Effects Register that are considered to be Major Accident Hazards, which shall include an assessment of the risks associated with each hazard including the key assumptions
A summary of the HEMP studies completed including results
That all HSE risks have been identified and that Medium and Low risks that are not considered Major Accident Hazards are managed and controlled by the PETRONAS or project/ site/ operations specific HSE Management System.
The representation of each major accident hazard using Bowties or barrier analysis to enable identification of the Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) and equipment. The bowtie analysis should also identify the critical activities that ensure the identified SCE integrity.
Description of the facilities and operations.
Detailed Performance Standards covering the design, procurement, fabrication, QA/QC, installation and commissioning phases for the SCE identified sufficient for the development of Inspection Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs)
A summary of the philosophies and measures that have been implemented during the FEED phase to reduce risks to ALARP
An ALARP demonstration for considered risk reduction options and reasons for acceptance or rejection
A register of where, and providing justification as to why, the design has deviated from the PETRONAS Technical Standards
Details of how workforce involvement has been achieved in the development of the Design HSE Case
The Design HSE Case shall also identify and detail those activities, with cross reference to procedures where appropriate, that are critical for the integrity of the identified SCEs. This is to ensure that all Safety Critical Elements are designed, purchased, built, installed, operated, inspected and maintained in a manner to guarantee their continued effectiveness. The Performance Standards should detail those acceptance criteria, assurance activities and verification tasks that are applicable and appropriate to demonstrate that the facility is designed and built for HSE integrity. For example, the SCE Performance Standards may require welder’s certificates, material certificates to ensure that they are fabricated by the vendor appropriately during the fabrication phase. It may also be necessary to have Factory Acceptance Tests and Site Acceptance Tests that provide assurance that the SCE is in accordance with its Performance Standard.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
25
The Design HSE Case should be updated to address the major accident hazards during the Construction Phase of the project. It is envisaged that this will only be significant when there is likely to be simultaneous production and construction / commissioning, for example for Brownfield projects. This Design HSE Case update for construction phase should involve the generation of an addendum that provides the following as a minimum:
Construction Phase HAZID which reviews the construction methods to be used e.g. hot tapping / stoppling, heavy lifts, etc.
Construction Phase MOPO, SIMOPS and /or SISO providing information on the operation or activity operating envelope and safe operating limits during the construction phase.
For Brownfield projects only it may be beneficial to undertake a Construction Phase Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to determine the most appropriate construction and commissioning strategy e.g. facility shutdown against simultaneous construction, commissioning and operation. It may also be of use to determine the lowest risk strategy for the commissioning hazardous facilities. The construction phase QRA will typically require the existing platform risk profile and knowledge of the construction phase manning levels. It should be noted that a construction phase HAZID and SISO / SIMOPS / SIPCON / SIPCOM may be considered sufficient as a construction phase risk assessment. The requirement for conducting a construction phase QRA shall be determined by PETRONAS Projects and Engineering (P&E) HSE to ensure that the construction workers are not exposed to an unacceptable level of risk during simultaneous production and construction / commissioning.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
EP HSE SG 02 12
FEBRUARY 2014
26
Figure 4-1 – Asset Integrity Life Cycle – Design Stage Performance Standards
4.1
Brownfield Projects Brownfield project may be categorised as follows:
Development of a new platform/ facilities that tie-in to existing production facilities
Modification of the existing facilities including infill drilling activities, power upgrade, etc.
For Brownfield projects such as development of new facilities that are to be implemented onto, or tie into, existing PETRONAS owned assets a Design HSE Case is required to be completed for the additional new project facilities. This Design HSE case shall then be incorporated into the existing Operations HSE Case prior to commissioning of the brownfield facilities by the Operations team. For modifications such as infill drilling, it may just require the update of the existing Operations HSE Case and associated FSA (e.g. QRA to include the additional risk associated with the new wells and flowlines, etc.)
4.2
Accelerated Projects For accelerated programme projects, which may be either an unconventional way of project completion or represented by a copy of an
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
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already existing design e.g. incorporation of additional identical trains, etc. A single HSE Case may be developed that covers both the design and the operations phases of the asset. For example, the bowtie diagrams shall detail the escalation factor controls and critical activities that ensure that the facility is designed with HSE integrity. The HSE Case shall be handed over to Operations during the commissioning phase.
4.3
Workforce Involvement For Design HSE Cases, workforce involvement can be demonstrated by ensuring that the relevant staff representatives, including Operations team representatives, have been involved in the design. This may be done by ensuring they participate directly in the design activities such as HAZIDs, HAZOPs, etc. and by participating in project assurance reviews such as design reviews and audits.
4.4
Roles and responsibilities The Design Phase HSE Case should be completed by the project team at the end of the Front End Engineering phase.
4.4.1
Design Phase HSE Case Custodian He/ she is responsible for identifying and managing the relevant HEMP studies to assess the hazards and risks associated with the development. Identifies risk reduction strategies, Safety Critical Elements and defines their Performance Standards in conjunction with the SCE Technical Authorities. Ensures that there is a suitable and robust ALARP demonstration in place. Reviews and approves all action items raised for correct detail, action party and completion date. He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Design Phase HSE Case report. The Design HSE Case Custodian shall be the Lead Technical Safety Engineer.
4.4.2
HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the safety studies and the recommended control and mitigation measures to ensure the risks are ALARP. An example of the Manager/Manager.
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
4.4.3
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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HSE Case Endorser HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P HSE Case requirements. The HSE Case Endorser is the Head of HSE Division.
4.4.4
HSE Case Approver HSE Case Approver is responsible for approving the HSE Case, including the safety studies carried out and the recommended controls/remedial action plans arising from those studies. He/she shall also provide the required leadership and commitment in the development of HSE Case as well as implementation of any recommendations to ensure risk levels are ALARP. The HSE Case approver shall also jointly approve together with the Project Manager, the Design HSE Case. The HSE Case Approver shall be the Asset Manager or the Head of Country/Region e.g. Senior General Manager of Sarawak Operations. Where there is an inter-connection of PETRONAS facilities with facilities owned and operated by a third party, the third party facility HSE Case and FSA shall be submitted to PETRONAS and accepted as being adequate by the HSE Case Approver.
4.4.5
Project Manager The Project Manager shall identify the requirement for the Design Phase HSE Case. The Project Manager shall appoint the Design Phase HSE Case Custodian and assigns responsibilities. The Project Manager shall approve the recommendations or findings that may result from the ALARP demonstration for incorporation into the design. He / she ensures that there has been sufficient consultation with relevant parties through the Design HSE Case Development e.g. Technical Authorities, Maintenance, etc. The Project Manager shall develop the Statement of Fitness for the asset and shall also jointly approve, together with the HSE Case Approver, the Design HSE Case.
4.4.6
Technical Authorities Technical authorities are responsible for approving the Safety Critical Element listing and confirm the adequacy of the associated Performance Standards.
4.4.7
Maintenance Team The maintenance team for the facility are responsible for the development and implementation of the Assurance plan and activities
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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for the identified Safety Critical Elements in accordance with their Performance Standards. In addition the verification tasks should be identified.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
5
DOCUMENT NO :
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OPERATIONS HSE CASE The Operations HSE Case Report is to demonstrate that Major Accident Hazards are managed during operations so that risks remain tolerable and ALARP. The Operations HSE Case should describe the emergency response systems provided and should review the emergency response plan to confirm that the plan and systems provided adequately cover the identified major accident hazards. The Operations HSE Case shall describe the list of SCE Critical Tasks that must be performed to ensure that the protection and mitigation measures provided remain effective. The critical task list should also define roles and responsibilities for performing the identified activity. The Operations HSE Case is to be developed from and make reference to the Design HSE Case. The Design HSE Case shall be updated during detailed design to become the initial Operations HSE Case prior to facility handover and shall be based on ‘As Built’ documentation where necessary. The Operations HSE Case shall include, but not be limited to the following:
An introduction, a description of the facilities and operations that are covered by the HSE Case.
A Matrix Of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) together with a description of how the relevant management system is implemented. These shall be derived using the templates provided in Appendix 11.
Details of the hazards and their sources and controls associated with the operation. This should reference the Design HSE Case, risk reduction measures, the identified Safety Critical Elements and their Performance Standards.
Detailed Performance Standards covering the operational phase for the identified SCEs sufficient for the inclusion into specific asset maintenance and inspection plans / routines.
Details of the SCE Critical Tasks that have to be performed to ensure that the Performance Standards are met for the SCEs. This shall include inspection, maintenance activities (e.g. preventative), frequency of inspection, etc.
Details of the emergency response systems provided and a review of the facility emergency response plan.
The Operations HSE Case Report must review the facility Emergency Response Plan and facilities to ensure that all the identified Major Accident Events are addressed and adequate provisions made for the successful escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel.
Details of how the workforce involvement has been achieved in the development of the Operations HSE Case
The performance standards should consider the Functionality, Availability, Reliability, Survivability and Inter-dependencies (FARSI) of the SCE. They should detail the minimum acceptance criteria, assurance
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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activities and verification tasks that are applicable and appropriate under FARSI to demonstrate that the facility can be operated for HSE integrity. Figure 5-1 – Asset Integrity Life Cycle – Operations Stage Performance Standards
The Operations HSE Case essentially should describe how to operate to maintain HSE Integrity. The following requirements must be considered:
The Operations HSE Case Report must address all HSE aspects of routine and non-routine operations and must be based on finalised construction, which may include modifications from earlier detailed design and/or late changes in predicted impacts.
The Operations HSE Case Report is essentially an update of the earlier Design HSE Case Report.
The Operations HSE Case Report must be reviewed and updated every 5 years or when major equipment modifications significantly alter the HSE impacts and/or hazards within the 5-year interval.
The Operations HSE Case must be reviewed and updated when there are significant changes to the process conditions e.g. if a new well / reservoir is to be linked to an existing platform which has higher pressures or sour service when previously sweet.
The Operations HSE Case shall be reviewed and updated when it is required to operate the asset beyond its design life. The Operations HSE Case must clearly demonstrate on what basis continued safe operation beyond the design life has been made.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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The Operations HSE Case shall include the production of a video, to be used as a training video for operations staff on the facility that describes as a minimum the following:
What are the Major Accident Hazards for the facility
How these hazards are being managed to ALARP levels or lower
How the HSE Case is implemented by the facility.
As part of the HSE Case submission suitably sized posters (for example A1 size) shall be provided for all the Bowties, and the MOPO / SIMOPS for display at the facility control room. For new assets the video shall be produced / commissioned by the Operations team, once the facility has been handed over from projects.
5.1
Workforce Involvement The HSE Case shall demonstrate that the workforce have been part of the development and review of the HSE Case. Workforce in this context is the front line operations and maintenance staff that are directly involved in the day to day running of the facility. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that front line staff have:
Knowledge of the major accident hazards that have been identified for that particular facility
Awareness of the controls and barriers that are in place to manage these hazards, specifically SCEs, their performance standards, MOPO etc.
Knowledge of how these controls and barriers are managed i.e. ITPMs
Operations HSE Cases shall be communicated to the operations and maintenance teams on the site or platform. The focus shall be on what the case means to them and what impact is it likely to have. In addition, representatives from current operational, engineering and maintenance teams shall be included in the regular reviews of the HSE Case.
5.2
Roles and responsibilities During detailed design phase of the project the design team shall be responsible for the initial completion of the Operations HSE Case, which shall be handed over to Operations during the Commissioning phase. Thereafter the Asset Manager shall be responsible for the subsequent HSE Case revisions either due to facility modifications or in line with the periodic revisions as set out by this standard.
5.2.1
Operation Phase HSE Case Custodian The Operations Phase HSE Case custodian shall ensure that the Operations HSE Cases are developed and maintained for the assets in accordance with the latest requirements.
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
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He/ she is responsible for validating the HEMP studies undertaken during the previous phase to confirm that the studies remain relevant, and that no additional studies are required. The Operations HSE Case custodian shall ensure participation in development, awareness and proper use of the HSE Case. In conjunction with a multidisciplinary team to develop, review and update the Safety Critical Elements listing. He/she is responsible for the development and/or review of the Performance Standards for the SCEs. The Performance Standards may require updating following changes associated with the codes and standards on which they were based, changes in operating parameters e.g. more wells, higher POB, etc., or when significant changes are made to the asset. He/ She is responsible to confirm and monitor that the Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPM) are in line with the Performance Standards and that inspection and maintenance is being conducted as per the ITPM and at the required frequency and schedule. He / She is responsible for the review of the emergency response plans against the identified Major Accident Hazards. The HSE Cases custodian is responsible for the maintenance and accuracy of the Operations HSE Case, so that it continues to reflect the management of Major Hazards on the facility. He / she is responsible for preparing and maintaining the content of the Operations Phase HSE Case report when there is major modification or as a minimum, once in every five (5) years. The Operations HSE Case custodian shall ensure that updates to the HSE Case are communicated to all personnel when necessary. The Operations HSE Case Custodian shall be the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) or equivalent for the onshore terminals. The OIM shall also be heavily involved in the production of the facility video.
5.2.2
HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the safety studies and the recommended control and mitigation measures to ensure the risks are ALARP. An example of the Manager/Manager.
5.2.3
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
HSE Case Endorser HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P HSE Case requirements. The HSE Case Endorser is the Head of HSE Division.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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The HSE Case Endorser shall also review and approve the HSE Case video content.
5.2.4
HSE Case Approver The asset manager shall be the Operations HSE Case approving authority for the contents of the Operations Phase HSE Case including the associated safety studies and the recommended controls / remedial action plans arising. He/she shall also provide the required leadership and commitment in the development of HSE Case as well as implementation of any recommendations to ensure risk levels are ALARP. He / she shall:
Ensure the on-going compliance, implementation, periodic review and update of the Operations HSE Case in accordance with these guidelines.
Develop the Statement of Fitness for the Asset.
Approve the outcome of the HEMP Studies undertaken as part of the HSE Case and Formal Safety Assessment.
Ensure that the facility is operated according to the Operations HSE Case.
Be accountable to the PETRONAS leadership for ensuring that major hazards management is in accordance with the measures described in the HSE Case.
Where there is an inter-connection of PETRONAS facilities with facilities owned and operated by a third party, the third party facility HSE Case and FSA shall be submitted to PETRONAS and accepted as being adequate by the HSE Case Approver.
5.2.5
Project Manager The Project Manager initiates the development of the initial Operations Phase HSE Case in accordance with this standard. For the initial Operations HSE Case only the Project Manager shall appoint the Operations Phase HSE Case Custodian and assigns responsibilities. The Project Manager shall identify and liaise with the SCE Technical Authorities. He / she ensures that Design Phase HSE Case is maintained and updated to reflect any changes made during detailed design. The Project Manager shall also jointly approve together with the HSE Case Approver, the initial Operations HSE Case, which is the HSE Case completed as part of the project handover documentation to the Operations team.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
5.2.6
DOCUMENT NO :
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Technical Authorities Technical authorities are responsible for approving the Safety Critical Element listing and confirm the adequacy of the associated Performance Standards. Technical authorities are responsible for managing the Safety Critical Elements listing. They are responsible for the development, review, update, and implementation of strategies and Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) through which the Performance Standards of the SCEs will be maintained.
5.2.7
Operations and Maintenance Team The operations and maintenance team for the facility are responsible for the development, review and update of the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS).
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
6
DOCUMENT NO :
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36
MOTHBALLING / DECOMMISSIONING / DISPOSAL HSE CASE The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case Report is to demonstrate that major accident hazards are managed during mothballing, decommissioning and disposal so that risks remain tolerable and ALARP. The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case shall describe the list of SCE Critical Tasks that must be performed to ensure that the required protection and mitigation measures provided remain effective during and after shutdown of the facility. The critical task list should also define roles and responsibilities for performing the identified activity. The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case shall include, but not be limited to the following:
A description of the facilities that are covered by the HSE Case.
A description of how the implemented to control risks.
Details of the hazards, their sources and controls associated with the decommissioning and disposal. This should reference any risk reduction measures, the identified Safety Critical Elements and their Performance Standards
Details of the SCE Critical Tasks that have to be performed to ensure that the Performance Standards are met for the SCEs.
relevant
management
system
is
The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case is to essentially describe how HSE Integrity will be maintained during and after shutdown of the facility. The report must include all HSE considerations of shutdown, decommissioning, mothballing and/or removal or discontinuation of an operation, including site restoration. Equipment items that are to be decommissioned on an existing asset, but the facility remains in production, shall be considered as a modification, and the facility HSE Case shall be updated accordingly, either as part of the modification or as part of the ongoing HSE Case review cycle.
6.1
Roles and responsibilities
6.1.1
Decommissioning Phase HSE Case Custodian He/ she is responsible for managing the relevant HEMP studies and preparing the risk tolerability and ALARP assessments. Identifies risk reduction strategies, any new or existing Safety Critical Elements which may be required following decommissioning, and defines their Performance Standards. He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Mothballing / Decommissioning Phase HSE Case report.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
6.1.2
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DATE:
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HSE Case Reviewer HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the safety studies and the recommended control and mitigation measures to ensure the risks are ALARP. An example of the Manager/Manager.
6.1.3
HSE
Case
Reviewer
is
the
HSE
Senior
HSE Case Endorser HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P HSE Case requirements. The HSE Case Endorser is the Head of HSE Division.
6.1.4
HSE Case Approver HSE Case Approver is responsible for approving the HSE Case, including the safety studies carried out and the recommended controls/remedial action plans arising from those studies. He/she shall also provide the required leadership and commitment in the development of HSE Case as well as implementation of any recommendations to ensure risk levels are ALARP. The HSE Case Approver is the Asset Manager or the Head of Country/Region e.g. Senior General Manager of Sarawak Operations.
6.1.5
Project Manager Project Manager shall initiate the Mothballing / Decommissioning Phase HSE Case for the facility and ensure that it shall be developed in accordance with this guideline prior decommissioning.
6.1.6
Technical Authorities Technical authorities are responsible for approving the Safety Critical Element listing and confirm the adequacy of the associated Performance Standards for the mothballed / decommissioned facility. Technical authorities are responsible for managing the Safety Critical Elements listing. They are responsible for the development, review, update, and implementation of strategies and Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) through which the Performance Standards of the SCEs will be maintained.
6.1.7
Operations and Maintenance Team The operations and maintenance team for the mothballed / decommissioned facility are responsible for the review and update of the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
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DATE:
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(SIMOPS) and on-going inspection, maintenance and testing of the SCEs.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
7
DOCUMENT NO :
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DRILLING UNITS HSE CASE The Drilling Contractor engaged with the Company shall have in place an HSE Case developed in accordance with the latest revision of the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) HSE Case guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU) or Land Units [10][11], whichever is applicable. The HSE Case for the drilling unit shall:
Demonstrate that there is an effective HSE management system in place for managing major hazards, other workplace hazards and environmental aspects
Identify all potential hazards, including major accident hazards
Identify, assess and manage the risks associated with these hazards and demonstrate that residual risks have been reduced to tolerable levels.
The drilling unit HSE Case shall contain the following as a minimum:
Drilling contractor’s management system
Drilling unit description and supporting information
Risk management
Emergency response
Performance monitoring
As part of their HSE Case development, the Drilling Contractor shall adhere to the regulatory requirement of the Country where it is intended to be operated as well as the Company that it is engaged to, by incorporating the relevant requirement in the HSE Case studies. The Drilling Contractor shall declare if the HSE Case has been approved by any external authority or party. The HSE Case for the drilling units shall be submitted to PETRONAS E&P Drilling Division for review and check of adequacy. The Drilling Contractor shall ensure that the identified hazards, its associated controls and mitigation measures are communicated to all relevant parties. If a formal HSE case that is fully compliant with the IADC HSE Case guidelines is not available then formal written approval for dispensation to engage that particular drilling contractor must be obtained from the Head of Drilling. The Drilling Contractor’s HSE Case shall be part of the documents to be reviewed during Contractor selection process, which will depend on the type of drilling which is undertaken. The type of drilling may be:
Exploration, where there is typically no other installed facilities other than the drilling unit itself
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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Development, where the facility or platform is existing, and may be producing where an Early Production System (EPS) has been installed
Production, where the facility or platform is existing and producing
For drilling activities the required documentation shall be required in addition to the IADC HSE Case Table 7-1 – Documentation requirements for Drilling types Type of Drilling
Required Documentation / Safety Studies
Exploration
IADC HSE Case
Development without EPS
IADC HSE Case
Development with EPS
IADC HSE Case Bridging Document SIPROD SISO
Production
IADC HSE Case Bridging Document SIPROD SISO
The bridging document shall be used to align the Drilling Unit HSE management systems and that of PETRONAS E&P. The purpose of the bridging document shall be to ensure that there is clear definition of how all shared activities will be managed in a safe manner. It shall include but not limited to the following:
HSE Objectives
Organisation chart together with roles and responsibilities
Safety processes including communications, PTW, MOC, Inductions, Shift Handovers, HSE meetings, etc.
Emergency Response and Notification
Manning levels and training requirements
Worksite inspections
Safety drills
Health and hygiene
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
DATE:
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7.1
Drilling Roles and Responsibilities
7.1.1
Head of Drilling, E&P
41
The Head of Drilling Division shall provide the required leadership and commitment in ensuring the availability and adequacy of the HSE Case by Drilling Contractors.
7.1.2
Head of Drilling (Technology & Engineering), DRE The Head of Drilling (DRE) shall ensure that the Drilling Contractor’s HSE Case is available and adequate, and if an HSE Case is not available shall provide formal written dispensation for the engagement of that particular drilling contractor. The dispensation shall provide justification as to why the drilling contractor should be engaged and what measures, systems, and barriers, etc., are in place in the absence of the HSE Case to prevent major accidents hazards from being realised.
7.1.3
Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) Depending on the drilling type of project; either exploration, development or intervention, the Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) for the respective drilling rig shall ensure development and review of HSE Case in line with latest IADC requirements [10][11].
7.1.4
Head of Drilling Operations (DRO) The Head of Drilling Operations for the respective drilling rig shall track and monitor the implementation of recommendations / remedial action plan by Drilling Contractors.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
8
DOCUMENT NO :
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HSE CASE STRUCTURE The HSE Case shall be required for facilities that have the potential to cause a Major Accident Event (MAE), e.g. drilling facility and production facility. Each HSE Case shall be specific to the facility and to the facility / project phase (e.g. Concept, Design, Operations or Decommissioning / Disposal), demonstrating that the risks associated with the particular facility and phase are managed to ALARP. The HSE Case may be developed for a Field. However, the detail description, including the assessment of risks, MAHs, Bowties, SCEs and Performance Standards shall be specific for each and every facility within the Field e.g. Samarang HSE Case covers for all platforms within the Samarang Field. Drilling unit HSE Case development shall be the responsibility of the drilling contractor, and the structure of the HSE Case shall follow the requirements within the IADC guidelines [10][11]. The HSE Cases, irrespective of the asset lifecycle phase, shall be in line with the following format.
Book 1 o
Part 1 – Overview
o
Part 2 – Major Accident Hazards
o
Part 3 – Control of Major Accident Hazards
o
Part 4 – Systems
Book 2 o
Appendices
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
9
DOCUMENT NO :
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PART 1: OVERVIEW Part 1 of the HSE Case shall:
Define the objectives of the HSE Case assessment
Describe the contents of the HSE Case
Describe the facility features that are relevant to HSE and the emergency management of the facility
Explain the key accountabilities for the HSE Case, i.e. the person who is responsible for the implementation and management of the HSE Case
Explain the HSE Case change control i.e. when it is required to be updated
Highlight the number of remedial action plans according to the category of findings e.g. Very High, High, Medium and Low
Explain the management of tracking and monitoring of the remedial action plans
Conclude the statement of fitness for safe operation of the facility based on the result/analysis from the risk assessments, or the selected option for the concept phase HSE Case represents the lowest risk concept, or that it has been demonstrated that the cost/ effort to adopt the lowest risk is grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained
For Contractor facilities, Part 1 of the HSE Case shall also include the information below o
Explanation on the facilities operated;
o
Key interfaces between the Contractor and PETRONAS E&P; and
o
Roles and responsibilities for each party involve in HSE Case development
Part 1 shall also detail the HSE Case boundary limits and interfaces. For example, it should detail what facilities, platforms, pipelines, etc., that are included or excluded from the assessment. The HSE Case should detail what operational modes are included within the assessment e.g. Normal Operations, SIMOPS, Well Services (e.g. workover, wire-lining, etc.), logistics operations (e.g. Helicopter take off / landing, marine operations within 500m of platform) Some activities and their associated hazards are not entirely confined to the facility and these interactions with other PETRONAS or Contractor HSE Cases shall be identified.
9.1
Facilities Description Part 1 shall describe accurately the essential features of the facility that are relevant to the HSE and emergency management of the facility,
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
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based on the level of detail/ knowledge at that particular phase of the asset lifecycle. When the scope of the HSE Case comprises several facilities in a field e.g. main platform and satellite platforms, each facility shall be described separately in detail. The description of the facilities shall detail the equipment and operations which are expected to be functioning during an emergency. The facility description shall consist of two main sections:
9.1.1
Overview of the installation
Facility and process description.
Overview of the Installation For offshore facilities the overview of the installation shall include:
Field layout
Exact location
Facilities in the field.
For onshore facilities the overview shall include:
9.1.2
Facility location
Facility layout
Description of the surrounding area, with respect to land use, population, environmentally sensitive areas, etc.
Facility and Process Description The facility description shall include a detailed description of the asset(s) within the scope of the HSE Case. The level of detail shall be commensurate with the phase of the asset lifecycle. The essential elements that shall be described in this section include:
Structural design of the facility
Facility production capacity
Main process equipment
Facility operating parameters; this should include operational envelopes which shall provide data on the structural limits for items whose failure could lead directly to a major accident occurring. Typically, this will include Sub-sea structure and topsides structures which if they fail may lead directly to structural collapse.
Process flow description, including Process Flow Diagrams (PFD)
Meteorological conditions or Metocean data for offshore facilities
Utilities system e.g. electrical, power, diesel, etc.
Manning philosophy as per the design philosophy
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
9.2
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Remedial Action Plan (RAP) The Remedial Action Plan (RAP) is a compilation of recommendations identified during HSE Case assessments which include:
Recommendations on the inadequacy of facility HSEMS
Recommendations from all associated safety studies for the facility
All recommendations shall be reviewed and accepted by the HSE Case Custodian. The recommendation shall be prioritized according to the risk level using PETRONAS E&P Risk Assessment Matrix (Figure 2-2):
Intolerable or High Risks represented by risks ranked as Red equate to P1-Serious;
Tolerable if ALARP Risks with a severity impact of 5 equates to P1High;
Tolerable if ALARP or Medium Risks with a severity less than 5 equates to P2; and
Broadly Acceptable or Low Risks represented by risks ranked as Green equates to P3.
The requirements relating to timeline to close the recommendations are as follows:
P1-S shall be fully mitigated immediately and corrective action completed within 6 to 12 months
P1-H shall be closed within 6 months
P2 shall be closed between 6 to 12 months
P3 shall be closed within the revision cycle of the HSE Case.
Fully mitigated means that alternative measures shall be incorporated immediately prior to continuing facility operation. The suitability and effectiveness of the mitigation measures provided shall be based on approval of the appropriate Technical Authority. The HSE Case Custodian will appoint action parties and target completion based on the prioritization. In addition, the recommendations shall be tracked to closure via a formal action tracking system (e.g. HSE Online, iHSE etc.) to ensure it is properly monitored. Sample template for Remedial Action Plan is shown in Appendix 8.
9.3
Statement of Fitness A statement of fitness shall be developed for the assets prior to the prestart up audit for the project, before starting or commissioning a new
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO :
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asset or a modification to an existing asset. represents the conclusion of
The statement of fitness
The demonstration of the lowest risk option having been selected, or that the cost/ effort required to adopt the lowest risk option represents a grossly disproportionate investment to the level of risk reduction achieved.
The demonstration of safe operations for the facility
The demonstration of safe abandonment of the facility
Typically, the statement should:
Confirm compliance to PETRONAS E&P HSE Management System in terms of hazard identification
List the identified Major Accident Hazards (MAH), including associated Major Accident Event (MAE) arising from Bowtie risk assessment
Summarise the risk contribution (in terms of %) from Quantitative Risk Assessment, which can be typically represented in a pie chart
Summarise the key Safety Critical Elements (SCE) in managing MAH, including the management of SCE integrity and reliability
Confirm that the risks associated with the facility and activities are minimized to ALARP and the facility is safe to be operated
Confirm that all recommendations included in the Remedial Action Plan have been reviewed and accepted.
The Table 9-1 details the various elements that must be addressed in the statement of fitness and how compliance is demonstrated. Table 9-1 – Statement of Fitness Requirement
Demonstration
Process Safety Risks have been identified, documented and are managed to ALARP
HSE Risk studies including HAZOP, HEMP, FERA, and bowties have been completed. ALARP demonstration has been made for the asset SIMOPS and developed
MOPO
matrices
have
been
Hazards and Effects Register An Emergency Response Plan addressing each of the identified Major Accident Hazards has been developed and is routinely tested Employees or Contractors executing HSE Critical Activities are competent and fit to work
Operator competence assurance plans with HSE Critical Roles identified in Job Descriptions Personnel in HSE Critical Roles are fit to work TA approval framework is in place
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Requirement
Demonstration
Safety Critical Equipment meets its Technical Integrity Requirements
SCEs have been identified, documented and included in the HSE Case
Design and Construction of new assets and modifications to existing assets meets design and engineering requirements
Compliance with all PTS requirements and a non-conformance register where requirements cannot be satisfied
Performance Standards have been developed for all identified SCEs and approved by TAs
Critical drawings and documents are prepared and approved Well handover document is completed
Procedures are in place to operate Safety Critical Elements within its operational limits The asset register, Safety Critical Elements (SCEs), SCE related Performance Standards (PS) acceptance criteria and maintenance / inspection routines are identified and loaded into the maintenance management system (SAP)
Operating procedures are in place Integrity operating envelopes catalogues are completed
and
alarm
Trip settings are in place, including wells Performance Standards and maintenance / inspection routines are current and uploaded into SAP Asset Register is current and uploaded into SAP Corrosion Management Plans are in place Well integrity management is in place
Modifications are complete and have been managed via the Management of Change process
Management documented
of
Change
(MOC)
process
is
Staff in HSE Critical Positions are trained and a log maintained MOC procedures are in place and in use A change register is maintained
HSE Audit and inspection programmes test compliance with the inspection and maintenance regime and HSE Case
Audits are scheduled and completed as per plan Audit findings are internally communicated to all levels in the organisation and a RAP developed
The acceptance of the HSE Case by HSE Case Custodian, Endorser and Approver shall be indicated on this page. A sample template for statement of fitness is shown in Appendix 1.
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PART 2: MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS During the Concept phase, Part 2 of the HSE Case shall describe the following:
The HEMP and how it has been applied for the assessment of Major Accident Hazards in the HSE Case
The process by which the Major Accident Hazards have been identified and how these have been ranked on the PETRONAS Risk Ranking Matrix
The applicable Major Accident Hazards and their hazard identification number obtained from the Generic Hazard List (see Appendix 3)
The Hazard and Effects register sheets for all identified Major Accident Hazards, and reference to all HSE hazards listed in the Hazard and Effects Register developed as part of the HEMP
For all other phases of the Asset lifecycle Part 2 of the HSE Case shall also include the following, in addition to the above:
10.1
A review of the facility HSE Management System to ensure that the non-MAHs are adequately controlled
The application of Bowties to the identified Major Accident Hazards, and the developed bowties for the facility
Hazard and barrier assessment that should also make reference to, confirm validity, and summarise the main findings of the group of technical HSE studies specifically focused on Major Accident Hazards. These technical HSE studies form part of the Formal Safety Assessment and may include QRA, FERA, etc.
An assessment of barrier and control effectiveness
Operational Envelopes that include the Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and the safe limits, or operational envelope, for systems where the failure of a single Safety Critical Element could result in the Major Accident Event. For example, structural collapse may occur in the event of subsea structure or topside structure failure. Therefore, the HSE Case shall detail the safe working envelope or limitations that prevent the failure of that particular SCE. For structural limits that may include but not be limited to platform deck loading, soft mooring pull from boats/ ships, helideck loading, crane lifting capacity, environmental conditions (max wave height, maximum wind speed, etc.)
HEMP The completion of the HEMP shall be in accordance with the PETRONAS Technical Standard PTS 60.0401 [3]. The Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) is a structured and systematic analysis methodology involving the identification, assessment, and control of hazards and the recovery from the effects caused by a release of the hazards. HEMP is an iterative process. The four stages may partially overlap or may have to be carried out more than once. HEMP is illustrated in Figure 10-1 below.
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Figure 10-1 – Hazard and effect management process
The principle of 'identify', 'assess', 'control' and ‘recover’ are the basis of HEMP as below:
Identify all hazards associated with comprehensive and structured process
the
facility
through
a
Assess the likelihood (how often the hazardous event could occur?), the size of the consequences (e.g. how big is the fire?), and the severity of the outcome (what sort of damage / harm could occur?)
Determine what needs to be in place to remove the hazard from the business, or reduce the likelihood of it occurring, or reduce the size of the consequence and severity
Provide measures that allow people to get away from the location of the hazard (e.g. lifeboats to abandon a platform) or re-establish normal operations after the incident.
To ensure that the four key elements of the HEMP process are applied effectively in the management of Major Accidents Hazards a comprehensive set of assessment activities shall be undertaken. These activities shall include:
Major Accident Hazards Identification
Bowtie Assessment
Hazard and Barrier Assessment and Risk Reduction Philosophies
Barrier / Control Effectiveness
ALARP Risk Management for Major Hazards
Operational Envelope
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Major Accident Hazards Identification The first step in Hazard and effect management process is identification of hazards. A Hazard Identification study (HAZID) is the primary tool used to identify and document hazards. The HAZID should be based on a “Hazard Inventory”, which is a structured list of potential hazards and covers hazards ranging from loss of hydrocarbon containment to general slips, trips and falls. The HAZID shall be conducted in accordance with the PETRONAS Technical Standard PTS 60.2004 [5]. The HAZID study shall be a multi-disciplinary team facilitated by an experienced leader and the team shall identify those hazards that are relevant to the specific facility or asset under consideration. Ideally the team should comprise site / facility management, operations, HSE, maintenance and engineering disciplines. The PETRONAS risk ranking matrix Figure 2-2 shall be used to assess the hazards, their severity and frequency of occurrence. Hazards that are assessed as having a severity of 5 or high risk are then modelled further using bowtie methodology to demonstrate how these hazards are managed and controlled. For low and medium risk hazards the controls for these hazards may be typically related to operating integrity i.e. Permit to Work, Job Hazard Analysis, Operating Procedures and Process Safety Information, Management of Change, etc. All the major accident hazards are assessed for their overall risk levels using a technical HSE study such as the Quantitative Risk Assessment, which will form part of the facility Formal Safety Assessment. Major Accident Hazards to the Environment and Occupational Health risks shall also have been identified in the HAZID. The impact of facility emissions/ discharges shall be the subject of the facility Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), in accordance with the requirements detailed in PTS 60.3206 Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment [8] and PTS 60.3202 Environmental Aspects and Impacts Assessment [7]. Control of the identified Major Accidents To The Environment (MATTE) events shall be demonstrated via the HSE Case. Other environmental hazards shall fall within the remit of the EIA. In addition, the occupational risk assessment shall be completed in accordance with the PETRONAS standard PTS 60.1400.01 Health Risk Assessment (HRA) [6]. The control of Occupational Health Risks shall be demonstrated in the HRA.
10.3
Hazard Inventory Hazard inventory is a compilation of process and non-process hazards developed specific for the facility prior further assessments on the inherent risk for each of the hazard. The hazard inventory may either be identified during HAZID exercise or extracted from a generic list of hazards applicable for PETRONAS E&P production facilities.
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The hazard inventory register shall include below information:
Hazard category e.g. Hydrocarbons
Hazard code number e.g. H01.01, etc.
List of hazards by respective category e.g. Crude Oil under pressure, etc..
The hazards identified from the studies undertaken (e.g. HAZID studies during concept stage and detailed design stage, Health Risk Assessment, Environmental Impact Assessment) shall be recorded in a Hazard and Effects Register, which is a complete record of all hazards, their threats, consequences, and risk ranking. A generic “Hazard Inventory” list is as shown in Appendix 3.
10.4
Facility Hazard and Effects Register The hazards and their potential effects on people, environment, assets and PETRONAS’ reputation shall be identified and listed for the full asset lifecycle from design to operations and eventually decommissioning. The hazards are typically identified in a facility hazard identification study (HAZID) which is subsequently used to develop the Hazards and Effects Register (HER). The HER is a tabulation of information related to each hazard. The information that shall be included in the hazard and effects register are:
Hazards and its code as per the hazard inventory
Source of each hazard i.e. specific location where the hazard exists
Threats that may cause the release of the hazard
Top Event, which is the first event when the hazard is released
Consequences to people, environment, asset and reputation as a result due to the release of hazard
Evaluation of inherent risk to people, environment, asset and reputation based on PETRONAS Risk Assessment Matrix
Identification of relevant documents in managing the hazards
Determination of the hazard representing a MAH based on the MAH criteria described in section 10.2.
An example of Hazard and Effects Register is as shown in Appendix 4. The Hazards and Effect Register is a deliverable from HEMP [3], the HSE Case shall reproduce the Hazard and Effects sheets that represent the identified Major Accident Hazards.
10.5
Safety Critical Elements Safety critical elements can be represented as barriers between the hazard and the consequence following the release of the hazard. This is illustrated in Figure 10-2 below. There are often holes present in the barriers that may be permanent or temporary. For example, a design error may lead to an area of poor fire and gas detection coverage, or a maintenance activity may require the barrier to be partially isolated.
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These holes reflect a path or route through which the hazard is released and the consequences of that released hazard are realised e.g. fire, explosion leading to fatalities. Figure 10-2 – Safety Critical Elements
The UK Offshore HSE Case Regulations 2005 [13] defines Safety Critical Elements as any structure, plant, equipment, system (including computer software) or component part whose failure could cause or substantially contribute to a major accident, as are any which are intended to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident. Examples of SCEs and relevant associated equipment (sometimes referred to as sub-elements) include but are not limited to: Structural Integrity (SI)
Critical structures whose failure could lead to a multiple fatality accident, e.g. offshore jackets, accommodation unit topside support structures
Structures supporting equipment where loss of integrity could result in an escape of hazardous material with the potential to cause fatality and/or damage the environment
Structures designed to protect other structures or equipment from the full force of an impact which otherwise has the potential to cause major accidents e.g. boat fenders / riser guards
Lifting equipment and systems, jacking systems whose failure could lead to or contribute to a major accident
Process Containment (PC)
Equipment, piping and pipelines where loss of integrity could result in an escape of fluid under pressure or hazardous material with the potential to cause harm to people and /or the environment
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Integrity protection systems such as relief valves, instrumented protective systems, and bursting discs that protect the plant from loss of containment as a result of exceeding design conditions.
Ignition Control (IC)
Area classification systems and procedures designed to prevent ignition in case of an escape of flammable material. This also includes ventilation systems that may be necessary to maintain the correct area classification.
Miscellaneous ignition control components such as flame arrestors, spark arrestors, etc.
Detection Systems (DS)
Detection equipment and systems designed to alert the operators of an escape of hazardous material and possibly to initiate various control actions.
Portable gas monitoring and gas testing equipment, used either to supplement, or to complement fixed equipment and systems, or for certifying safe conditions of work, e.g. prior to undertaking hot work or confined space entry under Permit to Work (PTW).
Protection Systems (PS)
Fire and explosion suppression equipment and systems where people could otherwise be at risk
Fire fighting equipment and systems
Incident control equipment such as water sprays, foam systems
Equipment and systems designed to mitigate the consequences of fire and explosion such as fire walls, blast walls and passive fire protection
Other equipment and systems, which play a significant role in preventing major accidents, such as navigational aids.
Shutdown Systems (SS)
Release control equipment and systems such as emergency shutdown, non-return valves, and blowdown, which are designed to limit the quantity of hazardous material involved in an incident.
Well isolation equipment such as the SCSSSV, SSV, etc.
Drilling well control equipment such as Blowout Preventer, Mud weight control, etc.
Emergency Response (ER)
Emergency power equipment and systems (emergency generators, switch gear, Uninterruptable Power Supplies (UPS), etc.
Communications equipment and systems that alert people that an incident has occurred and which can be used to provide instruction as to further action
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Equipment and systems that allow communication between emergency response teams and the emergency control centre
Equipment and systems that expedite the removal of people to a place of safety such as emergency lighting, escape routes, offshore platform evacuation systems and standby vessels.
Equipment and systems that allow communication with external agencies that can provide assistance in dealing with the incident.
Secondary containment equipment and systems designed to restrict hazardous materials spreading from a spillage location into other areas.
Weighing and measuring equipment and systems whose failure could lead to or contribute to a major accident such as gas meters, pressure/ temperature/level gauges, weighbridges.
Life Saving (LS)
Personnel protective equipment for general use in an emergency such as life jackets, breathing apparatus, and search and rescue equipment, etc.
Evacuation facilities such as life boats, TEMPSC, life rafts, knotted ropes, scramble nets, boat landing etc.
The Safety Critical Element not only includes the specified equipment, but also any other SCE required for the equipment to perform its specified safety function, including electric and hydraulic power supplies and connections. Figure 10-3 below shows a typical SCE barrier diagram [18] and typical barrier sub groups.
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Figure 10-3 – Typical SCE Barriers diagram [18] Structural Integrity
Safe Operation
Process Containment Ignition Control
Detection Systems
Protection Systems
Shutdown Systems
Emergency Response Lifesaving
Escalating Consequences
SI001
SI002
SI003 SI004
SI005 SI006 SI007 SI008 SI009
Structure (Jacket / Vessel Hull/ GBS / Foundation / Weathering Enclosure / Piles etc.) Topsides Primary Structure (Incl. Helidecks, Crane Pedestals, Bridges, Flare Tower etc.) Heavy Lift Cranes and Mechanical Handling Stability systems(Incl. Ballast, Bilge, Cargo, FPSO offloading, Computer Management systems) Road Vehicles Mooring Systems Drilling Systems Bridge connections to support Vessel Station Keeping / Propulsion / Dynamic Positioning / Thrusters
PC001 PC002 PC003 PC004
PC005 PC006 PC007 PC008 PC009 PC010 PC011 PC012
PC013
PC014
Pressure Vessels Heat Exchangers Rotating Equipment Tanks (Incl. IBC's) Containing hazardous (flammable, toxic etc.) fluids Hydrocarbon Piping Pipelines and Risers Relief System (PRV, PSV etc.) Wells' Hydrocarbon Containment Fired Heaters Gas Tight Floors and Walls Tanker Loading Systems Helicopter Refueling Equipment Well Intervention / Well Control Equipment (Incl. BOP System / Connector / Diverter, Cement System, Ramrig, Drilling Instrumentation, Well Control Equipment) Moveable and Temporary Equipment
IC001 IC002 IC003
IC004 IC005
IC006 IC007 IC008
IC009
Hazardous Area Ventilation Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation Certified (Exrated) Electrical Equipment Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System Electrical Earthing Continuity (Earth Bonding) Fuel Gas Purge System Inert Gas Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components (hot surface protection, inert gas) Flare Tip Ignition System
DS001
Fire and Gas Detection
DS002
Security Systems Water in Condensate / Gas
DS003
PS001 PS002
PS003 PS004
PS005 PS006
PS007 PS008 PS009 PS010 PS011 PS012 PS013 PS014 PS015 PS016
Deluge Systems Explosion Protection including Blast Barriers and Venting Provisions Helideck Fire Fighting Systems Fire Water Pumps (Incl. Caissons, Tank and Supports) Fire Main and Other Distribution System Passive Fire Protection (Incl. Doors, Walls and Penetrations) Gaseous Fire Protection Systems Fine Water Spray Systems Sprinkler Systems Power Management System Fixed Foam Systems Sand Filters Chemical Injection Systems Navigation Aids (Aircraft) Navigation Aids (Marine) Metocean Data Gathering Systems
SD001
SD002
SD003
SD004 SD005
SD006
SD007
SD008
SD009
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System Emergency Depressurisation (Blowdown) High Integrity Pressure Protection Systems (HIPPS) Well Isolation Pipeline Isolation Valve (Riser) Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDV) Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV) System Drilling well Control Equipment Utility Air
ER001
ER002 ER003 ER004
ER005
ER006
ER007
ER008
ER009 ER010
ER011
Temporary Refuge (TR) / Primary Muster Areas Escape Routes Emergency / Escape Lighting Internal, External and Emergency Communication Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) Helicopter Facilities (Incl. Markings, Nets, Obstacle Marking / Lighting etc.) Emergency Power (Incl. Generation and Distribution) Manual Fire Fighting Equipment Process Control and Alarms Bunding and Drains (Hazardous and Non-Hazardous) Oil Spill Contingency (Oil Booms and Dispersants)
LS001 LS002
LS003 LS004
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE) Rescue Facilities (Incl. Standby Vessel / Man Overboard boat / Fast Rescue Craft TEMPSC / Lifeboats Alternate Means of Escape (Liferafts, Scramble Nets and Ladders to Sea)
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Bowtie Assessment The bowtie is a model that represents how a hazard can be released i.e. the threats, escalate to their associated consequences, and how they are controlled. The Hazards and Effects Register documents all hazards associated with the facility and that control and mitigation measures have been identified. Hazards that are assessed as having a severity level of 5 or considered high risk shall be modelled using bowties. The purpose of the bowtie analysis is to identify and ensure the adequacy of controls and recovery barriers for the facility hazards. The bowtie analysis shall allow for:
Identification of the hazard release, escalation and consequence scenarios
Identification of controls e.g. barriers and escalation factor controls required to manage the hazards
Categorisation of controls into inherent safety, safety critical element (hardware) or critical activity (procedures, processes, operator action)
A clear visual representation to facilitate the ALARP demonstration
An aid to the incident review process if an occurrence of such a major incident occurs
The bowties shall comply with the requirement of the PETRONAS Bowtie Guidelines PTS 60.xxxx [4]. Figure 10-4 graphically presents the Bowtie analysis process.
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Figure 10-4 – Generic Bowtie Diagram format
Safety Critical Elements
HSE Critical Tasks - Engineering (Design and Installed for HSE Integrity) - Maintenance (Maintain for HSE Integrity) - Operations (Operate for HSE Integrity)
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The following definitions shall apply to the bowtie analysis. Hazard is something with the potential to cause harm, which may include ill health or injury, damage to property, products, production losses or increased liabilities. The concept is that the hazard has the potential for something undesirable to happen rather than the actual event itself. Top Event or hazardous event occurs when the hazard is released. It is important to realise that the top event is not the catastrophe yet, but the dangerous characteristics of the hazard are now in the open. For example oil or gas is outside of the pipeline (loss of containment). Therefore it is not yet a disaster but if not mitigated correctly then it can result in unwanted events i.e. consequences. Figure 10-5 – Hazard & Top Event as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Threats are those factors that could cause the top event. Each threat should be sufficient to cause the top event on its own. For example corrosion of the pipeline can lead to loss of containment. Figure 10-6 – Threat as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Consequences are the potential events resulting from the release of the hazard which results directly in loss or damage. Consequences represent the unwanted events that PETRONAS wants to avoid by all means.
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Figure 10-7 – Consequence as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Barriers comprise proactive barriers and reactive barriers. Proactive barriers are required to prevent a hazard being released and appear on the left hand side of the bowtie diagram. Reactive barriers are designed to prevent top event resulting in the unwanted events or consequences being realised, and appear on the right hand side of the bowtie diagram. Figure 10-8 – Barriers as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Escalation factors are conditions that make a particular barrier fail. It is the condition that leads to increased risk by defeating or reducing the effectiveness of a control. Escalation factors may also be termed as defeating factors or barrier decay mechanism. In a similar way to Threats, there may be controls in place that prevent the escalation factor being realised. For example, if a barrier relates to protection from overpressure by manual response to a high pressure alarm, an escalation factor might be ‘operator not trained in correct response’, ‘control room unmanned’, etc. Each escalation factor requires to be provided with a control mechanism in the same way as threats and consequences. Figure 10-9 – Escalation Factors as typically shown on the Bowtie Diagram
Controls are the barriers in place that prevent the escalation factor from arising. For example, the escalation factor for a shutdown valve may be ‘fails to close’ and the control that helps prevent its failure to close may be preventative maintenance system.
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The Bowtie analysis shall be completed using PETRONAS approved software, such as BowTieXP. The Facility Bowtie assessment shall contain the same threats, top event and consequences as identified in the Hazard and Effects Register. Subsequently, the required barriers and recovery barriers shall then be identified in managing the hazards. For facility risks, the barriers should contain Safety Critical Equipment (hard barriers), while the escalation factor controls may be either soft or hard barriers. Examples of hard barriers are pressure safety valve, firewater pumps, pressure vessel, life boats, escape routes, etc. Meanwhile examples of soft barriers are anchor pattern, first aid, operating procedure, etc. A bowtie workshop shall be held to ensure that the barriers, escalation factors, controls, activities and roles have been correctly identified. The escalation factors and the associated escalation controls for each of the barriers and recovery barriers shall be identified to ensure the integrity and reliability of the barrier. Any recommendation arising from the Bowtie analysis and its associated workshop, to further reduce the risk, shall be recorded in the Remedial Action Plan. A sample of Facility Bowtie is as shown in Appendix 5.
10.6.1
Barrier and Control Effectiveness The Bowtie assessment identifies the required barriers and the Formal Safety Assessment should confirm that any barrier has been designed appropriately. However, the safety of personnel at the facility depends on how successful the barriers are functioning in the operational phase and this is directly related to the effectiveness of the escalation control barrier. For example, a barrier to the Over-pressure threat may be a Pressure Relief Device. This device has an escalation factor e.g. that it fails to open, with the control barrier to that escalation factor being preventative maintenance. This is illustrated in the figure below.
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Figure 10-10 – Barrier / Control Effectiveness Schematic
These controls are managed through systems and processes such as inspection, competency assurance, etc. Determining the effectiveness of the controls is important and relies on the feedback from operations and maintenance personnel. This is best achieved in a workshop environment taking informed opinion from personnel, and any relevant audits or assessments available. The Bowtie diagram shall also reflect the control effectiveness, with identified escalation controls being colour coded as follows: Effective – the control always works as intended Partially Effective – the control works most of the time but there are some weakness or performance issues Ineffective – the control is not present or if present is not suitable for the required function If a control is ranked as partially effective or ineffective then there is a risk that the barrier that it supports will fail leading to the potential for a major accident (or the inability to recover from one). To correct for this weakness a remedial action plan shall be raised that identifies the necessary actions needed to be undertaken to reinstate that particular control to full effectiveness. The barrier effectiveness shall be summarised in the Hazard Control Sheets (see Section 10.9).
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10.7
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62
Performance Standards Performance standards shall be prepared for all Safety Critical Elements. The performance standards are the parameters that are measured or assessed so that the suitability and effectiveness of each SCE can be assured and verified. They are the essential requirements that the SCE must maintain in order to fulfil its intended function. Performance standards shall be produced for all equipment and systems that:
Protect people and the environment from a major hazard involving fire, explosion and the release of flammable and /or toxic gases and fumes
Ensure effective escape form affected areas of the site, evacuation of the site or transfer of people to a place of safety.
For a Performance Standard to be suitable it should satisfy all of the following conditions:
The goal or function of the SCE
The functional performance requirement for the following criteria; Functionality, Availability / Reliability and Survivability
Any dependencies on other SCEs
The pass or fail acceptance criteria by which performance of the SCE will be measured and recorded
The reference material from which the acceptance criteria should be derived
Any contingency actions that may be taken into consideration when performance criteria are not met
During the operational phase of the installation, the Performance Standard has to reflect how it shall be assured that the SCE is maintained in the minimum acceptable condition, or minimum acceptance criteria, and how it is being verified. This may not be the same as the design criteria, for example an acceptable level of degradation should be defined, if appropriate. For static or passive systems such as structures, containment (vessels, piping, pipelines), lifting equipment etc., measurable criteria for operational suitability may be expressed as the maximum allowable degradation that is acceptable. This may be derived from international standards, industry guidelines or other best practice. For active systems it is likely that performance can be clearly quantified and confirmed by functional testing (e.g. active fire system discharge rates, instrument alarm and trip set points, ESD valve closure time and leakage rates, etc.,). Detailed functional analysis may be required to determine the failure modes (including computer systems) which lead to loss of critical functionality and the means of identifying them. Equipment that is self-testing may make functional failure evident.
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For SCEs such as personal survival or escape equipment where continual suitability is primarily achieved by original design specification, it may be more practical to define periodic service or recertification intervals. Defining a fixed life for equipment replacement may also be appropriate. The following shall Standards:
10.8
be observed in
the setting of Performance
Each criteria, including minimum acceptance criteria shall be justified
It should be encouraged to use and reference design standards and codes where this is relevant. For example, the Code used to design the SCE, or that governs the testing frequency e.g. API RP 520 for sizing of relief valves, EEMUA 188 for establishing operating periods of relief valves. This may be relevant throughout the asset lifecycle.
HSE Case supporting studies such as Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) should be reflected in the Performance Standard criteria, e.g. FERA shall provide information for the required fire water demand in respect to the largest potential scenario.
Clearly measurable criteria, which can be confirmed during operations, maintenance, testing or inspection is needed. acceptance criteria are obscure or ambiguous they practicably be assured. This can lead to confusion and confidence in the SCE management process
Lifecycle phases shall be separately considered, but shall be combined into a single Performance Standard document this is to provide traceability across the entire lifecycle of the SCE. However, there shall be a single Performance Standard document for each SCE that covers each lifecycle phase of the asset. The Performance Standards should be updated to cover design, procurement, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning for example as appropriate. However, in the operations phase more concise, specific and measurable criteria are required.
It is required to ultimately align maintenance activities directly to the performance standard criteria ensuring specific failure limits are defined within the routines. These activities should be programmed into the maintenance management system and their compliance with the performance standard verified. Therefore, the means by which the Performance Standard criteria are assured should be identifiable from the Performance Standard.
routine Where cannot loss of
Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) The assurance processes contained within the Performance Standard for each SCE are to be incorporated into the Specific Equipment Reliability Plan (ITPMs) process. The ITPMs must provide clear demonstration that the SCE is meeting its respective Performance Standard. The
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implementation of the Performance Standard should be a goal setting evidence based regime. It should be noted that ITPMs are not part of the HSE Case, but shall be linked to the HSE Case via the Safety Critical Elements and their Performance Standards. ITPMs are not necessarily required during the FEED stage of the project, although ability to maintain may form part of the equipment selection. However, they shall be developed towards the end of the detailed design, or EPC, phase of the asset lifecycle. These developed ITPMs shall be handed over to Operations team as a baseline ITPM document. For Brownfield projects the baseline ITPM document will be limited to the additional facilities. During the operational phase of the asset the ITPMs shall be maintained and updated as necessary by the Operations team. Additional equipment added during the facility operations phase shall have ITPMs developed by either the brownfield project team or by the Operations team.
10.9
Hazard Control Picture and Sheets Part 2 of the HSE Case shall include the Hazard Control Picture and Sheets that shall describe the hazard, the threats and their control barriers, the possible consequences and their control barriers including escalation likelihood and control, risk reduction measures and any remedial action required. A typical Hazard Control Picture and Sheets are shown in Appendix 2. The Hazard Control Sheets shall contain the following information as a minimum:
10.9.1
Hazard type from the generic hazard list (Appendix 3) e.g. H-01 Hydrocarbons, H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure
Description of the Top Event and its risk ranking according to People, Assets, Environment and Reputation
Description of the Hazard and location
Assessment of the threats that may cause the hazardous top event, and the measures in place to prevent it from being realised
Assessment of the consequences that may occur if the top event arises and the control and mitigation measures in place that minimise its impact. This should include immediate consequences and escalation likelihood and control
ALARP demonstration and risk reduction measures considered, including barrier effectiveness assessment. At the concept stage in the asset lifecycle the barrier effectiveness assessment is not required.
ALARP Demonstration Risk assessment via the HAZID and associated risk assessment techniques such as QRA determine whether risks are broadly
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acceptable, tolerable or intolerable by comparison with the PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria and the PETRONAS Risk Ranking Matrix. The demonstration of ALARP requires a judgement to be made that determines whether or not risk levels are as low as is reasonably practicable. ALARP is demonstrated when the level of effort or complexity of any risk reduction measure, its cost and the time required to implement it are disproportionate to the level of risk reduction that may be achieved. To demonstrate ALARP it is necessary to identify all risk reduction measures and assess whether or not a particular measure represents a disproportionate level. Those identified risk reduction measure that are considered as proportionate shall be included on the remedial action plan for the facility. For information on the determination Typically the ALARP demonstration shall form part of the QRA study. However, it is required to be summarised in the HSE Case. All hazards shall be managed and controlled, and all hazard management techniques shall be considered for each stage of the asset lifecycle. The hazard management techniques to be considered shall follow the principles of inherent safety.
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Figure 10-11 – Hazard Management Hierarchy Hazard Management Control MOST EFFECTIVE
ELIMINATE
SUBSTITUTE
LEAST EFFECTIVE
Eliminate the hazard Substitute using processes or materials with lower risk impact
ISOLATE / SEPARATE
Segregate hazards and/or targets
ENGINEER
Prevention – design to prevent unwanted event Recovery – Design to mitigate harmful consequences
ORGANISATION
Training, Competency, Communication
PROCEDURE
PPE
Examples
- Aqueous based hydraulic fluids rather than oil based. - Use of MEG instead of Methanol for hydrate formation prevention Reduce hazardous inventories and vessel sizes Prevention – Design a vessel to withstand the maximum upstream pressure. Use of corrosion resistant materials e.g. SS rather than CS Recovery – Provide a relief device to mitigate the flow from a high pressure source.
Operating procedures, work instructions, PTW, ERP, Maintenance Regimes Protect the person
The strategy that is selected for managing a hazard will differ depending on the project phase, and this shall form part of the evaluation when making an ALARP demonstration. Focus shall be on
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elimination or substitution of hazards during the early design phases when the potential for making changes in the facility design is greatest. Later in the project design there will be less opportunity to elimination or substitution hazards and the focus should be more reflecting of the isolate/ separate and engineer hazard management strategy. Once the facility is operational the hazard management strategy will tend to be largely organisational and procedural controls. PPE is to be regarded at the last resort of hazard management and represents the least effective strategy. In most situations the decision as to whether HSE risks have been reduced to ALARP involves a comparison between the control measures a project is proposing and the measures PETRONAS would expect to see in such circumstances i.e. compliance with the relevant PTS, International Standards and Industry Recommended / Best Practices. Compliance to the relevant PTS, International Standards and Industry Recommended / Best Practices is considered to be an essential step in demonstrating ALARP. ALARP demonstration shall be carried out for each HSE Case as the asset lifecycle develops, with the exception of the Concept Select Phase.
10.9.2
Hazard and Barrier Assessment The hazard and barrier assessment shall essentially provide a summary of the technical HSE studies that comprise the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) as part of the HEMP implementation. The FSA, and the typical technical HSE studies that comprise the FSA, are discussed in more detail in Section 13. These technical HSE studies are conducted for one or more of the following reasons:
Assess in depth, the potential impacts from MAH on people, environment and assets including determination of the magnitude of consequences and frequency of occurrence
Provide input into the design of the facility and selection of equipment
Confirm that the risk management approach through the design complies with the philosophies e.g. HSE philosophy and strategies such as Fire and Explosion strategy that are established at the start of the project or development
Confirm that the engineered barriers i.e. Safety Critical Elements, have a level of functionality and reliability that reduces the risks from the hazards down to ALARP.
Confirmation of the engineered barriers having the required level of functionality and reliability shall be achieved by performing a qualitative review of the Bowties developed for the Design, Operations and Decommissioning HSE Case hazards. The review shall be led by an experienced facilitator and the review team shall comprise experienced staff from the following areas of expertise:
Engineering
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Each of the threat lines in the bowties shall be reviewed in turn and the discussion should cover such questions as:
Does the industry best practice state what should be done or make recommendations?
Can a benchmark exercise be undertaken against other operators and similar controls implemented?
Where are the gaps/ shortfalls and what action needs to be taken to address these gaps/ shortfalls?
Is there sufficient quantity and quality of barriers?
Is there anything else that can be done to further reduce the risk?
Both barrier effectiveness and the number of barriers contribute to the overall effectiveness of control, although in general the effectiveness of individual barriers is more critical e.g. structural integrity. The number, independence and reliability of the control and recovery measures shall be appropriate with the level of risk. By approaching the bowtie review in this systematic fashion, the barriers can be challenged in terms of completeness, adequacy and gaps identified and addressed so that the review team is satisfied that the risks are reduced to ALARP. This process enables an ALARP argument to be formulated although the number, quality, performance and location of the barriers must be verified to complete the ALARP demonstration. The verification of the safeguards shall be obtained via the maintenance activities, audits, reliability assessment In addition, the key assumptions on which the technical HSE studies have been completed shall be detailed in the HSE Case. This should include assumptions made on occupancy of the facility, modes of transportation, process conditions, etc., that may alter the findings of the FSA. A summary of the QRA results shall be provided that identifies the largest risk contributors and a comparison of the results with the PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria, together with any recommendations made. A summary of the risk reduction measures that were identified by the technical HSE studies and were implemented during the life cycle of the project, together with a discussion on the implications of these risk reduction measures duration the operational phase shall be made.
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It should be highlighted that the incorporation of any future modification shall not compromise or exceed the safe limits of the risk reduction measure provided. For example, future expansion and associated construction activities must ensure that platform risers and subsea pipelines are not exposed to unacceptable risk due to dropped objects.
10.10 Manual of Permitted Operations Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
(MOPO)
and
The MOPO and SIMOPS are tools designed to assist Supervisors and Line Managers during the planning and co-ordination of operations and activities by providing information on:
The operation or activity operating envelope and safe operating limits
Actions to be taken if or when certain situations arise that could compromise the safe operation of the asset
Both the MOPO and SIMOPS shall be readily available in a suitable format i.e. poster size and laminated, and displayed in the facility Control Room and any other operational and job planning or coordination room. They shall be referred to during both routine work planning and in determining the response to any unforeseen conditions. The development of the SIMOPS matrix shall make reference to the PETRONAS Carigali Guideline [19].
10.10.1 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) is a guide to define the limit of safe operations or activities that are permitted if control and/or mitigation measures are reduced and/or removed e.g. SCEs in terms of threat controls, recovery preparedness and escalation factors are partially present or not present.
10.10.2 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) is a guide to define the limit of safe operations, both normal and abnormal operations that are permitted to occur concurrently. Abnormal conditions include:
Concurrent high-risk activities such as maintenance of equipment located adjacent to live plant e.g. production sampling while corrosion coupon removal, pigging while topping up chemical tanks, etc.
External influences such as extreme weather conditions (high wind, sea swell, lightning, etc.), visibility, security issues and interfaces with adjacent fields / platforms / facilities
Organisational issues, such as absence or unavailability of key personnel e.g. ER – first aider, ER – Fire Fighting Team, Radio operator, etc.
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Concurrent activities or simultaneous activities (production/ construction/ maintenance), operations outside the design envelope, severe weather, etc., are limited in accordance with the SIMOPS. Issue of a permit to work (PTW) is a means of implementing the SIMOPS. Variations of SIMOPS are:
SIPCOM simultaneous production whilst commissioning activities are undertaken
SIPCON simultaneous production whilst construction activities are being completed
SIPROD simultaneous operation whilst drilling activities are being completed.
10.10.3 MOPO and SIMOPS Workshops Prior to conducting the MOPO and SIMOPS workshop(s) and agreed Terms of Reference document shall be produced that details the following:
Introduction including facility description
The MOPO and SIMOPS objectives and scope
Proposed Agenda
MOPO and SIMOPS workshop methodology o
List of Activities
o
List of Influences
o
List of SCE Impairment
o
List of Critical Manpower Unavailability
o
List of Assumptions to be confirmed during the workshop
Documentation required for the workshop team members e.g. plot plans, etc.
Workshop participants
The team to develop or review the MOPO and SIMOPS shall comprise personnel from the following areas who are familiar with the operation of and required activities at the facility:
Operations
Maintenance
HSE
Management
The workshop shall be chaired by an experienced facilitator and shall:
Confirm the list of operations and activities that could compromise the safe operating limits
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Develop the MOPO and SIMOPS utilising the matrices provided in Appendix 7 as a guidance
Identify those activities that are not permitted, and those that are permitted and if so under what circumstances using a traffic light system of red / amber / green
Provide the supporting guidance notes for those activities identified as being permitted with additional control requirements i.e. amber. This is to assist the Supervisors if and when the situation arises
Collectively review the matrices and ensure that they reflect the current practise and give clear guidance for action to be taken under specific circumstances
10.10.4 MOPO and SIMOPS template A template MOPO and SIMOPS for both onshore and offshore facilities are show in Appendix 7. These matrices shall be used as the basis for the construction of the asset specific MOPO and SIMOPS or for the review of the existing MOPO and SIMOPS if available. Where there are deviations to the prohibited operations identified in the matrices, these shall be fully justified in the facility HSE Case. A number of assumptions have been made in developing this template MOPO and SIMOPS, which are:
The SIMOPS shall assume that two or more activities e.g. production, well intervention are simultaneously being performed in the same location or area.
The MOPO shall assume that the operation or activity is in the vicinity of, or within the area affected by the impaired SCE.
The MOPO shall define the minimum level failure mode assessed as having an impact on or more of the high level activities or operations. If the failure mode is less than this shall be the subject of a specific risk assessment and remedial action plan.
When SCEs are in test mode, alternative controls shall be put in place to ensure that their functionality is provided. Testing of these systems is not generally considered to be impairment for MOPO purposes.
In cases where multiple barriers are unavailable or impaired then the combined effect of the simultaneous failure on the activities shall be the subject of a separate risk assessment.
Where the field comprises multiple facilities covered by a single HSE Case then it may be required to have several MOPO / SIMOPS matrices to cover satellite and main platform facilities.
Construction phase activities shall be subject to a separate MOPO and SIMOPS study.
Additional controls required as indicated in the MOPO and SIMOPs (coloured amber) shall be listed. All work shall only be carried out under the formal control of the Permit to Work (PTW) system, including component elements such as plant isolation certificates, vessel entry
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certificates, hot work permits, etc. All applicable procedures and work instructions relating to the work to be undertaken shall be complied with. In certain cases, the specific operation is not directly impacted by the barrier that is impaired, but consideration shall be given to proceeding with non-essential work that could increase the risk. Where necessary, the requirement for undertaking risk assessment shall be noted. Measures shall be taken to maintain risks at ALARP and the effectiveness of the measures shall be verified. All actions involving bypassing the safeguarding systems shall be authorised by the appropriate Technical Authority. The notes within the MOPO are intended to support rather than supersede any specific risk assessments that may be required. For a MOPO to be effective it must provide clear concise information to the Operator of immediate action to be taken under the specified conditions, e.g. if working at height is on-going and wind speed increases, he needs to be able to quickly see when to stop the activity in question.
10.11 Operational Envelope Facilities are generally designed to tolerate a degree of deviation from normal operating conditions e.g. fluid composition, GOR, operating pressure and temperature. The safe operation of the facility is dependent on remaining within a defined operational envelope that is assessed as providing a suitable level of control. For example, process alarms, trips and pressure relief devices will define the safe process operating pressure limits and ensure that these limits are not exceeded. However, there will be circumstances where the operating envelope must not be exceeded e.g. structural limitations. Typically it will take a number of barriers or SCEs to fail before a major accident occurs. However, the HSE Case shall detail the operational limits that apply where the failure of a single barrier could lead directly to a major accident occurring. For example, this applies to the Structural Integrity barriers, Subsea structures, and Topside Structures, or any onshore structure, which if it fails can lead directly to structural collapse. Typical operating envelope data for structural integrity barriers may include but not be limited to the following:
Deck loading restrictions e.g. allowable live loads for each deck, laydown area, etc.
Soft Mooring e.g. the maximum allowable soft mooring pull on each jacket leg
Helideck loading e.g. restrictions on the maximum allowable helideck loading
Crane capacity e.g. maximum allowable crane load
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Environmental conditions e.g. maximum wave height, wind speed, sea current, etc.
Marine operations e.g. Maximum wave height for attendant boats, maximum boat weight and approach speed.
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PART 3: CONTROL OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS Part 3 of the HSE Case shall contain
11.1
A register of Safety Critical Elements and their associated Major Accident Hazard Bowtie
A brief description of the identified barriers or Safety Critical Elements
A list of the safety critical features
A description of how the technical integrity of the identified barriers is to be maintained throughout the applicable project phase e.g. design, operations, abandonment. This should include descriptions of systems, procedures and responsibilities associated with the process of ensuring barrier effectiveness.
A review of the facility emergency response plan to ensure that it adequately addresses the consequences of the identified major accident hazards.
Barriers and Safety Critical Elements The bowtie assessment required in Part 2 of the HSE Case will identify the required barriers to prevent and recover from a Major Accident. The barriers detailed in the bowties which are structure, plant or equipment (hardware) are Safety Critical Elements (SCEs). In PETRONAS there are 8 general barrier groups or categories as shown in Figure 10-3. These barrier groups are either proactive or reactive. Proactive barriers are those barriers designed to prevent the hazard being released. Reactive barriers are those that are designed to control the hazard, limit the size of the consequences that may arise and enable personnel to escape. The bowtie assessment can be used to broadly identify the applicable SCE groups and sub-groups, see Figure 10-3. Whereas the flowchart shown in Figure 11-1 below may be used to assist in the identification of SCEs at the asset tag number level. Each step in this flowchart (Figure 11-1) procedure is described in more detail below. Contains hydrocarbon or hazardous substance
If the element in a system that contains flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous substance then there is the potential that failure could result in a major accident or MATTE event. Therefore, these items would be considered as an SCE. Typically these items would include process pipework and vessels containing hydrocarbons, and represent the process containment barrier grouping.
Part of a Control, Shutdown, Alarm or Mitigation System
If the element is part of a control, shutdown, alarm or mitigation system then there is the potential that its function is to provide
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protection against a major accident and their consequences. This would be the case if it was designed to protect process equipment from catastrophic failure. Typical examples are the facility Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD) and Passive Fire Protection (PFP). This identifies those SCEs that are part of the Detection, Protection and Shutdown systems barrier grouping. Can failure lead to Upstream or Downstream release?
The failure of an element may result, for example, in upset conditions that lead to over-pressurisation of pipework or vessels if they are not designed to withstand the event. This would lead to a major accident due to loss of containment in the upstream or downstream systems. An example of this type of system is a High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS). This type of system falls into the Shutdown Systems barrier grouping.
Can failure result in a major accident or inability to prevent, control or mitigate?
This would be a consideration for systems that are generally not considered part of the process. For example, structural failure on a mobile offshore facility may lead to loss of stability and a Major Accident. In addition, systems such as the navigational aids help prevent ship collision. Similarly cranes or lifting equipment may cause a Major Accident in the event of their failure due to dropped objects. This should identify the Structural Integrity barrier group and also the Protection Systems grouping for elements such as navigational aids, collision avoidance systems, etc.
Does the element prevent harm to people?
This would include items that: o
Protect people and the environment from a major accident hazard involving fire, explosion and the release of toxic gases and fumes.
o
Ensure effective escape from affected areas of the site, evacuation of the site or transference of people to a place of safety.
This identifies SCEs that are part of the Emergency Response and Life Saving barrier groupings
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Figure 11-1 – SCE identification Flowchart
11.2
Identified facility SCEs The HSE Case shall include a description under each general barrier group the applicable SCEs that have been identified within the facility that are linked to a particular Major Accident. This section must demonstrate the clear link between the facility MAH (and bowties) and the hardware barrier that is considered to be an SCE for that facility. It should be noted that equipment may fall into the barrier groups or categories. However, it may not be classified as an SCE because there is no Major Accident Hazard that requires its presence as a barrier.
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Safety Critical Features Safety Critical Features are elements of the design and the facility that inherently limit the risk although they are not linked with any of the hardware barrier groups or categories. Typical examples of safety critical features are:
11.4
Plant layout to minimise explosion over-pressures due to level of congestion, equipment orientation
Boat landing located away from risers. Note that Riser Guards are considered to be a Safety Critical Element. The orientation and layout of the platform such that the risers are distant from the boat landing is a Safety Critical Feature
Normally unmanned operations
HVAC intake location preventing smoke, flammable and/or toxic gas ingress
Refuge / muster points located upwind
Minimisation of flanges and instrument connections to reduce leak frequency
Platform orientation with respect to prevailing wind direction, with operator shelters located up wind
Location of life rafts, life jackets, TEMPSC etc., at an easily accessible position from the primary muster point.
Minimisation of hydrocarbon inventory and vessel sizes
Minimisation of ignition sources
Safety design margins
Technical Integrity It is only by ensuring the Technical Integrity of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ safety barriers that the safety of the facility can be maintained. The HSE Case shall provide an overview of how the identified hardware barriers or SCEs will be designed, procured, fabricated, installed, commissioned, operated, inspected and maintained in a manner that ensures its technical integrity during that particular phase of the asset life cycle. The TIPS process encompasses the HSE Case. However, the purpose of the HSE Case is to identify the Major Accident Hazards and the Safety Critical Elements required to control Major Hazards and to detail the specific performance requirements. Therefore, Performance Standards must be developed based on the HSE Case that are fully defined and agreed by the appropriate Technical Authority, for each phase of the project life cycle. These Performance Standards are not considered to be part of the HSE Case but are to be developed based on the HSE Case findings.
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The Performance Standards report for the SCEs will detail how they have been developed and what critical assurance tasks are required to ensure that technical integrity is maintained. It is required that the identified SCEs are always able to perform to 100% of their required functionality. However, there will be times when this is not possible due to breakdown or other causes. The Performance Standards report shall detail the processes that are in place that controls any deviations in SCE performance in a safe manner. This represents essentially a management of change procedure. The Performance Standards report shall also detail the process to be followed in the event of modification to the SCEs. For example, deviations in materials of construction during the fabrication phase of the SCE, performance issues during operational phase, incorrect design standard followed at the design stage, etc.
11.5
Safety Critical Element Register For better management of the safety critical devices, each Safety Critical Element shall be assigned a unique number as an SCE code according to the category e.g. for fire fighting deluge system that falls under the category of Protection System, the SCE number would be PSXXX. A record must be made of the SCEs identified; the record should state why the element is considered safety critical and how it relates to specific major hazards. The register must demonstrate the clear link between the facility MAH (and bowties) and the hardware barrier that is considered to be an SCE for that facility. The HSE Case shall contain a list of the SCEs identified in the bowtie diagrams as per the example SCE register provided in Appendix 6. The SCE Register must show each SCE against the MAH bowties where that particular SCE appears as a hardware barrier. The SCEs and their performance standards must be traceable in the maintenance management system.
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PART 4: SYSTEMS Part 4 of the HSE Case is to document those activities, people, competencies and procedures that impact the barriers required to manage the Major Accident Hazards. Part 4 of the HSE Case shall contain
12.1
HSE Critical Activities
Activity Sheets
Competency assessment description
Essential procedures that manage Major Accident Hazards
HSE Activity Matrix
HSE Critical Activities Having identified the barriers required to manage Major Accident Hazards Part 4 of the HSE Case (with the exception of the Concept Select Phase), shall describe how during that particular phase of the asset lifecycle e.g. Design, Operations, etc., their performance and integrity will be assured and maintained. This is to be achieved by identifying the SCE Critical Activities, which are those activities that must be carried out to ensure that the SCE is suitable, has the design integrity and will continue to perform its intended function. The SCE critical integrity activities shall be identified for all SCEs and for the entire asset lifecycle, they may include:
Critical design, construction, installation, commissioning, maintenance, operation, modification and repair activities.
Periodic testing of SCEs including testing of Instrumented Protected Functions (IPFs) and systems
Certification activities
Independent inspection, examination and testing
Administrative aspects such as training, auditing, etc..
Figure 12-1 shows the relation of Critical Activities to SCEs / barriers and controls.
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Figure 12-1 – How activities relate to barriers
In order to assist in the identification of SCE critical integrity activities it is recommended that asset groups are segregated along with the life cycle processes for these assets, and upon which the SCE Critical Integrity Activities should be identified. Figure 12-2 is a flowchart to assist in the identification of SCE Critical Integrity Activities. This will also assist in the identification of the organisational aspects to manage the SCE Critical Integrity Activities during that particular phase of the life cycle. It should be noted that SCE Critical Integrity Activities shall also include SCE Integrity Audits that are carried out by the Independent Competent Body and is used to confirm that all the SCE Critical Integrity Activities have been identified and are performed.
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Figure 12-2 – Methodology for identifying SCE Critical Integrity Activities
SCE Critical Integrity Activities
PROCESSES
ACTIVITIES
ASSETS
DESIGN
WELLS
PROCURE
FLOWLINES & PIPELINES
BUILD
STRUCTURES
QA/QC INSTALL / COMMISSION OPERATE
TESTING PROCEDURES RECORDS TRAINING REPORTING AUDIT ETC.
TANKS & VESSELS PIPEWORK & VALVES ROTATING EQT
INSPECT
BOILERS & HEATERS
CORROSION MGMT
ELECTRICAL EQT
MAINTAIN
INSTRUMENTS
REVIEW / IMPROVE
HVAC & AC
CHANGE
EMERGENCY & LIFE SAVING
DISPOSE
INTEGRITY ASSURANCE OF SCEs
For example, SCE Critical Integrity Activities and assurances that are identified during the design phase may include reviews that ensure that the designer has taken account of:
The expected working life of the asset
The properties of the materials handled
Corrosive environments
Extreme operating conditions, including start-up, shutdown, and reasonably foreseeable fault or emergency conditions
The need for asset examination and testing to ensure continued integrity throughout the design life
Foreseeable changes to design conditions of equipment that may be connected to the asset, including those operated by third parties
Protection against system failure using suitable measuring, control and protecting devices
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Provision of door safety devices to prevent opening of equipment whilst pressurised
Interlocking devices to ensure availability of pressure relief devices and emergency depressurising valves
Suitable material for each component part compatible with service and operating conditions
External forces exerted on the asset including thermal, seismic, wind, and wave loadings
Safe access for operation, maintenance, and activities associated with integrity assurance
Indelibly marking of equipment with safe operating limits and other safety information
This may simply be achieved by the normal project design procedures, and assured via technical safety studies such as HAZOPs. During the fabrication, construction, installation and commissioning phase the HSE Case should identify the activities and assurances that those doing the installation have the required training, skills, and experience and that they:
Provide adequate supervision, taking into account the complexity of the system being installed. Critical stages of fabrication / installation activities such as welding procedures, testing, material laboratory analysis and NDT requirements should be witnessed.
Prepare suitable foundations to support the equipment, taking into account the nature of the ground, equipment weight, and other internal loads and external forces
Decide on the most suitable method of lifting and handling sizeable loads to avoid harm to people and accidental damage.
Check for signs of damage to equipment during transit and prior to delivery to site for installation
Protect the SCEs from the environment including adverse weather before and during installation
Ensure that hot work such as welding or cutting will not affect the integrity of the SCE
Ensure that protective devices are clear of obstruction, operate correctly without hindrance or blockage and that the discharge is routed to a safe place
Ensure that access doors / hatches are clear of obstruction and operate correctly
Ensure that any labels or markings attached to the SCE are clearly visible
Provide adequate access for maintenance and examination purposes
Provide suitable protection against mechanical damage such as accidental impact by vehicles
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Have the installation work checked and approved upon completion by a suitably qualified and competent person
It is likely that these may all be achieved by the normal project construction, installation, pre-commissioning and commissioning procedures. For the Operations Phase the HSE Case shall demonstrate how persons operating the SCEs are provided with adequate instructions covering the safe operation and actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, and that the SCEs are operated in accordance with these instructions. The operating instructions must contain all information needed for safe operation of the SCEs including appropriate limits within which it is to be operated and the environmental conditions in which it may safely operate, see section 10.11. The instructions shall typically also include:
Normal start-up and shutdown procedures
Equipment procedures
Precautions for standby operation
Function and effect of controls and protective devices
Likely fluctuations expected in normal operations
Requirements to ensure that the SCEs are adequately protected against operating outside their design envelop at all times
Maximum loads which may safely be imposed on parts of the structure
Procedures in the event of an emergency
Reporting and recording of critical information which should include equipment failure reports for root cause analysis.
preparation
for
maintenance
and
re-instatement
The HSE Case shall identify those aspects of the operating manual that are applicable to the management of SCEs, and their assurance processes. In addition during the Operational phase the SCEs must be maintained and repaired so as to prevent danger or a major accident. The type and frequency of the maintenance for the SCE must be assessed and the suitable maintenance programme planned. It is essential to maintain the desired functionality of the SCE during the operation and maintenance phases, which are characterised by their long term nature and where controls are difficult to maintain at the same level. Processes that support these phases must be addressed, for example:
Monitoring SCEs against their Performance Standards
Condition or reliability approach for maintenance
Preventative maintenance approach
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Use of appropriate support software
Spare parts strategy
Examining SCE failure modes and their consequences
Activity Sheets With the exception of the Concept Phase, the HSE Case shall include the activity sheets. The purpose of the activity sheet is to clearly summarise the following:
An overview of the activity which links the activity to how it ensures that barriers are adequate and effective.
Hazard management objectives of the activity which gives the background as to how the activity either creates or maintains adequate controls and barriers and how it manages hazards
Description of tasks which is a list of the key sub tasks that form an overall activity
Accountable and responsible personnel / competency criteria – these are the job positions accountable and / or responsible for the task being done appropriately. An ‘accountable’ person is not necessarily the person performing the task but is answerable for its adequacy (generally supervisor / management level). The ‘responsible’ person is the person that does the task.
Company systems – these are the systems functioning within PETRONAS that help in undertaking the task (either by planning it or recording the results).
Verification of the satisfactory performance of the task will take place either by internal audits or by use of an Independent Verification Body. An example Activity Sheet is provided in Appendix 10.
12.3
Competency to undertake activities for managing major hazards An important factor in ensuring barrier effectiveness is the presence of a person with the right competencies being available to undertake the task specified in the activity sheets. In order to ensure the presence of a person with the right competency it is necessary to:
Identify each task or activity and match the task to a specific position within the company and this position represents the accountable and responsible persons for that particular task or activity being done satisfactorily.
The required competencies for a position are defined either in the positions Job Competency Profile or in a detailed job description
An assurance system is in place to demonstrate that the person who is working in a position has the right competency, or has a plan in place to close any competency gaps.
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The Operations HSE Case shall include a description of how competency is assessed and maintained to ensure that the barriers identified remain effective.
12.4
Essential Procedures to Manage MAH A procedure is considered essential if any inadequacies in the procedure or failure to follow it could lead directly to a barrier being ineffective or a major accident hazard occurring. The Operational HSE Case shall identify those essential or critical control procedures. The Operational HSE Case shall include a training matrix for the critical control procedures against job position or function, so that it can be ensured that relevant people are adequately trained in these critical control procedures. Typical critical control procedures are:
12.5
PTS 60.2001 Permit to work system – specifies the application of Permit to Work within PETRONAS operations
Emergency Response Procedure – emergency response for the facility
Job Hazard Analysis – describes the requirements of the job hazard analysis as a tool to manage hazards and risk analysis in the execution of all work at the work place
PTS 60.2201 Management of Change – provides guidelines for managing proposed modifications to existing onshore and offshore facilities and structures to ensure that the changes are practical with added values and no additional risk whether or not it involves change in the process
PTS 60.2212 Bypassing of Safety Critical Equipment / Safety System Isolation – Describes the requirements for defeat or override or bypass of an automatic control or protection system when it is required to be deliberately rendered inoperable for the purpose of start-up, testing and maintenance
Operating deviations – stipulates the hazard management requirements for continuing operations when integrity assurance activities or corrective maintenance cannot be executed
MOPO/ SIMOPS procedure – Defines the standards to be applied to safely manage multiple activities being performed simultaneously at a location.
provides
the
guidance for
Critical Activity Matrix The HSE Case shall present the organogram for the facility and the manning levels in place with details of shift rotation. The job positions identified shall be used to form the Critical Activity Matrix along with the identified critical activities.
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Function of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix The SCE-Critical Activity Matrix is a tabulation of critical activities and its corresponding parties who are responsible and accountable to perform the critical activities. The SCE-Critical Activities are activities that shall be carried out to ensure the effectiveness of the identified barrier (e.g. scheduled maintenance to maintain the hard barriers). In general, the SCE-Critical Activities are the escalation controls identified in the Bowtie assessment. The responsible parties for the respective SCE-Critical activities may vary from the Management level to the Technician level at site. However, the accountable parties should be limited to Management and Supervisory level. Note: A single party may be responsible or accountable for more than one critical activity.
12.5.2
Development of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix The SCE-Critical Activity Matrix shall be developed after completion of Bowtie risk assessment where the hard barriers for both facility hazards have been identified and confirmed. The identification of SCE-Critical Activity and their corresponding responsible and accountable parties should be developed by a team comprising various disciplines as described below, but not limited to:
Operations
Maintenance
HSE
Integrity Engineering
Well Engineering
Project Management
Leadership
Pipeline Engineering.
As a minimum, the personnel involved in the development of the matrix should be the Subject Matter Expert (SME) in the respective discipline. Sample template for Critical Activity Matrix is as shown in Appendix 9.
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13
MAIN SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR THE HSE CASE
13.1
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Requirements The HSE Case shall demonstrate that the risks associated with the major accident hazards (MAH) are managed to ALARP. Process facilities risks shall be evaluated via various techniques i.e. quantitative risk assessments, semi-quantitative risk assessments and qualitative risk assessments. The scope for formal safety assessment during FEED and detailed design phase are more detailed and comprehensive where the results are used in finalizing the possible design options and the requirement for and incorporation of risk reduction measures. During the later phases of the Asset Lifecycle a revalidation of the technical HSE studies as part of the HSE Case may be sufficient. However, the FSA should be reviewed and updated as required in line with the HSE Case report revision. All technical HSE studies shall be completed in accordance with the appropriate PETRONAS Technical Standards e.g. PTS 60.2210 for Quantitative Risk Assessment, PTS 60.2209 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), PTS 60.2204 Process Hazard Analysis, etc. As part of the assessments, the adequacy of the control and mitigation measures shall be evaluated in minimizing the risks to ALARP. Additionally, recommendations shall be made should these controls and mitigation measures be found to be insufficient and shall be recorded in the HSE Case Remedial Action Plan. For Contractors facilities, the facilities shall also be subjected to the comprehensive safety studies in demonstrating that the risks posed by the facilities operations are at ALARP and the required controls and mitigation measures are adequately identified and in placed. The requirement to conduct comprehensive FSA shall be specified as part of the contract provision. The formal safety assessment shall be reviewed in cases of any major modifications done on the facility which may impair the existing controls, or if the reliability and integrity of the existing controls are in doubt. Subsequently, the HSE Case shall also be updated for any change in the safety studies to reflect the current risk exposure.
13.2
Scope of Assessment The scope of the FSA in HSE Case shall include process hazards and non-process hazards that may lead to Major Accident Event (MAE). The Process Hazards shall include the assessment of potential leaks for all process equipment, including flowlines and pipelines.
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Non-process Hazards shall include the assessment of transportation hazards, lifting hazards, ship collision, occupational hazard and structural failure. The FSA shall cover all the facilities within the field, including all satellite facilities. The exposure of hazard shall take into account the maximum personnel onboard the facility, including Contractors and visitors.
13.3
FSA Tools The FSA tools in HSE Case shall consists of qualitative, semiquantitative and quantitative assessment as elaborated below:
Qualitative Risk Assessment is a study/assessment which is based on conservative assumptions particularly where uncertainties exist. In this method, a single person or team can gather information and brainstorm on the causes, control and consequence. Examples include Hazard Identification (HAZID), Structured What-if Techniques (SWIFT), Hazard Operability Study (HAZOP), etc.
Semi-quantitative Risk Assessment is a more detailed study/assessment to evaluate in detail on the key risk/issues identified in a qualitative risk assessment. This method is useful especially when quantification of risk is difficult and the qualitative interpretation is too subjective. Examples include Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Instrumented Protective Function (IPF) study, etc. and
Quantitative Risk Assessment is a study/ assessment to numerically determine the frequency of various adverse events and their consequences to establish the risk to life that the particular facility poses. The consequence modelling undertaken as part of the Quantitative Risk Assessment shall utilize the relevant programme/software e.g. FRED, PHAST, etc.
Other similar studies include Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA), Radiation, Dispersion and Plume Study, Non-Flammable Hazard Analysis (NFHA), etc.
Below are typically the minimum safety studies required to evaluate facility risks necessary to complete the HSE Case. These studies are initially undertaken in detail during the design phase of the facility. Therefore, during subsequent phases of the asset lifecycle i t may only be necessary to revalidate the basis, assumptions, recommendations, and to identify if any significant changes have been made from the previous study. This may include, for example, that the muster point location remains in the same location as originally intended, that process conditions and materials remain the same as those used in the consequence modelling, that the location and type of fire fighting and/or EER facilities remain the same and in the same location as detailed in the previous study, that all fire and gas detectors are located as per the Fire and Gas Layout drawings, etc. Therefore, for the Operations HSE Case it is expected that site visits shall be undertaken
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to confirm the applicability and / or validate the assumptions and findings of the previous FSA.
Qualitative Risk Assessments may be required to assist in the determining the credible scenario before proceeding with Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). Examples of the assessments that may be conducted are Hazard Identification (HAZID), Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP), Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment and verification, etc.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) o
An assessment to identify and quantify the exposure to process hydrocarbon fire and explosion hazards on the facility. This study usually yields the quantification of fatality risk to personnel working on the facility.
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a detailed hazard analysis where the purpose is to identify the possible hazard scenarios of the process, assess the existing safeguards and where necessary, provide recommendations to ensure that the risk is managed to ALARP level. The detailed analysis is divided into qualitative, semi qualitative and quantitative analysis depending on the aim of the study. The most widely used technique is the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. Other detailed analysis techniques are Structure What-If Technique (SWIFT), Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), etc. The analysis shall be in accordance with the PTS 60.2204 Process Hazard Analysis. However, it is envisaged that during the design phase of the project that the Emergency Mitigation Facilities Review (EMFR) checklist is completed. For subsequent phases only a review of the EMFR Checklist is required as more detailed analysis will be provided by associated studies such as EERA, ESSA, FRA, QRA, etc.
Fire Risk Assessment and Thermal Radiation: o
Gas Dispersion, Plume Study and Blast Study: o
An assessment on fire risk and thermal radiation to establish hazardous thermal radiation contours for the facility. The purpose of the study is to assess the impact of thermal radiation, on personnel, facility and operation. An assessment on flammable gas dispersion and plume, to establish safe cold vent locations, or flare stack height based on flame out scenario. An assessment of delayed ignition of a flammable vapour cloud causing an explosion and blast to assess the maximum realistic overpressure levels at various locations. This may require the use of CFD modelling, particularly for offshore structures.
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA): o
An assessment on the emergency system with the objective to identify and determine the availability of the critical emergency system, assess the vulnerability to withstand major accident emergency condition (e.g. fire and explosion), as well as determining the survivability of the emergency system.
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Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA): o
An assessment to ensure safe escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel in the event of major accident. The intent of EERA is to ensure the safety of personnel at all time while retreating from the effect of hazardous situation with due consideration of likely hazardous scenario, its duration, and severity as well as the predicted responses of individual under threat.
o
It should be noted that the EERA study is an offshore assessment which is not required for onshore facilities. However, for onshore facilities a Safe Access and Layout review study may be beneficial during the design phase. A typical proposed methodology of this type of study is illustrated in the Figure 13-1. However, the scope of the review can be adjusted depending on the intended purpose of the study. This type of study is envisaged to be only of practical use during the design phase of the asset / facility.
Figure 13-1 – Safe Access and Layout Review
Temporary Refuge Smoke Ingress Assessment (TRSIA): o
An assessment to identify the position of the Temporary Refuge (TR), determine the integrity of the TR and the extent
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of impairment and survivability of personnel in cases of any major accident hazards.
Hazardous Area Classification (HAC): o
An assessment to classify the areas around equipment handling or storing flammable fluids. It provides a basis for the correct selection of fixed electrical equipment and the location of other fixed sources of ignition in those areas. Hazardous area classification is essential for the control of ignition sources, and hazardous area rated electrical apparatus are considered as SCEs.
Buildings Risk Assessment: o
For occupied buildings and/ or functionally significant buildings, a buildings risk assessment may be required to confirm that the building location or design does not place the occupants at undue risk.
In cases where there are specific concerns on the adequacy of safety systems on the facility, the suitable safety studies may also be conducted on a case by case basis e.g.:
Acoustically Induced Vibration (AIV) Study; o
Fire and Gas Mapping; o
An assessment of piping systems that may be at risk of failure due to acoustic induced vibration caused by high capacity gas let down facilities. This may apply to relief and blow down systems. An assessment to identify location, number and type of detector (including its voting strategy) to be used based on potential source of gas release and fire. The output shall be indicated on the master plan of a fire and gas safety system.
SIL Assessment and Verification o
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction provided by a safety function, or to specify a target level of risk reduction. SIL is a measurement of performance required for a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). SIL Verification is the demonstration that the installed SIF achieves it required performance.
The detail reports from all formal safety assessments shall be referenced in the HSE Case.
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HSE CASE REVIEW
14.1
HSE Case Communication
92
The revised/new HSE Case shall be communicated to all relevant parties working on the facilities and/or involved in the HSE-Critical activities. During the communication session, it is essential to highlight:
14.2
The fitness of the facility to be operated
The risk exposure by personnel working on the facility
Information Assessment
The SCE-Critical activities, including the accountable and responsible parties, required in maintaining the effectiveness of hard barriers for all MAH
Information that is important as reference for the safe conduct of HSE-Critical activities e.g. HSE-Critical Activity Bowtie Risk Assessment.
with
regards
to
MAH
e.g.
Facility
Bowtie
Risk
Review Requirement A HSE Case is intended to be a live document and shall always be kept up to date to ensure that the information and the risks exposed to personnel are current. The review shall examine the basic assumptions made in HSE Case as well as its entire content. To ensure accuracy of the review, detail information with regards to the facility and operations shall be made available to the appointed party in charge for reviewing/developing the HSE Case. This is essential as the facts and information given to be the basis of the studies will reflect the results and findings of the HSE Case. It is vital that before changes are made to the facility or the way it is operated that the HSE Case is consulted as part of the change decision making process.
14.3
Frequency of Review A HSE Case shall be regularly reviewed and revised at least every five (5) years, provided there is no change made to the facilities and/or activities. However, where the review and revision frequency is determined by local legislation e.g. Malaysian DOSH CIMAH report, then the review and revision cycle shall be in accordance with the prevailing local legal requirement.
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The following will require the HSE Case to be updated:
Material changes to the facility, its organisation or mode of operation
Changes that affect the key assumptions used in the HEMP analysis
The review of HSE Case shall also be conducted to reflect:
14.3.1
Major modification to the facilities and operations
Findings from Other Risk Assessment
Findings from Assurance Exercise
Lesson Learnt.
Major Modification to the facilities and operations For any major change in process facilities (e.g. installation of new process equipment, pipeline tie-in, or change in operating conditions (composition, pressure, temperature, etc.)), a thorough review and update of the safety studies shall be conducted to evaluate the new hazards and risks e.g. new source of leak, potential impact due to fire/explosion from the new source of leak, dispersion of toxic gas, etc. In addition, in cases where there is change to the manning philosophy, the assumptions of the safety studies (e.g. QRA, EERA, ESSA, etc.) shall be reviewed in determining the actual risk exposure to personnel.
14.3.2
Findings from Other HSE Risk Assessments The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect findings from other HSE risk assessment exercise e.g. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), Facility/HSE-Critical Activity Risk Assessment, Fire and Gas Mapping, etc., as and when required to ensure the completeness of the control and/or recovery barriers identified in the safety studies.
14.3.3
Findings from Assurance Exercise The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect findings from HSE assurance exercise as and when required. The new recommendation and/or area for improvement with regards to HSE Case shall be incorporated in the revised HSE Case with view to minimize the risk to ALARP.
14.3.4
Lesson Learnt The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect lesson learnt from incident investigation as and when required. The new recommendation and/or area for improvement shall be incorporated in the revised HSE Case with view to minimize the risk to ALARP. Any discrepancy to the defective and/or missing barriers shall be re-assessed and to be replaced with an effective barrier.
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REFERENCES [1]
PTS 60.0303 Documenting a HSEMS and HSE Case, Rev. 1, June 2006
[2]
PTS 60.2210 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), Rev 1, June 2006
[3]
PTS 60.0401 Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP), Rev 2, October 2012
[4]
PTS 60.XXXX Draft Guideline for Bowtie
[5]
PTS 60.2004 Guideline for Hazard Identification (HAZID), Rev 2, 2011
[6]
PTS 60.1400.01, Guideline Health Risk Assessment, March 2012
[7]
PTS 60.3202, Environmental Aspects and Impacts Assessment Guide, Rev 0, June 2006
[8]
PTS 60.3206, Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment, Rev 2, September 2012
[9]
PETRONAS E&P Technical Standard for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), EP HSE SG 06 14 February 2014
[10] International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Health Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU), Issue 3.3 1 Dec 2010 [11] International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Health, Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Land Drilling Units, Issue 1.0.1, 27 July 2009 [12] Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore production installations – Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment, BS EN ISO 17776:2002 [13] L30 A Guide to the Offshore Installations (HSE Case) Regulations, 2005 [14] L111 A Guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations, 1999 [15] UKOOA Fire and Explosion Guidance, Issue 1, 2007 [16] P.U.(A) 39/96, Occupational Safety and Health (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulations 1996 [17] Hong Kong Planning Department, Chapter 12 Miscellaneous Planning Standards and Guidelines, http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/ch12/ch12_tex t.htm [18] EP OE MAN SCE Safety Critical Elements Manual, Rev 0, August 2013 [19] PETRONAS Carigali, Simultaneous Operations Guidelines, WW ALL O 05 001 Rev 1, 2013 [20] EG 1/04, Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Assessment, Department of Environment (Malaysia), 2004
Risk
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Appendix 1 Typical Statement of Fitness
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Major Accident Hazards Describe the Major Accident Hazards that have been identified for the facility. This should be referenced against the generic hazard list. For example: The Major Accident Hazards that have been identified for the facility are: H01.01 Crude Oil under Pressure – leading to fire/ explosion due to loss of containment of hydrocarbon H01.02 Hydrocarbons in formation – leading to blowout and fire / explosion following loss of containment of hydrocarbon H01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas – leading to fire / explosion due to loss of containment of hydrocarbon H06.03 Overhead Equipment – leading to dropped object and subsequent fire / explosion from loss of containment of hydrocarbon H07.02 Objects under compression – leading to platform structural failure / collapse H08.02 On Water Transport (boating) – leading to ship collision H08.03 In air transport (flying) – leading to helicopter accidents Technical HSE Assessment This section shall illustrate that an assessment has been carried out to identify the threats, their likelihood of occurrence, the possible consequences that may arise and the provision of suitable and sufficient barriers and controls as part of the HSE Case. Design Assessment – Describe the HSE studies that have been undertaken in relation to the facility. Detail the continued validity of these studies and any salient findings. Bowtie Analysis – Insert a paragraph related to the development of the Bowtie diagram and any identified shortfall in barriers or controls. SCEs – Insert a paragraph relating to the identification of SCEs and the assessment of their effectiveness Largest Risk Contributors – Insert a pie chart to show biggest risk contributor e.g. see pie chart below. 5.00%
1.00%
5.00% 10.00%
6.00%
15.00%
48.00% 10.00%
HC under pressure - HC in formation
HC under pressure - Risers and Pipelines
HC under pressure - Topsides piping and equipment
Dropped Object
Occupational
Helicopter Accidents
Platform Structural Failures
Ship Collision
Risk levels – Insert a table detailing the PLL and IRPA values for the facility and that they are within the PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria
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Barriers and Control Effectiveness A statement should be provided that describes how the effectiveness of the barriers was ascertained. In addition, it should describe the identification of the escalation factors and there controls in place that ensure the continued effectiveness of identified SCEs. The statement should make due reference to the performance standards being met and clear HSE Critical Roles and Responsibilities being identified. ALARP Management of Risks The key risk reduction measures identified and incorporated into the design should be described. In addition a summary of the ALARP demonstration should be provided.
Remedial Actions This section should summarise the remedial actions. Signatures As managers for the facility, we fully endorse the contents of this HSE Case. We are committed to ensure that the integrity of the facility is maintained and that operation described or referenced will be safe. We will address the shortfalls as documented in the Remedial Action Plan and aim to deliver continuous improvement in HSE Performance. We have concluded that the xxxx facilities are safe to operate and Major Hazards can be managed in accordance with the requirements set out in this HSE Case.
Title
Signature
Reviewed by
Regions Senior Manager, HSE
HSE Case Custodian
Head of Production or Offshore Installation Manager
Endorsed by
General Manager, HSE Division
Approved by
Asset Manager or Head of Operations
Regions
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Appendix 2 Typical Hazard Picture & Control Sheet
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HAZARD PICTURE HAZARD: Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside Equipment
HAZID REFERENCE: [H-01-03, H-01-05, H-01-06] BOW-TIE 01 Hydrocarbon under pressure in topside equipment
THREATS Overpressurisation of facilities / Equipment Underpressure Temperature (high and low) Deterioration of hoses (weather, mechanical, etc.) Corrosion (internal and external) Erosion (sand and debris management program) Breaking into the process (opening pressurized equipment, launchers, receivers or piping) Material deterioration / fatigue / equipment vibration, e.g. pulsation dampeners, structural mounting, etc Seal failure / degradation External Impact e.g. Swinging load Internal explosion
PREVENTIVE BARRIERS SI003 Heavy Lift Cranes & Mech Handling Equipment PC001 Pressure Vessel PC002 Heat Exchanger PC003 Rotating Equipment PC004 Tanks PC005 Piping System PC007 Relief System IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
IC008 Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components DS003 H2O in Condensate PS012 Sand Filters PS013 Chemical Injection System SD001 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) SD006 Process Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs) ER009 Process Control & Alarm
TOP EVENT Loss of Containment
CONTROL & MITIGATIVE BARRIERS IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation IC002 Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment IC005 Earth Bonding IC008 Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components SD001 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) SD002 Depressurisation System SD004 Operational Well Isolation SD005 Pipeline Isolation Valve SD006 Process Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES Explosion Jet fire Pool fire Smoke Hydrocarbon spill ESCALATED CONSEQUENCES Damage to critical structure/platform collapse Impairment of EER provisions Failure of riser and/or well flowline
PS001 Deluge System PS002 Fire & Explosion Protection PS003 Helideck Foam System PS004 Firewater Pump PS005 Firewater Ringmain PS007/8/9/11 Fire Protection Systems PS010 Power Management System SI001 Structures Subsea / Vessel / Hull / GBS / Foundation Structures SI002 Topside Structure
DETECTION DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
RECOVERY Escape Muster Evacuation by lifeboat/liferaft
EER MEASURES ER001 Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Area ER002 Escape and Evacuation Routes ER003 Emergency / Escape Lighting ER004 Communication System ER005 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) ER006 Helicopter Facilities ER007 Emergency Power) ER010 Open Haz./Non-Haz. Drains
LS001 Personal Survival Equipment (PSE) LS002 Rescue Facilities – Standby Vessel LS003 Lifeboats / TEMPSC LS004 Alternative Means of Escape
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas A HAZARD DESCRIPTION
The Yetagun Complex produces export gas and condensate. It comprises of three platforms, namely: • Yetagun “A” Wellhead Platform, a four leg, 20 slot drilling platform which was installed in March 1998; • Yetagun “B” Production Platform, an eight leg production, compression and living quarters platform which was installed in April 1999; and • Yetagun “C” Booster Compressor Platform, a 4 leg, separation and 3 train booster compression platform which was commissioned in April 2012. Well fluids from Yetagun A production flow line are choked to 37 barg before routed to the production header or the test header and then routed across the bridge to the Yetagun B platform for three phase separation. The gas is routed to the booster compression facility at Yetagun C where it is compressed to circa 70 barg and then it is routed to Yetagun B for water and hydrocarbon dew point suppression and then the sales gas compressors to 160barg and cooled to 63°C before export to shore. Condensate routed to the condensate stabilization unit at Yetagun B where the condensate needs to be stabilized to reduce the volatility of the condensate to 14.5 psia (1 bar) true vapor pressure at 100°F (9.7 RVP predicted) before being sent to the FSO. Releases of gas and condensate could potentially lead to fire and/or explosion causing injuries/fatalities, and severe asset damage. Uncontrolled hydrocarbon releases within the furnace can potentially cause fire/explosion of the furnace leading to similar scale of casualties and losses. In addition, condensate release can also have environmental effect though it is not as severe as crude oil releases due to the lighter components evaporating with less chance of prolonged environmental impact. Hazard locations: The primary locations likely to give rise to this top event are: Yetagun A Cellar deck – wellheads and production manifold/headers Main deck – gas pig launcher Yetagun B Cellar deck – production separator, condensate pumps and propane package Main deck – sales gas compressors Upper deck – separators, sales gas coolers & compressors and propane package Yetagun C Cellar deck – separator Main deck – sales gas booster compressors
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
B THREAT AND CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT Consequence:
Threats/Causes:
Overpressurisation of facilities / Equipment Underpressure Temperature (high and low) Deterioration of hoses (weather, mechanical, etc.) Corrosion (internal and external) Erosion (sand and debris management program) Breaking into the process (opening pressurized equipment, launchers, receivers or piping) Material deterioration / fatigue / equipment vibration, e.g. pulsation dampeners, structural mounting, etc Seal failure / degradation External Impact e.g. Swinging load Internal explosion
The threats leading to this events are controlled through the following Bow-Tie: Hydrocarbon Equipment
Under
Pressure in
Ignited release • • • • • •
Immediate ignition leading to jet fire Explosion or flash fire from delayed ignition of gas cloud Pool fire on the topsides or on sea-surface generating smoke Asphyxiation of personnel due to smoke Impairment of the escape and evacuation systems Damage to critical structural members
Unignited release • • •
Asphyxiation of personnel due to gas cloud Personnel injuries caused by escape and evacuation from incident site Environmental impact
These consequences from this Hazard are controlled through the following Bow-Tie: •
All Hazards (excl air transportation) – Consequence only
Topside
C THREAT AND CONSEQUENCE CONTROL This hazard is assessed in the following technical studies, which is explained in Section xxx of the HSE Case:
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA) Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
The summary for each of these studies is within Section xxx Formal Safety Assessment of the HSE Case and the recommendations/gaps for these studies are listed in the Remedial Action Plan.
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas Immediate Consequences
The technical studies show those jet fire and vapour cloud explosions are the main threats for Yetagun Complex from process topsides failure, with major accident consequences on people and asset. It is important to understand the following about jet fires:
Fatalities to personnel in the event of immediate ignition occur before personnel have the chance to make safety arrangements or escape from the affected area; and Detection and shutdown systems generally do not offer much protection to people for these types of events; the most effective way to reduce the risks to personnel is to prevent/stop the leak and minimize the ignition.
For Yetagun B topsides, the small, medium and large hydrocarbon releases from IP Separator, Gas / Glycol Exchanger, Cold Gas / Gas Exchanger, Refrigeration Vessel Package Skids (Propane Bullets), LP Compressors and Fuel Gas System on Upper Deck, Main Deck and Cellar Deck could result in jet fire scenario with initial flame length longer than the critical distances to the firewall separating the LQ and the process area. For HP Separators and Sales Gas Compressors, only medium and large releases could result in similar jet fire scenario. However, the length of the jet fire will decrease once isolation and blowdown starts and for large and medium release, the duration of the jet fire is very short to cause impingement to the nearest firewall. The explosion dimensioning accidental load (DAL) side on pressure for the Yetagun B process area is 0.15 barg for a fairly short duration of 121 milliseconds. The explosion DAL reflection overpressure is 0.21 barg and this pressure is applicable to the interior of the process area, such as the firewall. The explosion drag pressure for the modules is 0.08 barg and this pressure is applicable to smaller piping inside the area and for the larger piping and equipment the effect of both pressure and drag has to be combined. The main contributors to this explosion DAL overpressure are release from HP Separators, Gas Exchangers and the LP Compressors. The following list the critical SCEs for controlling immediate consequences: Barrier type Preventive
Detection Control and Mitigative Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Roles Process Containment (PC001, PC002, PC003, PC004, PC005, PC007) to minimize loss of containment through good technical integrity management, and Protection System (PS012, PS013) to protect against degradation Not effective for controlling immediate consequences Ignition Control (IC006, IC008) to minimize ignition probability Not effective for controlling immediate consequences
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H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
Escalation Likelihood and Control Upon occurrence of MAH, the management strategy for preventing escalation is to rely on effective detection method to be followed by activation of shutdown/isolation and blowdown. Barriers are put in place to prevents the following types of escalation consequences:
Impairment of muster shelter and evacuation provisions that allows safe escape and evacuation of personnel; and Escalation within the platform that pose a bigger consequence than the initial event.
The following list the critical SCEs for controlling escalation: Barrier type Preventive Detection Control and Mitigative
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
Roles Not effective for controlling escalation consequences Detection System (DS001) to provide quick alert to incident Shutdown System (SD001, SD002, SD004, SD005, SD006) for emergency shutdown and blowdown Protective System (PS001, PS002, PS003, PS004, PS005, PS007/8/8/11, PS010) to provide effective fire protection and fire fighting Emergency Response (ER001, ER002, ER003, ER004, ER005, ER006, ER007) to provide provisions for safe access to muster and evacuate via Life Saving (LS001, LS002, LS003, LS004)
D ALARP & RISK REDUCTION The demonstrate ALARP, the Operational HSE Case maps out the barriers effectiveness in controlling MAH during operations. Barrier Effectiveness In the SCE assessment done together with the operational personnel, the effectiveness level of the SCE was determined accounting for the current operational state of the barrier. From the Bow-Tie, the identified SCEs that do not have ‘Effective’ rating are summarized below:
THREAT
BARRIER
RATING
REMEDIAL ACTION
SI002 – Topsides Structures
Partially Effective
Confirm on the deck plate structural remaining strength is within the acceptable limits.
Discovery of pinhole corrosion on deck plate.
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DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
104
H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
SI003 - Heavy Lift Cranes & Mechanical Handling Equipment
Partially Effective
Provide limit switches to restrict crane travel preventing possible dropped object on live plant e.g. Production Cooler at Yetagun C.
Partially Effective
Expedite recruitment of experienced and competent Inspection Engineer or utilize 3rd party expertise for inspection and maintenance of pressure vessel and heat exchangers.
Partially Effective
Expedite recruitment of experienced and competent Inspection Engineer or utilize 3rd party expertise for inspection and maintenance of pressure vessel and heat exchangers.
Partially Effective
Confirm CBM monitoring program complies with CIMG requirement for all rotating equipment.
Partially Effective
Identify a mechanism for ascertaining the internal condition of the diesel / water storage legs and establish the min. acceptable wall thickness
Partially Effective
Identify an inspection plan to cover pipework hot spot locations that are susceptible to corrosion.
To maintain suitable integrity so that loads, or any lifting components, does not fail in a manner that could cause or contribute to a major accident. PC001 - Pressure Vessel To maintain integrity of the pressure containment system.
PC002 - Heat Exchangers To maintain integrity of the pressure containment system.
PC003 - Rotating Equipment To maintain leak tight integrity. To ensure no catastrophic failure of component parts that could result in a major accident. PC004 – Tanks To maintain leak tight integrity.
PC005 – Piping System To maintain the integrity of pipework.
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
Hazard Control Sheet
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
105
H-01 Hydrocarbons
TOP EVENT
P
E
A
R
H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure
Loss of Containment – Topsides
C5
C5
C5
C5
H-01.05 LPGs H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas PS001 - Deluge Systems
To mitigate the consequence of fire & explosion. PS004 - Firewater pumps To provide fire water on demand to extinguish or limit the spread & effects of a fire. PS005 - Firewater Ring main & Other Distribution Systems
Partially Effective
Confirm maintenance & inspection requirements for FRP piping.
Partially Effective
Ensure the auto start on firewater pump P-1301 A is rectified to provide designed level of reliability.
Partially Effective
Carry out hydraulic analysis on FW ringmain to prevent the observed vibration with P-1302 in operation
Partially Effective
Confirm the required frequency for PAGA system PMR.
Partially Effective
Confirm the UPS system to deliver emergency power meets the designed performance requirements.
Partially Effective
Carry out overdue recertification of Yetagun A lifeboats
To distribute sufficient fire water to all fire water systems. ER004 - Communication Systems To ensure that all personnel on board or at site at any location are made aware of any need for mustering or abandonment once the decision has been made. To ensure that the communication systems & information required for emergency response control, plant evacuation, & with all external parties identified in the emergency plan, are available. ER005 - Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) To provide uninterruptable power supply to the vital services during a major incident when normal power fails. LS003 - Lifeboats / TEMPSC To facilitate a secondary means of evacuation of personnel, independent of external resources, when the primary means is unavailable.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 3 Generic Hazard List
106
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REVISION 1.0
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
01
Hydrocarbons
01.01
Crude Oil under pressure
Flowlines, pipelines, pressure vessels and piping
01.02
Hydrocarbons in formation
Oil wells especially during well drilling and entry / workover operations
01.03
LPGs (e.g. Propane)
Process fractionating equipment, storage tanks
01.04
LNGs
Cryogenic plants, tankers
01.05
Condensate, NGL
Gas wells, gas pipelines, gas separation vessels
01.06
Hydrocarbon gas
Oil/ gas separators, gas processing plants, compressors, gas pipelines
01.07
Crude Oil at low pressure
Oil storage tanks
01.08
Wax
Filter separators, well tubular, pipelines
01.09
Coal
Fuel source, mining activities
02
Refined Hydrocarbons
02.01
Lube and seal oil
Engines and rotating equipment
02.02
Hydraulic Oil
Hydraulic pistons, hydraulic reservoirs and pumps
02.03
Diesel fuel
Engines, storage
02.04
Petroleum spirit / Gasoline
Storage
03
Other Flammable Hazards
03.01
Cellulosic materials
Packing materials, wood planks, paper rubbish
03.02
Pyrophoric materials
Metal scale from vessels in sour service, scale on filters in sour service, iron sponge sweetening units
04
Explosives
04.01
Detonators
Seismic operations, pipeline construction
04.02
Conventional explosives
Seismic operations, pipeline construction, platform decommissioning
04.03
Perforating gun charges
Well completion activities associated with drilling rigs and workover operations
05
Pressure Hazards
05.01
Bottled pressure
gases
Sources
under
Welding and metal cutting, laboratory gas sources
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
Sources
05.02
Water under pressure
Water disposal, water floods and injection operations, strength testing of pipeworks, well fracturing and treatments
05.03
Non-hydrocarbon gas under pressure in pipeworks
Purging and leak testing of facilities
05.04
Air under high pressure
Seismic air guns and related piping
05.05
Hyperbaric (diving)
Undersea operations
05.06
Decompression (diving)
05.07
Oil and Hydrocarbon under pressure
06
Hazards associated with differences in height
06.01
Personnel at height >2m
Work involving scaffolding, suspended access, ladders, platforms, excavations, towers, stacks, roofing, working overboard, working on monkey board
06.02
Personnel at height <2m
Slippery/ uneven surfaces, climbing / descending stairs, obstructions, loose gratings
06.03
Overhead equipment
Objects falling while being lifted/ handled or working at a height over people, equipment or process systems, elevated work platforms, slung loads
06.04
Personnel under water
Objects falling onto divers from overhead operations
07
Objects under induced stress
07.01
Objects under tension
Guy and support cables, anchor chains, tow and barge tie-off ropes, slings
07.02
Objects under compression
Spring loaded devices, such as relief valves and actuators, and hydraulically operated devices
08
Dynamic situation hazards
08.01
On water transport (boating)
Boat transport to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products, marine seismic operations, barges moving drilling rigs and workover rigs
08.02
In air transport (flying)
Helicopter and fixed wing travel to and from locations and camps, transporting materials, supplies and products
operations
Undersea operations gas
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REVISION 1.0
Hazard Number
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DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
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Hazard Description
Sources
08.03
Boat collision hazard to other vessels and offshore structures
Shipping lane traffic, product transport vessels, supply and maintenance barges and boats, drifting boats
08.04
Equipment with rotating parts
Engines, motors, compressors, stems, thrusters on DP ships
08.05
Use of hazardous hand tools (grinding, sawing)
Workshop, construction sites, maintenance sites, rotating equipment
08.06
Use of knives, machetes and other sharp objects
Galley, seismic line clearing, grubbing operations
08.07
Transfer from offshore platform
Basket transfer, rope transfer
09
Physical Environment Hazards
09.01
Weather
Winds, temperature extremes, rain, etc.,
09.02
Sea state / river currents
Waves, tides or other sea states
09.03
Tectonic activity
Earthquakes or other earth movement activity
10
Hot surfaces
10.01
Process piping equipment 60 – 150°C
and
Oil well piping, piping in fractionation systems, glycol regeneration
10.02
Process piping equipment over 150°C
and
Hot oil piping, piping associated with stills and reboilers
10.03
Engine and turbine exhaust systems
Power generation, gas compression, refrigeration compression, engine driven equipment such as forklifts
10.04
Steam piping
Sulphur plants, power boilers, waste heat recovery systems, heat tracing and jackets
11
Hot fluids
11.01
Temperatures between 100 and 150°C
Glycol regeneration, low quality steam systems, cooling oils, galley
11.02
Temperatures greater than 150°C
Power boilers, steam generators, sulphur plants, waste heat recovery units, hot oil heating systems, regeneration gases used with catalysts and desiccants
12
Cold surfaces
12.01
Process piping between -25 °C and -80°C
Cold ambient climate, Joule-Thomson expansions (process and leaks), propane refrigeration systems, LPG gas plants
12.02
Process piping less than 80°C
Cryogenic plants, LNG plants, LNG storage vessels including tankers, vapour lines off liquid nitrogen storage
moving /
boat
to
drill
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
13
Cold Fluids
13.01
Oceans, <10°C
14
Open Flame
14.01
Heaters with fire tube
Glycol reboilers, amine reboilers, salt bath heaters, water bath heaters (line heaters)
14.02
Direct fire furnaces
Hot oil furnace, Claus plant reaction furnace, catalyst and desiccant regeneration gas heaters, incinerators, power boilers
14.03
Flares
Pressure relief and blowdown systems
15
Electricity
15.01
Voltage > 50V to 440 V in cables
Power cables, temporary electrical lines on construction sites
15.02
Voltage > 50 V to 440 V in equipment
Electric motors, electric switchgear, power generation, welding machines, transformer secondary
15.03
Voltage > 440 V
Power lines, power generation, transformer primary, large electrical motors
15.04
Lightning discharge
Major lightning prone areas
15.05
Electrostatic energy
Non-metallic storage vessels and piping, product transfer hoses, wiping rags, unearthed equipment, aluminium / steel, high velocity gas discharges
16
Electromagnetic Radiation
16.01
Ultraviolet radiation
Arc welding, sunshine
16.02
Infrared radiation
Flares
16.03
Microwaves
Galley
16.04
Lasers
Instrumentation, surveying
16.05
E/M radiation: High voltage AC cables
Transformers, power cables
17
Ionizing Radiation – Open Source
17.01
Alpha, Beta – open source
Well logging, radiography, densitometers, interface instruments
17.02
Gamma rays – open source
Well logging, radiography
17.03
Neutron – open source
Well logging
seas
and
Sources
lakes
Northern and Southern oceans and lakes
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DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
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Hazard Description
Sources
17.04
Naturally occurring ionising radiation
Scales in tubulars, vessels and process plant fluids (especially in C3 reflux streams)
18
Ionizing Radiation – Closed Source
18.01
Alpha, Beta – closed source
Well logging, radiography, densitometers, interface instruments
18.02
Gamma rays – closed source
Well logging, radiography
18.03
Neutron – closed source
Well logging
19
Asphyxiates
19.01
Insufficient atmospheres
19.02
Excessive CO2
Areas with CO2 fire fighting systems such as turbine enclosures
19.03
Drowning
Working overboard, marine operations, water transport
19.04
Excessive N2
N2 purged vessels
19.05
Halon
Areas with halon fire fighting systems such as turbine enclosures and electrical switchgear and battery rooms
19.06
Smoke
Welding / burning operations, fires
20
Toxic gases
20.01
H2S, Sour Gas
Sour gas production, bacterial activity in stagnant water, confined spaces in sour operations
20.02
Exhaust fumes
Enclosed spaces
20.03
SO2
Component of H2S flare and incinerator flue gas
20.04
Benzene
Component of crude oil, concentrated in glycol vent emissions and Wemco units
20.05
Chlorine
Water treatment facilities
20.06
Welding Fumes
Construction and metal fabrication / repair, welding toxic metals (galvanised steel, cadmium coated steel), metal cutting, grinding
20.07
Tobacco smoke
Accommodation, office buildings, boats, aircraft
20.08
CFCs
Air Conditioning, refrigeration, aerosol sprays
Oxygen
Confined spaces, tanks
seismic
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
21
Toxic Liquid
21.01
Mercury
Electrical switches, gas filters
21.02
PCBs
Transformer cooling oils
21.03
Biocides (gluteraldehyde)
Water treatment systems
21.04
Methanol
Gas drying and hydrate control
21.05
Brines
Hydrocarbon production, well kill fluid, packer fluids
21.06
Glycols
Gas drying and hydrate control
21.07
Degreasers (terpenes)
Maintenance shops
21.08
Isocyanates
Two-pack paint systems
21.09
Sulphanol
Gas sweetening
21.10
Amines
Gas sweetening
21.11
Corrosion Inhibitors
Additive to pipelines and oil/gas wells, chromates, phosphates
21.12
Scale inhibitors
Cooling and injection water additive
21.13
Liquid Mud Additives
Drilling fluid additive
21.14
Odorant (mercaptans)
Custody transfer facilities for gas, LPG and LNG
21.15
Alcoholic beverages
21.16
Non-prescribed drugs
21.17
Used engine oils (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons)
Used engine oils
21.18
Carbon tetrachloride
Plant laboratory
21.19
Grey and / or black water
Septic systems, camps, detergents
22
Toxic Solid
22.01
Asbestos
Thermal insulation and construction materials, old roofing (encountered during removal)
22.02
Manmade mineral fibre
Thermal material
22.03
Cement dust
Oil well and gas well cementing, civil construction
22.04
Sodium hypochlorite
Drilling fluid additive
22.05
Powdered mud additives
Drilling fluid additive
22.06
Sulphur dust
Sulphur recovery plants
22.07
Pig trash
Pipeline cleaning operations
additives
Sources
insulation
and
construction
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
Sources
22.08
Oil based muds
Oil and gas well drilling
22.09
Pseudo oil based muds
Oil and gas well drilling
22.10
Water based muds
Oil and gas well drilling
22.11
Cement slurries
Oil and gas construction
22.12
Dusts
Grit blasting, (dumping, drumming)
22.13
Cadmium compounds other heavy metals
22.14
Oil based sludges
23
Corrosive Substances
23.01
Hydrofluoric acid
Well stimulation
23.02
Hydrochloric acid
Well stimulation
23.03
Sulphuric acid
Wet batteries, regenerant for reverse osmosis water makers
23.04
Caustic soda
Drilling fluid additive
24
Biological Hazards
24.01
Food borne bacteria (e.g. E Coli)
Contaminated food
24.02
Water borne bacteria (e.g. Legionella)
Cooling systems
24.03
Parasitic insects (pin worms, bed bugs, lice, fleas)
Improperly cleaned food, hands, clothing, living sites (pin worms, bed bugs, lice, fleas)
24.04
Cold and flu virus
Other people
24.05
Human Immune deficiency Virus (HIV)
Contaminated blood, blood products and other body fluids
24.06
Other diseases
Other people
25
Ergonomic Hazards
25.01
Manual materials handling
Pipe handling on drill floor, sack handling in sack store, manoeuvring equipment in awkward locations
25.02
Damaging noise
Release from control valves
25.03
Loud, dB(A)
steady
and
drilling,
plant
sand blasting, catalyst screening, removal,
Welding fumes, handling coated bolts Oil storage tank cleaning
communicable
noises
well
>85
systems,
relief
domestic
valves,
water
pressure
Engine rooms, compressor rooms, drilling brake, air tools
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
Hazard Number
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Hazard Description
Sources
25.04
Heat stress (high ambient temperatures)
Near flare, on the monkey board under certain conditions, in open exposed areas in certain regions of the world during summer
25.05
Cold stress (low temperatures)
Open areas in winter in cold climates, refrigerated storage areas
25.06
High humidity
Climates where sweat evaporation rates are too low to cool the human body, personal protective clothing
25.07
Vibration
Hand tool vibration, maintenance and construction worker, boating
25.08
Work stations
Poorly designed office furniture poorly laid out workstations
25.09
Lighting
Work areas requiring intense light, glare, lack of contrast, insufficient light
25.10
Incompatible hand controls
Controls poorly positioned in workplace requiring workers to exert excessive force, lacking proper labels, handoperated control valves, for example in driller house, heavy machinery, control rooms
25.11
Awkward location of workplaces and machinery
Machinery difficult to maintain regularly due to their awkward positioning, for example, valves in an unusually high or low position
25.12
Mismatch of work to physical abilities
Requiring older workers to maintain a high level of physical activity over the course of an 8/12 hour day, heavy construction work performed by slight individuals
25.13
Mismatch of work cognitive abilities
to
Requiring individuals to monitor a process without trying to reduce their boredom by giving them a higher task load, asking a worker to supervise something he/ she is not qualified to do
25.14
Long and irregular working hours / shifts
Offshore locations utilising long shift cycles, overtime, night shifts, rollover shifts
25.15
Poor organisation and job design
Ambiguity of job requirements, unclear reporting relationships, over/under supervision, poor operator / contractor interfaces
25.16
Work planning issues
Work overload, unrealistic targets, lack of clear planning, poor communications
ambient
and
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Hazard Number
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
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Hazard Description
Sources
25.17
Indoor climate (too hot / cold / dry / humid, draughty)
Uncomfortable climate for permanently manned areas
26
Psychological Hazards
26.01
Living on the job /away from family
Homesickness, missing family and social events, unable to be involved in community, feeling of isolation and missing part of life.
26.02
Working and living on live plant
Awareness that mistakes can be catastrophic, vulnerable to the mistakes of others, responsible for the safety of others. Awareness of difficulty of escape in an emergency. Awareness of risks in helicopter travel, adverse weather
26.03
Post traumatic stress
Serious incidents, injuries to self and others
26.04
Fatigue
Physically demanding or arduous work, long or excessive working hours
26.05
Shift work
Construction, operations or drilling activities involving 24 hour working, saturation diving operations, changing rest and sleep patterns associated with activities
26.06
Peer pressure
Pressure from others at the work location to behave in a manner which may affect well-being of the individual
27
Security Related Hazards
27.01
Piracy
27.02
Assault
27.03
Sabotage
27.04
Crisis (military action, civil disturbances, terrorism)
27.05
Theft, pilferage
28
Use of natural resources
28.01
Water
Cooling water
28.03
Air
Turbines, combustion engines (pump and compressor drivers)
29
Medical
29.01
Medical unfitness
Medically unfit staff for the task
29.02
Motion sickness
Crew change operations
on
water,
marine
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Hazard Number
Hazard Description
30
Noise
30.01
High level noise
Plant areas e.g. turbines, compressors, generators, pumps, blowdown, etc.
30.02
Intrusive noise
Intrusive noise in sleeping areas, offices and recreational areas
31
Entrapment
31.01
Fire / explosion
Blockage of routes to muster location or contamination of muster area
31.02
Mechanical damage
Objects blocking access / escape routes
31.03
Diving
Snagging of lines / umbilicals
Sources
Considered to be a Major Hazard under ISO 17776. However, this may not constitute a Major Accident Hazard that is the focus of the HSE Case, e.g. falls from height, electrical voltage etc., are considered to be health hazards and shall be the subject of a separate health risk assessment.
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Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 4 Typical Hazards and Effects Register
117
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RISK RANKING ACCORDING TO RAM
Ref No.
L
Hazard Description
Source
Threats
Top Event
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
Consequence P
A
E
R
R
Barriers (HSE Controls)
Barrier Effectiveness
Remedial Action to achieve ALARP
Risk
H-01 Hydrocarbons (Unrefined)
H01.01
H01.05
H01.06
Crude under Pressure
Oil
Condensate, NGL
Hydrocarbon Gas
Flowlines Pipelines Pressure Vessels Piping
Pressure, Vacuum Corrosion Erosion Temperature Material Fatigue Seal failure Overfilling Environmental Loads jack ups / rigs / lift barges etc adjacent to the platform Structural support apparatus failure External impact / boat collision
Pressure Vessels Piping
Corrosion Erosion Overpressure Temperature Fatigue Seal / Connection failure Maintenance External Impact
Pipelines Pressure Vessels Piping
Corrosion Erosion Overpressure Vacuum Temperature Fatigue Maintenance Seal & Connection failure External Impact
Loss of Containment
Fire Explosion Injury / fatality Severe environmenta l impact Structural loss / damage
C
5
C
5
C
5
C
5
Facility Case
HSE
M H
Loss of Containment
Fire Explosion Environmenta l impact Injury Structural loss / damage Loss of stability
C
5
C
5
C
1
C
4
Facility Case
HSE
M H
Loss of Containment
Fire Explosion Environmenta l impact Injury Structural loss / damage Loss of stability
C
5
C
5
C
1
C
4
Facility Case
HSE
M H
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
119
RISK RANKING ACCORDING TO RAM
Ref No.
Hazard Description
L Source
Threats
Top Event
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
R
L
C
Consequence P
A
E
R
R
Barriers (HSE Controls)
H-02 Hydrocarbons (Refined)
H02.01
H02.04
Lube and Seal Oil
Diesel fuel
Engines and rotating equipme nt (gas compress or, pumps, etc)
Mishandling Inadequate packaging / container Maintenance Corrosion Gaskets / joints mechanical failure Tank leak Human error
Diesel Storage Engines (EDG, FW Pump)
Mishandling External impact Corrosion Erosion Gasket / mechanical failure Faulty equipment Maintenance Level control failure
Spill
Irritation to skin / eyes Irritation to respiratory tract Fire
D
1
D
1
D
1
D
1
Health Risk Assessment
Loss of Containment
Fire Irritation to skin / eyes Irritation to respiratory tract Chronic health effect Environmenta l impact
D
1
D
1
D
1
D
1
Health Risk Assessment
Barrier Effectiveness
Risk
Remedial Action to achieve ALARP
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 5 Example Bowtie Analysis
120
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
121
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
122
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
123
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 6 Example list of Safety Critical Elements
124
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
125
PS Code
Safety Critical Elements
Present on Facility
DS001
Fire and Gas Detection
√
DS002
Security Systems
NA
DS003
Water in Condensate / Gas (Dewpoint) Measurement
NA
ER001
Temporary Areas
√
ER002
Escape and Evacuation Routes
√
ER003
Emergency / Escape Lighting
√
√
ER004
Communication Systems
√
√
ER005
Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)
√
SCE Group
Consequence
H01.02 Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon in Formation (Platform wells)
H01.01a Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside equipment H01.01b Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Pipelines and Risers
H08.03 Loss of Control – Marine Collision / Impact
H07.02 Object Under Compression – Topside, Jacket and Substructure
MAH Bowties
√ Detection Systems
√ √ √
Emergenc y Response
Refuge
/
Primary
Muster
References e.g. Operating Manual
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
126
Safety Critical Elements
Present on Facility
ER006
Helicopter Facilities
√
ER007
Emergency Power
NA
ER008
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment
NA
ER009
Process Controls and Alarms
NA
√
ER010
Open Hazardous Drains System
√
√
ER011
Open Non-Hazardous Drains System
√
IC001
Hazardous Area Ventilation
NA
IC002
Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation
√
IC003
Certified Electrical Equipment
√
SCE Group
PS Code
Consequence
H01.02 Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon in Formation (Platform wells)
H01.01a Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside equipment H01.01b Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Pipelines and Risers
H08.03 Loss of Control – Marine Collision / Impact
H07.02 Object Under Compression – Topside, Jacket and Substructure
MAH Bowties
√
√ √
Ignition Control
References e.g. Operating Manual
Consequence
REVISION 1.0
H01.02 Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon in Formation (Platform wells)
H01.01a Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside equipment H01.01b Loss of Containment – Hydrocarbon under pressure in Pipelines and Risers
H08.03 Loss of Control – Marine Collision / Impact
H07.02 Object Under Compression – Topside, Jacket and Substructure
Exploration and Production TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12 DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
SCE Group PS Code
IC004
127
MAH Bowties
Safety Critical Elements Present on Facility
Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System NA
References e.g. Operating Manual
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 7 Example Manual Of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
128
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
129
LEGEND A Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW P Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval N Activity not permitted in these circumstances NA Not applicable
Containment Integrity compromised (known leaks such that gas tight walls / floor fails to meet
Containment Integrity compromised (known leaks in tanker loading system) - FPSO offtake unit
Containment integrity Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable
Observed or detected defect in the well intervention / Well control equipment e.g. Rams, load
Ventilation impaired - loss of gas detection and end element (dampers / fan(s)) resulting in
Hazardous Area Ventilation unavailable - (fans / dampers / detectors etc not working)
HVAC Shutdown - loss of gas detection and end element resulting in impaired functionality e.g. 2ooN in
HVAC Shutdown - unavailable (dampers / detectors etc not working)
Certified Electrical Equipment fails to meet the PS requirement resulting in increased risk of ignition
Cargo tanks inert gas system unavailable resulting in increased risk of ignition
Earth Grounding and Bonding fails to meet PS requirements resulting in increased risk of ignition
Inability to provide fuel gas purge flow to the flare header resulting in air ingress to the flare
Inability to provide the required gas blanket flow to individual equipment resulting in increased risk
Total loss of gas blanket system resulting in increased risk of ignition
Loss of Gas (Toxic) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting
Total loss of F&G Detection system
Loss of access control to facilities
Deluge system - Local (area) unavailabilty
Observed or detected defect in the blast wall resulting in increased risk of failure in the event of an MAH.
Helideck FW/Foam supply unavailble
FW Supply - Loss of redundancy (
FW Supply unavailable - all pumps not available, loss of FW tank, caisson etc
FW Delivery - local unavailability of the FW distribution main
Passive Fire Protection - locally unavailable - (damaged, removed, etc)
Loss or unavailability of Gaseous Fire Suppression System
Fine Water Spray system - local unavailability
Loss of sprinkler system - local unavailability
Total loss of sprinkler system
Loss of Power Management System leading to increased risk of loss of main power supply
Loss of sand filters leading to increased erosion rates
Inability to provide the required chemical injection flow leading to increased corrosion rate
Navigational Aids unavailable
Collision Avoidance System unavailable
PC009 Fired Heaters
PC010 Gas Tight Floor / Walls
Tanker Loading Systems PC011 Floating Production Storage Offtake (FPSO) unit
Helicopter Refueling Equipment
Well Intervention / Well Control Equipment
IGNITION CONTROL
IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
IC007 Inert Gas Blanket System
IC007 Inert Gas Blanket System
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
DS002 Security Systems
PS001 Deluge Systems
Explosion protection including PS002 blast barriers and venting provisions
PS003 Helideck Fire Fighting Systems
Gaseous Fire Suppression System
PS004
PS004
PS005
PS006
PS007
PS008 Fine Water Spray systems
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
PS010 Power Management System
PS011
PS012 Sand Filters
PS013 Chemical Injection Systems
PS014 Navigational Aids
PS015 Collision Avoidance System
METOCEAN Data Gathering System
IC008
IC009 Flare Tip ignition System
Passive Fire Protection (incl. doors, walls and penetrations)
IC002
IC005 Earth Bonding
Fire Water Ring Main and Other distribution system
IC002
IC004 Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System
Fire Water Pumps (inc. Caissons, Tank and support)
IC
IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment
Fire Water Pumps (inc. Caissons, Tank and support)
PC013
IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation
Non Hazardous Area Ventilation
PC012
IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation
Non Hazardous Area Ventilation
PC009
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N A A P N A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N A A A A A NA A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N N A P N P N N N N N A N A N P A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
N N A P N P N N N N N A N A N P A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
N P A A N P N N N A N A P A A N A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
N A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P
N P A A N P N N N A N A P A A N A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
N P A N N P N P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P P A A
N P A A N P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
N N A A N P N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
N P A A N P A A P A A A P A A A A A P A N A P A A A A A P P
P P A A N P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A P N P N P P A P A P A A A A P P A P A A P P P P A P P
N N A P N N N N N A P A P A A A A N P A P A A P P P P A P P
N P A P N P N P P A P A P A A A A P P A P A A P P P P A P P
N N A P N N N N N A P A P A A A A N P A P A A P P P P A P P
P A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A N A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A A A
N N P N N N N N N P P A N A N N P A A A N A N A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A P P P P P N N P A A A A P A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A P P P P P P P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
P P N P P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N -
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N P N N -
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N P N N -
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N P N N -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P N A N N A N A N A A A A A P A A A P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
N A N A A N P N A N N A A N N A N N N N N N N N P N A A A N N N N N N P -
N A N A A N P N A N N A A N N A N N N N N N N N P N A A A N N N N N N P -
N A A A P A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N A N A A A N A A N P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P P A N A A A A A A A A A P P A -
N A A A P A A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N A N A A A N A A N P N A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N P P P P N P P N A A A A A N A A N P N A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A N A A A A A N A A N P P A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A N P A N A A A A A N A A N P N A -
P A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A P P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A A P N A -
P A A A P P P P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
N A A A P N N P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
P A A A P P P P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
N A A A P N N P P P P A A P P P N N N N P P P N A P A A A P A A P P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P A N A A A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P P A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
N A A A P N N A A A A A A A A A N N N N P A A N A P A A A A A A A P N A -
A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A N N N N A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A P N A -
P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A P A A A A A A A N P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N N -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A -
P A P A A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A P P P P -
P P P N N
P P P P N
A A A A N
P P P NA N
P P N N N
P P P P N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
A A A A N
P P A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N A N
A A A A N
A A N A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N N N
A A A A N
A A N P N
NOTES
PS016
PROTECTION SYSTEMS PS
Fixed Process Area Foam System
Water in condensate / Gas (dewpoint) measurement DS003
DETECTION SYSTEMS (FIELD) DS
Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components
Fired Heaters (Burner Management System)
PROCESS CONTAINMENT PC
Bilge, Ballast and Cargo Management Systems
METOCEAN Data Gathering System unavailable
Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks, reduced furnace tube wall thickness beyond
PC008 Operational Well Containment
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Process Area FW/Foam supply unavailable
Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks in completion string, casing / liner,
PC007 Relief System
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Loss of Water in condensate / Gas dew point measurement resulting in increased corrosion rate, increased risk of hydrate formation causing SCE FAILURE MODE
Unavailability of Relief at design flow rateresulting in increased risk of MAH due to overpressure
PC003 Process Containment
N P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
Rotating Equipment Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks, seal failure, etc.,)
PC001/6 Process Containment
N P A P N N N N N A A A N NA A P A N P A A A A A A A N N P P
Loss of primary and secondary flare ignition systems resulting in flare out
Pig Launcher / Receiver Containment Integrity - Compromised (pressure gauge / transmitter faulty or
PC001-6 Process Containment
N P A P N P N N N N N N N A N N N P N A N A P N N N N N P P
Observed or detected defect in the ignition control equipment e.g. Flame / Spark Arrestor element damaged, plugged, or missing, hot
Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable
SI007 Drilling Systems
N P A P N P N N N N N N N A N N N P N A N A P N N N N N P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Observed or detected defect to drilling systems structural integrity e.g. derrick, heave compensation
SI006 Mooring Systems
N P A P N P N N N N N N N A N N N P N A N A P N N N N N P P
Observed or detected defect or Unavailability of the BMS / IPS resulting in increased risk of
Observed or detected defect in the mooring system (e.g. anchor handling system failure) resulting in
SI004
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Observed or detected stuctural / mechanical defect resulting in increased risk of MAH due to Heavy Lift Cranes and SI003 Mechanical Handling Equipment
P P A A P P P P P N P N P P N N N P P A P A P P P P P P P P
Loss of bilge / ballast control leading to impaired vessel stability and increased risk of MAH
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH, e.g. pipe / vessel supports,
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P NA P P P P P P P P
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH
A A A A A A A A A N N A P P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
Structures subsea / Vessel hull / GBS / Foundation Structures
SI002 Topside Structure
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A14 Bunkering (potable water) A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) B4 Radiography work B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B8 Coldwork B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) B12 Diving operations in close proximity B13 ROV B14 Choke Valve bean up or down B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) B26 Hook up and commissioning B27 Manned presence on NUI B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Working at Heights B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval B36 Local Venting B37 Black Start Up B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Extended stay over night C3 Night Helicopter Operations C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc)
P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SI
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
SI001
HSE CASE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
Loss of F&G (fire and flammable gas) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in nonvoting system Loss of F&G detection - fusible plug loop unavailable leading to loss of fire detction in specific area
SAFETY CRITCAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
130
Total loss of HIPPS system
Loss of well isolation - inability to isolate steam / water / gas / WAG injection well or annulus resulting in
Loss of operational well isolation SCSSV, SSV not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly
SDV (Riser) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing
SSIV - not meeting performance standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
Loss of Drilling Well Control - loss of BOP, insufficient mud weight, loss of mud pump, incorrect mud weight
Local or partial loss of Utility / Instrument Air
Total loss of Utility / Instrument Air
SCE FAILURE MODE
Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Area - unavailable / compromised (structural damage, muster areas not clear etc)
Alternate Muster Points unavailable / compromised (structural damage, muster areas not clear, etc)
Escape route - locally unavailable
Evacuation route - unavailable
Emergency lighting - locally unavailable
PAGA system - Loss of redundancy (one of the systems not available)
PAGA system - unavailable
VHF Channels - unavailable
Shore Communications - unavailable
Marine Radio - unavailable
UPS - Loss of redundancy - (one of the 2x100% systems not available)
UPS - Unavailable - Inability to provide emergency power supply to essential systems
Helicopter facilities observed or detected damage / defective or unavailable markings, lighting, nets, etc.
Emergency Power Supply - Loss of redundancy (
Emergency Power Supply unavailable - all generators not available, loss of distribution etc
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment Hose reels / monitors / portable extinguishers locally unavailable
Individual Process SIF unavailable e.g. low low level trip, etc
Audio Visual Alarms - unavailable
Basic Process Control system (BPCS) unavailable
Life Buoys below minimum level or damaged
Insufficient number or inadequate type of Chemical PPE available
Safety Shower / eyewash stations not available or inoperable
TEMPSC - unavailable - (all units not available)
Alternate Means of Escape - locally unavailable - liferafts / Scramble nets / Ladders / knotted ropes /
Temporary Refuge (TR) / ER001 Primary Muster Areas
ER002 Escape Routes
ER003 Emergency / Escape Lighting
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
Helicopter facilities (inc. ER006 markings, nets, obstacle marking / lighting etc)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER010
ER010
ER010
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
Personal Survival Equipment LS001 (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER010
ER011 Oil Spill Response
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER008
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER007
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER007
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
LIFE SAVING
ER004
ER005 Uninterruptable Power Supply
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment
ER004
ER005 Uninterruptable Power Supply
Emergency Power (inc generation and distribution)
ER004
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Emergency Power (inc generation and distribution)
ER004
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
ER001
ER002 Escape Routes
Internal, External and Emergency Communication
ER
LS001
LS001
Rescue Facilities (Medical / LS002 first aid facilities)
Rescue Facilities (in. Standby Standby vessel (inc crew boat) LS002 Vessel / Man Overboard boat / unavailable - (not present or Fast Rescue Craft) response time too slow)
TEMPSC - loss of redundancy - (one boat not available in a 2x100% or 3x50% configuration)
SD009 Utility Air
Temporary Refuge (TR) / Primary Muster Areas
SD008
SD009 Utility Air
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Open Drain System - Totally and Non-hazardous) Unavailable
Life Jackets below minimum level or damaged (e.g. light not working etc)
Drilling Well Control Equipment
SD006
SD007 Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV)
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Open Drain System - locally and Non-hazardous) unavailable
Portable BA sets below minimum level (SCBA and Rescue Sets)
SD005 Pipeline Isolation Valves
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Closed Drain System - Unavailable and Non-hazardous)
Portable BA sets / Smoke Hoods below minimum level or faulty (escape sets)
SD004 Operational Well Isolation
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Closed Drain system - locally and Non-hazardous) unavailable
Personal H2S monitors below minimum level or faulty
SD004 Operational Well Isolation
Tank bunding observed or detected Bunding and Drains (Hazardous ER010 defect resulting in loss or impaired and Non-hazardous) secondary containment
SCE FAILURE MODE
High Integrity Pressure Protection System SD003
LS003 TEMPSC / Lifeboats
LS003 TEMPSC / Lifeboats
Alternate Means of Escape LS004 (Liferafts, scramble nets and ladders to sea)
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A A A P N
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LEGEND A Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW P Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval N Activity not permitted in these circumstances NA Not applicable
Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
Medical Response cannot be met e.g. on-site burns treatment facilities insufficent or unavailable
HIPPS system not meeting the performance standard (loss of redundancy in SDV, Pressure Transmitters, etc) High Integrity Pressure Protection System SD003
N P A P N P P P P P P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A A
Spill Containment (e.g. booms) unavailable
Total loss of the EDP system Emergency Depressurisation System (Blowdown) SD002
N N A N N N N N N N N A N A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
LS
Local or partial loss of the EDP (Topsides / onshore) system not meeting the performance standards Emergency Depressurisation SD002 System (Blowdown)
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A14 Bunkering (potable water) A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) B4 Radiography work B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B8 Coldwork B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) B12 Diving operations in close proximity B13 ROV B14 Choke Valve bean up or down B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) B26 Hook up and commissioning B27 Manned presence on NUI B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Working at Heights B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval B36 Local Venting B37 Black Start Up B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Extended stay over night C3 Night Helicopter Operations C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc)
Aviation VHF radio - unavailable
Total loss of ESD system Emergency Shutdown (ESD) SD001 Control System
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
EMERGENCY RESPONSE - EER
Local or partial loss of the ESD system Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System SD001
P P A P N P P P P P P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A A
HSE CASE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
SDV (Topsides / Onshore) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
SCE FAILURE MODE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS SD
SAFETY CRITCAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
LEGEND A P N NA
Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
NOTES
B26 Hook up and commissioning
B27 Manned presence on NUI
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval
B29 Working at Heights
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing
B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial)
B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain
B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out
B34
B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval
B36 Local Venting
B37 Black Start Up
N N A P A A A A A A P A A A A
N A P A P A P A A P A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A N A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A
A A A A A A
A A A A A
A A A A
A A A
A A
A
P A A N P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P P P NA N -
A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A -
N N N N N N N N N N N P P N N N N N N N N N N N P P N P N N N N N N N N -
N N N N N N N P N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P N P A N -
N N N N P P P P N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P N P A P -
A A A N A P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A P A P P A A A A A P P A P P N -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A P A P P A A A A A P P A P A N -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A P P A P A N -
A A A N A A A A P P A P P A A A A P A A A A A A P A A N N A P A A P A N -
P P A N P P P P A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P A P P P P A -
A A N P A A A A P P A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P A A -
A A N N A P P A P P A N N A A A A A A A P P P P P A A P P A A A A P A N -
A A N N A P P A P P A N N A A A A A A A P P P P P A A P P A A A A P A N -
A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A P A A N P A A A A P A A -
A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A N P A A A A P A A -
A A N N A A A A P P A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A N P A A A A P A N -
A A A N A N N N N N A P P N N N N N N N N N N N P A A P N A P P A P N N -
A A A N A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P N N -
A A A N A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A -
A A A N A N A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A A A A A N P N A -
A A A N P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A A P A A P P P P -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A A A A A P P P P -
A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A P A P -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A N A P P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A A N A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A A N A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A P P A P A N -
A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N N N -
P A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P A A A A P A A A P N N -
A A A A A A A P P P P P P P A P P P P P A A A P A A N P N A -
A A A A A A P P P P P P P A P P P P P A A A P A A N P N A -
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P N N -
P P P A A A A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A A P P A A -
P P A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A P A A A A P A P -
N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P N A A A A P N N -
A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P N A A A A P N N -
P P N N N N A P P P P P A A A P P P P P P A -
A N N N N A P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A -
N N N N A P A P P A A A A P A A P P N A -
N N N A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
N N A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
N A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
A P P P P A A A P A A A A P N N -
-
-
P P P P P A A A P P P P P N A -
P P P P P P P P P P P P N P -
P P P A A A A A A P P P A -
P P A A P P N P N P P N -
P P P P P P P P P P P -
A A A A A A P P N A -
A A A A A A A A A -
A A A A A P P A -
A A A A P N N -
P P P P P A -
A P P N N -
P P N A -
P N N -
P P -
N -
-
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N N N
A A P P N
A A P P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A NA N
A A A N N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P A N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A N N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A P N
N A A P N
A A A P N
A A A P N
-
-
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P P P P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
P P P P N
P P N N N
N P A N N
-
A A A N
A A N
A N
N
C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc)
B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines)
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A P P
C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring
B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic)
P A N N A A A A A A A A A A A P P
C3 Night Helicopter Operations
B23
P P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A P P
C2 Extended stay over night
B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
A P P A A A P P A P A P P P P P P P P
C1 Night Time Working
B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
A A N N A A N A P A A A A A A A A A P P
Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc)
A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B39
B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations
A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation
A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A
B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out
B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal
3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc)
B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure
P A N A P A A A A A A A A N N A N P P P A N P P
Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing
B15
Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc)
B14 Choke Valve bean up or down
W6 High swells - Alert Level (xx m < h < xx m)
W3 High winds - Alert Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
W2 High Ambient Temperature (>50°C)
B13 ROV
P P P P N
B12 Diving operations in close proximity
P P P P N
B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring)
P P P P N
B9 Abseiling (working above open sea)
P P P P N
B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work)
A A A A N
B8 Coldwork
A A A A N
B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc)
A A A A N
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc)
P P N N N
B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry)
P P N N N
B4 Radiography work
A A N N N
B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work)
N N N N N
B2 NDT
P P P N N
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent)
A A A P N
A P N N A P A A A P P A P A N N A N N N N P N P P
A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel
N N N N N
A A N N N A P P N A N N A P A N N A N N N N P N P P
OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party)
P P N N N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson
P P P P N
A A A A A A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A P A A
A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops
A A A A N
PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc
P P P P N
A27
P P P P N
A26
P N N N N N N N N N P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N P N N N P N N -
A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc)
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc)
N P P P N N N N P P P P A N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P N N N N N N N N -
Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone
P N N N N N N N N N P N N P N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N P N N N P N N -
A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps
P A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A P P P A -
A22
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump)
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A -
A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise
P P N N P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P N N -
A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc)
P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N -
A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV
A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A P A N -
A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling)
P P N P P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P N N -
A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off)
A A N A A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P P N -
A14 Bunkering (potable water)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N -
Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring
N P N N P N P P N N N N N P P P N N N N N N N N P N N N N P P P N P N N -
A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc)
P P N P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N -
A12
P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A -
A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts)
P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P N P P P P N P N -
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment A A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A4 Function Testing of ESD system A A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A A7 Well production testing A A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A A9 Pigging Operations P A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) A A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) P A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A A14 Bunkering (potable water) A A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) N A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) N A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) N A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops P A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel A OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P B2 NDT A B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) A B4 Radiography work N B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) N B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) P B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) P B8 Coldwork P B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) A B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) A B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) A B12 Diving operations in close proximity A B13 ROV A B14 Choke Valve bean up or down A B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) A B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure A B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal N B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation N B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations N B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) N B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing N B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) N B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) N B26 Hook up and commissioning N B27 Manned presence on NUI P B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval A B29 Working at Heights A B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing P B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) A B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain A B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out P B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) P B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval N B36 Local Venting P B37 Black Start Up NA B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out N B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working A C2 Extended stay over night A C3 Night Helicopter Operations A C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring A C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc) N
A9 Pigging Operations
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P -
4
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts)
P P A N N N P N P N N P N P P P N N P N N P N N N N P N P P
3
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required)
A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
2
A7 Well production testing
N P N N N N N N N P N P N A A N A N N A N A P N N N N N N N
1
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations
P P A N N N P N P N N P N P P P N N P N N P N N N N P N P P
3
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations
P P A P P P P A P A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A
2
A4 Function Testing of ESD system
P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
1
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection
P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment
11 P P P P A P P P P N P N N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P
9
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
10 P P P P A P P P P P P P P P N N P P A P P P P P P P P P P P
8
Activities and Influences XXXX Operations
M4
A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
7
CRITICAL MANPOWER UNAVAILABILITY
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
6
HSE CASE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS)
A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment
Local Emergency Crisis Center LECC - Competent persons not available to fill LECC positions or LECC not available
M3 ER Team Members - Competent persons not available to fill ER team member position
M2 ER Medic - Insufficient number of medics available on the facility
M1 HSE Critical Position - Competent persons not available to fill HSE Critical Position
Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Planned shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Unplanned Shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Emergency / incident on other facility affecting O3 operations
P P P P P P P P P N P N N N P P N P P N P P P P P P P P P N
5
O2
A A A P P P A A A P A P P P A A P A A A A P A A A A A A P P
4
O1
W11 Low Visibility - Almost Zero Visibility Level (l < xx m)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
3
FIELD INTERFACES
P P P P P P P P N N N N N P N N P P N N N N N N N N N N N N
2
W9 Low Visibility - Degraded Level (xx m < l < xx m)
A A A P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
1
W7 High swells - Warning Level (xx m < h < xx m)
A A P P P P P P P P P A P P A A A P P P P A P P P P P P P P
1
W4 High winds - Warning Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
P P P P P P P P P N N P N P P N P P P N P P P P P P P P P P
P1 Intrusion (500m zone)
W10 Low Visibility - Severely Impaired Operations (xx m < l < xx m)
W8 High swells - Cease Operations / Abandon Platform Level (h < xx m)
W5 High winds - Cease Operations / Abandon Platform Level (V < xx m/s)
W1 Adverse Weather (including monsoon (heavy rain), lightning, etc)
ACTIVITIES
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
ADVERSE WEATHER
PUBLIC
INFLUENCES
131
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
132
LEGEND A P N NA
Process Area FW/Foam supply unavailable
Loss of sand filters leading to increased erosion rates
Inability to provide the required chemical injection flow leading to increased corrosion rate
Navigational Aids unavailable
HIPPS system not meeting the performance standard (loss of redundancy in SDV, Pressure Transmitters, etc)
Total loss of HIPPS system
Loss of well isolation - inability to isolate steam / water / gas / WAG injection well or annulus resulting in potential back flow of HC
Loss of operational well isolation - SCSSV, SSV not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly
SDV (Beach Valve, Block Valve Station) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
Process SDV (Onshore) - not meeting Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly)
Loss of Drilling Well Control - loss of BOP, insufficient mud weight, loss of mud pump, incorrect mud weight
Local or partial loss of Utility / Instrument Air
Total loss of Utility / Instrument Air
Power Management System
Fixed Process Area Foam System
Chemical Injection PS013 Systems
PS014 Navigational Aids
High Integrity Pressure Protection System
Drilling Well Control Equipment
SD003
Operational Well SD004 Isolation
Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs)
SD003
Operational Well SD004 Isolation
Pipeline Isolation Valves
PS011
PS012 Sand Filters
High Integrity Pressure Protection System
PS010
SD005
SD006
SD008
SD009 Utility Air
SD009 Utility Air
A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A P A
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P P P P N N N N N N N A N N N P P
N A A A A A P A A A A A A A N A P N N N N A N A P A A A P A A A P A
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N P P
A A A A N A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A P A A A A P A
A A A A N A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A A A A A A A N N N N N N N A N N N P P
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A A A A A A A N N N N N N N A N N N P P
A A A A A A N N N P N N N N A A A A A A A P N N N P N N A N N N P N
A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A N A N N N N P N N N P N P A P P P P P
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A P P
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A P P
N A A A P N P P N A N P A A N N A N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N
N A A A P N P P N A N P A A N N A N N N N N N N N N A A N N N N N N
N A A P P A N A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N N A A N A A N P P
N A A P P A N A A A A A A A N N A N N N N N A P N N A A N A A N P P
N A A A A A P A A A A A A A N A N P P P P N P P N A A A N A A N P P
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A N A A A N A A N P P
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A N P A N A A A N A A N P P
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A P A A A A P A P A A A A A A A P A A A P A A A P P
P A A P P P P P P A A A A A P P P N N N N P P P N P A A P A A P P A
N A A P P N N N P P P A P P P P P N N N N P P P N P A A P A A P P P
P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N N N N P P P N P P A P A A P P P
N A A P P N N N P P P N N P P P P N N N N P P P N P P A P A A P P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P A N A A A A A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P P
N A A P P N N N A A A A A A A A A N N N N P A A N P P A A A A A P N
A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A N N N N A A A P A A A A A A A P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A P A A A A A A A P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P A A A A A A A P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P P
P A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P P P
P A A A A A N A A A P A A A P A A N N N N A A A N A P A A A A P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P N N N N P P P N P N A P A P P P N
P A A A A A N A A A P A A A P A A P P P P A A A N A P A A A A P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P N A P A P P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P A A P A P P P A
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P A A P A P P P A
A A A A A A P A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A P A A A A A P N
A A A A A A N A A A A A A A N N A N N N N A A A A A N A A A A A P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P N A P A P P P N
N A A P P P N A A A P A A A P P P P P P P P P P N P N A P A P P P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A NA A NA NA NA NA A A A A A P A A A A A P N
P A A A A A P A A A A A A A P P A P P P P P P P N P A A P A P P P A
P A A A A A N A A A A A A A N P P P P P P P P P N P A A N A P P P A
A A A A N
A A A A N
A P A A N
A N N A N
A A A A N
N N A P N
N N A P N
N N A P N
N N A P N
A A A A N
N N N P N
P A A A N
P A A A N
P NA NA NA N
N NA NA NA N
N N A P N
N N A N N
P P P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P A A A N
P A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A P N
A A A N N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
NOTES Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
PS
Helideck Fire Fighting Systems
PROCESS CONTAINMENT PC
P P A P N P P P P P P P A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P A A A
N N A N N N N N N N N N A A P A A A N A A A N A P P P N P A A
N P A P N P P P P P P P A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A P A A A
N N A N N N N N N N N N A A P A A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
Meteorological Data Gathering System is unavailable
Total loss of the EDP system
Loss of Power Management System leading to increased risk of loss of main power supply
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
Local or partial loss of the EDP (Topsides / onshore) system not meeting the performance standards (not opening, or insufficient blowdown rate)
Total loss of sprinkler system
PS009 Sprinkler Systems
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
Emergency SD002 Depressurisation System (Blowdown)
Loss of sprinkler system - local unavailability
Fine Water Spray systems PS008
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
Total loss of ESD system
Fine Water Spray system - local unavailability
Gaseous Fire PS007 Suppression System
P P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A
Emergency SD002 Depressurisation System (Blowdown)
Loss or unavailability of Gaseous Fire Suppression System
Passive Fire Protection PS006 (incl. doors, walls and penetrations)
N N A N N P N N N A A P A P A A A A N A A A A A A A A P P A A
Local or partial loss of the ESD system
Passive Fire Protection - locally unavailable (damaged, removed, etc)
Fire Water Ring Main PS005 and Other distribution system
P P A P P P P P P A A P A P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N P A A A A A A P A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System
FW Delivery - local unavailability of the FW distribution main
Fire Water Pumps (inc. PS004 Tank, FW Supply and support)
N A A A A A A A A A P A A A P P A A NA A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A P A A N A A A A A A A P A N A P A A A A A A A
SD001
FW Supply unavailable - all pumps not available, loss of FW tank, loss of supply source, etc
Fire Water Pumps (inc. PS004 Tank, FW supply and support)
P P A P N P P P P P P P A A A A A A N A A A A A P P P N P A A
N N A A N P N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
FW Supply - Loss of redundancy (
PS003
N N A N N P P P P N N N A A N N A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
N P A A N P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Control System
Observed or detected defect in the blast wall resulting in increased risk of failure in the event of an MAH. Observed or detected defect in explosion Explosion protection PS002 including blast barriers and venting provisions
N P A A A A P A A A N A A A N N A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A N N P N P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P P P P
SD001
Deluge system - Local (area) unavailabilty PS001 Deluge Systems
N P A A A A A A A A P A A A P P A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P N N N P P N A N A A A A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS
Loss of Water in condensate / Gas dew point measurement resulting in increased corrosion rate, increased risk of hydrate formation causing blockage, Water in condensate / DS003 Gas (dewpoint) measurement
N N A N N N N N N N A N A A A A A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
N P A A N P N N N N P N A N A A A A A P A A A A N N A P P P P
SD
Loss of access control to facilities DS002 Security Systems
N N A N N N N N N N A N A A A A A A N A A A P A P P P N P A A
N N A P N P N N N N P P N P A A A A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
Meteorological Data Gathering System
Total loss of F&G Detection system DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
P P A A P P P A P P A A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A
N N A P N P N N N N P P N P A A A A N A A A A A N N A P P P P
PS016
Loss of Gas (Toxic) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in non-voting system DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
A A A A A A A A A P A P N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Helideck FW/Foam supply unavailble
Loss of F&G detection - fusible plug loop unavailable leading to loss of fire detction in specific area DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
PROTECTION SYSTEMS SCE FAILURE MODE
Loss of F&G (fire and flammable gas) detection end element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in non-voting system
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
SCE FAILURE MODE
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Loss of primary and secondary flare ignition systems resulting in flare out
P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
DETECTION SYSTEMS (FIELD)
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Flare Tip ignition System
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC009
P P A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
DS
N P A A P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Observed or detected defect in the ignition control equipment e.g. Flame / Spark Arrestor element damaged, plugged, or missing, hot surfaces or hot
N P A A N P A A P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Total loss of gas blanket system resulting in increased risk of ignition
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P N A A A A A A A
Miscellaneous Ignition IC008 Control Components
N N P N N N N N N P P N N N P A A A A A A N P N A A A A A A A
Inert Gas Blanket System
P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A A A
IC007
A A A A A N A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Inability to provide the required gas blanket flow to individual equipment resulting in increased risk of ignition
P P A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Inability to provide fuel gas purge flow to the flare header resulting in air ingress to the flare
P P A A N P P P P P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Inert Gas Blanket System
P P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC007
P A A A P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
N N A P N N N N N P A P A A A A P A N P A P P A P P P P A P P
Earth Grounding and Bonding fails to meet PS requirements resulting in increased risk of ignition e.g. earthing cable missing or damaged, temporary
N P A P N P N P P P P P A A P A P P P P A P P A P P P P A P P
Certified Electrical Equipment fails to meet the PS requirement resulting in increased risk of ignition
N N A P N N N N N P A P A A A A A A N P A P P A P P P P A P P
Earth Grounding and IC005 Bonding
N P A P N P N P P P A P A A A A A A P P A P P A P P P P A P P
HVAC Shutdown - unavailable - (dampers / detectors etc not working)
N A A A A A NA A A A N A A A N A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A
Certified Electrical Equipment
N A A P N A A A A A N N P N N A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Non Hazardous Area Ventilation
N P A P N P A A A A N P A A N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC003
Containment integrity - Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable limits, without approved temporary repairs (wraps / Helicopter Refueling Equipment PC012
N P A P N P NA A A A NA P NA NA NA NA N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC002
Tanker Loading Systems Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks in PC011 -Road Tanker Loading tanker loading system) Systems
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A P A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
HVAC Shutdown - loss of gas detection and end element resulting in impaired functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting system
Tanker Loading Systems Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks in PC011 -Single Buoy Mooring tanker loading system) - SBM systems
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Hazardous Area Ventilation - unavailable - (fans / dampers / detectors etc not working)
Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks such that gas tight walls / floor fails to meet the PS requirement PC010 Gas Tight Floor / Walls
N P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Non Hazardous Area IC002 Ventilation
Observed or detected defect or Unavailability of the BMS / IPS resulting in increased risk of Explosion e.g. failure of BMS to carry out heater fire box purge, Fired Heaters (Burner Management System) PC009
N P A A A A P A A A N A A A N A N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
Hazardous Area Ventilation
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks, reduced furnace tube wall thickness beyond allowable limits, etc) PC009 Fired Heaters
N P A P N N N N N A N N A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A N N P P
IC001
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks in completion string, casing / liner, production packer, pressure in the annulus etc) Operational Well PC008 Containment
N P A P N N N N N N N N A A N A N N A N A N A P N N N N N P P
Ventilation impaired - loss of gas detection and end element (dampers / fan(s)) resulting in impaired functionality, inability to meet PS requirements
Unavailability of Relief at design flow rateresulting in increased risk of MAH due to overpressure PC007 Relief System
N P A P N P N N N N N N A A N A N N N N A N A P N N N N N P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Tank containment integrity - Compromised (known leaks, Primary and Secondary seal failure on Floating Roof Tanks, known pontoon leaks leading to PC004 Process Containment
N P A P N P N N N N N N A A N A N N N N A N P P N N N N N P P
Hazardous Area Ventilation
Rotating Equipment Containment Integrity Compromised (known leaks, seal failure, etc.,) PC003 Process Containment
N P A P N P N N N N N N A A N A N N N N A N P P N N N N N P P
IC001
Pig Launcher / Receiver Containment Integrity Compromised (pressure gauge / transmitter faulty or unavailable, door leaking/ not sealing, etc.,) PC001/ Process Containment 6
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A
Observed or detected defect in the well intervention / Well control equipment e.g. Rams, load measurement and increased risk of well release /
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks, reduced wall thickness beyond allowable limits, without approved temporary repairs (wraps/ clamps)) PC001Process Containment 6
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IGNITION CONTROL
Observed or detected defect to drilling systems structural integrity e.g. derrick, etc. SI007 Drilling Systems
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Well Intervention / PC013 Well Control Equipment
Observed or detected vehicle defect resulting in increased risk of RTA or increased consequence if one were to occur e.g. brake failure / no ABS, tyres SI006 Road Vehicles
A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
IC
Observed or detetced structural defect to onsite road impact barriers protecting process plant resulting in increased risk of MAH SI006 Road Vehicles
P P A A P P P P P P A P A A A A A P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
SCE FAILURE MODE
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting A11 Fork Lift Operations A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A18 Working on Tall Structures A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A23 Marine Operations - SBM A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Radiography work B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Hot tapping / stoppling B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B9 Coldwork B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck B13 Road Maintenance / Grading B14 Excavation activities / shoring B15 Choke Valve bean up or down B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) B27 Hook up and commissioning B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval B35 Local Venting B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements C4 Night Helicopter Operations C5 Night Heavy Lifts
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in increased risk of MAH
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SCE FAILURE MODE SI
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
Heavy Lift Cranes and SI003 Mechanical Lifting
HSE CASE ONSHORE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
Civil Structures / SI002 Structural Support (vessels, piping /
SAFETY CRITCAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
133
Evacuation route - unavailable
PAGA system - Loss of redundancy (one of the systems not available)
PAGA system - unavailable
VHF Channels - unavailable
Shore / Offshore Communications - unavailable
Marine Radio - SBM - unavailable
Aviation VHF radio - unavailable
Emergency Power Supply - Loss of redundancy (
Emergency Power Supply unavailable - all generators not available, loss of distribution etc
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment - Hose reels / monitors / portable extinguishers locally unavailable
Individual Process SIF unavailable e.g. low low level trip, etc
Audio Visual Alarms - unavailable
Basic Process Control system (BPCS) - unavailable
Tank secondary containment / bunding observed or detected defect resulting in loss or impaired secondary containment
Closed Drain system - locally unavailable
Closed Drain System - Unavailable
Open Drain System - locally unavailable
Open Drain System - Totally Unavailable
Spill Containment - unavailable
SCE FAILURE MODE
Personal H2S monitors below minimum level or faulty
Portable BA sets / Smoke Hoods below minimum level or faulty (escape sets)
Portable BA sets below minimum level (SCBA and Rescue Sets)
Life Jackets below minimum level or damaged (e.g. light not working etc) at jetty
Life Buoys below minimum level or damaged at jetty
Insufficient number or inadequate type of Chemical PPE available
Safety Shower / eyewash stations not available or inoperable
Medical Response cannot be met - e.g. on-site burns treatment facilities insufficent or unavailable, Hosiptal resonse time cannot be met
Fire Fighting Response cannot be met - e.g. fire fighter / brigade within specified time frame
Alternate Means of Escape - locally unavailable liferafts / Scramble nets / Ladders / knotted ropes / Escape chutes etc
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Uninterruptable Power UPS - Unavailable - Inability to provide emergency Supply power supply to essential systems
Emergency Power (inc ER007 generation and distribution)
Process Control and Alarms
Process Control and Alarms
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
ER011 Oil Spill Response
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER009
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER009
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER009
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
Personal Survival Equipment (PSE)
ER008
Bunding and Drains ER010 (Hazardous and Nonhazardous)
LIFE SAVING
ER005
Emergency Power (inc ER007 generation and distribution)
Process Control and Alarms
ER005
Helicopter facilities ER006 (inc. markings, nets, obstacle marking /
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment
ER003
Internal, External and ER004 Emergency Communication
Uninterruptable Power UPS - Loss of redundancy - (one of the 2x100% Supply systems not available)
Helicopter facilities observed or detected damage / defective or unavailable markings, lighting, nets, etc.
ER002 Escape Routes
LS
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
Rescue Facilities LS002 (Medical / first aid facilities)
LS002 Rescue Facilities
Alternate Means of LS004 Escape (Liferafts, scramble nets and
P P A P P P P P P P A P A P A A P P P A P A A A P P P P P P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
P P A P P P P P P P A P A P A A P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P A P A P A A P P P A P A P A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P A P A P A A A A P A P A A A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P P A P P A P P P A P A P A P P P P P P P
P P A P P P P P P P P P A P P A P P P A P A P A P P P P P P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P A P A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P P P P A A P P P A A P P A P A P N A P P P P P P P
N P A A N N P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A
N N A P N N N N N A A P A A A A A A P A A A P A A A A A A A A
N N A P N N N N N A A P A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N A P P A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A N N A P P A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A P P A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A P P A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
P P A A P P A P P A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A
N P N N N N N N N P N P A A N A N N N P A A P A N N A N N A A
P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P A P P P A A A A A N N A N N A A
P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P A P P P A A A A A N N A N N A A
P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P A P P P A A A N A P P A P P A A
P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P A P P P A A A N A P P A P P A A
P P N N N N N N N P P P A A P A N N N A A N N N N N N N N P P
P A P P P P P P N P P P A A P A P A P A A A P A N N N N N P P
N P N N N N N N N N N N A N A A N P N N A N N N N N N N N N N
N P N N N N N N N N P A N N P A N N N N A N N N N N N N N P P
P P P P P P P P P P P A A A P A P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A
A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A P A
P A A P P N N P A A A P A A A A A P P P P P P A P A P A A A A A P P
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A P A N A A A A A A A P A
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P A P A N A A A A A A N P A
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P A P A N A A A A A A N P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A
N P P N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P
P P P N N P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P A
P P P N N P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P A
P P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P P P P A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P P
N P A A A P P P P A A A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
P A A A N
P A A A N
N N N N N
P A A A N
N A A N N
P A A A N
P P P A N
P P P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
P N A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
P P A A N
N N A A N
N P A A N
P P A A N
LEGEND A P N NA
Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
Emergency / Escape Lighting
Emergency lighting - locally unavailable
Escape route - locally unavailable ER002 Escape Routes
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting A11 Fork Lift Operations A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A18 Working on Tall Structures A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A23 Marine Operations - SBM A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Radiography work B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Hot tapping / stoppling B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B9 Coldwork B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck B13 Road Maintenance / Grading B14 Excavation activities / shoring B15 Choke Valve bean up or down B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) B27 Hook up and commissioning B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval B35 Local Venting B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements C4 Night Helicopter Operations C5 Night Heavy Lifts
Temporary Refuge (TR) Alternate Muster Points - unavailable / compromised / Primary Muster Areas (structural damage, muster areas not clear, etc)
P P A P P P P P P P A P A P A A P P P A P A A A P P P P P P P
ER
Activities and SCEs XXXX Operations
EMERGENCY RESPONSE SCE FAILURE MODE EER Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Area Temporary Refuge (TR) ER001 unavailable / compromised - (structural damage, / Primary Muster Areas muster areas not clear etc)
HSE CASE ONSHORE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
ER001
SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
LEGEND A P N NA
Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval Activity not permitted in these circumstances Not applicable
B33
B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval
B35 Local Venting
A N N A A A A P A A A A A P P A P P A A
A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
N A A A P A A A A A A A A P A A A A
A A A P A A A P A P A A P A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A N A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A A
A A A A A A A
A A A A A A
A A A A A
A A A A
A A A
A A
A
P A N N N P A P P A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N A P P A P P N P N
P A N P P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P A P A A P P P P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A N A A A A A P N
N N N N N N N N N P N A A A N N N N N N N N N N N P N P P N N N N N
N N N N N N N N P P N A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P A P P N P N
N N N P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P A P P P P N
A A N A A P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A N A P A N A A P P A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A P P P P A N A P A N A A P P A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A P P A P N
P P N P P P N P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P A P P P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A P P P A A P A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A N A A A N A P A A A P N
A A N A A N N N N N N A A A N N N N N N N N N N N A N A A P P A P N
A A N A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P N A A A A A P N
A A N P P N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P N A P A A P P N
A A N A P N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P N A P A A A P N
A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A N A P A A A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A A N A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
A N A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A A P N
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
A P N A A A A A A A P P P P P P P P P P N A N A P A A A P N
P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P N A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A N A A A A A P P P P A P P P P N A P A A N P N
A A N N A A A N P P P P P P P N N N P N A P A A N P N
A A A P A A A A A P P P P A P P P P N A P A A N P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A N A A A A P P N
P P A A A A A A A A P A A A N A A A A A P N
P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
P P N N N N A P P P P N A P P P P P N
A N N N N A P A P A N A A A A A P N
N N N N A P A P A N A P A A P P N
N N N A P P P A N A A A A A P N
N N A P P P A N A A A A A P N
N A P P P A N A A A A A P N
A P P P A N A A A A A P N
-
-
P P P P N A P P P P P N
P P P N P P P P P P N
P P N A A A A A P N
P N A P N P N P N
N A A A A P P N
N N N N N N N
A A A A P N
P P P P N
A P P N
P P N
P N
N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A P N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A P A N
A A P A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A N N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
N A A A N
N A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A N N
N A A A N
N A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
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-
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
N N N N N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
A A A A N
NOTES
N N N N N
A A A N
A A N
A N
N
C5 Night Heavy Lifts
B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out
N P N N P A P P P P A P A P P P P P P P P
C4 Night Helicopter Operations
B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain
N P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing
A N P A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements
B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting
A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P A A
C1 Night Time Working
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval
P A N N P A A A A A A P P A N N A N P P P A N P P
B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads
B27 Hook up and commissioning
A P N N N P A P P A A A P P A N N A N N N N P N P P
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines)
3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc)
B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic)
A A N N N P A A N N A A A A P A N N A N N N N P N P P
Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B24
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc)
A A A A A A P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A P A A
A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel
A A A A A A A P N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N A P A A
OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party)
B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc
B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
P P P P N
B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc)
P P P P N
B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations
P P P P N
B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation
P P P P N
B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal
A A A A N
B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure
A A A A N
B16
A A A A N
B15 Choke Valve bean up or down
P P N N N
B14 Excavation activities / shoring
P P N N N
B13 Road Maintenance / Grading
A A N N N
B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck
N N N N N
B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold
P P N N N
B9 Coldwork
A A A P N
B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures)
A A A A N
B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc)
P P P P N
B7 Hot tapping / stoppling
P P P P N
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc)
P N N N N N N N N N N N P N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N P N
B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry
P P P P P N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry)
N P P N N N N N N P P N P P N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N P N N N N
B3 Radiography work
P N N N N N N N N N N N P N P N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N P N
B2 NDT
P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P N
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent)
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank
P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N
A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops
P P N P P P P P P N N N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N
A28
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N
A27
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A P N
A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc)
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc)
N P N P P N P P P N N P P P P P P N N N N N N N N N N N P P P N P N
A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps
P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
A23 Marine Operations - SBM
P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N
A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump)
P P P P P P P P P P P N N N P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P N N
A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P N
NORMAL ACTIVITIES A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A4 Function Testing of ESD system A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A7 Well production testing A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A9 Pigging Operations A10 Crane Operation / Lifting A11 Fork Lift Operations A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A18 Working on Tall Structures A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A23 Marine Operations - SBM A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party) B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) B2 NDT B3 Radiography work B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) B7 Hot tapping / stoppling B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) B9 Coldwork B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck B13 Road Maintenance / Grading B14 Excavation activities / shoring B15 Choke Valve bean up or down B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) B27 Hook up and commissioning B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval B35 Local Venting B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads NIGHT ACTIVITIES C1 Night Time Working C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements C4 Night Helicopter Operations C5 Night Heavy Lifts
A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc)
P P A N N N P N P N P P P P A A A A N P N N P N N N N P P P P
A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV
A A A P P P P P P P P P P P A A A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A18 Working on Tall Structures
N P N N N N N N N N N N A N A A N P N N A N P P N N N N N N N
A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc)
P P A N N N P N P N P P P P A A A A N P N N P N N N N P P P P
A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot
P P A P P P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A
A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot
A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling)
A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off)
P P P P A A P P P N N P N N N N P N P P P P N P P P P P P P P
A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc)
4
P P P P A A P P P P P P N N P N P P P A P P N P P P P P P P P
A11 Fork Lift Operations
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
M4 3
A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A
A9 Pigging Operations
2
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting
1
Local Emergency Crisis Center LECC - Competent persons not available to fill LECC positions or LECC not available
M3 ER Team Members - Competent persons not available to fill ER team member position
M2 ER Medic - Insufficient number of medics available on the facility
M1 HSE Critical Position - Competent persons not available to fill HSE Critical Position
3
P P P P P P P P N N N P P N P P P P P N N N N N N N N N N N N
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required)
2
A A A P P P A A P P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A7 Well production testing
1
CRITICAL MANPOWER UNAVAILABILITY
Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Planned shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Unplanned Shutdown on other facility affecting operations Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Emergency / incident O3 on other facility affecting operations O2
O1
FIELD INTERFACES 8
A A P P P P P P P P P P A A A A P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations
7
A A P P P P P P P N N P P N P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations
6
W8 Low Visibility - Almost Zero Visibility Level (l < xx m)
W7 Low Visibility - Severely Impaired Operations (xx m < l < xx m)
W6 Low Visibility - Degraded Level (xx m < l < xx m) 5
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
A4 Function Testing of ESD system
4
Activities and Influences XXXX Operations
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection
3
W5 High winds - Cease Operations Level (V < xx m/s)
W4 High winds / Shamal (Dust Storm) - Warning Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
W3 High winds - Alert Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s) 2
HSE CASE ONSHORE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS)
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment
1
ACTIVITIES
A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment
1
W2 High Ambient Temperature (>50°C)
W1 Adverse Weather (including monsoon (heavy rain), lightning, etc)
P1 Intrusion (within perimeter fence)
ADVERSE WEATHER
PUBLIC
INFLUENCES
134
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 8 Template for Remedial Action Plan
135
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
136
Target Completion
Description of Action N o (example)
Priority
Action Party
(example)
(example)
Action 11
P1-S
xIE
dd/mm/yy
Action 22
P1-H
xRM
dd/mm/yy
Action 33
P2
xSE
dd/mm/yy
Action 44
P3
xPD
dd/mm/yy
(example)
Remarks
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 9 Example SCE Critical Activity Matrix
137
SAFETY CASE ACTIVITIES, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES MATRIX
A = Accountable
Legend
R = Responsible
EXECUTION PARTY 1 Operations Manager 2 OIM 3 Country HSE manager 4 Corporate HSE Department - Oil Spill Response Co-ordinator 5 ER Team Member 6 Logistics Manager 7 Logistics Team Leaders 8 Line HSE advisors 9 Asset Manager 10 Audit Team Member 11 Head of Marine Services 12 Head of Aviation Service 13 Radio Operator 14 Boat Landing Officer 15 Crane Operator 16 Marine Vessel Captain 17 Helicopter Landing Officer 18 Helicopter Pilot 19 HSE Systems & Competency Manager 20 HSE Capability Co-ordinator 21 HSE Contractor Advisor 22 Safety Manager 23 Technical Safety Advisor 24 Metocean Team Leader 25 Metocean Engineer 26 Project Manager 27 Projects Technical Authority 28 Project Engineer 29 Project HSE Advisor 30 Commissioning Lead Engineer 31 Construction Lead Engineer 32 Pipelines & Subsea Engineer 33 Works Supervisor 34 Operations Technician 35 Maintenance Engineering Discipline Manager 36 Maintenance Engineering Discipline Team Leaders 37 Maintenance Strategy Manager 38 Maintenance Strategy Team Leaders 39 Maintenance Execution Team Leader 40 Maintenance Execution Engineers 41 Scheduler 42 Site Analyst 43 Chief of Well Services 44 Well Integrity Engineer 45 Head of Well Services 46 Well Services Supervisor 47 Technical Authority 1 48 Technical Authority 2 49 Well Services Engineer A R A R A A R
R
A R A
A R A A A A
R R R
Provide a full range of support in the areas of HSE global processes, and contractor HSE management Development and maintenance of HSE competence assessment, development, and assurance
PROVIDE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT
Evaluate deck capacity versus demand during loading / unloading
Co-ordinate marine operations both scehduled and unscheduled with due regard to HSE Co-ordinate aviation/ helicopter operations both scehduled and unscheduled with due regard to HSE Provide emergency response coverage. Manage, administer ER equipment and resources Review meteorological data and verify integrity of operations against adverse weather policy Carry out marine unloading of people and cargo (including crane lifts) with due regard to HSE
MANAGE LOGISTICS
Carry out helicopter unloading of people and cargo with due regard to HSE
A
R A R A A A
R R R
A R
A R A R A R A A A R
R R R
A A
R R R
A
R R A R A R
A
A R R A R A R R
A
A R A
R R R
R R R
A R A R A R A
R A R A R A R A R A R A R A A R
Refer to Pipeline Safety case, pipeline management group and supporting documentation
ASSURE PIPELINE INTEGRITY
Examine SCEs status to comply with Performance Standards
Critical drawings and documentation shall be maintained AS BUILT
ASSURE WELL INTEGRITY
Examine SCEs status to comply with Performance Standards
Critical drawings and documentation shall be maintained AS BUILT
ASSURE SURFACE FACILITIES
Refer to pipeline management group and supporting information
PLAN AND EXECUTE PIPELINE MAINTENANCE
Establish maintenance and integrity tasks to be performed based on defined strategies and facility specific performance standards Maintain maintenance planning system and activities defined in the SERP guide including the adoption of key HSE MS processes and management of operations personnel competence assurance Monitor and control the execution of facilities maintenance including implementation of safe systems of work raising required corrective actions Ensure all deviations of safety critical elements are formally recorded and authorised by the appropriate technical authority
PLAN AND EXECUTE FACILITIES MAINTENANCE (WELLHEAD ROUTINES)
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Monitor and control the execution of facilities maintenance including implementation of safe systems of work raising required corrective actions Ensure all deviations of safety critical elements are formally recorded and authorised by the appropriate technical authority
Prepare the wells, topsides processing and utilities for production processing (including purging operations if required) Performing root cause identification and corrective action following shutdowns Carry out process monitoring and control to ensure the facilities are maintained within the design operating envelope Perform process intervention operations as required including sampling, chemical injection, venting, isolation Undertake corrective actions following defined HSE controls when wells, topsides processing and utilities equipment does not perform to the defined operational performance criteria Carry out first line maintenance of production processing and utility systems equipment PLAN AND EXECUTE FACILITIES MAINTENANCE (STANDARD ROUTINES, MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING ROUTINES) Establish maintenance and integrity tasks to be performed based on defined strategies and facility specific performance standards Maintain maintenance planning system and activities defined in the SERP guide including the adoption of key HSE MS processes and management of operations personnel competence assurance
PRODUCTION OPERATIONS (PRODUCE HYDROCARBONS)
Identify major HSE risks, prepare mitigation plans and demonstrate that HSE risks are ALARP during design Prepare specifications, plans and design complying with Petronas, legal and industry regulations and codes Prepare performance testing requirements and acceptance criteria for precommissioning and commissioning activities Construct and install jacket and topside facilities including all required hook up and testing to manage HSE issues Design and construct pipelines and subsea flowlines to meet required standards for integrity and prevention of major accidents
Define the technical integrity management framework for facilities
Define Performance Standards including Safety Critical Elements
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF FACILITIES
Refer to Drilling HSE Case and supporting interface documentation
DESIGN, DRILL, SERVICE, AND ABANDON WELLS (excluding routine wireline and stimulation operations)
Manage / update design and operational criteria
Manage operational forecatsing
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
Manage real time data acquisition and data archiving
MANAGE METOCEAN DATA
Provide technical safety advice in the development and maintenance of Safety Cases and supporting technical studies Provision of safety advice and services with respect to asset emergency preparedness Provision of advice and services with respect to oil spill emergency preparedness
Provide support and advice on contractor engagement and HSE management
Support and co-ordination of incident management and investigation
A
Provide advice and services for all aspects of HSE hazard and risk studies
R A
Perform audits and reviews including pre-start up audit to manage HSE risks to ALARP
Prepare and resource assurance plan
AUDIT AND REVIEW
REVISION 1.0
The operation of the defined change management process (including the assessment of risk) for both permenant and temporary changes, in people, facility hardware and procedures
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
Provide logistics emergency response coverage. Manage, administer ER equipment and resources Provision of HSE advice and services with respect to asset emergency preparedness
Carry out emergency repsonse to oil spills at sea
Carry out emergency reposne to health, safety and environmental events
A R
Ensure ER preparedness including housekeeping carry out and assess the effectiveness of ER drills and exercises
Produce and maintain Oil Spill Response Plans (OSR)
Produce and maintain Emergency Response Plans (ERP)
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT - CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING
Exploration and Production TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
138
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 10 Example Activity Sheet
139
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
140
ACTIVITY SHEET PXX-XX-XXX DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF FACILITIES Overview of the Activity The facility systems and structure must be capable of withstanding the design loads to which they will be exposed to as a result of normal and anticipated upset conditions. The correct design of the facility allows for these loads and the subsequent fabrication, construction and / or installation of the facility in accordance with the design will result in the potential for equipment or structural failure leading to a major accident hazard being reduced. This activity includes the modification, decommissioning and/or removal of existing plant and any operations in which it is intended to operate plant outside its stated design limits Hazard Management Objectives of the Activity To ensure the implementation of Design Integrity principles and risk management strategies through all phases of the project to reduce risk levels to ALARP HSE Tasks and Responsibilities PETRONAS Key Tasks
Execution Party (Competency Criteria) Accountable
Responsible
Define performance standards including Safety Critical Elements
Project Manager
Project Technical Authorities i.e. discipline leads
Define the technical integrity management requirements for facilities
Project Manager
Project Engineer
Identify major HSE risks, prepare mitigation plans and demonstrate that HSE risks are ALARP during design
Project Manager
Project HSE Advisor
Project Manager
Project’s Technical Authorities i.e. discipline engineers
Prepare specifications, plans and design, complying with PTS, legal and industry regulations and
Guidelines, Processes and Documentation
Mandatory Control Framework PETRONAS Technical Standards Project Basis of Design
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
codes Prepare performance testing requirements and acceptance criteria for precommissioning and commissioning activities
Project Manager
Construct and install jacket and topsides facilities including all required hook up and testing to manage HSE issues
Project Manager
Design and construct pipelines and subsea flowlines to meet required standards for integrity and prevention of major accidents
Project Manager
Commissioning Lead Engineer
Commissioning Lead Engineer Construction Lead Engineer
Pipelines and Subsea Engineer
Verification As built drawings Data sheets and specifications Audits and reviews during design construction and installation Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) or Site Acceptance Test (SAT) PETRONAS Process Owner: Engineering Manager
141
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 11 Typical Information Required
142
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
143
Item
Description
1.0
Section 1 – Hazardous Substances
1.01
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for all raw materials and products
1.02
Complete list of hazardous substances inventory and data (location, facilities, average storage capacity, maximum anticipated storage)
1.03
Type of leak detection system on-site i.e. fire and gas detection
1.04
Latest JKKP-5 form – Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) 1996 Notification of Industrial Activity Form (Malaysia only)
2.0
Section 2 – Installation Information – “As Built” version
2.01
Map / Layout showing location and surrounding areas / facilities (for onshore – updated version since last submission to DOSH)
2.02
Facilities layout (updated version), Overall Field Layout Drawing and Pipeline routing layout
2.03
Site specific layout plans within each facilities (sub-unit) showing locations and maximum inventory of hazardous substances (updated version)
2.04
Latest offsite population data (onshore only)
2.05
Latest manning levels for personnel on-site and their occupancy factors in identified areas / facilities / platforms. For offshore, maximum and average POB, manning levels on each deck / area
2.06
Total number of wells, number of operating wells including current closed in tubing head pressure, flow rate, flowing temperature, etc) and number of wells that are shut in.
2.07
Design life of each platform, date start of operation and asset integrity assessment of the facility, Details of any asset life extension studies
2.08
Frequency of visit of operators to satellite platforms, duration of each visit
2.09
No. of dedicated supply vessels / standby vessel / FRC
2.10
Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) / Utility Flow Diagram (UFD)
2.11
Heat and Material Balance
2.12
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing (P&IDs)
2.13
Cause and Effect Matrix (Process) / API RP 14C SAFE Chart
2.14
Equipment Layout (Plan view and Elevation view)
2.15
Safety Equipment, fire fighting and escape route layouts
2.16
Hazardous Area Classification drawing
2.17
Functional shutdown logic block diagram
2.18
ESD kill knob loop schematic
2.19
Telecommunication system overall block diagram
2.20
PAGA system block diagram
2.21
Equipment list
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
144
2.22
Facility HAZID Report
2.23
Facility HAZOP Report
2.24
Latest revision of the facility HSE Case
2.25
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report
2.26
Heath Risk Assessment (HRA) Report
2.27
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) / Simultaneous Operations, Hazards and Effects Register (HER) and Critical Activities Catalogue (CAC)
2.28
Close out reports on recommendations raised in all HSE Studies / Assessments / Reports
3.0
Section 3 – Actual Photographs of Facility
3.01
Photograph of helicopter operations
3.02
Photograph of crew transfer operation via boat
3.03
Photograph of lifting activities involving crane and supply boat
3.04
Aerial photographs of the various sides of the facility
3.05
Close up photographs of safety systems / safety critical elements on the facility e.g. firewalls, gas detectors, fire detectors, firewater system and pumps, lifeboats, life rafts, abseiling ropes, etc
3.06
Snap shots of the platform at various angles (elevation view, top, each deck)
4.0
Section 4 – Philosophies – “As Built” version
4.01
HSE / Safety Philosophy
4.02
Basis of Design
4.03
Operating and Maintenance Philosophy
4.04
Escape and Evacuation Philosophy
4.05
Relief, Vent and Blowdown Philosophy
4.06
Shutdown System Philosophy
4.07
Structural Design Basis
4.08
Firewater Protection Philosophy
4.09
Fire and Gas System Philosophy
4.10
Fire Fighting Philosophy
4.11
Process Control System Philosophy
4.12
Safety Instrumented System Philosophy
4.13
Operations Philosophy
5.0
Section 5 – Safety Management System
5.01
Organisation structure / chart at plant level including responsibilities and accountabilities of the management and personnel as provided in the organisation structure
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
145
5.02
HSE committee (as formal communication of HSE issues from the company to other parties) details e.g. function, members, roles and responsibilities, structure, operation, etc
5.03
HSE Plan
5.04
Emergency Response Manual / Arrangements including Platform Emergency Response Plan, Oil Spill Response Plan, Typhoon / Cyclone Response Plan, emergency response team, emergency drills and exercises conducted / planned etc.
5.05
Training details including records (e.g. training needs, type of training conducted, frequency, personnel competency, safety passports, etc)
5.06
Specific courses / permit / certificate for conducting HSE critical work including records
5.07
Risk management documentation e.g. documentation on HSE hazards identification, records, controls and management
5.08
Incident reporting and follow up procedures, records and communication
5.09
HSEMS Audit – HSE elements, frequency, personnel involved, function
5.10
HSE Management System Standard / Manual (not limited to key safety responsibilities, design and operating standards, contractor management, safety committee, training matrix and competence assurance, monitoring and audit, health programmes, security programmes, etc)
5.11
Latest signed HSE Policies, drug and alcohol abuse policy, etc
6.0
Section 6 – Potential Major Accidents
6.01
Risk assessment report for plant modifications, HAZID study report
6.02
Safety and fire fighting equipment layout for all units
6.03
Layout drawing for all EER facilities
6.04
Temporary Refuge Impairment Assessment (TRIA) / Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)
6.05
Evacuation information (muster time, time to prepare lifeboat) based on emergency drill reports
6.06
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) report
6.07
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
6.08
Ship collision study
6.09
Fire and Gas Mapping Study
6.10
All calculation files for all the formal safety assessments e.g. spreadsheets, consequence modelling files, etc
6.11
Fire rating and blast rating specification
6.12
Blast Protection Report
6.13
Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study
6.14
Fire and Gas Detection Study
6.15
Firewater and deluge layouts
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
146
6.16
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
6.17
Dropped Object Study
6.18
Fire and Gas Detection System Layout
6.19
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment and verification reports
6.20
Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV) Report
7.0
Section 7 – Others
7.01
Complete list of plant / platform modifications since last HSE Case / CIMAH submission
7.02
Comments / correspondence between PETRONAS and DOSH since last CIMAH submission to DOSH (onshore only)
7.03
Performance Standards for Safety Critical Elements
7.04
Noise Study Report
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
Appendix 12 Verification Examination Level
147
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production
REVISION 1.0
DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
148
SCE Verification Examination Level The SCE Register will include a “Verification Examination Level”, based on the nature of the asset and the perceived consequence of failure. This examination level will be categorized into three groups 1, 2 and 3, based on the function of the SCE (i.e. inherent safety, prevention, control, mitigation or emergency response), the propensity of failure to escalate the incident, and the extent to which an alternative system can compensate for the failed SCE. The examination level is based on a scoring system with: SCE Verification Examination Level = F x C x A Function Score ‘F’ The distinction between each function is made on the basis that hazard elimination or prevention is more effective than control, which in turn is more effective than mitigation of effects or emergency response. On this basis the following score set has been used: Table A1– Function Score ‘F’ Function
Description
Score
Inherent Safety
Elimination and minimisation of hazards by design
3
Prevention
Reduction of likelihood of occurrence of accidents
3
Control
Limitation of scale, intensity and duration of accidents
2
Mitigation
Protection from effects
1
Emergency Response
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
1
Therefore, typically Structural Integrity and Process Containment barrier groupings will represent examples of inherent safety barriers. Ignition Control, SCEs such as Navigational Aids etc., may represent an example of Prevention. Control and Mitigation functions are typically represented by the Detection, Protection and Shutdown systems. For example, a fire water system, PFP are considered to represent a mitigation function as they offer protection from the effects. However, fire and gas detection, ESD and blowdown systems are Control measures as they will limit the scale and duration of the accident.
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
149
Consequence Score ‘C’ The potential for escalation of an incident due to failure of SCE is scored as follows: Table A2 – Consequence Score ‘C’ Function
Description
Score
Moderate
Failure of the SCE function would not solely contribute to an increase in severity of the consequences.
1
Failure of the SCE function would or could lead to escalation of the consequences, or Significant
Items whose failure could lead to major hydrocarbon release and escalation affecting more than one module or compartment.
2
Failure of the SCE function would or could lead to major escalation of the consequences, or Major
Items whose failure would lead to direct impairment of the TR or emergency escape and rescue (EER) systems including associated support structure.
3
Alternative Score ‘A’ The extent to which an alternative SCE can take over the function of the failed SCE is scored as follows: Table A3 – Alternative Score ‘A’ Alternative
Description
Score
No
There is no SCE that can reasonably duplicate the function of the SCE subject to failure.
2
Yes
There is an alternative SCE that can carry out a similar function to the SCE subject to failure.
1
Verification Examination Level The verification examination level of each SCE is based on the ranges of the examination level scores presented below:
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR HSE CASE
Exploration and Production DOCUMENT NO : EP HSE SG 02 12
REVISION 1.0
DATE: FEBRUARY 2014
150
Table A4 – Verification Examination Levels Level
Score
1
12 to 18
2
6 to 11
3
1 to 5
The verification examination levels may be typically defined as follows:
Examination Level 1 – High consequence of failure, and little or no level of redundancy. Its failure during normal operation could immediately result in a major incident i.e. single barrier to the Major Accident Hazard
Examination Level 2 – Significant consequence of failure, and at least one level of redundancy but could not immediately result in a major incident i.e. two or more barriers to the Major Accident Hazard
Examination Level 3 – Minimal immediate consequences of an individual failure, and having several levels of redundancy i.e. many barriers to the Major Accident Hazard.
The verification examination level of the SCE may influence the frequency of inspection, testing and verification, when considered in conjunction with the likelihood of its failure and the required reliability or availability. However, the verification examination level should be considered in the development of a verification scheme. For example, a high examination level item such as the jacket should attract more verification checks than a less critical item for example a fire water pump. Hence, as the examination levels will impact the verification scheme, it is essential that the methodology adopted for the SCE verification examination levels are agreed with the Independent Verification Body. It should be noted that the Verification Examination Level does not reflect the overall importance of the SCE or distinguish between the importance of one SCE compared to another.
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