Facts

CASE DIGEST: CALTEX V PALOMAR Caltex vs Palomar G.R. No. L-19650 29 September 1966 Facts: In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest". It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex Station will dispense during a specified period. For the priviledge to participate, no fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were required. Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of sections 1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code and declined to grant the requested clearance. Issues: W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the provisions of the Postal Law Held: Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the author's of the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent. Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting

artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the present case, the element of consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of a merchandise was required for the privilege to participate. PCFI v. National Telecommunications Commission G.R. No. L-63318 November 25, 1983FACTS: Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that “there was a necessity of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the application of the PLDT”. On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the questioned decision permanently approving PLDT’s new and increased SIP rates. It is the submission of the petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217. Held: There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to promulgate rules and regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a simple problem of statutory construction – that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision sustained the petitioner’s contention that it is the duty of NTC to first promulgate rules and regulations. The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive “may” and not the mandatory “shall.” The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the

canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we have the following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word “may” in a statute is permissive while the word “shall” is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed as mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no justification for the rate increase of the revised schedule of PLDT’s SIP. It is untimely, considering the present economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the decision of NTC is annulled and set aside. CASE DIGEST: NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL) VS EISMA

NFL v. Eisma G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984 Facts: On 1982, the National Federation of Labor, certified by the Ministry of Labor as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., charged the respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment. Petitioners declared a strike against the respondent, after the latter terminated the president of the union. Respondent firm filed a complaint before the respondent Judge against the members and officers of the union for obstruction and prayed for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The petitioners assail the jurisdiction of

the Court, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, and filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge has jurisdiction on Labor related cases. Held: The issuance of PD No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. Hence, the respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction. CASE DIGEST: PAAT VS CA Paat v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 111107 10 January 1997 Facts: On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Four days later, Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO, issued an order of confiscation and asked the owners to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited within fifteen days. Private respondent, however, failed to do so. R.E.D. Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. de Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration but was subsequently denied. The letter was forwarded to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to the respondent’s wishes. During the pendency of the resolution, however, the respondent filed a suit for replevin. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was later denied by the RTC. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied and the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the confiscation of the truck was valid.

Held: Yes. The suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. The provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 could never be clearer. CASE DIGEST: PEOPLE V MAPA People v Mapa GR No. L-22301 30 Aug 67 Facts: On or about August 13, 1962, Mario Mapa was apprehended due to possession of an unlicensed firearm. The defendant admitted before the trial court that he was carrying the unlicensed firearm and that he does not have a permit to carry such a weapon. In his defense, he said that he is a secret agent of the Governor of Batangas and that he is exempt from the requirement of securing a license of firearm. The defendant also showed a certification that he was appointed as such. Issue: whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary Held: In the present case, there is no room for interpretation or construction because the law is clear. The law provides for the class of people who are not covered in the prohibitive law. No exemption was provided for secret agents. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988 FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case: Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration

(CAA) and. Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years. Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and Contract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years. There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three contracts of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is the same parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is 4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has been reduced to 3,000 square meters. It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it appears that defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil, and the latter, as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of time that also overlapped. Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased. This is the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of brevity, these defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza. Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned. Defendants Leverizas’ claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.

CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid.

another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C) The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A

After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:

Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically “for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.”

1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date; 2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28, 1966 because of the cancellation of Contract A; 3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is still valid and subsisting; CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was properly registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the Airport General Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however denied.

HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. YES

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full: 7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement. Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:

On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for Review on certiorari.

8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand. It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.

ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid contract. The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of

Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They maintain that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for the President, or by delegation of power, the (2)Director of CCA who

could validly cancel the contract. Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.

CASE DIGEST: PARAS VS COMELEC

Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in Contract “A” which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is evident that in the implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said Department Head is no longer necessary if not redundant.

Facts: Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.

CASE DIGEST: DAOANG V MUNICIPAL JUDGE Daoang v Municipal Judge G.R. No. L-34568 28 March 1988 Facts: Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private respondents filed a petition before the MTC of San Nicolas seeking adoption of two minors. Petitioners filed an opposition to the adoption invoking the provisions of the Civil Code. That the respondents have a legitimate child, the mother of the petitioners, now deceased, as such they are not qualified to adopt as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The petition for adoption was granted. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Art. 335. Held: No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, no construction or interpretation should be made. To add “grandchildren” in this article where no such word is included would be in violation to the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included.

PARAS v COMELEC G.R. No. 123169

Issue: Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government Code. Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.