France And Florence 1494

INVASION AND REVOLUTION: FRANCE AND FLORENCE IN 1494

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, THE GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HUMANITIES, AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY AND HUMANITIES

by William Harrison Fredlund June, 1988

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(c) Copyright 1988 by William Harrison Fredlund

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I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

(

InljutUH- 0 /

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(Principal Advisor)

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, In scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

7 (Graduate Program in Humanities)

Approved for the University Committee on Graduate Studies:

(Dean of Graduate Studies)

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PREFACE

In the fall of 1494, the king of France led a m ilitary expedition to Italy for the purpose of claiming his rights to the kingdom of Naples. The size and power of the army caught all Italy unprepared, and in the ensuing turmoil a number of governments within the Italian peninsula were permanently changed. The Florentine Republic found itse lf in an especially exposed situation in front of the advancing army because of its strategic position astride the peninsula and because its leader, Piero de‘ Medici, had guided Florence into declared opposition to the French king. The explosive encounter between the army and the relatively defenseless republic led to a revolution in which Piero de‘ Medici was removed from power on November 9, 1494. It is the intent of this study to examine the relationship between the invasion and the revolution with special interest in the leadership of the two men, King Charles VIII and Piero de' Medici. Previous accounts have relied too heavily upon biased witnesses such as Philippe de Commynes, and it is the object here to see both leaders in new perspectives and thereby to establish a better understanding of the causality of the invasion and revolution. In addition, the reaction to these events by contemporaries as well as later Florentine historians w ill be examined. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professors Judith Brown, Lewis Spitz, and Lawrence Ryan whose encouragement, support, and advice have helped bring this project to completion.

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CONTENTS

PART ONE: N ovem ber 17, 1494 3 13 31 41 53 57 71 85 90

Porta San Frediano The Army King Charles Enters Florence The Piazza della Signoria The Cathedral The Palazzo Medici Charles VIII Charles, Anne, and Louis Fornovo

PART TWO: Lom bardy 124 131 153 170 191

Piacenza Prophets and Omens The Decision The Cousins On the Move

PART THREE: Tuscany 208 223 266 283 296 317 334

Sarzana Florence Piero de' Medici Empoli Santo Stefano di Magra The Ambassadors The Revolution

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Bibliography

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PART ONE: November 17,1494

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On November 17, 1494, under a grey and threatening sky, a French army of 12,000 confident, undefeated soldiers led by King Charles VIII arrived at the southwestern gate of the Republic of Florence after a three-month march across the Alps, Piedmont, and Lombardy. Months of rumor and fear were at an end. That which the citizens of Florence had anxiously anticipated for so long was now upon them.1 The anxiety had driven some right out of the city.

After inconclusive

negotiations between French ambassadors and the Florentine government, the rumor had swept Florence that the French king was furious and would sack the republic on the Amo. Michelangelo, who had feared the worst, took action. He raced over the mountains to the north and settled in Bologna where he worked in San Domenico, the same convent that had sheltered Savonarola for seven years.2

1 For Florentine attitudes In the days preceding Charles' arrival see Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino dal !4 5 0 a l 1516, ed. lodocoDe! Badia (Florence, 1883), p. 70ff., 2 Charles De Tolnay, The Youth o f Michelangelo (Princeton, 1947), p. 20,

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Regardless of the anxiety that remained in the hearts of those citizens who had stayed in the city, they were determined to give the king a public demonstration that would outshine all others. Preparations had been under way for weeks.

Even as Florentine ambassadors

negotiated with Charles VIII in the countryside to the west of the city, within Florence the communal office of the Camera dell'Arme was given the responsibility of organizing the festivities.3 Citizens from each of the city's quarters were chosen to oversee the celebrations, and among the delegation from the Santo Spirito quarter of which the San Frediano Gate was a part, one found the famous name of Machiavelli: Niccolo d'Alessandro Machiavelli, a relative of the young Niccolo, the future diplomat and historian.4 On November 6, two painters, Antonio di Jacopo and Andrea di Salvi, were paid to decorate the Porta San Frediano which was to have painted banners, garlands and tapestries.6

Five days later, on November 11,

the Signoria ordered that all citizens prepare festive garb according to their possibilities and plan to be present at the San Frediano Gate for the king's arrival.6 Thousands had obeyed and were packed into the piazzas and streets around the gate.

3 Eve Borsook, "Decor in Florence for the Entry of Charles VIII of France," Mitteiiungen desKunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz, vol. 1 0 ,11 (Dec. 1961), p. 107. The modest title doesn't begin to describe the richness of this article which includes historical background and a six page section of documents pertaining to Nov. 17, 1494. 4 Borsook, "Decor,” p. 107; also, Roberto Ridolfi, The Life o f Niccolo Machiavelli (Chicago, 1963), p. 29. 5 Borsook, "Decor," p. 107. 6 lodoco del Badia, editor of Landuccl, Diario, provides background material in the notes of his edition of the Diario. See n. 1 above.

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PORTA SAN FREDIANO

The Porta San Frediano was also known as the Porta della Verzaia, which means gate of the cabbage gardens referring to the acres of cabbages ( cavolo or verza) growing in the low, flat, well-watered land along the Via Pisana outside the gate.7 A memory of the cabbages which have long since disappeared from fields now covered w ith apartments, remains in a favorite Florentine saying: "portare cavolo a Legnaia,” which would be analogous to our "carrying coals to Newcastle". No doubt the Signoria saw to it that cabbages were forgotten on this November seventeenth and that the strange saint from Lucca regained possession of his Florentine gate. The saint had firs t given his name to a small neighborhood church, then the street, and then to the great tower-gate designed in 1332 by Andrea da Pontedera (Andrea da Pisa or Andrea Pisano). 8 San Frediano remains a mystery. He is often identified with the Irish Saint Finnian of Moville (sixth century) who fled Galloway after complications with a Pictish girl who fell in love with him-

went to

Rome and may have finished his life as Bishop of Lucca but whether the two men are the same s till remains in doubt. Traders from Lucca apparently carried his fame to this southwest corner of Florence.9

7 Piero Bargellin! and Ennio Guarnieri, Firenze delie Torri (Florence, 1973), p. 188. On pp. 188-90 Bargellini prints a number of different contemporary views of the Porta San Frediano. 8 Bargellini, Firenze delle Torri, p. 188. 9 On Finnian of Moville (San Frediano) see Donald Attwater, The Penguin Dictionary o f Saints (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1965), p. 131.

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The massive tower-gate of San Frediano through which the King of France was about to enter, was part of the extraordinary city wall project begun in 1284, with which the commune planned to extend the size of the protected city to more than double its measure. The proposal was the largest civic building project of fourteenth-century Europe. So enormous was the space contained within the new walls begun in 1284, that only in the nineteenth century did these hundreds of acres begin to fill and then the city, in one of the more despicable acts of official vandalism, tore them downJO The walls were about 12 meters high with the principal gates such as Porta San Frediano originally reaching to 35 meters.

When artillery changed the whole nature of civic security, most

of the tower gates were lowered as was done with Porta San Frediano. But even with its crenellation removed the powerful stone monument must have stood 30 feet high or more and at least 20 feet thick. Normally the space just inside the gate was a busy chaotic neighborhood center and commercial crossroads in which the world of the farm outside the gates mixed with the world of city commerce just inside the great wooden doors.

Peasant women, carefully balancing

vegetable baskets on their heads, tread softly past the customs officers concealing various products to escape the duties levied on everything that entered the city. Carts brought in fru it— apples, pears—from nearby orchards. One relatively new success was the fig brought from Naples in 1466 by Filippo Strozzi and growing extremely well in the area near Pisa thus called Pisani. Another success for Strozzi had been

10 On the great wall project see C. Casamorata, "L’Ultimo cerchio di mura fiorentine," L 'Universo, July-August, 1946; and Bargellini, Firenze delle Torri, pp. 165-170.

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the artichoke ( carciofo) that flourished abundantly in this low wet terrain along the south bank of the Arno and up into the valley of the Elsa. 11 They still grow there today. Besides the fruit and vegetables, mules arrived constantly, weighted down with sacks of grain from the rich rolling plains of the Val d’ Elsa and with flour ground at the mills along the banks of the lower Amo. This gate was especially busy since the fieius stretching just to the southwest were the richest and most productive close-in to the city. The best greens, the best spinach, the best tomatoes, came from the fields of Legnaia where stood the magnificent villa of the Capponi family in which King Charles had been staying as he awaited arrangements for his formal entry into the city.12

In addition to all of the traffic

generated by farmers of the surrounding territory (the contado ), there was also the bustling trade coming to and from Pisa. Through the Porta San Frediano went all the travelers and merchants on their way to Pisa along the Via Pisana, which stretches along the south bank of the Arno, the road along which the king and his thousands of men were now slowly moving.

11 Eve Borsook, Companion Guide to Florence (London, 1973), p. 364. 12 Landucci, Diario, p. 78: "A di 12 detto, mercoledi, ritorno Lorenzo di Piero Francesco de' Medici, e desino alia sua casa della Gora, e la sera medesima ando incontro al Re, che veniva ’albergo a Legniaia, in casa Piero Capponi." This information from Landucci suggests that King Charles spent five days in the home of Piero Capponi (Nov. 12 to Nov. 17), the five days preceding his entry into the city on Nov. 17. If Landucci is correct about the dates, this suggests that the king spent almost a week in the Capponi home and would have given them valuable oppportunity to influence events.

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On this day, November 17, the piazza at the gate had been cleaned and ordered into a magnificent civic theater on whose stage would soon appear the King of France and the Signoria of Florence. A special balcony, a kind of tribune, had been built into the structure of the Porta on the inside so that the Signoria could sit high above the crowd and enjoy the French parade. When the king arrived they would descend to welcome him officially, but the size of the approaching army was such as to require several hours to pass this point and enter the city before the king himself could appear. Thus the Signoria needed some comfort for its wait. The tribune had been decorated with rich tapestries, flowers, and plants. Up above, covering the whole space, was a blue silken sky-tapestry with the arms of Florence emblazoned with gold.13

13 A number of eyewitness accounts of the arrival of King Charles VIII in Florence on November 17, are available. The following are especially important for the ceremonies at the gate: Agnolo and Francesco Gaddi, Estratto dal priorista di Agnolo e Francesco Gaddi in Archivio Storico itaiiano, vol. IV (1853), pp. 46-48; Alamanno Rinuccini, Ricordi storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini dai i2 8 2 a i 1460 coiia continuazione di A lamanno e Neri suoi fig!i, ed. G. Aiazzi, (Florence, 1840), pp. CU1I-CLIV; Marin Sanudo, LaSpedizione di Carlo V iil in ita iia (Venice, 1873), pp. 133-35. Sanudo was not present himself in Florence on November 17, but he used extensive Venetian diplomatic material and knew many witnesses personally. Moreover, his history is a near contemporaneous account, being finished in i495, just after Charles had left Italy. Scores of critical documents, letters, treaties, and the like are reproduced in full and for some material this is the only complete record. The size and the scope of the history is extraordinary; the only printed edition, this one of 1873, runs to 677 pages, thus making La Spedizione the longest most complex attempt at a history of a contemporary period produced in the fifteenth century. See the introduction to this edition by the editor Rinaldo Fulin, pp. 5ff. For the French point of view see Andre de la Vigne, Le Voyage de Naples (Milan, 1981), pp. 208-221.

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The banners and colorful tapestries decorating the porta were echoed on the facades of the great palaces of the quarter. Although the San Frediano district was not the home of the very rich, some w e ll-o ff and influential families such as the Nerli, lived here and had prepared their own buildings with precious hangings and furs and flags for the festivities of the day.14 The ancient lineage of the Nerli is stressed by Dante himself when his ancestor Cacciaguida mentions them in his interview with Dante in the Paradiso-.

E vidi quel de’Nerli e quel del Vecchio esser contenti alia pelle scoperta, e le sue donne al fuso e al pennecchio.15

The Nerli have provided us with a contemporary view of the Porta San Frediano and the neighborhood by way of their commission to Filippino Lippi to paint an altarpiece that now rests in Santo Spirito. In addition to the primary subject matter of the Madonna with Saints, Lippi has also painted a detailed view of the Nerli family in front of their palace as well as the San Frediano gate and its neighborhood in

14 On the Nerli family see Ivo Biagianti, "Politici e storici del Cinquecento: Filippo de' Nerli (1485-1556)," ArchivioStorico Itaiiano, vol. CXXXIII (1975), pp. 69-100. 15 See the Oxford University Press edition, Italian text with English translation by John D. Sinclair (Oxford, 1971), p. 220, lines 115-117: And I saw del Nerli and del Vecchio content in plain buff and their ladies at the spindle and flax.

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the background.16 Behind the Nerli palace the great interior arch of the porta is visible with its painting of the city’s protectress, the Madonna. Down in the streets mules and carts stop at the customs shed while dogs fight nearby over a piece of meat in the road. A mother with her little girl walks through the gate balancing a platter of food on her head. On the steps of the palace stands Tanai de' Nerli, one of the most influential men in Florence in 1494. He had just served as Gonfaloniere di Giustizia (Standardbearer of Justice), the highest elective office of the republic, and in the previous week he had returned from a meeting with King Charles where he had been a member of a Florentine ambassadorial group of five, including Savonarola, that had attempted to reach an agreement with the king.17

In the painting, he is seen

bidding goodbye to his grandaughter and wife Pippa. His brown horse waits closeby with reins tied to the iron ring implanted in the mortar of the palace walls—rings that still project from the palace walls of Florence. The little girl's brother Filippo was then nine years old and on this day was to witness one of the most important events of Florentine history. Forty years later, the adult Filippo turned to the study of the history of Florence and wrote Commentari dei a tti c iv ili occorsi dentro 16 Filippino Lippi, Madonna and child with 55 John the Baptist, Martin, Catherine o f Alexandria, with Tanai de'Ner/i and wife, now conserved in the Nerli Chapel, Santo Spirito, Florence. Katharine Neilson provides an extensive discussion of the dating of the painting and concludes that it was ordered and completed between 1487-88, see her Filippino Lippi (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), pp. 70-72. See also Borsook, Guide, p. 316. A good reproduction is available in Paul George Konody, Filippino Lippi {London, 1905), plate 49. 17 Abel Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane (Paris, 1859), vol. I, p. 598.

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ia citta di Firenze in which he talks of that November when the King of France "venne in Firenze...con tutto 1‘esercito suo..dentro nella citta...con gran pompa e con molta onoranza ricevuto."18 The children's uncle, Jacopo de' Nerli, had played a central role in the revolution of the previous week in which Piero de' Medici was removed from power and chased out of town. Jacopo stood at the great doors of the civic palace, the Palazzo della Signoria, and prevented Piero from entering and was now one of the new post-Medicean heroes.19 Another uncle, Benedetto, would play an equally dramatic role in a Florentine governmental upheaval when four years after King Charles' sojourn in Florence, Benedetto joined three other citizens to supervise officially the fire for the burning of Savonarola ("regolare la prova del fuoco")2^ The Nerli detested Savonarola.21 By midday the crowds had filled every inch of the piazza adjacent to the gate. The last preparations for the entrance of the king were being made. On this November day, the gate had become a giant symbol in stone and mortar of the historic meeting of the commune of Florence with the realm of France. On the exterior of the gate, the side towards Pisa, the city had hung an enormous shield of blue and gold, the French colors, with

18 The standard edition of the Commentari is that edited by C. Settimani and published in Augsburg in 1728, and reprinted, including Settimani's preface, by Coen Editore, Trieste, 1859. For Nerli on Nov. 1494 see p. 103. On Filippo de' Nerli as historian see Eric Cochrane,

Historians andHistoriography in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1981), pp. 278-282. 19 Alamanno Rinuccini, Ricordi storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini

dai 1282a i 1460 coiia continuazione di A iamanno e Neri suoi fig ii, ed. G. Aiazzi (Florence, 1840), p. CL.I1. 20 Biagianti, "Filippo de' Nerli," p. 70. 21 Biagianti, "Filippo de' Nerli," p. 70-71.

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the royal arms and an inscription in French: “Conservateur et Liberateur de Nostre Liberte". 22 More significantly, the Florentines had completely removed the great wooden doors of the gate with their heavy iron locks— the doors that still hang in place— and had knocked down a small part of the wall itself. This hole in the wall was not functional. No one passed through it. Rather, it was a symbolic statement that Florence was thereby a vanquished city. Never before had any conqueror penetrated these walls.23 The ambiguity of the Florentine position and of Florentine sentiment is contained in this imagery at the gate. On the one hand a huge sign announced the event as liberation; on the other the gaping walls suggested the symbolism of conquest. This paradoxical imagery sums up a significant aspect of the Florentine experience with Charles. Florentine witnesses such as Piero Parenti accent the hopeful auguries for the future: "Quod felix faustumque futurum sit." 24 Non-Florentine witnesses such as Angelo Ghivizzano, the ambassador from the Gonzaga court at Mantua, see the event as sad: “. . . la M. del S. R. sie intrato in

22 Yvonne Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III et son m ilieu (Paris, 1975), p. 293. 23 In Marin Sanudo's history of Charles VIII in Italy, this fact of the doors and opening made in the wall is the firs t thing he discusses in his section on Charles in Florence. It clearly had great significance for contemporaries. See La Spedizione di Carlo V III in Ita lia , p. 131. 24 Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, Bib. Naz., II. IV. 169, fol. 199V, extracts in J. Schnltzer, Quellen undForschungen zur Geschichte Savonarolas, IV (Leipzig, 1910), p. 12. For more on Parenti see p. 99, note 3, below.

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questa inf el ice terra."25 Fortunately, the French were alert to the already agitated Florentine sensitivities and refrained from carrying the banners seen at Charles' entry into Lucca: "Veni, vidi. Vincet Caesar alter.”26 By two in the afternoon, the crowd must have been growing uneasy and tired. The firs t shouts from outside the walls along the Via Pisana heralded the approaching procession. Just as the firs t riders neared the entrance, a few drops of rain began to fall. The richly dressed priests and bishops in their sables and other finery reserved for the most exalted occasions, disregarded protocol and ran helter skelter in all directions down side streets, pushing through the tightly packed crowds and nervous horses, looking wildly for any dry doorway or overhanging cornice to protect their silks and brocades. The unexpected disturbance ruined the solemn atmosphere of the occasion for which the city had been preparing for days and irritated the Signoria. Order was restored just in time to welcome the initial group through the wide opening of the gate. Riding at the head of the column as it came through the colossal arch were the Medici cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de' Medici. The two brothers had been maneuvering for months to overthrow their cousin Piero. And now today they would enjoy

25 Angelo Ghivizzano's report to Francesco Gonzaga written on the evening of Nov. 17, 1494 describing the events of the day is printed in "Nuovi documenti su Girolamo Savonarola," ed. A ttilio Portioli, Archivio Storico Lombardo, vol. I (1874), pp. 330-333. 25 Labande-Mailfert, Charles V I/I, p. 290.

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their triumph at the side of Charles as the defeated Piero mourned alone in exile in Venice after three painful years of struggle.27 Among the firs t arrivals the crowd recognized Florentine faces. Lorenzo, Giovanni, and an entourage of 100 pairs of Florentine youths on horseback would lead the royal party through the unfamilair streets to their destination, the cathedral. The on-lookers cheered 200 of their handsomest boys dressed alia francese in cream colored robes with huge sleeves and doublets trimmed in sable and velvet.28 And as the cortege approached the various palaces of the great patrician families, loud hurrahs resounded from family members watching from the decorated palace windows for one of the clan's own riding in this elite two hundred. These youthful fam iliar faces moving gaily through Borgo San Frediano laughing and waving to their friends, lulled the crowd into a relaxed and peaceful mood. The explosion just outside the gate caught them unprepared. Directly behind the Florentine boys came the biggest, noisiest infantry drums the Florentines had ever seen or heard. These pacific w ell-fed merchants were unaccustomed to martial music of this kind and they were stunned.

All the witnesses remark on the powerful

frightening effects of these drums. Sanudo, the Venetian, tells us that

27 Francesco Gaddi, Priorista, p. 47; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 134. For more on the cousins see pp. !70ff. below. 28 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 134. It is interesting to see that the Venetian Sanudo always notices and records in detail the clothing, skillfully distinguishing among types of furs and silks. Also, Ghivizzano, p. 331.

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they appeared as big as a wine vat and that the noise seemed to bring the walls right down.29 The crashing beat of the marching drums brought the citizens back to the business at hand. A foreign army of more than 12,000 men was about to march into their city.30

29 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 134: "... et innanzi a tu tti 4 tamburini con 4 tamburazzi grandissimi, che paravano 4 tinele, .et sonavano con tutte due le mani, et havevavno duo da lati che sonavano zuffoli, et fazevano si grande el strepito che '1 pareva ruinasse quel la via dove i passavano." 3 ° Debate has raged for almost 500 years about the exact size of the French army in Italy in 1494. The debate is well summarized in John Bridge, A History o f France (Oxford, 1924), vol. II, pp. 93-94, Bridge concludes conservatively that the overall force was 30,000 men but this whole army did not come through Tuscany in November, 1494. 5ee also n. 26 above.

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THE ARMY

Leading the forces were seven officers ranged abreast and thus cutting a path so wide that they literally had to sweep onlookers aw?y at some of the narrower points of the Borgo. They wore cuirasses, the breast- and back-plate armor that cover only the upper torso and leave holes for neck and arms. Over tne armor they wore magnificent decorated capes with great slashes for arms and weapons. And topping it all off were enormous hats.31 The outfits delighted the fashion conscious Florentines; the weapons did not. Each officer carried a shining gilded halberd. Although the Florentines did not know what they were, they did not like their looks.32 The halberd firs t appeared in battle in fourteenth-century Switzerland and southern Germany. A straight sharp spike extends from the point of the six-foot shaft (the handle) and an ax-like blade is affixed perpendicular to the shaft. It has a harsh deadly form and gave an immediate advantage to the infantry when it went up against mounted knights. Not only could it break their lances with a blow and even damage their armor, but the little hook at the back of the blade allowed the infantryman to reach up and hook into the armor of the mounted knight and pull him to the ground leaving him exposed to the

31 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 134. 32 Reaction to the halberd, Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 134.

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deadly sharp point. That the halberd came marching through the gate firs t was perfect symbolism. This tool of wood and metal announced the m ilitary superiority of the north, especially Switzerland. And the Florentine reaction—one could say Italian since the Venetian Sanudo and others reacted the same way— is indicative of the dangerous gap that had developed during the fifteenth century between northern Europe and Italy in m ilitary technology. The Florentine reaction was essentially aesthetic: it was ugly 33 As the officers pushed through the crowd they were followed by 200 crossbowmen and troops of archers from Brittany, Gascony, and Picardy. These skilled fighters with bow and arrow were the product of fifty years of French royal policy which commanded that in each parish there should be an archer called franc-archer chosen by an official as the most skilled of the parish. He would keep himself attired with proper clothing, bows arrows and the like, would practice regularly, and would perform publicly on holidays. In exchange he would be exempted from all taxation. This policy had been put into effect by Charles’ grandfather Charles VII. There had been ammendations and changes over the years but the overall result was that fifty years of royal attention had produced an extraordinarily well-trained archery fighting unit.34 As the leading officers and the archers moved down Borgo San Frediano and on through the cheering crowds along Via Santo Spirito, there appeared among the marchers a strange comic giant carrying a 33 J. R Hale provides a larger Italian context within which the reaction to war and its technology is placed. See "War and Public Opinion in Renaissance Italy,” most recently printed in Renaissance War Studies (London, 1983), pp. 359-387. 34 Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 97.

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twisted weapon carved from oak in convoluted shapes. The crowd laughed. As they enjoyed these lighter moments a great dark snake was slowly inching along the Via Pisana towards Florence. For more than two miles along the road outside the gate stretched the infantry marching in perfect formation, seven abreast like the firs t officers, more than 1100 lines of seven men carrying the fourteen-foot pike that was the weapon of these frightening soldiers.35 The view of this westbound road must have presented an extraordinary sight from on high this November afternoon. With the great army stretched out along Via Pisana to the west, moving slowly but purposefully towards the Porta San Frediano, one would have seen the horses, men, carts, drummers, banners, the armor, flashing in the afternoon light, all strung along the edge of the shining ribbon of the curving Arno, framed by the steep dark hills covered with stone-strong terraces supporting purple vines and silver olive. Via Monte Oliveto clinging to the side of Bellosguardo hill just south of the San Frediano Gate would have provided an unrivalled view of this historic procession and no doubt Botticelli and his family, the Filipepi, profited from their recently purchased villa and its extraordinary location in order to watch Charles’ arrival. This villa s till stands today

35 About the exact numbers of various units of Charles' army there is a great deal of debate(see n. 21) but as regards the numbers that actually arrived and entered the city on Novermber 17, the witnesses are in close agreement. All seem to have counted the Swiss infantry at about 8,000. SeeSanudo, Spedizione, p. 134 (he says 10,000), Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 331 (he says 8,000).

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at *9 6 Via Monte Oliveto.36 Botticelli was probably troubled by the events of this week. He had been close to Lorenzo II Magnifico and his son Piero for many years and yet he was also a good friend of the cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, who were today leading Charles into the city and enjoying Piero's overthrow. Botticelli had painted La Primavera and The Birth o f Venus for the "cousins" who came from a junior branch of the Medici family. In addition, he was being barraged by the arguments of his brother Simone who was a fanatical follower of Savonarola and hated the Medici—all the Medici— as perpetrators of a sixty year tyranny.37 The black line of soldiers continued to move along the road and through the gate and into the tiny city streets of Florence filling the space from wall to wall with the forbidding phalanx protected by the fourteen-foot pike. The cheers and laughter began to fade and the sheer physical reality of these thousands of foreign soldiers inside the city began to register. Florentines had never before seen such an army inside their city.

Not even an army of their own. The last time that soldiers in

any number had come inside the city gates was in September, 1466, when Piero di Cosimo had brought 3,000 soldiers into the Piazza Signoria and immediate neighborhood to ensure control of a Parlamento, a public

36 On the Botticelli villa see Ronald Lightbown, Sandro B otticelli Life and Work (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978), p. 127; Piero Bargellini and Ennio Guarnieri, Le Strade di Firenze (Florence, 1977), vol. II, p. 295, with illus. The extraordinary view from the villa which is still reknowned in Florence today would undoubtedly have drawn the family and friedns up from the city for such an extraordinary occasion. 37 Lightbown, B otticelli, p. 128.

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assembly, that was deciding the fate of the government.38 But that was only for a day or so. Who knew how long these men would stay?' The lines of perfectly drilled marchers continued pushing through the narrow stone streets beating a hard rhythm on the rock-solid roadway beneath them. The Italian scorn for infantry began to fade. These men looked truly formidable even in the eyes of those who deemed real military valor as possible only on horseback. The medieval mind instinctively envisoned the warrior, the true knight, the hero in battle, on a horse. This imagery was being destroyed by these Swiss mercenaries, just as their brethren had destroyed the finest of Burgundian knighthood at the Battles of Grandson and Morat. There was a political revolution implied as well. Infantry meant by definition a large number of men, men who were armed. Such a force was manageable only within a secure political context in which the government need not fear that these men would turn on the government itself. The meaning of this kind of force was especially difficult to integrate into the Italian political situation in which a significant number of the city-state governments— for example, the government of Ludovico Sforza in Milan — lacked clear, widely accepted, and enduring legitimacy, whereas the governments of France, England and Spain were at this time in a positon of having achieved rather recently a generally accepted status of legitimacy and stability.

And it was Charles Vlll's

invasion of Italy in 1494 that brought this m ilitary revolution to Italy. Within one year Machiavelli was leading the movement for the formation

38 On the events of September 1466, see Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government o f Florence Under the Medici (Oxford, 1966), p. 164.

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of a Florentine infantry on the Swiss model.30

|n 1520, he wrote that

the footsoldier should be twenty times as numerous as the horsemen.40 Machiavelli said that the infantry was the "substance and sinew of an army, and that part of it which ought constantly to be considered."4 1 In that case the French army that marched into Florence on November 17, had Swiss muscles. King Charles' father, Louis XI, had recognized the weakness in the native French peasant infantry and therefore had arranged a permanent alliance between France and the Swiss cantons whereby the French 2rmy would have use of the Swiss mercenary force. This agreement transformed the French army overnight into the preeminent fighting force of Europe.42 As Borgo San Frediano and Via Santo Spirito began to fill to overflowing with thousands of Swiss infantry, more drums then flutes then banners came through the gate. Behind the banners came black-

30 On the Swiss m ilitary revolution see the s till valuable F. L. Taylor, The A rt o f War in Italy, 1494-1529 (Cambridge, 1921), esp. pp. 29-33. Also helpful is J. R. Hale's essay, “International Relations in the West: Diplomacy and War," in The New Cambridge Modem History: the Renaissance (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 259-264. The m ilitary revolution of Grandson and Morat is brilliantly described in Richard Vaughn, Charles the Bold {London, 1973), chapt. 10, "Savoy, Grandson and Murten," pp. 359-398. On Machiavelli and the Swiss model see Taylor, War, p. 36. 40 Niccolo Machiavelli, Arte della Guerra , Bk. II, in Tutte leOpere, ed. Mario Martel 1i (Florence, 1970), pp. 317-334. 41 Machiavelli, Discorsi, Bk II, Chapt. 18, in Tutte leOpere, ed. Mario Martel 1i (Florence, 1970), pp. 171-173. 42 A good brief summary of these events is available in Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 105-110 and J. R. Hale War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620 (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 149-152. Also see Paul Murray Kendall, LouisX! (New York, 1971), chapt. 21: "The Swiss," for details of the relationship between Louis and the Swiss cantons in their war with Charles the Bold.

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faced soldiers. These were the gunfighters ( arquebusiers) with faces blackened with the charcoal gunpowder of their profession. One can imagine these toughened Swiss mercenaries sitting in camp along the Arno putting on their black ”make-up" and chuckling over the effect it would soon have upon their fat burgher hosts.

Arquebuse is a French

word—harquebus in English, arcobugio in Italian. The word derives from the Middle Dutch "hake“ meaning hook and “busse" meaning box.43 The “hook” was on the end of the muzzle and allowed the soldier to secure the gun against a wall or into a stable stand of some kind. The northern European origin of the word alerts the reader to s till another m ilitary technology in which the Italians were inferior in 1494. The development of truly portable and powerful firearms was firs t pursued in the late fourteenth century especially at Liege where they were experimenting in the manufacture of small "hand cannons.”44 The most important technological problem, the solution of which would transform a cannon into a rifle (arquebuse ) was the firing mechanism. The soldier needed to be able to hold the "rifle" with two hands and have it fire automatically. The earliest solution was the matchlock; the firing mechanism held a lighted match which was then plunged down into the firing powder when the trigger was pulled. And thus the firing would be completed. A drawing from the year 1411 shows the firs t illustration of a matchlock arquebuse. 4^

43 American Heritage Dictionary (New York, 1969), p. 602. 44 Auguste Demmin, An Illustrated History o f Arms and Armor (London, 1877), p. 67 45 Weapons, An International Encyclopedia (New York, 1980), p. 111.

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During the fifteenth century the Swiss and southern Germans developed the use of portable firearms in battle. Obviously, the introduction of portable firearms required a whole new military strategy. In Italy the peasants seem to have developed skills with small firearms while the generals continued to look down upon them as not fitting and proper for the fine art of war. Sanudo quotes a letter from a

Governador of a Venetian camp in 1495 in which the leader speaks of "cavalli 5500 et zerca pedoni 6000, il resto cernide et guastadori, schiopetieri etc." (horse 5500 and about 6000 infantry, the rest: leavings and spoilers and shooters, etc) 48 It was the expedition of Charles VIII to Italy that forced Italian recognition of the value of this technology and its use within m ilitary strategy. The Italians caught on fast. Machiavelli had infantry with firearms in the m ilitia organized in 1506.47 And when Italians turned their attention to the technological problems of firearms they made important advances. In 1500, Leonardo da Vinci designed a dramatically improved wheelock firing mechanism with a turning wheel and flin t which replaced the cumbersome match. 48 The gun-toting Swiss mercenaries were truly frightening to the Florentines with their black faces and huge helmets and "necklaces" on which they carried their firing powder in tiny boxes looking like some kind of mysterious and dangerous amulet. But they were few in number compared to the overall force. In this army marching into Florence, the infantry carrying firearms were only about one-tenth the number of the

48 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 404. 47 Machiavelli, S c ritti inediti di Machiavelli, ed. Canestrini, pp. 325, xxxix. 48 Weapons...Encyc/opedia, p. 111.

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overall infantry. They were just auxiliaries to the pikemen 49 But this ratio of gunmen to pikemen changed quickly and in 1521 at Milan, Prospero Colonna's garrison of 40,000 had 9,000 Spanish arquebusiers: one in four. In 1527, the Duke of Urbino’s army of about 30,000 had 10,000 men armed with guns, a ratio of one in three. And in the same year the Prince of Orange commanded two companies made up entirely of arquebusiers 59 The men marching into Florence on November 17, 1494, were announcing a revolution in m ilitary technology. A great trumpet sounded to announce the entry of the cavalry which was a delight to the crowd after the passage of the dark menacing troops. First came about sixty men on the biggest horses that anyone had ever seen. Angelo Ghivizzano, the ambassador from Mantua, noted well the horses since the recipient for whom his report was intended, Francesco Gonzaga, the Duke of Mantua, was one of the firs t to undertake the scientific breeding of war horses and was importing stallions from Turkey, Spain, and Ireland.51 Up to this time the only quality sought in war horses was power and bulk sufficient to carry up to 700 pounds, the combined weight of a rider and armor.52 Some of the knights wore spectacular outfits of golden brocade and velvet and carried colorful pennants that brought a festive air back to the proceedings.

Besides the

pennants, some carried the mace and some carried the lance. While they

49 Taylor, War,p.4\. 59 Taylor, War, pp. 47-48. Guicciardini in Bk XVII-XV111 of Storia d'ltalia ed. S. Menchi (Turin, 1971) remarks on these figures. 51 Giovio, Elogia Clarorum Virorum, Bk V. (Francesco Gonzaga). 52 Donald Braider, The Life, History andMagic o f the Horse (New York, 1973), p. 58.

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23

rode holding the reins in the left hand, their right was free to grasp the lance or the mace with the weapon supported against the right thigh. The mace ("masse" in French, "mazza” in Italian) had been the quintessential medieval weapon in the age of armor. Its function was to pound through heavy armor thus its huge head was spiked to break open a knight's protective metal skin. The knights carrying the lance rested them against the thigh at the slanted position for ready combat, a fact the witnesses noted. Sanudo s a y s : .. portavano le lanze inclinate come se volessano imberciare."55 In Tuscan, “imberciare” means to hit the mark.

Immediately behind the beautiful leaders came 1,000 more

cavalry riding two abreast some carrying bow and arrow, and others with the crossbow and more with mace and lance. So richly dressed were these last cavaliers that Sanudo tells us they must all have been nobility (“. . . tanto riccamente che tutti doveano esser o conti o signori, et era zente molto fiorita.").54 And indeed they were. This was the firs t part of the king's immediate party. By late in the afternoon, the crowds had been squeezed into the piazza for hours and everyone must have been exhausted. But the air was electric with the noise of the trumpets and coronets and tamborines still coming through the gate. Thousands of horses and soldiers had passed and now more were filling in the spaces of the area around the gate to witness the exciting moment of the arrival of the King of France. Every window looking on to the piazza was filled with ladies and gentlemen; the balconies and loggias were crowded close to collapse.

53 Banudo, Spedizione, p. 134; Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 331; Gaddi, Priorista, p. 47. 54 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 135.

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Florentines with duties elsewhere in the city were now converging on the spot to see everything. The streets adjoining the Porta San Frediano were packed solid with people. And all the time the members of the king's party kept coming through the gate. Then at a signal from the Gonfaloniere di Giustizia, Francesco di Martino dello Scarfa, and the Signoria in their tribune, twenty trumpeters of the official Signoria guard dressed in the colors of the King of France—white and v e rm ilio n moved in under the arch of the gate, raised their polished trumpets and blasted an official announcement of the king's arrival that echoed all through the quarter and caught the crowd's attention.55 The royal party started through the gate. First came the princes of the blood, dukes and counts, among whom were two Italians well known to the Florentine onlookers: Galeazzo di Sanseverino and Don Ferrante, son of the Duke of Ferrara. That Galeazzo would head the royal party in procession was appropriate. In his person were combined half a dozen significant lines of authority and history, all important to the enterprise of the King of France in Italy. The family of Sanseverino was an ancient noble family of Naples; but they were not originally Italian. They had come to Italy with the Norman invasions of the eleventh century and in 1045 had obtained the county of Sanseverino near Salerno from Robert Guiscard.56 in 1266, they had fought at the side of Charles Anjou as the fate of all of southern Italy and Sicily was decided at the ancient Roman crossroad site of Benevento where the Via Appia joined the other 55 Sanudo, Spedizione, pp. 134-134. 56 On the Sanseverino family see introductory article in Lessico Universale itaiiano (Rome, 1978), vol. XX, pp. 39-40. For the Norman invasions of southern Italy see J. J. C. Norwich, The Normans in the South, f 0 l6 - f lJ 0 { London, 1967).

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southern Roman roads. This was where Pyrrhus had been defeated in 275 B.C. Benevento sits on the "spine' of the southern peninsula. It yields control of all north-south as well as east-west traffic and it can totally isolate Naples from the inland routes. Charles of Anjou was the brother of the King of France.57

He had

been invited into Italy by Pope Clement IV. At Benevento he confirmed his conquest of the Kingdom of Sicily (which included Naples) and the Pope officially invested him with its royal office. With their blood spilled beside Charles at Benevento, the Sanseverino family forever joined their hopes of power in the Neapolitan kingdom to the fate of the French. The Battle of Benevento was the historical antecedent that explained Galeazzo's presence today at the side of the King of France. It also explained the claims to Naples that were the legal origins of this expedition of the King Charles to Naples that was today passing through Florence on its way to the sunny south. Charles maintained that he was the rightful heir to that other Charles of 228 years before, and therefore was legally entitled to the crown of Sicily-Naples 58 The eclipse of the Angevin house of Sicily-Naples in the fifteenth century landed the Sanseverino family in exile in France. Among these boisterous discontented Neapolitans at the French court, the most 57 The best introduction to Charles Anjou is in Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers (Cambridge, 1958), esp. pp. 65-77. Also see Ferdinand Schevill, Medieval and Renaissance Florence (New York, 1963), vol. I, pp. 135-140. 58 For King Charles Vlll's rights to the Neapolitan crown see Ph. Van der Haeghen, "Examen des droits de Charles VIII sur le royaume de Naples," Revue Historique, vol. XXVI 11(1885), pp. 39- 111. This has been a very influential article but is filled with errors. For a recent review of the problem and corrections see Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, pp. 169-176, esp. p. 174, n. 208 on Van der Haeghen.

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important and most influential was Antonello, the brother of Galeazzo.59 From 1489 on, Antonello was able to capture the attention of the King of France, to inflame his martial dreams, and to encourage those dreams in a Neapolitan direction. Galeazzo remained in Italy, living in Milan, where he was treated as a member of the family— like a son—by the de facto ruler of Milan, Ludovico Sforza. Galeazzo's father, Roberto Sanseverino, had been a very close m ilitary ally and condottiere for Ludovico's father, Francesco Sforza, thus Galeazzo fe lt almost like a member of the ruling Sforza dynasty of Milan. And ini 496, so he became. The year after Charles left Italy, Galeazzo married Bianca Sforza, the illegitimate daughter of Ludovico.60 When Ludovico became deeply involved in Charles' plan to come to Italy and desired to send a totally reliable and authoritative ambassador to Charles in 1494, he chose Galeazzo. This was the perfect choice since Galeazzo and his family represented the historic legitimacy of French authority in Naples. Galeazzo was a great success. Charles seems to have become deeply attached to this young, handsome, athletic Neapolitan; at night they would go out drinking and carousing together. Galeazzo taught the king to play CaJcio Fiorentino. The young king kept Bello Galeazzo with him constantly so that others at the French court, especially the king's firs t cousin, Louis d'Orleans (the future Louis XII), became extremely jealous of Galeazzo.61 No doubt some of Louis'

560n the Neapolitan exiles at the French court see Ernesto Pontieri, "Napoletani alia corte di Carlo VIII," in Per la storia del regno di Ferrante / d'Aragona Re di Napoli (Naples, 1969, 2nd Ed.). Also Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIIi, p. 191. 60 Cecilia Ady, A History o f Milan Under the Sforza (London, 1907), p. 162. 61 Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, pp. 269-270.

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anger at Galeazzo was fueled by Louis' designs on Milan for himself and his fears that Galeazzo and Ludovico were scheming together about the Milanese succession and might even succeed in drawing the king into their plans. This personal duel fought betweeen Louis and Galeazzo in the salons of the royal court at Lyons was an adumbration of a later confrontation between the two on the fields of battle when Louis, then King Louis XI I, made a grab for Milan and Galeazzo served as commanding general of the Milanese troops.62 Galeazzo gained even greater influence within the French court than had his brother Antonello; he became an inseparable companion to King Charles before the expedition and remained at his side during much of the king's time in Italy. But it should be remembered that Galeazzo's loyalty went above all to Ludovico Sforza, not to King Charles. Thus when the two fell apart Galeazzo went to the side of Sforza. He died at the Battle of Pavia in 1525, fighting in the service of the third French king he had known, Francis I.63 We should note one more interesting fact that complicates one step further the extraordinary influence of the Sanseverino in this story of 1494: Caterina Sanseverino, Galeazzo's cousin, was Piero de'Medici's mother-in-law. Her role in this crisis of 1494 reveals just how complex were the lines of family tradition, domestic politics and international diplomacy. As a Sanseverino she was devoted to the cause of a French royal return to Naples and involved herself directly in the international maneuvers taking place between some Florentines and the French

62 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, p. 174f f . 63 "Galeazzo Sanseverino," Less/co Universale Italiano, vol. XX, p. 40.

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court 64 As a Medici she found herself living in the palace from whence was coming some of the most important opposition to such a French invasion organized by her own son-in-law, Piero. Her contact with her kinsman Galeazzo put her in direct touch with Milanese events at a time when Ludovico Sforza was actively plotting against Piero. Once Piero was overthrown and the French arrived, Caterina was a central figure in the negotiations with Charles in which she attempted to enable Piero to return to Florence.65 Riding next to Galeazzo as they came through Porta San Frediano was Don Ferrante d'Este, the son of the Duke of Ferrara. Ferrante was comfortable with his role as a French cavalier. He had been received into the royal French family more than a year before when his father, Duke Ercole, had sent him to do service with the French king and thereby to bind France in an intimate relation with the Estensi dukedom of the Po delta. Like Galeazzo he was an intimate friend and frequent companion of King Charles. His position at the head of the royal party accented Ferrara’s role as an open partisan of the French expedition to Italy from its earliest formation. Ercole’s decision to send his son Ferrante to the French court was a public proclamation of his diplomatic intent in the matter of the French invasion and the French king rewarded this loyalty by Ferrante's role of honor.66 64 Labande-Mailfert, Charles VI//, p. 208. 65 For the political maneuvers of Caterina and her daughter Alfonsina Orsini in November 1494, see Piero Parent!, Storia fiorentina, Bib. Naz„ Magi., II. IV. 169, fols. 200v-fol. 204T (Schnitzer, Quelten-W pp. 12-18) 66 For Ferrara's relations with the French court and Ferrante's sojourn in France see the following: Werner Gundershelmer, Ferrara, The Style o f Renaissance Despotism (Princeton, 1973), p. 225ff.; Edmund Gardner,

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29

Guicciardini provides an extraordinarily convoluted explanation for the Ferrara choice of a pro-French position in 1494. He suggests that Ercole was secretly urging on Ludovico Sforza in his plan of the French invasion so that in the resulting chaos that was expected, Ferrara would be able to regain that part of its territory, called the Polesine, recently lost in a war with Venice. Even worse, Guicciardini goes on to repeat gossip of the day that suggested that Ercole was noping for the destruction of Ludovico in the deluge that would result: that he secretly hated his own son-in-law due to Ludovico's role in the recent war.67 This is all too bizarre and completely without foundation. The truth is simple. Ferrara's enemy was above all Venice. Only a French army would have real leverage against Venice. Thus it was in the interest of Ferrara to cooperate with France. Besides, there was a very long tradition in Ferrara of ties to France and French culture and in the 1490s this was widely manifested by a broad sector of the upper class in their clothes, food and literature. Courtiers and other citizens dressed alia

Francese. 68 But we should not think that the pro-French policy of Ferrara in 1494 was an easy choice. The target of the French invasion, Naples, was bound to Ferrara with the intimacy of family blood. Ferrante's namesake was the recently deceased King of Naples, his grandfather. The French were on their way to dethrone Ferrante's uncle. Thus the alliance of Ferrara and France against Naples was all in the family and produced deep

Dukes and Poets o f Ferrara (New York, 1904), p. 235, 239, & 248,; Ermanno Lanzoni, Ferrara, una cittan ella storia (Ferrara, 1984), pp. 266ff. 67 Guicciardini, Storia d ltalia , ed. 5. Menchi (Turin, 1971) vol. I, p. 37. 68 Gundersheinner, Ferrara, p. 225.

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suffering within the Estensi household where Ferrante’s mother Eleonora was a member of the royal family of Naples and one of the most widely respected women of her age. It was her brother, Alfonso, who would soon be facing this army with which her son Ferrante now rode. And it was still another relative, Ferrante's brother-in-law Francesco Gonzaga, married to his sister Isabella, who would lead the Italian army against King Charles in the battle of Fornovo in the following year. If all these family ties caused Ercole some anguish in relation to the French alliance, a famous son of Ferrara, Savonarola, seems to have had a critical influence on Ercole in strengthening his resolve to stick with the French. In letters to Ercole that influenced him deeply, Savonarola told the duke that Charles was divinely inspired to this mission in Italy and that all should join what was God’s w ill.69 Considering the importance of the early and strategically valuable decision on the part of Ferrara to support the King of France, it is interesting to speculate that Savonarola's most decisive contribution to the invasion may have been these letters to Ferrara rather than all the influential sermons he preached in Florence.70

69 Gundersheimer, Ferrara, p. 226. 7 ° For more on Savonarola's role in these events see below pp. 139ff.

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THE KING ENTERS FLORENCE

As the crowd waited for the king to come through the gate, the sun was dropping low in the western sky toward Pisa. The parade of soldiers, horsemen, drummers, trumpeters, bannerbearers, clowns, and nobles had lasted for hours and now there was only another hour left before sunset.7 1 Fortunately, the Signoria had planned for nighttime festivities and all residents had been commanded to prepare torches for their street-side walls.72 The king rode through the gate on a magnificent black stallion from the mountain valleys of Savoy preceded by the royal squire carrying the monarch's sword. The horse wore a complete set of equestrian armor covered by a cloth of gold. The huge steed, given to the king by his cousin at Turin, was a precious companion to Charles and carried him in each of his triumphal entries into the three great cities of Italy that witnessed his royal procession: Florence, Rome, and Naples. "Savoy" also carried him into the most important battle of his life, the Battle of Fomovo, fought about ten months after this November day. At Fornovo, Charles gained considerable fame as a wise and brave general.7^' All around Charles were French nobles, part of the

71 Henri-Francois Delaborde, [.‘Expedition de Charles V/li en ttalie (Paris, 1888), p. 460. 72 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136. 73 On the Battle of Fornovo see below pp. 92ff.

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official royal guard walking along at his side, their golden capes occasionally dragging on the stone streets.74 All the witnesses remembered Charles' position as he rode through the gate. Giovanni Portoveneri from Pisa recalled "Re Carlo... colla lanza in sulla coscia."75 His lance rested against his thigh and was inclined in the battle-ready stance advertising his rights as a conqueror even if the banners hanging on the gate under which he rode announced liberation. Was this conquest or liberation? Angelo Ghivizzano, writing at the end of the day, saw it clearly: this was the day Florence lost her liberty 76 But the crowd crying "Viva Francia, Viva Francia" didn't seem to react that way. It is interesting to note that in none of the accounts of that day do we hear of the crowd shouting for Charles personally. It is always "Viva Francia" and not "Viva Carlo". It would seem that his personality or personal cult was not a significant factor in this popular reaction, although it is strange since the most powerful preacher in Florence, Savonarola, had been preaching specifically about Charles as a holy savior for many months.77 As Charles entered the city the bells of nearby San Frediano began to ring and then all the churches of the city picked up the signal and echoed

74 For the entrance of King Charles into Florence see the following: Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 135; Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 331; Gaddi, Priorista, p. 47; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, pp. 459-460; Labande-Mailfert, Charles Vi//, p. 294. 75 Giovanni Portoveneri, Memoriale d i Giovanni Portoveneri in ArchivioStorico Italiano, vol. VI, pt. ii (1845), p. 289. 76 Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 333. 77 See below, pp. 139ff.

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a welcome melody across the red tile rooftops 78

It is easy to imagine

the excitement of this moment. The drums and tambourines were still audible in the distant streets as the soldiers continued to march ahead toward the cathedral. The bells were sounding in every parish. The crowd, yelling and shouting, was packed in with thousands of nervous horses. The trumpets of the Signoria and the king's entourage added to the boisterous medley. Francesco Gaddi, a member of the welcoming committee for the Signoria, tells us what happened next.79 As Charles neared the tribune where the Signoria had watched the parade, the members of the government left their box and descended onto the street to greet him officially, and to witness the formal welcoming oration to be delivered by Luca Corsini. Just at this moment it began to rain again and all the people ran for cover, pushing and shoving and getting mixed up with the horses and banners. The Signoria found itself caught up in the middle of a wild melee and had to retire. Francesco tells us that fortunately he was able to beat a path through the excited horses and scrambling people and reach the king so as to deliver a few words of welcome in French to which Charles replied graciously. ("Furono usate alcune brevi et accomodate parole in lingua franzese; alle quali benignamente rispose Sua Maesta."80) The king continued on but without the Signoria at his side as had been planned. One can imagine the terrible disappointment for the governors of Florence to miss the entry procession they had planned so carefully

78 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 135. 79 Gaddi, Priorista, p. 47. 88 Gaddi, Priorista, p. 47.

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during the preceding weeks. His Majesty continued down Borgo San Frediano riding under a decorated canopy colored with the arms of France and carried by the sons of the great patrician families of Florence, one of whom was Lorenzo di Filippo Strozzi whose betrothal to the daughter of Bernardo Rucellai, a marriage portending dangerous anti-Medicean alliances, had set off a political explosion in Florence.8 ^ There came behind hundreds of nobles, clerics, members of the royal chancery, valets, cooks, bakers, chambermaids, carpenters, and clerks. And what about the 500 prostitutes that Sanudo tells us traveled with the army?82 Did they come into the city too? As the king left the piazza adjacent to the Porta San Frediano, the onlookers ran across the city to be at the cathedral to see his arrival and welcome by the Archbishop. Charles moved slowly down narrow Borgo San Frediano and on through Via Santo Spirito passing close by the cloisters of the Augustinian convent attached to Santo Spirito, the architectural gem of the Oltrarno designed by Brunelleschi.83 On the other side of the street opposite the cloister buildings stood the huge tower of the Lanfredini, whose roots were traceable to another invader, a German Emperor in the tenth or eleventh century, and who were now some of the strongest supporters of the Medici. The Lanfredini had

81 Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968), p. 80. On the Strozzi-Rucellai marriage see below pp 253ff. 82 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 210 83 On Santo Spirito, the church and the neighborhood, see Borsook, Guide, pp. 3 i 3-318 and 327-329.

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served as Priors, Gonfalonieri, and ambassadors.84 Giovanni Lanfredini had been chosen by Lorenzo de’ Medici to represent Florence in Rome in 1488 at a critical time when the marriage of Lorenzo’s son Piero was being finalized, and in the years after Piero’s fall the Lanfredini stayed loyal to the Medici. In the later years when the Medici returned to rule the city, this Oltrarno family was greatly honored by Pope Leo X.88 Just past Santo Spirito, the royal party emerged into Piazza Frescobaldi which takes its name from a tower-palace that commands the south side of the Santa Trinita bridge. The Frescobaldi were an ancient feudal family with castles and farms in the Val di Pesa, a small river valley just south west of Florence. Charles' army had just crossed the tiny Pesa near where it drops into the Arno. The Frescobaldi made a successful transition into banking in the thirteenth century and wielded enormous power in Florence all through the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. On a corner of the piazza s till stands the thirteenth-century palace of the Frescobaldi.88 Another Charles with an army from France, Charles of Valois, stayed in this same palace during his sojourn in Florence in 1301.87 Did anyone

84 On the Lanfredini see M. A. Mansfield, A Family o f Decent Folk, 1200-1741 (Florence, 1922); Bargellini, Firenze de/le Torri, pp. 155-156. 85 For the correspondence of Giovanni Lanfredini with Lorenzo de' Medici see ASF, MAP, LXXXIX, 312; XCVI, 49. 88 On the palace and the piazza see Bargellini, Strade, vol. I, pp. 371372. On the Frescobaldi family and business see Armando Sapori, "La Compagnia dei Frescobaldi," in studi di storia economica medievale (Florence, 1947), pp. 579-646. 87 For an eyewitness account of Charles Valois in Florence see Dino Compagni, Cronaca de/le cose occorentine'tempisuoi (Milan, 1982), pp. 124ff.

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tell King Charles as he paused in front of the palace that the founder of the Valois dynasty had stayed there 193 years before? Did witnesses think of it as they stood there in Piazza Frescobaldi and remember that Charles of Valois had entered Florence through the same Porta San Frediano, through these exact same streets? Maybe not. The memory of that French presence in Florence would have been the last of all historical precedents the Florentines would have wanted recalled on this festive day. That earlier Charles had brought with him one of the most destructive horrors ever visited upon the Florentines and the French troops, once welcomed inside the gates, had presided over one of the most treacherous and murderous episodes in Florentine history. Its memory would not have augured well 'or this day's honored guest. The horses and banners and squires all came to a stop in Piazza Frescobaldi so that Charles and his party could enjoy a spectacular float —Sanudo called it a cart with a building on it —positioned by the bridge to present to the king a religious tableau of the Annunciation similar to those displayed each March 25 in the Piazza Annunziata in front of the church of Santissima Annunziata. Actors portrayed the Virgin and the Angel Gabriel with the whole scene enclosed by rich tapestries. It seems that several wagons made up this presentation since Bartolomeo Cerretani mentions "Trionfo sui Carri" along with singers who sang the King's praises ("...un Trionfo sui Carri molto magnifico con ottimi musici i quali Laudi di esso Re con inaudita armonia dolcemente cantavano...").88 Sanudo says that the house on wheels seemed “cosa bella" to the king.89

88 Bartolomeo Cerretani as quoted in Borsook, "Decor," p. 108, n. 28. 89 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 135.

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Charles and his men moved out of the piazza and past the Palazzo Frescobaldi on the corner and down Borgo San Jacopo, the narrowest of all the streets of his parade route. Here it was clear to him why he had had to leave the great cannons outside of Florence and send them on along to Siena. The cannon, cart, and thirty-six horses for each heavy gun would never have been able to maneuver through these medieval alleys. This narrow borgo led the king to the south side of the Ponte Vecchio where the procession entered Borgo di Piazza (now Via Guicciardini). As they turned the corner under the menacing tower of the Mannelli that had guarded this vital spot for hundreds of years, Charles could have glanced up the street to the gloomy house and ancient tower of the Guicciardini that was not yet developed into the palace that we see on the spot today.99 Young Francesco was an eleven-year old student of Latin and the humanities at this time, studying in the family home under the guidance of ser Giovanni della Castellina. 91 Francesco was especially attached to his grandmother Guglielmetta de’ Nerli of the Nerli family whose palace stood near the Porta San Frediano. 92 Did he stand here at this corner just outside his home and watch the king go by? More likely he went with his father to the Piazza Signoria or to the San Frediano gate itself. He tells us that a great number of richly dressed young men went out to meet the King of France. Was he among them?93 90 P. Guicciardini and E Dori, Leantiche case e / / palazzo dei Guicciardini in Firenze (Florence, 1952), pp. 32, 116. 91 Roberto Ridolf i, The L ife o f Francesco Guicciardini (New York, 1968), p. 5. 92 Ridolf i, Guicciardini, p. 4. 93 Storie fiorentine, ed. Aulo Greco (Novara, 1970), p. 151: .. adorono a incontrarlo a cavallo moltissimi giovani vestiti riccamente con livree; andovvi tutti gli uomini di qualita..."

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On the same street as the Guicciardini houses but a little closer to the bridge was located the house of the Machiavelli where twenty-five year old Niccolo was living with his two sisters and brother and parents, Bernardo and Bartolomea.94 The king turned his black horse up onto the bridge and began slowly to cross the river on this span where a bridge had stood since Roman times. The firs t bridge had been built in this location because here one finds the narrowest section of river in the whole upper Arno valley; it was a good choice from an engineering standpoint for the original Roman bridge. Parts of it survived right up to the flood of 1333, the worst in Florentine history. But if this was a good place to build a bridge, it was a terrible place to build a city. The narrowness of the river here—exactly what attracted the bridgebuilders— creates a kind of bottleneck for the water tumbling down through the Arno valley from the mountains up in the east. The river is narrowing for miles, always building up pressure as the water is restricted into a narrower and narrower channel, rushing faster and faster downstream toward the Ponte Vecchio. And in times of heavy rainstorms the river literally explodes out of its banks. The busiest section of Florence, developed over centuries right along the busy bridge road, is perfectly positioned to receive a massive river

o v e r f lo w .9 5

In 1345, twelve years after the disaster of '33, a new bridge was built.

It was this "new" bridge that Charles now traversed waving to

94 Roberto Ridolf i, The Life o f NiccoloMachiavelli {Chicago, 1963), chapt. 1: "Early Life and Education," pp. 1-15. 95 On the Ponte Vecchio see R. Baldaccini, 11Ponte Vecchio (Florence, 1947) and Borsook, Guide, pp. 170-172. For the best short history of the bridge see the richly illustrated Bargellini, Le Strade di Firenze, vol. IV, pp. 306-312.

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the merchants who had decorated their small precariously balanced shops that had been here since the thirteenth century. The shops that Charles passed were not the elegant goldsmiths that we see there today. In the 1490's, the bridge shopkeepers were the bloody and smelly butchers who were able to use their bridge-top positon to great advantage. They could just dump the carcasses and detritus right over the side. One can easily imagine the aromatic effects of this practice in the summer months when the river dried to a puddle. In these last months of 1494, the office that was in charge of bridges, G liU fficiali

de/le Cinque Cose (The Officials of the Five Things), was in the process of selling off the shops in order to try to quickly fill the depleted city treasury.96 At the apex of the slight rise of the bridge, Charles could see before him an extraordinary sight. Beyond the tower-palace that once guarded the north side of the bridge, along the busiest commercial street of Florence, the king was looking into a street-salon created by completely covering Via Por Santa Maria with precious tapestries and silks. A huge stone room, several stories high, brilliant with silks and brocades and furs stretched before him. Decorated banners splashed with color were flying from the ancient stone facades of the tower-houses. The Etruscan lion heads glowering down from the tower of the Amidei among the silks and flowers awaited him as he descended from the bridge and began to traverse the busiest street of the city.97

9 6 Borsook, Guide, p. 172. 97 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 135.

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The French were amazed. They had never seen anything like it. When the whole Italian adventure was over, the French participants agreed that Florence surpassed all other places for the magnificence of the welcome.98 All of the merchants of the Guild of Por Santa Maria located in this street and the neighborhood of the Mercato Nuovo had decorated the shops in which were sold silks, jewelry, feathers, napkins from Cremona, veils from Perugia, scissors, needles and thread. They had all contributed to the cost of covering the whole street. Since most of the merchants of Por Santa Maria dealt in cloth of various kinds, especially silk, this great pageant was essentially a bit of advertisingputting the wares out where they could be seen on this splendid occasion after which thousands of visitors and diplomats would praise their goods the world over.99

98 Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 293. 99 On Via Por Santa Maria and the neighborhod see Borsook, Guide, pp. 205-210 and Bargellini, Strade, vol. Ill, pp. 163-166. For the Guild of Por Santa Maria see A. Doren, Le a rt! fiorentine (Florence, 1940), vol. I, pp. 183ff.

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THE PIAZZA DELLA SIGNOR IA

The procession moved out of the richly decorated Por Santa Maria and turned through the short narrow Via Vacchereccia to discover the commanding golden-brown, rough-faced bulk of the Palazzo della Signoria whose tower had been visible to Charles since he had set off from the French camp earlier in the day. Moving into the piazza the king was swept up in the most elaborate entertainments of the day. The whole piazza had been turned into a huge theater with various floats positioned among choirs of youths singing the praises of the king and allegorical figures moving among musicians and orators and punctuating the festivities: fireworks.100 An outstanding contribution to these celebrations was a float depicting the "Triumph of Peace” decorated with a huge golden lily alluding to the king's crest and a silvered crown of palms and olive

100 Bartolomeo Cerretani, (in Borsook, "Decor," p. 111):“. . . in Piazza, dove era un altro Trionfo con canti eccellentisimi, e razzi e Scoppietti in gran copia alquanto spiritelli et Gigante ed la Gigantessa con assai romorj Popolari per la Piazza " Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, Bib. Naz., Magi. 11.11. 129, fol. 69r (Borsook, "Decor," p. I l l ) : "In Piazza dei Signori spiritelli et Giganti passeggiavano eravi— i 1 trionfo della Pace con palme et olivo e giglio d'oro ornato tutte " Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 135:"... et zonzendo in piazza, li era un carro triumphale, con un grandissimo zio (giglio), et di sopra una corona di palme inarzientade, con rami de olive; et eravi su giovani con diversi instrumenti, che sonavano et cantavano, et salutarono el Re dicendo: ben vegna el liberator et restaurator de la liberta.. . . “

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branches symbolic of peace which was the work of Filippino Lippi.101 In a little more than a month Lippi had designed an enormous mobile tableau capable of carrying an orchestra of eighteen musicians and singers dressed in the king's colors of red and white who sang a welcome to the royal visitor. This was one of several floats that the civic office of the

Camera dell'Arme mentioned above, had arranged to have positioned along the entrance route for the king's edification and pleasure.102 The officials had called Filippino Lippi away from his work in Santa Maria Novella where the painter was working on frescoed scenes of the four Evangelists and Patriarchs for the chapel of Filippo Strozzi. It gives us some insight into the complexity of relationships maintained by popular and active artists like Lippi to note that while the artist was preparing the float for the city, he was also working on an aristocratic family chapel commissioned by one of Savonarola's most formidable enemies, the very kind of chapel that Savonarola had denounced in several sermons as sinfully seeking after worldly fame, while he also worked for followers of Savonarola as w ell.103

Filippino

seems to have been the ideal choice for this allegorical construction.

101 For Lippi's "Triumph of Peace," see Borsook, "Decor," pp. 111-114. 102 See p. 2 and n. 3. 103 On Lippi's activities in 1494: Eve Borsook, The Mura! Painters o f Tuscany (Oxford, 1980, 2nd ed.), pp. 122-123; Guide, pp. 143-144; "Documents for Filippo Strozzi's Chapel in S. Maria Novella and Other Related Papers," Burlington Magazine, Nov-Dee 1970, pp. 737-745. On Savonarola and the artists see Ronald M. Steinberg, Fra Girolamo

Savonarola, Florentine Art, and Renaissance Historiography (Athens, Ohio, 1977). On processional banners and the art of religious celebration in Florence see Martin Wackernagel,

The World o f the Florentine Renaissance A rtist: Projects and Patrons, Workshop and A rt Market (Princeton, 1981), pp. 138f f.

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His work in the Caraffa Chapel at Santa Maria Sopra Minerva in Rome, and the Strozzi Chapel in Santa Maria Novella in Florence, showed his enthusiasm for fantastic ornament of the kind appropriate for these theatrical inventions.104 What is most interesting about the reception in the Piazza della Signoria is what did not happen. Charles did not go into the palace. No formal ceremony took place either inside or out of the official residence of the governing council of Florence. Rather, such a ceremony took place a bit later at the Medici Palace where Charles was to reside.105 The significance of public ceremony here is fascinating.106 The Palazzo della Signoria and its resident governors were now superseded. Power had moved elsewhere. The Medici were gone, that was true, but the authority remained there at the private palace. 107 Charles moved in, took up where the Medici left off, and the councilors of the city came to him. But now all the old fictions were gone. No one pretended that the powers were really inside the Palazzo della Signoria. The king and a handful of men in secret meeting decided the fate of the city. The games

104 Borsook, "Decor," p. 113. 106 See below pp. 99ff. 106 For a rich and detailed analysis of the significance of public ceremony in Florence see Richard Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (New York, 1980), "The Ritual of Foreign Relations," pp. 279ff. esp. p. 286. 107 An early indication of this movement away from the legitimate locus of Florentine governmental action, the Palazzo Signoria, to th^ private residence of the Medici occurs in 1459, when the Accoppiatori, the most influential officials controlling elections, begin holding official meetings at the family palace in Via Larga rather than the city's own palace. See Rubinstein, Government o f Florence, p. 128.

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44

the Medici had played in order to mask the truth that the republic was finished were now over. The king did not need them. But if Charles was happy to reign from the former seat of Medici power, one wonders whether the Signoria itself wasn't also happy to keep him out of the Palazzo Signoria. By doing so they avoided the embarassing symbolism of the king taking over the palace, the appearance of taking over the government itself. Were they the ones who saw to it that the official ceremonies took place at the Palazzo Medici rather than here at the Palazzo della Signoria? Since it was now late in the day, almost sunset, the royal party needed to hurry along. Thousands of citizens and French m ilitary were awaiting the king at the cathedral. He moved out of the Piazza della Signoria along the north side of the palace and out into the small piazza of the Oratory of San Firenze directly behind the great brown c liff of stone of the Palazzo Signoria.108 As Charles proceeded north towards the cathedral he was able to enjoy the beauty of the new Palazzo Gondi with the most exquisite new Renaissance facade in all Florence. The palace project had begun only five years before at the exact same time as that of the much larger Strozzi Palace on the other side of town.109 The two largest building projects under construction at the time King 108 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 135. 109 For the Palazzo Gondi see Leonardo Ginori Lisci, The Palazziof Florence (Florence, 1985), vol. II, pp. 585-592 with illus. & refs. Also see Borsook, Guide, p. 95. There is debate about the starting date of the project. 1 agree with Ginori Lisci who follows the evidence given by both Giovanni di Nero Cambi and Luca Landucci that the Gondi palace was begun at the same time as the Strozzi palace( 1489) and not as Vasari says in 1494. Thus herein I refer to the palace as well along in completion by Nov. 17, 1494. See Ginori Lisci p. 585-586. Also see R. Goldthwaite, The Building o f Renaissance /7
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Charles arrived in Florence, the Gondi and the Strozzi palaces, were both the result of fortunes made in the Naples, the same southern city toward which the king's expedition was directed. Giuliano di Lionardo Gondi had lived in Naples for many years where he had directed the Gondi banking business.110 As he entered old age (his sixties) he decided to return to Florence to the neighborhood of his Florentine bank right behind the Palazzo Signoria and initiated the palace project to have a suitably impressive family domicile in his native city. His Neapolitan years had brought him the friendship of fellow Florentine Giuliano da Sangallo, one of the greatest architects of the day and the favorite architect of Lorenzo de'Medici.111 Sangallo was working in Naples for the royal family, and Gondi prevailed upon him to take on the palace design.112 Gondi himself had been extremely close to the King of Naples, the recently deceased King Ferrante, and his son Alfonso had so appreciated Gondi’s services to his father that he had wanted to make Giuliano Gondi a Duke; Gondi had refused knowing such a title carried home to Florence would not wear well among the republican fictions.113

1 JO For an excellent introduction to the Gondi family see Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, A Study of Four Families (Princeton, 1968), pp. 157-186. Also see J. Corbinelli, Histoiregenealogique de lamaison di Gondi (Paris, 1705), 2 vols. with documents; "Gondi," EncidopediaItalians (Milan, 1933), vol. XVII, pp. 532-533; Rudolf Hirsch, "Gondi-Medici Business Records in the Lea Library of the University of Pennsylvania", Renaissance News, vol. XVI (1963), pp. 11-14. 111 Giuseppe Marchini, Giuliano da Sangallo (Florence, 1942), pp. 38-41. 112 Ginori Lisci, Palazzi, vol. II, p. 585. 1J3 Ginori Lisci, Palazzi, vol. II, p. 585.

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Gondi's story is an important one. It brings to our attention a Florentine merchant whose success was rooted in close ties between the Republic on the Arno and the royal family of Naples. This was the same relationship that had brought wealth to the builder of the other great palace across the city, Filippo Strozzi.

Now on this November day,

a French king was moving past the palace on his way to unseat the Neapolitan monarch who had been so generous to Giuliano di Lionardo Gondi. This confrontation directs our attention to the dilemma in which Florence found itself in late 1494. The commercial and political ties of the Republic to Naples were almost as important as those with France. In fact, in the days of Charles VIII's ancestor Charles of Anjou it had been the tripartite alliance of France-Florence-Naples that had aided the extraordinary commercial success of Florence throughout all of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 114

114 For a helpful survey of the traditional Guelf alliance of Florence-Pope-Naples in the late fourteenth century and the mutations it experienced in the early fifteenth century see Peter Partner, "Florence and the Papacy in the Earlier Fifteenth Century," in Florentine Studies, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, 111., 1968), pp. 381-402. Partner Includes Neapolitan aspects throughout the article although the title does not so indicate. Ernesto Pontieri provides material on relations between Florence and Naples in the later fifteenth century in "La politica estera di Ferrante d’Aragona," in Per la storia del regno diFerrante d'AragonaRe diNapoJi (Naples, 1969), pp. 209-371. The title of Pontieri's article is misleading. This is a history of relations between Florence and Naples, 1465 to 1481. Also see: Ernesto Pontieri, La dinastia aragonese di Napoli e /a casa dei Medici di Firenze (Naples, 1942), available also in Archivio 5toricoper ie provinceNapoietane, vol. LXV (1940), pp. 274-342; vol. LXVI (1941), pp. 217-273.

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Some of the richest Florentine families such as the Acciaiuoli had accumulated their fortune through this Neapolitan connection.115 The Angevin conquest of Naples had been good for Florence since it meant that France, its traditional ally in the north, and Naples, its commercial ally in the south, were now in the control of the same royal family. This linkage elevated the geographical position of Florence to a central one in the Franco-Neapolitan alliance. Florence stood right in the middle of the peninsula, a fact that was not lost on Charles VI11.

It could guarantee or

impede whatever overland communications were necessary between France and Naples. So the conquest of southern Italy in 1266 by a French royal brother elevated Florence to its most important international role in all its history. In 1266, an international Angevin empire looked very likely and Florence’s role was critical in holding the central peninsula loyal to both the northern and southern wings of this international power.1

This history is worth remembering since it explains the

extremely close ties that had developed between Florence and Naples over hundreds of years, ties such as those between the Gondi and King Alfonso. Gondi's palace was a monument to the value of the Neapolitan marketplace to a Florentine banker. Yet the presence of the French king within Florence on this November day was forcing a choice in favor of a Gallican alternative rather than the Neapolitan; Florence was being pressured to participate in the conquest of her longtime ally Naples. The 115 For the Acciaiuoli in Naples see: F. Schevill, Med. & Ren. Florence, vol. I, p. 301; C. Urgugieri della Berardenga, 617Acciaiuoli di Firenze (Florence, 1961) 116 Steven Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 135ff„ describes the Angevin plans for an international empire.

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worst of the situation for Florence was that these two vital allies were now about to go to war and Florence was in the middle. Only a few weeks before, the leader of the city had been attempting to hold the republic to a Neapolitan alliance.117 Now the King's triumphant presence had washed that all away. Gondi must have been deeply saddened by all this. But he would have been little help to Piero de’ Medici in his maneuvering within Florence in favor of the Neapolitan side in the coming war. The banker had been away in Naples so long that he had lost the opportunity to accumulate that political power that required decades if not generations to build in fifteenth-century Florence. The Gondi had never had great political power in Florence; their earlier Ghibelline loyalties had gotten them banned from office for all of the fourteenth century.118 Thus when they did achieve their firs t election to the council of the priors in 1438, they were behind other aristocratic Florentine families in the construction and solidification of family political power. 119 Piero de'Medici has been abused for having tried to steer Florence into an alliance with Naples.120 But Gondi's personal story should remind us

117 For Piero de' Medici's pro-Naples alliance see below pp. 11 Off. 118 The Gondi family social-political situation can be compared to other fifteenth-century Florentine families by reference to Dale Kent, The Rise o f the Medici (Oxford, 1978), pp. 151-185, esp. pp. 151 -1 59 on the Santa Croce quarter to which the Gondi belonged. 1 ig Encyclopedia Italians, vol. XVII, p. 532. 120 For one recent historian's reaction to Piero and the Neapolitan alliance see Donald Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence (Princeton, 1970), p. 123:"... Piero plunged heavily into a one-sided alliance with the King of Naples. Why he did so has never been satisfactorily explained.” Despite this depiction of the alliance, there was nothing one-sided about it. The King of Naples was pledged to lead the troops he raised personally and to fight to stop the French before they reached Florence, as he and his brother tried to do.

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that, apart from the m ilitary issues of 1494 (ie. could a FlorentineNeapolitan alliance stop the French?), the Neapolitan connection had a concrete and long lasting value to the merchants of Florence and the severing of that alliance could usher in an era of extreme uncertainty for Florentine business interests in the south. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Neapolitan alliance of 1494 also included the Pope, thus a correct evaluation of its commercial importance must include recognition of the value of Rome as well as Naples for Florentine merchants and especially for banking. 121 It seems strange that those Florentine merchants and bankers with important interests in the south were unable to help Piero in his attempts to maintain the Neapolitan alliance in the face of the French threat. But the stories of Giuliano Gondi and Filippo Strozzi suggest that those who did appreciate the Neapolitan commercial connection found themselves without political power, either by personal choice or because of past political ostracism, at the very moment when the test came. Whether due to Gondi's absence from Florence for considerable periods, or due to a lack of rapport with the Medici, the fact is that in 1494, Gondi did not have political influence to support the Neapolitan option.122 jhe same was true of the one other Florentine banker for whom Naples was the center of his commercial success: Filippo Strozzi. Whether Strozzi chose to remain aloof from the political maneuvers within Florence after his rehabilitation in 1466, or whether he was

121 The following families had Important banking or other commercial investments in Rome and Naples: Strozzi, Gondi, Medici, Tomabuoni, and many others with lesser amounts invested. 122 Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 163.

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subtly warned to stay out of politics by the Medici who were allowing him to return, the result was that he too found himself without political influence in the later years of Lorenzo's

ru le 12 3

j^e result for Florence

was that within political circles, those merchants with strong interests in France were preponderant even though two of the most successful Florentine businessmen of the second half of the fifteenth century had made their fortunes in Naples. Most important among the Florentines who combined political power with French commercial interests were the Capponi.124 The thousands of infantry, archers, drummers, trumpeters and cavalry of the French army were slowly filling up all the space around the great cathedral of Florence as the king now moved through the last part of his urban journey across the city of the lily. Beyond the Palazzo Gondi, he entered Via Proconsolo named after the captain of the guild of the judges and notaries whose guildhouse wac here in this section of the street. Via Proconsolo was a wide, straight, well-paved street, impressive with its line of extraordinary and important civic and religious buildings. It moved along a north-south axis that followed exactly the firs t line of walls of Roman

F l o r e n c e . 12 5

Nea r

the guildhouse stood the building

called the Bargello, formerly the firs t city hall of Florence and later the headquarters for the Podesta.

123 Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 67. Strozzi died before the arrival of Charles VIII and therefore could not have participated personally in the struggle of 1494, but he had brothers and heirs all of whom could have invoked family political influence if Filippo had chosen to build it. 124 on Piero Capponi see pp. 259ff. below. '2 5 Bargellini, LeStrade, vol. Ill, pp. 186-193.

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At the corner of Via del Proconsolo and the Corso the King passed the former palace of the Pazzi family which had given its name to the corner, commonly known as Canto de'Pazzi (Pazzi Corner), the only reminder of the hated family name that had been totally obliterated from Florence sixteen years befor 1478, the Pazzi

P l o t . 1 26 T h e

in the days after the murderous plot of magnificent new palace at this corner had

been confiscated along with all other Pazzi property, the family shields had been torn down and members of the family had been exiled. The murderer himself, Francesco de ‘Pazzi, had rushed to the palace after killing Giuliano de‘ Medici at the altar of the cathedral. But the enraged crowd hunted him down and dragged him from the central portal and out into Via Proconsolo and down the street to the Palazzo Vecchio (the route King Charles had just passed) and hung him from a first-flo o r window. Now in 1494, the palace belonged to a French family, the D'Estonville.'2 7 Charles' ambassadors had stayed here earlier in the year in May when they had journeyed through Italy preparing the ground for the present expedition.128 The Florentine government was feeling extremely anxious about the coming invasion and went out of its way to accommodate the embassy with honors even while sending them away without the agreements they had requested. While they stayed in

126 Harold Acton, The Pazzi Conspiracy (London, 1979). 127 on the Palazzo Pazzi della Congiura see Ginori Lisci, Palazzi, vol. II, pp. 545-550 with illus. & refs. 128 Alamanno Rinuccini, Ricordistorici, p. CLI: "A di 4 di Maggio in domenica, a ore 22 e mezzo in circa, entro in Firenze Monsignore di Bogni con tre altri compagni, tutti imbasciadori di Carlo VIII re di Francia che venivano alia communita di Firenze."

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Florence, the ambassadors ate off the Signoria’s own precious silver and were accorded the special honor of receiving a tribute from the Signoria's trumpeters who came here before the palace to salute them.'2 9 it was the angry exit of these disappointed French diplomats

and the frightening rumors that had circulated after their departure that had so scared Michelangelo and caused him and others to flee. * 30

'2 9 Landucci, Diario, p. 68 and n. 2. '3 0 see above p. 1.

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THE CATHEDRAL

Via del Proconsolo brought the king out into the great open space at the back of the cathedral where Charles continued along the reinforcing foundations of Brunellischi’s dome, around the north side along Via dei Fondamenti, finally emerging into the piazza at the front steps of Santa Maria del Fiore in the space between the cathedral and the baptistery. All along the cathedral were drawn up the French forces that filled sections of the piazza and spilled out along connecting streets such as Via Larga leading north to the Palazzo Medici where Charles was going to stay. The interior of the cathedral was filled and all the space outside was jammed with the citizens of Florence shouting, "Viva Francia." We can estimate that there must have been around 30,000 people gathered together here in the shadows of this sunset hour. The cathedral alone holds 30,000 worshipers.'31

Crowds in our own day filling the

same space on occasions such as Easter morning approach 100,000 and more.

Luca Landucci who was there and wrote extensive details of the

moment in his diary, says that the church and piazza were fu ll.132 To Landucci it seemed as if all of Florence were there. For many of the Florentines this was the second time today they had seen the king since many had rushed across the twisting streets of the city from Porta San

131 Borsook, Guide, p. 76. 132 Landucci, Diario, p. 80.

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Frediano to the cathedral as the procession moved slowly along its prescribed route. But now here on the steps of the cathedral they would be able to get a good look at him.

Until this moment he had always been

moving and somewhat hidden up on the huge horse. With the golden light of sunset igniting the reds and greens of the baptistery marble, with Donatello's Prophets high up on the cathedral facade gesturing a benediction, and with the bells of Giotto's campanile sounding a welcome, King Charles VIII of France rode to the steps of Santa Maria del Fiore and with squires holding the black Savoy and nobles assisting the king, the temporary master of Florence, dismounted and moved into the cathedral to deafening choruses of "Viva

F ra n c ia .” 1 3 3

As he walked up the stairs and stood on the top step surrounded by his retinue of battle-ready knights, his small size threw a moment of disillusion into the tumult of the welcome. Landucci says that to see him on foot caused a diminution of his fame; he was a very small man ("E vedutolo a piede, parve al popolo un poco diminuta la fama; perche invero era molto piccolo uorno").134 The chroniclers remind us of how important physical size has always been in political leadership. It seems clear that Charles' diminutive size contributed importantly to the later creation of the image of a near-buffoon. He could be treated as a non-entity, as somewhat comic, not quite serious, because he was

133 For Charles at the cathedral see: Luca Landucci, Diario, p. 80; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136; Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 332; Andre de la Vigne, Voyage, p. 220; Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 294. 134 Landucci, Diario, p. 80.

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small.135 When he emerged from the church after the mass, the witnesses noted again how small he was. Sanudo says that he had to be helped up onto his horse because he was so short, "piccolissimo," the absolute superlative. Practically a midget! 135 The king entered the cathedral through the great center doors that are usually opened only on Easter and other special occasions. Down the center of the huge nave, an aisle of blazing torches marked the royal entry creating this one narrow central opening lined with light. Every other inch of the space was filled with thousands of Florentines, all of whom, according to Landucci, shouted enthusiastically "Viva Francia."137 The king and the royal party moved slowly through the flaming aisle to kneel at the altar. There the Archbishop Rinaldo Orsini presided over a mass enriched by choruses and lit by dozens of candelabra along each of the great supporting piers under Brunelleschi's dome.135 At the conclusion of the mass, Charles retraced his steps back through the center aisle, out the door, and onto his black horse having accepted the undignified but necessary lift up onto Savoy. 139 It was now dark. The crowds were so huge, the streets so solidly packed with humanity, horses, drums, dogs, and weapons that Charles'

135 For some reflections on Charles in this regard see LabandeMailfert, Charles V III, pp. 539-541. 135 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136. 137 Landucci, Diario, p. 80. 135 In Sanudo's description of this mass at the cathedral I have discovered one of the few serious errors in his account of Charles in Florence. Here he confuses this mass and a later one (Nov. 25) at which an oath was sworn to uphold the treaty between Florence and the King. Spediz ione, p. 136. ,3g Landucci, Diario, p. 80.

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guard had to take the bridle of his horse and lead it slowly through the people as rowdy boys shouted and laughed. The colorfully dressed French counts and dukes jostled with the youths of Florence. Did his royai household fear for his safety in these moments of chaos? There was no space left for a dignified procession north along Via Larga to the Medici Palace where the king would stay for the next eleven days.140 The royal group moved through the Florentines and the French troops packed in among the citizens. The guards shoved to make an opening. Then they turned across in front of the north corner of the cathedral steps and moved up the street toward the palace.

' 40 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136.

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THE PALAZZO MEDICI

Pope Pius II said that the Palazzo Medici was worthy of a king.141 On the night of November 17, 1494, with torches blazing, drums crashing, and Florentines shouting a welcome as they pushed among the visiting warriors in the crowded street, the palace got a king. The Medici Palace stands only a few hundred meters to the north of the cathedral steps along the Wide Street (Via Larga) that leads to the Porta San Gallo and the old road to Bologna. But this short distance was the slowest of King Charles' progress through the city. 142 The thousands of troops that had converged on the cathedral all day had flooded into the adjoining streets including the one that led to the palace. If the crowds detracted somewhat from the ceremonies of the occasion, the city-planned decorations for this last section of the king's

141 Cosimo "fece costruire in Firenze un palazzo degno di un re___ Commentarii (Milan, 1984), ed. Luigi Totaro, vol. I, p. 353. This new edition of the Commentaries supersedes that of Giuseppe Bernetti (Siena, 1972) since the Totaro edition provides the Latin text with an Italian translation on the facing page as well as copious notes and helpful index. 142 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136: (Charles)" ... con gran furia fu messo a cavallo, per esser piccolissimo, et fu menato in la via larga, perche era si grande la calca, che non si poteva seguitarlo, et era notte, et dismonto da cavallo.-

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journey struck everyone as beautiful and extraordinary.143 As in Via Por Santa Maria, here too the street had been covered with fine cloths dyed blue brightened by yellow fleurde /is and a border lined with the crests of the king and the city. This blue and yellow canopy began at the cathedral square and ran continuously above the street all the way to the door of the Palazzo Medici, into the interior of the palace, and up over the stairs and along the loggia.144 It was dark by the time the king emerged from the cathedral and moved toward the palace, thus the huge urban hall created with the canopy had to be illuminated by hundreds of torches set into the wrought iron torch-holders that are still in place on many palace walls today. The Signoria had ordered that during the stay of the French all citizens were to maintain torches lit til late into the evening on their street-side w alls.145

Sanudo says that it was so bright that it seemed day

(" ... et pareva zomo, tanta luce vi era").146

The thousands of

Florentines, soldiers, and horses were packed into this street chamber several stories high, lit by the flickering smoky light of hundreds of

143 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136: “A la caxa de Piero de Medici era apparato per Soa Maesta con tante zentillezze, che mai piu si vide, dicono i Fiorentini.“ 144 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136: "Primamente era coperta tutta la via de mantegli de roversi azzurri con zigli zali, et con uno cornisone con le arme di 1 Commune et dil Re, et cussi sopra lo usso (uscio) che usciva a la scala con festoni acconci ornatamente, et cussi sopra la loza dentro..." Also see Borsook, "Decor," p. 115. 145 Sanudo, Spedizione, la Signoria fe metter uno bando, che ognuno mettesse lume a le finestre per fina a le 5 hore, sotto pena di la disgratia loro." ' 46 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136.

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torches, and completely enclosed by the brightly colored canopy; it is easy to understand why witnesses said they had never seen anything like it. The remarkable street decorations drew all eyes to the central portal of the Medici Palace, around which had been hastily constructed a magnificent triumphal arch designed by Perugino.147 A wooden structure transformed the simple center doorway into a Roman urch fit for an emperor returned from international conquest, imagery which was no doubt welcome to the French propagandists who had been advertising possibilities for Charles' conquests far beyond the confines of the peninsula.148 The arch which was integrated into the larger decorative scheme of the street canopy had giant columns, horns of plenty, garlands, antique decorative motifs, French inscriptions announcing liberation, and of course, the king's coat of arms.149 It is surprising that the city of Florence had been able to convince Perugino to take on the project of the portal decorations.

In the Fall of

147 Landucci, Diario, p. 79: “. . . fece grande apparto pe' Re, in casa Piero de' Medici, e massime alia porta del palagio de' Medici." 148 For analysis of the structure at the palace portal which received considerable contemporary comment see Eve Borsook, "Decor,” p. 115; Landucci, Diario, p. 79: "Feciono due grande colonne di fuori, che mettevano in mezzo la porta, con tanti adornamenti, e arme del Re di Francia, che non si potrebbe dire. Era veramente una cosa trionfale, tante erano grandi e ben fatte ogni cosa.” 149 parenti, Storia, fols. 69v-7 0 r (Borsook, “Decor," p. 115, n. 65): .. si messono con l'arme del Re di Francia et sotto un breve in franzese il quale dicea come lui il conservatore et liberatore della nostra Liberta. “ Borsook notes that no drawings of the triumphal arch are known to her, "Decor," p. 115, but a very suggestive vision of Perugino's arch is avaliable in his fresco of "The Giving of the Keys," in the Sistine Chapel reproduced in Pietro Scarpel 1ini, Perugino (Milan, 1984), pi. 48, p. 156.

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1494, the painter from Perugia was at the peak of his career. Everyone was demanding his services and he was constantly on the move negotiating contracts and directing his huge studios in both Florence and Perugia. When he began work on the palace decorations, he had just returned from Venice where he had signed a contract with the Venetian authorities to paint a huge mural in the Great Hall of the Grand Council of the Ducal Palace.150 At the same time his home town of Perugia begged an altarpiece from him for which they waited twelve years! And Orvieto waited nine years for his promised frescoes for their cathedral which was to earn him the astounding sum of 1500 ducats. They finally gave up and called in Luca Signorelli to whom they gave much less.*51 Eve Borsook points out that the choice of Filippino Lippi and Perugino for the two most complex artistic creations for the November 17th celebration was appropriate.152 Their careers had been constantly intertwined. Both had worked in Rome in the 1480's on major fresco projects for high religious authorities. Filippino had succeeded Perugino on work in the Audience Hall of the Palazzo della Signoria in Florence. Perugino had been invited to complete an unfinished Deposition left abandoned at Filippino's death.

Both had submitted plans for the facade

of the Florence cathedral. Their styles were similar and seem to have struck a responsive note in the tastes of the 1490's. They were both enormously successful at the exact same moment.

Both delighted in the creation of fantastic

150 Canuti, Perugino, vol. I, pp. 93-96; Cartwright, Perugino, p. 22. 151 Cartwright, "Perugino," p. 22. 152 Borsook, "Decor,” pp. 115-116.

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illusionistic architectural structures that often overwhelmed the human fig u r e s J

53 g0th were adept at the invention of pseudo-antique

decorative themes and fantastic ornamentation that they no doubt absorbed during their years in Rome. Both seem to have lost interest as their careers proceeded with the more subtle and profound aspects of character and human experience that had been central in earlier Renaissance art such as in the work of Donatello. The extraordinary success of both artists suggests that in this last decade of the fifteenth century those commissioning major works of art (city authorities, church authorities, and private patrons) were seeking an artificial gaiety, a busy, complex but hollow and meaningless festivity to mask an ever increasing sense of gloom. Lippi and Perugino were the right artists to help create the forms for the ambiguously joyous celebrations of November 17, 1494. Just down the street from Perugino's fantasti
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We should pause to note the symbolism. Although Charles did not occupy the Palazzo della Signoria and thereby formally announce conquest and overthrow of the legitimate government of the Republic of Florence, he did occupy the real seat of power, the Medici Palace, and thus replaced the recently removed "tyrant," Piero de' Medici, and became temporarily the new Signore of Florence. For ten days the republic existed in name only. The royal cavalcade moved slowly along under the blue and yellow canopy, pushed through the crowd, and came to rest before Perugino's triumphal arch. The king dismounted from his big black horse with the help of his aides and moved under the arch and received the tumultous accolades of the crowd.155 At some point Charles was presented with the keys to the principal gates of the city: San Frediano, San Gallo and San Pier Gattolini (now Porta Romana). Who gave him the keys? Its is a minor but fascinating mystery. Didn't the Signoria come to the palace and make the formal presentation? Angelo Ghivizzano, who was an eyewitness to all the events of the day and wrote his account immediately that same evening, says that the keys "were sent." 156 Francesco Gaddi says that because of the crowds the Signoria returned to "the palace" Cse ne torno in palazzo”), presumably the Palazzo della Signoria, and their further presence at the Medici Palace is not mentioned.157 Their absence is striking. It would have

155 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136; Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 294. 156 Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 3 3 2 :" ... a chasa de Piero: elli desmontoe ed e li alozato: et alozato chel fue la Signoria li mandoe le chiave a presentare “ 157 Gaddi, Driorista, p. 47.

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been customary for the officials of the city to present formally and publicly the keys to the city's gates. The custom is so ancient that it endures even today when city walls have all come down. Certainly the council had plenty of time to move across the city from the Porta San Frediano where they had first encountered the king while Charles traveled along his prescribed route at an extemely slow pace. They could have been ready to meet the him at the Medici Palace. Charles would have insisted on having the keys. At Pavia he had created a major incident when he had demanded that his putative ally, Ludovico Sforza, give him the keys to the gates of the Castello Visconteo where the king was going to stay. Ludovico was enraged and insulted but complied. 158 At Florence, it sounds as if the keys were sent over to the king after he was in the Medici Palace. If this was the procedure we are tempted to conclude that the members of the government did not want to be seen actually presenting the keys in a formal and official ceremony, that in the midst of losing their liberty, such a ceremony would have only punctuated the obvious and would have been too embarassing. If this was the reasoning behind the absence of the Signoria from the Medici Palace welcoming ceremonies it calls our attention to the exteme ambiguity surrounding Charles' encounter with Florence. Although it was conquest in every possible way, no one wanted to call it that. Charles VIIt's arrival at the Palazzo Medici is memorialized in the most important work of art deriving directly from the Caroline presence in Florence. Some years after the event, Francesco Granacci

158 Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 418.

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painted King Charles VUi Before the Medici Palace now in the Medici Palace museum.159 Granacci was a friend and neighbor of the family of Michelangelo and lived just a few blocks from the Buonarotti on Via Ghibellina in the Santa Croce district where his father was a mattressmaker.150 He was responsible for helping the young Michelangelo begin his artistic studies.

After a year together at the

Ghirlandaio workshop the two young artists moved to the Medici garden art studio which was just up the street from the Palazzo Medici on Via Larga opposite the monastery of San Marco.161 Granacci’s version of November 17, 1494, is faulty because he was not there. At the moment that Charles arrived in Florence, Granacci was working on a fresco for the facade of the cathedral of Pisa in which Charles, the "Liberator of Pisa" is honored as he does homage to the Madonna of Pisa.152 In the Granacci version of November 17, Charles sits upon his black horse amidst his cavalry, with handsome Florentines lounging in front of the palace. There is no sign of nighttime, no torches, no canopy, no triumphal arch. Perugino must have raged when he saw it .155 Historically accurate or not, it is this painting that has depicted for thousands of viewers over the centuries what happened in Florence on November 17, 1494.

159 Christian Von Holst, Francesco Granacci (Munich, 1974), reproduces the painting, pi. 85. For analysis see pp. 159-160. 150 Von Holst, Granacci, p. 12. 16 1 De Tolnay, Youth, p. 16. 152 Von Holst, Granacci, p. 14. The fresco has not survived. 155 The painting was completed eight to ten years before Perugino died in 1523. See Von Holst, Granacci, pp. 159-160.

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After a very long day, the king moved in through the arch and proceeded under the canopy that ran into the courtyard and up the stairs. Next to the decorated staircase hung with tapestries, was the little

scrittoio from which Piero's great-grandfather, Cosimo de' Medici, had directed the international Medici banking network. Charles moved up the stairs to the central rooms on the pianonobiJe (literally, the "noble floor" or the principal floor) that had been prepared for his stay; gold brocaded tapestries covered the walls and the bed.164 Refreshments awaited the king. Sweet wines, pistachios, almonds, and fruit preserves stored away by the Medici servants for Piero and his family, had been brought up from the elaborate complex of storerooms in the subterranean level for the pleasure of the new residents.165 The French visitors were deeply impressed with the palace.166 Philippe de Commynes, who had visited the Medici residence many times, said that it was "the most beautiful house of a townsman or merchant that I have ever seen."167

Newcomers were usually struck

by the plan.166 The great stone cube of the palace was organized with a

164 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136. 165 Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 294. 166 Andre de la Vigne, Voyage, p. 220 167 The Memoirs o f Philippe de Commynes, ed. Samuel Kinser (Columbia, South Carolina, 1973), vol. II, p. 465. Commynes is a very important witness to the events of 1494, although the accuracy of his testimony has recently been called into question. For further discussion of Commynes and these issues see below, pp. 79ff. 168 The best study of the palace in any language is Isabelle Hyman,

Fifteenth Century Florentine Studies: The Palazzo Medici and a Ledger for the Church o f San Lorenzo (New York & London). This is an extraordinarily rich work with ample quotations from documents used by Hyman for the firs t time. On the plan of the palace: p. 98.

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kind of geometric precision around the central courtyard which occupied one-third of the space and was itself divided into thirds by the three arches of the loggia along each side of the cortile with echoes above in the three rondels (inside which sat the Medici shield with six balls) and three windows, one above each arch. This tri-p a rtite economy was reflected outside the palace on the street side with three central street-level portals, three stories carefully delineated with horizontal decoration, and nine windows on each of the higher stories. Always threes and multiples of three.'69 This orderly plan developed by Michelozzo, an associate of Brunelleschi, also extended into the interior of the palace where all the apartments and areas were carefully organized around this central courtyard that gave order and light to the whole structure. The use of the central courtyard as an organizing principle for the whole building demonstrates the most essential aspect of the Italian Renaissance revolution in architecture for both public buildings and domestic structures.'70 This was the "central plan" reinvented by Michelozzo's friend and mentor, Brunelleschi, from classical inspirations. This new architectural vision was revealed in the dome of the cathedral, the Ospedale degli Innocenti, Santo Spirito, the Pazzi

169 To appreciate the original geometric perfection readers should consult Ginori Lisci, PaJazzi, vol. I, pp. 373-374 for drawings of the palace before the seventeenth-century additions destroyed the geometric plan as described above. 170 por a helpful introduction to the new fashion in Italian domestic architecture evolving in the fifteenth century see: James Ackerman, The Architecture o f Michelangelo (London, 1961), vol. I, pp. 76-79; Peter Murray, The Architecture o f the Italian Renaissance (New York, 1969 & 1986), pp. 68-73.

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Chapel at Santa Croce, and the Old Sacristy at San Lorenzo and applied by Michelozzo to this first major Renaissance style palace.171 The central plan put man at the center with all things his measure. In the Medici Palace courtyard, all things are related to the palace resident, to the human scale, by way of the mathematical and geometric division and subdivision of its decorative elements and the clarity and unity with which it is all related to the living space, the human space. The human being, standing in the Medici Palace courtyard, senses instantly the relationship of his own person to this huge structure of stone by way of his apprehension of this mathematical division of the space he is viewing. The fearsome weight and power of this mass—any building is potentially dangerous to the person who dwells in it— is reduced to a pleasant sense of security which derives from the inherent pleasure the human being experiences when space is organized according to the knowable unity and order of mathematical principles. After five hundred years all of this Renaissance mathematical organization seems common to us, but to the newcomer to Florence in the fifteenth century such as our French guests, it was surprisingly new, almost shockingly so. It was all so clear, so orderly and such a contrast to the rambling medieval castles developed over centuries that they had left behind at Blois, Amboise, and Tours. Contemporaries remark again and again on the newness of it all. Vasari calls it the "first one built in Florence in the modern manner (maniera moderna)."172

171 On the central plan, Michelozzo and Brunelleschi: Hyman, Palazzo Medic!, pp. 97-99, & pp. 144-1147; also see Borsook, Guide, p. 283. 172 Giorgio Vasari, Le vite de'piu ecce/Ientiarchitetti, pittori, et scu/ton italian i, ed. G. Milanesi, (Florence, 1906), vol. II, p. 433.

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It was still "new” in 1494—s till the fashion. Every palace built in Florence subsequent to the completion of the Medici Palace in the 1450's (and many all over Italy) imitated the Medici in every respect. Both the Gondi and the Strozzi palaces under construction during Charles' visit, were modeled on the Medici with a precision that is surprising. Variety comes only in the decorative

d e t a i l s . ! 73

And soon after Charles' return

to France, French architecture also fe lt the influence of this building that had impressed itself upon the northern guests in these November days.174 The exhausted king now retired to his rooms, removed his armor and enjoyed the refreshments. But his official day was not yet complete. Word had come that Giovanni Pico della Mirandola was dying nearby. Charles had already sent his physicians. But French medicine knew no better cures than the Italians who had been bleeding the expiring Pico. Now the King of France insisted on hurrying personally to the bedside of the young p h i l o s o p h e r . 175 it must have been quite a s c e n e . 1 76 Savonarola was there, holding Pico as he died. Charles and his party, certainly including the king's uncle, Philippe de Bresse, who had known Pico well in France, arrived just moments before Pico died.

Did anyone

173 Hyman, Palazzo Medici, p. 147: "The novel effectiveness of its design was admired and imitated in every subsequent palazzo signorile of the Renaissance.. . . “ 174 peter Murray, Architecture o f the Renaissance (New York, 1971), pp. 317ff. 175 Labande-Mailfert, Charles V/H, p. 294. 176 pico's nephew, Francesco Pico, wrote a life of his famous uncle and describes the death scene on the night of November 17, 1494. See

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: His Life by His Nephew Giovanni Francesco Pico, Translated from the Latin by S ir ThomasMore (London, 1890), pp. 23-25.

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remember Pico's prediction that he would die "in the time of the l i l y ”?

177 Did they think of the fleurde 1is that had just swept into the

room— into Florence? The king and his uncle had come to know Pico five years before when Pico had come to France as the Pope pursued him on charges of heresy arising from his 900 Theses. Charles and Philippe treated Pico with great care (although he was officially under arrest) even as they tried to assuage the Papal ambassadors.

Finally, Pico was allowed to return

to Italy under the protection of the Medici. 178 Charles had always remembered Pico and had even hoped to lure him to his court on a permanent

b a s i s . 1 79

But now the brilliant young man was gone and as

the king returned to his Florentine palace, Savonarola carried Pico to San Marco, just a few blocks up Via Larga from the Medici Palace. There in the church of the Dominican monastery of San Marco, Pico was buried and has rested ever since.180 Angelo Ghivizzano, the ambassador from Mantua, who wrote his report of the day's activities for the Duke of Mantua only hours after the death of Pico, seized upon the sad event as a symbol of the Florentine reality as he interpreted i t . 181

He couples the untimely death of the young

177 piero Bargel 1ini, Strade, vol. Ill, p. 89. 178 Leon Dorez and Louis Thuasnes, Pic de LaMirandoie en France (Paris, 1897), 71-101. 17g Labande-Mailfert, Charles V iii, p. 152; Dorez & Thuasnes, Mirandole, p. 102. '8 0 pico is buried on the left side of the nave of the church of San Marco near the third chapel. See Borsook, Guide, p. 238. 181 Ghivizzano, ''Documenti,'' p. 333: .. hozi a hore una sie fato le esequie del conte Zovani dalla Mirandola qual morte si e stato molestissima a tutta questa terra a me parse che Fiorenza abi hozi perduto el fiore del mondo ede la liberta e la v irtu ...

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philosopher with the loss of Florentine liberty and virtue, all lost on the same day he says, thus calling our attention to one view of the sad reality of November 17, contradicting the celebrations of the constrained citizenry. Charles and his small party of intimate advisors wound through the streets of Florence still blazing with torchlight, moved along without pomp or celebration, without armor or banners, mounted the great staircase and prepared to sleep their firs t night in the Medici beds. The chamberlains prepared the couches for the valets and guards who would remain in the king's bedchamber at all tim es.182 several French archers and armed knights would patrol the corridors of the palace all night.

182 Labande-Mai If ert, Charles V III, p. 148.

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KING CHARLES VIII

Who was Charles? What kind of king? What kind of man? It is unlikely that any other French sovereign has been so unfairly treated by historians.' 83

frven Charles' grandfather and namesake, Charles VII,

weeping and whimpering behind Joan of Arc, has received belated credit in twentieth-century historiography for bringing the nation together after the horrors of the 100 Years War. 184 gut Charles VII I's memory still is lost in a haze of gossip and superficiality. Yvonne LabandeMailfert's definitive biography which was published in 1975, may help to find the truth. But the myths and falsehoods are so thick one wonders whether one book can right the balance. Look first at the depiction of Charles' behavior upon his arrival in Florence.

Rachel A. Taylor in her biography of Leonardo da Vinci tells us

that Charles wanted to see nothing but the lions— the lions kept by the city near the Palazzo della Signoria.195 This is such marvelous and economical defamation. With a few deft words, Charles is depicted as childish, impetuous, trivial, and silly. Instead of attending to affairs of state, he rushes off to see the lions. Nothing is said of his all-day

183 For review of historiographical problems see Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, pp. 9-11; for a review of the reign see pp. 489-541. 184n.G.A Vale, Charles VII (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974). For Charles VII and the historians see pp. 3-12. J85 Rachel Annand Taylor, Leonardo the Florentine (New York, 1928), p. 193.

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meetings with various Florentine politicians. No mention is made of his visits to the important churches and shrines of the city or meetings with philosophers and artists. While it is true that he did eventually visit the lions as all Florentine guests did, he did so several days after his entry into the city and his visit was a brief and casual one. He did not even take the time to dismount from his horse. '8 6 Quite different from Taylor's account of an impetuous child dropping everything to rush off to see the lions. Rachel Taylor's reduction of Charles is not unique. John Addington Symonds called him "harebrained."'8 7 Guicciardini uses the word "monster" when describing him physically.'8 8

The Italian humanist

historian Pietro Martire d’Anghiera (Peter Martyr) who lived through the events of 1494, called Charles "smaller than a pygmy."'8 9 Notice how demeaning the language. He does not just say that the king is small; he uses the word pygmy. Thus we envision something extraordinary, foreign, strange, almost deformed. Vincent Cronin ,in a good survey of Renaissance Florence, summarizes the conventional view: "He was an ugly young man, with myopic eyes, a big hooked nose, thick lips, and a straggly reddish beard. His head shook with a nervous tic, and his body was so small that he had to be lifted into his stirrups. He spoke seldom, and then in a mumble; his hands trembled to such a degree that his

'8 6 Landucci, Diario, p. 81. 187 John Addington Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, The Age of the Despots (New York, 1888), p. 539. 188 sto riad'italia, ed. S. S. Menchi (Turin, 1971), vol. I, p. 78. 189 Pietro Martire d’Anghiera, Opus Episto/arum (Amsterdam, 1670) n. 191.

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signature was an unreadable scrawl." 190 The portrait is devastating; all images of authority and wisdom dissolve within this cartoon depiction of the king. In order to re-examine Charles, it is useful to begin with something simple and concrete. What about his handwriting mentioned by Cronin? Yvonne Labande-Mailfert reproduces a letter written and signed by Charles which displays a handwriting that is quite beautiful, consistent, and comparatively easy to read.191 If we compare his handwriting to that of his contemporary Ludovico Sforza, Charles displays a clear and far superior script.192 Having examined the rather beautiful letter w ritten by Charles, one can imagine the surprise at hearing from Guicciardini that the king didn’t even know the alphabet.193 This one item should alert us to the extraordinary discrepancy between the reality of Charles VIII and the historical record. Charles wrote thousands of cultured, intelligent letters during his reign that are collected in five very large printed volumes.194 Many were dictated, of course, but some are autograph. They reveal an intelligent probing sovereign with an extraordinary memory, who in a short reign (15 years) produced a rather rich correspondence.

To have this man described by

190 Vi ncent Cronin, The Florentine Renaissance (New York, 1967), p. 248. 191 Labande-Mai lfert, Char/es V III, plate Hi. 192 A sample of Ludovico's handwriting is also reproduced in Labande-Mai lfert, plate X. 193 storia d ita lia , ed. S. 5. Menchi (Turin, 1971), vol. I, p. 78. 194 Lettres de Charles VIII, Roi de France, ed. P. Pel icier (Paris, 1898-1905), 5 vols. (more letters in supplements).

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the "greatest historian of the Renaissance" as illiterate suggests something serious is awry in the historical record of Charles VIII. 195 What about the nervous tic? Charles was a champion archer, billiards player, constant winner in tournaments, and one of the best tennis players in France.• 96 |S this athletic achievement consistent with the image of a near-epileptic midget? It can't be reconciled. Archery alone required extraordinary control and he was well-known as a champion.' 97 As we peel away centuries of defamatory accretions and discover a rather normal young man who did not drool, mumble, twitch, and shake it is interesting to ask something about his appearance. Was he really "ugly”? There are so many portraits of Charles that it is rather easy to make some kind of evaluation even as we recognize the subjectivity of ugliness and beauty. The finest work of art among the many portraits of the king is that by an anonymous sculptor done in terra cotta and sculpted in 1494, presumably while the King was in Florence or soon after. The artist clearly had the opportunity for firs t person observation

195 Characterization of Guicciardini by J. R. Hale in the introduction to

Guicciardini) History o f Italy and History o f Florence (New York, 1964), p. xlv. It is important to note that the extremely negative description of Charles VIII by Guicciardini is present only in the later Storia d'italia and not in the Storie fiorentine written in 1508-1509. This is strange since one would expect Guicciardini's research efforts to have yielded a more accurate picture of the king rather than a less accurate one. Thus his choice of a very unflattering portrait seems a conscious choice, almost as if Guicciardini were setting Charles up for a role in a drama even to the degree of openly disregarding well-known facts—for example, the king's literacy and the existence of a large correspondence in the French government archives. 196 Labande-Mai lfert, Charles V III, pp. 143 & 157. 197 Labande-Mai lfert, Charles V III, p. 157.

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75

of his subject. The sculpture is now conserved in the Bargello in F lo r e n c e .

198

It reveals an interesting face; certainly not what one

would describe as classically handsome yet indeed interesting and strong. He has large penetrating eyes with fine arching brows. The most distinctive feature is the we 11-remarked nose, large with a slight hook. But contemporaries of Charles had similar prominent noses, Maximilian for example, and they are never called ugly. One is tempted to conclude that the physical descriptions of Charles are manifestations of scorn for him and his northern army in Italy. By turning Charles into an ugly or comic figure his whole enterprise is thereby also reduced.

This scorn leads to parody and extreme distortion.

Certainly this is the case with Guicciardini. Charles is: feeble, short, ugly, ill-proportioned, illiterate, negligent, lazy, impulsive, inconsiderate, and lacking wisdom. 199 One sentence in the description stands out: "He was neglectful of almost all effort and enterprise, and those affairs which he did take care of, he managed with very little judgement or wisdom." 200

when one has concluded reading

Guicciardini's description of the King of France the firs t and obvious question is this: how could this incompetent, lazy, and stupid person successfully conquer most of Italy in one year?

198 For a reproduction see Labande-Mai lfert, Charles V III, plate XII. 199 Francesco Guicciardini, S to r/ad 'Italia, ed. Silvana Seidel Menchi (Turin, 1971), vol. I, p. 78. For English translation see The History o f Italy, tr. Sidney Alexander (New York, 1972), p. 49. 200 stor/a d'/talia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 79: "alieno da tutte le fatiche e facende, e in quelle alle quali pure attendeva povero di prudenza e di giudicio.” English trans. cited above from Alexander edition, p. 49.

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If this picture of Charles examined above is erroneous how did it get started? What are its sources? The most influential French source is the Memoires of Philippe de Commynes 201 This recollection of events in which he had personally participated by the extremely close advisor to Charles' father, exerted an unprecedented influence on the interpretation of the recent past when it appeared in 1524 in its first printed edition.202 In the next quarter century, over 13 editions appeared in France and by the end of the century translations had been printed all over Europe 2°3 Commynes was in a unique position to w rite about France and Italy in the late fifteenth century. He had been present and had participated in many of the most important decisions made during the reign of Louis XI. He had been Louis' roving ambassador to Italy and had known Lorenzo de' Medici as well as all the other political leaders in Italy of the time. During the reign of Louis' son, Charles, he had continued to participate in the highest levels of government and diplomacy, with one interrupting period of disgrace, though he lost the great political power that he had wielded in the earlier years of Louis' reign.204

20 M n the four and a half centuries since the appearance of the first edition of the Memoires over 120 editions in more than ten languages have been printed. For a recent English translation of the complete Memoires see The Memoirs o f Philippe de Commynes, ed. Samuel Kinser, (Columbia, South Carolina, 1969). For a critical evaluation of this edition see Paul Murray Kendall, LouisXi (New York, 1971), pp. 379-381. 202 For editions and influence of Commynes see Michael Grant's introduction to his edition of the Memoires (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1972), pp. 45-48. 203 Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. I, pp 81-84, & Memoires, ed. Grant, p. 46. 204 Michael Grant provides an excellent short biography of Commynes in

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He knew Charles, of course, although on a less intimate basis than Charles' father. If Louis had kept his family close to him, Commynes might have known the son well and could have watched him grow up, but King Louis protected his only male heir with extreme care and had him raised at secluded Amboise to which came only the closest members of the family. Thus the king's close companion, Commynes, had not had a great deal of time to come to know the growing boy before Charles was suddenly thrust onto the throne in 1483 205 Commynes accompanied the French expedition to Italy in 1494 and served as Charles' ambassador to Venice where he had contact with the recently exiled Piero de' Medici. He is the exclusive source for the details of some of the most famous episodes of the Italian expedition. One such example is important to our story: Piero de’ Medici's encounter with Charles VIII at Sarzana. The Memoires became widely available exactly at the moment when Italians in general and Florentines in particular were engaged in an extraordinary effort to understand their recent history. At this moment, the 1520s, Italian thinkers were especially concerned with that which related to foreign invasions and therefore Commynes' view of the events of 1494 and the king who precipitated the invasion was of great interest to both French and Italian historians.206

his edition of the Memoires, pp. 11-26. 205 Labande-Mai lfert, Charles V /ii, pp. I7ff. 206 Guicciardini's own attempt at another historical record of recent Italian history that became Cose fiorentine was begun in 1527. On Guicciardini's use of Commynes, see Roberto Ridolfi, The Life o f Francesco Guicciardini (New York, 1968), p. 259.

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Commynes' Charles VIII is "feeble" and "willful" but not wise.207 He is dominated by others who are themselves venal and stupid. Most important of all, he is manipulated by Ludovico Sforza. More than any other person, Commynes is the source of the fable that Ludovico's manipulations of the innocent and foolish king precipitated the French expedition to Italy.208 This is a critical juncture in the evolution of the interpretation of Charles. If he came to Italy through the machinations of others, such as Italian princes, he is a pawn, a leaf in the wind, a fool. If on the other hand, he came because of his own decision, his own plan, his own steadfast determination, that would be quite another thing altogether. The Commynes' interpretation has dominated until now. There is not space sufficient to analyze in detail the motivations for Commynes' distorted view of Charles. We know that he fe lt left out of the most important circles of power in the years of Charles' strongest leadership (1 4 9 1-1498), and no doubt he missed the era of Louis' reign in which he played such a central role. And he was downright offended when he was an ambassador at Venice in 1494-1495 when the king left him poorly informed and apparently neglected.200 Possibly the age difference between the young king and himself also made it difficult for Commynes to assess correctly the abilities of Charles. But whatever his motivations his portrait of King Charles VIII has been unchallenged for more than 400 years.210 207 Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 438. 208 Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, pp. 447ff. 200 Memoires, ed. Grant, p. 24. 2 10 The veracity of Philippe de Commynes has become a major historiographical issue since the I960's when two scholars in Europe began publication of what both purport to be a multi-volume series

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The picture of the stupid, gullible French king tricked by much wiser Italians was given great impetus by Ludovico Sforza himself. His version has come down to us by way of one of the most influential pieces of diplomatic reporting of this period. Sebastian Badoer, the Venetian ambassador at the court of the Duke of Milan, filed a lengthy report of a meeting with Ludovico on December 3, 1494 211 This report has been used in almost all histories of the period, and has been introduced somewhat uncritically into many depictions of Charles up until recent times.212 According to Ludovico, who by December was turning against his former ally, the King of France was a young, inexperienced leader with no authority of his own. He was surrounded by a rapacious fratricidal mob of advisors who cared nothing about the good of France and only about money for themselves. In the midst of this chaos the king himself exerted no leadership. The king’s councils lacked "form" and proper procedures. Everything in the king’s inner court seemed chaotic to

on Commynes. See Jean Dufournet, La Destruction des mythes dans Jes Nemoires de Ph. de Commynes (Geneva, 1966), and Karl Bittman, LudwigXi undKari derKuhne.• die Memoiren des Philippe de Commynes a/shistorische Quelle (Gottingen, 1964). I reject their unproven contention that Commynes intentionally distorted the record. My remarks above go only so far as to suggest that Commynes conveyed an incomplete and inaccurate record but with no malicious intent. For an excellent review of the debate about Commynes’ Memoires see Paul Murray Kendall, "The Reliability of Philippe de Commynes," in his Louis.XI, pp. 378-381. 211 Badoer’s dispatch is printed in full in Storia documentatadi Venezia, ed. 5. Romanin (Venice, 1913), pp. 50-58. 212 Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 4-5.

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Ludovico. The counselors behaved with what Ludovico deemed a lack of respect in front of the French monarch. He was scandalized by one scene at Asti where one advisor played at some game while another ate dinner as the king proceeded with business. The proud Duke of Milan was enraged when King Charles went off to eat and left Ludovico sitting, waiting "like an animal" ("come una bestia").213 Most memorable of all in this portrait of the King of France was Ludovico's description of Charles at Sarzana. Ludovico prepares to leave to return to Milan and the king begs him to stay. The duke insists he must return to the government of Milan. The king begs his advice on what he should do next. Ludovico lays out the plan: throw Piero de'Medici out of Florence and go on to

R o m e . 2 14

|n this account, Ludovico would have

us believe that without him the King of France does not know what to do next. He is lost. It is the seasoned, commanding, Italian prince who knows what to do. The obviousness of the self-serving motivations behind this picture should have warned everyone about its value yet this version has continued to exert considerable weight in the histories of the time and in the depiction of the French king.

2 13 Badoer quotes Ludovico (Romanin, Storia documentata p. 51): "Costui e giovine e di poco governo e non ha alcuna forma ne modo di consiglio, i suoi assistenti sono divisi in due parti....uno contrarii all'altro e vinca la opinion sua(the King), non hanno alcun rispetto al beneficio del regno attendono a smugner danari e non curano d'altro, i quali tutti insieme non fariano mezz'uomo savio. lo mi ricordo essendo in Asti vederlo in una sala ridotto con i suoi del Consiglio e quando aveano a consultar alcuna materia, uno stava a giuocar, un altro faceva colazione e chi attendeva ad una cosa e chi ad un'altra “ 214 Romanin, Storia documentata, p. 52.

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Another aspect of Ludovico's encounter with Charles is very interesting. It is the form of courtly procedures that most offends Ludovico. Charles' court seems chaotic to the Italian prince who was then reigning over the most highly organized bureaucracy in E u r o p e . 2 15 But the forms have confused him. He thinks that because things look chaotic that they are so in substance.

It is clear from Charles'

leadership into and out of Italy that this was not the case. It simply could not have been the case. It would have been impossible to bring an army of 30,000 men half-way across Europe, all the way to Naples, and then back to France, keeping this large force intact and undefeated, if the leadership had been hopelessly confused. In fact, later events showed that Ludovico himself was totally inept as a m ilitary leader and therefore a bad judge of the matter. 216 The negative portrait of Charles that evolved out of French sources such as Commynes and hostile Italian sources such as Ludovico Sforza was dramatically strengthened by the History o f Italy written by Francesco Guicciardini in the 1530's and published posthumously in 1561.217 This book has had a stronger influence on the interpretation of Charles and the events surrounding him in 1494 than any other. It is strange that the author firs t produced a fair and balanced account of the events of 1494 in his History o f Florence, which he wrote in 1508-1509,

215 Caterina Santoro, "L'Organizzazione del Ducato," in Storia di Milano, Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri (Milan, 1956) vol. VII, pp. 520ff. 2 16 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza (London, 1907), pp. 174-178. 2 , 7 For a short introduction to the History o f Italy and its writing see J. R. Hale, Guicciardini, History o f Italy and History of Florence (New York, 1964), pp. vii-xlvii.

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then thirty years later in the History o f Italy turned Charles into a cartoon. In the History o f Florence, Charles is treated fairly with none of the denigrating epithets present in the History of Italy. But we can understand the change immediately when we read the first sentence of the History o f Ita ly : "I have determined to w rite about those events which have occurred in Italy within our memory, ever since French troops, summoned by our own princes, began to stir up very great dissensions here.. . "2 ia The French came to Italy because Italian princes summoned them. The French did not come to Italy because they took independent decisions, made evaluations, and then moved their powerful, invincible forces south. Instead, Guicciardini emphasizes that the initiative lay with the Italians. There is no place in this interpretation for an intelligent, independent authoritative king whose own reasons of state and well-considered diplomacy sets in motion an international revolution that overturns many Italian governments. In Guicciardini's History, the Italians set in motion the events. Once the Italian historian chose to accent Italian initiatives in the events of 1494, there was no room for the truth about King Charles. He had to become powerless and ridiculous. And the already influential Commynes Memoires was in print. Guicciardini could

218 History o f Italy, ed. Alexander, p. 3. Storiaditalia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 5: "lo ho deliberato di scrivere le cose accadute alia memoria nostra in Italia, dappoi che l'armi de'franzesi, chiamate da'nostri principi medesimi, cominciorono con grandissimo movimento a perturbarla...."

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fashion his history using the French source with which to corroborate his own interpretation.219

|n the process the real King Charles got lost 220

Charles was not stupid, lazy, vacillating, weak, confused, rude, dishonest, or dependent on others,. He knew exactly what he was doing from an extraordinarily early age. He was only fourteen when he ordered the governor of Provence to institute a formal research into the royal titles to Naples held in the treasury of Aix-en-Provence. Note that this is ten years before the expedition its e lf.221

He had an unusual memory.

He had a useful sense of timing. He was sensitive and courageous with personal relationships. He was extremely loyal to associates.

He was

often shockingly aggressive at the exact right moment. He was

219 For Guicciardini's use of Commynes, see Ridolfi.Guicciardini, p. 259. The reader should note that Guicciardini did not know Charles personally. He probably saw the king in 1494, when Charles was in Florence, but Guicciardini was only eleven years old at the time and thus could not have formed very detailed or solidly based opinions. He no doubt had substantial second-hand information from the older generation of the Guicciardini family and other Florentines who had known Charles during November and at other times. But Guicciardini had no further opportunities to know or meet the French king. By the time the History of Italy was written in the 1530's, Charles had been dead almost thirty years. 220 a review of nineteenth and early twentieth century histories that deal with the events of 1494, w ill reveal the enduring power of the Commynes-Guicciardini interpretation of Charles VIII. One of the most influential was Pasquale Vi I lari's The Life and Times o f Girolamo Savonarola (New York, 1896). See p. 198, n. 2: "The character of Charles VIII is admirably described in Guicciardini's Storia d ita lia , vol. I, p. 87. But the best author to consult on this period of history is Philippe Comines (from whose Memoires we have already quoted)... The firs t significant revision of this traditional interpretation of Charles is Yvonne Labande-Mai lfert, Charles V III . 221 Labande-Mai lfert, Charles VIII, p. 174.

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absolutely and totally without pretension.

This probably derived from

learning to deal with his diminutive size; he learned early to avoid embarassment by avoiding pretension. He was deeply loved by his wife to the end of his life —rather a rare relationship in the annals of fifteenth century royal marriages. He made his greatest rival his best friend. All of these points w ill become clear in the following pages.

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CHARLES. ANNE. AND LOUIS

A few incidents w ill reveal the real King Charles. In June of 1491, France was at war over the future of Brittany. The English were about to invade. Troops of the Empire under the leadership of Maximilian already had invaded French territory. While plotting with the Breton nobles, the king's cousin, Duke Louis d'Orleans, putative heir to the throne in the absence of any children of Charles, had been captured and imprisoned. Louis was the most dangerous man in France if he was the enemy of the king. Around him flowed all plots and maneuvers damaging to Charles. On a fresh spring night King Charles secretly left his lodging at Plessis-les-Tours, journeyed east along the river Cher with a very small group of his most trusted advisors, and spent the night at Montrichard. In the morning, he went as far as Pont de Barangon where the Cher and the river Yevre meet. From here he sent Stuart d'Aubigny forward to Bourges with written orders for the release of the imprisoned Duke of Orleans and then he waited. Within hours the messenger party returned along the route it had just taken, bringing Louis with them. When the confused duke saw the king waiting in the distance and understood his release he rushed forward, threw himself at the king's feet and collapsed in tears. The king reached down, raised him to his feet, and embraced him. From this moment the two men, two kings of France, became

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inseparable companions. Louis never plotted against Charles again and mourned the loss of his friend when Charles' death made him king.222 It is a dramatic and emotional tale. But its interest for us is that it reveals a decisive and wise leader. He had judged Louis correctly. Within his cousin, there were reservoirs of affection. Generosity on the king's part could bring peace between the men. The king acted quickly and independently while around him others debated various solutions to the problem of Orleans, including execution. Of course there was more to it than just a hug in the woods. Charles showered his cousin with titles, valuable sinecures, and real authority. But it was bold action and right judgement that prevailed and in one generous gesture he removed for the rest of his reign treasonous plotting by a potential rival. Only a few months later we get another glimpse of royal decisiveness. In November 1491, all of Europe was watching the denouement of the "Matter of Brittany." 223

For three years since the death of the Duke of

Brittany, international diplomatic maneuver had centered on the future of this vital northwestern province still independent from the Kingdom of France. England, Spain, and the Empire all were involved. They sent troops and money or both to the war over Brittany. Each correctly foresaw that the permanent absorption of this huge rich province by Franco would yield a dramatically more powerful France: a France

222 por an account of the dramatic scene with Louis see LabandeMailfert, Charles VIII, pp. 95ff; M. Guizot, A History o f France (New York, n.d.), pp. 396-397; John Bridge, France, vol. I, pp. 238-239. 223 For a good introduction to the question of Brittany in 1488-91 see John Bridge, France, "The Breton Succession," vol I, pp. 103ff.

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relieved of its ancient fear of this "backdoor" by which its enemies could invade and threaten the unity of the French heartland. Brittany was especially important to England. It was the ally that could allow English troops to land on the continent during any conflict with France. And it was especially dear to Henry VII of England who had spent most of his exile there before becoming king. The Duke of Brittany had protected him even against the demands of the King of France and Henry fe lt honorbound to help the beleaguered young duchess, the 15 year-old heiress to the recently deceased duke. Maximilian, with interests in the Low Countries and Germany, had already taken action by way of a proxy espousal (which was of dubious strength and legality until the two actually consummated the union) to the Duchess Anne. Maximilian was officially elected Holy Roman Emperor two years later in 1493, but already acting as such in his father's declining years. He dreamed of a northern expansion of the Empire cutting across Normandy and leaving France isolated from her richest provinces. The monarchs of Spain also intervened and sent aid to the young duchess in the hope that she would be able to hold out against France. The crisis of Brittany was a rehearsal for the other great international crisis of this period: Italy, 1494. All western European nations were involved and the diplomatic apparatus that was just at this moment coming into being as a permanent web of established embassies was called into action.224 224 For the story of Anne and Charles see Mildred Allen Butler, Twice Queen o f France, Anne o f Brittany (New York, 1967), pp. 82-99; Labande-Mai lfert, Charles V/ii, pp. 97-100; Bridge, France, vol. I, pp. 210-218. For background on the international aspects see R. Doucet, "France Under Charles VIII and Louis XII,"

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In November, Anne was surrounded in the ancient historic capital of Brittany, Rennes, which sits at the hub of a great wheel of roads that converge from all directions. Nantes is directly south. The seaport of St. Malo is directly north. French troops had all directions cut off and supplies in the city were dwindling. Now that the irresistible power of France had been demonstrated Charles extended the hand of a friend. He withdrew all French troops. Trade resumed. Supplies poured into Rennes. Anne could leave Brittany with a French escort if she wished to join her Maximilian. But she did not want to leave and her people did not want her to leave either. Or, she could marry any French lord she chose and reside within Brittany, although not in the capital, not exerting real authority. She rejected this too. 225 During all of these negotiations Charles was gentle, solicitous, and made no demands. Anne had complete freedom of movement. Friends and diplomats came and left Rennes with promises of support. Charles never mentioned marriage. His diplomats just took her step by step through alternatives. Then at exactly the right moment he moved. On the pretext of a pilgrimage to the nearby church of Notre-Dame de Bonne Nouvelle on the outskirts of Rennes, Charles set out with a small group of friends. After worship at Notre-Dame Charles rode on to the gates of Rennes. The astonished Breton soldiers recognized the king and opened the ancient gate of the Porte Mordelaise. He rode right up the hill to the ducal chateau. Moments later Anne's servants came running in announcing the

The New Cambridge Modern History: The Renaissance (Cambridge, 1957), p. 295. 225 Bridge, France, vol. I, p. 211; Butler, Anne, p. 89.

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King of France. Charles left his advisors. Anne left hers.

Soon the

matter was settled. They were married on the 6th of December.226 As in the case of the Duke of Orleans, here again we see Charles following his instincts, taking quick decisive action while all around him fuss advisors with complex plans for winning Brittany. As in the case with Louis so here also his instincts are right. He evaluates people correctly then acts with perfect timing. consideration.

He acts with care and

One more thing about the incident. The most trusted

advisor and friend of Anne of Brittany was Louis, Duke of Orleans. It is easy to imagine what Louis told the Duchess about Charles and his own recent experience of royal generosity.

226 Erasmo Brasca, Milanese ambassador at the French court provides us with a firs t person account filed from Tours, Decembers, 1491 (ASM, Pot. est., Francia, 548): "Essendo facto intendere a la maesta r[ealej che non poria maritarse in alcuna quale portasse piu pacificatione al Reame suo che questa fiola de Bertagna, li haveva gran inclinatione. Et per questo deliberoe andarla ad vedere. Etcosi havendola vista, nel primo ingresso non li gusto molto, poi le e forte piaciutaj..

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FORNOVO

A true assessment of Charles VIII is impossible without examining Fornovo. In April of 1495, five months after Charles' sojourn in Florence, the League of Venice was announced to ambassadors from France in the Doge's palace.227 The stated goal of the League was the maintenance of peace in Italy. The true goal was to cut off and destroy the King of France while he was still in Italy. The members of the League were Venice, Mantua, Milan, Spain, the Pope, and the Empire—almost everyone except Florence and France. In Naples, Charles was told that it was an alliance to defend against the Turks. He laughed in the faces of the ambassadors: "The Signory has made a league... because the Turks have built a fleet! Why, truly, how frightening the Turks are! I see them coming!"228 A French withdrawal, or at least the withdrawal of the king with part of his troops, was necessary from the instant that the League became a reality. Since we have mentioned Guicciardini above and his interpretation of Charles, it is worthwhile reviewing the Italian historian's presentation of this specific moment: "Before this new league was formed, the French king had already made up his mind to return soon to France, impelled thereto more by light fancy and the ardent desire of

227 The best account of the formation of the League of Venice is in Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 174-22!. 228 Sanudo, Spedizione, pp. 294-295. English translation of Charles' remarks from Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 233.

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the court than by sober considerations... "229 The Guicciardini version is totally false but more important is the way in which it is false. The facts are distorted so that not only are the realities of the moment twisted but most importantly, Charles is once again, in this small detail, maligned to appear moved by light and self-indulgent reasons. The Italian of Guicciardini is quite precise: "leggiera cupidita." Charles is moved by his own cupidity and the selfishness of others rather than as was the case, by careful consideration of the strategic reality and extensive military and diplomatic preparations. The king did not hurry, but by July he and his army had moved north through Rome and Tuscany and were ready to traverse the Apennines north of La Spezia and Sarzana through the Cisa pass that the French had used on their southbound journey eleven months before. The League chose the foothills where the French route debouched onto the Po valley plain to mount its major military challenge to the French and both forces converged on the small river valley of the Taro which drops out of the high Apennine peaks moving north, flowing down towards the Po and finally emptying into the great wide river near Parma. There on Monday July 6, 1495, in torrential rainstorms and blasting winds, just below the

22g History of Italy , ed. Sidney Alexander, p. 90. Storiaditalia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 164: "Aveva il re, insino innanzi si facesse la nuova lega, quasi stabilito di ritornarsene presto in Francia; mosso piu da leggiera cupidita e dal desiderio ardente di tutta la corte che da prudente considerazione...

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small bridgehead town of Fornovo, was fought the biggest, most violent, and most important Italian battle of the fifteenth century.230 Fornovo was a critical moment for all. For the French, there was the real possibility of total defeat and the capture of the king. This had happened before. In 1356, at the Battle of Poitiers, King John 11 had been taken prisoner by the English and the event had ushered in some of the worst years in French history: chaos at home, humiliation for the king in

230 The Battle of Fornovo is extraordinarily well-documented. Sanudo, Spedizione, pp. 446-486 provides narrative plus many diplomatic documents printed in full. His version is, of course, somewhat overly favorable to the Venetian interpretation. Philippe de Commynes was present in Venice during the secret negotiations for the formation of the League and then joined the king and was present at Fornovo. Much of Book VIII of the Memoires describes the situation and the battle in great detail. It is possibly the finest section of the entire Memoires and its veracity is confirmed by the numerous other accounts of the day. Commynes played a central role in the pre-battle diplomatic maneuvers between the forces of the League and the forces of the king. See Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II pp. 514-541. Alessandro Benedetti, a Venetian physician, also produced one of the important memoirs of the battle, Diaria de Bello Carolino, now available in a bi-llngual edition with the original Latin text and English translation on facing page: Diaria de BelJo Carolino, ed. Dorothy Schullian (New York, 1967), pp. 89-121. Three secondary works are notable: Delaborde, L 'Expedition de Charles VIII en Italie, pp. 608-651 ; Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, pp. 379-414; John Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 242-268. Guicciardini comments on the battle as “memorable because It was the first battle fought in Italy with bloodshed and slaughter for a very long time; before then, very few men had ever died in military action." History o f Italy, ed. Alexander, p. 104. {Storia d'ltalia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 196:",.. memorabile perche fu la prima che, da lunghissimo tempo in qua, si combatesse con uccisione e con sangue, in Italia; perche innanzi aquesta morivano pochissimi uomini in uno fatto d’arme")

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his English captivity, and economic collapse under the burden of unprecedented ransom 231 For the Italians, the defeat of the French was necessary to demonstrate Italian power in the wake of the king's unexpected penetration of all of Italy in a matter of months. Italian failure to unite would send a message all over Europe that Italy was open to adventurers. Our interest is in the leadership of the king. First we should note the unusual esprit de corps that was present in the French forces and was never so evident as in the extraordinary feat of the crossing of the Apennines with the huge cannon being moved by the men themselves along tortuous mountain paths. The king was always close to the men and gave them an unusual amount of influence and participation in decisions. The fate of Pisa which was not turned over to Florence as promised, was decided by Charles in response to an unprecedented strength of feeling among the troops in favor of the Pisans and the free expression of this opinion directly to Charles for the protection of Pisa.232

231 m. Guizot, History of France, vol. 2, p. 104 & pp. I33ff. 232 Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 240; Fanucci, "Pisa e Carlo VIII," pp. 36-43, examines in detail Charles' return to Pisa and the issue of the control of the city after his withdrawal. On the troops' role in the decision, p. 41: "L’esercito intero fmv emphasis] poi si opponeva alia restituzione delle terre [the return of Pisa to the Florentines], e i soldatl giusero non solo ad inglurare il maresciallo dl Gi& e a minacciare il presidente di Gannai, i quali difendevano la proposta del cardinale, ma a recarsi fino alia camera del re, armati, e pregarlo a proteggere i Pisani." Fanucci's detailed and accurate reconstruction of this incident is dependent on Commynes who was an eyewitness to these events and records his impressions in Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, pp. 510-512.

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Second, we should consider the unity of command that prevailed in the battle itself on the French side. Charles' generals participated fully in the choice of strategy and then fulfilled their part precisely by remaining steadfast to the plan as conceived.233

This is exactly what

was not true of the Italian armies.234 Third, we must note that King Charles participated in the battle itself on a fully equal basis of responsibility and effort, fighting heroically.235

Finally, in addition

to presiding over wise unified strategy, assuming a fa ir share of the burden, and inspiring loyalty among his men, all observers state, including Guicciardini, that the king's behavior in battle was extraordinary: heroic, not reckless, showing reserves of strength that no one would have thought possible. "In that day, no man bore himself more courageously than the King."236

£Ven Guicciardini agrees that Charles

"displayed great ardor in nobly defending himself."237 But Commynes, present at the whole battle and with the king in clear sight, cannot bring

233 Delaborde, 1'Expedition, pp. 636-640; Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 254-263; J. De La Pilorgerie, Grande Armee, p. 340. 234 For evaluations of the behavior of the Italians at Fornovo see Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 264 where he quotes Italian reaction to the Italian army conduct. 235 Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 260: "the King behaved with a cool intrepidity which would have done credit to an older head and a more stalwart frame." 236 r de Maulde la Claviere, Procedurespoiitiques duregne de LouisXii, p. 669. English trans. in Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 260. 237 History of Italy, ed. Alexander, p. 100. Storia d'/taiia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 192: "Contro a' quali il re, avendo intorno a se pochi de' suoi, dimostrando grande ardire si difendeva nobilmente."

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himself to w rite a single word praising Charles and narrates the details of the entire engagement without a word about the king's bravery. 238 The outcome of Fornovo was a success for the French. Although they lost many of their supplies and much of the booty they were carrying out of Italy, they escaped the allied effort to corner and capture the King of France and his army. Their success was due to the unity of their command and the discipline exercised by all their commanders in fulfilling precisely their exact responsibility as decided before the battle in the counci 1.239 if We remember Ludovico Sforza's characterization of the king's council examined above, we realize that Sforza was mistakened. The chaos and lack of resolution that he thought he saw was an erroneous evaluation, possibly made due to his own expectations about the proper forms of governmental procedures. But Fornovo demonstrated the exact opposite of what Sforza maintained: the successful and unified leadership exercised by King Charles VIII. For the Italians, Fornovo was the worst kind of disaster since it revealed precisely the reality Italians had hoped to disprove. It showed almost comic disunity for all the world to see as Italy confronted a well-trained, well-equipped northern army. Part of the Italian army had broken from the line and run off in pursuit of the baggage train in the hope of seizing valuable booty; their unexpected bolt ruined the unity of the Italian line and caused a momentary loss of nerve on the Italian side.240

238 239 240 of

Memoires, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 532. Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 257-262. see Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 264. The above is an Italian evaluation their own army.

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King Charles seized the day, held his men together, fought bravely, and triumphed amidst one of the greatest challenges confronting a fifteenth-century monarch.241 This was the decisive king who met with the leaders and citizens of Florence in the Medici Palace on November eighteenth.242

241 Charles' own reflections on the battle are contained in the following letter written to his sister six days after Fornovo: "Ma seur, m' amye, je me recommande bien fort a vous. J'escripz a mon frere comment en mon chemin ay trouve une grosse armee que le seigneur Ludovic, les Venlciens et leurs aliez m' avoient prepare, me cuidant garder de passer. A quoy, a l'aide de Dieu et Nostre Dame, a este tenement resiste que suis venu jusques icy sans riens avoir perdu. Au surplus, je foiz la plus grant diligence que faire ce peut de passer oultre et espere de brief vous voir, ce que je desire, afin de vous compter bien au long de tout mon voyage. Et, a Dieu, ma seur, m’amye, qui vous ait en sa garde. Escript a Croya, le XII jour de jui 1let. Vostre bon frere, Charles." Lettres de Charles V III, vol. IV, p. 227. 242 piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 69r cited in Borsook, "Decor," p. 116, n. 74.

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PART TWO: Lombardy

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Tempo vegg' io, non molto dopo ancoi, che tragge un altro Carlo fuor di Francia, per far conoscer meglio e se e' suoi. Dante, Purgatorio, XX. 1

With the thrill and the fear of King Charles' Monday entrance celebration now past, on Tuesday the citizens of Florence had to sit down with the king and begin to discuss the realities of hosting more than 12,000 foreign soldiers and thousands of horses inside the city of Florence. But first Charles went off to church. In the morning, His Royal Highness was out early to walk from the palace the few hundred feet to Borgo San Lorenzo where he found the Medici-sponsored church of San Lorenzo built by Brunelleschi and the place of resting for generations of Medici leaders. Luca Landucci was at the same mass and records that he saw the king up close.2 Charles took

1 The Divine Comedy of Dante A lighieri with Translation and Comment by John D. Sinclair (New York, 1939), vol. II, p. 260: I see a time, not long from now, which brings another Charles out of France to make both him and his people better known; 2 Landucci, Diario, p. 81: "E a di 18 di november, 1494, martedi, el detto Re ando a udire messa in 5a’ Lorenzo, e io stetti alia medesima messa e molto lo vidi d'apreso in detto San Lorenzo."

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communion kneeling close to the tomb of Cosimo de' Medici and then emerged from the church and stood before the rough, brown-stone, unfinished facade that even the efforts of Michelangelo failed to complete. There he greeted the citizens of Florence. Later in the day, the citizens and governors invited to meet with the king passed through the Medici Palace courtyard, ascended the broad stone staircase, and gathered together in the Grand Salon.3 The great hall was magnificently decorated with rich intarsia inlays in the wooden paneling, glazed terra cotta tile borders, a fine decorated ceiling, and tapestries of gold and ultramarine The form of the original inlaid floor

3 Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, Bib. Naz., Magi.,11. II., 129, fol. 69r. (Borsook, "Decor," p. 116, n. 74): "A di XVIII. La nostra Signoria con circa trecento cittadini a casa 1 'ando avisitare. parlo messer Luca Corsini cominciando in latino di poi subvingendo in nostra Lingua lo effetto fu come a visitare andavano quel la maesta la qual liberatrice era, o chiamar li potea non solo della nostra citta di Firenze ma di tutta Italia da quel la pace tranquillita, etc." The history of Florence by Piero Parenti is one of the most important sources for this period, especially for 1494. It is extremely detailed and in the absence of such governmental records as the Consulte e Pratiche Parenti's practice of relating in detail what was said at civic meetings makes this record especially valuable. The original manuscript and copies are in the Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence. Observe the following notation: the original is numbered Bib. Naz., Magi., II. IV. 169. The copy is numbered Bib. Naz. Magi. II. II., 129. The Storia has never been published, but large sections have been printed in various histories of the period. Therefore, all references to Parenti's history herein w ill carry in parenthesis a reference to printed sources where the Parenti citations have appeared. For more on Parenti's history see Guido Pampaloni, "Piero di Marco Parenti e la sua Historia fiorentina'," Archivio Storico Italiano , vol. CXVII (1959), pp. 1 4 7 -153, and Joseph Schnitzer, QueHen undForschungen zur Geschichte Savonarolas, vol. IV: Savonarolanach den Aufzeichnungen desFlorentiners- Piero Parenti (Leipzig, 1910), pp. xxv-clxii.

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and ceiling can still be seen today in the palace chapel. On the walls hung Paolo Uccello’s two large (10 by 6 feet) battle scenes painted for Cosirno.4

Light streamed in from the outsized windows that Michelozzo

had designed to bring clarity and brightness into this new kind of residence 5 With Uccello's belligerent momentos setting the scene, Luca Corsini delivered his speech. The tone of celebration and unrestrained welcome did not last long. The king's entrance into Florence the previous day, during which he had chosen the stance of a conqueror with lance at the thigh and baldachino over head, signalled trouble to the authorities who were already concerned about their own future. But more disturbing were the events in Pisa.6 During Charles' two days in the coastal city, November 8 and 9, his behavior had allowed, if not openly encouraged, the Pisans to rebel from their Florentine rulers and on the evening of the ninth, Pisa exploded into a joyful, raging, dancing, singing, hate-filled expulsion of the Florentines. Youths danced in the piazzas. The Florentine flag was dragged through the streets. Fires were lit all along the Arno. And the hated Marzocco, the sculpted lion which was the symbol of Florence, the

4 Filarete visited the palace in the 1450's and recorded his observations of the interior in his Trattato d‘architettura of 1464. Also see: Hyman, Palazzo Medici, pp. 177-179; Ronald Lightbown, Botticelli, vol. I, p. 73, on the 1492 inventory of the palace. A substantial portion of the inventory of 1492 is printed in G. B. Picotti, La Giovinezza di Leone X (Milan, 1928), pp. 649-652. 5 Hyman, Palazzo Medici, p. 162. 6 Landucci, Biario, p. 8 0 :" ,.. al suo palazzo, sempre gridando Viva Francia, che mai fu fatta tanta alegrezza, e tanto onore d'un animo buono e non fitto, sperando in lui ogni nostra pace e riposo. E finalmente non fu cosi, perche ci tolse Pisa e donolla a' Pisani, che non poteva ne doveva farlo; perche dette quello che non era suo."

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bottom of which prisoners were forced to kiss as an act of submission, was hurled to the ground, broken into pieces and thrown into the river. 7 The apparent loss of Pisa contained devastating potential for the Florentine oligarchy: the Medici, the Rucellai, the Capponi, all owned extensive tracts of land in the Pisan territory as well as other profitable businesses.8 But even more frightening were the possibilities regarding

7 The events in Pisa are narrated by the eyewitness, Giovanni Portoveneri, Memoriale di Giovanni Portoveneri in Archivio Storico Italiano, vol. VI (1845), pp. 287-288. Also in Landucci, Diario, p. 78. Indispensable for these events is Vittorio Fanucci, "Le Relazioni tra Pisa e Carlo VIII," AnnaJidella ScuolaNormale Superiore diPisaFilosofia e Filologia, vol. X (1894), pp. 3-85, with documents. 8 For a general review of the importance of Pisa to Florence see Michael Mallett, "Pisa and Florence in the Fifteenth Century: Aspects of the Period of the First Florentine Domination," in Florentine Studies, Politics, and Society in Renaisance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, 111., 1968), pp. 403-441. Among the many individual cases of Florentines who lost everything due to the Pisa rebellion and the resulting collapse of the Florentine business network that had profited from the Florentine control of the Pisan economy, especially interesting is the story of Giovanni di Bernardo dei Cambi da Querceto. Giovanni was a partner with Lorenzo and Piero de' Medici in a very profitable iron foundry and an allied monopoly granted for the sale of iron in the Pisan territory. When the November rebellion occurred, the Medici holdings were seized and the company of which Giovanni Cambi was manager dissolved and he was forced to sell whatever rights he held to the Buonvisi of Lucca at a great loss. A Libro dei creditorie debitori of the ironworks survives covering the period 1493-1496. This disastrous experience in Pisa seems to have contributed significantly to Giovanni's willingness to become an active conspirator in a plot to return Piero de' Medici to power, a plot that ended in his execution on August 21,1497. See Piero Ginori-Conti, Le magone della vena del

ferro di Pisa e di Pietrasanta sotto la gestione di Piero de ‘Medici ecompagnia (Florence, 1939-1947); M. G. Cruciani Troncarelli, "Giovanni Cambi," Dizionario Biografico degli Italian/', vol. 17, pp. 97-99, with refs.

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who might end up with control of the Tuscan port when the French moved south. Ludovico Sforza was known to be pressing his Milanese claims and had his trusted lieutenant, Galeazzo Sanseverino, right at the king's elbow.9 In fact, many believed the rebellion to have been the work of Ludovico using Galeazzo as his agent provocateur}^ The extraordinarily complex moves of Ludovico are amazing. He played the ally to the King yet began relations with the King's enemies the minute the king left Lombardy. He played the friend to secret allies within Florence such as Bernardo Rucellai while he maneuvered to rob Florence of Pisa (and thereby directly damage the holdings of the Rucellai in the Pisan contado)J 1 He played the friend to Piero de' Medici yet counseled the king to overthrow him.

He played the friend and protector of the Genovese

while he maneuvered to obtain coastal fortresses that were formerly holdings of Genoa. The possibiIty that Milan might end up with control of the whole Tuscan coast including Pisa and Livorno struck terror into the Florentines. But there were other problems closer to home. The issue of the future of Piero de' Medici came up immediately and soured the still

9 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 463. 10 Fanucci, "Relazioni," p. 5 & n. 2; Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 465: "While the King was in Pisa, Galeazzo at his master's instigation invited several of the principal citizens of the town [of Pisa] to his lodgings, and advised them to rebel against the Florentines and to request the king to give them their freedom, hoping that by this means the city of Pisa would fall into the hands of the duke of Milan...." 11 Giuseppe Schnitzer, Savonarola, tr. Ernesto Rutili (Milan, 1931), vol. I, p. 173.

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pleasant mood. At this moment, Piero was in Venice where the government had apprehensively given him asylum fearing that they would thereby displease the King.

Philippe de Commynes, the king's

ambassador in Venice, writes of receiving the recently deposed ruler of Florence: "Two days later Piero arrived in a doublet or in the dress of a v a le t;. . . I wanted to help him, and I had not received any letter against him from the king;. . . And so he came there [on November 18, 1494]; and I went to see him the day after he had spoken to the Signoria, who had him well lodged... When I saw him, it seemed to me indeed that he was not a man who was about to rise up again. He told me at length about his fate, and I comforted him as best I could. Among other things he told me how he had lost everything

"12

Within Florence, the fate of Piero was the most important issue. Luca Landucci records that certain counselors of the king were swearing that they would have the king put Piero back in power. He adds that maybe it was not true but the people thought it was.13 Marin Sanudo reports that many were maneuvering within the city for the return of Piero and doing everything possible to bring about his return.14 It should be remembered that as of this date, Piero had only been gone one week.

12 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 470-471. Commynes' opportunity to meet with Piero de' Medici immediately after the revolution in Florence is extremely important for our story. This encounter provided Commynes with a detailed (as he emphasizes) account of the events at Florence on November 8 and 9 from Piero's own lips soon after the events. Commynes' Memoires thus become our only account of these events as seen from Piero's point of view. 13 Landucci, Diario, p. 85. 14 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 136.

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The Medici had ruled in Florence for sixty years and they had only been out of power eight days. Thus there was no sense of finality about affairs in Florence. With the support of the King of France, Piero's return was still a possibility. The two leaders of the effort to bring Piero back were his wife, Alfonsina Orsini, a member of one of Naples' most powerful families, and her mother, Caterina Sanseverino, mentioned above. When Piero and his brother Giovanni (the future Pope Leo X) slipped out of the Porta San Gallo just up the street from the palace on the night of November 9, and rode on to Bologna and safety, the Medici women stayed behind, protected in the convent of Santa Lucia which was located near the gate through which their men had escaped.15 Now with the city in the control of the king, they emerged from the convent, went to stay with their relative, Lorenzo Tornabuoni, and overnight became the leaders of the Medici party within the city.15 Piero Parenti says that Caterina was a woman of great authority and leadership. We have already noticed the web of her contacts with her cousin Galeazzo and through him the king, as well as secret ties to Ludovico Sforza.17 Also staying at the Palazzo Tornabuoni was Philippe

15 Parenti, Storia, fol. 194r (Schnitzer, Que//en-\M, p. 10). 15 Parenti, Storia, fol. 200v (Schnitzer, Quelien-IV, p. 12): "Mentre che tra la nostra Signoria et la Mta del re di Francia le sopradette cerimonie si exeguivano, la donna di Piero de Medici colla madre, femina di auctorita et governo, inoltre Lorenzo Tornabuoni, Giannozzo Pucci et li altri complici di Piero a niente altro attendeano, che con subornationi, corruptele et tutte altre vie iniquissime persuadere a governatori del re, che ingiustamente Piero de Medici cacciato suto era di Firenze...." 17 See above p. 26.

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de Bresse, the king’s uncle and most influential advisor, thus the two Medici women had immediate access to the king through his two most trusted counselors: Philippe and Galeazzo.18 This congruence of powerful personages within the Tornabuoni home must have fueled the worst fears of the Medici enemies for whom a return to power by Piero meant certain exile and loss of property, if not worse.19 Alfonsina was only twenty-two when she found herself thrust into the role of the leader of the house. But many of the players in this story were young. Piero was twenty-three. His brother Giovanni was nineteen and his other brother Giuliano was sixteen. The king was twenty-four. Galeazzo di Sanseverino was twenty-seven. Alfonsina spent her firs t sixteen years in Naples as the pampered daughter of Roberto Orsini, Grand Constable of Naples, one of the most important and powerful men in the Kingdom of Naples.20 Then in 1487, her whole life changed when Lorenzo de' Medici chose her from among the nobility of Naples as a wife for his son and successor, Piero. Lorenzo

18 Parenti, Storia, fol. 203r (Schnitzer, Oue!/en-\\l, p. 18): "La donna non dimanco di Piero de Medici insieme col la madre, Lorenzo alsi Tornabuoni et li altri partigiani di Piero dal 1a impresa non si toglevano, continuamente erano alii orecchi et spalle de governatori del re. Davano, promettevano, offerivano, che se Piero tornassi, loro non altrimenti che Piero signori sarebbono della citta di Firenze." 19 Parenti, Storia, fol. 202V (Schnitzer, Ouel/en-W/, p. 16): .. che vivamente alia M^3 del re intendere si facessi, che per modo alcuno consentire non volavamo, Piero de Medici tornassi nella citta perche chi questo volea, non altro volea, che la ruina della nostra citta et la uccisione de nostrl clttadini." 20 Yvonne Maguire, The Women o f the Medici (New York, 1927), pp. 186ff.

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couldn't aspire to the Neapolitan royal family itself so the Orsini were the next best thing.21 The Florentine ambassador to Naples, Lorenzo's brother-in-law Bernardo Rucellai, wrote home to describe the prospective bride: "She does not seem to be particularly good or bad, but I rather dislike her throat, which is somewhat thick at the back. If it were in proportion it would not m atter.. . . She does not displease me, for if she is only thirteen years of age [Rucellai was wrong about the age], as our friend tells me, she is not small. Her arms, which are usually a guide to the legs, are good, and also her hands. She seems to be straight, but about this and her height I w ill tell you another time. Her skin is good and she has a good natural color. Her eyes are light, but not unpleasantly so; she has a good nose, and her mouth, though a little heavy, is not enough to destroy her charm... ,"22 In February 1487, Piero de' Medici and Alfonsina Orsini were married by proxy in Naples in the presence of the King and Queen of Naples.2^ Lorenzo de' Medici's choice of a Neapolitan bride for his son in the year 1487 is extremely important for an understanding of the dilemma facing Florence in 1494. This choice merely confirmed what had been Lorenzo's policy during the whole period of his political leadership in Florence: alliance with Naples.24 The Pazzi Plot and Pope Sixtus'

21 For background on the Orsini marriage and Lorenzo's considerations see Judith Hook, Lorenzo De' Medici (London, 1984), p. 169. 22 Maguire, Women, p. 187. 23 Maguire, Women, p. 187. 24 For an analysis of Lorenzo's foreign policy as it applied to Italy see Roberto Palmarocchi, La politica Italians di Lorenzo de' Medici (Florence, 1933).

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maneuvers in 1478 had temporarily disturbed the Florentine-Neapolitan alliance and it was Lorenzo's most important foreign policy objective to re-establish it. When a new Pope made war against the southern kingdom (14851486), Lorenzo enlisted on the side of Naples and arranged for his Orsini allies to support King Ferrante.25

Lorenzo took this position

disregarding a threatened French intervention on the side of the Pope. This moment of the so-called Barons' War thus provides a fascinating adumbration of the situation that would develop in 1494: a crisis of relations between two Italian powers, a threatened French intervention, and Florence in the middle.

When the French envoys came to Florence

and tried to enlist Lorenzo and the city in a war against Naples—exactly as they would do again eight years later using the same arguments and same threats—Lorenzo stood solid with Naples and was able to carry the Ten of War, the responsible Florentine council, with him in spite of French threats of a total commercial ban on Florentine trade within France.25 Thus when historians speculate about the situation in 1494 and suggest that Lorenzo would have handled the threat of a French invasion differently than did his son, they totally disregard Lorenzo’s record. To suggest that he would have jettisoned his alliance with Naples in 1494 runs counter to every evidence about his foreign policy goals.

25 For a good review of the events surrounding the Barons' War and the role of Lorenzo see Cecilia Ady, Lorenzo dei Medici andRenaissance Italy (London, 1955), pp. 94-96. 25 Ady, Lorenzo dei Medici, p. 95.

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These goals were restated in a period during which Charles’ invasion was already a widely discussed possibility.27 The leader of Florence made an unequivocal statement by way of the marriage contract of 1487 with the Orsini of Naples that the foreign policy of Florence under his leadership would be unalterably attached to the Neapolitan Kingdom; an alliance with Naples was the cornerstone of his whole foreign policy 28 The timing of this choice makes it clear that Lorenzo understood the risks and even in the increasingly disturbed atmosphere of Italy in 148788, he saw an alliance with Naples as a necessity for a sensible Florentine foreign policy 29 It had been eight years since his famous trip to Naples in which he successfully negotiated an end to the war then raging.30 Yet s till in 1488, he saw this southern alliance as the critical

27 Giovanni Lanfredini to Lorenzo de' Medici, 5ept. 3, 1488 (ASF, MAP, XIV, 220). The diplomatic correspondence cited here and below from the Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Archivio Mediceo avanti il Principato (ASF, MAP) is found on individual sheets ( carta), unbound in large folders ( filza). The notation within this paper uses roman numerals to indicate the filza, and arabic numerals to indicate the page. For more on Ludovico's maneuvers see Ady, Miain Under the Sforza, pp. 153-155. 28 Palmarocchi, Lapolitica Italiana. 20 The two-year period from 1487 to 1488 was a time of extreme instability for Italy. The Malvezzi conspiracy in Bologna had left the Bentivoglio near collapse. The Baron's war in Naples had left King Ferrante greatly weakened. In Milan, the coming wedding of Giangaleazzo disturbed the delicate balance of power with his uncle Ludovico. The Sarzana War had brought chaos to Lorenzo's careful diplomacy and had opened the question of control of the Ligurian coast in the wake of the Florentine defeat of Genoa. 30 Giovanni Cecchini, "La guerra della congiura dei Pazzi e 1' andata di Lorenzo de' Medici a Napoli," Bo!ietino Senese di Storia Patria (1965), pp. 291-301.

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building block for continued security for Florence. This choice of a Neapolitan and Roman alliance was also rooted in economics. Among the most important clients of the Medici bank in the 1490's were the Orsini.31 The two Orsini marriages, his own to Clarice Orsini of Rome, and that of his son Piero to Alfonsina of Naples, looked toward a clearly defined alliance of Florence with the southern powers.

And he accepted

the ensuing changes within his other Italian alliances 32 As Lorenzo continued his close cooperation with Naples, Ludovico Sforza began a re-evaluation of Milan's relationship to Florence. At the same moment that Lorenzo was announcing his absolute loyalty to a Neapolitan alliance, Ludovico Sforza in Milan was observing the firs t dangers to himself from that very direction. In 1488, after a delay of many years during which the prospective bride and groom matured to acceptable marriage age, final negotiations for a wedding between the legitimate Duke of Milan, Giangaleazzo Sforza (Ludovico’s nephew), and Isabella of Naples were concluded. The granddaughter of the King of Naples journeyed north through Rome and Tuscany and on to Milan; her companion and escort from Livorno was the recently wed Piero de' Medici whose new wife was also a Neapolitan 33 Piero continued with her on to Milan where he assisted at the sumptuous wedding joining the royal

31 Judith Hook, Lorenzo De'Medici, p. 169; Raymond de Roover, The Rise andDecline of the Medici Bank (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 370. 32 Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 171. 33 Yvonne Maguire, The Private Life of Lorenzo the Magnificent (London, 1936), p. 118.

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house of Naples and the ducal house of Milan.34 This marriage complicated Ludovico's control of the Milanese government. Now he was no longer manipulating only his incompetent nephew. He also had to consider the opinion of the King of Naples whose granddaughter was the new Duchess of Milan. And there was the young Duchess herself to consider, who was not a spineless invalid like her husband.35 These two marriages being finalized simultaneously in 1488, the Orsini one for Florence and the Neapolitan one for Giangaleazzo, the legitimate Duke of Milan, are the true cause of the eventual breakdown of the sixty-year alliance between the House of Medici and the House of Sforza. The Orsini marriage tied Florence to a strong commitment to Naples. The Milanese marriage scared Ludovico into joining with the French king to unseat the Neapolitan dynasty when a granddaughter of 34 For the complex matrimoniale negotiations see a new biography of Isabella: Jerta Cappelletti Butti, Isabella d' Aragona-Sforza, Duchessa di Milano (Mi lan, 1984), pp. 21 f f as wel 1 as Ady, Milan Under the Sforza p. 126 & p. 138. The substantial delay between the initial negotiations and the final consumation of the marriage plans explains the apparent anomaly: why Ludovico would permit a marriage that was dangerous to his control. The firs t marriage negotiations were undertaken when Ludovico was an insecure uncle slowly acquiring more and more power and depending upon his close relationship with the King of Naples for help. But by the early 1490's all had changed. Now Ludovico was married himself to a great dynastic prize, Beatrice d'Este, and had expanded his political goals from mere control of Milan to dreams of legitimate succession to the ducal throne and the heritage of that throne for his own children. 35 The arrangements for the marriage of Giangaleazzo and Isabella pre-dated the assumption of complete control of Milan by Ludovico, and although by 1489 he understood the dangers therein for his own power, there would have been no subtle way to cancel a treaty of ten years standing without thereby signalling a total break with Naples which was not his intent. See Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, p. 126.

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that dynasty and her children threatened Ludovico's future hold on Milan. This collapse of the most enduring alliance in fifteenth-century Italy was not the fault of Piero de' Medici. It was all in place when Piero’s diplomatically astute father made the choice of Naples. Thus as we look at the events of 1494, it is important to remember that Piero's problems with Milan and the Milanese cooperation with the invading French was not a problem of his own making but rather was something he inherited. A sudden break with Naples sometime in 1494 would have gained Piero nothing. It certainly would not have gained a new alliance with Milan since the most simple observation of Ludovico's moves (confirmed by intelligence reports) made it clear that he was maneuvering to bring down the Medici in Florence and hoping to win certain Tuscan forts, if not Pisa itself in the wake of the coming invasion. All the while he maintained the public fiction of being Piero's friend.36 Nor could Piero have won anything from Venice, which was determined to maintain a guarded neutrality. Thus a break with Naples and Rome in the face of the

36 On October 22, the new Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza, met with the diplomatic community including the Florentine ambassador. At this meeting the Duke reminded the Florentine ambassador that his father, Francesco, had called Cosimo de' Medici "father" when he wrote to him. And that being of the "same bones" he, Ludovico, would want to proceed in the same manner towards Florence. But in the very same dispatch, Giovanbatista Ridolfl, warns Piero that other words of Ludovico, overheard by various ambassadors, hinted at grander ambitions which some interpreted as meaning his desire to win Florence itself. Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de' Medici, Oct. 22, 1494, Milan, (ASF, MAP, LXXIV, 114):"... esaminato la interpretazione di questi suoi parlari, di quello disse a noi, e dell' atto usato a questo gentiluomo, avendo sua signoria, per quel lo intendo.. That is, Ludovico might have designs on "sua signoria," Piero's government.

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French invasion would have left Florence with no Italian allies, a situation that would have left the republic totally exposed when the French went home. This was exactly what happened to the Florentine government that succeeded Piero. On the other hand, Piero's stubborn loyalty to the long-term alliance with Naples yielded at least the respect of the King of France.37

When

Piero did have to face the invincible power of King Charles, he came before the king as someone worthy of trust. It is clear that King Charles had much greater affection and trust for Piero who had opposed his invasion, than for Ludovico Sforza who had been its earliest champion. The king treated Piero with great consideration after their critical meeting at Sarzana where he extracted no worse an agreement from Piero than would have been concluded earlier. Charles wanted one thing: free passage through Tuscany and control of the important fortified towns until his retreat. That was what he had asked before arriving in Tuscany and that is what he got from Piero. Once in Florence, the king honored his agreement with Piero by valiantly trying to convince the Signoria at least to allow Piero a fair hearing before the Florentine authorities and in his final agreement with the city before his departure he also attended to such detail as Alfonsina's dowry, which was to be returned to her, and obtained the city's agreement to allow Piero's son

37 This statement is made fully cognizant of the tradition in which Piero is depicted as having been mocked and derided at his encounter with king at Sarzana. Such a tradition decends from Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 464. The meeting at Sarzana and the complexities of historical record w ill be examined below, see pp. 297ff.

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Lorenzo to be allowed to return to the city of his birth.38 After his sojourn in Florence, the king continued to treat Piero, now a destitute and powerless exile, with great care and kindness. And during part of the French progress through Italy, Piero de' Medici rode honorably at the king’s right side, even though his political usefulness was now in doubt. These points are significant since it has frequently been written that Piero, in all his stupidity, chose a Neapolitan alliance contrary to all sound advice in the face of the French threat. Donald Weinstein states: "Where Lorenzo had skillfully walked the tightrope of equilibrium between the great Italian powers, Piero plunged heavily into a one-sided alliance with the King of Naples.”39 But this is incorrect. Lorenzo chose the Neapolitan alliance. And he chose it in a particular way that would institutionalize this alliance in the strongest possible manner, and thereby add to the ties already existent with the south—banking arrangements, military cooperation, and marital contracts. Thus Piero inherited an alliance with Naples that would have been very difficult to break. If he had indeed wanted to end his alliance with Naples it would have required much more than just diplomatic maneuvering. It would have precipitated a major personal, fam ilial, and social crisis as well. A break with Naples would have forced a divorce (actually an "annulment” granted by the church) from Alfonsina since her family would never have quietly accepted the desertion of the Medici from the Rome-Naples-Florence alliance. And divorce among the most prominent Medici was simply not done. In the extremely conservative

38 Maguire, Women, p. 189. 39 Donald Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 123.

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social world of fifteenth-century Florence the divorce of the leader of the Medici clan would have created terrible turmoil and would have done Piero's reputation great harm. It would have particularly angered his Tornabuoni relatives who managed the Rome bank through which they were extremely close to the Orsini.

Besides, the object of the divorce,

Alfonsina, would have fought such a move with every force at her disposal. And her later life demonstrates a politically astute individual every bit the equal of her husband. But if such a divorce might have been acceptable to Piero on the personal level—which it would not have been since he truly loved Alfonsina— it would have been insane on the m ilitary and economic level. The Orsini were the most powerful m ilitary clan in all of central Italy.40 Their newly constructed fortress at Bracciano (completed in 1485 by Napoleone Orsini and his son Gentile Virginio Orsini) was reputed to be one of the most modern, near-impregnable m ilitary installations in all of Italy.41 And they were capable of fielding immense armies all on their own resources. S till, if Piero had been willing to brave an enraged wife, an angry social class, and a m ilitary danger, he would not have been willing to destroy the last profitable branch of the family bank: Rome. And at the Rome office of the Medici bank, the Orsini were the most important

40 Vincenzo Celletti, 61i Orsini di Bracciano (Rome, 1963), pp. 24-45. 41 Celletti, Orsini, p. 29. For an understanding of Bracciano within the larger context of fifteenth-century fortifications see J. R. Hale, "The Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian Chronology, c. 1450-c. 1534," in Renaissance War Studies (London, 1983), pp. 1-29.

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clients.42 Finally, and most important of all, the source of a divorce had to be the church, the Pope, and since the alliance to which Piero belonged was one made up of the Naples, Florence and the Papacy, and since the members of that alliance saw themselves in a fight to the death with the encroaching King of France, it should be self-evident that the Pope would never have sanctioned a divorce between Piero and Alfonsina in order to facilitate a change in Piero’s strategic loyalties. Thus all of the above should make it clear that there was absolutely no possibility for Piero de’ Medici to jettison his adherence to the Neapolitan-Roman alliance in 1494 even if he had wanted to—which he didn’t. Having examined these numerous factors all of which mitigated against Piero breaking with Naples, it is important to take note of one final aspect of Piero's attitudes respecting the Neapolitan alliance that transcended all of these objective material, matrimonial, and m ilitary elements. Piero viewed the Neapolitan alliance as a construct of his beloved father. He saw this structure as one of his father's greatest triumphs—which was a perfectly correct evaluation— and he continued to view it as a living testimony to his father’s greatness as a leader. He seems to have transferred a near filial piety from his dead father to the head of the alliance, King Alfonso of Naples, and to have viewed loyalty to the alliance and to Alfonso as a kind of test of loyalty to his father. In this attitude he exhibits more than a simple political loyalty to an alliance officially contracted. Even more, he viewed his own loyalty to it as a vehicle for his loyalty to and love for his own departed father. Thus when all seemed lost, when it seemed certain that his loyalty to

42 De Roover, Rise and Decline, p. 370.

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this alliance was in the process of destroying him Ctraho ad immolandum"), even then did he tell the Neapolitan ambassador by way of his personal secretary Piero Dovizzi da Bibbiena that he held a continuing loyalty and affection ("dovotion") for King Alfonso and would do so to his end.43 As one ponders these terrible last days of the political life of Piero de' Medici, one wonders whether his loyalty to an alliance—an alliance that lost, we must admit— deserves the derision that it has received. Piero has been attacked time and again as having been "rash" and “stubborn" for having held to this alliance.44 But this ignores much.

43 The most important documents that reveal Piero's attitudes in the last days of his authority are five letters that he wrote to his private secretary, Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena. For his comments on Alfonso see Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, Oct. 27, 1494, Pisa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80; Desjardins, Negotiations, vol. I, p. 589): "Restavi cura di fare intendere al mio magnifico M. Marino [Neapolitan ambassador] che, poi che mio padre mon, io ho servito con quel la fedele affezione la Maesta del Re Alfonso, e del suo padre che mi e suta possibile, e mi sono condotto tanto in la con questa devozione che ora, come intenderete, traho ad immolandum -, e questo e perche, abbandonato da tu tti i cittadini Fiorentini, amici e nimici miei, non mi bastando piu ne la reputazione, ne danari ne il credito a sostentare la guerra accetta sponte in casa, ho preso per partito, non potendo servire con le forze, le quali jam defecerunt, alia Maesta del signor Re Alfonso servirgli almanco con la disperazione, la quale me conduce in potere del Re di Francia, sanza condizione o speranza di bene alcuno, se non di avere messo la vita, dopo le altre cose per quello a chi me reputavo obbligatissimo, em i riputero s i diu vivam" It should be noted that this letter was a private communication to one of Piero's closest collaborators and was not written for any official government body or council. Therefore, there is no reason to suspect its sentiments of personal sacrifice as being expressed for purposes of theatrical self-aggrandizement. ^ W ein stein , Savonarola, p. 123.

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It ignores completely a long-term policy cemented by two marriages betwen the Orsini and the Medici, the purpose of which was the strengthening of this southern alliance. If we are to accept the commonplace that Lorenzo was a wise leader in foreign policy then we must consider the possibility that the alliance with Naples which he instituted and which his son followed, was not idiocy. And the historians' inability to evaluate it correctly may derive from their having confused their knowledge of the outcome with an objective analysis of the situation prevailing before the decisive events. Although Alfonsina's efforts to maneuver her husband back into power in Florence were unsuccessful in 1494, this was not her last opportunity to exert authority in her adopted city. After Piero's death in 1503, she lived in Rome and when Piero's brother Giovanni became Pope Leo X and the Medici returned to Florence, Alfonsina's son Lorenzo (named for his grandfather Lorenzo il Magnifico) was installed as virtual head of state 46 Lorenzo di Piero's powerful and domineering mother chose to remain in Rome from whence she could influence policy by virtue of her frequent contacts with her brother-in-law, the Pope. Her son she commanded through an extraordinary correspondence that moved from Rome to Florence on an almost daily basis.46 Yvonne Maguire says that she ruled Florence by letter.4"7 For the next six years she instructed

45 J. R. Hale, Florence and the Medici (New York, 1978), pp. 95-100. For a recent history of Florence during the period of Lorenzo di Piero's rule, see J. N. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic, I5 I2 -/5 J 0 (Oxford, 1983), pp. 8 Iff. 46 Stephens, Fall of the Florentine Republic, pp. 86ff; Maguire Women, p. 190. 47 Maguire, Women, p. 190.

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her son in the most minute details and maneuvered a grand strategy for her family by virtue of her power with the Pope. In the war with the French in 1519, Alfonsina advised her warrior son on m ilitary strategy and then chose the Florentine ambassadors to the peace talks. She was viewed as sufficiently important to be provided with a copy of the proposed treaty.4® Alfonsina's plans went far beyond Medici power in Florence. It was she who conceived the idea of getting her son made Duke of Urbino. Her scheme is revealed in a letter to her son: "It w ill be enough for me if the Pope w ill come here to stay a month or so, and that you w ill be here too, for thus we may pass the time happily, and the King's friendship may last, so that we may yet obtain a state, and my idea would be Urbino."49 And she got it. But she did better than that. Her granddaughter born in the palace on Via Larga on April 15,1519, became the Queen of France. Machiavelli should have dedicated The Prince to Alfonsina instead of to her son Lorenzo! How extraordinary it is to consider the scene in the Medici Palace in November 1494: Alfonsina, destitute, abandoned, living off relatives, thrown back on nothing but her own wits, imploring the help of the King of France. Yet it is she who w ill produce a future sovereign of his state and not the king himself. Within the Medici Palace, King Charles was plunged into a continual round of discussions with all the various parties fighting for control of

48 Maguire, Women, p. 191. 49 Maguire, Women, p. 192.

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Florence after his departure.50 In addition to Alfonsina and her mother, who according to Parenti were constantly at the king's elbow, there was their kinsman Lorenzo Tomabuoni who had been in touch ever since the Charles' arrival in Tuscany.51 Then there were the official representatives of the city, such as Piero Capponi who knew the king well and had just hosted the French monarch in his villa at Legnaia the night before the king's entry into

F lo re n c e .5 ^

The anti-Piero cabal was there too. Piero's dangerous enemies from within his own family, the cousins Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco, had been with the king ever since their journey to meet him at Piacenza.53 Bernardo Rucellai was using his friendship with Charles to prevent a return of Piero.54 Rucellai was not only using his rhetorical skills in personal talks with the king. He was also secretly meeting with Ludovico Sforza to obtain the Sforza's intervention against Piero's possible return.55 As Ruceliai, Capponi, and Tomabuoni jostled each other to get to the king, men within the royal circle were also maneuvering on the subject of Piero. Galeazzo di Sanseverino was there as the king's lieutenent but in reality was serving the interests of Ludovico. Therefore, insofar as Ludovico adopted an actively hostile stance towards Piero de' Medici's

50 Gaddi, Priorista, p. 48. 51 5ee n. 18 above. 52 Michael Mallett, "Piero Capponi," DizionarioBiografico degliItalian; (Rome, 1976), vol. 19, pp. 88-92. 53 On the cousins see below pp. 157ff. 5 4 on Bernardo Rucellai see Guglielmo Pellegrini, L 'UmanistaBernardo Rucellai (Livorno, 1920), esp. p. 13. 55 Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 465.

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future, then in that degree did Galeazzo press this argument in his private moments with the king even as his relative Caterina argued the opposite. She and her daughter were trying to save things for Piero.56 Finally, within the palace salons the most influential advisor of all the king's counselors, Charles' uncle, Philippe de Bresse, moved to support Piero in an unequivocal manner and was seen as his most effective champion.57 While inside the palace the collapse of the Medici structure yielded a furious scramble for power among various factions hoping to seize control once the king was gone, outside the citizens were equally agitated.

The boisterous celebrations of the previous day had been

cosmetic. The government of Florence had commanded its citizenry to appear for the king's entrance and so they had done 58 But behind the facade of welcome churned a two-week accumulation of anger, irritation, fear, and doubt. No one had known what occupation by a foreign army was going to be like when the firs t French quartermasters arrived in Florence on November 5. No one in Florence had ever experienced anything like it. The last large non-Italian army to push into the city and take over was that of Charles of Valois in 1301, 193 years before. On November 4, the government had issued a ruling that no one was to remove anything—not

56 On the Sanseverino see above pp. 24 ff, & esp. n. 57. 57 Alamanno Rinuccini, Ricordistorici, p. CUV: "E questo s’intese procedere da certi signori che erano al consiglio suo [the King], e massime da uno Filippo Monsignore, fratello della madre del re, uomo rapacissimo, avarissimo e corrotto con danari da' nostri cittadini che favoreggiano la parte di Piero de' Medici;. . . " 58 See p. 2 above.

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furniture, not provisions, not anything— from their houses in the next days.59 This enraged the citizens since it seemed to suggest that the Florentines were afraid of the French whereas it was the general impression that these were allies coming to stay.50 Then the next day the French quartermasters arrived and began circulating through the whole city and choosing the most attractive lodgings and signalling their choices with white chalk marks on the doors.51 The French officials would barge into the houses and move from room to room apportioning places and beds to such and such a commander, marking on the walls as they went, and then out and along to another house. This procedure provoked the most famous remark of the whole French invasion: Pope Alexander VI said that Charles conquered Italy with a piece of chalk.52 The Pope's w it captured for all time the ease with which the French moved through the peninsula and captured the Neapolitan prize. All of a sudden the Florentines began to realize what was happening. They would have to move out. They would have to give up their own beds and find other lodgings. It is difficult to imagine what the citizens

59 Lanoucci, Diario, p. 71: "E a di 4 di Novenbre 1494, ando un bando da parte della Signoria, che ogniuno fussi ubrigato mostrare la sua casa per allogiare e Franciosi. E commandavano che non si toccassi ne cavassi nulla di casa." 50 Landucci, Diario, p. 71. 51 Landucci, Diario, p. 72: "E a di 5 di Novenbre 1494, certi mandatari del Re di Francia andavano per Firenze, e segnavano le case che piu gli piacevano. Andavano in casa, e per tutte le camere, e segnavano, questa per tale signore, e questa per l'altro barone." 52 Orville Prescott, Princes of the Renaissance (New York, 1969), p. 20. This book has one of the best short accounts of the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. See pp. 3-29.

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thought would happen when an army of 12,000 came to town, but probably it was not carefully considered. When the issue was whether to spend specific sums to try to stop the French as Piero was begging them to do in October, then at that moment the sum was unacceptable.6^ Later when they found themselves amidst the reality of thousands of Frenchmen and Swiss sleeping in their beds and eating every last grain of wheat in their storage rooms and slaughtering their animals, only then did the concrete reality become clear and predictably, voices began to circulate that maybe they should have resisted as Piero had tried to get them to do. No doubt when the whole issue of the French coming to Florence was in the abstract the citizens had imagined the army coming in and punctiliously paying for every crumb of bread. Instead, with 12,000 hungry men and 7,000 equally hungry horses to be fed, the niceties got lost and the Florentines got mad.

Luca Landucci's marvelous

comment sums it up: the French paid for the horns and ate the cow.64 The horses were as big a problem as the men since there was no place in Florence for thousands of war horses. There was little open space and the city was notoriously short of grain even in the best years. Angelo Ghivizzano says that all of Florence became a stable and it is easy to imagine the stench, the filth, and the discomfort for all as the narrow stone streets became running sewers and the small piazzas, redolent of equine boarders, turned into makeshift barns 65

63 on Piero's efforts to extract support money for resisting the French see below, pp. 223ff. 64 Landucci, Diario, p. 72: ”. . . pagava le corna e mangiavasi el bue." 65 Ghivizzano, "Documenti,” p. 3 3 2 :"... se V. S. vedesse al presente Fiorenza non vi pareria quel la, anzi pare una stalla da chavalli."

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But grumbling about beds and grain was of little importance beside the real fear of everyone packed inside the ancient walls—that fighting would break out and lead to the total sack of the city. Landucci says that the French seemed as afraid as everyone else and constantly went around asking how many people there were in Florence.66

Each day the tension

inside the city increased. Each day there were more and more incidents: fights, arguments, weapons drawn.67 Finally, three days after the king's meeting with the citizens it all exploded. While the Signoria debated the city's future inside the Palazzo della Signoria, down in the piazza in the midst of an altercation, someone yelled that the king had given his troops permission to sack the city. Everyone dashed madly through the city running to their shops to close the shutters, and hide their valuable cloths and supplies, and to their homes to lock the doors and protect their possessions. Since almost everyone had Frenchmen staying inside their homes, the sudden explosion of action set off a reaction among the French soldiers who, according to Landucci, were just as afraid of their hosts as the Florentines were of them. The French soldiers grabbed their arms, raced into the streets, and took control of all the bridges and the gates especially Porta San Frediano since this was the escape route in case of

66 Landucci, Diario, p. 72: "Avevano pure in secreto una grande paura: tuto '1 giorno dimandavano quanta giente puo fare Firenze; e intesono come Firenze, a un suono di campana, centomila persone tra dentro e di fuori." 67 Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, Bib.Naz., 11.111., 74., fol. 52r (Schnitzer, Ouefien-III, p. 23): "Senddo le cose im questi termini e Franzesi facevano ogni gorno piu violenze et superchierie, et dal altro canto e nostri govani (1' un di piu che V altro) gli stimavano mancho, in modo che nasceva spesiximi scandali et nuovi insulti."

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emergency. The incident ended without bloodshed but it demonstrated to all the terrible dangers existing in the situation and the most influential leaders went to the king to try to resolve quickly all the outstanding issues between him and the city so that they could get this unwanted army out of Florence and on the road to Rome.68 With each day the tensions increased. The city and the king seemed locked in unyielding positions over a treaty that would get the French out the gates and on their way south, and the people fell into arguments over what should be done and who was to blame for the current danger. And everybody began to ask how this alarming situation had come about, how Florence could find herself occupied and at the mercy of an increasingly intimidating monarch.6^

68 Landucci, Diario, p. 8 2 :" ... comincio un poco di scandolo in Piaza de' Signori; esendo tutto el popolo in sospetto e sollevato a ogni piccolo romore, aspettando tuttavolta qualche cosa pericolosa. 5i stava in grande timore e quasi ismarriti; e massime avere le case piene di Franciosi. E tuttavolta si sentiva dire che '1 Re aveva promesso a' soldati Firenze a sacco. E [per] questo poco di scandolo della piazza ogniuno correva a casa e serravasi tutte le botteghe, e chi mandava panni a casa e chi drappi, dove credeva essere piu sicuro. E questo sospetto era cosi tacitamente, sanza parlare; onde molti Franciosi, non manco ismarriti di noi, pigliavano 1' arme, e presono la Porta di San Friano e' ponti " 8g On this period of debate and tension, Nov. 17 to Nov. 28 see: Landucci, Diario, p. 84-85; Sanudo, SpePizione, p. 138-139; Gaddi, Priorista, p. 48; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fols. 201v-2 03v (Schnitzer, Quellen-IV, pp. 13-18), Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, fols. 52v-5 4 v (Schnitzer, Quellen-\\\, pp. 23-28).

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PIACENZA "La guerra viene a casa nostra.", Ludovico 5forza.

Exactly one month before the meeting in the Palazzo Medici between the king and the Florentine citizens on October 18, Charles and his army had entered Piacenza in a driving rainstorm.

The king went to stay in

the huge red brick and white marble Palazzo Comunale called / / Got/co in the center of town.70 In the previous month, the French monarch had traversed the Alpine summits and crossed through the Mont Saint Genevre pass used by Caesar, had descended into Piedmont and been warmly received at Turin by his Savoyard relatives (his mother was Charlotte of Savoy), had met Ludovico Sforza, his unreliable yet putative ally at Asti, and disregarded Ludovico's objections to a visit with the Duke of Milan, Giangaleazzo Sforza, who lay sick at Pavia. Now Charles was moving his army toward its goal in the south. For an understanding of the Florentine role in the crisis of 1494, these six days at Piacenza are critical. Here the final decisions were made and the confrontation between Charles and Piero, between France and F l o r e n c e , became inevitable.

70 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 672. The description of Charles at Piacenza is contained in a kind of appendix to the original history and is therefore out of chronological sequence. See pp. 664-677.

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125

Charles' firs t act in the city by the Po was the same as that which he performed in every city he visited during the Italian expedition: he attended mass and offered prayers for his men and the success of his venture.?1 In Piacenza this meant a visit to San Sisto and obeisance to the precious relics of Santa Barbara which were especially treasured by the French since she was believed to have been of French origin. Or so the French believed; Sicilians have a different legend. Piacenza became the scene of critical decisions for the king's enterprise because of its important location, which had rendered it vital to hundreds of armies that had moved through the peninsula over the centuries since the days of Hannibal. The city is pleasantly situated on the banks of the Po at an intersection between the river and the Via Aemilia. The Via Aemilia, which was constructed by the Romans in the third century B. C., along with its seaside extension, the Via Flaminia, which it intersects at the Arch of Augustus in Rimini, creates the most important north-south road of Italy.72 Thus this municipality oversees the meeting place of the two busiest communication routes of northern Italy: the waterway that carries all the rich produce of the Po delta to market and to Venice for export, and the Via Aemilia, the most important highway. So central has the highway been to this northern third of the Italian peninsula that it has given its name to the whole province.

/ ■ Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 672. 72 On the Via Aemilia see: Raymond Chevallier, Les VoiesRomaines (Paris, 1972), pp. 153-157; N. H. H. Sitwell, Roman Roads of Europe (London, 1981), pp. 20-21.

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Piacenza obtains one more element of significance in the communication routes of Italy in that it is the last major city on the north-south route before one encounters the intersection with the southerly road over the Apennines which carries the traveler through the Cisa pass and down into Tuscany. This intersection presents the southbound traveler with his most important itinerant decision: whether to continue southeast on the straight, smooth, easy Via Aemilia, through Bologna and then south along the coast finally traversing the mountains at some point to arrive at Rome or Naples; or whether to turn due south, take the Cisa Pass road then drop into the Arno river valley and continue along an inland route through the Chianti mountains to Siena, Rome, and Naples. Thus the six days that Charles and the army passed at Piacenza witnessed the most important decision for Florence of the whole expedition: would Charles choose the Via Aemilia-Via Flaminia route taking him along the Adriatic shore, or would he choose the Cisa Pass and Tuscany?7^ Before October 22, the king’s route was not known.74

73 For a review of Charles' position at this point and his decision on the two possible routes south see Franco Catalano, Ludovico UMoro (Milan, 1995), pp. 200ff. This biography of Ludovico Sforza is the most recent review of the events with which we are herein concerned. 74 Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de’ Medici, Oct 3, 1494, Alessandria (ASF, MAP, LXXIV, 106): "Dal prefato signore intesi il Christianissimo Re debbe partire oggi d’ Asti per andare a Casale di Monferrato, e H potra dimorare due o tre giorni; di li, circa a martedi,ne va a Vigevano; e poi a Pavia, venerdi o sabato; e da Pavia a Piacenza disegna sara circa il martedi seguente; e quivi pare dovra stare qualche tempo, e deliberare di se secondo chei disegni loro riusciranno.”

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Charles was extremely clever in the way that he played with the question of what route his southerly progress would take. He knew very well that the authorities in all Italian states were wild with curiosity to know whether or not his itinerary would include their territory. During October when he was still in Piedmont, he tormented Ludovico Sforza with talk of his desire to see Genoa one moment then Lombardy and Milan the next.75 Commentators have too frequently ascribed this to genuine indecision. But there was a definite pattern in the king's maneuver all through the expedition. He kept every step of his journey a secret until the last possible minute when it had to be known. He correctly surmised that in this way he could keep his potential enemies off-balance. Ludovico was of course encouraging the route through Genoa since that would take the king and his armies well out of the way of Ludovico's capital.75 But Charles had a surprise for Ludovico. At the last moment the French monarch announced that he would indeed come to Milan and mentioned that he wanted to see his first-cousin, the sick young Duke of Milan in whose name Ludovico ruled much of northern Italy.77 This drove Ludovico crazy with apprehension as he imagined the king in his city with 10,000 troops right then and there deciding that cousin Giangaleazzo should rule in deed as well as name.78

75 Labande-Mailfert, Charles VII/, p. 283. 76 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, p. 151. 77 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, pp. 150-151. 78 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, pp. 151-152. Charlesnever did actual ly enter the city of Milan, but stayed nearby in theCaste!loVisconteo.

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But it was not only the Milanese who were thrown into confusion by the uncertainty of Charles' marching orders. Every Italian power had diplomats attending the king's traveling court and every one of them was trying to decipher his moves. His most casual remark could precipitate immediate reaction among those trying to report home his probable route. When he off-handedly told the Venetian ambassadors that he would like to see Venice the Venetians went wild. Word of the remark was raced to Venice and a special meeting of the Signoria was called into session to appraise this new intelligence and to consider the possibility that the King of France might actually have plans to come to Venice.7^ All of this enables us to appreciate better these days at Piacenza and what they meant for Florence. Up to this moment, it was not at all clear that the king would come through the republic on the Arno. It was Piero de' Medici's strategy to make the Tuscan route as unattractive as possible by refusing the free passage agreement that Charles had been attempting to obtain all year. And even further, Piero was trying to reinforce his own m ilitary position within Tuscany so as to make the Tuscan route look potentially difficult.80 It should be remembered that up until the end of the French army's week-long stay in Piacenza it was not known whether Piero’s policy had

70 Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, p. 285: "Le 18 a 22 h., il entre a Plaisance, sous la pluie, laissant encore planer quelque incertitude sur la direction qu'il va prendre. N 'a-t-il pas fait dire aux Venetiens qu'il aimerait visiter leur ville? La Seigneurie, mordant a cete feinte, s'est reunie, fort inquiete." 80 See below, pp. 223ff.

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failed or succeeded. There was s till the possibility that the king might choose the Via Aemilia route.

It is quite extraordinary that Piero had

succeeded in holding the official Florentine governmental bodies to his policy as long as he had done, considering that the pressure for Florence to commit to the French side was tremendous. Many interested political forces from both within Italy and without were exerting pressure upon the city to come out in favor of the King of France.81 And some elements within this pressure group were interested in the king's side primarily as a way of overthowing Piero82 Their strategy was to get Charlesjand his army into Florence and hope to use this force to change the government of the Medici.88 And it was upon Piacenza that all these forces converged. If the king decided to go along the Via Aemilia then that meant the main battles, the damage from the armies, the potential political dangers would all bypass Florence. Of course it was clear that no matter what route the king himself took with the main body of the army, it was very likely that some French force would pass through Tuscany. But having some small part of the army pass by was much different than having the King of France himself come with all his authority right

81 Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 387; Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 79-85. 82 Among the Florentines using the king's enterprise as a vehicle for overthrowing Piero the most important were: Leonardo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, Bernardo Rucellai, and Piero Capponi. Details of their maneuvers w ill be examined below, pp. 247-265. 88 See p. 83 above and the report of Sebastian Badoer on his conversation with Ludovico Sforza in which Ludovico boasts of having counseled Charles to overthrow Piero.

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inside the city walls. Thus the diplomats of the various interested powers pressed upon Piacenza hoping to influence Charles in one way or another. For six days Piacenza became the center of all attention. Diplomats arrived from Florence, Venice, Ferrara, Bologna, Mantua, Siena, Rome, Perugia, Naples, and Spain.84

84 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, pp. 420-427. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, pp. 461-463 describes the king at Piacenza but this is derived from other sources since the diplomat was then in Venice.

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PROPHETS AND OMENS

If a great deal of doubt about the king's exact Italian itinerary had developed, much of it intentionally encouraged by Charles himself, there seems to have been little doubt in the months preceding his arrival in Italy that he would indeed come. During the’ two or three years before his descent onto the Piedmont plain in September, a kind of international network carried news of prophecies, visions, preaching, diplomatic assessment, and rumor by way of merchants, diplomats, students, and clerics that established in everyone's mind the imprecise yet insistent belief that the King of France would come to Italy, conquer it all, then go on to even greater glory.85 One of the earliest, most precise, and most influential of these prophecies came from Francesco di Paola, a Calabrian hermit who had been brought to France by Charles' father in the last year of the old king's life when Charles was only thirteen years old. King Louis had heard of this famous holy man who ate no meat, foul, eggs, or milk and lived on roots and fruits in a small cavern under a rock in Calabria within the Kingdom of Naples. Louis begged Francesco to come to him in these last days of his life but Francesco at firs t refused. So Prince Federigo of

85 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, pp. 313-317 describes the various prophets and predictions about the expedition. On expectations regarding King Charles within Italy before the Expedition and reactions afterward see Anne Denis, Charles VIII et fes I ta liens: Histoire et Mythe (Geneva, 1979).

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Naples and Pope Sixtus IV interceded and convinced the sixty-six year old hermit to make the journey to France.86 The Calabrian saint gained enormous authority as his various predictions, such as the successful expulsion of the Turks from Taranto, came true. When King Louis died, the "holy man" as he was always called, remained in France and became a very strong influence in the life of King Charles VIII. Charles built the saint a small church on the grounds of the royal castle at Plessis-les-Tours and there he lived well past the end of Charles' own short life, to the year 1507 when he died at age 91. The predictions that he made about Charles' coming conquest of Naples carried great weight both in France and equally in Italy where Francesco was well known and revered.87 But Francesco di Paola was not the only prophet to describe Charles' coming conquests. Several years before the fateful journey, Guilloche di Bordeaux published his La Prophetie di Charles VIII in which he predicted that at age twenty-four the king would conquer Naples and at age thirty-three he would have absorbed all of Italy. 88 And the royal

86 There is an irony in this intervention by Prince Federigo. The Neapolitan royal family interceded and convinced Francesco to go to France where the saint then became one of the most powerful intellectual and moral forces in the Kingdom of France to advance the Italian expedition which then deprived Prince Federigo and his family of their throne. 87 On Francesco di Paola see Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 315; Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 113; Paul Murray Kendall, LouisX/, pp. 366-376; "Francesco di Paola," Lessico Universale Italiano vol. VIII, p. 241. One of Murillo's greatest paintings is an imaginary portrait of San Francesco di Paola in the Prado. Francesco di Paola was.canonized by Pope Leo X in 1519. 88 Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 165.

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physician, Jean Michel, published his La Vision de JehanMichel which forecast a complete triumph for Charles over all other monarchs, the reformation of the tired world and the establishment of a new reforming world monarchy.89 In Italy, the two years between the death of Lorenzo de' Medici in 1492 and the arrival of Charles in 1494, witnessed an explosion of prophecy, vision, provocative preaching, and inexplicable incident that fueled a burning public anxiety about the future. In Florence during 1493, Fra Bernardino da Feltre, a Franciscan like Francesco di Paola, was preaching that God would bring men to the good life by means of a great scourge. His preaching was so incendiary that the authorities prohibited further appearances but friends interceded and obtained the help of Piero de' Medici in getting the order rescinded.90 Bernardino stirred the people against the Jews, constantly evoked images of future cataclysm, and led the people to stage great bonfires of vanities at which thousands would destroy clothing, books and jew elry91 Another Franciscan preacher, Domenico da Ponzo, was equally contentious and was frequently banned from preaching in Florence for periods of time and then would return. Fra Domenico preached to

89 For the text of La Vision see J. de la Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de fa grande armee d' I talie (Paris, 1866), pp. 431 -432 90 Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 125. 91 Parenti, Storia, fol. 148r (Schnitzer, Ouel/en-\M, p. 5): "Frate Bernardino da Feltro havendo facto le sue predicationi, all fine, benche malecontento de noi si partissi, pure publicamente arse molti capelli et libri disutili a leggere reputatisi. Appetiva e giudei si rimovessimo et monte di pieta si facessi, la quale cosa impetrare non potea.”

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frightened thousands that horrible fighting would soon break out in the city and that blood would run in the streets.92 Some suspected that he was an agent for Ludovico Sforza and was functioning as an arm of Milanese foreign policy, supporting its goal of maneuvering Florence into a position on the invasion which meant either changing Piero de' Medici's mind or overthrowing him. Piero Parenti wrote explicitly of Fra Domenico's relationship to Ludovico.9^ The Franciscan preacher's message, which was alternatively pro-Savonarola at one moment then anti the next, could be explained by the fact that he was reflecting Ludovico's own switch on the issue of Charles. When Ludovico supported Charles' invasion in early 1494, Fra Domenico was denouncing Piero de' Medici and supporting the French. Then when Ludovico changed sides Fra Domenico also flipped to an anti-French and thus anti-Savonarola position.94 Fra Domenico's activities and his extremely influential preaching to thousands of anxious citizens should alert us to the very complex political situation facing Piero de' Medici as he tried to steer a foreign policy that opposed the coming of the French. Within his own city, in the

92 Parenti, Storia, fol. 130r (Schnitzer, QueJ1en-\y, pp. 3 -4 ):" ... Frate Domenico da Ponzo dell' ordine minore observante. huomo di singulare doctrina, di protestare al popolo, se non di coreggievano, che horribili scandoli nascerebbono nella citta e sangue per le strade correrebbe fra brieve tempo...." 93 Parenti, Storia, fol. 169r (Schnitzer, Oue!/en-\y, p. 6): “Frate Domenico da Ponzo dell' ordine de frati minori, famossissimo huomo in su pergami, venuto qui alia observantia vietato fu della predicatione. Questo perche amicissimo era del Signor Lodovico et a male intentione si reputava predicassi." 94 Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 126.

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churches and the squares, men of great moral authority were openly preaching doctrine and public policy that were totally opposed to what Piero was trying to maintain. And when we consider that some of these religious spokesmen were possibly in the pay of the leaders of other states (in this case, Ludovico Sforza), some sworn to the overthrow of the Medici, it suggests that there was more to the anti-Medici agitation than just fickle public opinion. Treason was at work as w e ll.9 5 In other Italian cities, prophets and preachers echoed these predictions of apocalyptic upheavals. A Roman street preacher of unknown nationality predicted that trouble would begin in Rome in 1491, that it would spread to all Italy in 1492, that all cities would lose their freedom and that in 1493 the clergy would lose its temporal power and a reformer would come to purify the church.9^ Another Roman preacher, called Maestro Habram of the Augustinian order and of Lombard origins, was denouncing traitors and those who consorted with Jews and predicting upheaval in the Papacy.9? At Taranto within the Kingdom of Naples, the Book of Prophecy of the former bishop and patron saint of Taranto, San Cataldo, was

95 Donald Weinstein suggests that Fra Domenico probably was an agent of Ludovico Sforza. See Savonarola, p. 126: "If the suspicion was justified—as is likely—this would explain the apparent inconsistency of his behavior toward Savonarola." 96 Stefano Infessura, Diario della citta di Roma, ed. 0, Tommasini, in Fontiper la storia d' Italia, (Rome, 1890) vol. V, pp. 264-265; Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 63. 97 Parenti, Storia, fol. 154v (Schnitzer, Que/Ien-\\J, pp. 5-6)

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"rediscovered” in 1 4 9 2 ."

San Cataldo is reputed to have been an Irish

monk of the sixth century on his way to the Holy Land when his saintliness endeared him to the citizens of Taranto where he remained to become bishop and inspiring leader, a story similar in time and tone to that of San Frediano. The book, which was found in a hole in a wall in May 1492, was held within a cover of lead which carried the letters: "C.J.D." interpreted to mean "Cito Judicium Dei" (Soon Comes God's Judgement). It predicted the coming of Charles, a world war between believers and unbelievers, and the appearance of a savior who would bring about universal renewal. But it was not only the lone prophets, cave dwellers, and street preachers whose prophecies and visions looked forward to the coming of the King of France. High churchmen saw this expedition as a moment of cleansing for what they saw to be a corrupt world. Pietro Delfino, the general of the Camaldolensian Order, a Tuscan religious house, openly hoped that Charles would come. He re-interpreted the morning liturgical

"

See Piero Parenti's notation of the finding of the book in his history under the date of May 1492, Storia, fol. 131v (Schnitzer, Quelien-IV, p. 4): "Nel reame ancora a Tarento (in San Cataldo) si trovo in certo muro un libro con coverta di piombo scripto in cavo d' anni bene 300 adrieto. Quello vi si contenessi al re et a pochi altri fu noto. Di sopra notate erano 3 lettere C. J. D. interpretatesi Cito Judicium Dei." The prophecy was also mentioned in Florence by Bernardo Vettori in a letter to Piero Guicciardini, May 7, 1492, in which he links it to the contemporaneous prophecies of Savonarola. See Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 63, n. 94. For more on the prophecy of San Cataldo see Giampaolo Tognetti, "Le fortune della pretesa profezia di San Cataldo," BuIIettino del!'

/stituto 5 torico Italiano per i i Medio Evoe Archivio Muratoriano, No. 80 (1968), pp. 273-317.

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hymn of the Laudes such that the Gallo meaning cock, referring to the cock that crowed for Peter, now meant The Frenchman (also Gallo) and in his re-interpretation The Frenchman's summons (Charles' challenge to Italy) in the morning would chase away the dark of night and call forth the Italians to rise up. And the current Peter (the Pope) would consider his own guilt as did the firs t Peter so long a g o ." Delfino's friend and correspondent, Bishop Barozzi of Padua, was even more pessimistic than Delfino. He not only hoped for the coming of the French. He believed that an even more violent scourge would be necessary to clean up the filth of centuries of corruption. He thought that perhaps even the feared Turks should have swept through Italy to bring about a true new beginning.1" Another friend of Delfino, who like Fra Pietro was the leader of a monastic community and equally interested in the expedition of Charles VIII, was Girolamo Savonarola, Prior of the Dominican monastery of San Marco in Florence. As was the case with Delfino and Barozzi, Savonarola was a member of the religious and communal establishment. He was not an itinerant preacher stirring up the people and then escaping to another city with the authorities one step behind like Domenico da Ponzo. And

On Pietro Delfino see Joseph Schnitzer, Peter Delfin, General desCamaldulenserordens, 1444-1525 (Munich, 1926); Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 190; Giovanni Soranzo, "Pietro Dolfin, generale dei Camaldolesi e il suo epistolario," Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia, 13(1959), pp. 1-31, 157-195. Delfino's interpretation of the Laudes is taken from a letter he wrote to Cardinal Piccolomini on Sept. 1, 1494. See Petrus Delphinus, Epistolarum , (Venice, 1524), Epistle IV, p. 14. For a modern edition of Delfino's correspondence now in the Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence, see Schnitzer, Peter Delfin. 100 Schnitzer, Savonarola, p. 190.

"

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before November 1494, he was not a preacher who was using his power of the pulpit to interfere in political affairs as were both Bernardino and Domenico.101 Piero Parenti and Bartolomeo Cerretani, both of whom were witnesses to these events and wrote histories of this period to which we have frequently referred and whose main interest was politics, mention Savonarola hardly at all before November whereas they both give considerable information about Fra Bernardino da Feltre and Fra Domenico da Ponzo.102 Savonarola was in a very different position from that of the provocative preachers mentioned above. He was the official leader of the most important monastic community in Florence. As Prior of San Marco he was the second most important ecclesiastical figure in the city. As a man of such position he was forced to deal constantly with the established political leadership of his city. And before November 9, 1494, that leadership was Medicean; more specifically, it was Piero de' Medici. Therefore, up until November 9, Savonarola at no time took action or public position of which we have record that can in any way be seen as intentionally maneuvering to bring about the fall of the Medici.10^

101 This important point is examined by Donald Weinstein. See his Savonarola, pp. 127-128. 102 Parenti mentions him twice before November, 1494: once, when Savonarola visited the dying Lorenzo; again, on the occasion of the separation of San Marco from the Lombard Congregation. See Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 127, n. 58. 1Q3 Weinstein, Savonarola, pp. 127-129.

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In fact, as late as November 5, Savonarola specifically refused to discuss the situation of Piero de' Medici, which was at that moment deteriorating rapidly. Savonarola was part of a diplomatic group appointed to meet with King Charles who was then approaching Florence. At first Savonarola refused to participate in the embassy. Then when he reluctantly agreed he insisted that the instructions include specific mention that the "status of private persons would not be discussed."104 This was a pointed reference to the status of Piero and Savonarola's unwillingness to be drawn into any maneuver between the representatives of Florence and the king that might include some kind of accommodation leading to the fall of Piero. We can only speculate about his motives here but it is clear that before November 9, Savonarola was extremely careful to avoid being drawn into anti-Medici plotting. It is possible that he felt some residual loyalty to the Medici who had helped him with the affairs of San Marco. It is possible that he was only cautious and wanted to avoid taking steps until he knew the sure outcome. It is possible that he was sincere all along about not wanting to be drawn into politics and later accepted that role reluctantly. A correct understanding of Savonarola's position before November 9 has been obscured by the tradition of Savonarola scholarship beginning in 104 Parenti, Storia, fol. 190v (Schnitzer, Que//en-\V, p. 10): "Adi 5 partirono e nuovi 5 facti ambasciadori. Frate Jeronimo a pie con 3 compagni frati in via si misse... El quale fu, che a mitigare le domande dannose (se cosi fussino) per la citta del re di Francia andassino, et impetrare s'ingegnassino venia del 1i errori commessi, raccomandassino questo affanato popolo et gratia per esso chiedessino in ogni sua appartenentia. Accepto frate Jeronimo con prima notificato, chome di stati di private persone ragionare non volea, bene in publico pregare oer la citta si contentava et voleva."

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the nineteenth century that saw in the Dominican leader a symbol of Italian quest for liberty within the vision of the Risorgimento then unfolding.^ 05 Most responsible for this interpretation was the extremely influential biography, The Life and Times of Girolamo

Savonarola, by Pasquale Villari. For Villari, it was necessary that Savonarola fight for liberty and lead the battle against Medici "tyranny.'' In order to do that, the religious figure had to enter into the fight early and Villari places Savonarola's declaration of independence from the Medici tyranny at the moment of Lorenzo's death in April, 1492.106 This famous scene was used by Villari to signal the fight that then supposedly continued for the next two years until the fall of Piero. This is totally inaccurate and has led to a major misunderstanding of these two years, especially the months just before the entrance into Florence by Charles. The truth is that Savonarola worked closely with Piero right up to the end of Piero's days in Florence.

An examination of one important issue

at the monastery of San Marco w ill show how closely intertwined were the fortunes of San Marco and Medici influence. Sometime in 1492, Savonarola recognized that the flourishing religious community over which he was then presiding was outgrowing its official affiliation with the Lombard Congregation within the Dominican Order of Italy.107 Savonarola was trying to lead a moral reformation within his monastery and he saw this affiliation to the more lax Lombard Congregation as an

'0 5 por an analysis of this historiographical tradition see Weinstein, Savonarola, pp. 3-6. 106 Weinstein, Savonarola, pp. 4-5. ' 07 For details of this important episode see Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of Girolamo Savonarola (New York, 1959), pp. 54-65.

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impediment to his reforms. So he began a campaign to separate his own San Marco monastery from the larger Congregation. The case would of course be decided in Rome and therefore Savonarola had to turn to the Medici and to Piero's brother, Cardinal Giovanni, for support at the Vatican. They gave it unstintingly.108 The opposition came from Milan. San Marco was one of the richest and most flourishing monasteries in the whole Congregation and therefore it was the last one that the Congregation leaders wished to see separated from their control. Also, any successful move by one rich house to separate itself from the oversight authorities might encourage others to do the same. Since the authority from which Savonarola wished to be separated was the Lombard Congregation based in Milan, the case quickly developed into a fight between the Medici, represented by Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, and the Sforza of Milan, represented by Cardinal Ascanio Sforza. Piero versus Ludovico. Roberto Ridolfi says that Piero gave Savonarola warm support and that the documents show them to have been on affectionate terms.109 The case was ultimately decided by Pope Alexander in favor of San Marco after months of extraordinary efforts by both the Medici and Sforza parties in what seems a minor jurisdictional dispute but what turned into a major test of influence at Rome. The Medici apparently won because of their allies from Naples.110 But what is of most interest to us is this warm cooperation between Savonarola and Piero de' Medici in 1493 and 1494.

108 Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 6 Iff. 109 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 61. 110 Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 62-63.

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All of this must be remembered when considering Savonarola's preaching about the coming invasion and about Charles VIII. It was possible for Savonarola to preach extraordinary sermons that were very specific about the French invasion without these words automatically indicating a call for the removal of the Medici. The sermons were concerned with moral regeneration and called for a general repentance and return to God.111 Such a regeneration would have been possible under the leadership of the Medici unless the Medici were seen by Savonarola as hopelessly corrupt, violent, or unworthy of respect, something he never suggested before becoming an active member of the post-Medicean government.

The sermons did not recommend any

particular government under which such a regeneration would take place. Considering that Savonarola was availing himself of the political power of the Medici at the same moment that he was delivering these sermons, it would have shown a rather extreme degree of hypocrisy to condemn them at the very moment at which he was engaged in political maneuvers using their authority. Our understanding of this has been greatly confused by two sources: first, the nineteenth century Italian scholars such as Villari who wanted to see Savonarola as a freedomfighter destroying the tyranny of the Medici; and second, our knowledge that Savonarola later became a political leader which has propelled us too quickly to the subsequent questionable conclusion that this alone demonstrates that he all along intended so to become.

111 For details of the sermons see below, n. 118.

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On Ash Wednesday, February 12, 1494, Savonarola mounted the pulpit in San Lorenzo and began his series of daily sermons for Lent.1 12 The location for the delivery of these sermons should alert us further to the cooperative relationship between Savonarola and the Medici well into 1494. San Lorenzo was the family church of the Medici.113 An extensive series of sermons continuing over many weeks at the most important religious season of the year could not have been given there in contravention of the desires of the Medici family. Thus we should note that this series which was so important in the development of Savonarola's reputation and his power as a prophet were delivered in the Medici church, not the cathedral.114 Besides, Savonarola was still engaged in the battle to separate San Marco from the Lombard Congregation, a fight in which Piero was his most important supporter. Immediately after the sermons the Signoria and Piero de' Medici applied more pressure in Rome to help Savonarola.113 The subject of the Lenten series derived from the book of Genesis about which Savonarola had been preaching during various religious festivals for two years. He had last spoken from these Genesis texts at

112 For the Lenten sermons see Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 71-73; Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 129; Villari, Savonarola, pp. 185-186. 113 On San Lorenzo and the Medici see Borsook, Guide, pp. 228-230; "The church thus virtually became a Medici property." Also, Piero Ginori-Conti, La basilica di San Lorenzo di Firenze (Florence, 1940). 114 Pasquale Villari erroneously locates the Lenten Sermons in the Duomo and then reports that Piero de' Medici grew uneasy as they progressed (see Savonarola, p. 188). As noted herein, Savonarola's appearance in San Lorenzo for the series signalled that all was well between Savonarola and Piero de' Medici, at least in Feb., 1494. 113 Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 73-74.

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an Advent series in the previous year. This formal aspect is worthy of note. The sermons were not inventions of the moment but were part of a long series which was dictated by the various texts that would appear for a particular day.116 This is very different from the daily improvisations of Bernardino da Feltre and Domenico da Ponzo. This series in San Lorenzo was scholarly and intellectually complex. Savonarola's text for these sermons took him to the mystery of Noah's Ark in chapters 6 and 7 of Genesis. Each day Savonarola would examine symbolical planks that would go to the building of the Ark within which the Florentine people could take refuge from the threatening flood of foreign invaders. Soon the Deluge would come. "Soldiers and princes... would take cities and fortresses by merely presenting themselves before the walls."117 His listeners could save themselves by coming into the Ark— into God's care. Whatever more general predictions he had offered in the previous year's sermons, in 1494 his prophecies became more and more specific. Now he talked of a king who would come from beyond the mountains in the likeness of Cyrus, and that all the gates would open to him, and he would take cities with the greatest ease.1 18 116 Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 71-72. 117 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 72. 118 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 72. On the texts of the Lenten sermons: the information that we have about the sermons derives not from original texts but from chroniclers along with summaries published long after Savonarola was dead ( Sermons super Archam Noe, Venice, 1536). The summaries were dressed up in what was deemed appropriate Latin by later editiors and thus are highly suspect as records of Savonarola's original language. See Roberto Ridolfi,

Le prediche del Savonarola cronotogia e tradizione del testo (Florence, 1939), pp. 40-46.

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One of Savonarola's followers, Fra Benedetto, provides us with his master's words: Presto vedral summerso ogni tiranno, E tutta Italia vedrai conquassata Con sua vergogna e vituperio e danno Roma, tu sarai presto captivata; Vedo venir in te coltel dell' ira, El tempo e breve e vola ogni giornata.11 g Finally, on Easter morning he announced that the Ark was complete and ended his sermon with these words: "Let all hasten to enter into the Lord's Ark! Noah invites you all today, the door stands open; but a time w ill come when the Ark w ill be closed, and many w ill repent in vain of not having entered therein."120 The Lenten sermons of 1494 increased Savonarola's reputation immensely.121 The prophecies of the coming invasion were merely echoes of so many other similar prophecies about which we have spoken above. But these sermons were different. They were careful, rooted in Biblical text, extending over many weeks of daily preaching during which the attendance increased constantly, united by a common and memorable theme, a memorable single symbol at their heart, and delivered in the

119 Pasquale Villari, Savonarola, p. 187: Soon shalt thou see each tyrant overthrown, And all Italy shalt thou see vanquished, To her shame, disgrace, and harm. Thou, Rome, shalt soon be captured: I see the blade of wrath come upon thee, The time is short, each day flies past. 120 villari, Savonarola, p. 186. 121 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 73.

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Medici family church by a close associate of the Medici. Moreover, they were not finished. On September 21, the feast day of St. Matthew and the birthday of Savonarola, the Prior of San Marco returned to Genesis, chapters six and seven.' 22

His text for this first return to Genesis since February came

from chapter 6, verse 17. Now in September, his fame and influence had grown and San Lorenzo was no longer large enough for the expected crowds; from this day forward Savonarola would preach in the cathedral before tens of thousands. On the day of St. Matthew, the crowds had begun filling the Duomo early in the morning and had been waiting many hours in the packed interior. The wait had increased the sense of excitement and anxiety.123

Savonarola mounted the pulpit, looked out

on the agitated crowd, and shouted with all his might these seven words: "Ecce ego adducam aquas diluvii super terram "; "Lo, I shall loose over the earth the waters of the Flood." Pico della Mirandola said that shivers went up his back.124 Shouts, cries, and weeping broke out within the crowd. The fear and agitation mounted as Savonarola continued on to describe in detail the suffering to come as the Flood washed over Italy. ' 25

' 22 On the sermon of September 2 1 ,1 4 9 4 see: Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 78-79; Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 129; V illari, Savonarola, p. 188. ,2 3 Villari, Savonarola, p. 188. 124 Villari, Savonarola, p. 188 125 Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia, fol. 24r(Schnitzer, Que//en-\\\,v. 12): "[Savonarola] haveva predichato in s. Liperata, et havendo al entrata del Re di Francia in Italia apunto chiuso l'archa, chon tantto terrore, spavento et grida et piantti haveva facto alchune prediche, che chascuno quasi semivivo sanza parlare per la cipta sbighotiti

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The extraordinary power of the September 21 sermon derived from the parallel movement of Savonarola’s own exegetical commentary delivered over many months, developing in concert with the unfolding of international events. The image of the Ark and the Flood was now common language to the churchgoers of Florence. The imagery fixed in their minds the idea of encroaching disaster and possible salvation. And the content of these sermons now seemed to confirm their deliverer as a seer, a prophet, someone who had known all along what was to happen. In the five months since the Lenten series, King Charles' actions had confirmed Savonarola in every way. On the very day of the sermon, rumors had reached Florence that the king had entered Genoa.126 The rumors were untrue, but they only tended to heighten the sense of distress and anxiety within Florence and also to confirm Savonarola as right in his predictions of the Cyrus from across the mountains who would walk easily into the cities and fortresses of Ita ly .127 Although it seems that Savonarola was extremely careful to avoid any public or private statements that might be interpreted as calling for the overthrow of the Medici, it must be recognized that the content of

s'agiravano, la quale paura molto piu chresceva, che e d e l I pareva che di futura chalamita non solo la cipta, ma tutti gl' huomini minacassino...." ,2 6 Landucci, Diario , p. 70. 127 In the commentary above, Savonarola's unwillingness to attack the Medici rule directly has been emphasized. But it must also be understood that his more general predictions about the suffering and chaos that was to result from the coming of the new Cyrus necessarily impinged upon the current Florentine government and contributed to the instability that was growing more acute within Piero's regime.

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the sermons in September greatly complicated the situation for Piero in his attempt to pursue his foreign policy objectives. If the great prophet was right and the Cyrus from beyond the mountains was invincible then why should the commune agree to support Piero's m ilitary preparations for resistance? Thus indirectly Savonarola’s preaching did harm the family that was at that very moment exerting all its political capital within ecclesiatical circles to help the Prior of San Marco. And a sophisticated political operator like Savonarola must have understood the damage he was doing to Piero's position. Therefore we are left with the inescapable conclusion that there was a great deal of duplicitous maneuver contained within the actions and sermons of the fria r from Ferrara in these critical months just before the arrival of King Charles. The carefully prepared sermons of Savonarola, Delfino, and Barozzi, the more incendiary street harangues of Bernardino da Feltre and Domenico da Ponzo, and the prophecies of Francesco da Paola were the rhetorical manifestations of an extremely agitated general condition throughout Italy in 1493 and 1494. But even more shocking than the rhetoric and more ubiquitous were the stories of countless personal experiences of the supernatural and fantastic the reports of which traveled immediately all over Italy. In the dark of night in Puglia, were seen three

su n sJ2 8

|n Pietramala near Arezzo, the residents reported

hearing a multitude of soldiers passing nearby every night on foot and on

'2 8 Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 183.

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horseback but in the daylight there was no sign of them.129 In a number of locations, statues were discovered to be sweating.130 In Siena, babies were heard to chant funereal litanies at night. And an unknown kind of bird never seen by anyone before flew into the Piazza del Campo, circled the tower several times then disappeared.131 The Florentine chroniclers tell of one shocking incident after another in this period immediately preceding the arrival of the French. Everyone remembered the first of a series of ominous portents. As Lorenzo de' Medici lay dying, a lightning bolt struck the lantern on the top of the Cathedral hurling huge chunks of marble the size of a man to the ground.132 A terrible storm caused the gesturing finger of Saint John over the door of the baptistery to fall to the earth.133 This was seen as extraordinarily significant since John the Baptist was the patron saint of Florence and in this misfortune his benediction was now broken. At the Piazza Signoria, a huge fat falcon was seen to fly into the piazza, to circle the tower of the Palazzo della Signoria, and then to come hurtling

129 Parenti, Storia, fol. 132v (Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 113): "Stavansi cosi le cose adormentate e novita alcuna perlo terre di Italia non si scopriva benche qualche portento ogni giorno di nuovo si divulgasse: siccome quello che piu huomini di Pietramala sopra ad Arezzo dissonon havere sentito, cioe passare moltitudine di gente d'arme a piei a cavallo in certo luogho di nocto. la quale cosa con effecto vana essere sicompresa." 130 Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 183. 131 Sigismondo Tizio, HistoriaSenesium, MSS., Biblioteca Chigi, Siena, G II 36, t. 6, fols. 204-205 (Delaborde, L'Expddition, p. 317). 132 Landucci, Diario, p. 63 133 Cerretani, Storia, fol. 24r (Schnitzer, QueIIen-\\\, p. 12).

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down dead in front of the door. This was read as a sign for the future of Piero.134 Most disturbing of all was an incident at the ancient church of Orsanmichele.135 A vagabond appeared in the streets of Florence doing damage to images of the Madonna. He broke statues and defaced paintings. His actions of course enraged the people but he continued. He moved to the niches on the outside of Orsanmichele that hosted the famous statues of St. Mark by Donatello, St. John the Baptist by Ghiberti, and the Doubting Thomas of Verrocchio. He walked around to the Via Lamberti side and found the statue of the Madonna and Child sponsored by the Guild of the Doctors and Pharmacists and carved by Piero Tedesco almost one hundred years before. He attacked it. He climbed up and scratched the eye of the child; he threw excrement into the face of Mary. This last act unleashed the fury of the crowd. Boys grabbed stones and threw them at him and were quickly joined by grown men who stoned the poor fool to death right there before the soiled eyes of the Virgin and Child. They then dragged his bloody body through the streets.

1 3 4 Cerretani, Storia, fol. 24v (Schnitzer, Quellen-\\\,v. 12). 135 Landucci, Diario, p. 66: "E a di 17 d' agosto 1493, intervenne questo caso ch' un certo marrano, per dispetto de' Cristiani, ma piu tosto per pazzia, andava per Firenze guastando figure di Nostra Donna, e in fra 1' altre cose, quella ch'e nel pilastro d' Orto Sa' Michele, di marmo, di fuori. Graffio T occhio al bambino e a Santo Nofri; gitto stereo nel viso a Nostra Donna. Per la qual cosa, e fanciugli gli cominciorono a dare co‘ sassi, e ancora vi posono le mani ancora uomini fatti; e infuriati, con gran pietre 1' ammazzorono, e poi lo strascinorono con molto vituperio."

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All of these incidents were "read" the way we read the newspaper. It was believed that God's order was filled with meaning in every gesture and that all we had to do was look carefully. Bartolomeo Cerretani finished his own narration of many of these unusual happenings with the assui ance that God had put His Order and His Virtue into all of the creation, into the skies, the animals, the plants and the bodies of men. He who would want to understand the present and the future had only to contemplate and meditate upon these manifestations of God's plan.136 These happenings confirmed the feeling that men were living in extraordinary times, that something terrible was wrong, and that something worse was to come. "Everyone is terrified," reported Niccolo Guicciardini in a letter to Piero Guicciardini, "especially myself. May God help us."137 In Florence, Piero Parenti said that the city was all stirred up.138 Piero de' Medici's diplomatic representatives warned him repeatedly of the disturbed atmosphere in Florence.130 It was noted above that the tension of October sent Michelangelo running.140

136 Cerretani, Storia, fol. 24v (Schnitzer, Ouellen-III, p. 13.): "Et sanza alchuno dubbio iddio della natura ne cieli, negt' element), negl'animali et piantte et finalmente in tuuti corpi ha infusso tantto del suo ordine et virtu, che se 1' huomo con asidua meditatione lo chontemplassi, vedrebbe spessissimo gl' acidenti futuri et gl'efecti etiam nelle loro chause aschonditi et non al comspecto degl' huomini comparssi e visti." 137 Roberto Ridolfi, Studi savonaroliani (Florence, 1935), p. 262. 138 Parenti, Storia, fol. 18l r (Schnitzer, QueJien-\\i, p. 7 ):" ... et veramente molto mesta la citta nostra rimase." This in October, 1494. 130 Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de’ Medici, Oct 22, 1494 from Milan (ASF, MAP, LXXIV, 1 14). 140 See p. 1.

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Events such as the September death of Poliziano three days after Savonarola's St. Matthew's day sermon, and the desperate illness of Pico della Mirandola, extended the already widespread anxiety about the future. It seemed that an age was coming to an end, an idea that was widely disseminated by the powerful sermons of the reformers. Lorenzo was gone and now his companions were also fatigued and going to an early grave. And no one knew what was to come afterward. The seasoned observer of the Italian world, Philippe de Commynes, saw a general longing for change throughout Italy at this moment—this moment of the arrival of the French.141

141 Commynes, Memoires, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 462: "And from all sides the people of Italy began to take heart and to wish for change, for they were seeing things which they had never seen in their time."

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THE DECISION

King Charles was masterful at manipulating these fears. By October when he arrived at Piacenza, he had already been doing exactly this for more than two years.142 An unprecedented diplomatic barrage was unleashed on all the city-states of Italy at the same time that Charles' diplomatic moves throughout Europe were obtaining the optimal international climate for his expedition. A mixture of threats and enticements established an atmosphere of almost unbearable tension which was augmented by the rhetorical prognostications of the preachers. This tension climaxed at Piacenza. Until the king's decision was announced and the troops began to move, there was hope all over Italy that somehow the expedition could be delayed. Ludovico Sforza’s desire was that the French could be slowed until some Italian response could be organized. Commynes tells us that, "he would have liked to have the king out of Italy already." 143 Thus the advice of Sforza had been all along for Charles to establish winter camp somewhere near Piacenza, but as far from Milan as possible.144

142 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 353; Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, pp. 234ff. 143 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 465. 144 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 463: "The duke of Milan's advice had always been directed toward two ends: that we should not proceed any farther that season,and also that he hoped to obtain Pisa, which is an important and large city, as well as Sarzana and Pietrasanta." In this passage Commynes refers to Ludovico Sforza

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The Duke of Ferrara was sure that the king would take the Via Aemilia and move south across Romagna. This would allow the loyal French ally to stage a great reception for the King of France at Ferrara. Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena was one of the representatives of Piero de' Medici in Romagna at this moment and his daily letters give us a detailed report of the situation there in these critical days from the 18 to the 22 of October.145 Dovizi’s letters are extremely important since they allow us to judge the evolution of the policy of the king and the public knowledge thereof on a day to day basis. Frequently Dovizi filed more than one report a day to his Florentine superiors.145 It is clear that until October 22, no one in Romagna knew the nature of Charles’ coming decision. Many believed that the French would not cross the Apennines until the next spring.147 Even within the royal council there was lingering fear of the expedition and the hope that one more complication might somehow

as the Duke of Milan although at the moment at which this advice was being prof erred he was not yet duke. His nephew died Oct. 21, and Ludovico was proclaimed Duke the next day. 145 Bernardo Dovizi to Piero de' Medici, Oct 22, 1494, Faenza (ASF, MAP, filza XVIII, c. 351): "A Ferrara s'aspecta el re di francia et si comincia a preparare." See also, EpistoJario di Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena, ed. G. L. Moncallero (Florence, 1955), 2 vols. 145 Dovizi sent letters to Piero de’ Medici on the following dates: Oct 18, 20, two letters on Oct 21, one on Oct 22, two more on Oct 23, etc. (ASF, MAP, filza XVIII, beginning c. 341); see Moncallero, Epistolario, vol. I, pp. 216ff. 147 Delaborde, L Expedition, p. 431.

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delay departure until some reason might cancel it altogether.148 The diplomats seized upon every problem as a sign of the collapse of the king's enterprise and encouraged their home governments to hope that they could be saved by Charles' supposed confusion.14^ Until mid-October, the French pace had been rather slow and leisurely. Upon his arrival in Piacenza, Charles had already been in Italy seven weeks. Thus it was possible for the diplomats to think that the Italians had several months in which to organize for the French thrust further south. And therefore it was reasonable for Piero de' Medici to think as others were doing that there was still a possibility of stopping or slowing the king's enterprise or at least detouring it around Florence. This hope was especially important for the Florentines since they were now the major obstacle to the king's further plans to move forward, it was in these days, as all Italy watched Charles at Piacenza, that Piero was trying to convince the Signoria at Florence to spend sufficient funds

148 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 462:".. .the army wanted very much to turn back because of the uncertainty [of the situation],. . . And those who had firs t praised the expedition now condemned it, such as the grand equerry. Lord of Urfe." also Delaborde, L 'Expedition, pp. 429-430. 149 see the letters of Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de' Medici with reports also frequently being sent to the Otto di Pratica, dated Oct. 16, n.d., 21, 22 (ASF, MAP, filza LXXIV, cc. 1 12-1 15 ). Ridolfi fell victim to the ruse of Charles' indecision and so reports in a letter to Piero de' Medici, Oct 1, Milan (ASF, MAP, filza LXXIV, c. 105): "Ha ritratto ancora Bernardo da uno amico, ser Lodovico, cancelliere del signor Ridolfo, ch' el signor Lodovico si duole di non poter saldo il cervello del Re, non pero circa la impresa, alia quale dice sta forte; ma che una volta vuole andare in campo, un' altra stare a Piacenza, un' altra a Ferrara, e simili mutazioni che gli danno impedimento al potere deliberare.”

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to organize a solid defense of Tuscany.150 The king’s own strategy of remaining quiet about his exact route and his schedule encouraged everybody to think that he could be slowed or detoured. Late in the evening of Monday, October 20, a courier rushed into the royal quarters at Piacenza with news for Ludovico Sforza. His nephew, Giangaleazzo, Duke of Milan, after months of poor health and weeks of serious danger, now seemed to have taken a turn for the worse. At daybreak, Ludovico set out through the flat Lombard fields along the Via Aemilia and across the Po river to the north for the forty mile trip to Pavia, but was intercepted by another courier along the way with the news that the young duke had just died that morning with his wife and mother at his side.151 He had been Duke of Milan for eighteen years. Giangaleazzo had been sick for a long time from what appears to have been chronic gastro-enteritis. In October, he had grown too weak to stand and he made things worse by refusing to follow his doctors advice. They prescribed rhubarb pills and warned the young Sforza that his stomach could not tolerate raw fruit and wine and that he should eat the fresh fish that Isabella arranged to have brought in baskets from the

150 Parenti, Storia, fol. 56v (Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434.). For more on Piero's efforts to rally a Florentine defense see pp. 223ff below. 151 The details of the death of Giangaleazzo are derived from the following sources: Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 674; Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 461; Franco Catalano, Ludovico iIMoro (Milan, 1985), p. 200; Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, pp. 153f f.; L. CollisonMorley, The Story of the Sforzas (London, 1933), pp. 215-217; Jul ia Cartwright (Ady), Beatrice D'Este (London, 1899), pp. 238-239; Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 136-139. A recent review of the whole mystery is now available in the new biography of Isabella: Cappelletti Buti, Isabella d'Aragona-Sforza, pp. 157-165.

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Ligurian Sea. Yet he obstinately kept plums and pears under his pillow with the excuse that he just wanted to enjoy their aroma, then would gorge himself on the dangerous produce and wash them down with strong wines. He seems to have understood that his own end was near for on his last night he asked that his two favorite horses and his greyhounds be brought to his room so that he could enjoy them for a moment. The poor prince seems always to have liked animals more than men. All these details of the behavior of Giangaleazzo are fortunately preserved in letters the doctors sent to his uncle Ludovico. 152 Without these documents, Ludovico would certainly have been convicted in the court of historical opinon of having poisoned the nephew who had stood in the way of total control of Milan for 18 years. 153 The moment had some advantages. The duke's cousin, the King of France, was now on his way south and was no longer such an immediate danger to Ludovico. 154 Commynes hints at poison. 155 And Sanudo states it as common belief at the time. 156 yet it does not make sense and a consensus among

152 Collison-Morley, The Sforzas, p. 215; Carlo Magenta collected the letters of the doctors and published them, see / ViscontiegliSforza

nel casteHo di Pavia e loro attinenze con ia certosa e ia stori cittadina (Milan, 1883), 2 vols. 153 Guicciardini, S to riad 'Italia , ed. Menchi, vol. I, pp. 92-93, reports the poison accusation in detail without stating his own position. 154 Duke Giangaleazzo's mother, Bona of Savoy, was the sister of Charlotte of Savoy, the mother of the King of France, thus the family relationship of Giangaleazzo and Charles was extremely close. '5 5 commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. I, p. 461. 156 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 674.

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historians has grown that Ludovico was not guilty.157

why wait

eighteen years? As early as 1482, Pope Sixtus IV had accused Ludovico of planning his nephew's death, but this may tell us more about the Pope than about Ludovico.158 |n 1490, the Florentine ambassador had raised the subject with Ludovico and he replied that, "If I were capable of such a thing, I should be infamous in the eyes of the whole world."'5 9 This remark, suggesting that Ludovico was incapable of this kind of violence, rings true; during Ludovico's control of Milan there were remarkably few executions.150 More importantly, why choose to administer poison during the very week in which the young man's powerful cousin was s till in the area when years and years of safer opportunity had been available during which Ludovico had taken no action against his nephew. From Ludovico's point of view there was great danger from the king. Charles could easily have reversed his movement and returned to Pavia to intervene if he had been convinced that Ludovico was guilty of murdering his firs t cousin. It would have been easy to place Giangaleazzo's son Francesco '.'Don the ducal throne with French protection. King Charles had only a few days before sat and held and caressed the little boy, shown him great affection, and remarked that he was the same age as the king's own son.

'5 7 For an examination of the debate see Cecilia Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, pp. 153-154; Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 136-139; Felice Fossati, "Lodovico Sforza avvelenatore del Nepote?" ArchivioStorico Lombardo, series IV, vol. II (1904), pp. 162-171. 158 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, p. 154. 159 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, p. 154-155. 150 Collison-Morley, The Sforzas, pp. 2 16-217.

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The boy's bedridden father had begged the protection of the King of France for little Francesco.161 Charles' behavior at the time revealed no hint that he suspected his ally of having murdered his cousin. But this may have been nothing more than a necessary strategic position taken by a general responsible for 30,000 men. One year later, as he was about to leave Italy with the whole expedition now behind him, and Ludovico's perfidy still an open wound, the king wrote to Maximilian an account of the incident that is cold in tone and hot with suggestion: "At Pavia we found the former Duke of Milan [Giangaleazzo] convalescent and in fairly good health, but entirely bereft of liberty. And at Piacenza, a day's distance from Pavia, Signor Ludovico told us that the said Duke of Milan was dead. Of what he had died he did not say. Yet the end was sudden. He took his leave of us to attend the obsequies at Milan, and there he got himself made Duke, wresting the Duchy from the little boy whose guardian he was. We w ill leave the judgement of these things to God."162 161 Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de' Medici, Oct. 22, 1494, Milan (ASF, MAP, filza LXXIV, c. 114). 162 Lettres de Charles VIII, vol. IV, p. 280: "Passando per Pavia trovassimo el quondam Duca de Milano ch' era sano e in bona convalescentia, ma fora de ogni liberta. Et quando fossimo a Piasenza distanti una giornata da Pavia, el dicto Signore Ludovico ne dissi ch' el dicto duca de Milano era morto, ma di che morte era non lo disi. Tamen la fo subita, et preso licentia per fare le exequie et ando a fare quelle a Milano dovi el se fece duca et tolsi el ducato a lo figliolo del quale r era tutore. et de queste cose ne volemo lassare el judicio a Dio " A substantial number of King Charles' letters written during his Italian expedition were retrieved from the Archivio di Stato di Milano for inclusion in the edition of collected letters edited by P. Pel icier (1898-1905). Some of these letters are preserved in their Italian translation only, such translations most

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At Milan, in the solid, sprawling, red-brick Castello Sforzesco in the very center of the city, Ludovico was hurriedly conferring with his supporters and maneuvering to have the dukedom for himself as the citizens outside received the official announcement of their late duke's passing.163

At Piacenza, Charles continued his meetings in which the

itinerary for the expediiton was being decided.'6 4 The decisions that

likely having been prepared for Ludovico Sforza. In the case of this letter sent to Maximilian, it is probable that the original was intercepted by Ludovico's agents and this Italian copy made. Portions of the English translation quoted in the text above derive from Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 139-140. Charles' recollection that he was told by Ludovico at Piacenza that the nephew Duke was dead conflicts with testimony that Ludovico himself left Piacenza not knowing of the death but only that the young man was gravely ill. The King may have here confused in his memory being told by Ludovico that the duke was gravely ill with his later knowledge that he died. '6 3 sanudo, Spedizione, p. 674: “A di 22, la matina, za era divulgato per tutto Milan la morte dil Duca, et venuta dil sig. Ludovico in castello; et tra loro molto mormoravano quello havesse a seguir, o se '1 faria lui sig. Ludovico, o pur volesse levar el putino, fio dil Duca [Giangaleazzo's son Francesco], a cui de jure aspettava el Ducato." 164 The Florentine ambassador at Milan, Giovanbatista Ridolfi, wrote to Piero de' Medici on the day that the d^ath became known and then again the next day during which the government of Milan came into Ludovico's hands. Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de' Medici, Oct, 22, 1494, Milan (ASF, MAP, filza LXXIV, c. 114): "leri vi scrissi della morte del duca Gian Galeazzo; stamani si publico in nuovo duca il signor Lodovico, el quale stanotte e venuto in Milano. El modo che e stato tenuto in tale assunzione, dopo alcune pratiche che sua signoria avea tenute con di questi gentiluomini, fu che buono numero di loro, o vero alcuni di loro per parte di molti andarono stamani alia sua eccellenza a pregarla e confortarla pigliassi in tutto il titolo e dominio di questo Stato, sperando dovere essere meglio governati che se venissino in mano d' altri; e cosi accetto le offerte, e ha sequito."

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the king was now about to make were being considered within a dramatically changed Italian situation. Ludovico's willingness to get involved with the French expedition in the firs t place had been greatly moved by his fear of Naples and what the King of Naples might do to protect his daughter and son-in-law (Giangaleazzo) in Milan, as was noted above in discussing the marriages of 1488-89J &5 From 1489 on, Ludovico had fe lt very insecure in his hold on the Lombard dukedom as the new Neapolitan bride encouraged her poor sickly husband to put aside his games and greyhounds and to step forth and claim his rule in fact as well as name.I66 The French decision to enter Italy was welcomed by Ludovico, with appropriate reservations, as a way of repulsing this potential threat from Naples. But as of October 21, that threat had vanished. Giangaleazzo, Duke of Milan, was dead; there was no longer any danger from his Neapolitan in-laws. The authorities invested Ludovico with the ducal power and literally overnight the presence of 30,000 troops and the King of France became an embarrassment rather than an opportunity. The developments in Milan coming at exactly this juncture in the French expedition, yielded important effects on the decision-makers at Piacenza as well as throughout all of Italy. For King Charles, Ludovico

165 see p. 109 above. 166 Ady, Milan Under the Sforza, pp. 150-151.

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had been a questionable and difficult ally from the very beginning. 167 Ludovico's father-in-law, the Duke of Ferrara, had spent time in Piedmont and Lombardy with the two men and was witness to the extremely strained relations between the ruler of Milan and the King of France from their firs t days together. The daily reports from Ercole's ambassador which he received after he left Charles and Ludovico and which he shared with his friend Giovanni Bentivoglio,told of the continuing trouble between the two leaders. 168 we know how scornfully 167 Antonio Dovizi da Bibbiena to Piero de' Medici, September 24, 1494, from Bologna, reports on difficult relations between the court of King Charles and Ludovico in the early weeks of Charles' presence in Italy, printed by Angenore Gelli, "Rassegna bibliografica: Histofre de Charles VIIIparC. G. De C herrierA rchivio Storico Italiano , vol. XVI (1872), p. 407: "Hoggi sono stato a lungo con Campano: el quale me referisce, che nuovamente hanno letter da quel cancelliere loro che e in Piemonte, come la mala contentezza del S. L. [Signor Ludovico] ogni di cresce: perche pare che Mons. d' Orliens ogni di piu si doglia dei sinistri portamenti factili da' Genovesi, et del disagio hanno patito di danari a Genova, e che Philippo Mons., la duchessa di Savoia et la marchesana di Monferrato aiutano el duca d' Orliens a dire male del 5. L., et pare che habbino possuto et possino tanto apresso di quel Re che el 5. L. non ha avuto se non una audientia da S. M. poiche e alia corte, che questo non mi consuons, et che per averla piu spesso voleva andare ad allogiare piu presso alia M. del Re, et Orliens ha operato tanto che non vi e possuto andare. Adeo che '1 S. L. sta molto malcontento parendoli essere in cattivo luogo, et haver gettata via la spesa et el tempo...." 168 Antonio Dovizi da Bibbiena to Piero de' Medici, September 27, 1494. from Bologna, in G e lli,"Histoire de Charles VIII," p. 407: "Essendo stato a visitare per buona usanza el S. [BentivogIio] me ha confermate le medesime cose: et piu dectomi che el duca di Ferrara doveva hlersera o hoggi giugnere a Ferrara, che torna da s&:. . . et che ogni di ha lettere da quel suo, che dicono el 5. L. essere alle mane col Re, et che l'uno sta molto malcontento dell' altro, subiungendomi che li pareria molto a proposito la M. del re Alfonso, et voi altri tenessi qualche pratica con Mons. d' Orliens, duchessa di Savoia, Philippo Mons. et Marchesana di Montferrato, che sono inimici col S. L. .. ."

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Ludovico viewed the king's leadership.169 And on the other side, Charles understood very well Ludovico's selfish motivations in the alliance.170 Now in October, the death of poor Giangaleazzo would release the newly enthrowned duke from his former fears. Of course, the ugly rumors of poison accentuated Ludovico's already shifty reputation with the French. But the immediate events did not impel King Charles to any outburst against the new Duke of Milan. His strategic sense was intact. His expedition was momentarily in danger. The Venetians were neutral. The Pope, Naples, and Florence were fielding troops against him at that very moment in the Romagna. If he were to come to an open break at this time with his most significant Italian ally, the Duke of Milan, he might suddenly be in real peril. Thus there is no record of any comments from King Charles against Ludovico during these days of October.171 He bode his time and only addressed the issue in the letter quoted above, written

169 See p. 79 above for Ludovico's extremely negative view of the king. 170 This is an important point that cannot be verified with any one document but must be assessed by looking at the king's actions. One source that w ill suggest exactly the opposite, namely that Ludovico controlled a gullible king, is Commynes: "Thus the king began to manage his affairs according to the will and leadership of Lord Ludovico.'' ( Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 459) But it should be clear from the king's decisions that this is not true. Duke Ercole was reporting trouble between the two men from the very beginning. (see above p. 159) The king did not do what Ludovico wanted: he did not avoid Giangaleazzo, he did not yield the Tuscan fortresses to Ludovico, he did not hand over Pisa as Ludovico so desperately wanted. The list could be extended, but this should be sufficient to clarify that the king understood Ludovico from the very beginning of his time in Italy and made his decisions protecting his own interests accordingly. ' 7 1 Bridge, France,va\. II, p. 140.

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one year later as he was leaving Italy.

But lingering within Ludovico's

territory now was foolhardy. Within the circle of the king's advisors, opinion shifted quickly to strong animosity towards Ludovico whom many saw as a murderer.172 The leaders wanted to move. For the Venetians, the developments in Milan were most unwelcome. Before, Ludovico had been restrained by his own vulnerability within Milan. Now that he was the legally invested duke there was no telling what territorial acquisitions he might covet. His alliance with the King of France now put Milan in a perfect position to claim such vital coastal holdings as Sarzana, Pisa, Porto Pisano, and Livorno if the Florentines collapsed entirely. Commynes had just arrived at this moment in Venice as the king's ambassador and he reported on the mood: “ .. .the Venetian ambassador notified them that he [Ludovico] wanted to make himself duke. And to tell you the truth, it was displeasing to both the doge and the Signoria of Venice. And they asked me whether the king would take the part of the child [Francesco, the son of Giangaleazzo and Isabella of Naples]; and although this was a reasonable thing I expressed doubt about it to them in view of the need which the king had of Lodovico."173 At Ferrara, where a visit from the king s till seemed a possibility if he took the Via Aemilia, the death of the young duke clarified things for Duke Ercole. Now his son-in-law was in firm control of Milan and the choice he had made of joining the French-Milanese alliance seemed to be a good one. His daughter Beatrice now reigned as the new Duchess of Milan as his son rode at the side of the King of France. Venice seemed

172 Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 139. 173 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 461.

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tamed for the moment and no longer a threat to the ever-vulnerable Estensi city-state on the flatlands of the river Po. In Bologna, the reaction was exactly the opposite. Giovanni Bentivoglio had attempted to maintain some kind of neutrality as he secretly hoped that Piero de'Medici and the Neapolitans would stop the French enterprise.174 Bentivoglio had consistently been the wisest interpreter of the meaning of the French interest in Italy and the possible effects of a French invasion. He repeatedly warned of the consequences to anyone who would listen and one of his best known messages went to Ludovico in March, 1494, in which he told his neighbor in Milan that Ludovico "must consider well this coming of the French into Italy and that which it may bring of both good and ill."

Through the

Milanese ambasssador at Bologna, Francesco Tranchedino, the ruler of Bologna told Ludovico that “we Italians should not allow barbarian peoples to come between us especially as their claws and teeth are long."175 This memorable and prescient evaluation with its reference to

174 Cecilia Ady, The Bentivoglio o f Bologna (London, 1937), p. 114: “There is no doubt that he [Giovanni Bentivoglio] was by conviction opposed to Charles VI M's expedition, and that he looked with fear and hatred upon the presence of the French in Italy." Especially important is G. B. Picotti, "La neutrality bolognese nella discesa di Carlo VIII," A ttieflem orie dellaDeputazione distoria patriaper !eprovincie diRomagna, series 4, vol. IX (1919), pp. 165-246; Also see G. L. Moncallero, "Documenti inediti sulla guerra di Romagna di 1494,“ Rinascimento, a. IV, no. 2 (Dec., 1953), pp. 233-261; a. V, no. 1 (Jun., 1954), pp. 45-79; a. VI, no. 1 (Jun., 1955), pp. 3-74. 175 Francesco Tranchedino to Ludovico Sforza, March 31, 1494, Bologna (ASM, PE, Romagna, cart. 1043). The English translation is from Cecilia Ady, Bentivoglio, p. 114.

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“Italians” should remind us that many Italian leaders—Bentivoglio, Caterina Sforza, Piero de' Medici— did understand the dangers to Italy inherent in this French undertaking and tried to stop it. Bentivoglio's reference to the barbarians "coming between us" was especially pertinent to Bologna and her leading family, the Bentivoglio. The arrival of the French was now impelling Giovanni towards positions that would align him with the opposition against Florence and the Papacy. And opposition to Florence was painful. It was contrary to the strongest traditions of Bologna. Again and again during the second half of the century, the Bentivoglio had stood with the Medici and the two families had protected each other from internal and external

d a n g e r s . 1 76

Opposition to the Papacy was almost as uncomfortable as opposition to Florence. Bologna was officially a papal territory with the government owing allegiance to the Pope. The Pope, as part of the alliance against King Charles, was commanding that Bentivoglio impede the French progress even though there was no way to compel obediance to such an unrealistic demand. But if the Pope had no power to force Bologna into a war with France, he did have the power to deny the treasured cardinal’s hat that Giovanni coveted for his son. 177 The coming of the French was driving a wedge between Giovanni and one other friend: Ercole d' Este. The relationship between Ercole and

176 Ady, Bentivoglio, p. 114. 177 Ady, Bentivoglio, pp. 113-114.

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Giovanni was one of the closest of the age. 178 p0r forty-five years, the two men labored side by side leading their neighboring cities. Their geographical contiguity dictated both potential enmity as well as the possibility of real friendship. And over the years it was the latter that won out. The two men led similar cities—cities exposed out on the Po plain to the dangers of Venice and Milan, with similar problems—the family, the government, foreign relations. And throughout the years the correspondence of the two presents an extraordinary picture of these two men, whose lives and political leadership ran parallel for so many years (Ercole ruled from 1471 to 1505, Giovanni from 1462 to 1506). Especially interesting for an understanding of the effects of the arrival of King Charles are the letters that passed between the two men during the summer of 1494 as the reality of the invasion became more and more certain. Giovanni thanked Ercole for his intervention with Ludovico. He confided to Ercole the pressures being exerted upon him by the Pope. The two men lamented the problems with handling their powerful neighbor in Milan.179 Then in September Charles arrived in Italy. Ercole joined the expedition in an active manner and Giovanni's

178 see Umberto Dallari's review of this friendship in “Carteggio tra I Bentivoglio eGli Estensi," A tti e Memorie della Deputazione di Storia Patriaper le Provfnde di Romagna, 3rd series, vol. XVI11 (1900), pp. 3-11. Esp. p. 3: " ... tra questi due personaggi destinati ad assistere e partecipare ai grandi fa tti che si svolsero nell’ ultimo quarto del secolo XV e nei primi anni del seguente, si pud dire che regno per tutta la vita una sincera e costante amicizia." 179 Giovanni II Bentivoglio to Ercole I d’ Este, July 18, 1494, Bologna; August 3, 1494, Bologna; August 27, 1494, Bologna; Ercole I d' Este to Giovanni II Bentivoglio, August 30, 1494 (ASMo, ASE, Carteggio di Principi Esteri). See also Dal lari, "Carteggio," see n. 174.

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reticence about it brought their warm relations to a cool period until after the French were gone. With the death of Giangaleazzo in October, the dangerous new duke in Milan who had invited in the French seemed more powerful than ever.

It

looked as if the Milanese-French alliance would sweep the opposition from the roads leaving Bologna totally exposed. Like other Romagnol leaders, Bentivoglio had had to come to some arrangement with the Sforza in Milan. There was no way that a government in Bologna could maintain a policy of openly opposing Milan. The huge Milanese power was only 150 miles to the north along the wide open Via Aemilia with nothing in the way. At least Venice could withdraw behind her aquatic defenses, but the much smaller Bologna sat out in the open among the rich fields along the Po with no natural protection of any kind. Thus it was always better for Bologna to have the Sforza in Milan worrying about their own internal situation than as matters would be now, with power totally consolidated under the crafty Ludovico, who might be ready for new enterprises. For Piero de' Medici, the death of the duke was bad news.

Ludovico's

legal succession to the ducal chair would have alarmed him as it did the Bentivoglio in Bologna. As long as Ludovico had to worry about his own power in Milan there were limitations to his maneuvers.

Now Piero had

to contend with a new arrogance in Milan, a legitimate and aggressive Duke Ludovico who might have much larger aspirations than just a consolidation of Lombardy, aspirations that might point right at Tuscany—maybe even Florence itself. The Florentine ambassador hinted at this in his dispatch to Piero on the day after the death of

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G i a n g a l e a z z o . 180

Giovanni Bentivoglio also warned Piero that Ludovico

would now be more dangerous than before. Ludovico would now "take off his mask," said Bentivoglio. He would pursue his interests exactly as he w is h e d .

'81

Ludovico had already been mixing in Florentine politics

through his contacts with the preacher Domenico da Ponza, and was in touch with anti-Piero leaders such as Bernardo Rucellai. Now his power would be even greater and the danger to Piero more menacing.

180 5ee p j |0, n. 36 above. '81 Antonion Dovizi da Bibbiena to Piero de' Medici, Oct. 22, 1494, from Bologna, in G e lli," Histoire de Charles V III ," p. 409: "Fa giudizio [Bentivoglio] che el S. L. [Ludovico] per questa morte habbi a quietar queste cose [problems because of Giangaleazzo's right to rule, etc.], parendoli si sia cominciato a chavar la maschera, et fare intendere a voi altri el desiderlo suo “ Especially important for research in the correspondence between the Bentivoglio and the Medici in the fifteenth century is Rita Sorbelli, CarteggioMediceo-Bentivolesco del!' Archivio diStato di Firenze, Appunti (Bologna, 1917) in which Sorbelli prints a chronological listing of all letters exchanged between the Medici and the Bentivoglio, during the period June, 1465, to September, 1494, that are now held in the Archivio di Stato of Florence.

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THE COUSINS

At exactly this moment there arrived in the king's headquarters at Piacenza, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de' Medici.182 These two Medici brothers were the wealthy, stylish, and handsome cousins of the embattled Piero and their presence here at the king's council and its suggestion of collusion between one branch of the Medici family and Charles VIII could only signal dangerous portents for the continued rule of Piero de' Medici in the increasingly chaotic city by the Arno. The two young Medici had just raced over the Apennines through the Cisa pass—the same mountainous route King Charles would set out upon the next day. They were moving fast enough to elude officials of the Florentine Republic; they were outlaws. Earlier in the year on April 29, the Signoria of Florence had banished the brothers to a place of confinement not closer than one mile to the city.183 For their

182 Guicciardini, S to riad 'Italia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 94; Bridge France, vol. II, p. 141; Delaborde, L E ’ xpedition, pp. 431-432. 183 Landucci, Diario, p. 68: ”E a di 14 maggio 1494, andorono a' confini Lorenzo e Giovanni di Pier Francesco de' Medici." iodoco del Badia, the editor of the diary, has provided additional information from the archives in n. 1, p. 68: the Sfgnori e Collegi voted April 29, 1494 to ban the cousins from the city due to "iustis causis ut dixerunt moti, ad Statum multum pertinentibus" and to allow them to come no closer than one mile. They were given 15 days to move to their location of confinement and thus Landucci is correct they they entered their villa at Castello on May 14. The law of banishment was lifted on November 9, the day after the revolution that overturned the regime of Piero de' Medici with these words: "Attenta

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sequestration, Lorenzo and Giovanni had chosen their sprawling villa at Castello spread out at the foot of the northern hills on the northwestern road that led to

P ra to .

184 They owned the villa thanks

to the advice of Lorenzo de' Medici, who had counseled them to buy the valuable property from Niccolo della Stufa in 1477 with its great circle driveway surrounded by cypress leading to the imposing yet austere Tuscan facade. It was at Castello that two of Botticelli's most famous pictures, The Birth o f Venus and Spring, were displayed and the paintings remained on the walls of the villa salone until 1815J85 The legal incarceration was comfortable without doubt, but it was stringent nonetheless and it was understood that the cousins would not enter the city nor would they leave the location they had accepted as their legally binding residence. Now with this flight to Piacenza they had violated the provisions of their banishment and Piero could have them legally declared enemies of the state. The action of the Signoria in April against the cousins provides a fascinating glimpse into the politics of Florence as the city faced the dangers of the French invasion. And it also tells a great deal about Piero and his leadership. We know about these important days in late April in some detail because Tommaso di Zanobi Ginori, a close associate of the

humanitate et bonis moribus Laurentii et loannis Pier Francisci de Medicis et qualiter, contra justitiam et omne debitum, et ad instantiam tirannorum, fuerunt relegati “ 184 por a history of the villa see Harold Acton, Tuscan Villas (London, 1973), pp. 61-62. Also included is a drawing of the villa as it appeared in the fifteenth century (p. 62). 185 Acton, Villas, p. 6 1. Ronald Lightbown has established that the paintings were most likely first displayed in the city palace on Via Larga. See Lightbown, B otticelli, p. 73.

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Medici, was keeping a diary at this time and was careful to note the affairs of the cousins.186 On April 23, the Council of Seventy, the executive council of the Signoria, met to consider intercepted communications between Lorenzo and Piero di Pierfrancesco and the King of France and Ludovico Sforza.18? The Council decided to summon the cousins to the Palazzo della Signoria for an official interrogation and on April 25, the Medici brothers entered the massive brown-stone palace to face the governors

186 Tommaso di Zanobl Ginori, Libro di debito ri e creditor! e ricordanze inJ. Schnitzer, Quellen undForschungen zur Geschichte Savonarolas, I (Munich, 1902), pp. 94-104. This selection from the diary edited by Schnitzer covers the period April 25, 1494 to May 23, 1498. See p. 94 for the events of April, 1494: “Adi 25 d'aprile 1494 la signoria mando per Lorenzo e Giovanni di Pierofrancesco de de Medici e ritennegli in palagio per piu pratiche avevono tenute col re di Francia e col sigre Lodovico di Milano, e prima adi 23 di detto si raguno el consiglio de 70 e consigliorono e aprovorono, che e detti fussino ritenuti. Adi 28 di detto si ragunorono di nuovo e 70 con la signoria e lessesi certi brievi, che e detti avevono dal re di Francia, coe Lorenzo e Giovanni predetti, e molte altre lettere, onde detti 70 consigliorono la signoria, che i detti fussino condannati a perpetua carcere e confiscati tu tti e loro beni. Adi 29 aore 22 incirca di detto mese Piero di Lorenzo de Medici inpetro gratia per i detti dal la signoria e furongli concessi con condi tione, che e fussino confinati fuori della cipta infra..................... [place to be specified] da doversi rapresentare infra 15 di, e detto Piero usci di palagio con loro e condussegli a casa con gran concorso del popolo." 187 The exact contents of these letters are not known but something can be inferred from later developments. The letters no doubt made plain the cousins' support for the King of France. This was no secret. And letters to Ludovico probably dealt with the French plans. What must have been absent from the letters were open references to overthrowing Piero. If such had been included in these intercepted letters in the hands of the Signoria, it is impossible to believe that the cousins would have been released.

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173

of Florence. It Is most likely that they were led up the stairs to the

Sala del}'Udienza designed by Benedetto da Maiano for exactly this kind of proceeding, with its statue of Justice over the door carved by Benedetto and his brother Giuliano.

At the conclusion of the session the

Medici cousins were held in the palace in what should be considered a temporary state of arrest. 188 Several of their supporters were taken to imprisonment in the Bargello.' 89 n0 doubt the most famous incident of another Medici imprisoned in the same Palazzo della Signoria, that of their great-uncle Cosimo held in the alberghettino in the tower in 1433, came to their mind and to the minds of the citizens waiting to know their fate out in the piazza.190 Three days later, the full Signoria reconvened to consider the case of the Medici brothers. The many intercepted documents were re-examined and then a vote was taken: Lorenzo and Giovanni were sentenced to lifetime imprisonment and complete confiscation of all their possessions—an astounding decision. Only execution could have been worse. But even more interesting events were still to come. The next evening, Piero de' Medici appeared before the Signoria and asked clemency for his cousins. It was granted. And Piero led the newly

188 Ginori, Libro di debitori, ed. Schnitzer, p. 94. 189 Alamanno and Neri Rinuccini, Ricordi storfcf di Filippo di Cino

Rinuccini colla continuazione d i Alamanno e Neri suoi fig li (Florence, 1840), p. CLI: "A di 24 d'Aprile 1494, circa ore 22 furon sostenuti in palagio de' signori Lorenzo e Giovanni figliuoli di Pier Francesco di Lorenzo de' Medici, e Bernardo da Ricorboli, e Zanobi figliuolo naturale di Raffaello di Messer Agnolo Acciaiuoli, erano suti mandati al bargello, i quali erano molti familiari e intrinsechi amici de" sopradetti Lorenzo e Giovanni de‘ Medici.” 190 Gutkind, Cosimo, pp. 76ff.

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174

freed young men out of the palace, into the piazza, and along the streets past the cathedral to their home adjoining Piero's own Palazzo Medici followed by cheering crowds.191 A number of things are important here. First, it should be remembered that the Signoria and its executive council, the Council of the Seventy, were s till under the control of Piero de' Medici— the same kind of control exercized by his father, grandfather, and great­ grandfather, a loose negotiated control but nevertheless control.192 Therefore events are not what they seem. The Signoria did not actually change its mind between April 28 and April 29. The citizen who came to plead for his relatives on April 29 was the same citizen who had arranged the whole proceedings in the firs t place. So what was the purpose of all this? It was Piero's warning. The arrest, interrogation, 191 Ginori, Libro di debitori, ed. Schnitzer, QueJJen-\, p. 94. For Guicciardini's version of these events see Storie fiorentine, ed. Aulo Greco (Novara, 1970), p. 135; History o f Florence, trans. Mario Domandi (New York, 1970), from which comes the following passage: "[The cousins] began negotiations with signor Ludovico by means of Bernardo Rucellai's son Cosimo, who had left Florence because he was Piero's enemy. When negotiations were just beginning to get under way, with nothing of any importance yet concluded, the affair came to light. In April, 1494, Lorenzo and Giovanni were arrested, and they confessed what they had done. Although Piero was disposed to deal harshly with them, the leading citizens, reluctant to bloody their hands, set them free but banished them to their properties in Castello." I do not accept this version of the events of April, 1494 as correct. More important, Guicciardini does not himself accept it since he specifically in the De! Reggimento di Firenze proclaims that Piero was not “bloodthirsty" and in proving his point specifically points to this plot (see below pp. 269-270). Furthermore, the suggestion that Piero was bloodthirsty before the threats of his enemies runs contrary to all the information we have about his three years of leadership. For more on this see below pp. 268-271. 192 Rubinstein, Government o f Florence Under the Medici, pp. 229-32.

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and incarceration were a statement to the cousins that if it should come to this Piero had the votes and the w ill. All of which was made clear on April 28. If the cousins were to persist in attempting to undermine Piero's policy of resisting the French, then Piero was willing to act against them even if they were his cousins. Second, and equally interesting, is the fact that Piero did not allow the sentence to be carried out even though he knew very well, and had documents to prove, that his cousins were indeed maneuvering against his French policy and that they would remain powerful opponents, though he probably did not yet know the extent to which they were plotting against his personal rule.

What is striking here is Piero's leadership: he

chose a careful non-provocative warning rather than extreme retribution. In this critical overheated moment—the French ambassadors were arriving the next week— Piero s till chose clemency. Even more, he chose public reconciliation with his cousins and walked through the streets with his relatives to the cheers of the citizens. It should be noted that this was not a choice made out of weakness. The vote against the cousins was taken and was allowed to stand for 24 hours exactly to demonstrate that such a vote was possible and that there would be no public demonstrations sufficient to overturn it. This kind of leadership is surprising when one considers all that has been w ritten about Piero's arrogance, his egotism, his tyranny. Even Guicciardini admits that he had ample provocation. "What more obvious plotting against the state and

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against Piero did he need than what was done by Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco... yet they were handled peacefully."193 This incident raises one of the most fascinating possibilities of the career of Piero de' Medici: possibly he was not tough enough, not hard, not quite as merciless as his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. It is hard to imagine that his predecessors would have allowed the cousins to walk off to a pleasant unguarded exile at Castello under similar circumstances.194 But if Piero’s choice in this April crisis with his cousins revealed mercy and an unusual trust extended to those who

193 Del reggimento d i Firenze in Opere inedite, vol. II, pp. 104-105. For complete quotation of this section of the Reggimento as well as my translation see p. 270 below. 194 Piero’s great-grandfather Cosimo reacted with massive arrests, torture, and the occupation of the city-center by thousands of troops in a crisis of 1458 similarly dangerous to that of 1494 (Rubinstein, Government o f Florence, pp. 103ff; Gutkind, Cosimo de'Medici, p. 136). In 1466, Piero's grandfather and namesake stopped a conspiracy against him with arrests, tortured confessions, a large number of sentences to lifetim e exile, and 3,000 troops (Rubinstein, Government o f Florence, pp.156ff.) Rubinstein calls Piero di Cosimo’s repression of this opposition “relatively mild,” (p. 166) which makes sense only If one considers that there were few executions. The rule of Piero di Lorenzo’s father was downright bloody even by the standards of fifteenth century Italy. In his reaction to the Pazzi conspiracy— admittedly a violent challenge to Lorenzo and his family—Lorenzo went well beyond the necessary lim its for preserving order. Judith Hook comments:" ... after the Pazzi conspiracy, Lorenzo gave full vent to the vindictive streak in his nature. In his pursuit of vengeance he showed no mercy and gave no respite. Gruesome executions dragged on long after Giuliano’s burial in San Lorenzo on April 30" (Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 102.) Lorenzo’s harshness was not confined to such obvious dangers as the Pazzi. Even in relatively unimportant cases he often chose execution, refusing requests for clemency (Alison Brown, "Pierfrancesco de’ Medici," Journal o f the Warburg andCourtauld Institutes, vol. XL11, 1979, p. 101.)

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were openly opposed to him within his own family, it calls into question the whole traditional characterization of Piero as a rough, arrogant bully, thoughtlessly pushing people out of his way, blundering from one mistake to another. When one considers the existence of documentary proof of illegal plotting, of continuous public opposition to Piero’s Neapolitan policy, and in addition all the animosity over family finances, Piero's gesture to his cousins on April 29 is quite extraordinary. 195 The third aspect of these April politics that is interesting is that it reveals a sophisticated political leader aligning his allies in the Signoria and making an attempt at conciliation and civic unity. The whole scenario required considerable planning. The different meetings had to be arranged, their various considerations and their outcome all had to be organized so that on April 29 Piero could magnanimously appear and ask for clemency. The script was played out, the effect achieved, and on April 30 the cousins prepared to go off to their place of exile apparently subdued. But what is significant is that this kind of political acumen is exactly what Piero’s father was supposed to have had and what Piero was supposed to have lacked.196 The details of this particular incident

195 The traditional representation of Piero w ill be examined below, pp. 265ff. 196 J. R. Hale, Florence and the Medici, the Pattern o f Control (New York, 1978), p. 76: [Piero] "had been prepared for a position beyond the range of his talents unless all went smoothly. He lacked the ferocious concentration which allowed Lorenzo to be effective on so many fronts. He lacked his father’s gift for anticipating opposition and soothing it. Lulled by the fluency with which Lorenzo’s postion had been passed on to him and with little awareness that this postion had to be earned as well as accepted, he thought it safe to act on impulse."

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suggest that in April, in his third year of leadership, Piero was more than just the political fool that has so often been portrayed. But beyond Piero's personal role, the action by the Signoria on April 29, tells us something important about the rapidly changing situation within the Florentine political world. It testifies to the fact that as of this date, just a few months before King Charles was to leave France, and at a time when the invasion was a near certainty, Piero de' Medici, even with all the forces working against him, was s till in control of the government of Florence. The cousins had been openly advancing the project of the French invasion and had become Piero's most dangerous adversaries on that point. Then in the last week of April, in a test of the two sides of the question within the government council, it became clear that Piero was s till successful in his attempts to convince the Florentine authorities that they should resist France; therefore the action was taken against the cousins. That Piero was s till in control and still holding steady the Florentine commitment to the Neapolitan alliance, explains the tension-filled encounter between the French ambassadors who arrived only a few days after the decision on the cousins and the Signoria which attempted to assuage the angry Frenchmen with fancy dinners and trumpets but no treaty. These were the ambassadors who stayed in the Palazzo dei Pazzi.197 It is likely that Piero had some suspicions about his cousins' more dangerous maneuverings against him throughout 1494. But it is certain that by the fall he had solid evidence of the link between the brothers and Ludovico Sforza and must have regretted his earlier generosity. On

197 See p. 51 above.

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September 22, several weeks after King Charles' arrival in Italy, Antonio Dovizi da Bibbiena wrote Piero from Bologna telling him that an emissary-friend of Giovanni Bentivoglio had come to Dovizi with the information that Ludovico Sforza was in extremely close contact with Piero's relatives for the purpose of action against Piero.198

What is

interesting about the letter is the extreme secrecy with which the whole a ffair was treated. Dovizi implored Piero to remain quiet about this information so as not to endanger the source: Giovanni Bentivoglio. And so that more information could be forthcoming. Antonio Dovizi was in a very advantageous position in his Bologna diplomatic post. In the great crossroads city of the north he was perfectly positioned to have access to almost immediate reports of conditions in Milan since the Bentovoglio court watched Milan more carefully than any other Italian power and Milan reciprocated with the posting to Bologna of Ludovico's most trusted diplomat.199 Dovizi's

198 Antonio Dovizi da Bibbiena to Piero de' Medici, September 22, 1494, from Bologna, original letter in cipher, deciphered and printed by Agenore G e lli,"Histoire de Charles V III “ p. 408 : "M. Luigi me ha decto per parte di M. Giovanni [Bentivoglio] che per uno che sta qui per S. L. [Signor Ludovico] secretamente oltre alio Arzimboldo et Tancredino, quale k grande amico di S. M. Gio. li k facto intendere che S. L. tiene strecta practica con cotesti vostri parenti et con alcunl altri per contro alia persona vostra, et dectolt in grandlssimo secreto che fra pochl dl M. Gio. vedrd le cose vostre sottosopra. DI che vi ha voluto dare nottzia: ma prega V. M. li tenga el secreto; perch6 intende quanto gl' importerebbe sapendosi uscire da M. Gio." 199 The special relationship between Bologna and Milan is attested by the extraordinary frequency of diplomatic and personal contact between the two cities and their leadership. Francesco Tranchedino was Ludovico's most trusted diplomat. His posting to Bologna over a period of many years was most unusual and allowed him to develop

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friendships allowed him access to these assessments of Milan on an almost daily basis.

He also was in contact with Ferrara diplomats who

were always the best-informed on Venetian affairs and he could meet personally with many Venetian diplomats as well. In addition, he was able to watch closely the developing military situation to the east of Bologna where the firs t engagements between French expeditionary forces and the armies of Naples were occurring. All of this information was sent along to Piero de' Medici almost every day and sometimes twice a day with the letters frequently in Piero's hands within 24 hours. Thus Piero, through the two Dovizi brothers (as well as official reports from the ambassadors at Milan and Venice), had very accurate, detailed, and timely information on the situation in all of northern

Ita ly

.200

The letter of Antonio Dovizi makes it clear that if before September there were only suspicions, after this date it was certain that the

an expertise, a network of contacts, and an influence over policy in both capitals that was unrivaled by any other Italian diplomat of his time. For the extensive letters of Francesco Tranchedino see ASM, PE, Romagna, cart. 1041-1044. See also Ady, Bentivoglio, p. 66: “The intimacy between Sforza and Bentivoglio entailed frequent coming and going of envoys between Milan and Bologna... Francesco Tranchedino arrived in Bologna in December 1490. He remained at his post during the difficult years which preceded and followed Charles Vlll's invasion, and he left only with the fall of Ludovico Sforza." 200 for a good introduction to the part played by the Dovizi brothers in the events of Fall, 1494, see G. L. Moncallerols biography of Bernardo Dovizi, / / Cardfnale Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena umanista e dipiomatico (Florence, 1953), pp. 107-149. Also see: Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 121; Brown, Bartolomeo Scafa, pp. 121, 122, 187, 188. A small selection of the letters of Antonio Dovizi da Bibbiena was published by Agenore Gelli in his review of C. G De Cherrier’s Histoire de Charles V III cited above. See "Rassegna bibliografica:

Histoire de Charles V III ro i de France par C. De Cherrier," Archivio Storico italiano, vol. XVI (1872), pp. 406ff.

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cousins were deeply involved in a plot with Ludovico Sforza to overthrow Piero. The difference between the intelligence contained within this report and that which the Signoria had to consider in April hinges on the question of whether the cousins were merely advocating a policy of alliance with King Charles of France which, albeit contrary to the current policy of Piero's government, was neither a secret nor treason; or whether they had crossed a line and were now plotting the actual overthrow of the government led by their cousin. Dovizi's September letter to Piero reports that the cousins were without doubt engaged in the latter. It is possible that they chose to leave their villa at Castello when they did because they feared that their maneuvers were becoming too well-known and that they might be in real danger as long as they remained within Florentine territory 2°1 Therefore it is clear that at some time in 1494 or even earlier, the Medici brothers entered into an actively treasonous relationship with Ludovico Sforza to bring down their cousin Piero.202 When we add this relationship to the others mentioned above, it becomes clear just how aggressive was Ludovico Sforza in seeking the destruction of the regime of Piero de’ Medici at 201 It is significant that Piero did not repeat the April action by the Signoria against the cousins once he knew for certain that they were plotting to overthrow his government. One possible explanation is that In the ensuing five months his hold on the government had weakened to such a point that he feared that he could no longer put through the kind of vote that he managed in April. Four weeks elapsed from the time when Piero was informed by Antonio Dovizi that the cousins were plotting against him (Sept. 22), and the date when the cousins escaped from Florentine territory and joined King Charles (Oct 22). 202 Donald Weinstein in Savonarola, p. 128, states: “Piero’s own cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, were expelled under suspicion of having treated w ith Ludovico Sforza of Milan."

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the very moment he was continually pledging loyalty through the diplomats. Besides this link forged with Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco, Ludovico was also using Bernardo Rucellai as well as the preacher Domenico da Ponzo to overthrow Piero.203 After the November revolution In which Piero was overthrown, the cousins maintained frequent correspondence with Ludovico Sforza— in cipher— in which he gave them instructions for future action.204 This intimate relation could not have developed only in the few months after November 9. It is clear that the cousins and Ludovico had been in touch for some time. It would greatly clarify our understanding of Florentine politics in the 1490's if we could know exactly how long this relationship had been in existence. If it dated from 1492, possibly soon after the death of Lorenzo, it would explain much of the difficulty that Lorenzo's son Piero found in the governance of Florence. If powerful Florentine oligarchs as well as important members of the Medici family had been coordinating a strategy with the ruler of Milan to destabilize the government of Piero for his entire three-year period of leadership, our traditional explanations for Piero's problems would have to be 203 see above p. 127. 204 Sergio Bertelll, "Machiavelli e la politica estera Fiorentina," Studies onMachiaveUi (Florence, 1972), p. 34. This rich article is filled with helpful material for my own study even though its period of interest begins immediately after November 9, 1494. The opening paragraph could serve as an Introduction to this chapter: “La politica estera fiorentina appare costantemente condlzlonata non solo dal rapporti di forza esistenti nella penisola italiana sul finire del Quattrocento, ma in larga misura dalle correnti politiche interne e dal la lotta fra i vari gruppi oligarchic! che si avvicendarono al potere. II dlscorso sul la politica estera fiorentina deve percid tener continuamente d' occhio le lotte e i contrasti politici interni alia "polls".

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rethought and we would have to rely less on the usual ascriptions of his problems to his "incompetence" and look more carefully at real enemies. But if the Medici cousins were the enemies of Piero, why were they so? The answer is to be found in two forces: money and power. The two major branches of the Medici family in Florence during the fifteenth century derived from two men: Cosimo di Giovanni de' Medici and Lorenzo di Giovanni de' Medici— the two sons of the political and financial genius of the family in the early decades of the century, Giovanni di Bicci (1 3 6 0 -1 4 2 9 )205 When the head of the family died in 1429, he left no w ill. Therefore his fortune had to be jointly administered by the two sons Cosimo and Lorenzo.206 This caused no immediate problems since the two brothers got along extremely well. In 1440, Lorenzo died leaving the elder Cosimo in complete control until his nephew, Lorenzo’s only heir, would come of age.207 This boy, who was only nine when his father died, was named Pierfrancesco. The

205 On the Medici family In the early fifteenth century, especially Cosimo and Lorenzo, see Dale Kent, The Rise o f the Medici (Oxford, 1978). pp. 6 5 ff and Curt Gutkind, Cosimo de'Medici (Oxford, 1938), pp. 63ff: "Lorenzo... agreed so completely with his elder (brother Cosimo] on all points of political and mercantile business that they frequently appeared and were addressed in common." 206 Judith Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici (London, 1984), p. 7; Raymond de Roover, The Rise andDecline o f the Medici Bank (Cambri dge, Mass., 1963), p. 60. 207 Plerfrancesco's mother, Glnevra Cavalcanti, formally renounced her right to guardianship over her son In favor of his uncle, Cosimo de’ Medici. This arrangement must have been advanced as allowing more efficient control of the joint businesses in which Pierfrancesco had a 50% share. See Alison Brown, "Pierfrancesco de’ Medici, 1430-1476: A Radical Alternative to Elder Medlcean Supremacy?" Journal o f the Warburg and CourtauldInstitutes, vol. XL 11 (1979), pp. 81-103.

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184

boy's uncle Cosimo would be his legal guardian until he came of age In 1451. For these eleven years, Cosimo had almost exclusive control of the whole family fortune and business (with some watchful intervention by the boy's mother, Ginevra Cavalcanti) and this control contributed greatly to his political power. When Cosimo's nephew came of age he assumed control of his portion of the inheritance, but it should be remembered that much of the young man's wealth remained invested in the family bank and In various family business partnerships so that the close cooperation of the two branches of the family continued of necessity. And young Pierfrancesco continued to live in his uncle's house for many years. He was s till there in 1457 at the age of 26.208 Then when he married Laudomia Acciaiuoli he established his own menage in the old family palace right next door to the new Palazzo Medici. Although on the surface it appeared that the two branches of the family continued an intimate relationship of cooperation, the firs t cracks in the unity of the house of Medici appear at this time when the family fortune had to be divided according to arbitration. Lorenzo later claimed that Pierfrancesco got the best of the

b a r g a in .2 0 9

And

Pierfrancesco had complaints about the way the fortune had been

208 Cosmto's catasto report of 1457 lists Pierfrancesco as a member of the household which included Cosimo's wife, his own two sons, the nephew, the wives and children of his sons, all adding up to fourteen members of the family. See De Roover, Rise and Decline.., p. 27. By the time of his 1458 catasto report Cosimo was living in the new palace on Via Larga and Pierfrancesco now inhabited their former shared family palace adjacent. See Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, 14J0-M 97, Chancellor o f Florence (Princeton, 1979), p. 31. 209 Judith Hook, Lorenzo, p. 7; Alison Brown, "Pierfrancesco," p. 84.

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managed.2 JO The apparent disparities were accentuated In that the fortune of Lorenzo di Giovanni passed Into the hands of one son who could then pass It on to his two sons whereas in the senior branch of the family by the time Lorenzo il Magnifico became leader of his side of the family, the fortune had been split among four heirs in his generation and among seven in the generation of his children. So when the cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco faced Piero in a battle for control of Florence ,.i 1494, the sons of Pierfrancesco were Immensely rich compared to their relatively poor cousin Piero. Beyond the friction about management of the family bank, there was also trouble about political power. Pierfrancesco's father Lorenzo had been content to let his elder brother Cosimo take the lead In their joint political action. But Pierfrancesco was less willing to accept a position of subservience to the senior branch of the family, and in 1466 he signed a republican oath which was a declaration of war against the regime then headed by his first-cousin Piero di Cosimo 2 1 1 Not only was he involved as a signer of the oath; his wife's father, Angelo Acciaiuoli, was one of the two key leaders with Luca P itti of the anti-Medici movement. In 1476, Pierfrancesco died. He was still in his forties as had been his father at the time of his death. Now the family history was replayed in yet another generation. The heirs to Pierfrancesco were s till boys (Lorenzo and Giovanni) so their elder cousin Lorenzo il Magnifico assumed their legal guardianship and arranged for their education, their travel,

210 Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 23. 2 1 1 Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 31. On the oath and its importance in Florentince politics see Rubinstein, The Government o f Florence Under the Medici (London, 1966), pp. 157ff.

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186

purchases, and marriages.2 12

In addition, their grandmother, Ginevra

Cavalcanti, now watched over them as she had guarded their father when he too was left alone at an early age. In May of 1482, Lorenzo arranged the marriage of Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco to Semlramide, the daughter of the Lord of Plombino. For their wedding Botticelli painted the Spring which was hung In a room next to Lorenzo di Plerfrancesco's bedroom on the ground floor of the old palace on Via Larga2 ^ It Is at this juncture that serious trouble occurred within the family. In 1478, Lorenzo de’ Medici was in the middle of the worst crisis of his life. The bank was on the verge of total collapse because of the poor management of Tommaso Portinari; the Pazzi organized their murderous plot and killed Lorenzo's brother as he worshiped at the altar of the cathedral on Easter Morning; and the Pope In league with the King of Naples declared war. In the midst of this crisis, Lorenzo removed 58,643 florins from the estate of his wards, the cousins, in order to stay solvent2 ,4 Six years later, when Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco came of age, some settlement had to made. Official arbiters (one of whom was Bartolomeo Scala) entered the case and forced Lorenzo to surrender to his two cousins the villa at Cafaggiolo, sixty-six farms, twenty houses, three mills, three ovens, and

212 The most useful source for the youth of Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco is Ronald Lightbown, B otticelli, pp. 70-81. Professor Lightbown is interested in the cousins because they were Botticelli's most important patrons. 2 ,3 Lightbown, Bottice/H, p. 72, and 80-81. The painting was moved later to the villa at Castello as mentioned above p. 164. 214 De Roover, Rise and Decline, p. 366; Judith Hook, Lorenzo, p. 151.

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jewels worth over 16,000 florins.215 it was an extraordinary transfer of wealth from one branch of the family to another and the settlement caused permanent damage to the family unity. The cousins still complained that they had had to suffer losses due to Lorenzo's poor judgement. And Lorenzo's children—most importantly, Piero—fe lt cheated for the rest of their lives by these cousins who emerged in the 1490's immensely rich while the more politically powerful senior branch of the family continued to rule Florence but did so constrained by a relatively paltry personal wealth. Lorenzo's children fe lt that their father's actions in the crisis of 1478 were dictated by his desire to protect not just a private fortune but also to guard the freedom of the entire Florentine state and they saw their cousin's avaricious pursuit of every florin as destructive to the whole family.216 Once this enormous settlement had been finalized In 1485, it occurred to the cousins that since they were financially the preeminent Medici family in Florence financially, why not extend that preeminence to politics?217 And it may have occurred to them even sooner. There

215 Alison Brown, "Pierfrancesco," provides details of the arbitration, see pp. 99-100. 216 Brown, "Pierfrancesco," p. 100. 217 The cousin's political maneuvers are treated throughout this paper. On their pretensions to replace the senior branch of the Medici as rulers of Florence see Filippo de’ Nerii, Commentari, vol. I, p. 106. Historians have been too passive and not sufficiently curious about the cousins and their pursuit of power. J. R. Hale says that “constitutionally they were of no account whatever," Florence and the Medici, the Pattern o f Control, (New York, 1978), p. 90. This is inaccurate as my arguments above suggest. The maneuvers of the cousins are extremely important in our understanding of the constitutional difficulties that Florence faced in the 1490's. They

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is a hint of calculation and ambition in Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco's aggressive pursuit of an embassy appointment to the coronation of Charles V I I I . Lorenzo approached Bartolomeo Scala and begged Scala to get the appointment meeting deferred until he could arrange with his cousin Lorenzo il Magnifico to join the embassy.218 It was so arranged and on November 10, 1483, Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco, who was then twenty, set off from Florence to be one of the city's official representatives carrying congratulations to the new King Charles V I I I 219

Thus from the firs t days of the new king's reign, Charles knew

Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco as one of the firs t Florentines to come to his realm with good wishes. Eleven years later, this old acquaintance and his brother rode into the king’s headquarters at Piacenza. Guicciardini's description of the situation at Piacenza accents the arrival of the cousins in the king's camp on the very day that Charles decided to move on the Tuscan road and thereby ascribes to the cousins some import in the decision (the historian is in error on Charles' departure date)220 There is no doubt that the Medici brothers would reveal the nature of faction and Its danger to the government as examined in Dale Kent's The Rise o f the Medici for an earlier period, and further discussed in its relation to foreign affairs by Sergio Bertelli, see n. 162 above. Alison Brown's article on Pierfancesco, is the most thorough analysis of the junior branch of the Medici family and supports the interpretation that sees them offering serious political opposition to the senior branch throughout the middle and late fifteenth century. 218 Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scaia, p. 120. 210 Lightbown, B o tticelli, p. 72. 220 S to ria d 'Ita lia , ed. Menchi, vol. I, pp. 94-95: "A1 re, il di medesimo che si mosse da Piacenza, venneno Lorenzo e Giovanni de' Medici; i quaff, fuggiti occultamente delle loro ville, facevano instanza che '1

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have been impressive in their representations. They were both handsome, elegant, and rich. Giovanni was reputed to be one of the best looking Italian men of his age.221 There is a softness about his beautiful face that is completely unlike the other Medici with their great drooping eyes and lantern jaws. A year after Charles left Italy, Giovanni's beauty won him Caterina Sforza when he just happened to vis it Forll on a business trip and Caterina immediately moved the handsome Florentine into the room adjoining hers while the Foriivesi gossips whispered that she was ready for a man for her cold bed 222 Later they married and had a son.223

re si accostasse a Firenze, promettendo molto della volontd del popolo fiorentlno inverso la casa di Francia, e non meno dell’ odio contro a Piero de' Medici." Guicciardini does not openly state that it was the counsel of the cousins that encouraged the king to choose the Tuscan road but his organization of the section putting the cousin's arrival at the head of the chapter gives the reader the impression that their advice was important and he mistakenly states that the king left Piacenza on the same day that the cousins arrived there. This is incorrect. Charles departed on Oct. 23, the following day after the arrival of the Medici. On other aspects of the decision at Piacenza the historian Is In error. He suggests that the king's council was totally united on the Tuscan route (p. 94)when we know that this was not case. See Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Klnser, vol. II, pp. 462-63. Commynes states clearly that it was due to the representations made to the king by the Medici cousins about the state of opinion in Florence in favor of France that Charles set off along the Tuscan route when he did (p. 463). 221 A portrait of Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de* Medici survives in The Adoration o f the Magi by Filippino Lippi, now in the Uffizi Gallery, Florence. Giovanni is in the foreground being crowned. For a reproduction see Ernst Breisach, Caterina Sforza (Chicago, 1967), after p. 182. 222 Ernst Breisach, Caterina Sforza (Chicago, 1967), p. 176. 223 Breisach, Caterina Sforza, p. 178. This son was later known as Giovanni delle Bande Nere and it is from him that descends the the line of Medici Dukes in the sixteenth century and beyond.

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The Medici brothers* travels and business activities would have yielded experience, eloquence, confidence, and style as they faced the king. In addition, Lorenzo knew Charles as an old acquaintance from eleven years before when he had attended the coronation. But the most attractive aspect of the cousins' presentation would have been the message: Florence was decidely pro-French and Piero’s attempts to rally the city against the Invasion were failing.

Unfortunately, it is

unlikely that we w ill ever know exactly how important was the message of the Medici cousins as Charles and his council made their decision on October 22. However, the special honors accorded them by the king suggest that Charles viewed their support as of significant symbolic value and thus they traveled at his side from this day until they led the French army into Florence one month later.224

224 Guicciardini, Storia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 94; Commynes, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 463; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 674: “ .. .era venuto da Soa Majesty Lorenzin de Medici, el qual era confinato mia 3 da Fiorenza, et appropinquandose el Re in. Italia ruppe li conf Inl, et andb dal Re dlcendo: Sacra Majesty, lo, per honorar 11 tol ambassadorl et alozarll In caxa, son sta da* Florentlnl mandato in exilio; unde al presente son venuto a inchinarmi a Toa Christianissima Majesta, facendoli bon animo la vengl; et si da* Florentlnl non havera quella II passo, II offerlsco di sopra, per la via dl mlo cugnado, slg. di Piombtno, el qual k dedito a Toa Majesta. Et II Re lo vete volentlera, et molto lo carezo, et tenelo a presso de s£ molto stmato."

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191

ON THE MOVE

As Charles and his lieutenants prepared for departure and hurried to bring about order among the more than seventeen thousand men who made up the international m ilitary melange of the French army, news from around Italy continued to pour into the royal headquarters. In addition to the review of the Florentine situation that Lorenzo and Giovanni de' Medici had just provided, there were also continual reports from Milan on Ludovico's consolidation of power and ambassadors arrived from Naples, Florence, and Rome, all trying to solve the crisis between the King of France and the King of

N a p l e s .225

Lorenzo Spinelli came to present a

proposal from the Florentine-Neapolitan alliance: he was authorized to offer King Charles the sum of 300,000 ducats to renounce the enterprise. The king's response is now legend: "Ce n'est pas l'or que je desire mais dominer ceux qui detiennent l'or." 226 But the most important diplomat awaited at Charles' headquarters was on his way from Lucca.227 position of this Tuscan city was vital for French planning since a belligerent Lucca would be positioned to cause major problems to the army if Charles chose to move through Tuscany.

225 sanudo, Spedizione, p. 673; Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 286. 226 The famous remark of Charles is firs t quoted in a letter of Guillaume de La Mare, Epistolae, n. 5. See Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 287. 227 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 673.

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At the same time that Charles was meeting with all of these representatives, he was also monitoring reports from his vanguard forces under the leadership of Gilbert, Count of Montpensier, the commanding-general of the whole French

a r m y .228 T h i s

force had been

dispatched to penetrate the Cisa pass and the Lunigiana valley which leads down to the fortress city of Sarzana, which stands guard over this mountainous entrance into the corner of northwest

Tuscany

229 jhe

region known as the Lunigiana is named after the ancient Etruscan and later Roman city of Luna; Sarzana was called Luna Nuova in the Middle Ages. When Charles decided to move, he would either go southeast along the Via Aemilia or directly south over the mountains and down through the Lunigiana to Sarzana. If he chose the latter, the mountain pass had to be relatively free of danger or the whole army might be blocked for weeks as winter set in. While the death and funeral of Giangaleazzo in Milan had been changing the politics of northern Italy, Montpensier had been winning this important mountain passage for the king. Count Gilbert was the scrupulously honest and greatly admired heir to the Montpensier junior branch of the great house of Bourbon.230 But his life is a little sad. At this juncture, in October, 1494, he was the most honored among the

228 sanudo, Spedizione, p. 101; Portoveneri, Memoriale, pp. 284-285; J. De La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de ia grande armee d'italie commandeepar Charles V III, 1494-1495, (Nantes and Paris, 1866), p. 88; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 43 J. 229 Delaborde, L Expedition, pp. 430-431. 230 on Gilbert see: La Grande Encyclopedie (Paris, 1972), vol. 4, pp. 1897-1901; Delaborde, L'Expedition, pp. 429-431; Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 92, 141-143, 187; Guicciardini, Storia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 95.

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193

m ilitary men leading the French expedition, no doubt full of hopes and dreams of riches awaiting the conquering army in Naples. He was commander-in-chief, a close friend and a relative of the king. But in the collapse of Charles' Neapolitan empire one year later. Montpensier was chosen to stay behind to maintain French control over Naples after the king and the major portion of the army had withdrawn, and there he led a brave but futile holding action, sickened, and died of malaria among his beloved troops.231 The cousin of the Count of Montpensier was Pierre, the Duke of Bourbon, who was married to King Charles' sister and acted with her as regent during Charles' sojourn in Italy. The wife of Count Gilbert was Clara Gonzaga, daughter of the Marquis of Mantua and sister to Francesco Gonzaga, who was at this moment general of the Venetian forces, but would soon be elevated to commander-in-chief of the armies of the Holy League formed to stop Charles. The two contending generals, one leading a French and the other an Italian army, had just missed a reunion near Parma when the Venetian Signoria refused Francesco permission to travel to visit with his brother-in-law.232 j ust after missing this rendezvous with his brother-in-law, Count Gilbert set off with his troops up through the valley of the Taro river to cross the Apennines passing over the same bridgehead at Fornovo that would be the site of the momentous battle one year later. The route being explored by Montpensier and his troops was part of the old Via Francigena, so named because it was a link in the great 231 Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 301 & 304. 232 Jacopo d'Ardria to Marquis Federico Gonzaga of Mantua, Oct. 20, 1494 (ASMa, AG, E, XLV, 3.); Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 430.

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194

medieval road used by the French and Germans (Franks) to move their armies and caravans through central Italy and south to Rome.233

it

leaves the safe, fla t, Po valley south of Piacenza near Parma and climbs quickly into the mountains that block Lombardy from Tuscany, then traverses the summit by way of the Cisa pass and descends through Pontremoli.234 if Charles chose to move his army along the Via Francigena instead of the Via Aemilia, control of Pontremoli would be essential. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this small ridge-top roadside town. For any army camped in the wide Po valley, there were only two easy choices for moving south: either the troops went all the way to the southeast corner of the valley to the Adriatic coast or they came over the Cisa pass and through Pontremoli. All other Apennine routes were more difficult. The Cisa-Pontremoli passage was advantageous because it allowed the forces to descend to the easy flat coast road and then to continue along towards Lucca or Pisa and inland through Poggibonsi, Siena, and on to Rome. The advantages of the Cisa pass road were evident from the earliest days of civilization in Italy and the fortress of Pontremoli that controls this mountain road yields remains from Etruscan times. The name, Pontremoli, is the old Pons Tremulus of the Romans. The ridge upon which the town sits seems a bridge across the mountainous valleys on both sides; the winds shake the bridge. The castle was probably firs t a 233 Archibald Lyall, The Companion Guide to Tuscany (London, 1973), pp. 21-22. 234 por the history, architecture, and topography of Pontremoli see: Touring Club Italiano, Toscana (Milan, 1959), pp. 227-228; Guide ditaiia, Toscana (Mi lan, 1985), pp. 152-153.

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Lombard construction in the sixth and seventh centuries. It grew important during the eighth and nineth centuries when Arab control of the western Mediterranean and their coastal raids destroyed completely the usefulness of the grand old Roman coastal road, the Via Aurelia, and for more than two hundred years all the coastal traffic had to move to the safer but more arduous overland route—the Via Francigena— that came through Pontremoli.235 Documents from the 900's tell of Pontremoli as a stop on the Via Francigena. The castle was destroyed by Emperor Henry V in 1110; it stood victorious over Emperor Frederick Barbarossa who recognized it as a commune after 1167; it was destroyed again by Emperor Frederick II; then it was rebuilt by his son. After the difficult climb over the mountains, Pontremoli provided the perfect respite for southbound travelers as they would begin the descent down into the Tuscan coastland at Sarzana. In the fields around the town the olives and vines cling to the steep terraced hills. Up behind the walls, the mountainsides are covered with chestnut trees and sheep have always grazed in the fields. The town sits next to the river Magra which divides the territory of Florence from the territory of Genoa. The favorable position of this ancient highway stop gave it control of the southern side of the summit road and thus allowed its governors to

235 Gino Luzzatto, An Economic History o f Ita ly from the F all o f the Roman Empire to the Beginning o f the Sixteenth Century, tr. Philip Jones (London, 1961), pp. 53-54. The efflorescence of Pontremoli and its function within the Via Francigena route is a fascinating example of the accuracy of the Pirenne Thesis: that is, that the greatest dislocations to the ancient Roman communication and trade patterns (in this case the Via Aurelia) occurred after 7 1 1 with the Arab conquest of Spain and all of the western Mediterranean. See Luzzatto commentary, p. 37.

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block any force headed for Tuscany.

An invincible fortress called

Cacciaguerra built onto the stony remains of the old castle in 1322 by Castruccio Castracane, made Pontremoli a great prize and Genoa, Milan, and Florence had battled for its control for centuries.236 In 1494, the town stood at the southernmost edge of Milanese territory and thus under the authority of Ludovico Sforza. Just below Pontremoli stood Florentine forts in a state of readiness. On the morning of the twentieth, Gilbert and his small army reached the mountain stonghold and began the descent to the sea, following the Magra river which carves out the valley that drops down to the Gulf of Spezia and Sarzana.237 Once they had le ft Milanese territory behind at Pontremoli and had penetrated the Florentine frontier, they could expect the firs t fighting of the Tuscan advance. As the French vanguard moved south they came upon the castle of Castiglione del Terzieri where the occupants, loyal to Florence, refused to surrender and were quickly shown the realities by this foreign army. The castle and town walls were breached. Other castles further down the valley were quickly conquered.238 As a shining Ludovico Sforza dressed in gold rode triumphantly through the streets of Milan on the bright morning of October 22, preceded by the sword of the Duke of Milan and greeted by the cheers of the crowd yelling, "Ducal Ducal Moro! Morol", Gilbert, Count of

236 On Pontremoli see Italy, A Phaidon Cultural Guide (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1985), p. 354. 237 The memoir of Giovanni Portoveneri is very accurate and detailed on this particular section of the French progress since he was a native of the region. See Memoriale di Giovanni Portoveneri, p. 284-285. 238 Portoveneri, Memoriale, pp. 284-285.

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Montpensier, led the vanguard of Charles' army to the gates of Sarzana, the key to all of

T u s c a n y .239

The army of the King of France stood

knocking at Piero de’ Medici's front door. The reports of Montpensier—only one day's ride away for a fast messenger—must have been welcome news to the king, for they made clear that if he so chose, the Via Francigena was open to him and his army. But far more exciting was the news from the southeast comer of Romagna which was brought to the king as he ate his

d i n n e r .240

while

Montpensier had been exploring the Cisa pass road, the Battle of Mordano, the firs t and most important land battle of the early phase of the invasion, had been taking place. French forces had been moving southeast across the Po valley for weeks as Neapolitan troops moved up the east coast of Italy and entered Romagna from Rimini and Forli. Since Giovanni Bentivoglio was maintaining a strict neutrality and allowing the French free passage through Bologna, this moved the front line between the two armies to the east, to Imola. The ancient Etruscan city that sits astride the Via Aemilia was then under the government of Caterina Sforza, Ludovico's niece. All of Ludovico's offers of protection and reminders of past services had been unable to bring Caterina ovpr to the French side.241 With the fortress of LaRocca well-provisioned and recently strengthened, it looked as if Caterina could block the French advance for some time.

By the third week of October the countryside around

239 on Ludovico: Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 675; on Gilbert: Portoveneri, Memoriale, p. 285, Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 141, Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 431. 240 Delaborde, L Expedition, p. 431. 241 Breisach, Caterina Sforza, p. 154.

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Imola and Faenza nearby was aswarm with thousands of troops from both armies, French, Breton, Swiss, Scots, German, and Italian, roaming the countryside and denuding the farms of supplies. But the French looked at the massive, impregnable fortress of Imola, assessed its ability to resist and the cost to take it, and simply bypassed it and besieged the smaller, weaker fortified town of Mordano about ten miles to the northeast.242 Two thousand soldiers were able to encircle the outpost and by October 17, the troops inside loyal to Caterina were desperately hoping for help. The young women of the town had been sent off at the beginning of the siege when escape was still possible and with them went a message to Caterina to obtain reinforcements. She had turned to her Neapolitan allies but so far they had not moved toward Mordano to help.243 On October 18, Gaspare Sanseverino, brother of Galeazzo and one of the generals of the French forces, asked to meet with the defenders and entered Mordano to offer them an honorable surrender. The proud Italians

242 On the siege of Mordano see the following: Jacopino de' Bianchi de' Lancillotti, Cronaca Modenese {Parma, 1861), p. 121; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 95; J. De La Pilorgerie, Campagne et buiietins de la

grande arme d' ita lie commandee par Charles V iii (1494-1495) (Nantes and Paris, 1866), p. 87; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 431; Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 286; Piero Pieri, / / Rinascimento e la crisi m iIitare Italians (Turin, 1952), p. 331; Breisach, Caterina Sforza, pp. 1 5 4 -156. Especially important are the letters of Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena to Piero de' Medici since they not only describe events in great detail but also allow us to know what Piero was hearing about the military situation in the Romagna. See letters of Oct. 21 (2), 22, 23 (2), 24, and 25 (ASF, MAP, XVIII, 347, 348, 351, 352, 353, 355, 358). Also see Picotti and Moncallero cited above, p. 162, n. 170. 243 Breisach, Caterina Sforza, p. 156.

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refused his terms so he exited and the attack began. At first fighting was slow. Then a cannon shot from the fort killed some French soldiers. The French became enraged. Their artillery blew a hole in the fortress wall and the foreigners came screaming into Mordano. They killed everybody in sight and set fire to all the buildings. The town hall and the church, filled with hundreds of women and priests praying, were spared, but some defending troops were hacked to pieces by the attacking Frenchmen over whom their generals lost all control. By October 20, the Battle of Mordano was over.244 The small fortified town out on the fla t fields of Romagna was of no great significance by itself. Its size and strategic import were in inverse proportion to its psychological significance at this critical moment. It had been chosen as an easy target. It allowed the French to evaluate their enemy. And the results of this small battle were momentous. It was probably as much of a surprise to the French as it was to the residents of Mordano that the Neapolitan allies under the young Duke of Calabria made no move to engage the French attackers. They stood by with their considerable forces while Mordano was conquered and sacked. And then they withdrew from the area. The firs t to react was Caterina Sforza. In the days after the battle she met with French leaders and as Charles in Piacenza came to his decision about his route, Caterina joined the Milanese-French side.245 This was a critical juncture in the encounter between the invading French forces and the various Italian powers. In the firs t important

244 Breisach, Caterina Sforza, pp. 156-157. 245 Breisach, Caterina Sforza, p. 157.

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engagement on land that had drawn blood, the Italian defenders had withdrawn and the smaller states observing this test of power acted accordingly. They chose to join the French. Caterina had been willing to join the side of the defending Neapolitan-Florentine alliance (Neapolitan troops, Florentine money) at great danger to her cities and her rule and in defiance of her own uncle. Thus it should be noted that in those moments before the firs t guns were fired at least one Italian power was willing to risk a great deal to stop this foreign invasion. But when the results were in from Mordano, smaller powers such as the ruler of Imola had to face reality and Caterina's quick move to join the French side was the firs t and most important indication of the collapse of any united Italian front in the face of this foreign army.246 Mantua drew the same conclusions as had Caterina and took the same action.24? Thus as of October 22, all the major states of the Po valley were either actively campaigning with the King of France or standing by neutral: Turin, Milan, Mantua, Ferrara, Bologna, Imola and Forli. The one remaining northern Italian power that was a question was Venice. The next to react to the battle was the Neapolitan army. It began a withdrawal from Romagna and thus ended the fight for all of northern

246 It is fair to depict this encounter at Mordano as essentially a fight between Italians and foreigners. Although some of the leadership on the French side was Italian (Sanseverino) and a few hundred soldiers were sent by Ludovico, the two thousand troops of the French forces were overwhelmingly non-Italian (French, Swiss, Breton, Scot) and the troops of the Neapolitan forces were mostly Italian. See Piero Pieri, Crisi M iiitare, p. 331, n. 1. 247 Donato de Pretis to the Duke of Mantua, Nov 1, 1494 (ASMa, E, XLIX, 3); Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 432; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 101; De La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins, p. 88.

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Italy. The Neapolitans were unwilling to risk their resources in aid of the northerners and preferred to withdraw south to fight on home ground.248 Charles was now freed from all opposition in the north. He could concentrate on the only remaining center of resistance to his army north of Rome: Florence. The two days in which the Battle of Mordano was decided changed dramatically the strategic situation in northern Italy and provided the king with his most important reason to choose the route through Tuscany. Before the battle, the large Neapolitan army gathered at the southeastern comer of the Po delta provided an almost irresistible challenge to Charles and to his army. To move south with such a force holding the whole east coast and with the further dangerous possibility that this army might cut in behind the French and isolate Charles and his force without the necessary supply and communication lines to France, this was too dangerous a possibility to leave unchallenged. Therefore before Mordano it was likely that Charles would have had to move his central force to the east to take on the Neapolitan army firs t before moving south. But after Mordano, with the Neapolitan decision to abandon its hold along the Adriatic coast, the more dangerous challenge to Charles stood in Tuscany where Piero was still leading the opposition to the king and with whom it now became imperative to deal. As King Charles sat easing his dinner on the evening of the twentysecond and listening to the reports about Mordano, he must have felt

248 Delaborde, L E ‘ xpedition, pp. 431 -432; Breisach, Caterina Sforza, pp. 155-156;

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very secure about his decision to leave for Tuscany the next morning.249 His strategic situation in eastern Romagna had turned suddenly advantageous. The Medici brothers had been assuring him earlier in the day that he would be welcomed in Florence. His general, Count Gilbert, was sending back reports of total control over the vital Via FrancigenaCisa Pass road that would take him to Sarzana. While he continued to review all of this he was also dispatching letters to attend to various matters before the departure of the morrow. He wrote to Ludovico telling him about the Florentine offer. 25 ° Another letter went off to France to deal with administrative matters and its presence among the correspondence of the king written from Piacenza reminds us that during the year-long expedition to Italy, King Charles continued actively to administer detailed matters of his kingdom at home even though he had left his able sister (former Regent during Charles' minority) and brother-in-law as regents in his a b s e n c e .2 ^ !

249 This decision was known in Milan on the evening of October 22, thus it had to be openly known in the king's camp sometime in the later part of the day. Giovanbatista Ridolfi reported the decision to Piero de' Medici in a letter from Milan written that evening (ASF, MAP, LXXIV, c. 114), see p. 158, n. 160 above. 250 Letters de Charles V III, vol. IV, p. 101. 251 Lettres de Charles VIII, vol. IV, p. 102.The letter of Oliver de Coetlogon, Procurer General de Bretagne, in which the king deals with advance planning for a parlement to take place in Paris on January 1, 1495, was written as Charles continued to participate in one of the most critical decisions of the entire Italian expedition. This letter is just one of dozens of similar letters that demonstrate Charles' detailed awareness of and concern for events in France even as he led his army through Italy. This correspondence should demonstrate the fallaciousness of Guicciardini's characterization of the king as negligent and uninvolved in complex matters of state. See above p. 85.

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Another correspondent that night of October 22 was viewing the situation very differently. The exhausted Giovanbatista Ridolfi, the Florentine ambassador to Milan and Piero de’ Medici's representative in Milan, sat down to describe the day to Piero (his official reports went to the Florentine government bodies and private letters went to Piero) .252 The forty-six year old Giovanbatista was at this moment one of the most skilled and experienced of the diplomatic corps then serving F l o r e n c e .253

He had been in Milan as Florentine ambassador in the

previous year, 1493, as the expedition of Charles was taking shape. And while the French and Milanese diplomats rushed back and forth across the Alps, Giovanbatista had been able to watch every move as Ludovico and the king juggled with the fate of Italy. He had then proceeded to Venice early in 1494 for a period there as Florentine ambassador and was now back in Milan. Few Florentines knew better the details of this year of maneuver than did Giovanbatista Ridolfi. Ridolfi was a descendant of one of the oldest Florentine merchant families that had made its fortune in the wool trade ( L'Arte della Lana) and banking ( L'Arte de! Cambio) and had come into wealth and political influence in the thirteenth century.254 jhe Ridolfi were from the Oltrarno, the distinct neighborhood on the the south side of the river.

252 Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de' Medici, Oct. 22, 1494, Milan (ASF, MAP, LXXIV, 114). 253 on Giovanbatista Ridolfi: Less/co Universale Italiano (Rome, 1978) vol. XIX, p. 18; Abel Desjardins, ed., Negocrations diplomatiques de la Franceavec la Toscane (Paris, 1859), vol. I, pp. 495-496. 254 on the Ridolfi family see: Lessico Universale Italiano, vol. XIX, p. 18; G. Carocci, La fam iglia R idolfi d i Piazza {Florence, 1889); Dale Kent, Rise of the Medici, pp. 5 land 146; Rubinstein, Government o f Florence, pp. 48, 49ff.

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They traced their civic origins to the region immediately around the Ponte Vecchio and had divided into three branches: Ridolfi di Ponte (the bridge), Ridolfi di Borgo (of the street Borgo San Jacopo) and Ridolfi di Piazza (Piazza San Felice). Giovanbatista's personal loyalties replay the family’s ambiguity toward the Medici. He supported and helped Piero then turned fanatically devoted to Savonarola when Piero was gone. Later he helped bring about the fall of the Soderini regime in 1512 and cooperated with a return of the Medici. It was Giovanbatistia who served as Gonfaloniere in the period immediately after the collapse of the Soderini Signoria while maneuvers went forward for the return of the Medici. His life and service provide a fascinating reflection of the ambiguity with which the Florentine aristocracy supported and fought, loved and feared, the Medici.255 The events of this October day must have taxed the Florentine ambassador to the limit: he had met with Ludovico to hear of the new regime and its attitude towards Florence; he had witnessed the public presentation of the new Duke of Milan; he had been in touch with other ambassadors so that he knew of the king's decision to move, notice of which must have been carried to Milan immediately in order to be available to Ridolfi the same evening. Now he sat dictating his report from the city. It is filled with a sense of danger, of impending calamity.

255 The political career of Giovanbatista Ridolfi after the fall of Piero de' Medici is covered in detail in H. C. Butters, Governors and

Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence, 1502-15 /9 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 59 -6 0 ff. For his term as Gonfaloniere see J. N. Stephens, The F all o f the Florentine Republic, 1512-15JO (Oxford, 1983), pp. 60, 62, 66.

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He warns Piero about Ludovico. He implores Piero to be alert to coming trouble in Florence itself: "Per Dio, Piero, siate prudente

“256 This

was his last letter to Piero. The events that he feared were already shaking the government for which he had labored so valiantly. His usefulness in Milan was at an end.

256 Giovanbatista Ridolfi to Piero de' Medici, Oct. 22, 1494, Milan (ASF, MAP,LXXIV, 114)

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PART THREE: Tuscany

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Macra che, per cammin corto, Lo Genovese parte del toscano. Dante, Paradiso, IX, 89-90.

The troops gathered from their camps all morning—thousands of men collecting their supplies, watering their horses, then moving toward the south gate of the city where the army was lining up for its departure along the Via Aemilia toward Bologna.1 The king appeared in the Piazza dei Cavalli before the Palazzo Communale dressed all in white and in a full suit of armor. Sanudo says he looked quite handsome.2 His doctors had begged him to forgo the heavy metal protection on the assumption that it was excessively fatiguing for his small frame. But Charles told them he would obey their orders to the fullest in everything but war. Still, he did agree to leave the heavy helmet off. This would at least assure him good air.3 But there was no real need for the armor anyway. This was not yet war. Hostile territory was several days away.

1 J. De La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins de la grandarmee d italie (Nantes and Paris, 1866), p. 88; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 101; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, pp. 432-433; Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, pp. 284-285. 2 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 101. 3 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 432.

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The citizens of Piacenza appeared in the piazza to cheer— one can imagine with great enthusiasm— the royal departure and to present the French monarch with a local prize: mammoth wheels of the Piacenza cheese that were as large as a mule, said one observer. Charles sent some of it home so that his wife Anne could enjoy it too 4 Thus provided with cheese, good w ill, and bon voyage, the king and his huge French army (ten thousand or more, with the troops from Mordano to join them later) accompanied by the diplomats, the bishops, the Medici brothers riding with the king, and the prostitutes, all set out on Wednesday, October 23, from the riverside rest spot leaving behind, without doubt, a relieved host city of Piacenza. For the firs t three days, the travel was easy. The army moved out along the straight solid Via Aemilia that cuts through the fla t wet valley with the Po down on the left and the foothills and high Appenine peaks up on the right.5 At the Taro river, the great Gallic war machine with its small shining white leader in the back, shifted through a right turn up towards the mountains heading for Fornovo and the important bridgehead that would be the scene of many of their deaths one year hence. The fact that the critical battle took place on ground that the entire army had had ample opportunity to observe in detail during the slow difficult move up towards the mountain on the southbound journey no doubt aided the French in their moment of trial in the following year.

4 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 432. 5 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 101, De La Pilorgerie, Campagne et bulletins, pp. 87-88; Delaborde, L Expedition, pp. 432-433; Labande- Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 287.

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SARZANA

At Fornovo, the Via Francigena, named for the ancestors of the men of this army, began the arduous ascent that took the traveler over the Apennine chain and down the other side to Sarzana. Straight up from the foothills the road climbs, moving from sea level to above three thousand feet in less than ten miles. In the fifteenth century, the road<was s till a narrow dirt surface, barely a mountain track in some sections, with extremely dangerous curves and loose ground made more slippery with the passing of ten thousand men and horse. Commynes says that he saw many parts where it was difficult for even a mule to pass.6 When the army returned on this same road in the next year carrying the heavy cannon too, hundreds of soldiers tied themselves together and let the huge pieces down the extremely steep slopes by hand.7 The journey from Fornovo in the lowlands to the summit is about twenty miles. The firs t ten miles would have been magnificently beautiful in the October autumnal color with the fields ready for harvest, the terraced levels shining with the silver olive, the hillsides full of sheep, and higher up the forest colors of purple and yellow and orange reflecting off the snow white peaks covered by the recent storms. At the side of the road runs the quick cold Taro.

6 Commynes, Memoirs, vol II, pp. 518-519, describes the road in detail based on his experience with the army on the return voyage. 7 Commynes, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 519.

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At the small hillside town of Berceto the road becomes quite suddenly steep and difficult. The large army must have slowed to a crawling pace as it moved two thousand feet in only a few miles finally reaching the summit now known as the Cisa Pass. Here the road winds between the two towering six thousand-foot peaks of Mount Maggiorasca on the west and Mount Cusna on the east, both of which stand over three thousand feet higher than the traveler at the Cisa summit. On the morning of the twenty-eighth, the King of France and his army passed over the Cisa summit and enjoyed the beautiful and welcome sight of the descent before them with the towering snow covered peaks up behind, and then lower down, across an apparently endless line of ridge after ridge, the road dropping into the valley where the rushing blue ribbon of the Magra might have been visible. At that time the river was the dividing line between Genoese and Florentine territory; in the days of the Roman Empire it marked off the province of Etruria from Liguria. Further beyond, one might have made out the river and the road meeting the sea at Sarzana three thousand feet below. Up on the higher slopes, forests of the tall slender beech with their smooth silver bark would have been turning golden in the October light while lower down near the towns and castles the cousin of the beech, the valuable chestnut, would have been visible in the steep ravines. The army covered the easy ten miles to the rest spot of Pontremoli during the day and by evening the king was safely lodged in the ancient stone fortress that towers over the tiny red roofs of the town like a mother hen protecting her chicks.8

8 There is some confusion about the date of Charles' arrival at

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As he had done so often before, here again the king paused9 This was his method. From the earliest days of the expedition it had been his procedure to make a move and then wait. He would wait to see how his opponents would move, then he would move forward, increase the diplomatic pressure, then pause, then move again. This is what he had done back in vienne during the summmer before leaving France, then again at Turin, Asti, Pavia, an especially long stop at Piacenza, now again several days at a very small but very strategic spot in the m o u n t a i n s A s Sanudo informs us, this stop was to see how the Florentines would move.11

But he chose this careful and prudent

strategy consistently all during the invasion. Again in the next month

Pontremoli. I follow Delaborde even though Sanudo says Oct. 29. But six days to reach Pontremoli would have been ample and all sources agree that he spent several days there and we know for certain he is near Sarzana on the thirtieth. See Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 433; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 101; De La Pilorgerie, Campagne et Bulletins, p. 88; Portoveneri, Memoriale, p. 284-285. 9 Sanudo, Spedizione , p. 101:"... et adi 29 zonse a Pontremolo dove volea star zornl cinque per metter ordine a quello havea a far, et veder come Fiorentini si movevano.. . . “ Sanudo's "five days" is not what happened but it is possible that he was informed by a diplomat that that had been Charles' intention. Developments were unfolding very fast now in Tuscany and it is possible that Charles expected to have to wait possibly a week for his move over the mountains to have its effect upon the Florentines whereas in reality Piero was already on the road to meet him as the king came over the mountains. 10 For Charles at Vienne, see Delaborde, L Expedition, p. 388; at Piacenza see above, outside Florence see below pp. 344ff. 11 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 101.

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he would camp outside Florence for nine days waiting to see how the internal politics might settle. He was anything but rash—Guicciardini to the contrary.12 His strategy worked very well. As he moved the pressure of the army closer and closer, his opponents tended to solve his problems for him: witness the week he spent at Piacenza. Now again in this week as he descended into Tuscany, his enemies reacted to his coming and rearranged the strategic situation to the king’s advantage without his ever having to engage the full force of his army. The territory into which he was now leading his army—Florentine territory—was tricky and dangerous. All during the Middle Ages and still in the fifteenth century, this valley called the Lunigiana had been one of the most heavily castled strips of land in all of Italy. At its peak of power it boasted over 160 castles in the twenty miles that extended from Pontremoli down to Sarzana at the sea.13 This extraordinary concentration of defensive architecture witnesses to the unique value of this route. The Lunigiana is sim ilar to the Brenner Pass-Trento highway region in northern Italy along which a like concentration of castles developed over the centuries to control another key road. To the invaders from the north the Via Francigena road would have looked very attractive from on high at Pontremoli. It is a much easier more gentle descent than the difficult drop down to Susa that these troops had traversed after passing over the Alps at Montgenevre in September. But the ease of the road masks the dangers. Once the army had left the protected heights of the pass and Pontremoli and had begun

12 5ee ^ove pp. 85-87. 13 Guide d ita lia (Milan: Fabbri, 1985), p. 151.

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to string itself out along the bottom of the Lunigiana valley road, it was prey to every one of hundreds of possible enemy attack points, each guarded by one of the great castles. A dozen or more sw ift mountain torrents— the Teglia, the Filetta, the Aulella—cut into the Lunigiana from the east and west sides opening up lateral valleys, each with its castle that provided excellent access for a defending army intent upon harassing the northern travelers. Especially important was the small valley of the fast-moving Aulella with its high castle of Fivizzano since this valley road allows the only access to the Lunigiana and the coast from around behind the white-capped, jagged-ridged mountain range called the Apuan Alps that screen off a twenty mile section of the coast just north of Lucca. Once the army got down deep into the heart of the Lunigiana the invaders were bottled up in a valley with only one easy exit to the seacoast at the south. The great high mountains they had just crossed stood behind them and equally high mountain peaks ranged up to the east and the west. All around on all sides stood hundreds of tall heavily fortified castles with perfect visibility of the whole valley. And even worse, the Magra river runs along the side of the road just to the west so the army traveling along the road hoping to reach the safety of the open seacoast cannot even maneuver across the valley floor if attacked. It is a general's nightmare and for exactly this reason the king wanted to know what he was getting into before leaving his mountaintop safety.14 14 On the Lunigiana see Guida d'Italia del Touring Club Italiano, Toscana, pp. 221-227. The Medieval road route through the Lunigiana up to Pontremoli is followed by State highway No. 62. A modern autostrada has been built since World War II that follows a slightly different route to the west.

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The French had taken action to neutralize as best as possible these intersecting valleys and their strongholds before the king's arrival. On the twenty-sixth, a French force moved up along the Aulella river to the east toward the powerful red fortress of Fivizzano with its famous tower that provided a view of the whole

a re a .

15 Fivizzano was

important because it guarded this eastern road that cut into the very middle of the Lunigiana and an army defending Tuscany coming from Florence or Pisa could have moved along this side valley, swooped down on the French strung out along the narrow Lunigiana and cut the forces of King Charles in half. If the Florentines were planning any aggressive action in pursuit of their heretofore anti-French policy, Fivizzano would be the place from which to launch such an operation. It was in the control of the Florentines. It was high, well fortified and of inestimable value. The French led by Montpensier and joined by Georges de Sully and Odet d'Aydie, sire de Chaumont, marched up the valley of the Aullela, surrounded the castle of Fivizzano, summoned the defenders to surrender, and when they did not, stormed the ancient walls and broke in. In the chaos of the victory, there ensued a ruthless sack of the garrison as well as attacks on civilians from the town with many indiscriminately put to the sword. The events at Fivizzano have played a large part in blackening the reputation of the French army. At the time, the sack was quickly attributed to the foreigners and this only increased

15 on Fivizzano see: Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 105; Portoveneri, Memoriale, p. 285; Landucci, Diario, p. 71; Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 433; Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, p. 288; Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 141.

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the fear in Italy of the invading army.16 But the French were innocent of the terrible massacre. The perpetrators had actually been the Italian allies, a force that had accompanied the French to Fivizzano, neighbors of the defenders of the castle from nearby Fosdinovo under the leadership of Gabriello Malaspina.17 The Italians had seized upon the moment to revenge themselves upon their neighbors, but the historians have erroneously blamed the French.16 One very well informed witness to all these events of the invasion of the Lunigiana and the sack of Fivizzano was the author of Orlando

Innamorato, the poet Matteo Boiardo, Count of Scandiano, who was serving at this time as captain of a castle outpost for the Estensi regime of Ferrara. Boiardo’s location on the north side of the Appenines at a castle near Reggio, gave him access to daily reports of the action within the Po valley.

Travelers passing along the Via Aemilia nearby

found his castle a useful respite and their stops provided Boiardo with constant reports of action to the east and west of him, and more information about the king’s progress through the mountains came from neighbors descending from the hilltop regions just behind his

16 Landucci, Diario , p. 71; Guicciardini, Storia d ita lia , ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 95. 17 Parenti, Storia, fol. 57v (Delaborde, p. 4 3 3 ):"... opera de vicini nostri di Fosdinovo piu che de Franzesi... “ 18 Guicciardini, S to riad ltalia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 95: [the French] "accostatosi a Fivizano, castello de' Fiorentini, dove gli condusse Gabriello Malaspina marchese di Fosdinuovo loro raccomandato, lo presono per forza e saccheggiorno, ammazzando tu tti i soldati forestieri che vi erano dentro e molti degli abitatori ” See also commentary of Delaborde, p. 433.

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castle. His daily letters to the Duke of Ferrara give us a sharp account of these events about which he wrote in detail.19 The news of Fivizzano, added to the already frightening story of the sack at Mordano, was beginning to build the reputation of Charles’ army as ruthless and unlike any army seen in Italy before.29 stories of the treatment of the defenders of Fivizzano ran through the whole of the Lunigiana and one by one the castles all submitted to the French. In just two days the region was pacified and the fleurde lys went up over the

19 Matteo Maria Boiardo, Opere volgari: amorum libn\ pastorate; tetters, ed. Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo (Bari, 1962), see esp. letters dated Oct. 16-0ct. 31 ,1 4 9 4 , pp. 311 - 3 16. On Oct. 31, Boiardo wrote this summary of events to the Estensi at Ferrara: "lo non potria di certo advisare le 5[ignorie] Vostre de le gente che hanno passato et che debbeno passare in LulisanafLunigiana], per non havere loro facto questa via; tutavia scrivero quello ch’io ne scio. El fu ordinato che T Christ[ianissi]mo S[igno]re Re andava a la volta de Pontremullo et passava in Lunisana a danni de Fiorentini cum tute le gente ch'el se retrovava havere qua in Lombardia, che erano computata la guardia Qualle autem ne quante ne siano passate insino ad hora no 1’ho inteso, per6 che tutohora ne va. Passato che furno de qulllt Francesi, Mons[igno]re re de Obignon, uno de li Capitanii del Sfignojre Re, sepresentete a Bagnom che era loco di Fiorentini, et perche li fu facto renitentia, non essendo forteza non se potero tenire, et furno sagezati et morti. Cusi hanno stracorso quel la Lulisana et preso le infrascripte terre, videlicet Bagnom predicto, Fivizano che e stato saccomanato perche non poteno havere cusi subito la forteza, Valslgillina, Filatera, Treschie, Pastene, Cervarolla, Castigliona, Falcinello, Caprigiola, Albiano. Item le terre del March[ionato] de Fivizano... .Prima che Fivizano fusse posto a saccomano quilli horn ini mandorno ad me alcuni de li suoi in nome de quello Commune..." 20 Guicciardini, Storia d ita lia , ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 95-96: “ .. .saccheggiorno, ammazzando tutti i soldati forestieri che vi erano dentro e molti degli abitatori: cosa nuova e di spavento grandissimo a italia, gia lungo tempo assuefatta a vedere guerre piu presto belle di pompa e di apparati, e quasi simili a spettacoli, che pericolose e sanguinose."

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castles of Bagnone, Verrucola, Soliera, Rocca Sigillina, Monzone, Panicale, Licciana, Bastia and others. The most powerful concentration of defenses that the king would encounter in his Italian expedition, all his in just two days!21 With the whole of the Lunigiana safe for passage, the king moved down the valley to stop at Aulla, a magnificently located castle owned by the Malaspina that still sits high on an impregnable promontory above two rivers and three vital roads: in the fifteenth century it controlled the Lunigiana road from the north, as well as the one that comes from Fivizzano in the east and the one from the coast at Sarzana in the south. King Charles liked the castle so much that he wanted to buy it from the Malaspina.22 It is easy to imagine what the Duke of Milan thought when he heard that Charles was trying to buy Aulla. Any such signal from Charles that he had long term interests in the region and would want to own a castle here would have enraged Ludovico. His most important territorial goal that he hoped would be advanced by the French invasion was the control of these Tuscan coastline fortresses with the possibiity of extending Milanese authority all the way to Pisa. Commynes is very insistent about this and says that Ludovico pressed the king strongly to have these coastal forts and it was Commynes' firm conviction that the Pisan revolt against Florentine control had been encouraged but possibly even planned by Ludovico working through Galeazzo Sanseverino who

21 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 105; Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 288; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434; 22 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 105: “Et ando a uno castello dei marchexi Malaspina, racommandati al Stato de Milan, chiamato TAulla, mia X distante da Serzana, loco Fiorentini, el qual el Re mostrava di voler acquistar."

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remained at the king's side almost all the way to

R o m e .23

Ludovico told

Commynes that he had been promised these fortified cities such as Sarzana and Pietrasanta by the king and that at the time that this promise was confirmed he delivered over to Charles 30,000 ducats to help the financially pressed monarch pay for the

e x p e d itio n

.24 if this is

true then there is no doubt that the crafty Ludovico met an even more clever and duplicitous leader in the person of King Charles since Ludovico most definitely did not get the cities he wanted and Charles got the ducats. But relations between the two men had now deteriorated to a point at which there was no trust left. Ludovico would not even spend the night inside the same locale controlled by the king. All during this period when Charles was passing through the Tuscan coastland, Ludovico would travel during the daytime to an encounter with the king—at Sarzana or Pietrasanta or Pisa— and then would travel back to his own Milanese held territory for the night. In this moment near Sarzana, that safety was to be found at Villafranca, halfway up the Lunigiana in the direction of Pontremoli.25 23 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 465: "Now a few words are in order concerning the duke of Milan, who would have liked to have the king out of Italy already. He had made his profit from him, or still wanted to do so in order to obtain the places which he had conquered. And he pressed the king strongly in order to have Sarzana and Pietrasanta, which he claimed belonged to the Genoese; and at this time he lent the king thirty thousand ducats. He told me and told several others afterwards that he was promised that they would be handed over to him. And when he was refused, he left the king, marvelously displeased, saying that his affairs forced him to return home. And the king never saw him again." 24 commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol II, p. 465. 25 Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 105.

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The king must have been content as he settled into the comfort of the Castle of Aulla high above the Magra river. The arduous journey over the mountains had been completed with almost no loss of life and the dangerous Lunigiana valley had been pacified in a few days. But there were dangers ahead. He and his men were scattered at the south end of the river valley near the seacoast and held back from further progress by the fortified city of Sarzana. Montpensier had been sitting just outside the northern gates for several days waiting for the king and the rest of the army to arrive. S till more reinforcements were expected by way of the sea. They would put in at the harbor of La Spezia, but control of Sarzana was imperative before any of these forces could move.26 During Charles’ week in Piacenza, his preparations, the military situation in the Romagna, the nature of Italian geography, the direction of the major roads, Montpensier's activities in the Lunigiana, all suggested that if a confrontation between Florence and France was to take place it would unfold at Sarzana. Then on October 24, Tommaso Ginori recorded the arrival of the Ridolfi letter from Milan in which the ambassador confirmed that the king was indeed about to depart for the Via Francigena road and Tuscany.27 Sarzana would witness the collision. Piero de' Medici had immediately dispatched Conte Checco de Monte d’Oglio to the coastal city with 200 men. D'Oglio had attempted to 26 Guicciardini, S to riad italia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, pp. 95-96; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434; Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 142. 27 Ginori, Libro di debitori, fol. I7 6 r (Schnitzer, Oue/Ien-\, p. 95): "E adi 24 di detto ci fu da Milano da Giovanbatista di Luigi di M. Lorenzo Ridolfi, nostro oratore, che ’1 sigre Lodovico, zio carnale al sopradetto duca, coe fratello del padre e figliuolo fu del conte Francesco Sforza, s’ era fatto duca di Milano. E fu opinione per molti, che ’1 detto sigre Lodovico lo facessi avelenare."

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protect the northern approach to the city but he and all his men had been overwhelmed and killed by the French force under M o n tp e n s ie r .28 More help would have to follow if the city was to remain in Florentine hands. But with the extraordinary position that it occupied, a very small contingent, well provisioned, could hold on for a very long time. Sarzana's location is unique on the west coast of ltaly.29

if

Pontremoli is important in that it sits astride one key highway, Sarzana is triply significant as it guards three great routes. Its value was recognized by all the city-states of northern Italy and it had changed hands dozens of times as Florence, Pisa, Lucca, Genoa, and Milan fought for control. Florence had only recently won Sarzana away from Genoa in a bitter war seven years previous to Charles'

in v a s io n .3 0

The north-south road that King Charles was now using, the Via Francigena, passed right through the city. The old coast road from Genoa, the Roman Via Aurelia, met the Via Francigena at Sarzana. The road from the harbor of La Spezia just a mile away, a port once called one of the finest in the world by Strabo and s till today the second most active in northwestern Italy, joined the other routes at Sarzana.

28 parenti, Storia, fol. 57v (Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434). It is most likely that Piero sent the troops on Oct. 25. Notification of events in Lombardy could not have reached Florence before the twenty-fourth, and Piero was himself on the move on Oct. 26. It would have taken at least two days for the horsemen to reach Sarzana, thus they would have arrived the day after Fivizzano, and two days before Charles himself was at Sarzana. 29 on Sarzana see Guida d ita lia del Touring Ciub itaiiano, Toscana (Milan, 1959), pp. 182-184; Guided'itaiia, Toscana (Milan: Fabbri, 1985), pp. 110-121; Italy, A Phaidon Cultural Guide, pp. 627-628. 30 For the best recent treatment of the Sarzana War see Judith Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, An Historical Biography (London, 1984), pp. 168-69.

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But the city was not merely a busy intersection. It had always been heavily fortified back to the days of the Etruscans, and it yielded control of all west coast communications to those who governed this spot.3 1 Immediately behind the city walls to the east stood the soaring, impenetrable, six thousand-foot peaks of the Apuan Alps. It was impossible to attack the city from behind. More mountains created another barrier in front of the city to the west toward the port of Spezia. Even more important, the fast, deep Magra ran right along the foot of these western mountains only a mile from the city walls adding another line of defense to the formidable natural barriers already giving the city unique security. The only bridge on which to cross the Magra to the west and on to the harbor was just beyond the gates of the city and thus Sarzana also controlled the vital bridgehead. With this extraordinary position, Sarzana need prepare defenses in only two directions: to the north from whence came the Via Francigena and to the south looking down the narrow coastal plain toward Lucca. Two powerful fortresses marked man's enhancement of what nature had given Sarzana. Just down the valley about a mile stood Sarzanello, a fortress built very high up on the hill by Castruccio Castracane in 1322 on an old Roman site.32 Sarzanello was so high, clinging to such a steep hillside, that it was virtually impossible to achieve effective position in order to be able to bombard it from the ground below. And even if the powerful new cannon brought by the French had been equal to the 31 For a brief history of Sarzana see Archibald Lyall, The Companion Guide to Tuscany (London, 1973), pp. 21 -22. 32 On Sarzanello see: Touring Club itaiiano, Toscana, pp. 183-184; Companion Guide to Tuscany, pp. 21-22; Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 142.

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Sarzanello walls, these guns were still on ships in the harbor of La Spezia waiting to be moved over to this coastal road. Florentine control of Sarzana could impede that important transfer indefinitely. Thus this rocky redoubt surveyed and controlled unchallenged the narrow coastal strip two miles wide, between the mountain and the sea looking toward Lucca. Nothing could move along this road without coming under the range of the guns of Sarzanello. In addition to the powerful protection of Sarzanello, the city of Sarzana had its own new citadel within sight of the city gates up on the hill behind, that had been built only six years earlier by Lorenzo de' M e d ic i .33 Giuliano da Sangallo had helped with the design of the huge new fort with its cylindrical towers and heavy walls. It was new, strong—virtually untouchable. For King Charles, having achieved so much in the week since leaving Piacenza, this moment before Sarzana presented the greatest danger he was to confront before beginning the war for Naples in the south.34 if he was going to be stopped anywhere, this would be the place. And even if his enemies were incapable of blocking the king's progress completely, just a delay of a week or so could prove to be very dangerous. For an army of this size, any prolonged interruption of the march was tolerable only if the surrounding territory was especially rich in provision—as had been the case at Piacenza— or if it had been prepared with supplies beforehand. Otherwise, there was the risk of the troops growing hungry and weak, even starving if the unwanted stop was overly prolonged. And

33 Touring Club italiano, Toscana, p. 182. 34 For an analysis of the m ilitary situation at this point of the expedition see Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434; Bridge, France, vol.’ ll, pp. 141-142.

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the weather could make things worse. The autumn rains could turn the whole French camp into an unhealthy swamp any day. But the tiny coastal valley in which the French were now blocked was a terrible location for an extended stop. It was not a rich agricultural area. It supported a very small population in the best of times. It was not the home of any great city with supplies to be captured. It was hostile territory; news of Fivizzano was traveling fast. With ten thousand men in Charles' group and another seven on their way, even one week stuck outside Sarzana could be disaster. Discipline could breakdown. Troops could begin to desert. Allies might change sides. And most dangerous of all, if the French expedition looked to be in trouble, its enemies might be emboldened to organize the kind of unified effort that was always a possibility. Ludovico Sforza was particularly dangerous. His discontent was now common knowledge. His relations with the king were terrible. What might happen if he suddenly changed sides and the French found themselves stuck at Sarzana between Florentine forces to the south and new Milanese enemies just behind on the Via Francigena to the north?

Charles had to break past Sarzana

immediately and get his army moving again.35

35 Commynes on the situation at Sarzana ( Memoirs, vol. II, p. 463): "And if the place had been well supplied [Florentine forts at Sarzana], the king's army would have broken up; for the country is barren and it is located among mountains and no provisions were to be found there."

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FLORENCE Fiorenza m ia.. . . Molti han giustizia in cuore, e tardi scocca per non venir sanza consiglio all' arco; ma il popol tuo l'ha in sommo della bocca. Molti rifiutan lo commune incarco; ma il popol tuo sollicito risponde sanza chiamare, e grida: T mi sobbarco!" Dante, Purgatorio, VI, 127-135.

Piero de‘ Medici now turned to the authorities of Florence and asked the Signoria for funds to mount a further reinforcement of Sarzana and the other coastal forts (October 25). At this point, he still had five days in which to increase the m ilitary preparedness of the fortress there, before the arrival of the full force of the king's army. But no one would help him; not even his best friends.36 Lorenzo Lenzi insisted that any resistance to the king would bring about the ruination of the city and the money was denied.37 The Otto diPratica, the council with the responsibility for foreign relations, read Ridolfi's letter from Milan, understood for certain that the king was on his way to Tuscany, and became extremely agitated. They insisted that Piero yield totally to King Charles.^8

38 Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 79-80. 37 Parenti, Storia, fol. 56v (Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434). 38 parenti, Storia, fol. 58r (Delaborde, LExpedition, p. 434). This exchange between Piero and the Otto di Pratica is very important since in the later events the most telling accusation directed against

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Not only would the Signoria not prepare to fight the king. They even refused to strengthen the garrisons in their own valuable Pisan holdings.^ Absolutely nothing was done to send provisions or additional soldiers to this vital port city even though it was now very clear that the French forces would surely pass through Pisa and should have been clear that the disruption of such an invasion might endanger Florentine control of this city that had never accepted willingly its subjugation to its neighbors. Why Florence would have failed to take such elementary and prudent action s till remains a mystery. The king could hardly have viewed this as hostile. Some reasonable reinforcement of the urban force in Pisa would have been prudent if only for the maintenace of public order. If the Florentine authorities were so intent on remaining amicable with France then it would have been reasonable for them to expect that the king would honor their territorial holdings especially one so important as Pisa. The one possible avenue of explanation that must remain speculative relates to the influence that we know Ludovico Sforza was now exercizing within Florence especially through the offices of Piero was that he took action without any formal authorization of the Signoria. TheOtto di Pratica had been created by Lorenzo in 1480 as part of the major reform of governmental institutions that Lorenzo put into effect upon his return from Naples. The Otto were granted complete control of foreign affairs by that reorganization (see Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 152). Of course, some action by the full Signoria might have been expected in an issue of such import in order for Piero to go to King Charles with full powers to negotiate. But it does at least provide some clarification of Piero’s eventual action if we understand what the Otto di Pratica was telling him one day before he left Florence. 39 Guicciardini, Storia ditalia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 97; Fanucci, “Relazioni tra Pisa e Carlo V III.” pp. 6-7.

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Bernardo Rucellai.4^ Since Commynes repeatedly emphasized Ludovico's designs on Pisa, it is possible that his pernicious influence was reaching into the deliberations of the Signoria and was distorting their decisions. He would have wanted to block any reinforcement of Florentine m ilitary strength within and around Pisa so that once his ally King Charles was within the city Ludovico or his agents (Galeazzo Sanseverino) could unleash the easily anticipated anti-Florentine sentiment .41 But if some councilors in Florence were ready to yield to King Charles, Piero was not; if he could not get help from government he would turn to family.

He called to Paolo Orsini for troops. Paolo, the

cousin of Alfonsina, immediately moved toward Sarzana with 300 soldiers to try to stop the King of France 42 The numbers may seem laughable when one considers that the French army numbered over 15,000 by the time it gathered at Sarzana. But the extraordinary physical situation of this coastal city as well as its neighboring fortresses allowed the possibility that a very small force could hold out for some time.43

40 See below pp. 249-260. 41 See Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 465, for a report on Ludovico's plans for Pisa: "While the king was in Pisa, Galeazzo at his master's instigation invited several of the principal citizens of the town [of Pisa] to his lodgings, and advised them to rebel against the Florentines and to request the king to give them their freedom, hoping that by this means the city of Pisa would fall into the hands of the duke of Milan " 42 Vi llari, Savonarola, p. 209; Guicciardini, Storia ditalia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 98. 43 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434; Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 141-142; Edward Armstrong, Lorenzo de'Medici, pp. 80-81.

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The Orsini appear throughout the events of 1494 as very Important participants both m ilitarily and diplomatically.44 Their marital ties to the Medici have been noted above. Both Piero’s mother and his wife were Orsini. Piero's father, Lorenzo, had considered Alfonsina's first cousin Virginio one of his most valuable associates to whom, he said, he was bound by the closest ties of family and friendship.4® it had been Virginio Orsini who had acted as intermediary in 1479-1480 for Lorenzo when the Medici leader and his city had faced disaster as a result of the war then in progress between Naples and Florence.4® Orsini had intervened and had helped Lorenzo establish contact with the King of Naples and through these efforts Lorenzo had achieved his extraordinary diplomatic breakthrough that brought peace for Florence and fame for himself. Virginio continued to offer the same services to Piero de' Medici as he had for the father and helped solve problems between Piero and the Pope.47 The Orsini role in the diplomatic maneuvers within Italy in 1494 transcended mere aid and support to the Medici. Virginio was at the very center of the network of alliances knitted together in anticipation of Charles' invasion. The basic accord that shaped the Italian alliance conceived to stop the king, the alliance to which Piero was trying to hold Florence, was negotiated in July at the castle of Vicovaro owned by

44 For a helpful general survey of the Orsini family see Vincenzo Celletti, Gli Orsini diBracciano (Rome, 1963). For the Orsini in 1494, see pp. 43-49. For a useful genealogical diagram see Table I, after p. 61. 45 Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 169. ^W ein stein , Savonarola, p. 124. 47 Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 124.

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Virginio. Here in an Orsini fortress under the watchful eye of the great Roman condottiere, the enduring enmities between the papacy and Naples were laid aside; King Alfonso and Pope Alexander VI agreed to cooperate to fight King Charles V III.48 Virginio continued to be one of the most important m ilitary leaders of the alliance in the south until forced to make his peace with Charles, and other members of the family participated in the major m ilitary confrontations during Charles’ invasion. At Mordano, when the French had challenged the nearby Neapolitan army, one of the most important of the Neapolitan generals had been Niccolo Orsini, Conte di Pitigliano, another cousin of Alfonsina 49 Paolo Orsini was now on his way to Sarzana at Piero's request. And later as Charles moved south his occupation of the Orsini stronghold of Bracciano was the necessary prelude to the taking of Rome.50 In October, Piero's Orsini relatives were s till willing to fight the king since they were viewing this battle as one for the whole of the peninsula.51 Their holdings stretched all up and down the center of Italy and a conquest of Naples by the King of France could destroy their network of power that extended from the southern edge of Tuscany through Rome to Naples. But from the point of view of the Florentine

48 Celletti, GH Orsini, p. 43; Michael Mailett, The Borgias, The Rise andFall of a Renaissance Dynasty (London, 1969), p. 134. 49 The activities of Niccolo Orsini with the Neapolitan army in the Romagna are described by Bernardo Dovizi in letters to Piero de' Medici. See Bernardo Dovizi to Piero de’ Medici, Oct. 18, 1494 (ASF, MAP, XVIII, 341); Bernardo Dovizi, Epistolario, ed. Moncallero, vol. I, pp. 204ff. 50 Celletti, Gli Orsini, pp. 44-45. 51 For the Orsini view of the strategic situation see Celletti, pp. 42-45.

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merchants sitting on the various councils, the war now coming to Tuscany could yield only danger and destruction for a commercial power with one of its most important areas of activity being France itself. So it is not at all surprising that when Piero turned to the government of Florence for help, he found the councils torn by dissension in this critical moment and unwilling to fight France.52 it was becoming a more and more lonely fight. The pressure was increasing on the republic almost hour by hour. Everything seemed to be happening at once. One blow after another was pounding down upon the young Medici leader and all who stood with him. A few days before Piero’s request to the Otto di Pratica for funds to resist Charles, the news that the Medici cousins had violated their exile and were now riding to join the the king had hit Florence.5 ^ This development must have struck Piero and his associates with a dark foreboding. It advertised a division in the leading house of Florence; it announced a Medici alternative to Piero; it underlined the very real support for the king within the city; it announced that Piero's was the losing side.

52 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 186r-v (Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 232). Parenti reports that the Otto di Pratica was tom by dissension and that Piero left Empoli (Oct. 26) in despair over the "altercatione factasi traili Octo della Pratica." 53 Guicciardini, S toriad'Italia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 94; Sanudo, Spedizione, 674; Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 141. The news that the cousins had left their place of exile would certainly have been available to Piero during the day of the twenty-second, the day on which the cousins arrived at Piacenza; most likely it was much earlier than this.

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At the same time that Piero was considering the disquieting news of his cousins' perfidy (October 22), a report arrived from Bernardo Dovizi, his trusted representative with the Neapolitan forces in Romagna, telling him the terrible news of Mordano.54 The French were winning. They were pounding, destroying, sacking the city and scaring everyone. With each successive day, more letters from Dovizi told Piero of the deterioration of the Neapolitan-Florentine position all of which carried the most awful indications for Piero's future within the alliance. He must have understood that if the m ilitary situation was crumbling in the Romagna Charles would have little strategic need to move along the Via Aemilia, although Charles' decision on his route was s till not known in Florence. Piero must have realized as he read Dovizi's letters that from this moment he was probably facing the whole French army. On the following day, October 23, as the Florentines began to digest the shocking news of the cousins' flight and the horrors of Mordano, another equally alarming report circulated through the city that Alfonso of Naples was dead.55 This was devastating. The King of Naples was the

54 Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena to Piero de' Medici, Oct. 21, 1494, Faenza (ASF, MAP, XVIII, 348, and see Epistolario, p. 213): "Magnifico Piero... .Hiersera vi scripsi come li inimici havevono posto il campo a Mordano. In questo punto che siamo a levata di sole ci e nuova come hiersera al tardi lo presono et se ne insignorirono et li franciosi furono li primi ad entrare drento et feciono qualche crudelta alii nostri che questa nuova ha portata alii animi di qualchuno di questi soldati qualche sbigottimento. Se hanno o no sacheggiata la terra non si sa anchora, ne io voglo aspectare de intenderlo che a voi basta sapere lo effecto della captura del castello, el quale e picholo et ha piutosto... .pure e passo di qualche importantia...." 55 Landucci, Diario, p. 70. Landucci's interesting report has been neglected on the sensible basis that the information was false. But the usefulness of such a false report to further undermine the regime

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ostensible leader of the whole alliance. His death would destroy order in the south, within his army and within his navy, right then operating off the Tuscan coast with orders to help Piero. It was quickly discovered that the rumor was false but for the time that it circulated this disquieting news must have done further damage to the stability of the regime.58 Other rumors did more harm. When Piero's brother Giuliano went off on a diplomatic mission to the Pope, gossips said it was all a ploy to get the younger Medici out of harm's way 57 Even more malicious was the story that Giuliano had been sent to guard a treasure which Piero was smuggling out of Florence.58 But there were more than just rumors.

of Piero suggests that its arrival in Florence at such a crucial moment was most likely not an accident. My candidate for originator of such false rumor would be Ludovico since we know about his use of Domenico da Ponzo to spread anti-Piero propaganda. In Landucci's record of the report he refers to Alfonso as "Duke of Calabria" even though Alfonso was now the reigning King of Naples. Clearly, Alfonso had been known for so long as the Duke of Calabria that in recording the information about the death, Landucci uses the more fam iliar name. This can be confirmed with his report of a meeting between Piero and Alfonso on August 5 about which we have independent record where Landucci calls Alfonso, “Duke of Calabria" (p. 69). About the rumor which circulated in Florence on Oct. 23: "E a di 23 d' ottobre 1494, ci fu come el Duca di Calavria era morto a Napoli, di sua morte, e forse di maninconia; che non fu sanza amirazione che in si poco tenpo morissi el padre e '1 figliuolo, sotto tanto sospetto de perdere lo stato." 55 There is no way to know whether Piero himself believed the rumor. He was in constant touch with the Florentine ambassador to Naples, Filippo Valori, and would have been able to verify the inaccuracy of the report within a day or so. 57 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 185r (Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 129). 58 Parenti, Storai fiorentina, fol. I8 5 r (Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 130).

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Handbills began to circulate in the streets of Florence calling on the king to come to Florence and liberate her from the yoke of tyranny.59 Fear of the French, of a "barbarian” army, of political chaos, of loss of markets, all kinds of fear began to spread through Florence.60 Piero Parenti says the city was very troubled.61 Francesco Gaddi tells us that news of the approaching French struck "terror" into the hearts of the Florentines.62 Everything was happening faster than anyone had expected.65 The calumny of preachers like Domenico da Ponzo, Ludovico Sforza's agent, continued to stir up the people with their rantings against Piero.64 One voice that was not raised against him in these late-October days was that of Savonarola., whose direct, public opposition in such a disturbed situation might have turned the city decisively against the embattled young Medici much earlier.65 But Piero was losing control with each day. As the Florentines gossiped about the rumor of the death of the King of Naples, about hidden treasure, about Mordano, news of Count Gilbert of Montpensier circulated: the French vanguard had traversed the Cisa pass, Pontremoli,

59 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 181r (Schnitzer, Que/Jen-W, p. 7): " Pollzie [polizze] etiam per la terra gittate erano, per le quali el re di Francia alia liberatione del tyranno si chiamava." 60 Guicciardini, Storiad'ftaiia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, pp. 96-97. 61 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 181r (Schnitzer, Oueilen-Vt, p. 7); “Et veramente molto mesta la citta nostra rimase.. . . “ See also Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, ed. Menchi, Vol. I, pp. 96-97. 62 Gaddi, Priorista-. "La qual cosa sentendosi in Firenze, pose terrore e spaventi assai, sapendosi quant' apertamente si fussi contro opposto alia voglia e riquisitione sua [the king]." 65 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 431. 64 Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 125. 65 See above, pp. 137-146; and esp. Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 176.

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and the Lunigiana; Florentine forts had fallen; the French were at the gates of Sarzana.66 Then Ridolfi's letter arrived 67 Giangaleazzo was dead. Ludovico was the new Duke of Milan. Charles had left Piacenza on October 23, headed for Florence. Now there was no further doubt. It was certain that Florence would have to face the full force of these murderous “barbarians" whose recent work at Mordano was already known and whose participation at the sack of Fivizzano would soon add to their reputation. All diplomatic delay had failed. The army in the Romagna had failed. All maneuver was now irrelevant. Florence would have to fight alone or surrender. In the two weeks that follow, the last two weeks of Piero de' Medici's political leadership in Florence, there is a certain sense of something like Greek tragedy animating the fate of Lorenzo's son. A tall, handsome, princely young leader struggles to remain faithful to an old ally, a friend of his father's, an alliance loyalty to which seems like loyalty to his own father who built it, while all around him friends desert him—abandoned

66 No document giving the exact date at which the presence of Montpensier at Sarzana was known in Florence has been found. But Piero was in constant touch with the coastal forts. Montpensier had been operating in the Lunigiana since he passed through Pontremoli on Oct. 20, therefore it is certain that the government in Florence knew of his arrival at Sarzana by the twenty-third. 67 Ginori, Ricordi, p. 95: "E adi 24 di detto ci fu da Milano da Giovanbatista di Luigi di M. Lorenzo Ridolfi, nostro oratore, che '1 sig^e Lodovico, zio carnale al sopradetto duca, coe fratello del padre e figliuolo fu del conte Francesco Sforza, s' era fatto duca di Milano. E fu opinione per molti, che '1 detto sigre Lodovico lo facessi avelenare."

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by friend and enemy alike, he says.68 His advisors are telling him he must jettison the alliance that w ill ruin him, yet he bravely, honorably— or foolishly, stubbornly, depending on one's interpretation— remains steadfast and goes on, marching knowingly to his doom 6^ He courageously goes to face a power greater than himself and in the end is destroyed. What was in Piero's mind in these terrible days is preserved for us in five extraordinary letters that he wrote to his personal secretary who was still in Florence while Piero journeyed to face the King of France.70 The fact that these letters were written to a friend, a personal assistant, someone who had remained faithful throughout the worst times, someone who was totally trustworthy and who would pay for this loyalty later when Piero fell from power, yielded most unusual epistles. Since the recipient was Piero's private secretary, not someone in government but a friend, an associate who knew everything, Piero fe lt encouraged to w rite with total abandon, sparing no one, speaking openly about his own feelings, about the things that had moved him, and about his fears of the next days.

68 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena, Oct. 27, 1494, Pisa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80; Desjardins, Negotiations, vol. I, p. 589): " abbandonato da tu tti i cittadini Fiorentini, amici e nemici...." 60 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena, Oct. 27, 1494, Pisa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80); Desjardins, Negotiations, vol. I, p. 589: ". . . trahoadimmolandum...." 70 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena, Oct 26, 1494 to Oct. 30, 1494, Empoli, Pisa and Pietra Santa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 79-83); Desjardins, Negotiations, vol. I, pp. 588-593.

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The letter written on the evening that Piero arrived in Pisa is touching in its familiar, almost fraternal tone71 He tells Piero Dovizi that he is exhausted, exhausted from the road, the rain, the bad bed he had slept in the night before, and from his own imagination—a reference no doubt to the fatigue induced by fears for the future that were filling his head as he traveled on to face the king. Most likely, the frank nature of the letters was encouraged by Piero's own sense of doom such that it probably seemed now irrelevant to worry about indiscretions. The letters must have been written quickly in the evening as Piero rested from the day's travel and dispatched to his friend in Florence immediately by a trusted personal messenger since no cipher is used. Piero asked Dovizi to send him a cipher but obviously there was no time to do it. 72 Letters in a coded cipher of some kind are very common in this period of such extreme international tension. For example, many of Ridolfi's letters to Piero are in c ip h e r.7 ^ The strongest theme of the letters is a sense of abandonment. But if the crisis of October was now bringing Piero to his most intense experience of abandonment, it could not have been a wholly new sensation. His three years of leadership had witnessed an unbroken chain of experiences in which one friend after another, one Medici supporter

71 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena, Oct. 27, 1494, Pisa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80); Desjardins, Negotiations, Vol. I, p. 589: "Sono arrivato in Pisa questa sera molto stracco tra '1 cammino, la fantasia, 1‘acqua di tutto el di, e il male letto abbi stanotte; pure domattina me inviero, piacendo a Dio.” 72 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 26, 1494, Empoli (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 79). 73 Giovanbattista Ridolfi to Piero de' Medici, September 25, 1494, Alexandria (ASF, MAP, LXXIV, 104).

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after another, one foreign prince after another, had deserted him and was frequently discovered actively plotting against the young Medici heir. Much writing on Piero’s years of leadership has accented the support he had in the beginning— in 1492 when his father died.74 Within a week of Lorenzo’s death, special legislation had been passed by large majorities in the governmental councils to allow the underage (21) Piero to serve in the Council of Seventy as had his father and thereby to assume the mantle of the now deceased Medici leader7 5

Nicolai

Rubinstein says that among the patrician supporters of Lorenzo there was no lack of goodwill towards Piero. 78 But the chroniclers and historians of the day tell another story. Piero Parenti says that in secret the city mourned the change, worried about a movement toward greater loss of freedom ("servitu") and generally sustained great displeasure Cassai dispiacere sosteneva").77 He says that the citizens put their faith in the preachers—he specifically mentions Domenico da Ponzo who had been preaching openly against Piero and most likely had been in league with Ludovico Sforza. He also states that the Florentines awaited change such that the "violence” and "power" of the Medici house might not be perpetual.78 He says that the "good citizens” waited “with ears perked up" for some event that might be used

74 The most authoritative version of this interpretation is: Rubinstein, Government of Florence Under the Medici, pp. 229-231 where Rubinstein speaks of "the smoothness of Piero's ’succession’” and "no lack of goodwill towards [Piero]". 78 Rubinstein, Government, p. 229. 76 Rubinstein, Government, p. 230. 77 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 130r (Schnitzer, Gue/Ien-\M, p. 3). 78 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 130r (Schnitzer, Queiien-IV, p. 3).

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to bring about "true liberty"—that is, the overthrow of Piero.79 There was an expectation of change.8° "All the time," he says, "everybody was waiting." ("Tuttavolta temporeggiava").81 Parenti's description of Florence in 1492 does not sound like a moment of smooth transition. It sounds much more like an extremely tense and dangerous political situation. Is it possible that the official actions of the councils were nothing more than the traditional procedures to ensure calm and order, the kind of order that was sacrosanct to the patrician class that supported Lorenzo? Is it possible that the official actions of the councils have obscured the reality behind the scenes causing us to lose sight of the situation with which Piero had to contend in Spring, 1492? What exactly was the alternative to Piero's apparent "succession"? Revolution? Dismantling the sixty year old Medici structure of government? But that was not the intent of the conservative oligarchy that controlled the governmental councils. Is it not possible that these official actions are misleading? And that underneath the apparent willingness of the governing class to continue Medici rule in the person of Piero, was a reality ready for explosion regardless of who might have been the leader at the moment? When we hear talk of citizens with their ears perked up, and everybody waiting for change, this suggests that the apparent initial tranquility at

79 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, (Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 123 provides this memorable quote without the exact foglio number, but from preceding citations it must be close to fol. 133). 80 Villari, Savonarola, p. 150: "A presentiment of coming change was already in the air." 81 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 130r (Schnitzer, Que/!en-\\l, p. 3).

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the time of Lorenzo's death masked powerful forces of disruption and even rebellion that were waiting to challenge Piero's authority.82 The challenge was manifested quickly. Within one year Piero faced full scale rebellion in the streets of Florence. In June of 1493, long before a crisis over relations with France, long before King Charles announced his decision on the Italian expedition, long before Florence found herself isolated in opposition to the king, the oligarchs of the Santa Croce quarter seized upon a local dispute at the Franciscan 82 The existence of a secret reality of power outside the official bodies of the Florentine government, a power structure invisible to the researcher using only the official documents, is a constant theme running through all of Florentine historiography dealing with the republic. Some examples: (1 )Gene Brucker, in analyzing the Florentine government in the 1350's remarks that "there is no completely satisfactory explanation for the ability of the patrician minority to secure the passage of legislation so patently detrimental to the interests of the gente nuova" ( Florentine Politics and Society, p. 119). But of course there is an explanation if one assumes that the realities of political power were inaccurately reflected in the councils and that real power lay outside the government. (2) In 1387. after Gonfaloniere Bardo Mane ini left office, he was showered with gifts worth more than 200 florins from the Parte Guelfa as a reward for the maneuvers while in office that had benefited the Parte (Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics p. 287). (3) The whole decade of the 1370's reveals a massive conspiracy outside of the government to control elections by the Parte Guelfa using the ammonizione (Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, 336) but strangely "not a whisper of protest against ammonizione appears in the protocols" (337). (4) In the 1420's, Giovanni Cavalcanti reported that "il Commune era piu governato alle cene e negli scrittoi che nel Palagio." ( /storie, ed. Polidori, p. 20.) This list could be continued all the way through to 1494. The appearance of a calm transfer of power within the councils in 1492 does not tell us much. Real power lay elsewhere.

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cloister of Santa Croce to launch a revolution. The Alberti, the Serristori, and the Corsi joined together, took arms, and moved into the streets on horseback leading their followers in a call for the overthrow of Piero.83 The attempted coup failed. The "people" failed to rally to the patrician leaders and Piero remained in power. This rebellion of June, 1493, which has been somewhat neglected by historians, tells many things.84 First, it demonstrates that the oligarchy was maneuvering against Piero in his very firs t year of leadership in the most aggressive possible way—in the streets. Second, and even more interesting is the fact that the outcome demonstrates a lack of popular disapproval of Piero sufficient to carry the coup to a successful conclusion. The historian, Parenti, who records this fascinating incident, calls into question the extent of popular discontent with Piero by his own detailed account thus revealing himself a good

83 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fols. 145-147 (Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 123). 84 It is extraordinary that Rubinstein who chronicles almost every twist and turn in the fortunes of the Medici, every coup and countercoup between 1434 and 1494, completely ignores this incident and in fact proceeds to describe September, 1493, as a time of renewal of Piero's government, citing the official acts of the Seventy ( Government, p. 231) with no mention at all of the recent rebellion. There is mention of "opposition” in the councils but nothing about rebellion in the streets. This suggests that there is a great danger for historians to concentrate too exclusively on official actions by government bodies. The governmental records may mask a social-political reality that does not appear at all in the official records but is in fact the driving force in some particular situation. Actions taken in some governmental council may be taken therein because of pre-arranged agreements formed outside of the councils motivated by forces—such as money, other rewards, or threats— totally apart from the ostensible governmental concerns.

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historian as well as a wildly anti-Medicean polemicist. What it does show is the nature of anti-Piero maneuvers by the patrician class rather than the anger of the "people" that Parenti would have us believe was at the heart of the troubles. Third, the Santa Croce rebellion suggests that the oligarchy did not fear Piero. His father's harsh treatment of the Pazzi conspirators cooled street rebellion for the remaining years of Lorenzo's rule. Then, one year after his death the nobles were in the streets calling for the ouster of the new leader. We hear of no executions, no purges, following the failed uprising.85 The more one reads in the contemporary histories such as that of Piero Parenti or Bartolomeo Cerretani, as well as the memoirs, diaries, and notebooks of the witesses, the more one is convinced that there existed in Florence in the period from the death of Lorenzo in April 1492 to the fall of his son in November 1494, a political reality that has somehow escaped the notice of later historians. The more evidence that one discovers of real oligarchical plotting against Piero, the less possible it is to maintain that at the death of Lorenzo, the political forces of the city willingly gathered to support the young heir of the Medici power structure— to bring about a smooth transition, and that through sheer stupidity and his behavior towards King Charles he alienated these supporters and destroyed that structure on which his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather had labored. The more one reads, the harder it is to accept the idyllic depiction of a Florence at peace and well ordered at the death of Lorenzo, an order ruined by his

85 Parenti, Stoh a fiorentina, fols. 145-147( Weinstein, Savonarola, 123).

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stupid son.86 The signs of opposition seem to emerge almost immediately, even before the young leader has had time to choose a political direction of his own: within thirteen months he faced rebels on horseback shouting for his removal. And even earlier than that, some of his father's closest associates had taken action that suggested they were unwilling to follow Piero's lead.8? Could it be that the assumptions that have guided so much of that which has been w ritten about Florence in the 1490's have been wrong: that condiitons were not peaceful and well ordered at Lorenzo’s death, but rather that Florence was seething with factional infighting among various oligarchical families hoping to seize the opportunity of his death to enlarge their share of power? Is it possible that the apparent order that so impressed Machiavelli, the father's order that contrasted so sharply with the son's troubles, masked the reality of factional maneuvering, masked a potent political force that was ready to oppose Piero the minute he inherited the authority? Is it possible that the apparently "smooth transition" was nothing more than a temporary facade thrown up to protect the oligarchy itself which was so intimately tied to the power of the Medici, a facade that would function until the moment came to openly seize power directly? Is it possible that throughout Florence, anti-Medicean forces maneuvered "in secret" while maintaining an apparently amicable relationship with Piero—all the time with their "ears perked up" ready for the provocation, ready to move?

86 The classic portrait of Florence at the death of Lorenzo derives from Niccolo Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini. See Machiavelli's History o f Florence (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 405-407. 87 See below pp. 253ff.

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This secret world of opposition is perceivable in the story of Piero Parenti. Parenti is the historian who provides the most detailed account of these Florentine events of the 1490's, but he was also a participant and his personal story provides insight into this duplicitous world of the oligarchy surrounding Piero de' Medici.88 The historian grew up just a few blocks from the Palazzo Medici in the San Giovanni quarter, the neighborhood of the Medici. The Parenti had several houses in Via del Cocomero (street of the watermelons) which began at the northern edge of the cathedral foundations and ran north towards San Marco and past the Medici gardens. The street is now known as Via Ricasoli and runs parallel to Via Larga (now Via Cavour) where Cosimo had been building his great palace in the years when Piero Parenti was bom.89 Parenti was almost an exact contemporary of Lorenzo de' Medici: Lorenzo was born in 1450, Parenti in 1451.90 Therefore, as Florence faced the crisis of 1494, Parenti found himself among the older generation, the generation of Piero de' Medici's father. In this, Piero Parenti shares a characteristic with all the oligarchs who plotted against Piero de' Medici: they were all of the older generation, the generation of Lorenzo de' Medici, and were all in their forties at the time

88 There is only one short biographical essay on Piero Parenti which was written by Joseph Schnitzer and published as a preface to his edition of the extracts from the Parenti Storia fiorentina in Quei/enundForschungen-\V, pp. XL1I-LIV. Also see Guido Pampaloni, "Piero di Marco Parenti e lasua Historiafiorentina" Archivio Storico Italiano , vol. CXV1I (1959), pp. 147-153. Additional background on the Parenti family is available in Mark Phillips, The Memoir of Marco Parent),; A Life in Medici Florence (Princeton, 1987), esp. pp. 21 - 7 1. 89 Phillips, Memoir o f Marco Parenti, p. 49. 90 Phillips, Memoir ofMarco Parenti, p. 44.

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of the crisis of 1494; Bernardo Rucellai was forty-six, Piero Capponi was forty-eight, Jacopo di Tanai de’ Nerli was in his forties, Piero Parenti was forty-four. Although the Parenti were rich silk merchants they had not been particularly important or powerful in the early years of the fifteenth century, but in 1448 Piero’s father married Caterina Strozzi—a marriage in which the bride was of far superior social standing than the groom— and with this marriage the Parenti family moved into the circle of those special Florentine families that had ancient lineage, political influence, and wealth.91 Unfortunately, at the moment of the marriage, the bride's family, the Strozzi, were in a period of political decline owing to their anti-Medicean role in the factional disputes of the 1430's, the result of which had been the exile of the most important Strozzi males, best known of whom was Pal la Strozzi, the richest man in Florence in the 1420’s 92 The Strozzi marriage at mid-century changed permanently the identity of the Parenti. They now became ’'Strozzi"; Piero's father became completely caught up in the problems and prestige of the great Strozzi clan and established a life-long intimacy with his powerful brother-in-law, Filippo, who was living out his years of exile in Naples where he had become extraordinarily wealthy and an intimate of the royal family.9^ For the son, Piero, this prestigious heritage which came

91 At the time of the marriage, the Parenti were among the richest 3% of Florentines. Phillips, Memoir o f Marco Parenti, p. 23 & 31. 92 Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, A Study o f Four Families (Princeton, 1968), p. 46, n. 32. 93 Mark Phillips, Memoir ofMarco Parenti, p. 71: "In a sense, Marco seems to have become a Strozzi more than Caterina a Parenti."

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to him from his mother Caterina, colored all his political thinking. The Strozzi had been the most important and the most persecuted opponents of the Medici. For more than thirty years they had suffered under a total ban during which no Strozzi achieved any political power and during which the senior line of Pal la was taxed into impotence. In 1466, this total exclusion was moderated and in the 1470's Filippo di Matteo Strozzi returned to Florence. But the history of this enmity between the Medici and the Strozzi influenced the young historian deeply and made of him a life-long enemy of the Medici—although a secret one before 1494.94 jh js critical stance towards the Medici was a heritage not only of his Strozzi side but also from his father who criticized the Medici government remarking on "the difficulty of knowing

On the Strozzi see: Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, esp. chap. II, "The Strozzi in the Fifteenth Century," pp. 31-74; Conte Pompeo Litta, Strozzi di Firenze, vol. V of the series Le famiglie celebri ita/iane, 15 vols. (Milan, 1819-1902); Lorenzo Strozzi, Le vite degli uomini illustridei/a casa Strozzi (Florence, 1892). Two works on Filippo di Filippo Strozzi which deal primarily with the Strozzi in the sixteenth century are also helpful for background on the earlier fifteenth-century family: Melissa Bullard, Filippo Strozzi

and the Medici, Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-Century Florence and Rome (Cambridge, 1980); Luigi Limongelli, Filippo Strozzi, primo cittadino d italia (Milan, 1963). 94 Schnitzer, Savonarola, p. 58. Pampaloni disagrees with Schnitzer about the duration of Parenti's hatred of the Medici. I agree with Schnitzer. It is curious to note that the senior* branch of the Strozzi in the person of Filippo di Matteo returned to Florence and made peace with the Medici and eventually in 1508 the two families were joined in a marriage between Clarice de' Medici, daughter of Piero and Alfonsina, and Filippo di Filippo Strozzi whereas the Parenti in the person of Marco and his son Piero, the historian, seem to have refused to follow the Strozzi lead, remaining more Strozzi than the Strozzi, holding loyally to the old anti-Medicean position.

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the truth when those who govern keep secrets to themselves— "95 But the secrecy worked in two ways: the government and its critics. Marco Parenti did not speak out and make any public demonstration of his feelings 96 Nor did the son.

Although Piero Parenti seems to have had an intense hatred of the Medici his whole life possibly fueled from his infancy by his Strozzi mother, a hatred that courses through the history that he wrote after Piero de' Medici had fallen from power and lived on in later generations of the Parenti, during the years of the Medici rule his family was in constant and apparently intimate contact with the family they so hated. They were neighbors, of course. The young boy studied with the Medici retainer Ficino, most likely in the Palazzo Medici itself.97 Lorenzo de' Medici attended and blessed the marriage of Piero Parenti's sister.98 In 1483, Piero Parenti was elected to the Signoria, an honor impossible to obtain without Medici backing. In 1484, he was appointed Podesta of San Casciano and in 1486, of Lari.99 in 1489, Piero de' Medici served as godfather to Piero Parenti's newborn son and held little Francesco as the priests baptised the child in the Baptistery.100 What is most striking in all of this is the secret opposition that seems to have been true of both the father Marco and the son Piero Parenti. Even with an almost daily intercourse with the ruling family, an intercourse that involved numerous public acts of honor and sponsorship, 95 Mark Phillips, Memoir ofMarco Parenti, p. 223. 96 Phillips, Memoir ofMarco Parenti, p. 224. 97 Schnitzer, Quei/en-W, p. XLII. 98 phi 11ips, Memoir o f Marco Parenti, p. 215. 99 Schnitzer, Quellen-\V, p. XLVI11. 100 Schnitzer, Que/Ien-W, p. XLVIII.

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it seems clear that underneath the apparent public amity there existed a powerful opposition if not real hatred of this family with which they continued cordial relations. This is what is most suggestive to our attempts f o understand 1494. How wide spread was this phenomenon? How many other families resembled the Parenti? We know less about them since they did not all produce historians as did the Parenti, the Nerli, and the Rucellai. But if such secret opposition existed throughout Florence, it is possible that what Piero de’ Medici found in 1492 was much less a smooth transition than a boiling cauldron of anti-Medicean anger and hatred built up over decades, something very different from the placid and contented city-state depicted by Machiavelli. Piero Parenti's ties to other influential Florentines active in the crisis of 1494 w ill illustrate how tightly related were the various men working against Medici rule. Piero’s own godfather who had held him at his baptism in the small parish church of Ronta in the Mugello near the Medici country home, was Tanai de' Nerli, Gonfaloniere in the days immediately after the fall of Piero de’ Medici, the same Tanai whom we met on the steps of his palace in Fra Filippino Lippi's painting.101 The son of Tanai de’ Nerli, Jacopo di Tanai, emerged as the very symbol of the anti-Piero revolution of November 9, when he planted himself before Piero at the door of the Palazzo della Signoria and summoned the courage to deny entry to the Medici leader, such action being credited with igniting the revolution.102 In the Lippi painting, Tanai is bidding farewell to his wife and little granddaughter Maddalena in front of the 101 Phillips, Memoir ofMarco Parenti, p. 45. On Lippi's painting see above p. 7. 102 Filippo di Ci no Ri nucc ini, Ricordi storici, p. CL 11.

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family palace nearby the Porta San Frediano. Maddalena de' Nerli becomes the wife of Piero Parenti's first born son, Marco.103 Thus the anti-Medicean cabal of 1494 lives on in Piero's history as well as in his heirs. Another Parenti son, Filippo (named for Filippo Strozzi) was one of the most influential leaders in the war waged against the Medici in 1527-1530 in which forces serving the Medici Pope Clement VII, overcoming an heroic resistance, blasted through the city walls and put the Medici family back in power.104 It is interesting to note that while Filippo Parenti was helping to lead the war fought to keep the Medici out of Florence, the son of the Strozzi banker for whom he was named was helping the Pope to pay for the conflict.105 And at the conclusion of the war when the city fell to the Medici forces, two of Piero Parenti's sons, Filippo and Benedetto, were banned from Florence.105

S till another

Parenti son, Giovanni, married the granddaughter of Bernardo Rucellai thus uniting to Piero Parenti one more of the families that helped bring Piero de' Medici

down.107

Piero Parenti is interesting because he wrote a brilliant history of his own times and this history coupled with our knowledge of his political attitudes yields an understanding of the political force, the "secret opposition," that was ranged against Piero de' Medici in the crisis of 1494. Parenti is most significant as a source for understanding attitudes towards the Medici rather than as a political power himself.

103 Schnitzer, Oue/ien-Wi, p. XLIX. 104 Schnitzer, Que//en-\V, p. LI I. 105 Melissa Bullard, Filippo Strozzi, pp. 151 ff. 105 Schnitzer, Quelien-\N, p. Llll. 107 Schnitzer, Quellen-\M, p. XLIX.

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He reveals himself as a secret opponent of Piero whose extreme antiMedicean position is made public after 1494 rather than during or before the fateful year. Parenti's relative by marriage, Bernardo Rucellai, is a completely different case. If Parenti still remains significant it is due to his history rather than his political actions--he was not an independently powerful political figure in 1494. Rucellai on the other hand, is significant not for the history that he wrote, which covers much of the same period as that of Parenti, but rather because of his political actions.108 His history is negligible; his political power was great.100 He emerged in the months after the death of Lorenzo de' Medici as the most dangerous and unexpected opponent of Piero. His opposition was all the more surprising for having come from within the inner circle of Lorenzo's family; he was Lorenzo's closest associate, like a brother— the husband of Piero's Aunt Nannina. The Rucellai shared with the Parenti the same dangerous fam ilial relationship: marriage with the Strozzi. 110 Bernardo Ruceliai's father,

108 Bernardo Rucellai, De be!lo italfco (London, 1733). l ° g Guglielmo Pel 1igrini says, ” Debello italico, come fonte storica non ha quasi nessun valore.. . L 'UmanistaBernardo Rucellai (Livorno, 1920), p. 55. 110 The best and most recent introduction to the Rucellai in the fifteenth century is F. W. Kent, "The Making of a Renaissance Patron of the Arts," in Giovanni Rucellai ed iI suo ZibaJdone, vol. II: A Florentine Patrician and His Palace (London, 1981), pp. 9-95. Also see: L. Passerini, Geneafogia e storia della famigliaRucellai (Florence, 1861); F. W. Kent, Household andLineage in Renaissance

Florence, The Family Life of the Capponi, Ginori, andRucellai (Princeton, 1977); Guglielmo Pellegrini, L'Umanista Bernardo Rucellai (Livorno, 1920); Felix Gilbert, “Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari,” Journal o f the Warburg andCourtauldInstitutes, vol. XII (1949), pp. 101-131.

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248

Giovanni, had married Jacopa Strozzi in Santa Trinita just three years before the political explosion that divided all of Florence into pro-Medici and anti-Medici factions.111 On November 9, 1434, when Pal la Strozzi rode out of the Florentine gates towards his exile in Padua, he carried with him the fate of the relatives who would be viewed as dangerous by the victorious Medici party. Thus for a quarter century, the Rucellai suffered exclusion from power and honor similar to that endured by Marco Parenti and his Strozzi wife and relatives. Giovanni Rucellai said that "for twenty-seven years, that is from 1434 to 1461, 1 was not welcome, but suspect to the regime."* 12 In the 1460's, the Medici regime felt secure enough to loosen the ostracism that had struck many families allied to the Strozzi faction. Filippo Strozzi himself was allowed to return to Florence in 1466. In June of the same year, in one of the most sumptuous and important weddings of the time, Giovanni Rucellai's son Bernardo married Nannina de' Medici, Lorenzo's sister, and took her home to the new family palace on Via Vigna Nuova designed by Leon Battista Alberti.113 This marriage signalled the re-entry of the Rucellai into the inner circle of Medici allies and registers a sudden and dramatic expression of Medici acceptance for the Rucellai.114 It is interesting to note that although

111 Kent, "Renaisance Patron," p. 17. 112 Giovanni Rucellai ed /1suo Zibaldone, ed. A. Perosa (London, 1960), p. 122. 113 On the wedding see Kent, "Renaissance Patron," pp. 67-68; On the several Rucellai generations living at Via Vigna Nuova, see Kent, Household and Lineage, p. 57. 114 Kent, "Renaissance Patron," p. 66.

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both Giovanni Rucellai and Filippo Strozzi were rehabilitated in the 1460's by the Medici regime, neither ever achieved any real power during their remaining years in Florence. Both Giovanni and Filippo were content to manage their fortunes and build and enrich their family palaces while remaining on the political sidelines. It was left to the next generation to reenter Florentine politics in an active way. For the Rucellai the next generation was led by Giovanni's son Bernardo (born 1448). His marriage in June, 1466, to the sister of Lorenzo brought him into the innermost circle of those trusted by the Medici family. His correspondence with the two Medici brothers, Giuliano and Lorenzo, shows an unusual degree of personal intimacy that derived from their common age, their shared childhood experiences, and their continuing partnership in various political activities.115 This proximity to the Medici yielded immediate influence, political positions, and elevated social standing in the society dominated by the Medici. Bernardo was s till only twenty-three years old when the Medici called him to active political participation and when Lorenzo included him in an important embassy to meet with the Pope.11& This responsibility was the firs t of a life long series of important political offices that were awarded to him and which he fulfilled with great distinction. As Lorenzo's brother-in-law, Bernardo moved as close to the Medici as one could get without having been born into the family.

115 Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo de' Medici, April 21, 1464, Volterra (ASF, MAP, XVII, 405); April 30, Florence (ASF, MAP, XXI, 154). Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici at Careggi, September 16, 1475 (ASF, MAP, XXVII, 400). 116 Pellegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, p. 3.

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if Bernardo Rucellai's life as an intimate friend of the Medici brought him dozens of significant political offices and the honors that went with them, this closeness may also have bred a discomfort, a friction deriving from being so close to power, so constantly involved in the affairs of state, but always relegated to a secondary role, always in the shadow of the Medici who were awarding to him all his power. The Rucellai were a family with lineage, political participation, artistic patronage, and wealth almost the equal to that of the Medici. It is unlikely that they willingly accepted their secondary role without considering the unfairness of being permanently in a subservient position.117 That contemporaries were aware of this touchy issue is revealed in an extraordinary fifteenth-century print which presented an interesting variation on the Rucellai shield.118 The shield itself s till hangs in the center of the courtyard of the Rucellai palace on Via Vigna Nuova, a beautiful sculpted example of the Rucellai family stemma carved by Bernardo Rossellino.1 ig Contained within the circular classical floral border are various images of the family shield and riding at the top of the design is a ship, the mast of which is formed by a beautiful nude woman who raises her left hand high over her head to hold the top of the sail as the right hand reaches down to catch the bottom of the great

117 On the Rucellai family within Florentine society and their sensitivity about the Medici see F. W. Kent, Household and Lineage in Renaissance Florence, pp. 219-221. 118 The print and the Rucellai shield on which it is based are discussed and reproduced in A. Warburg, "Francesco Sassettis letztw illige Verfuegung," in his GesammelteSchriften (Leipzig, 1932), vol. I, pp. 146-151; cited in Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 103. 11 ^ For an excellent reproduction of the shield see Piero Bargellini, LeStrade di Firenze, vol. 111, p. 280.

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flying canvas billowing in the wind. In an interpretation of the shield worked out between Giovanni Rucellai and Ficino, the female figure in the middle of the boat is Fortuna, who symbolizes the power of the storm. No one can resist this goddess, but the man who, like the sailor in the boat, recognizes her strength, can make appropriate adjustments and use her to come safely home to port.120 But even more interesting for our purposes is the print based upon this Rucellai shield.121 in the print, two figures have been added to the design of the shield: a young man stands in the middle of the boat and a young woman guides the boat at the helm. The young man was interpreted to be Bernardo Rucellai; the young woman was his new wife, Nannina de' Medici. In this version of the Rucellai shield, the powerful storms caught by the sail and moving the boat would be the power of the Medici family. The young man riding in the boat w ill be carried hither and yon by the storms of the family power. His guide, his helmsman is his wife, Nannina. What is so extraordinary is the accent on the helplessness of the man, Bernardo. He is not even guiding his own boat; his wife is at the wheel. Here in this fascinating image is a contemporary acknowledgement of an issue that must have yielded discomfort and even embarassment for Bernardo Rucellai. Was he in control of his own fate? Or was he a captive of his wife's family that rewarded his propinquity with great honor yet always held to themselves ultimate power.

120 Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 104. 121 Felix Gilbert describes the print in detail based upon Aby Warburg's article cited above n. 109. Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 104.

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Felix Gilbert says that "the Medici became a fundamental issue in Bernardo Rucellai's entire life."122 And the difficulty of this issue for Rucellai may present interesting possibilities for understanding his behavior in 1494. From 1469, when Lorenzo succeeded to the leadership of the Medici family, to 1492, when Lorenzo died, Bernardo was the most significant political participant in the activities of the Florentine politcal elite outside of the Medici family itself. Is it not possible that after twenty-three years of subservience, when a boy half his age suddenly moved to the helm, he decided it was time to take the wheel himself?123 If Bernardo Rucellai fe lt some compulsion to leadership amidst the crisis of 1494, this would not be surprising considering that by then he had had almost a quarter century of experience at the highest levels of Florentine government. In 1471, Lorenzo de' Medici invited the young man to join a diplomatic party going to Rome to meet with the Pope. In 1474 he was elected to the Council of the Hundred and six years later he was chosen by Lorenzo to join in the supervision of Lorenzo's Studio (University) at Pisa.124 As Lorenzo and Bernardo grew up together, learning more and more about politics and diplomacy, Lorenzo shared more responsibility with his Rucellai brother-in-law. When the Medici leader had to be absent from Florence, Bernardo Rucellai acted as his representative, relaying to him the views of Florentine citizens on

122 Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 104. 123 For more on Rucellai in 1494 see below pp. 344ff. 124 Pellegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, pp 4-6.

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various issues and advising Lorenzo on means to obtain political support.125 In 1482, Bernardo was sent to Milan to be the permanent Florentine ambasador at the Sforza court. From Milan, Bernardo wrote to Lorenzo every day.126 During the better part of almost four years, Rucellai was in constant personal contact with Ludovico Sforza on a daily basis as he continued to represent Florentine interests at Milan. He traveled with Ludovico to the Sforza summer villa at Vigevano; he accompanied Ludovico on diplomatic occasions; he was with Ludovico constantly. The result of this extended stay at Milan was a fam iliarity between Rucellai and Sforza that was of great significance when in 1494, Florence and Milan faced the arrival of the King of France. And when Piero de' Medici insisted on remaining in an alliance with Naples thus positioning Florence on the opposite side to that taken by Milan, this old friendship between Rucellai and Sforza re-emerged to create new bonds between the ruler of Milan and the Florentine oligarchy maneuvering against Piero. Rucellai returned to Florence from Milan only to be appointed immediately to another diplomatic post. First he went to Venice in January. Then later in the year, he came home and departed again for the south, this time traveling to Rome where he met with the Pope, and then

125 Roberto Palmarocchi, La Politica Italians di Lorenzo de'Medici (Florence, 1933), p. I I 4. 126 Almost 200 letters are preserved in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze from Bernardo's period as ambassador at Milan. See Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, September 25,1482, to March 1484, Milan (ASF, MAP, XLVIII, 94-296).

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on to Naples where he remained during 1486 and 1487.127 Again as in Milan, Rucellai moved into the circles of the ruling family and was treated like one of them, presumably because of his relationship to the Medici family, but also because of the sophisticated grasp he was gaining of diplomatic realities in Italy. The most important business that Rucellai handled while in Naples was the arrangements for the marriage of Lorenzo's son Piero to Alfonsina Orsini. The reader w ill remember Rucellai's impressions of Alfonsina: her thick throat, her good arms "which are usually a guide to the legs", her straight posture. 128 And in February, 1487, Bernardo Rucellai stood as proxy for his nephew at the formal betrothal ceremony that bound the Medici of Florence to the Orsini and their Neapolitan allies.129 The significance of this marriage has been examined above,130 therefore what remains to be remarked is the central role of Rucellai in yet another critical juncture for the Medici and Florence. And when the Neapolitan alliance so tightly tied to the marriage carried Florence into the center of the diplomatic storm of 1494, it is easy to imagine that Bernardo Rucellai fe lt qualified to untie the knot. Before returning to 1494, we must examine Bernardo Rucellai's reaction to the death of his lifelong friend, Lorenzo de' Medici, and the

127 For Rucellai's diplomatic correspondence of 1486-87 see: Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, November 4, 1486 to August 7, 1487, Naples and Rome (ASF, MAP, XLIX, 5 4 - 119). For this period of Rucellai's life also see Pellegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, p. 8. 128 see p. 107 above. 129 Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, February, 1487, Naples (ASF, MAP, XLIX, 80-87); A. von Reumont, Lorenzo de'Medici if Magnifico (Leipzig, 1883), vol. II, p. 256. 130 See pp. 10 7 - 110 above.

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assumption of Lorenzo's role by his son Piero. After almost thirty years of intimate association with the Medici, after so many years of being treated like a member of the family, of being honored and consulted by the Medici, one would have assumed that Piero's uncle Bernardo would have been his firs t and best supporter in this moment of grief. What did Bernardo do? Within two months, he had secretly negotiated with Filippo Strozzi's widow, with whom the recently widowed Rucellai had established an extremely close relationship, a marriage contract between his daughter Lucrezia and Filippo Strozzi's son Lorenzo.131 With the foregoing discussion of the Strozzi and their place in the political history of fifteenth-century Florence in mind, it should be obvious that such a secretly negotiated alliance between the Rucellai and the Strozzi would have come as a shock to the new Medici leader of Florence and would have been viewed as tantamount to a declaration of war. Of all possible marital alliances, those with the 131 Guicciardini, Stone fiorentine, ed. Aulo Greco (Novara, 1970), p. 127 {History of Florence, tr. Mario Domandi, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1970, p. 81); Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, p. 82; Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 107. The exact date of this action by Bernardo Rucellai is extremely important. The closer it is to the death of Lorenzo de’ Medici, the more obvious is Rucellai's anti-Medicean intent and the less tenable is the argument that Piero was responsible for alienating his uncle by having excluded him from the councils of power (Guicciardini). Guicciardini speaks of the marriage contract as coming in 1492 (pp. 80-82) and the structure of his narrative places the marriage contract before the death of Pope Innocent in July. If Guicciardini is correct, it means that within the period of only two months after the death of Lorenzo (May and June, 1492), Bernardo made the arrangements for the marriage. If this is accurate, Bernardo wasted no time and Piero's suspicions of his uncle (Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, ed. Greco, p. 128; History o f Florence, tr. Domandi, p. 81) seem to have been soundly based.

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Strozzi, the old Medici enemy, would have come under the closest scrutiny. It was common knowledge that all important marriages were reviewed and approved by Lorenzo to prevent exactly this kind of alliance out of which might emerge a combination so threatening as to be unacceptable to the Medici.132 Yet here was an intimate associate of Lorenzo, arranging a marriage of which Lorenzo would have certainly expressed total disapproval.133 Rucellai’s decision on this marriage was extremely important. It was a statement. There is no way that he stumbled into a mistake. There is no way that he could have failed to understand its significance. On the contrary, he was as knowledgeable about the political complexities of Florence as Lorenzo had been. The appearance of conspiracy was augmented by the fact that simultaneously with the Rucellai-Strozzi betrothal, Rucellai's very dear friend and ally Paolantonio Soderini betrothed—also in secret— his son Tommaso to another Strozzi child, a daughter of Filippo Strozzi, the sister of the young man who would soon marry the Rucellai g irl.134 Thus Piero was suddenly confronted with an alliance of three of the most powerful families of Florence cemented by marriage, all of which had been arranged without his knowing a word. Historians may wish to join Guicciardini in his extremely convoluted attempt to lay blame for the break between Piero de’ Medici and his uncle 132 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, ed. Greco, p. 122 (History of Florence, tr. Domandi, p. 75). 133 Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena stated that Lorenzo de' Medici would never have consented to this union ( Schnizter, Savonarola, Vol. I, p. 173). Dovizi certainly is correct. No other more powerful familial alliance could be imagined in the Florence of 1492 than that of the Rucellai and the Strozzi. 134 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 128 ( History of Florence, p. 81).

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on Piero. 135 But a more objective reading of the facts suggests that it is difficult to imagine what Piero could have done in a matter of weeks after his father died (failure to "listen" to Bernardo, says Guicciardini,

Storie fiorentine, p. 128, History o f Florence, pp. 80-81) to justify this reaction from his own uncle. The action by Rucellai and his friend Paolantonio Soderini seems an open provocation. The contract was negotiated precisely to announce independence from the Medici. The secrecy of its method stated that the oligarchs involved were unwilling

135 The traditional interpretation of the events of 1492-94 follows Guicciardini in stating that Piero's poor handling of foreign affairs— specifically those with Charles V III—brought about his downfall. Felix Gilbert's very important article on Rucellai echoes this approach: “When Piero disregarded [his] advice, Bernardo turned against him and became one of his bitterest opponents. The break became final when, without Piero's permission, he gave his daughter in marriage to a member of the Strozzi family, old adversaries of the Medici; here was proof that he had deserted the faction supporting Piero. He allied himself with Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, as member of the younger, rival branch of the family; he conspired to replace Piero by Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco and, as a result, Bernardo's sons were banned from Florence, even though Piero dared not take direct measures against Bernardo himself There can be no doubt that Bernardo had felt encouraged to such open opposition by the visible weakening of Piero's power resulting from the latter's mismanagement of foreign affairs." ("Bernardo Rucellai," p. 107). Within this passage is contained one of the most central misinterpretations of the Piero de' Medici period of government. The reader would assume from reading this paragraph that "the final break“(the language here demands that the reader assume a succession of events leading up to the final break), the Strozzi marriage, came after Piero's mismanagement had become intolerable. In this interpretation the onus is on Piero and his stupidity. But the marriage came in the first two months of Piero's rule, long before he could have accumulated any record of mismanagement, long before there was any problem in foreign affairs, and years before the crisis with King Charles VIII.

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to submit themselves any longer to Medici approbation. And that was exactly how Piero interpreted it. He viewed this action as "the beginning of a movement against him, to take away his power." 136 And he was right J 37 During the two and a half years from the death of Lorenzo de' Medici to the invasion of Charles V III, Bernardo Rucellai was at the center of the movement to overthrow the Medici government of Piero.138 Month after month, he made his aversion to the regime publicly known.139 jhe Rucellai opposition to Piero was not limited to Bernardo. His two sons, Cosimo (named for Cosimo de' Medici) and Palla (named symmetrically for Palla Strozzi) became so aggressive in their activities against Piero 136 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 128 ( History of Florence, p. 81). 137 one wonders whether Piero could have appreciated the irony in his opposition to the Rucellai-Strozzi marriage if he could have known that after his death, his own daughter Clarice would marry the other Strozzi boy, Filippo, in 1508. Mellissa Bullard {FilippoStrozzi, p. 45) comments: "The path that led Filippo Strozzi into the Medici family orbit was not clear-cut. Nor was the significance of his marriage in 1508 to Clarice de' Medici for his later career immediately perceptible, since at the time the Medici were out of power, exiled from Florence. In fact, until 1508 Filippo himself had had no immediate contact with the Medici, and no one would have suspected then that they would consider a parentado (betrothal) for the granddaughter of Lorenzo 11 Magnifico with a member of the Strozzi family which they had abused and exiled not so many decades before." 138 schnitzer, Savonaroia, vol. I, p. 173. Schnitzer's pages on these three years, 1492-1494, are extraordinarily insightful and are noteworthy for having been constructed without overreliance on Guicciardini whose version of these events is not to be trusted without independent verification. In addition to the excellent treatment by Schnitzer, attention should be called to a fine short essay on this period by Leopold von Ranke. See Sammtliche Werke, Vols. 40-41 (Leipzig, 1877), Historisch-biographische Studien, "Piero Medici und die Staatsveranderung von 1494," pp. 200-221. '3 9 Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 173.

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that their father finally sent them out of the city for their own protection.140 Felix Gilbert says that Bernardo was “one of the chief protagonists in th e ... formation of an opposition to Piero de‘ Medici's absolutism."141 It seems somewhat strange to refer to "absolutism" when the tyrant in question is allowing one of his most dangerous opponents to move freely around the city, travel outside the city, and meet with representatives of foreign rulers. Gilbert says that Piero "dared not take direct measures against Bernardo himself."142 Whether Piero "dared" not take action or chose not to do so, the result is the same: there was no absolutism. Piero's so-called absolutism is an invention of the anti-Medicean polemicists. Between the death of Lorenzo and the fall of Piero, there is no record of even one political execution. For two years Piero de' Medici tolerated his uncle's maneuvers. Finally in Spring, 1494, with the pressure of the French invasion growing greater, he acted. The formal governmental action involved was that examined above in April, 1494, concerning the Medici cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di P ie r fr a n c e s c o . 14^ in the decision against the cousins, the extent of their connections with the Rucellai were brought out and in addition to the mild treatment of the cousins who were confined to their villa at Castello, the Rucellai son Cosimo was declared a rebel and confined to Prato for his activities as the intermediary between the

140 141 142 143

Pelllegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, p. 12 Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 106. Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 107. See above pp. 170ff.

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cousins and Ludovico Sforza.144 Although it was the son who paid publicly for activities damaging to the Medici regime, it is impossible to believe that Cosimo Rucellai was functioning as a messenger between the Medici cousins and Ludovico Sforza on his own. As we noted above, among all Florentines, the man who was closest to Ludovico was Bernardo Rucellai. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the son was acting under orders from his father who was masterminding the conspiracy among the Rucellai, the Duke of Milan, and the Medici cousins to bring down the government of Piero de‘ Medici.145 Later, after Piero was gone from Florence and the Medici regime overturned, Bernardo Rucellai moved to the forefront of those who reconstituted the government (he was a member of the Committee of Twenty)145 , dealt with the King of France (he was an ambassador to Charles several times before the king entered Florence along with Piero Capponi and Tanai de' Nerli)147 and traveled to meet with Ludovico Sforza on the city's behalf.148 While Bernardo Rucellai was undermining his nephew's authority within Florence, Rucellai's very close friend, Piero Capponi was working

144 Pellegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, p. 13. 145 The fact that no document has ever been found that shows precisely Rucellai's role in this conspiracy should not surprise anyone. It is in the very nature of such maneuvers to avoid writing such things down and we are forced to rely on the circumstantial evidence. 145 Pellegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, p. 13; Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 107. 147 Delaborde, L'Expedition, pp. 442 & 454; Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 107. 148 Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 107.

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toward the same end in France.149 |n April of 1494, as the pressure of the coming French invasion increased upon the government of Piero de' Medici, the Signoria dispatched a very high level embassy to King Charles VIII to examine the possibilities for some kind of agreementJ 50 Joining the respected Guidantonio Vespucci in the embassy was Piero Capponi. The ambassadors reported back to Florence on the extremely cold reception extended by the king and said that the invasion seemed a certainty.

|n analyzing further aspects of this embassy it is helpful

to remember that it was unfolding exactly contemporaneously with the exposure before the Signoria in Florence of the plot by the Medici

149 for an excellent concise introduction to the Capponi family see Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, pp. 187-233 as well as the older Conte Pompeo Litta, Capponi di Firenze, vol. XI (1869-75) in the series Le famiglie celebri itaiiane (Milan, 1819-1902). On Piero Capponi see: Vincenzo Acciaioli, “Vita di Piero di Gino CapponiT Archivio Storico ftaJiano, vol. IV, pt. 2, (1853), pp. 13-71, including 30 pages of documents; Pasquale Villari, Life and Times o f Girolamo Savonarola, tr. Linda Villari (New York, 1898), pp. 235-237; Michael Mallett, "Piero Capponi," Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, Vol. 19 (Rome, 1976), pp. 88-82; Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 210-213; Desjardins, Negociations dipfomatiques, vol. 1, pp. 367-369. On the friendship betweent Rucellai and Piero Cappopni see Pellegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, p. 10. 150 For the instructions to the ambassadors see Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques , vol. I, pp. 369-373. 151 Approximately 30 letters reporting the situation in France to Piero de‘ Medici in April to June, 1494 survive in the Archivio di 5tato, Firenze: Guidantonio Vespucci and Piero Capponi to Piero de’ Medici, April 12, 1494, to June 20, 1494, Vigevano, Turin, and Lyons (ASF, MAP, LXXV, 20-50). Desjardins, Negociations dipfomatiques, vol. I, pp. 374-409, prints a selection. For their reception at Lyons see Vespucci & Capponi to Piero de’ Medici, Lyons, May 1, 1494 (ASF, MAP, LXXV, 40).

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cousins, their ties to the Rucellai sons, and their contacts with Ludovico Sforza and the King of France.152 In Lyons, Piero Capponi seems to have been far more active with his French hosts than his instructions had stipulated. According to Philippe de Commynes, who was present at many of these meetings and was viewed within the French court as particularly skilled in Italian affairs in general and Florentine affairs in particular, Piero Capponi secretly came to the French and informed them that they could increase the pressure on Piero significantly by expelling Florentine merchants from France, and that such pressure could lead to the downfall of Piero de' Medici.153 "And so it was done." But Commyne's summary is in error by one small detail: the king banished only the Medici bankers.154 not the many other Florentine bankers, especially not the Capponi bankers who had become in the 1480's one of the main rivals to the Medici bank in Lyons.155 The discriminatory nature of the French action is extremely important. It suggests that some kind of accord had been reached between one group of Florentines and the king to work to overthrow the Medici in exchange for favorable treatment later for their commercial interests in France. 152 See above pp. 171 ff. 153 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 459: "In both of the embassies [referring to an earlier embassy as well as the Capponi one] there was always someone who was an enemy of Piero de' Medici, and this time it was especially Piero Capponi, who underhandedly informed us of what should be done in order to thave the city of Florence turn itself against Piero. And he made his allegations more bitter than was the case, and he also advised that all the Florentines should be banished from the kingdom [of France]; and so it was done." 154 Acciaioli, "Vita di Piero Capponi," p. 28. 155 De Roover, Rise and Decline o f the Medici Bank, p. 310.

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Capponi's biographers and other historians have waged a furious campaign to clear Capponi’s name of any charge of treason, of a suggestion of double-dealing against his own government, since his supposedly heroic stand before the king later in Florence (November) has provided one of the favorite patriotic myths of Florentine historiography.156 BUt there is considerable supporting evidence to suggest that Capponi did indeed conspire with the King of France to overthrow Piero de' Medici just as his friend Bernardo Rucellai was doing back at home. Francesco della Casa, who was completely loyal to the Medici, was also in France serving as another ambassador for Florence and had been there for over a year when the Capponi embassy arrived. Della Casa wrote to Piero in April warning about the Capponi and telling Piero that the Capponi in Lyons were secretly aggravating the problems already faced by pro-Medicean diplomats such as himself. '5 7

156 The charges are examined by: Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques vol. I, p. 368; V illari, Savonarola, p. 202, n. 1; Mallett, "Piero Capponi," p. 90. Vincenzo Acciaioli, Capponi’s nineteenth-century biographer found the charges of Commynes so discomfiting that he simply ignored the whole issue and never mentioned it. Mallett concludes: “11 Commynes riferisce che il Capponi stava gia tramando contro Piero de' Medici e che aveva consigliato Carlo VIII di espellere dal la Francia tu tti i mercanti fiorentini alio scopo di far sollevare contro i Medici i cittadini piu influenti di Firenze. Lo stesso Capponi nego con vigore ogni accusa di tradimento in questo momento, ma non e impossibile che egli avesse gia concluso che Tunica salvezzaper Firenze consistesse nel liberarsi di Piero.” (p. 90). For those intent on proving Capponi’s innocence in this episode, there remains the challenge of explaining why Commynes would so explicitly lie about Piero Capponi. 157 Francesco della Casa to Piero de’ Medici, April 17, 1494, Lyons (ASF, MAP, LXXV, 82).

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In studying the business history of the Capponi family, Richard Goldthwaite has discovered another bit of evidence that may corroborate the charge that Piero Capponi was secretly treating with the King of France to the detriment of Piero de' Medici and for the advancement of the Capponi. In 1494, the Capponi companies were separated into two new legal entities. Piero and Girolamo Capponi withdrew all their capital from the company at Lyons, while Neri Capponi withdrew his from the company at Florence. After this division there were two companies, one under Neri and Alessandro in Lyons and one under Piero in Florence. 158 if pjero Capponi was indeed involved in dangerous secret maneuvers with the French, possibly agreements about the future of the Capponi holdings, it may be that he deemed it wise to protect his brothers by this formal division of the company just in case something went wrong either in France or in Florence.159 Whatever the truth of Piero Capponi's negotiations with King Charles in the Spring of 1494, the result was that the Capponi businesses emerged from the events of 1494 in very good shape and became the agent for indemnity payments and other business between the governments of France and Florence. 160 when the King of France left Florence on November 28, Piero Capponi's brother Neri accompanied

158 Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 207. 159 so Goldthwaite speculates, see p. 212, n. 71: "If the story is true [the story of Capponi's secret maneuvers with the French], it might explain why there was a legal separation of the two Capponi companies before such a precarious venture." 160 Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 212.

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Charles to Naples and then followed him back to France as the ambassador of Florence to the royal court of France. 161 Thus the events of 1494 yielded great success for the Capponi in France where they replaced the Medici as the most influential Florentine merchant family.

161 Gino Capponi, Storia dellarepubblica df Firenze (Florence, 1876), vol. Ill, p. 19, n. 2, p. 34, n. 2.

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PIERO PE' MEDICI

Why were men like Giovanni and Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, Bernardo Rucellai, and Piero Capponi trying to destroy the rule of Piero de' Medici? Philippe de Commynes who knew them all personally said it was envy. "Some of his closest relatives and many other persons of distinction (such as all the Capponi, the Soderini, and the Nerli, and almost the whole city) were envious of him."162 And although one such simple psychological observation w ill not satisfy to explain the whole revolution of 1494, s till, there may be some important truth to Commynes' insight. Piero's problem from his earliest years had been envy. After the death of his uncle Giuliano in the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478, Piero was understood to be the heir apparent and from then on he was pushed into the public arena and, as Judith Hook remarks, "progressively spoiled by the role into which the Florentines cast him as a substitute for Giuliano, the young prince of the Medici family." 163 The boy's tutor, Matteo Franco, in a letter to Piero Dovizi, said that "the poor lad cannot go outside the door without all Florence running after him."164 Such unrepublican adulation of the heir apparent was enough to evoke envy

162 Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 463. 163 Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 161. 164 Janet Ross, Lives o f the Early Medici as Told in Their Correspondence (Boston, 1911), p. 273.

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within the patrician circle, and his extraordinary physical beauty and athletic prowess only made things worse.165 Another factor that may have worked against Piero's successful political leadership was his youth. He was twenty-one when Lorenzo died.166 The entire political and social structure of Florence was constructed around a veneration for age and maturity. All important political offices were reserved for men of considerable age; the mimimum age for substitutes for deceased members of the important Council of Seventy was forty years old.167 Therefore in April, 1492, the councils had to pass special legislation to allow Piero to enter actively into his father's political offices.168 It may be noted that Piero's father had also succeeded to political leadership at an early age—almost the same age as that of Piero when Lorenzo's father, Piero di Cosimo, died. And his youth had been a grave political handicap for Lorenzo; he referred himself to the “peril'' arising from having to lead at such a young age.160 Foreign friends of the Medici rule were s till preoccupied by the problem two years later, and the Cardinal of Rouen wished that he could give Lorenzo twenty of his many years.170 But Lorenzo had almost eight years of relative calm in which to consolidate the Medici political machine before the great crisis of the Pazzi plot and the Papal war tested him, whereas his son Piero had no

165 Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 161. 166 Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 65. Hook is correct on the date (1471); Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 228, n. 4, is incorrect! 1472). 167 Rubinstein, Government o f Florence, p. 229. 168 Rubinstein, Government o f Florence, p. 229. 169 Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 53. 170 Hook, Lorenzo de"Medici, p. 57.

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time at all. The patrician rivals to the Medici moved immediately after the death of Lorenzo to unseat twenty-one year old Piero and the destabilizing effect of their maneuvers was augmented by the evolving crisis over the French invasion. It was a handicap for Piero to be so young. But there was more to it than just age. A whole generation of men had grown up with Piero's father and had shared with Lorenzo political leadership within Florence since his accession to the role of the leader of the Medici party in 1469. Lorenzo had relied on many of them to an unusual degree. Men such as Bernardo Rucellai and Piero Capponi came to expect that they would share in the daily exercise of Medici leadership since they were asked to do so over such a considerable period of time in so many different roles — political councils, financial councils, ambassadorial assignments, family business, and m ilitary posts.171 Lorenzo's Chancellor, Bartolomeo Scala, had anticipated the dangers and had warned against relying too exclusively on a relatively small group of leading citizens. He pointed out that although they presented no danger as long as they remained disunited, what would happen if some cause brought them together?172 Scala's insight had anticipated exactly the situation of 1492. With the death of Lorenzo, this group of very experienced, well-traveled, sophisticated politicians, men like Rucellai, Nerli, and Capponi, all of whom were in their forties, all of whom had been active in Florentine government for over twenty years, were

171 Gilbert, "Bernardo Rucellai," p. 102 & 106; Acciaioli, Bernardo Rucellai, pp. 20-29. 172 Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 65; Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 179.

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unwilling to cooperate with a boy. Jacopo Pitti in his Storia fiorentina puts it plainly: they wanted their usual part of the tyranny.173 Jacopo Pitti writes of "tyranny". Felix Gilbert mentions Piero's "absolutism". Guicciardini calls Piero "tyrannical and haughty" ("tirannesca ed altiera").174 Piero Parenti wrote a sonnet to celebrate November 9, the day of the fall of Piero de' Medici in which he sings the praises of the return of liberty after the tyrannical fury of Piero: Questo e il di del Signorie, hor faceam festa, Giubiliano con allegro et alto core Rendialli gratie et laudi et sommo honore Che ha vicitato la sua plebe mesta. Ha exaudita nostra prece honesta, Mandatoci il buon Syre Liberatore, Toltoci da Tyrannico furore Renduto liberta pure manifesta.175 Did Piero lose power because he was a tyrant? Of all the interpretations of the events of 1494, this is the most ridiculous. If anything, it appears that Piero lost power because he was not tyrannical enough—because he was too tolerant of opponents. In the Santa Croce rebellion of 1493, there is no record of any severe repression. Even though the preachers Fra Bernardino da Feltre and Domenico da Ponzo were engaging in wildly inflammatory public preaching to thousands in the piazzas with radical political implications—preaching dangerous to

173 Jacopo Pitti, Storia fiorentina, in Archvio Storico itaiiano, vol. I (1842), p. 28: "Conciossiache i piu riputati dello stato procuravano la rovina di Piero, non per zelo di ricuperare la liberta, ma per non avere nella tirannide la parte consueta, come s'erano sempre promessi." 174 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 127 {.History o f Florence, p. 80). 175 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, fol. 222v (Schnitzer, Quel/en-IV, p. 11).

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any regime—Piero tolerated both and Ponzo even enlisted Piero’s aid in getting a ban removed so that Bernardino could continue. 178 Piero's relationship with another dangerous preacher, Savonarola, was positively friendly, suggesting an unusually tolerant attitude on Piero's part towards a potentially dangerous voice in the city. Although his uncle signalled an implacable opposition from the very firs t months of Piero's leadership, he never moved against the person of Bernardo Rucellai. When Piero's Medici cousins were discovered conspiring with Ludovico Sforza, their punishment was a comfortable confinement to their country estate from which they could easily escape at will. And when in September one of his most trustworthy ambassadors forwarded warnings to him about his relatives in league with Ludovico, he took no new action against them (such as moving them to the city and putting them under twenty-four hour observation). 177 The remarks of Guicciardini in the History o f Florence that Piero was "haughty and tyrannical" have added to the picture of the Medici leader as a tyrant.178 But in a less polemical work, one in which he calmly reflects on the complexities of the government of Florence, the historian composes one of the most important evaluations of Piero's rule: And he who considers well [Piero's] conduct after the death of his father— I am speaking of his conduct in governing the state—w ill not find therein, indications of cruelty or bloodthirstiness contrary to our traditions. And what more obvious plotting against the state and against Piero did he need than what was done by Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco and by Cosimo Rucellai 178 Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 125 & 128. 177 See p. 179 above. 178 Guicciardini, Stone fiorentine, p. 127 {History o f Florence, p. 80).

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and perhaps also Bernardo [Rucellai], And yet they were handled peacefully. And although I admit that there was value in the counsel of important men of the state who were advising Piero against those who would have had him move in a bad direction, s till, if he had been of such a bloodthirsty and implacable nature, he would never have been willing to listen to our advice. And if you deny this you w ill have to explain how it was that Piero's government was so easily withdrawn from dishonest things. However, I repeat that it does not seem to me that Piero was leading us to such bad ends as Pagolantonio says."179 Not only does Guicciardini here contradict everything that he wrote about Piero elsewhere, but his final sentence is extraordinary when placed in the context of his comments on Piero in the Storie fiorentine and Storia

d'Italia-. "It does not seem to me that Piero was leading us to such bad ends

'

The letter of Giovanbattista Ridolfi sent to Piero on October 22 from Milan contains suggestions that Piero was too soft. Ridolfi warns him again to draw his supporters around him and to beware of disturbances in the city that are sure to come. He even suggests that Piero bring the 179 Guicciardini, Dei reggimento di Firenze, in Opere inedite, edited by Piero and Luigi Guicciardini (Florence, 1858), vol. II, pp. 104-105: "E chi considera bene il procedere suo doppo la morte del padre, dico nel governo dello Stato, non vi trovera drento indizii di crudelta o di sangue alieni da' nostri costumi. Che piu manifesto segno delle cose di Lorenzo e di Giovanni di Pier Francesco, e di Cosimo Rucellai, e forse di Bernardo, che furono machinazioni contro alio Stato e contro a Piero? E pure furono governate piacevolmente. In che io vi confesso che valse assai il consiglio dei principali dello Stato, perche Piero era stato indiritto da qualcuno a cattiva via; ma se fussi stato de natura sanguinoso o implacabile, non si sarebbe lasciato persuadere da noi; e se voi negate questo, bisogna mi consentiate che, come io ho detto di sopra, il modo del governo era tale che facilmente si ritirava dalle cose disoneste. Pero di nuovo dico che a me non pare che Piero fussi per conducerci a quegli ultimi mali che diceva Pagolantonio."

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army into the city to be prepared—something Piero never did but something his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather did not hesitate to do. He begs Piero to take care of his own person and to be on the alert. The letter, written only weeks before Piero’s fall, sounds like one composed by someone who believes that Piero is not being tough enough, not being suspicious enough, that he has failed to protect himself and his rule by taking unpleasant but necessary action for internal security. It is a fascinating letter written by a good friend who obviously is deeply anguished by his sense of the unraveling situation at home in Florence. 180 The advice offered to Piero by Ridolfi seems directed to someone whose rule has been too tolerant rather than to someone who has inflamed opposition by his harsh measures. All of this suggests one of two things about Piero's rule: either he was unusually tolerant of political opposition by choice or he fe lt that his own political position was too weak to permit him to take the tough measures necessary against his enemies. In either case he was no tyrant. If Piero did not lose his government through the excessses of tyranny, is it possible that he did so through neglect? This is one of the most oft-repeated criticisms. Donald Weinstein suggests that Piero was "basically uninterested in the exacting tasks of governing.”'81 But Pasquale Vi 1lari goes further; he maintains that Piero was "incapable”.'8 2 This picture of Piero as lazy, stupid, and preferring football to government has been advanced by Guicciardini’s influential

'8 0 Giovanbattista Ridolfi to Piero de’ Medici, Oct. 22, 1494, Milan (ASF, MAP, LXXIV, 114). '8 ' Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 122. '8 2 vi 1lari, Savonarola, p. 209.

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version of the events of 1494 in both the Storie fiorentine and Storia d'

Italia in which he belittles Piero and talks of his "small brain" ("poco cervello").188 These and other like attacks on Piero confound two issues: his capacity and his diligence. Was Piero intellectually incapable of good government? The briefest examination of his education and intellectual life w ill show that this charge is as inaccurate as Guicciardini's statement that King Charles VIII was illite ra te .184 Piero's childhood tutor and lifelong friend was Angelo Ambrogini called Poliziano, one of the greatest philosophers of the Florentine Renaissance.185 Poliziano came to the family when Piero was three and stayed with them, living with them, until 1479 when problems with Piero's mother forced the philosopher to move out.188 Piero began studying Latin at age three. He used a grammar specially prepared for him by Poliziano^87 By the time Piero turned seven, he could read and write Latin—he already knew the works of Livy, Cicero, and others—and when he wrote to his father he said that he always wrote in Latin "to give a more literary tone to my letters" (at age 81).188

188 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 127 {History of Florence, p. 80). 184 see above p. 77. 185 For an excellent brief introduction to Poliziano see Eugenio Garin, "The Cultural Background of Politian," in Portraits from the Quattrocento, tr. Victor and Elizabeth Velen (New York, 1972), pp. 161-189. 186 Yvonne Magui re, The Private Life o f Lorenzo the Magnificent (London, 1936), pp. 104-113. 187 Garin, "Politian," p. 179. 188 pjero de' Medici to Lorenzo de' Medici, May 26, 1479, Cafaggiolo (ASF, MAP, XXII, 474) cited in Maguire, Private Life, p. 111.

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Piero was also reading Greek at age seven—Homer and Isocrates— which he had studied using the grammar of Theodoro Gaza. He told his father that he knew the whole of the first book of Gaza by heart.189 His classical studies continued into his teens; at thirteen he wrote a translation of Brum's treatise on the Florentine constitution.190 While still a teenager, Piero joined Poliziano in an ambitious project with his father to completely reorganize the Medici library. Piero's participation was no mere decoration; he kept his father informed on the progress of the project in a series of detailed letters.191 His attachment and loyalty to Poliziano was deep and lasted his lifetime. Even midst the crisis of Fall, 1494, he had time to write a note attacking his childhood friend Bartolomeo Scala when Scala criticized Poliziano who had just died.192 The many years of classical studies and rigorous literary training were visible throughout his years of leadership in his letters. Those written in his last days as he traveled out of Florence, writing on the run without benefit of the chancellery, show what he could do on his o w n skilled, direct, intelligent, gracious. Just to read his one most famous letter, that written to the authorities in Florence on October 26 as he journeyed to meet with King Charles, surprises the reader in its skill after having been misled by various historians who have depicted Piero as an ignoramous and a fool ("poco cervello").198

189 Maguire, Private Life, p. 108. 199 Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 115. 191 Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 178. 192 Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 115. 198 For more on the letter see below pp. 293-296.

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Again and again during his youth, friends of the family remark on Piero as gracious and talented. Matteo Franco called him a fine boy and "the most graceful thing you ever

s a w ."

194 And this was not just praise

for a father's ear. In another letter to his friend Piero Dovizi who would be at Piero de' Medici’s side to the end, Franco said, "I cannot tell you what charm there is about him, so that all who talk for a while with him are captivated.”! 95 Certain incidents reveal this charming boy. Poliziano tells how Piero brought music to the philosopher's room: "The evening before last I unexpectedly heard our Piero singing, and he came with his company to my room. He pleased me much, especially in the Motets, and in the replies to the verses, as well as by the lightness of his execution. It seemed as if i could hear your Magnificence."!95 All of these attractive reminiscences of Piero have one thing in common: they ante-date the crisis of 1494. After November 9, when the historians such as Parenti, Rucellai, and Nerli, as well as the official propaganda organs of the city went to work on the mythology of the Revolution, the gracious and charming Piero disappeared behind the brutal athlete depicted by Machiavelli, the "bestial" night-prowier of Guicciardini, "witness to the death of more than one man."!97

194 Maguire, Private Life, p. 115. 195 Maguire, Private Life, p. 118. 196 Maguire, Private Life, p. 119. 197 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 141 {History of Florence, p. 90): "Lui uomo altiero e bestiale e di natura da volere piu tosto essere temuto che amato, fiero e crudele, che a' suoi di aveva di notte dato delle ferite e trovatosi alia morte di qualche uomo."

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But of course even if Piero was a student and lifelong friend of one of the great philosophers of Renaissance Florence, and even if he had been given an extraordinary education rich with Latin and Greek, s till he might have been hopelessly lazy and so negligent of his duties that the finest education in the world would have been no good. This is the suggestion of Donald Weinstein following Guicciardini, who states that he was uninterested in "the exacting tasks of governing".198 Guicciardini grumbles that, "amidst the many dangers to the city and to himself, he would spend the whole day in the streets publicly playing football."199 Only a few historians have questioned this traditional view of Piero: Leopold von Ranke in his short essay on the period of Piero's rule,200 and most noteworthy, Joseph Schnitzer, whose main interest was Savonarola but whose research on this critical year of 1494 led him to see Piero differently than the Guicciardini-inspired polemic.201 Fortunately, we do not have to rely upon the subjective evaluations of historians or even contemporary witnesses in order to assess Piero's diligence as ruler. Documentary evidence survives from his period as de facto head of the government of Florence to suggest that he was

198 Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 122; 199 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 141:" conciosiache in tanti pericoli della citta e suoi propri stava tutto di nelle vie publicamente a giucare alia palla grossa." 200 Ranke, “Piero de' Medici," pp. 200-221. 201 Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 176: "Benche dipinto come incapace, egli non era certamente inferiore, per doti di spirito, ai suoi critici piu mordaci. Se si dava ad esercizi fisici ed a piaceri sessuali, bisogna ricordare che suo padre, da giovane, non si era comportato meglio e che molti fiorentini avrebbero meglio fatto a piangere le proprie mende che quelle di lui. II suo governo non era in verita cosi tristo come lo si diffamava."

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extraordinarily dedicated to the details of political leadership. Preserved within the collection of the Archivio Mediceo avanti il Principato in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze, is a register of the letters of Piero di Lorenzo de' Medici into which was recorded on a daily basis the date of the letter, its destination, sometimes a notation about its contents, and whether or not a copy had been made.202 The register is the single most important record we have for evaluating the efforts expended by Piero during his thirty months of rule. The evidence of the Ricordi is quite extraordinary since it suggests that Piero was herculean in his dedication to one of the most important tasks of a leader in the 1490's: correspondence. The text of the Ricordi in the printed edition runs to ninety-two pages. The average number of letters per page of the printed edition that were recorded as having been sent numbers about fifty letters per page. Thus a very rough estimate of the total number of letters that Piero wrote himself, or dictated to a secretary, or in a more general way ordered to be sent numbers an astounding 4500 letters. If we divide this rough total by the number of months Piero ruled, thirty, we discover that the average number of letters handled by Piero for the thirty months of his time in power

202 MAP, ASF, "Ricordi di lettere,” Registro n. 64, c. 27r to c. 90r. Marcello del Piazzo edited and published the "Ricordi" in 1954-54. See, "I ricordi di lettere di Piero di Lorenzo de' Medici", Archivio Storico itaiiano, vol. CXI I (1954), pp. 378-432; vol. CXI 11 (1955), pp. 101-142. Del Piazzo remarks (p. 378) on the Register: "II registro che ci interessa e il n. 64; codice cartaceo di cc. 138, numerato modernamente, legato in pergamena. Esso contiene: da c. 2r a c. 26t, i protocolli di Lorenzo il Magnifico, dal 2 maggio 1491 al 5 aprile 1492; da c. 27r a c. 90r , quelli relativi a Piero dal 1‘ 8 aprile al ottobre 1494."

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comes to about 150 letters a month or five a day. The reader should be reminded that all these numbers are rough estimates. But this total is by no means an exaggeration of the numbers; if anything it is short of the actual total as noted in the Ricordi. To the modern reader this may sound like an enormous amount of correspondence for anyone. But compared to the efforts of others in similar positions of responsibility in Italy in this period, it would not have been unusual.

Ambassadors were in the habit of writing once a

day and sometimes even twice at times of particular crisis. Piero's representative in the Po valley at the time of the battle of Mordano, Bernardo Dovizi, was writing twice a day.

Bernardo Rucellai, while in

Milan, wrote every day and thus by the time he returned to Florence after several years at the court of the Sforza, the archives in Florence contained hundreds of these letters.203 The volume of Piero's correspondence is similar to that of his father. Contained within the same register that holds the listing of Piero's letters, one finds in the firs t twenty-five pages another list for the letters of Piero's father, Lorenzo, sent in the last eleven months of his 1ife.204 a check of the enumeration of letters sent by Piero in a comparable period of time, the firs t eleven months of his rule (April, 1492 to February, 1493) reveals almost the same number of full pages in the Ricordi as those covering a comparable period in his father's rule.

203 Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo de' Medici, March 22, 1482 to March 19, 1484, Milan and other locales (ASF, MAP, XLVI11, 93 to 296). 204 ASF, MAP, Registro n. 64, c. 2r to c. 26fc.

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Once Piero took over he plunged in with great zeal. For example, on April 9, Piero wrote to the Duke of Milan, Giovanni Bentivoglio, Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, Niccolo Michelozzi, the Balie of Siena, Dionigi Pucci in Faenza, the castellano in Faenza, the government of Faenza, Sforzo Bectini in Lucca, Alessandro Bracci in Siena, Virginio Orsini, Niccolo Orsini, the Archbishop of Florence, the government at Camerino, Caterina Sforza at Forli, Duke Ercole d' Este at Ferrara, Francesco Secho at Pisa, the King of Naples, and the Duke of Calabria.205 During the following days of April, Piero wrote and dictated a like number of letters almost every day.205 This was of course a critical period. S till, it should be evident that this young man suddenly thrust into leadership could hardly have been out in the piazzas playing football at the same time that he was handling this extraordinary amount of daily correspondence. Suspicions that someone else was doing it all for him—for example, his personal secretary Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena— can be allayed by an examination of the correspondence that exists throughout the rule of Piero de' Medici with his close friend and personal secretary, Piero Dovizi.207 The quality and style of these very personal letters reveals a style identical to that in the more official correspondence suggesting

205 ASF, MAP, Registro n. 64, c. 27. (Del Piazzo, “Ricordi" Archivio Storico Italiano, vol. CXI I, p. 380). 200 The number of letters handled by Piero remains roughly constant throughout his thirty months of rule. Predictably, the firs t months immediately succeeding his father's death, and the last month with the invasion imminent, saw an increase of correspondence. But overall there is no period of great inactivity that might account for Guicciardini's impression. 2° 7 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, August 1, 1492 to October 30, 1494, various places of origin (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 39-83).

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that Piero was indeed the author (usually through dictation to Dovizi or some other secretary) of the correspondence that bears his signature. Especially revealing in this regard are the last six letters written by Piero as he journeyed to meet with the king. These etters were written on the run, from Empoli, Pisa, Pietra Santa, with no chancellery there to help, no Dovizi who was s till back in Florence. They reveal Piero de' Medici as completely capable of creating interesting, intelligent, and quite sensitive letters on his own. The existence of this record of Piero's correspondence exposes the lie of Guicciardini's more polemical version of Piero's rule and character in the Storie fiorentine just as does the massive collection of the correspondence of King Charles VIII reveal the historian's fraudulent ridicule of the king as illiterate.

S till, Guicciardini's cartoon of Piero

has been dominant over the centuries.

His characterization of Piero has

been so definitive that rarely has anyone reviewed the evidence such as the Ricordi to ask about the contradictions. And unfortunately the letters themselves have not survived in large numbers in the Archivio di Stato, Firenze.208 Within the collection of the Archivio Mediceo avanti

208 The sparse representation of the correspondence of Piero de' Medici within the collection of the Archivio Mediceo avanti il Principato remains one of the major mysteries encountered in the research for this paper. The Ricordi contains a notation for each letter as to whether that letter had been copied for the Florentine archives at the time of its sending and this record does suggest that a very small number such as those going to the Duke of Milan or the King of Naples, were copied. It may be that the percentage of Piero's letters surviving in the archives at Florence is no different than those for his father or grandfather and this w ill be a useful line of questioning for further research when time permits. But there may have been reasons for some of Piero's records and letters to have been intentionally mislaid

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il Principato less than a hundred of the letters or copies of letters sent by Piero are conserved. No doubt a systematic search of the main archival collections in Italy and France would greatly expand the inventory of Piero’s surviving letters beyond the relatively small number in the Archivio di Stato, Firenze. But within the main collection in Florence which has been used over the centuries to research and depict the Medici, a small number of Piero's letters remain. And worse, they are scattered all through the collection with no single concentration thus increasing the likelihood that researchers would come away from a review of the contents of the Archivio Mediceo avanti il Principato with the impression that Piero was unusually unproductive in the epistolary aspect of his rule. This impression has been extended in the few collections of the Medici correspondence of the period. In 1911, Janet Ross published what has become a rather influential collection of letters written by members of the Medici family in the fifteenth

c e n tu r y .2 0 9

The collection provides

one of the few sources in English for Medici letters, but it contains

or destroyed. It should be noted that in the confusion of the revolution the Ricordi itself was neglected and therefore a number of important letters written by Piero in his last days are not entered into the Ricordi (see Del Piazzo,"Ricordi,’’ Archivio Storico Italiano, vol. CXI 11, p. 140.) Entries stop after Oct.25, even though several significant letters survive from after that date, It can be surmised that in the confusion of the revolution and the fall of the government of Piero and the subsequent action of the government to brand him a tyrant, etc., that some of his records may have been lost or destroyed. The looting of the Palazzo Medici in the aftermath of the escape of Piero and Giovanni from Florence may have destroyed some of Piero’s records. 209 Ross, Lives o f the Early Medici as Toid in their Correspondence (Boston, 1911).

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nothing written by Piero. Another very significant collection is that of Abel Desjardins, Negotiations diplomatiques de la France avec !a Toscane published in 1859.210 Desjardins includes only the last six letters written by Piero in the final terrible moments as he journeyed to meet King Charles VIII, and thus the impression of Piero's rule from these last letters does not allow a balanced picture of his efforts over the entire period of his rule.

210 Desjardins, Negotiations diplomatiques {Paris, 1859).

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EMPOL!

On Saturday, October 25, Piero faced the Florentine authorities with a request for funds to reinforce Sarzana and the other coastal fo rts 2 1 1 But the increasing pressure of events and the arrival of Ridolfi's letter with the news that the king was indeed on his way to Tuscany, threw the Otto di Pratica into terrible confusion and in the midst of their arguments they insisted that Piero yield totally to the king.212 Since the Otto diPratica was the specific council with the responsibility of overseeing foreign affairs, it is hardly justified to state that Piero left Florence the next day without any mandate or without having discussed these issues with any official body, as so states Francesco Gaddi 213 in fact, Piero had spent a part of the day in a disputatious meeting with the very council whose office it was to

211 See above p. 222. 212 Parenti, Storia, 56v and 58r (Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434). This meeting of the Otto di Pratica on October 25 is very important in the story of Piero de' Medici, as mentioned above, p. 222, n. 37. The notice of it in Parenti allows us to evaluate the inaccuracy of all the other witnesses who state that Piero went to see the king without any instructions. 213 Francesco Gaddi, Priorista, p. 43: "non solum sanza alchuna publicha chomessione, ma sanza averne pure participato o chomunichato ne cholla signoria ne chon alchuno altro magistrato della citta." See also: Rubinstein, "Politics and Constitution in Florence at the End of the Fifteenth Century," p. 148, n. 1; Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 116.

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decide on policy dealing with foreign relations. Lorenzo Lenzi is quoted by Parenti as having told Piero that there should be no resistance to the king 214 In evaluating this important meeting, it should be considered that if the whole council of the Otto di Pratica had been unanimously opposed to any further resistance to King Charles, it hardly seems likely that such a meeting would have been very disputatious. Therefore, Parenti's record that this meeting was filled with "altercations" suggests that the meeting Piero attended just before he left Florence must have witnessed at least some members putting forward the patriotic reasoning that the city should resist as Piero was asking, while others such as Lorenzo Lenzi insisted that they should yield totally. If we grant the possibility that Parenti's record is accurate and that this meeting was filled with argument over what to do about King Charles, it is much easier to understand Piero's choice the next day to get up and leave. He would have done so midst the feeling that his city was hopelessly divided and that a consensus on policy was seemingly impossible to achieve.2 15

214 Parenti, Storia, fol. 58r (Delaborde, L ‘Expedition, p. 434). 215 Parenti's one small phrase about "altercatione factasi traili Octo della Pratica" {Storia, fol. 186r_v , Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 232) is our one and only hint of what opinion was really like in Florence in these few days before Piero de' Medici left the city to go to meet with Charles VIII. All the other histories, memoirs, and diaries record unanimity about the fact that the city was insisting that Piero yield to Charles. These reports of such unified opinion are highly suspect. Parenti's small notation suggests that opinion was otherwise. But beyond that, the record of Florentine governmental meetings suggests that there was almost never unanimity about anything. And at a moment such as this, with many influential Florentine families with banking and commercial

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It is not difficult to understand why the memoirists like Francesco Gaddi, who was a member of the Signoria in November and certainly knew the truth of these days, later stressed how Piero had left Florence suddenly without any instructions. The yielding of the forts to King Charles would have been an unwelcome responsibility for any commissioner and thosewho approved such a policy would have shared the hatred that fell on Piero. These Florentine governors were in a difficult position. They did not want to resist the king but they also did not want to be the ones who would give him the forts which would have to be given over to him if the city was going to yield to Charles as Lenzi seemed to think it should do. Thus when the Revolution was over and Piero was gone, it was useful revisionism to stress how Piero had gone off and done everything on his own even though he had done exactly what Lorenzo Lenzi (and probably others) had told him in the meeting of the

Otto di Pratica should be done. On Sunday, October 26, disturbed over the fighting in the Otto di

Pratica,2 ' 6 Piero de' Medici and a few close friends rode out of the Porta San Frediano and along the Via Pisana following the road that hugs the south bank of the meandering Arno, the route along which would

activities in Rome and Naples, it seems inconceivable that none of this countervailing opinion to the supposedly unanimously pro-French position was expressed in the councils. 216 parenti, Storia, fol. 186r_v (Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 232). Piero was in despair over the "altercatione factasi traili Octo della Pratica." Also, Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 141.

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arrive the French king and his army two weeks hence.217 As Piero and his friends journeyed toward Empoli, the forward troops of King Charles were moving through the Lunigiana and up the valley of the Aulella river to begin the siege and sack of Fivizzano, but this was unknown to Piero and he assumed he was on his way toward Piacenza.218 There was no way for him to know how fast the king was moving. Piero and his small party stopped for the night at Empoli which had been an important Tuscan crossroads for centuries. In the days of Charlemagne the fortress that guarded this riverside junction was known as Empoli Vecchio. Empoli's location a little less than half way along the Florence-Pisa journey made it an ideal overnight stop on the way to the port city. In addition it guarded an important intersection between the busy Florence-Pisa road and a road from the south through the Val d' Elsa, and another from across the river coming from Lucca.219 When Piero and his friends Jacopo Gianfigliazzi and Giannozzo Pucci had settled into their lodgings at Empoli, Piero sat down to w rite the most important letter of his life. To the Signoria he wrote: I will not seize upon excuses with Your Illustrious Lords, for this my sudden departure, since I do not believe that I deserve to be accused or attacked for what I believe, according to my own soul and humble judgement, to be the most beneficial 217 Tommaso Ginori, Libro di debitori e creditori (Schnitzer, Ouellen-\, p. 95): "Adi 26 d’ ottobre 1494 si parti di Firenze Piero di Lorenzo di P°. di Cosimo de Medici per andare al re di Francia, che si trovava in quello di Parma per passare nel reame di Napoli per conquistare quello." Also Landucci, Diario, p. 70. 218 See his letter below. 219 On Empoli see: Archibald Lyall, The Companion Guide to Tuscany (London, 1973), p. 60; Italy, A Phaidon Cultural Guide (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1985), p. 216.

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287

solution for the preservation of my country. In the absence of any general obstacle or clanger to anyone other than myself, and disregarding any hardship under present circumstances, it seems to me that in offering myself personally before His Most Christian Majesty the King of France, I may be able to calm his anger and hatred conceived against our city and state due to the things you have done up til now and due to your faithful adherence to obligations incurred to others. If the king wants nothing other than a change in your policies, I, who am viewed as most guilty, w ill either succeed in exculpating myself before His Most Christian Majesty or on the other hand w ill draw down upon myself whatever punishment is at hand, which is better than having it fall upon the Republic. My family has offered similar sacrifice to the Republic in the past. I feel the need to go far beyond the efforts of my predecessors since I have been honored far above my merits. Insofar as I am unworthy of such honor, I am obliged to do what I am doing at present. I w ill not spare any effort or discomfort or expense in this endeavor, even including death, which I would judge a worthwhile sacrifice for any one of you let alone for the good of the while City. Either I w ill be able to return with what w ill bring happiness to you and to the city or I w ill lose my life. Therefore, I beg Your Illustrious Lords, for the faith and affection that you render unto the bones of your Lorenzo and my father, and for the love you hold towards me your son, be willing to pray to God for me. Take care of my brothers and children, who if it please God that I not return, I render unto your care. I w ill leave tomorrow morning for Piacenza, and from there, if it please God, I w ill w rite again to Your Illustrious Lords to describe the situation that I find, and with their advice I w ill pursue that which I can faithfully do, if they w ill entrust to me some action. I entrust myself and all of my family to You.220

220 pjepo de' Medici to the Signoria of Florence, October 26, 1494, Empoli (ASF, MAP, LXXll, 79), printed in Desjardins, Negotiations diplomatiques, Vol. I, pp. 587-588. The English translation above is my own based upon the Italian original: "Io non piglierd altra scusa con Vostre Magnificenze di questa mia subita partita, perche non credo dovere essere imputato o ripreso di quel Io che, secondo l'animo mio e debole giudizio, mi e parso el piu salutifero remedio a conservazione della mia patria, e di manco impedimento dello universale e pericolo di ogni altri da me in fuora, e manco disagio a tutte le occorrenze

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288

Piero's dramatic journey to meet King Charles, and this letter which records the enterprise, have been analyzed extensively over the centuries.221 The reaction of the students upon reviewing the details of this adventure has been overwhelmingly negative towards Piero: Piero was sneaky (Francesco Gaddi); he ran off to save himself (Parenti fol.

presenti; parendomi con lo offerirmi in persona alia Maesta Cristianissima del Re di Francia, potere meglio sedare la ira o odio avessi conceputo contro cotesta Citta o Stato, di quel la, per le opere conservate insino a qui ad instanza della vostra fede e obblighi verso altrij perche, se sua Maesta Cristianissima non vuole altro che la mutazione del le operazioni vostre, io che ne sono stato incolpato, o me ne purghero con sua Maesta Cristianissima, o ne pigliero conveniente sipplizio piu presto in la persona mia che in cotesta Repubblica; per la quale ancora che simile opera sia pecullare gia fatta di casa mia, mi pare essere tenuto molto piu ad affaticarmi che i miei predecessori, per essere stato io molto piu sopra i meriti miei onorato che gli altri, che quanto manco ne sono stato degno, piu me obbliga e a questo che fo al presente, e a non perdonare mai a fatica o disagio o spesa fino alia morte inclusive, la quale mi reputerei a benefizio semprela spendessi per ciascuno di voi particulare, e tanto piu per lo universale di cotesta Citta, come me ingegnero fare al presente, che o ne raportero el contento e vostro e della Citta, o vi lascerd la vita. Intanto priego ie Magnificenze Vostre, per la fede e affezione debbono al le ossa del vostro Lorenzo, mio padre, e lo amore avete conservato inverso di me non manco figliuolo vostro che suo in reverenza e affezione, siate contenti fare pregare Dio per me, e avere per raccomandati miei fratelli e figliuoli, de' quali, se a Dio piace ch' io non torni, ne fo a tutti voi testamento, e me insieme con loro vi raccomando. lo partiro di qui domattina per a Piacenza, e la, se a Dio piacera, rescrivero a Vostre Magnificenze quale disposizione trovero, e con loro consiglio eseguiro, se le mi commetteranno cosa alcuna, piu fedelmente potro; e iterum me vi raccommando insieme con tutta la mia casa." 221 Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 116; Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 232; Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 130; Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 186; Vi 1lari, Savonarola, p. 209; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 435, Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 141; Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 464; Parenti, Storia, fol. 187-188.

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187); he went off without telling anyone (Gaddi); he went off assailed by fear, cowardice, and confusion frightened by the news of Fivizzano (Villari); he headed to Sarzana to hand over the forts in exchange for protection for himself from the king (Gaddi); he had a safe-conduct all promised before he left (Gaddi). All of it is wrong. After bravely trying to maintain a policy which he believed right for his city, a policy adopted by his beloved father and still in effect (a treaty with Naples which had never been abrogated by the government of Florence), he faced a hopelessly divided and rancorous meeting of the city council responsible for foreign policy and concluded that further resistance to the king was futile. The next morning he left the city, went the short distance to Empoli, and immediately sat down to inform the Signoria of his actions and intent. Within that letter he noted that he would continue to w rite to them and inform them of his actions (which he did ), that he did not know what would happen (he did not even know the king had arrived in Tuscany), but that he would attempt to fu lfill their desires. He informed the Signoria that he felt particularly responsible for the policy that had brought on the trouble with the king, therefore it seemed sensible for him to go personally to encounter the French sovereign. The letter was sent to his secretary, Piero Dovizi da Bibbiena, who would then present it formally to the Signoria and in an accompanying letter to Dovizi he said he fe lt fine, and was in good spirits ("Sono sano e di buona voglia."222)

222 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 26, 1494, Empoli (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 79, printed in Desjardins, Negotiations dip/omatiques, vol. I, pp. 588-589)

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The Piero de’ Medici who emerges from the six fascinating letters that he sent back to Florence in this period, October 26 to October 30, shows no resemblance to the quivering fool depicted by those such as Villari and others.223

Far from appearing confused as Villari

states, a

close reading of the letter to the Signoria reveals a proud and determined man and his accompanying letter to Dovizi confirms it. There is rhetorical skill, sane recognition of danger, very clear awareness that he would be totally at the disposition of the king, but hope that some reasonable agreement could be reached. 224 n 0 deals had been made beforehand with the king. In fact, Piero did not even know whether a safe-conduct would be issued to him for his journey to the king's court and when it arrived on October 30, his letter reflects his relief and delight .225 But there was nothing particularly rash or unwise about Piero de' Medici journeying through territory that was s till under Florentine control, stopping at towns and fortresses staffed with loyal Florentine troops, and moving as close as possible to the advancing army in the hope that a meeting could be arranged with King Charles. All the while, as he moved closer to the king, he used diplomatic means to arrange the meeting and to stay in touch with Florentine diplomats traveling with

223 villari, Savonarola, pp. 209-210. 224 The letters in question are: Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi (including the one to be taken to the Signoria), October 26 to October 30, Empoli, Pisa, and Pietra Santa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 79 (2 letters), 80, 81, 82, 83, all printed in Desjardins, Negociationsdiplomatiques, vol. I, pp. 587-593). 225 piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 30, 1494, Pietra Santa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 83).

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291

the king or nearby (such as Francsco Della

C asa)

226 |n addition, he kept

Florence informed of his progress by way of his secretary, Piero Dovizi, to whom he sent five letters in five

d a y s .227

Of course, there was a sense of anxiety and danger about the outcome of the meeting with the king. After months of threats having been directed at Florence by the French, there was a possibility of the king taking action against Piero's person. But once the safe-conduct arrived with personal assurances by Charles' closest advisors that Piero would be received "with full honors", Piero need not have been concerned about his personal safety. But however reasonable Piero's journey to Charles might have been in the moment of its execution, the historians have viewed it as the height of folly. One small phrase in Guicciardini's History of Florence, "following the example of his father's trip to Naples," has sparked five centuries of interpretation to the effect that the whole enterprise was a disastrous and ill-considered attempt to imitate his father's famous journey to Naples in 1479-80, at which time Lorenzo negotiated a truce with the King of Naples.228 Guicciardini's phrase is filled with 226 piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 29, 1494, Pietra Santa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 81). 227 see n. 223 above. 228 Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 141: "E pero, trovandosi Piero in gran pericolo per el disordine di fuori e la mala disposizione di drento, si risolv§ essergli necessario accordarsi con Francia, giudicando quello che era vero che posata bene questa parte, ognuno nella citta per timore o altro si rassetterebbe; e seauitando adunche, benche in diversi termini e poco a proposito, 1' esemplo del padre Lorenzo ouando ando a Napoli. .. .se ne ando a Serezzana [Sarzana] a trovare el re ...." (my emphasis). History of Florence, p. 90. For the details of Lorenzo's trip to Naples which Piero was supposedly following see Judith Hook, Lorenzo de'Medici, pp. 112-117.

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ambiguities. Did he mean to say that Piero consciously planned to imitate the trip of his father? Or did he mean that the trip resembled the one Lorenzo took? Did he mean that he the historian saw the parallel and was drawing it to our attention? Certainly, to a historian writing about the events of 1494 sixteen years later, a parallel between the two events might have seemed obvious, especially since the results of Piero’s trip would have been well known and therefore the success of the father compared to the supposed failure of the son would have by then been becoming part of the new historical mythology of Florence.

But there is

nothing in any document or any contemporary observation, that suggests that any participant in the events or any witness to the events saw this trip as an imitation of Lorenzo’s trip to Naples at the time it took place. We have only this one phrase written by Guicciardini in 1508 during a period of strong anti-Medicean feeling when the Medici were in exile, to tell us that Piero intended to imitate his father. Piero Parenti, who was living through all these events and so accurately records them, says nothing about such a parallel either intended or observed at the moment of Piero's trip nor does anyone else .229 Whatever Guicciardini meant about Piero's trip, the historians who have come after him have accepted his version of the affair and have drawn all the predictable conclusions about Piero. Pasquale Villari

229 The relevant section of Parenti's history would be: Storia fiorentina, fols. 187-188. There is no mention of such a parallel in Cerretani, Gaddi, Landucci, Ginori, Rinuccini, Sanudo, or Commynes. Commynes is especially relevant since he was a personal friend of Lorenzo and prided himself on being well informed on Florentine affairs and would seem to have been the most likely participant to notice and record such a parallel if anyone would.

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compares Piero's cowardice to Lorenzo's courage. "In this way he thought to imitate his father's journey to Naples, when, by daringly putting himself in King Ferdinand’s power, Lorenzo had succeeded in obtaining honorable terms from him." But poor Piero, "urged by fear to that which Lorenzo had done from courage, reaped nothing but humiliation and ruin by an act that had brought increased power and prestige to his father."230 one hundred years later, Donald Weinstein, still following the Guicciardini lead, saw Piero's action as "a disastrous parody."2 3 1 Most significant of all is an article by Nicolai Rubinstein in which he analyzes the letter sent by Piero to the Signoria, and suggests that the letter its elf is an imitation of the one written by Lorenzo de' Medici to the Signoria at the time of his departure to Naples.232 "Piero's action was clearly modelled on that of his father, to the extent that even the letter he wrote back to Florence when on the way to the French camp imitates in style and content the letter of justification which Lorenzo wrote to the Florentine Signoria before embarking for Naples."233 Since it is known that Piero left suddenly the next day after the raucous meeting of the Otto di Pratica, and that most likely the decision to leave came late October 25 after this meeting was concluded, should we assume that Piero wrote out the letter in Florence before he left the city using a copy of the letter his father had w ritten as a model? That would seem to have been a bit risky. How could Piero know what events 230 V illari, Savonarola, p. 209. 231 Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 130. 232 Rubinstein, "Politics and Constitution in Florence at the End of the Fifteenth Century," in Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, 1960), pp. 148-149. 233 Rubinstein, "Politics," p. 149.

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might intervene even in the twenty-four hours that would pass before he could get to Empoli?

Or should we assume that he carried with him to

Empoli a copy of his father's letter and used it as he prepared his own letter that evening? If this were the case it is extraordinary that no one /

ever mentioned this at the time and one cannot but wonder what happened to such a precious document after the events of October. Or should we assume that he memorized his father's letter before leaving Florence? But this would seem the least possible in the rush of events that were unfolding so fast. Whatever the practical reality of the letter, it is safe to assume that Piero was fam iliar with it as a document deriving from his father's most famed exploit and whether he knew it well already or glanced at it in the excitement of his departure, it is fa ir to suggest, as Rubinstein does, that the famous letter of his father helped him to phrase his own thoughts in a similar situation .234 But the influence of the letter does not in itself call for the kind of characterization of Piero's journey to the king that has derived primarily from the History o f Florence by Guicciardini. While Piero may very well have availed himself of his father's rhetoric to impress the Signoria in this moment of tension, the motivation for the trip emerged from events, from the confusion in Florence and Piero's perception that something had to be done not from a desire to imitate his father. His own approach to the action he took is clear in the five letters that he wrote during the days of the trip. He certainly did not expect to receive great glory from

234 Rubinstein, "Politics and Constitution," p. 149.

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his efforts. On the contrary, he seems to have been extremely pessimistic about retaining power at all. The dozens of witnesses to these events never once mentioned the parallel between Lorenzo’s trip to Naples and Piero's to Sarzana. Only later in Guicciardini's history did the whole episode become encompassed in the imagery of imitation. Piero's exit from Florence, his negotiations, his return, all were compared to Lorenzo's diplomatic success. Finally, in looking at this important journey by Piero to meet with Charles VIII, it should be noted that the two events , Piero with Charles and Lorenzo with King Ferrante of Naples were similar. This does not in any way necessarily lead to the conclusion that the participant in the second journey undertook that trip intending to imitate the first. The most obvious explanation for the motivation behind Piero's journey is to be found in his own letter, and in Parenti's history which tells us that Piero left Florence "suddenly," after the meeting of the Otto di Pratica disturbed by the fighting he had observed there.235 He felt he had to try to do something since the council seemed hopelessly incapable of a decision. So he left.

235 parenti, Storia, fol. 56, and 58 (Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 434).

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SANTO STEFANO DI MAGRA

On Monday, October 27, Piero and his friends, Jacopo Gianfigliazzi and Giannozzo Pucci, arose in Empoli to a cold rainy day. They set off along the road to Pisa and traveled west along the river in the driving rainstorm. The Florentines continued on through San Miniato al Tedesco from whose fortress high above the road the vicars of the German emperors—Otto, Barbarossa, Frederick the Great— ruled Tuscany, and then passed through Pontedera, an important crossroads to Lucca toward the north and Volterra toward the south. In the evening, they arrived at the outskirts of Pisa, rode into the city and crossed to the north side of the Arno on one of the city's bridges, most likely the Ponte della Fortezza which stands right in front of the Palazzo Medici. The thirteenth-century Gothic-style palazzo that was the center of Medici activities in Pisa must have been a welcome sight to the horsemen who had ridden all day in the rain. 236 236 The following sources are important for the events of Oct. 26 to Oct. 31. Piero de’ Medici's letters to Piero Dovizi are the most valuable source and they w ill be cited individually below. Among the chroniclers, Francesco Gaddi, Priorista, and Giovanni Portoveneri, MemoriaJe, are most significant. Portoveneri, as his name suggests, was a native of this coastal region and therefore took close notice of the details of this week. Guicciardini, Stone fiorentine, ed. Greco, pp. 141-142, and Parenti, Storia, fols. 187-188, are helpful. Sanudo, Spedizione, always concentrates on King Charles and therefore provides no useful material on these activities of Piero until the Medici leader arrives at the king's camp. Commynes was not present in Tuscany at this tim e—he was in Venice—so his narrative of these days comes to him second hand from diplomats and possibly from King

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Once the travelers were settled in the palace, Piero quickly turned to the task of informing Florence by way of his secretary Piero Dovizi of his progress. He had arrived, he told Dovizi, worn out by the journey, the rainy day, and the bad bed he had slept in the night before. "Tomorrow w ill put me back on the right road."237 n0w that Piero had arrived in

Charles (Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, pp. 464-465). For the secondary literature see: Dalaborde, {.Expedition-, Villari, Savonarola, p. 210; Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 144; Weinstein, Savonarola, pp. 130131; Rubinstein, Government of Florence, pp. 232-233; LabandeMailfert, Charles V III, p. 288; Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 116. One of the most significant errors that recurs repeatedly in the histories of this period pertains to Piero at Empoli. It has been stated that he went to Empoli with other ambassadors of the city, all on their way together to see King Charles, when Piero slipped away from the official party and ran ahead and made his private deal with the king. This is inaccurate. There was no embassy sent by Florence to meet the king in Tuscany before Nov. 2. But it is easy to understand how this error found its way into the tradition since Guicciardini and others had accented the solitary, sneaky, aspect of Piero's flight. The inaccuracy about Empoli only accented further the image of Piero w illfully subverting the intentions of the city of Florence, whereas in reality Piero was Informing the authorities with daily letters as he moved west and north. For an example of this interpretation see Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 144: “On the news of the French approach the Signory of Florence decided to send an embassy to the king: eight of the chief citizens were selected to serve upon it, and amongst them was Piero. This made it easier for him to carry out his secret resolve, in which he was confirmed by the news that the reinforcements sent to Sarzana had been intercepted and cut to pieces by the French. Giving the slip to his colleagues, he went on alone by way of Pisa to Pietrasanta ..." For the Palazzo Medici in Pisa see Archibald Lyall, Companion Guide to Tuscany, p. 69. The palazzo is located on the Lungarno Mediceo and is now known as the Palazzo del Governo immediately adjacent to the Museo Nazionale. On the Medici in Pisa see Mallett, "Pisa and Florence," pp. 433-435. 237 pjero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 27, 1494, Pisa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80).

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Pisa and had access to information on the movements of the French just up the coast to the north, he learned that the king was at Pontremoli and therefore he resolved to move north on the next day to Pietrasanta to make contact with the king's lieutenants.238 Piero found affairs in Pisa in a state of great disorder.239 His profligate and irresponsible brother-in-law, Francesco Cibo (called Franceschetto because of his small stature) was proving hopelessly incapable of handling the complex mix of business and politics that required the continual attention of the Medici and their representatives in Pisa.240 Francesco, the illegitim ate son (called a "nephew") of Pope Innocent VIII (Giovanni Battista Cibo) and an unknown Neapolitan woman, was married to Piero's sister Maddalena. Life had been difficult for Maddalena from the beginning of her marriage in January, 1488.241 Francesco, with the protection and money of his papal father, lived a life of continual gambling, infidelities, street fights in the Roman alleys, and scandals. In one such incident he was accused of having participated with some friends in the rape of a woman. In one of the most famous nights of gambling in Roman history, Francesco lost 60,000 scudi to Raffaello Riario— another papal nephew— a sum which provided funds for the construction of the entire Palazzo della Cancelleria.242

ah 0f this

238 A5F, MAP, LXXII, 80. 239 ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80. 240 p Petrucci, "Francesco Cibo," Dizionario biografico degli italiani (Rome, 1981), vol. 25, pp. 243-245. For Medici business in Pisa see Mallett, "Pisa and Florence," pp. 433-435. 241 on the marriage see Ady, Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 111. 242 Georgina Masson, The Companion Guide to Rome (London: Fontana Books, 1970), p. 144.

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embarrassed and saddened the quite proper and genuinely pious Maddalena who, nevertheless, seems to have remained devoted to Francesco to the end.243 It is easy to understand how little interest Francesco would have shown in the dull business details that required attention in Pisa, and Piero resolved to send Cibo back to Florence under the cover of his going to the aid of Alfonsina 244 Apparently, Piero never had time to make the change since Cibo was there among the important Florentine leaders in Pisa who greeted King Charles VIII upon his arrival on the eighth of November245 If family business and city politics were in poor repair partly due to his brother-in-law, Piero found the entire Pisan province in a state of chaos because of Charles VIII 246 In all directions, civil order was collapsing. On the coast at Porto Pisano, troops and ships of the King of Naples were in the process of hurried and disorderly withdrawal to avoid being caught by the advancing French. In the countryside around Pisa, a furious migration (Portoveneri: "grandissima furia") of thousands of residents was crowding the roads as they flooded into the coastal city hoping to find protection not only from the frightening army from the other side of the Alps, but also from armed Italian bands who had now lost their chain of command and m ilitary discipline. In the chaos of the invasion, certain towns and castles were seizing the moment to rebel against Florentine control, an adumbration of a similar but much more

243 It is through the children of this marriage that the line of Cibo-Malaspina is born. 244 A5F, MAP, LXXII, 80. 245 Fanucci, "Relazioni tra Pisa e Carlo VIII," p. 7. 246 Portoveneri, Memorials, p. 286.

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dangerous rebellion that would take place one week hence in Pisa itself.247 Portoveneri records that over thirty castles had fallen in just these few days. There were now thousands of residents of this coastal plain that reaches all the way to Sarzana, searching for haven, and most seemed to be heading for Pisa. They came carrying all of their possessions: food, animals, furniture. One can imagine what a disturbing scene greeted Piero as the city filled up with this disorderly mobilization (". . .tutto il contado, cioe el piano di Pisa, sconbera in Pisa tutte loro robe e vittovaglie in grandissima furia").248 . But one of Piero's greatest concerns on this day was his necessary confrontation with the king at which he anticipated he was going to have to jettison his alliance with King Alfonso. His letter to Dovizi in Florence written in Pisa dwells at length on his sense of failure towards Alfonso and it is clear that, whether or not it was wise, there is no question that Piero was genuinely and personally devoted to the Neapolitan royal house and to the alliance his father had built with it 249 After only one day in Pisa, Piero was on the road again on the morning of the twenty-eighth. He started out through the northwest gate of Pisa next to the cathedral, traveled up along the coast around Monte Pisano which rises 3,000 feet just north of the city, then continued on through the forest of Migliarino with its swaying pine and holm oak, skirted the edges of the malarial marshes of Lago Massaciuccoli, and finally arrived

247 Portoveneri, Memoriale, p. 286. 248 Portoveneri, Memoriale, p. 286. 24$ ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80.

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301

at the Porta Pisana of Pietrasanta in the evening.250 pjetrasanta was exactly half way between Pisa and Sarzana— and King Charles. Since most historians think that this journey cost the Medici Florence in 1494, it is interesting to consider that as Piero settled into Pietrasanta to await this most important encounter of his life, he was in the heart of the region that would yield the longest-held territory for the heirs of the House of Medici in all of Italy. When Lorenzo Cibo (1500-1549), the son of the disreputable Francesco Cibo and Piero's sister Maddalena, married Ricciarda Malaspina, they created the Cibo-Malaspina dynasty that lasted well into the nineteenth century holding the Duchy of Massa-Carrara long after the last Medici had died in Florence.251 Pietrasanta is a walled town with a perfect rectilinear plan laid out in the thirteenth century by Guiscardo Pietrasanta at the center of the narrow coastal plain called the Versilia that is squeezed between the water and the Apuan Alps. Piero most likely went to stay in the Palazzo del Pretorio at the center of the town across from the Duomo since his extensive diplomatic activities already underway would have included formal receptions for the king's representatives for which he would have required an appropriately official setting. Outside in the piazza, a column holding aloft the heraldic lion of Florence, the Marzocco, announced Florentine control of the region.

250 pjero qe' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 29, 1494, Pietra Santa (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 81). 251 f. Petrucci, "Lorenzo Cibo," Dizionario biografico degli italiani, (Rome, 1981), vol. 25, pp. 255-257.

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But that control was collapsing. In a letter written to Dovizi the day after his arrival in Pietrasanta, Piero reviewed the situation .252 "Here and there, we are in bad shape." (Qui e la siamo in cattivo term ine. . . ) The French forces had gone around Sarzana (leaving it in Florentine control) and had moved south to take two fortified towns, Ortonovo and Nicola, that stood a bit above the coastal plain and were a part of its defenses. The even more important and better fortified Castelnuovo was being bombarded as Piero wrote to Florence.253 This report in Piero’s letter to Dovizi that the French had surpassed Sarzana, changes in an important way our understanding of the situation that Piero found as he approached his meeting with the king. The French were not completely blocked at Sarzana as has often been written.254 They had already moved past Sarzana and were on their way south taking each coastal town one by one. An agreement with Florence even now would save them resources and open the way to an easy march south to Pisa, but they were already well along in their movement down the coast. But for Piero this situation must have presented him with much more alarming conditions than he had expected while s till in Pisa. Events were unfolding very rapidly. If the French had already passed Sarzana, further Florentine resistance was increasingly irrelevant. Although he had talked of reinforcements in his letters to Dovizi and s till had been considering further attempts at holding the French, with this most recent information about their movement past Sarzana he must

252 piero de1Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 29, 1494, Pietrasanta (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 81). 253 A5F, MAP, LXXII, 81. 254B r j(jge, France, vol. II, p. 142.

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have concluded that fighting was now futile. He had over 600 men there in Pietrasanta, a not inconsiderable force that had all the strategic advantages over the invaders. But now he began to w rite to Dovizi of using his position to arrive at an honorable agreement ("per tanto che crederrei avere tempo a fare li patti onorevolmente").255 it is worth noting that the attitudes Piero displayed in these letters do not resemble a fool rushing to throw himself upon the mercy of the king .256 pven on the day just before meeting the king, Piero was s till evaluating the strategic situation carefully and speculating about reinforcements and the possibility of resistance, although on October 30, when he knew all the facts about the king's progress and location from his interview with the king's ambassadors, he then resolved that the king would be in Pisa within a few days no matter what the Florentines did to impede him, and that some agreement was mandatory .257 These two days in Pietrasanta, waiting for word from the king's camp, were the worst for Piero. He had no way of knowing whether or not the king wanted to meet with him at all. Possibly the French no longer wanted an agreement with Florence; possibly they would just take everything by force. He had heard nothing from Sarzana: not from the king nor from the Florentine ambassadors. He had sent ahead two envoys to ask for a safe-conduct from the king but they had not returned and he concluded that they had been hanged by the French. Food was scarce. He

255 A5F, MAP, LXXII, 81. 256 Pop one influential version of this view of Piero see Villari, Savonarola, p. 210: 257 see the three letters written Oct. 29-30 (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 81-83).

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was being bombarded with conflicting advice, some maintaining that he should immediately send all the troops to Pisa.258 Finally on the morning of the thirtieth, a herald of the French royal court arrived before Piero to announce that a safe-conduct had been arranged and that envoys were now at this very moment on their way to Pietrasanta to accompany Piero to see the king 259 In the excitement of this news, Piero hurried to write a quick brief note to his loyal friend and secretary telling him of the latest turn of events. His relief is palpable. "I know that you w ill rejoice with me over this great honor. Tell the Otto and Alfonsina, and Monsignore [Giovanni] and Giuliano immediately."280

258 ASF, MAP, LXXII, 81. 259 Piero de' Medici wrote twice to Piero Dovizi on October 30. The first letter was written in the morning upon receiving the herald announcing the safe-conduct(ASF, MAP, 83). The second letter was written late afternoon or early evening ("sera”) after the arrival of St. Malo and his party and describes the pleasant behavior of the archbishop. It also refers to the letter written that morning. These two letters have been filed in the Archivio Mediceo avanti il Principato in reverse order (numbers 82 and 83) and this has led to a great deal of confusion. 280 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 30, 1494, Pietrasanta (ASF, MAP, 83): "Questa lettera sara breve, ma di buono effetto. L'araldo del Cristianissimo Re di Francia or ora e venuto qui a dire, e per parte di Saint-Malo e di due altri gentili signori mi ha chiesto el salvacondotto; a quali signori mandati dal Cristianissimo Re di Francia vengono innanzi per ricevermi. Dovvene avviso perche meco vi rallegriate di tanto onore, di che farete intendere subito a' signori Otto e Alfonsina, a Monsignore [Giovanni] e Giuliano."

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The ambassador leading the French party to Pietrasanta was Guillaume Brigonnet, Archbishop of St. Malo 261 The choice of St. Malo as the envoy may have given Piero some concern since he knew that the French prelate had been a strong opponent of Florence within Charles' court when the ambassadors from the Republic had been maneuvering in France before the expediton was launched.2^2 gut once the French party had arrived at Pietrasanta, Piero was happy to find the archbishop behaving honorably towards him and offering him a gracious greeting ("molto onorrevolmente .. .grate accoglienze") .263 st. Malo talked with Piero about the king's plans and announced that even though the hour was late the party would depart from Pietrasanta immediately. They gathered and set off quickly for the fifteen mile journey along the coast to meet with the king near Sarzana.264

261 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 30, 1494, Pietrasanta (ASF, MAP, 83). For background on Brigonnet and his previous relations with Florentine diplomats in France as the expedition was forming see Bridge, France, vol. II, pp. 80-85. 262 Bridge, France, vol II, p. 80. 263 ASF, MAP, 82. 264 it seems unusual for a high-level ambassadorial party to set off at what must have been almost the end of the day for a journey that would surely require them to travel in the dark, but all authorities are agreed that Piero arrived to see the king on October 30, and therefore since Piero's letters give a detailed report of this entire day, it is necessary to conclude that the group did travel very late into the evening of the thirtieth so as to arrive at the king's quarters Oct. 30. See LabandeMailfert, Charles VIII, p. 288; Bridge, France, vol II, p. 144; Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 436. Guicciardini in S to riad 'Italia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 98, writes: "[Piero] aspetto a Pietrasanta il salvocondotto regio, dove andorono per condurlo sicuro il vescovo di San Malo e alcun altri signori della corte; dai quali accompagnato entro in Serezana il di medesimo che il re col resto dell' esercito si uni con l'antiguardia ..

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This decision on the part of the group at Pietrasanta to go so quickly to Sarzana without even a night’s rest, suggests that at this moment the exigencies of events demanded urgent resolution of the diplomatic and military situation in the coastal strip south of Sarzana. The French obviously were losing time and supplies in the fighting in progress and St. Malo's instructions were to bring Piero de’ Medici to the king as fast as possible. As the archbishop had been traveling south to meet with Piero, the king had been traveling all day too. He had left Pontremoli in the morning, had stopped at the castle of Aulla that he liked so much, and then continued on to the northern outskirts of Sarzana to the small roadside town of Santo Stefano di Magra, most likely to shorten St. Malo's return journey with Piero .265 The diplomats in Pietrasanta and their extremely important charge moved north along the coastal road in the quiet of the late evening, passed the critical city of Sarzana, inside of which Piero's friend and relative Piero di Leonardo Tornabuoni was holding out against the French siege, and traveled a few miles up the Lunigiana valley along the Magra river to the little Badia on the edge of Santo Stefano di Magra which sits on the riverbanks. There the king was waiting (Sanudo: "Piero zonse dal Re preditto, el qual era a una badia mia do lontan de Serzana ..."). In the simple rooms of this small country monastery, the King of France received the man who had done more to slow the royal progress than anyone. This was the firs t time they had ever met.266

265 Charles wrote from Pontremoli on the morning of Oct. 30 {Lettres de Charles VIII, vol. IV, p. 105) and was in Santo Stefano di Magra that evening for his interview with Piero. 266 on the meeting of Charles and Piero at Santo Stefano di Magra see

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Piero was introduced into the presence of the king and was received pleasantly, but, adds Guicciardini, more in appearance than in truth ("introdotto innanzi al re, e da lui raccolto benignamente piu con la fronte che con I'animo .. .")267 It is a mystery how Guicciardini knew what was in Charles' heart at this moment since no document, no letter, records his feelings. But whatever they were, the two men passed the whole next day in close consultations. Guicciardini describes them as "lengthy discussions and negotiations" ("molte pratiche e ragionamenti").268 This detail from Guicciardini, who is so hostile to Piero throughout his two histories, is especially valuable in refuting the now near-cliche presentation of Piero throwing himself on his knees before the king and begging that Charles save him from the wrath of the people of Florence in exchange for the keys to the fortresses. Commynes

the following: Portoveneri, Memoriale, p. 286; Gaddi, Priorista, pp. 42-43; Ginori, Libro di debitori, pp. 95-96; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 107; Parenti, Storia, fols. 187-188; Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, ed. Greco, p. 142; Storiad'Italia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, pp. 98-99; Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, pp. 464-465; Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 436; Villari, Savonarola, p. 210; Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 144; Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. I, p. 186; Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 288; Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 131; Brown, Bartolomeo Scafa, p. 116; Rubinstein, Government or Florence, p. 232 267 storiad'/ta/fa, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 98. 268 History o f Florence, tr. Domandi, p. 91 ( Storie fiorentine, ed. Greco, p. 142). The detail about lengthy negotiations is present only in the Storie fiorentine. It disappears from the storia d 'Italia (I, 98) as Guicciardini narrates the exact same scene. This change provides one of the most vivid examples of how the reality of 1494 was turned into myth when the historian and other Florentines looked back on 1494 from a distance of several decades. Guicciardini also repeats the Commynes observation about the reaction of the French to Piero, thus accentuating the image of Piero as fool (II, 99).

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seems to have been the earliest source for the damaging presentation of Piero at Santo Stefano di Magra in which Piero agrees to give up the forts even before he sees the king. "Brigonnet was sent to meet [Piero], They spoke to him about obtaining the obedience of the place of Sarzana, and he did it immediately .. .Those who dealt with Piero told me about it, making fun of him . . 269 Marin Sanudo, Commynes' acquaintance in Venice, elaborated on the scene in his history of the expedition. He described Piero throwing himself on his knees before the king and presenting the fortresses to Charles.270

memorable detail of the

kneeling has prevailed over the more mundane lengthy negotiations as described by Guicciardini, and later historians who have come after have stressed Piero at Santo Stefano unable to shake off his terrors his courage failing him, persuading himself that he must place all his trust in Charles' generosity, and accepting without demur the "harsh conditions imposed upon him".271 But Piero's posture before the king was never the most serious issue during his meeting at Santo Stefano di Magra. The angriest critics of his conference with Charles insisted that he had made commitments and accepted agreements for which he had no authority. Francesco Gaddi, a member of the Signoria at the time Charles arrived in Florence, put it most uncompromisingly: such grave and most important things had been determined on the private authority of Piero, without any public

2^9 Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 464. 270 sanudo, Spedizione, p. 107. 271 Villari, Savonarola, p 210; Bridge, France, vol. II, p. 144.

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commission, without having consulted or communicated with the Signoria, or with any other magistrate of the city.272 This was written after Piero had fallen from power when it was urgent to fix upon him all of the blame for the outcome of the crisis. But it is not true. The reader w ill remember that only five days before Piero arrived at the meeting with the king, Lorenzo Lenzi in a meeting of the Otto di

Pratica, the Signoria's committee on foreign affairs, had instructed Piero to yield to the king. Furthermore, when Piero left Florence the next day after that meeting, and wrote to the Signoria telling them that he was on his way to confer with the king, neither the Signoria nor any other commission nor magistrate did anything to either recall him, or to instruct him specifically, or to dispatch any other ambassadors to acoompany him with more detailed instructions. In fact, what they did was sit in Florence for one whole week. As Piero moved day by day, closer and closer to Charles, each day writing to inform them in Florence where he was and what he was doing, the government remained silent and waited to see what would happen. The firs t move by the authorities in Florence to act in any way to lim it Piero's authority was on November 2, one week after he had left. At any time during that week they could have dispatched a simple messenger demanding that he return, yet they did nothing. Then on November 2, when the authorities in Florence had information about what had happened at Santo Stefano di Magra from 272 Gaddi, Priorista, p. 43: "[There was] dispiacere grande che le cose si gravi et importantissime alia republics se ne determinassi per propria e privat' authorita di Piero, et non solum senza alcuna publics commessione, ma senza haverne participato ne communicato con la Signoria, ne con alcuno altro magistrato della Citta."

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310

Piero himself,273 Wh0 communicated with the appropriate body, the

Otto di Pratica, as he had done all during the week through Piero Dovizi, then suddenly there was activity by the authorities and an ambassadorial group was sent. Considering that in the mythology that developed after Piero's fall, it was told how Piero went off and gave away the fortresses against everybody's w ill, one would assume that the instructions to the ambassadors would have told them to repudiate immediately the entire agreement at Santo Stefano and to warn the king that Piero was there without any authority ("senza alcuna publica commessione"). Or at least one would have expected the group to be instructed to repudiate the agreement in a meeting with Piero. But nothing of the kind was arranged. Quite the contrary. The ambassadors were instructed to confer w ith Piero. And they were instructed to tell the king that they were overjoyed at the generous and most kind reception that had been extended to Piero and that this kindness would be viewed as having been extended to the whole city in his person Further, the ambassadors were instructed to inform His Majesty of the marvelous and incredible joy that had greeted the information that the king was on his way to Florence. But not one word about the fortresses. Nothing about Sarzana. No mention of rage sweeping the city at the scandalous agreement.274

273 Gaddi confirms this in the same passage quoted above, p. 43. 274 For the instructions see following note.

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There was one very curious aspect within the instructions given to the ambassadorial group dispatched to the king. The ambassadors were prepared with two possible modes of action. They could present themselves to the king without Piero, or they could present themselves to the king with Piero included. In each case they had a separate set of papers: one was labeled "with Piero" the other had nothing written on the outside. This detail tells much. It says that as specific action was demanded by the Signoria in response to the king, already there was a move to sacrifice Piero. Certainly, the Signoria knew how unpopular the ceding of the fortresses was going to be in Florence (Gaddi, p. 43). Yet they must also have known that the king was going to demand no less. Since the fortresses had been yielded, the time was right to begin to separate themselves from the man who had done the dirty deed. That is what is signified by the revealing instructions of the second of N o v e m b e r.2 7 5

275 instructions given to the eight ambassadors sent to Charles VIII on November 2, 1494 (Riformagione, classe X, dist. I, reg. n. 75; printed In Desjardins, Negociations, vol. I, pp. 597-598): "Andrete a incontrate la Maesta di Carolo Re di Francia per la via di Pisa, poi di Serzana, dove intenderete che sia, e quanto piu lo potrete incontrare; e conferirete prima con Piero de' Medici questa deliberazione nostra di mandarvi ambasciadori incontro alia Maesta del Re di Francia. Secondo ancora il suo ricordo, e secondo che parra a lui o insieme con esso o di per se, voi altri sette, sanza Piero de’ Medici, vi presenterete alia Maesta di quello Cristianissimo Re, e presenterete la lettera della credenza, e aretene due: l'una insieme con Piero, che sara segnata dappie di fuori con questa parola cioe: Cum Piero\ 1' altra e senza la persona di Piero, che non ara segno alcuno; accioche possiate presentare quel la che si richiedera, con Piero de' Medici, senza lui secondo che li paressi. E, presentate dette lettere di credenza, quello di voi che sara deputato a parlare, dira che noi, avendo inteso la sua deliberazione di venire a Firenze, ne abbiamo preso maravigliosa e

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The critics said that Piero made agreements without any public commission or without any authority to do so. But the agreements that he made at Santo Stefano di Magra were oral agreements ("promesse con semplici parole")27^ understood to require forwarding to Florence for official approval of the authorities in the usual way.277 The only thing that was done without approval was the yielding of the fortresses to Charles. Did the authorities in Florence really believe that with Sarzana surrounded, with Castelnuovo under bombardment, with dozens of castles and towns already lost and more rebelling from their Florentine loyalty, with thousands of French troops waiting to move, that the king and Piero were supposed to sit in Sarzana for four days or more while messengers carried the terms to Florence and then back to the Tuscan coast? And aside from the unacceptable delay, Florentine governmental indecision was what had driven Piero out of Florence in the first place. He must have realized what would happen if the Signoria were asked to

incredibile allegrezza, e abbiamo ringraziato Iddio come di eccellentissimo dono e grazia ricevuta da Lui, da chi viene ogni bene. E direte che e aspettato qui con tanto desiderio che nessuna lingua lo potrebbe esplicare. E lo ringraziete della umanissima e clementissima accoglienza fatta a Piero de' Medici, nostro cittadino, cio6 fatta a tutta la nostra cittd nella persona sua. E gli raccomanderete brevemente la Citta e popolo nostro, piu che mai osservantissimo e cultore della Sua Cristianissima Maesta. E di poi ne verrete in sua compagnia, procurando in ogni luogo che si facci ogni dimostrazione possibile di somma allegrezza e contentezza nostra; e similmente che in ogni luogo si facci dimostrazioni e fatti della fede nostra singolarissima nella Sua Cristianissima Maesta." The seven ambassadors (Piero made the eighth) were: Piero Alamanni, Piero Soderini, Agnolo Niccolini, Domenico Bonsi, Francesco Valori, Braccto Martel 11, and Giuliano Salvlatl. 276 Guicciardini, S to riad 'Italia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 98. 277 Guicciardini, Storia d 'Ita lia , ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 98.

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decide on such unpalatable alternatives while he sat waiting in the king's camp. He decided he had to act. His letters of the previous days make his understanding of this clear; he knew that he must seize the moment even if his action resulted in his own ruin. His letters repeatedly stress that he must act for the good of the city 278 But in analyzing the controversial yielding of the fortresses an even more profound confusion should be addressed. Did anyone in Florence in October, 1494, really believe that the King of France with his army of 17,000 would proceed through Tuscany without control of the vital coastal forts? This is the absurdity in both the contemporary reaction and later historical analysis. Piero only yielded at the last possible minute that which would have been required by any agreement from the very beginning of discussions with the king about "free passage" through Tuscany, something Charles had been asking for two years. "Free passage" meant that the army passing through was granted temporary control of fortified places. It could not be otherwise. What guarantees would such an army have that the residents would not suddenly activiate their defenses and slaughter the unprepared troops passing "freely"? This arrangement with the fortresses was exactly that which the French had with Bologna and Forli in October.279 if the French army had been granted "free passage" in 1493, or early 1494, or in May 1494 when the ambassdors came to Florence, or at whatever other date the agreement might have been signed, it would have required exactly what Piero granted: temporary control of the fortified places within the

278 Piero de' Medici to Piero Dovizi, October 27, 1494, Pisa (ASF, MAP, 80). 279 Picotti, "Neutralita Bolognese", pp. 164-246.

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region, with the understanding that they would revert to their former owners upon the resolution of King Charles1Neapolitan venture. The fact that this French control of the fortresses was temporary was understood and emphasized by French and Italians alike. Commynes notes it in his

Memoirs.280 50 does Francesco Gaddi: "[The king] wanted the fortresses of Sarzana, Pietrasanta, and Livorno .. .promising to restore them immediately upon the completion of his expedition to Naples."2 8 ^ But beyond all these considerations, Piero had a very good reason to cede quiickly the forts to Charles: Ludovico Sforza. Ludovico had been pressing Charles for the coastal cities since the beginning of the enterprise.282 And it should be noted that it would have meant a great deal of difference to Florence whether the fortresses went temporarily into the hands of a French leader or permanently into the hands of the Duke of Milan whose own territory extended right to the environs of Sarzana. It is virtually certain that in the discussions that Piero and Charles had on the th irty-firs t, there were discussions of Ludovico. As Charles and Piero met in Santo Stefano, Ludovico was only a half­ day's ride away at the Milanese fort of Villafranca up the road toward Pontremoli. He had been preparing for some time to take over these fortified cities in the wake of the French invasion.288 Milanese troops under the generalship of Galeazzo Sanseverino were still part of the French army at this point, and Ludovico had more troops with him. He had a secret personal accord with the Captain of the fortress of Sarzana,

280 281 282 288

Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 464. Gaddi, Priorista, p. 42. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 465. Commynes, Memoirs, ed. Kinser, vol. II, p. 464-465.

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a Greek Florentine named Demetrios, to yield the city to him, an arrangement for which he no doubt paid substantially.284 His strategy depended upon Florentine resistance.285 The longer they held out, the more the king would need his Milanese ally, and the higher could go Ludovico’s demands. Just that morning, the day of Charles' meeting with Piero, the king had asked and received 30,000 ducats from Ludovico to pay his troops 288 The last thing the duke wanted was’a sudden agreement between Piero and Charles. At the moment of such an agreement Ludovico, his ducats, and his Milanese soldiers would become significantly less important to the king. Sometime in the evening of the thirtieth or the morning of the th irty-firs t, Ludovico's friend Nicola da Correggio came to him with the intelligence that the king and Piero were in a meeting at Santo Stefano di Magra 287 Ludovico had been kept completely in the dark about the meeting by the king even though Charles had passed right by the duke on his way to see Piero. This fact illuminates the reason for such haste by St. Malo. Charles and his aides wanted the meeting with Piero to be arranged and to take place before Ludovico could know anything about it. Ludovico came flying down from his mountain-top perch and was there at the king's camp late in the day. In the camp he ran into an embarrassed Piero. Piero attempted a courteous greeting, saying that

284 Parenti, Storia, fol. 182 (Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 288. 285 Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 437. 288 Lettresde Charles V III, vol. IV, p. 105; Labande-Mailfert, Charles VfH, p. 289. 287 Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 288.

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when he heard that the duke was on his way he had wanted to offer Ludovico an official welcome to Florentine territory but they had apparently missed each other on the road. An angry Ludovico replied: "One of us certainly has been on the wrong road; perhaps it was youl"288 Upon learning of the results of the meeting between the king and Piero, an enraged Ludovico stormed out of the king's camp and never saw Charles again. Soon he was withdrawing all his troops from the Romagna and Tuscany to leave the French to fend for themselves and later s till he changed sides completely.289 Piero could view his two days of work with the king with some satisfaction. He had apparently reached a successful personal accord with Charles.290 The fighting would stop; the valuable fortresses would survive to be returned to the Florentines. And the danger from the Duke of Milan seemed to have been overcome. But it is unlikely that Piero had any illusions about how Florence would react. In all of his letters in these last days he returned repeatedly to note how little support he had in the city ( "nel [mio] primo luogo dello stato .. .e si debole a Firenze"291) and expressed a fatalistic mood which seemed to reflect his small confidence in his future as its leader. He must have known how the yielding of the fortresses would be judged in the palaces and piazzas of his republic.

288 289 2^0 291

Guicciardini, S toriad'Italia, ed. Menchi, vol. I, p. 99. Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, p. 289. Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 330. ASF, MAP, LXXII, 80.

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THE AMBASSADORS

OFlorentia, propter peccata tua venient tipi ac/versa. 0 Florence, for your sins,many trials w ill befall you. Savonarola, November 1, 1494.

Piero de' Medici remained with King Charles for the week following the October th irty-firs t negotiation of their personal accord on the fortresses.292 One might assume that he would have wanted to rush immediately to Florence to defend in person the agreement he had just concluded. But there would have been several reasons to remain in the coastal region at least for a few days, and paramount among them would have been the details of the ceding of the fortresses to the French by the Florentine representatives such as Piero di Leonardo Tornabuoni at Sarzana and by Piero di Giuliano di Ridolfi at Pietrasanta.293 In the absence of written orders from the Signoria to yield the fortresses, it must have required the personal intervention of Piero de’ Medici and he

292 For details of the firs t week of November, 1494, see: Portoveneri, Memoriale, p. 286; Gaddi, Priorista, p. 43; Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 43; Ginori, Libro di debitori, p. 96; Landucci, D/ar/o, pp. 71-72; Parenti, Storia, fols. 187-188; Cerretani, Storia, fol. 23; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 107; Guicciardini, Stone Florentine, pp. 141-142; Commynes, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 465-469. 293 pjero di Giuliano Ridolfi should not be confused with Piero de' Medici's brother-in-law, Piero di Niccolo Ridolfi who was married to Piero's sister, Contessina.

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most likely accompanied the French forces down the coast as they took control of not only Sarzana and Pietrasanta, but also other fortified places such as M a s s a .294 Also, King Charles probably wanted Piero there in the area to help with the complex maneuvers now required to move the huge army through this potentially hostile and dangerous area and he may have just enjoyed his company.295 He was feeling increasingly endangered from his supposed friend and ally, Ludovico Sforza, and many in the French high command hoped they would never see the duke again.296

n0w that the

issue of Sarzana and Pietrasanta had gone against the Duke of Milan, things were deteriorating rapidly in the alliance. On Sunday morning, November 2, the king wrote to Ludovico to protest vigorously the behavior of the Milanese troops near Parma who had battled with the French and killed several of Charles’ men.297 y/as this any way for an ally to behave? But the king would not be troubled with the problem of Milanese military behavior for much longer. Within the next two weeks, Duke Ludovico ordered the withdrawal of all his troops in both the Romagna and Tuscany, thus essentially abandoning the king, although in his 294 jhe chroniclers, diarists, and contemporary historians are not very helpful about Piero's exact whereabouts from November 1 to November 7, but several references to his presence with the king suggest that he did remain with Charles until November 7. See Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 83, and below pp. 328ff. 295 Later after Piero had lost power in Florence, Charles continued to be concerned about him and to make arrangements for him and invited him to come to Rome to be with the French party (Commynes, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 471). 296 Labande-Mailfert, Char/es VIII, p. 289. 297 Lettres de Charles V III, vol. II, p. 106.

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correspondence Ludovico continued to maintain the facade of a healthy Franco-Milanese alliance. His primary representative traveling with the king, Galeazzo Sanseverino, stayed on with Charles to the Orsini stronghold of Bracciano north of Rome, serving as Ludovico's spy on the expedition.298 Piero also may have wanted to stay with the king to protect Florentine interests from the unpredictable machinations of Ludovico. On October 31, there were s till substantial numbers of Milanese troops as part of the royal army and there was the continuing influence of Galeazzo in the king's camp. In addition, the Medici cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco were there .299 gut the charges by antiMedicean historians that Piero stayed close to the king because he had an agreement with Charles to keep him in power in exchange for a substantial sum, are undermined by Piero’s action on November 7 when he returned alone to Florence.^500 If he had had any agreement such as that mentioned by Parenti— the historian describes this as a rumor in Florence— Piero would probably have taken some French troops with him when he went to Florence. How else would Charles have helped Piero remain in power if not with the troops at his command? In an extraordinary Sunday session of the Signoria on November 2, the same day that Charles was having his troubles with Ludovico, the government of the Republic finally began to react to events on the Tuscan coast. An embassy of eight persons was nominated to proceed to meet

298 Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, p. 289. 299 Schnitzer, Savonarola, vol. II, p. 199. 300 Parenti, Storia, fol.191 (Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 233).

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with the King of France.301 Piero de' Medici was included within the embassy and the members of the delegation were instructed to meet with Piero first. The inclusion of Piero among the ambassadors of the November 2 delegation indicates that the government was not ready publicly to disown him, his leadership, or the agreement he had reached with the king. But, as noted above, there was a hint of his disintegrating power in Florence in that the embassy had two sets of instructions, one to follow with Piero and another should they wish to proceed without him. There was no mention of the fortresses or of any anger over the terms as rumored in Florence or of rejecting Piero's authority. Indeed, the Signoria had included Piero within the embassy thus reinforcing rather than publicly denouncing his unauthorized diplomacy. It can be safely assumed that the government and the ambassadors knew the details of the agreement between Charles and Piero. Francesco Gaddi states that Piero so informed the Otto di P ratica^ ^ News was reaching Florence about events on the coast in less than twenty-four hours. This is revealed by the correspondence of Bernardo Dovizi, brother of Piero's secretary and friend Piero Dovizi. Bernardo was in Florence at this time, and by checking his knowledge of events at Pietrasanta as reported to his brother by Piero de' Medici, it can be ascertained that

301 See pp. 311-312 above and n. 276 for the ambassadorial instructions and Ginori, Libro di debitori, p. 96 who reports on the embassy. 302 Gaddi, Priorista, p. 43.

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news was moving from the coast to the Tuscan capital in less than one day 303 Therefore, on November 2 the Signoria had had more than fortyeight hours to learn about the events at Sarzana and their knowledge of the important meeting between Charles and Piero would explain the unusual step of calling a meeting of the Signoria on Sunday. On this same Sunday during which the Signoria was grappling with the crisis on the coast, Savonarola was preaching a powerful sermon in the Duomo in which he recalled all of his predictions about the Cyrus to come and about the time of trials to begin. He reminded his listeners to pray and prepare to enter the Ark before the Flood broke. The day before, he had reminded them, "You know that some years ago, before there was any hint or rumor of these wars which have now come from beyond the mountains, great tribulations were foretold to you. You know too that less than two years ago I said to you: ' Ecce gladius Domini super terram

cito et velociter: Not I, but God gave you this prediction, and now it has come."304 in three days of preaching he shouted so much that, as he himself said, he almost broke his pectoral vein and became ill. As the political crisis grew more immediate, the friar's influence increased as events seemed to make manifest his miraculous prophecies.305 The list of the members of the embassy sent to meet Charles amidst the building tension suggests that the government was attempting, at

303 Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena to the Duke of Calabria, October 31, 1494, Florence (ASF, MAP, LXXII, 99; Epistolario, p. 235). As Dovizi wrote to the Duke of Calabria on the morning of Oct. 31, he already knew the contents of Piero de' Medici's letter just dispatched to Piero Dovizi the night before from Pietrasanta. 304 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 80. 305 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 81.

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least publicly, to remain neutral on the issue of Piero even as the politics in the city were quickly moving against him.306 Among the ambassadors, Piero Alamanni and Agnolo Niccolini were loyal friends of the Medici and remained so even after the revolution. The names of Braccio Martelli and Giuliano Salviati might at firs t glance have appeared to be good news for Piero but in fact both turned on him during the next week. The inclusion of Piero Soderini and Francesco Valori, however, would have signalled immediately to the Medici leader that he was losing control. Valori had battled publicly with Piero just before Piero's departure on October 26 and in this week he was emerging as one of the key leaders of the anti-Piero movement.307

He was a dangerous

opponent. He had been awarded more honors than any other Florentine politician of this period. He had been elected to the Signoria many times and had been elected Gonfaloniere di Giustizia for an unprecedented four terms. The presence of Piero Soderini also meant trouble for Piero de' Medici. Soderini, born in 1452, was another member of the generation of Lorenzo de' Medici who, like Piero Capponi, Bernardo Rucellai, and Piero Parenti, had participated in government for more than twenty years as a colleague of Lorenzo. Now he was having to accede to the wishes of

Short biographical notices of all the ambassadors dispatched November 2 are available in Desjardins, Negotiationsdiplomatiques, pp. 318, 595-596. 307 Rjnuccini, Ricordistorici, p. CLII.

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this younger man and like Rucellai, he did not like it.308

Soderini knew

quite a bit about Charles and relations between the Florentine Republic and France since he had spent many months in France during 1493 as a member of an embassy sent to negotiate with the king about the coming expedition. Like Rucellai, he was also a relative of Piero de' Medici—his mother was Dianora Tornabuoni, sister to Lorenzo's mother. But unlike Rucellai, he remained implacably anti-Medicean for the rest of his life. When the Florentine embassy reached the coast, King Charles refused to meet with them.309 This must have come as a blow and an unwelcome revelation. Piero continued at the side of the French monarch and the ambassadors returned to Florence spreading rumors that they could have had terms so much more reasonable than those to which Piero had already agreed.310 This would have been sheer maliciousness. There were no easier terms possible. The king wanted free passage and that included control of the forts until the expedition was over. Thus the statements about easier terms were being made without foundation. The frequency of false rumor in this story of October and November suggests that some individuals were intentionally manipulating public opinon against Piero in an attempt to end his rule. It is something that is impossible to document, but when it is remembered that handbills calling for the overthrow of the Medici were distributed in the streets of Florence in the days immediately preceding Piero's trip to Sarzana, it

308 For more on Soderini especially his relations with Piero as ambassador in France in the previous year see Desjardins, Negotiations diplomatiques, pp. 318ff. 309 parenti, Storia, fol. 61v (Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 440). 310 Vi 1lari, Savonarola, p. 212. Villari cites a fol. 180 of Cerretani, Storia, to which I do not have access.

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must be conceded that there was more than just spontaneous public opinion driving the anti-Piero frenzy that all the chroniclers report for this firs t week of November.311 The reports of the ambassadors combined with the visible reality of the king's reconciliation with Piero would have been disturbing information for those who had prepared the embassy. Not only had they been unable to nudge Piero out of the picture; they had not even been able to see the king at all. For someone like Piero Capponi, this news from the coast would have been most unwelcome. He very likely thought that while serving as an ambassador in France earlier in the year he had concluded an anti-Piero understanding with the king.312 it would have appeared to him that the worst had come and Piero, rather than alienating the king to such a degree as to lose power through the disruption of the invasion, was apparently going to achieve just the opposite and emerge stronger than ever. Thus the politicians in Florence moved to take definitive action. It must be stressed that the personal reconciliation between King Charles and Piero de' Medici came as a shock to everyone. The clever Ludovico Sforza never suspected it and was caught totally off guard. He had expected the Florentines to continue to resist. Then the king would triumph by force, turn the fortresses over to the Milanese troops, and follow Ludovico's advice and go to Florence to overthrow Piero.313 The men in Florence who had been watching Piero's moves until now 311 See pp. 230-231 above. 312 See above pp. 260-262. 313 see Ludovico’s statements reported in the dispatch of Sebastiano Badoer, Storia documentata di Venezia, ed. Roman in, vol V, p. 52; Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 437.

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—especially those who had recently been with the king and knew the gossip about the king's anger with Piero—were completely surprised.3 14 It is clear that the events in Sarzana moved the political leaders in Florence to organize against Piero. In the two days after the November 2 embassy was appointed, instructed, and departed, the political situation changed dramatically in Piero's disfavor. But it is the suggestion here that this change was not because of the agreement about the fortresses. No politician as well informed about French affairs as Piero Capponi or Piero Soderini could have been surprised that King Charles asked for control of the fortresses. Capponi was an old m ilitary hand. He knew Charles personally. He had spent many months in France conferring with the French authorities and with Charles himself about the expedition. He could have been confused about the military necessities for accommodating Charles in the Tuscan coastal region.3 15 Nor could he have expected the few hundred soldiers on duty at places such as Pietrasanta and Sarzana to have long resisted the French army of more than 10,000. It was not the details of the fortresses that suddenly brought into the open the anti-Piero movement. It was the fact of Piero's surprising personal reconciliation with the king demonstrated by the king's response to the embassy and the consequent inevitable

314 Ghivizzano, "Documenti," p. 330; Ginori, Libro di debitori, p. 95; On attitudes towards Piero in the court of King Charles before the accord at Sarzana see Delaborde, L 'Expedition, pp. 355 & 363. 315 On Capponi's days as ambassador in France see Delaborde, L Expedition, p. 355.

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conclusion that Piero would not lose power because of the invasion but would increase it.316 As a proclamation went out through the streets of Florence warning the citizens not to remove anything from their homes in anticipation of the arrival of the French army, the Signoria called a meeting, a large

Pratica, of all the veduti Gonfalonieri di Giustizia to consider the city's situation.3 17 Many of the citizens summoned to the meeting refused to 316 The import of Charles' treatment of the November 2 embassy requires documentation on the exact date at which a report of its attempted meeting with the king was known in Florence. This is unavailable to me at this time. But the following w ill provide some clarification. The Embassy received its instructions and departed immediately. The urgency of the situation was clear. Other representatives and embassies reached Charles in one day of travel from Florence to Lucca (the November 5 embassy left Florence on the sixth and arrived at the king's camp on the seventh.) Elsewhere I have demonstrated that news was returning to Florence from the coast in less than twenty-four hours. And since there was no need for the embassy to actually arrive at the king's quarters to hear that they would not be received, it is clear that there was ample time for the embassy to be appointed, dispatched and rejected and for this news to arrive in Florence by the time of the critical November 4 meeting. 317 Parenti, Storia, fols. 189v- 190r (Schnitzer, Que//en-WI, p. 9): "Onde richiedere feciono dalla S’a tutti e nostri cittadini, e quale seduti e veduti fussino gonfalonieri di iustitia per alloro communicare il pericolo in cui lo stato si trovava e dal loro parere domandare in che modo tante chose ghovernare dovessino." Cerretani describes this as a meeting of the Council of the Seventy and these veduti Gonfalonieri but since almost all of the Seventy were veduti Gonfalonieri it comes to the same thing. (Cerretani, Storia, II, III, 74, fol. 180v; See also Rubinstein, Government o f Florence, p. 232, n. 4.) But there are anomalies about the meeting. Recorded as present and speaking was Jacopo di Tania de' Nerli and he would have been too young to have served either on the Seventy or to have been veduti Gonfaloniere. Therefore it seems clear that the citizens attending this meeting were drawn from beyond the strict qualification described by Parenti and Cerretani. Who was invited

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attend.3 18 Since the extraordinary meeting was called to discuss how the state should be governed, and since in this moment of crisis Piero de' Medici was absent from the city, it must have been clear even before the rhetoric began that the meeting was about to consider governing the city without Piero. Therefore, it is interesting to hear that "many" citizens of this very select group refused to attend the meeting. Among those who refused to attend there may have been some who were merely timid. But many others must have refused since they knew what was going on and did not want to be present at a meeting that was maneuvering against Piero. This suggests that the meeting was weighted heavily against Piero even before it began. We can be sure that none of those who wanted Piero out of the government missed the meeting. Because the Signoria had called the meeting, the custom was that those invited to the practica waited to be asked to speak by the authorities. But on this occasion Luca Corsini rose to his feet and began to run on about how badly things were going and that the city was falling into a state of anarchy and that something had to be done. As he went on and on, his colleagues began to murmur and cough and grow uncomfortable by the harangue until Corsini became confused, faltered, and sat down. The young Jacopo di Tanai de‘ Nerli stood up and seconded Corsini’s statements but he then began to hesitate too and his father Tanai intervened. Lastly, Piero Capponi took the floor and stated it

to the meeting and who attended is a central question since it was this meeting that recharted the direction taken by the government in the next days. 318 Parenti, Storia, fol. 190r (Schnitzer, Que//en-\V, p. 9): "Molti andarvi recusorono."

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bluntly: Piero de' Medici was no longer fit to rule; "It is time to shake off this childish government."319 The immediate result of the meeting was the appointment of another group of ambassadors the next day. As the citizens grumbled about the previous day's proclamation prohibiting them from removing their possessions from their houses, and as they grew even more irritated with the French army quartermasters who were now moving through the city with their chalk, the Signoria sent this new embassy to Charles: Piero Capponi, Tanai de' Nerli, Pandolfo Rucellai (brother of Bernardo) and for philosophical and rhetorical decoration, Giovanni Cavalcanti.320

319 The most detailed account of the meeting of November 4, 1494, is given by Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, Bib. Naz. II, III, fol. 181. Vi 1lari Savonarola, pp. 216-217 recounts the meeting including lengthy quotations from Cerretani. Others who describe the meeting: Parenti, Storia, fols. 189-190; Gaddi, Priorista, p. 43 (Gaddi erroneously attributes the famous quotation about childish government to Jacopo di Tanai de’ Nerli but his inaccuracy is self-evident by virtue of the fact that he was no older than Piero de' Medici and such a remark coming from him would have been laughable whereas Piero Capponi was exactly the person whose age and experience would have been most irritated by Piero's youthful leadership); Rinuccini, Ricordi Storici, p. CLII. Also see Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 232. 320 Instructions given to the five ambassadors sent to King Charles VIII on November 5, 1494 (Riformagione, classe X, dist. II, reg. n. 75; printed in Desjardins, Negociations dip/omatiques, pp. 600-601: "Andrete a ritrovare la Maesta del Cristianissimo Re di Francia con ogni possibile celerita; e giunti, intenderete dagli altri nostri ambasciatori che si trovano appresso alia 5ua Maesta, in che termine sieno le cose nostre col la Maesta 5ua, massimamente circa le domande fatte da lui e del le fortezze e della gente d' arme e del danaio che ne ha domandato; e trovandone fatta conclusione ferma, non arete in questo adoperarvi altrimenti; ma, giugnendo a tempo che ancora non fussene fatta conclusione, sarete colla Maesta del Re, insieme con quel 1i che si trovano quivi o senza loro, come o a loro o a voi fusse paruto meglio; e, presentato la letters della credenza arete con questa, e fatto le

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In addition, Capponi urged that Savonarola join the embassy, an arrangement to which the religious leader would agree only after conferring with his brethren at San Marco and requesting a stipulation that the group would not discuss "the state of private persons," which was a specific reference to Piero de' Medici. Savonarola did not want to get drawn into what he certainly knew were the advancing maneuvers against Piero.3 2 !

prime convenienti cerimonie e parole che parranno alia prudenzia vostra, intrerete in questa materia; e ingegneretevi fare tutte queste petizioni migliori che vi sara possibile per la Citta nostra; dandovi in questa parte libera autorita e assoluta di fare e dire tutto quello che vi occorrera per la salute di questa Citta. Abbiamo in Dio principalmente, da che viene ogni salute e ogni bene, grandissima speranza; e nella vostra opera, la quale stimiamo che ci abbi a liberare da ogni pericolo, e dare tranquillita a questa Citta. Quella parte che diciamo di sopra che, trovato fatto ferma conclusione delle petizioni della Maesta del Re. non intendiamo, per quello che e sopradetto, diminuire in alcuna parte la vostra autorita; ma potendo ancora in tal caso opera alcuna colla Sua Maesta, come abbiamo fede nella prudenza e bonta vostra, ne farete ogni opera; e in questo ancora saranno maggiori e vostri meriti inverso la vostra patria. E arete a mente, come cosa molto importante, che, se le offese non fussino levate in ogni luogo e ancora in Romagna, che per clemenza della Maesta Sua, e vostra intercessione sieno levate, e tolto a questo popolo divotissimo di Sua Maesta questo tumulto dell' arme, e renduto alia sua consuete quiete, sotto 1' antiquissima protezione di Sua Clementissima Maesta, e naturale osservanza e culto nostro inverso della Cristianissima Maesta Sua." 321 parenti, Storis, fol. 190v (Schnitzer, Que//en-\M, p. 10): "A di 5 partirono e nuovi 5 facti ambasciadori. Frate Jeronimo a pie con 3 compagni frati in via si misse.. .Li altri 4 cittadini secondo che e consueto. Ebbono il mandato non dalli octo della pratica in disparte, come costumato s' era, ma dall Signoria con i collegi, 70, octo di pratica e tu tti e veduti e seduti ghonfalonieri di iustitia insieme ragunati.. .Accepto frate Jeronimo con prima notificato, chome di stati di private persone ragionare non volea, bene in publico pregare poer la citta si contentava et voleva."

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The instructions for the embassy are noteworthy in two ways.322 First, there is no mention of Piero de' Medici at all. This is surprising since the authorities knew Piero was there with the king. This detail suggests that the revolution was already an accomplished fact as of November 5. Piero de' Medici no longer had the authority to speak for the city. Instead, Piero Capponi and Savonarola did. The instructions to the embassy are extraordinary in that they give the group total authority to do what seems appropriate with the king. This is emphasized several times in the instructions—that there is no restriction to their authority. Therefore, that for which Piero de' Medici had been asking only a few days before and had been denied, was now granted to a group led by Capponi.323 The second interesting aspect of the instructions is that, even then five days after the accord of Sarzana, the city did not denounce the agreement made with Charles.

Quite the contrary. The government of

Florence assured the king that all troops under Florentine control would be withdrawn from the Romagna if such were still opposing him and all would be done to meet his needs. The city praised the king's generosity

322 See n. 319 above for the instructions. 323 Although at Pisa Savonarola emerges as significant in the affair with Charles, it should be remembered that it was Capponi who had arranged his inclusion in the embassy and it seems clear that the layman was the driving force in the authority of this embassy. See Ridolfi, Savonarola, pp. 84-85. Capponi continues to be the most powerful Florentine political figure in the next weeks, hosting the king at his villa at Legnaia and leading many of the negotiating sessions with Charles in the city.

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and he was assured that all m ilitary opposition in Tuscany to his enterprise would cease. The city of Florence would throw itself upon the king's clemency. But if the city was deeply agitated about the yielding of the fortresses, why was it that its representatives were not instructed to demand them back or denounce the agreement with Piero de’ Medici or denounce Piero for having illegally made the agreement or denounce the king for having taken Florentine property? Savonarola immediately set off along the road to Empoli walking with some brothers from his monastery.324 n 0 one knew whether King Charles would receive them at Lucca or Pisa. The Signoria was embarrassed that one of its ambassadors would go on foot so they sent richly decorated mules for the friar. The other ambassadors set off on horseback and joined Savonarola at Librafatta on the border of the territory of Florence and Lucca. There they stopped at the house of Carlo Pitti who was serving as podesta and was a close follower of Savonarola. When the group urged that they depart to see the king, Savonarola said—prophetically— that they would not succeed in seeing Charles at Lucca and therefore he would not go on. 325 The laymen continued on to Lucca and learned, as Savonarola had predicted, that there would not be time for the king to receive them and

324 Parenti, Storia, fol. 190v (Schnitzer, Que/Ien-W, p. 10.). 325 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 82, narrates these details of the embassy based upon an annonymous biographer of Savonarola.

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that they should travel with him to Pisa the next day.32^ while they did not have time for the formal presentation of their credentials and their oration, they did apparently have opportunity to have some kind of encounter with Piero de' Medici. Whether this was with only one or two members of the embassy or with the whole group, whether it was private or in the king's chambers, whether he saw their instructions or only heard about them, none of this is known. The one thing that is certain is that Piero quickly concluded that things had taken a turn for the worse. He left immediately for Florence.327 This moment of departure from Lucca brought Piero to the most critical decision of his life. That he did not request troops from the king doomed his attempt at restoring his authority in Florence. The situation had passed the point where words would be efficacious and as of this moment Piero needed m ilitary power to re-enter his city and reclaim his leadership. His family had not hesitated to do so on previous occasions and there is no reason to think that a thousand French soldiers joined to the already 2,000 that were in the city as of this date would have had trouble in returning Piero to his position. But he returned to Florence alone. This is not surprising if one considers his thoughts as expressed

326 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 84; 5anudo, Spedizione, p. 110, provides one of the only reports on the arrival and presence of this second Florentine embassy at Lucca on November 7, and he is very confused about its relationship to the previous embassy of several days before. Almost all of the contemporaries who wrote about the events of the firs t week of November confuse these two embassies and therefore misunderstand events in important details. 327 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 83. All the chronicles and diaries describe Piero as returning from Pisa (Landucci, p. 73). This is incorrect. Piero never was in Pisa after his departure to see the king on Oct. 28.

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in his letters of October 26 to 31. In these letters, he repeatedly referred to his mission as one joined for the purpose of saving his city in a moment of crisis and not one whose primary concern was the saving of his own power. In fact, he seemed very sceptical about his future as leader of Florence and it may even be that he was growing tired of the effort. There is nothing in these letters to suggest that his reaction upon hearing of political mutations in the city would have been to take French troops to reimpose his rule. Some commentators have called it "an insane d e c is io n ."^ But so much writing about Piero has fallen victim to the image of the "tyrant" that was created in the heat of the battle by such as Parenti, Cerretani, and Rinuccini, that it has handicapped modern historians in understanding Piero’s action. Again and again, he refrained from using deadly force to improve his political control. It was totally in character that on November 7, he returned without the troops he needed and went unarmed to the Palazzo della Signoria the next day.

328 Ridolfi, Savonarola, p. 83.

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THE REVOLUTION "Such are the events of this world that the one who flees and is the loser is not only harassed by those who pursue him but [even] his friends become his enemies." Commynes, Memoirs, II, 470.

In the late evening of Saturday, November 8, Piero de' Medici arrived in Florence after his hurried journey from Lucca, entered the city through the northern gate of Porta San Gallo, rode down Via Larga to the Palazzo Medici, enjoyed a reunion with Alfonsina and his family, and had sweet meats and wine given out to the people. Confetti was thrown from the windows of the palace to celebrate his accord with the king.329 He seemed very happy.330

329 Whereas for many of the events already described, the contemporary witnesses frequently agreed on all significant details, on the two days of November 8 and 9 there is no agreement. Many writers who were very trustworthy on other questions, suddenly do not even have the correct dates of these important events. For example, Francesco Gaddi records Piero as returning to the city on November 9, which is incorrect. The most significant documents recording the details of these days include the following: Landucci, Diario, pp. 73-76 (most objective and most detailed); Gaddi, Priorista, pp. 43-45 (important participant but very biased against Piero); Ginori, Libro di debitor! (brief but fair with significant details); Ghivizzano, "Documenti," pp. 330-331 (little information but trustworthy since he was not a Florentine); Rinuccini, Ricordistorici, pp. CLI l-CLI 11 (extremely biased against Piero as against all the Medici, but Rinuccini was standing in the piazza as the critical events of November 9 unfolded therefore his testimony is critical). Two men, Piero Parenti and Bartolomeo Cerretani, were witnesses and later wrote histories. For Parenti, see Storia fiorentina, fols. 191 -1 94 (not printed in Schnitzer, Ouel/en-\V)

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But his pleasant manner must have been more a facade than a reality. He already knew from his encounter with the ambassadors at Lucca that his leadership was in danger and his friends and family in Florence must have filled him in on the disturbing events of the last days. The entire city was in a state of confusion bordering on anarchy. On the night before, Piero’s supporters, Antonio Lorini, Francesco d' Antonio di Taddeo, and Francesco Niccolini, had exchanged harsh words in a latenight argument with Luca Corsini who had three days before spoken out so openly against Piero in the Pratica. The disagreement became so nasty that Corsini seized upon the occasion to run to the tower of the Palazzo della Signoria and begin ringing the huge bell called ilLeone, the Lion, which ordinarily summoned the citizens to the piazza to defend their freedoms. Since it was two or three o clock in the morning, the sounds awakened citizens from all around and soon the piazza was full. and for Cerretani see Storia fiorentina, II, III, 74, fols. 1QOff. (not printed inSchnitzer, Que/Ien-\\\). Commynes, Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 469-471 provides very valuable information because he was with Piero de’ Medici in the days immediately following his fall from power and we can assume that much of what he provides therefore comes from Piero. Commynes is the only source for Piero's point of view. Also important is Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 143-149 and Storia d 'italia, vol. I, pp. 102-105. The reasons for inacuracies on the part of a w riter who is otherwise totally trustworthy such as Gaddi, are not difficult to ascertain. One example. For those who wished to emphasize Piero's tyrannical nature and his dictatorial intentions, it was important to insist that he returned to the city with troops. But if he was returning with troops, it was inconvenient to depict correctly him going to his home and retiring. This broke into the image of his racing back to the city and immediately attempting to seize the government. Thus it became necessary to state inaccurately as Gaddi does, that Piero returned on November 9. 330 Landucci, Diario, p. 73; V illari, Savonarola, p. 83.

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The drowsy Florentines soon discovered it was a false alarm and went home to bed. But the incident pointed to the agitated state of the city and it left the people with a great fear. They were expecting something important to happen at any minute.331 Luca Landucci's descriptive phrase is memorable: "everyone was continuously expecting big things" ("ogniuno era .. .aspettando tuttavolta gran cose.").332 The incident of the night of November 7-8 is significant because it demonstrates how aroused and agitated the city was before Piero got there. But more important, Corsini's willingness to take the extraordinary step of ringing the great bell in the middle of the night indicates that an atmosphere of revolution was in the air even before Piero returned—certainly before he had time to appear in the streets armed or unarmed, with or without troops, acting tyrannical or peaceful, depending on which witness one accepts. It further suggests that men such as Corsini who had been in the vanguard of the move to overthrow Piero, were now alert and ready to act to change the government. The ringing of the bell was a dramatic action that implied urgent governmental mutations and the incident reveals that certain men in the city were ready for "big things." This attitude of preparation and readiness for change is important

in

understanding the substantial discrepancies that exist betweeen the official explanation of the events of November 9 and the reality of what happened. The Signoria stated that Piero had returned to the city with

Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 143; Landucci, Diario, p. 73. 332 Diario, p. 73.

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the intent of suppressing the liberty of the ancient republic.333 But much of what happened seems to be the contrary. The official explanation and the narratives of many of the witnesses such as Alammano Rinuccini, accent the aggression and preparation of Piero whereas a careful study of all the details available in the many accounts suggest exactly the opposite: the opposition appears well prepared and ready for action; Piero seems defenseless and surprised. On Sunday, November 9, the Signoria sat in another extraordinary Sunday session. One of its first acts was to order that Piero de' Medici appear before it within one hour of the receipt of notification 334 Such a peremptory and urgent demand from the governing authority of Florence addressed to the head of the Medici family would have been tantamount to announcing his fall. The ungracious ultimatum would have been so significantly out of character that Piero must have understood how serious a challenge he faced. He went to the Palazzo della Signoria unarmed but accompanied by his usual guard. There was nothing unusual in his having a personal guard. The days had long passed since Piero's great-grandfather had walked around Florence alone and unprotected. After the Pazzi Conspiracy, Lorenzo saw the need for protection and Piero continued it. Other than the small personal guard, Piero had no other troops in the city at his 333 The official explanation of the events of November 9 is contained in a letter sent by the Signoria to the Marchese of Mantua dispatched on the very same day as the revolution itself. The government is clearly defensive about these events and not expecting a favorable reaction in Mantua. See "Nuovi Documenti su Girolamo Savonarola," ed. A. Portioli, Archivio StoricoLombardo, vol. 1 (1874), pp. 334-335. 334 ASF, Deliberazioni dei Signori, ordinaria autorita, 96, fol. 86v. See also Rubinstein, "Politics and Constitution," p. 151, n. 3.

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command.335 The French troops already quartered in the city for several days clearly had no orders to support Piero with force. When Piero arrived at the Palace he was personally unarmed.335 Inside the palace, the Priors were in what seems to have been a continuous session since various actions and proclamations emanated from the palace all day and into the night.

At the principal door of the

palace, Piero met Jacopo di Tanai de' Nerli. Jacopo told Piero that he could enter but only alone and unarmed. But Nerli himself was armed. The situation was menacing. After receiving the belligerent summons of the Signoria, now Piero arrived to find armed citizens controlling the door of the palace— a most unusual situation and virtually an announcement of revolution 337 He decided on the spot to return to his own residence. He turned away from the doorway and walked to the Palazzo Medici.

335 Vi 1lari, Savonarola, p. 213. 335 This is one of the most hotly contested issues of the events of November 9. The polemical versions of that day seek to stress Piero's aggression and therefore describe Piero arriving at the Palace in a belligerent state, fully armed, and threatening all kinds of things. For this approach see especially Rinuccini, Ricordistorici, pp. CLI1-CLI11, whose description of these events is egregiously anti-Medici, and Gaddi, Priorista, p. 44. Both men were eye-witnesses. Rinuccini states that he was in the piazza at the time, therefore his account is very valuable even if it is written with an obvious bias against Piero. The most authoritative source stating that Piero went unarmed is Commynes, Memoirs, vol II, p. 469. Commynes' version of events came direct from Piero who had just arrived in Venice. Piero's description of the day is corroborated by certain details in Parenti, Landucci, Ginori, and Rinuccini examined below. 337 On the encounter at the palace doorway see: Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, p. CLI I; Landucci, Diario, p. 73; Gaddi, Priorista, p. 44; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 107; Guicciardini, Stone fiorentine, p. 144.

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Almost immediately, people began to pour into the piazza in front of the government palace. Shouts now came from the windows of the palace: "The People and Liberty!". A call was heard for a parlement. And immediately there appeared in the piazza the Gonfalone of the neighborhood called after the Ox, and within less than an hour all the Gonfaloni of all the neighborhoods were gathered in the piazza as the bell sounded from the tower of the palace. And, says Landucci, the piazza filled with armed citizens.338 The populace had been allowed to take arms from the communal depots with the complicity of the police.339 Francesco Valori, just returned from the diplomatic excursion to see King Charles, rode into the piazza s till riding the mule that had carried him and all covered with dust. He began to harangue the crowd from atop his mule, telling them that at first the king had been favorably disposed towards the ambassadors but that Piero had then intervened and ruined their progress by promising things injurious to Florence.340 Considering that the king had refused to receive this embassy with which Valori served, it should be self-evident that rather creative demagoguery was now at work, building the myths that would exculpate

338 Landucci's narrative of these important moments is far the best and is supported by Rinuccini, Gaddi, and Sanudo. See Landucci, Dlarfo, p. 74-75. 339 Labande-Mailfert, Charles V III, p. 292. 340 Vi 1lari, Savonarola, pp. 221-222 based on Cerretani, Storia, 192ff. Guicciardini, Storle fiorentine, p. 145. It is interesting to note how Guicciardini protects one of his heroes from the revelation of this demagoguery. He omits any mention of it and describes Valori being received by the people with great ovations and being carried on their shoulders to the palace.

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all other politicians from the unpalatable realities of the French invasion. Soon all blame would be affixed to Piero de' Medici. At the Palazzo Medici, Piero attempted to gather his people. His young brother, Cardinal Giovanni, moved down the street with some supporters, walking toward the Palazzo della Signoria along Via Calzaiuoli, but got only as far as the church of Orsanmichele when the menacing numbers and shouts from the piazza urged them to re tre a t341 Piero came out onto Via Larga and quickly assessed the deteriorating situation. He later told Commynes that "he soon heard everywhere cries of ’Liberty! Liberty!' and saw the people in arms.” And so he and Giovanni left town by the same Porta di San Gallo through which he had entered the city only the day before.342 commynes adds that, "it was a pitiful departure for him, for in terms of power and possessions he and his predecessors, beginning with Cosimo who had been head [of the house], had been the equals of great princes. But on that day .. .he lost both honor and possessions."343 The Medici brothers rode north along the Via Bolognese through the night. Their supporters who had ridden out of the city gates with them all deserted before they reached the Tuscan border. Exhausted and dirty, Piero was ushered in to see Giovanni Bentivoglio, who told him: "I would rather have been hacked to pieces than abandon my state." 344

341 Landucci, Diario , p. 74. 342 Commynes, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 469. 343 Commynes, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 469. 344 Vi 1lari, Savonarola, p. 223. Of course when his turn came, Bentivoglio preferred no such thing.

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Both Rinuccini and Landucci, who were witnesses, stress the rapidity with which the Signoria was reacting to events. Immediately a proclamation was issued and posted at the corner of Canto della Macina, and at the corner of the alley along the side of the Palazzo Medici which stated that any supporter of Piero de' Medici would be hanged.345 Once Piero and Giovanni de' Medici were gone, the Signoria faced the task of explaining themselves to the many governments all over Italy that would be interested in events and might not view the outcome with favor. The importance of these external reactions explains why the Signoria turned to the work of informing other governments immediately on the very night of the revolution. One letter went to the Marquis of Mantua and was written late in the evening of November 9, only hours after Piero had left. The letter from the Signoria told the Marquis that Piero had been overthrown because he had attempted to suppress the liberty of Florence ("Piero de Medici accennato e tentato tirannicamente dinvadere e soprimere la liberta nostra.")345 Exactly how Piero was supposed to have accomplished this with no m ilitary force was never explained. The Gonzaga were not impressed with the official explanation 347 There were other skeptics too. Piero Parenti, whose honesty as an historian frequently overrode his hatred of the Medici, repeated in his history the official explanation about Piero's planned tyranny and intent

345 Rinuccini, Ricordistorici, p. CLIII: "e subito la Signoria mando uno bando. . Landucci, Diario, p. 74: "E inmediato ando un bando..." 345 "Nuovi Documenti su Girolamo Savonarola," ed. Portioli, p. 334. 347 "Nuovi Documenti," ed. Portioli, p. 335.

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to seize the Palazzo Signoria.348 But in a marginal note to his manuscript, his good sense prevailed and he added that Piero probably only wanted to ask the Signoria not to proceed against him until he had a chance to explain his actions at a regular meeting on Monday.349 While the official explanation of the events of November 9 began to stir doubts in observers with more objectivity, Florence found that the inherent contradictions in its diplomacy and domestic politics had suddenly created serious problems with the King of France. As Florentines moved into the streets to overthrow Piero, Charles was moving along the Via Pisana towards the city after a brief stay in Pisa, and now on the evening of the Florentine revolution he was lodged at Empoli. In the next days he moved closer to Florence and stopped at Ponte a Signa. Finally stayed for five days in the country home of Piero Capponi at Legnaia from the twelfth to the seventeenth.350 As the news of the Florentine events of Sunday reached Charles, the contradictions in what he was being told about the Republic becime evident. He naturally wanted to know why Piero had been overthrown. And here was the problem. Although the authorities insisted it was because Piero wanted to impose a tyranny, Charles soon heard differently. He found out that Piero had returned to find his city up in arms about the yielding of the fortresses. Letters arrived from the exiled Medici leader explaining that the rhetoric of the revolution stated

348 parenti, Storia, fol. 192v . 349 Parenti, Storia, fol. 192v : " . . .per assicurare la Signoria che provedimento non facessi finche lui el lunedi ad ordine fussi. La quale openione molto e probabile.“ 350 Fanucci, "Relazioni," p. 10; Delaborde, L'Expedition, pp. 452-453; Sanudo, Spedizione, p. 114; Landucci, Diario, p. 78.

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that Florence had punished him for having ceded the fortresses to the king.351 But, asked Charles, if Florence were so loyal to the beloved ally France, how could it be that Piero de‘ Medici was overthrown for having made a perfectly honorable accord about the fortresses with me? The tra ffic along the Via Pisana to the king's temporary lodging grew busy. The ambasadors came and went almost every day. The now politically reactivated Bernardo Rucellai was there twice on November 13 and 15.352 Rucellai assured the king that the apparently anti-French rhetoric was not important and that the city was as loyal to France as it always had been since the days of Charlemagne and would accept whatever conditions he might want to impose. But could not the terms be specified before he entered the city? Charles remained cool. And Rucellai returned to the city shaken, fearing that the French might seize this opportunity to sack the whole city.353 The king's uncle was suggesting that the whole enterprise would be better off with Piero back in control of Florence and that they should reinstate him 354 The Pisans sent emissaries to Charles offering 8,000 men if he wanted to take Florence by force.355 Hard as they tried, the many ambassadors sent to try to calm things with the king were unable to answer the central question: if Florence was so loyal to France why had they just rejected their leader for having made an agreement to cede the fortresses temporarily ? The king

351 352 353 354 355

Parenti, Storia, fol. 66r (Delaborde, L'Expedition, p. 453). Pellegrini, Bernardo Rucellai, p. 13, n. 4. Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 455. Delaborde, L 'Expediiton, p. 453. Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII,p. 293.

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became extremely distrustful of Florence.356 As the anxiety mounted about the king's intentions, the ambassadors from Florence were unable to extract any kind of commitment from Charles about the exact nature of an agreement that would have to be rewritten with the new government of Florence. He would only tell them that all would be worked out once he was in the city. "Dentro alia gran villa, s'assetterebbe ogni cosa."357 It is interesting to note the names of the principal envoys: Rucellai, Nerli, Soderini, and of course, Savonarola 358 And Piero Capponi was there constantly since Charles was his guest in the Capponi villa from the tw elfth to the day of his entry into Florence. The dilemma in which the ambassadors found themselves in the second week of November was never resolved. It has continued in all the histories written about these events. In those histories the rage of the people at the unjust agreement yielding the fortresses to the king without any commission, as Francesco Gaddi put it, brought the people into the piazza. The tyrant reacted to suppress their freedom. The freedom-loving people drove him from the city.

But then the king

himself arrived to question the loyalty of this ally that was continually professing its devotion to France yet was driving from power the man who wanted to come to an agreement. If the ambassadors faced with this apparent contradiction could have responded in all candor, they would have explained that Piero was not overthrown because of the fortresses. They would have explained that he was overthrown so that they, the very men with whom the king was now 358 Ghivizzano, "Documenti;' p. 330. 357 Vi 1lari, Savonarola, p. 226. 358 Delaborde, L'Expedition, pp. 453-455.

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meeting, Bernardo Rucellai, Piero Capponi, Piero Soderini, Giovanni and Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de’ Medici, could have the power for themselves. But such frankness would not have fit well with the propaganda of the revolution about freedom for the people, and liberty, and democracy so they could hardly take advantage of it. Finally, on November 16, another delegation from Florence arrived at the king's headquarters to invite Charles and his army to come into the city immediately. The unresolved questions would be set aside. He now decided that after a week-long wait, it was time to move.359 The next day, under a grey and threatening sky, the French army of 12,000 undefeated soldiers led by His Royal Highness King Charles VIII moved toward the southwestern gate of the Republic of Florence, entered the city to the cheers of the people, traversed the narrow twisting streets, stopped at the cathedral for an evening mass, and accompanied the king to his temporary residence in the Medici palace so recently vacated by Piero.

Delaborde, L 'Expedition, p. 456.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRINTED COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS Buser, B. Die Beziehungen der Mediceer zu Frankreich waehrend der Jahre

i4J4- i494in ihrem Zusammenhang m it den aUgemeinen Verhaeitnissen ita/iens. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker, 1879. Includes usefin collection of Medici letters from the Archivio di Stato, Florence. Canestrini, Giuseppe and Desjardins, Abel. Negociations dipiomatiques de la France avec la Toscane. Paris: Imprimerie imperiale, 1859. Dallari, U. "Carteggio tra i Bentivoglio e gli Estensi dal 1491 al 1542 esistente nell' Archivio di Stato in Modena", Attiehlemorie della Deputazione di storiapatriper leprovincie di Romagna, XVI11 (1899-1900), pp. 1-88,2 85 -332 ; XIX (1900-1901 )/pp. 245-372. Gelli, Agenore. "Rassegna Bibliografica: Histoire de Charles VIII par C. De Cherrier", Archvio Storico /ta/iano, XV (1872), pp. 280-305, XVI (1872), pp. 384-418. Review article of De Cherrier's biography of Charles VIII which prints letters of Antonio Dovizi da Bibbiena and documents. La Pilorgerie, Jules de. Campagne et bulletins de la grande armee d' italie commandee par Charles V IIi 1494-1495. Nantes and Paris, 1866. La Pilorgerie has written a narrative of the m ilitary campaign within which he has printed a selection of military documents about the Italian expedition from French archives. Romanin, S. Storia documentata di Venezia. Vol. V. 2nd edition. Venice: Giusto Fuga, 1913. A narrative history of Venice that prints a substantial selection of documents from the Venetian archives. Schnitzer, Joseph. Quellen undForschungen zur Geschichte Savonarolas. Munich and Leipiz, 1902-1910. 4 vols, after 1910 bound as one volume. Schnitzer's main interest was Savonarola and his 2 volume biography remains one of the most important fifty years after its publication. These volumes were prepared to present to the modern reader unpublished fifteenth-century histories and chronicles from the Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence from which Schnitzer printed selections in the original Italian with ample notation in German.

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LETTER5. DIARIES. MEMOIRES. R1CQRD1 Boiardo, Matteo Maria. Opere volgari: amorum libri, pastorale, lettere. Edited by Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo. Bari: Laterza, 1962 (Vol. 224 in the series: Scrittori d'Italia) Charles VIII. Lettres de Charles VIII, Roi de France. 5 vols. Edited by P. Pel icier. Paris: Librarie Renouard. Commynes, Phi 11ipe de. The Memoires of Phi)lipe de Commynes. 2 vols. Edited by Samuel Kinser. Translated by Isabelle Cazeaux. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. Commynes, Phillipe de. Memoirs, the Reign of Louis X I. Translated with an introduction by Michael Grant. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972. Dovizi da Bibbiena, Bernardo. Fpistolario di Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena. Edited by G. L. Moncallero. Florence: Olschki, 1955. Gaddi, Agnolo and Francesco. Priorista di Agnolo e Francesco Gaddi in Archivio Storico Italiano, IV, pt. II (1853), pp. 40-49. Ghivizzano, Angelo. Letter to the Duke of Mantua, "Nuovi documenti su Girolamo Savonarola", edited by A ttilio Portoli, Archivio Storico Lombardo, I (1874), pp. 330-333. Ginori, Tommaso. Libri di debitori e creditori e ricordanze in Joseph Schnitzer, Quelten undForschungen zur Geschite Savonaro/as, Vol. I, Munich: LentnerSchen Buchhandling, 1902, pp. 94-104. Infessura, Stefano. Diario della citta di Roma. Edited by 0. Tommasini in Fontiper la storia d'Italia. Rome, 1890. Landucci, Luca. DiarioFiorentino dal MSOal 1516. Edited by lodoco Del Badia. Florence: Studio Biblos, 1969. Reprint of 1883 edition. La Vigne, Andre de. Le Voyage de Naples. Edited by Anna Slerca. Milan: Universita Cattolica, 1981. Martire, Pietro d’ Anghiera (Peter Martyr). OpusFpistolarum. Amsterdam, 1670. Pico, Giovanni Francesco. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: His Life by His

Nephew Giovanni Francesco Pico, Translated from the Latin by Sir Thomas More. London, 1890. Portoveneri, Giovanni. Memoriale di GiovanniPortoveneri in Archivio Storico Italiano, VI (1845), pp. 283-291. Rinuccini, Aiamanno. Ricordi storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini dal 1282a! 1460 colla continuazione di Afamanno e Neri suoi figli. Edited by G. Aiazzi. Florence: Stamperia Piatti, 1840.

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FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURY HISTORIES Works included herein treat a large chronological period, are based on some documentary material, reveal a plan or a method of organization, and in some cases, are described as history in the tile. Benedetti, Alessandro. Diaria de BeJIo Carolino. Edited by Dorothy Schullian. New York: Renaissance Society of America, 1967. Despite the title , this is not a diary but a history of Charles' invasion. Cerretani, Bartolomeo. Storia fiorentina. Biblioteca Nazionale, unpublished manuscript, II. III. 74. Extracts printed in Joseph Schnitzer, Oue/ien undForschungen zur Geschichte Savonaroias, vol. III. Munich: Lentner Schen Buchandlung, 1904. Commynes, Phi 1lipe de. The Memoires o f Phi!lipe de Commynes. 2 vols. Edited by Samuel Kinser. Translated by Isabelle Cazeaux. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. Despite the title, this is a full history of France from 1465 to 1498. Commynes, Phillipede. Memoirs, the Reign of Louis Xi. Translated with an introduction by Michael Grant. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972. Guicciardini, Francesco. Storie fiorentine. Edited by Aulo Greco. Novara: Istituto Geografico de Agostini, 1970. Guicciardini, Francesco. Storia ditaiia. 3 vols. Edited by Silvana Seidel Menchi. Turin: Einaudi, 1971. Guicciardini, Francesco. History of Ita ly . Edited and translated by Sidney Alexander. New York: Macmillan, 1969. Collier Books reprint, 1972, used herein. Machiavelli, Niccolo. /storie fiorentine, in Tutte ie Opere. Edited by Mario Martelli. Florence: Sansoni, 1971. Machiavelli, Niccolo. History o f Florence. London: Walter Dunne, 1901. Reprinted with an introduction by Felix Gilbert, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960 (Translator not identified). Nerli, Filippo. Commentarideiatticivilioccorsidentro la c ittad i Firenze. Edited by C. Settimani. First edition, Augsburg, 1728. Reprinted, Trieste: Coen Editore, 1859. Parenti, Piero. Storia Fiorentina. Biblioteca Nazionale, unpublished manuscript, II. IV. 169 (copy, II, II, 129). Extracts printed in Joseph Schnitzer, Quellen undForschungen zur Geschichte Savonaroias vol. IV. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Rucellai, Bernardo. De Bello Italico. London: Gulielmi Bowyer 1733. Sanudo, Marin. LaSpedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia. Edited by Rinaldo Fulin. Venice: Visentini, 1873.

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SECONDARY LITERATURF: BOOKS Ackerman, James. The Architecture of Michelangelo. London: Zwemmer, 1961. Acton, Harold. Tuscan Villas. London: Thames and Hudson, 1973. Acton, Harold. The PazziConspiracy. London: Thames and Hudson, 1979. Ady, Ceci 1ia. A History o f Milan Under the Sforza. London: Methuen, 1907. Ady, Cecilia. The Bentivoglio of Bologna. London: Oxford University Press, 1937. Ady, Cecilia. Lorenzo de'Medici and Renaissance Italy. London: English Universities Press, 1955. Albertini, Rudolf von. Firenze dalla republica al principato; storia e conscienzapolitica. Translated by Cesare Cristofolini from the original German edition of 1955. Turin: Einaudi, 1970 Armstrong, Edward. Lorenzo de"Medici and Florence in the Fifteenth Century. New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1908. Bargellini, Piero and Guarnieri, Ennio. Le Strade di Firenze. 3 vols. Florence: Bonechi, 1977. Bargellini, Piero and Guarnieri, Ennio. Firenze de/le Torri. Florence: Bonechi, 1973. Bittman, Karl. Ludwig X/ undKarl derKuhne: die Memoiren des Philippe de Commynes als historische Quelle, /. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck, 1964. Borsook, Eve. The Companion Guide to Florence. London: Fontana Books, 1973. This is much more than a guidebook. In addition to information and maps, etc., it contains a series of articles on various historical epochs, well-annotated with an excellent bibliography. Borsook, Eve. The Mura! Painters of Tuscany. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Breisach, Ernst. CaterinaSforza, A Renaissance Virago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. This is one of the finest biographies of a Renaissance ruler ever written in English. The notation and the extensive bibliography is especially helpful. Breisach seems to have consulted every pertinent document bearing on 1494 in the Archivio di Stato in Milan, Modena, and Florence as well as others. Bridge, John. A History of France from the Death of Louis X!. Vol. II: The Reign of Charles VIII. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924. Brown, Alison. Bartolomeo Seala, 14JO-1497, Chancellor of Florence. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979. Bu11ard, Me 1i ssa. Filippo Strozzi and the Medici, Favor and Finance in

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Sixteenth-Century Florence and Rome. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Butler, Mildred Allen. Twice Queen o f France, Anne of Brittany. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967. Butters, H. C. Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence, 1502-1519. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. Caggese, Romolo. Firenze da!la decadenza di Roma al Risorgimento d' Italia. Vol. II: Dalpriorato di Dante alia caduta della repubblica. Florence, 1912-1921. Reprinted, Giunti-Marzocco, 1978. Canuti, Fiorenzo. / / Perugino. 2 vols. Siena: Editrice d'Arte "La Diana", 1931. Illustrations. Carocci, G. La famiglia Ridolfi di Piazza. Florence, 1889. Cartwright (Ady), Julia. Beatrice d' Este, Duchess of Milan, 1475-/497. London: J. M. Dent, 1899. Cartwright (Ady), Julia. Isabella d'Este, Marchioness of Mantua, 1474I5J9. 2 vols. London: J, Murray, 1903. Cartwright (Ady), Julia. The Life and Art o f Sandro Botticelli. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1904. Catalano, Franco. Lapolitica de/F equilibrio nelF Italia del Quattrocento. Milan: La Gol 1iardica, 1970. Franco Catalano has had more to do with the general characterization of the Italian situation in the fifteenth century and its movement towards a "crisis" in the last decade than any other scholar. This work is a summary of his views but see also the two very important articles listed under Secondary Literature: Articles. Catalano, Franco. Ludovico /IMoro. Milan: dall'Oglio Editore, 1985. The most recent biography of Ludovico Sforza by one of the greatest Italian scholars to study late-fifteenth century Italy. Celletti, Vincenzo. GHOrsinidiBracciano. Rome: Fratelli Palombi, 1963. Chaste 1, Andre. A rt et humanisms a Florence au temps de Laurent le Magnifique. Paris, 1960. Chevallier, Raymond. Les VoiesRomaines. Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1972. Cochrane, Eric. Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Collison-Morley, L. The Story of the Sforzas. London: George Routledge, 1933. Corbinel 1i, J. Histoiregenealogique de lamaison di Gondi. Paris, 1705. Cronin, Vincent. The Florentine Renaissance. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1967. nelaborde, Henri-Francois. L Expedition de Charles VIII en /ta /ie .

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Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1888. Except for Sanudo's fifteenth century nearcontemporaneous account, this is the only complete history of Charles VIM’s invasion of Italy. Denis, Anne. Charles V/H et les /ta/fens: Histoire et Nythe. Geneva: Droz, 1979. Denis examines the great expectations that animated Italian attitudes toward Charles before he arrived in Italy, and the negative reaction that occurred as a result of his expedition. Its chronological scope is much wider than herein since it deals with the period of the whole expedition, as well as attitudes both before and after Charles' arrival in Italy. De Roover, Raymond. The Rise and Decline o f the Medici Bank. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. De Tolnay, Charles. The Youth o f Michelangelo. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947 (Vol. I of De Tolnay's 5 vol. Michelangelo, 1943-60). Doren, Alfredo. Le a rti fiorentine. Translated from the German by G. Klein. Florence: Le Monnier, 1940. Dorez, Leon and Thuasnes, Louis. Pic de LaMirandole en France. Paris, 1897. Duf ournet, Jean. La Destruction des mythes dans les Memoires de Ph. de Commynes. Geneva: Droz, 1966. Dupre-Theseider, Eugenio. Niccolo Machiavelli Diplomatico. Como: Marzorati, 1945. Provides the best introduction available to the diplomatic practices at Florence in the fifteenth-century. Ginori Lisci, Leonardo. The Palazzi of Florence. 2 vols. Translated from the Italian by Jennifer Grillo. Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1985. Maps, richly illustrated. Annotated with individual bibliography for each palace and its family. Ginori-Conti, Piero. La basilica di San Lorenzo di Firenze. Florence, 1940. Goldthwaite, Richard. Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, A Study o f Four Families. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Goldthwaite, Richard A. The Building of Renaissance Florence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. Guizot, M. A History o f France. Vol. 2. Translated by Robert Black. New York, n. d. Gundersheimer, Werner. Ferrara, The style of Renaissance Despotism, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973. Gutkind, Curt. Cosimo de'Medici, Pater Patriae. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938. Hale, J. R., ed. Guicciardini, History o f Italy and History o f France. New York: Washinton Square Press, 1964. Prof. Hale's 49 page introduction to this edition provides an excellent general essay on

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the histories with a short bibliography. Hale, J. R. Florence and the Medici., the Pattern o f Control. London: Thames and Hudson, 1977. 1983 paperback edition, same pagination. Hale, J. R. War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Holst, Christian Von. Francesco Granacci. Munich: Bruckmann, 1974. Hook, Judith. Lorenzo de' Medici, An Historical Biography. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984. This short biography has one of the best treatments of Lorenzo’s later years with special interest in the developing problems that are so important for understanding Piero. Hyman, Isabelle. Fifteenth Century Florentine Studies: The Palazzo Medici and a Ledger for the Church o f San Lorenzo. New York and London: Garland, 1977. Kendall, Paul Murray. Louis X I, the Universal Spider. New York: Norton, 1971. Kent, Dale. The Rise o f the Medici, Faction in Florence, I426-I4J4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Kent, F. W. Household andLineage in Renaissance Florence, The Family Life of the Capponi, Ginori, and Rucellai. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. Labande-Mailfert, Yvonne. Charles VIII et son milieu. Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1975. This is the definitive biography of Charles VIII and the firs t in over one hundred years to re-examine the documents. It is the product of over forty years of research. Richly illustrated, with excellent bibliography. Lanzoni, Ermanno. Ferrara, unacittane!iastoria. Ferrara: Belriguardo, 1984. Lightbown, Ronald. Sandro Botticelli, Life and Work. 2 vols. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978. Limongel 1i, Luigi. FilippoStrozzi, primo cittadino d 'italia Milan, 1963. Litta, Conte Pompeo. Strozzi di Firenze. Vol. V of the series Le fam iglie celebri italiane. 15 volumes. Milan, 1819-1902. Litta, Conte Pompeo. Capponi di Firenze. Vol. XI (1869-75) in the series Le famiglie celebri italiane. 15 vols. Mi 1an, 1819-1902. Litchfield, R. Burr. Emergence of a Bureaucracy, The Florentine Patricians, 1530-1790. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. Especially helpful for this study is the firs t chapter, "The Legacy of the Renaissance Republic" with references. Luzzatto, Gino. An Economic History of Italy from the Fall of the

Roman Empire to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century.

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Translated by Philip Jones. London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1961. Lyall, Archibald. The Companion Guide to Tuscany. London: Collins, 1973. Magenta, Carlo. / Visconti e g ii Sforza nel caste!io di Pavia e loro attinenze con ia certosa e !astoricittadina. 2 vols. Milan: Hoepli, 1883. Maguire, Yvonne. The Women of the Medici. New York: Dial Press, 1927. Maguire, Yvonne. The Private Life of Lorenzo the Magnificent London: Alexander Ouseley, 1936. Ma 11e11, Michae 1. The Borgias, the Rise andFa11 of a Renaissance Dynasty. London: The Bodley Head, 1969. Mallett, Michael. Mercenaries and their Masters, Warfare in Renaissance itaiy. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974. Marchini, Giuseppe. Giuiiano da Sangallo. Florence: Sansoni, 1942. Martin, Paul. Arms andArmor. RuUanti, Vermont: Charles Tuttle, 1968. Moncallero, G. L. / / Cardinale Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena, umanista e diplomatico. Florence: Olschki, 1953 (Vol. 35 in the series:

Biblioteca dell' Archivum Romanicum). Murray, Peter. The Architecture o f the Italian Renaissance. First edition, 1964. Revised edition used here, New York, Schocken Books, 1986. Murray, Peter. Architecture of the Renaisance. New York: Abrams, 1972. Neilson, Katharine. Filippino Lippi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938. Norwich, J. J. C. The Normans in the South, 1016-11JO. London: Longmans. Palmarocchi, Roberto. La Politics Italians di Lorenzo de 'Medici. Florence: Olschki, 1933. Passerini, L. Genealogia e storia della famigliaRucellai. Florence, 1861. Pel 1igrini, Gugl ielmo. L 'Umanista Bernardo Rucellai. Livorno: Raffaello Giusti, 1920. Perrens, F. T. Histoires de florence depuis la domination des Medicis jusqu'a la chute de laRepublique. Paris, 1888. Phillips, Mark. The Memoir of Marco Parenti, A Life in Medici Florence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. Although Phillips' is interested in the generation of Marco Parenti, the father of the historian, Piero, this is very important for the information that Phillips provides on the Parenti family background.

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Pieri, Piero. / / Rinascimento e !acrisim ilitare Italiana .Turin: Einaudi, 1952. Pontieri, Ernesto. La dinastia aragonese di Napoli e la casa deiMedici di Firenze. Naples, 1942. Pontieri, Ernesto. Per la storia del regno di Ferrante / d' Aragona Re di Napoli. Second revised edition, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1969. Prescott, Orville. Princes or the Renaissance. New York: Random House, 1969. Que 11er, Dona 1d. The Office o f the Ambassador in the Middle Ages. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. Ranke, Leopold Von. Sammtliche Werke, Vols. 40-41: "Historischbiographische Studien”. Savonarola, the Florentine Republic, Piero de' Medici and the Revolution of 1494. Leipzig: Dunder & Humblot, 1877. Ridolfi, Roberto. Leprediche del Savonarola, cronologia e tradizione del testo. Florence: Olschki, 1939. Ridolfi, Roberto. The Life of Girolamo Savonarola. Translated from the Italian by Cecil Grayson. New York: Knopf, 1959. Ridolfi, Roberto. The Life of Niccolo Machiavelli. Translated from the Italian by Cecil Grayson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Ridolfi, Roberto. The Life of Francesco Guicciardini. Translated from the Italian by Cecil Grayson. New York: Knopf, 1968. Reumont, A. Von. Lorenzo de'Medici if Magnifico. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1883. Ross, Janet. Lives of the Early Medici as Told in their Correspondence. Boston: Gorham Press, 1911. Rubinstein, Nicolai. The Government o f Florence Under the Medici. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966. Runciman, Steven. The Sicilian Vespers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Santoro, Caterina. GUSforza. Milan: dalT Oglio Editore, 1968. Sapori, Armando. "La Compagnia dei Frescobaldi", Studi di storia economicamedievale. Florence: Sansoni, 1947. Schevi 11, Ferdinand. Medieval and Renaissance Florence. 2 vols. First edition, 1936. Revised edition, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1963, has been used here. Schevill, Ferdinand. The Medici. First edition, 1949. New York: Harper Torchbooks, I960 has been used here. Schnitzer, Giuseppe. Savonarola. 2 vols. Translated from the German by Ernesto Rutili. Milan: Fratelli Treves, 1931.

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355

Sitwell, N. H. H. Roman Roads o f Europe. London: Cassell, 1981. Sorbelli, Rita. CarteggioMediceo-Bentivolesco del/'Archivio diStato di Firenze, Appunti, Bologna: Zanichelli, 1917. A chronological listing of all letters exchanged between the Medici and the Bentivoglio for the period June, 1465, to September, 1494, now in the Archivio di Stato di Firenze. Stephens, J. N. The Fall of the Florentine Republic; 15 1 2 -15JO. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Steinberg, Ronald. Fra Girolamo Savonarola, Florentine Art, and Renaissance Historiography. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977. Strozzi, Lorenzo. Le vite deg/i uomini H/ustri della casa Strozzi. Florence, 1892. Symonds, John Addington. Renaissance in Italy, The Age o f the Despots. New York, 1888. Taylor, F. L. The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529. First edition, 1929. Reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1973. Taylor, Rachel Annand. Leonardo the Florentine. New York: Harper 1928. Trexler, Richard. Public Life in Renaisance Florence. New York: Academic Press, 1980. Vale, M. G. Charles VII. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974. Vi 1lari, Pasquale. The Life and Times o f Girolamo Savonarola. New York: Scribner's, 1896. Wackernagel, Martin. The World of the Florentine Renaissance Artist: Projects and Patrons, Workshop and Art Market. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981. Weinstein, Donald. Savonarola and Florence. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970. Weissman, Ronald. Ritual Brotherhood in Renaissance Florence. New YOrk: Academic Press, 1982.

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SECONDARY LITERATURE: ARTICLES Acciaioli, Vincenzo. "Vita di Piero di Gino Capponi." Archivio Storico Italiano, Vol. IV, pt. 2, (1853), pp. 13-71. Adorno, Francesco. "La crisi dell' umanesimo civile fiorentino da Alamanno Rinuccini al Machiavelli." Rivista Critica c/i Storia della Filosofia, Anno VII (Gen-Feb, 1952), Fasc. I, pp. 19-40. Bertelli, Sergio. "Machiavelli e la politica estera Fiorentina." Studies on Machiavelli. Florence: Sansoni, 1972. Biagianti, Ivo. "Politici e storici del Cinquecento: Filippo de' Nerli (1485-1556)." Archivio Storico Italiano , CXXXIII, 1-4(1975), pp. 69-100. Borsook, Eve. "Decor in Florence for the Entry of Charles VIII of France." Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz, Vol. 10, II (Dec. 1961), pp. 106-122. Borsook, Eve. "Documents for Filippo Strozzi's Chapel in Santa Maria Novella and Other Related Papers." Burlington Magazine, Nov.-Dee., 1970, pp. 737-745. Brown, Alison. "The Humanist Portrait of Cosimo de' Medici." Journal of the Warburg andCourtau/dInstitutes, Vol. XXIV (1961), pp. 186-221. Brown, Alison. "Pierfrancesco de' Medici, 1430-1476: A Radical Alternative to Elder Medicean Supremacy?" Journal of the Warburg andCourtauldInstitutes, Vol. XL 11 (1979), pp. 81 -103. Cartwright, Julia. "Pietro Vannucci Called Perugino." Masters in A rt , Boston: Bates and Guild, 1902. Casamorata, C. "L'Ultimo cerchio di mura fiorentine." L 'Universo, July-August, 1946. Catalano, Franco. “La Crisi Italians alia fine del secolo XV, Aspetti della cultura Italians nella seconds meta del Quattrocento." Belfagor, Vol. XI (1956), pp. 393-527. One of the most influential articles published in post-war Italy. Catalano, Franco. "II problema dell' equilibrio e la crisi della liberta Italiana." Nuove questioni di storia medioevaie. Milan: Marzorati, 1964. Cecchini, Giovanni. "La guerra della congiura dei Pazzi e 1' andata di Lorenzo de' Medici a Napoli.” Boi/etino Senese di Storia Patria (1965), pp. 291-301. Dallari, Umberto. "Carteggio tra i Bentivoglio e gli Estensi dal 1401 al 1542 essistente nell' Archivio di Stato in Modena." A ttie

Memorie della Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Provincie di Romagna, Third Series, Vol. XVI11 (1900), pp. 1-88; Vol. XIX (1901), pp. 245-372. Dallari here provides a complete inventory of letters exchanged between the Estensi and Bentivoglio for the years noted

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with a short description of the contents of each. In addition he provides an extensive index of the collection. Doucet, R. "France Under Charles VIII and Louis XII." New Cambridge Modern History. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1957. Ettlinger, L. D. "A Fifteenth Century View of Florence." Burlington Magazine, Vol. XCIV (1952), pp. 160-167. Fanucci, Vittorio. "Le Relazioni tra Pisa e Carlo VIII." Annaiideila ScuoJa Normale Superiore di Pisa, Filosofia e FiJoloqia, Vol. X (1894), pp. 3-83. Fossati, Felice. "Lodovico Sforza avvelenatore del nepote?" Archivio Storico Lombardo, Series IV, Vol. II (1904). Garin, Eugenio. "The Cultural Background of Politian" in Portraits from the Quattrocento. Trans, by Victor and Elizabeth Velen. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Gilbert, Felix. "Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari." Journal of the Warburg andCourtauldInstitutes, Vol. XII (1949), pp. 101-131. Gombrich, E. H. "The Early Medici as Patrons of Art." Norm andForm, Studies in the Art of the Renaissance. London: Phaidon Press, 1966. Hale, J. R. "The Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian Chronology." Renaissance War Studies. London: Hambledon Press, 1983, pp. 1-29. Hale, J. R. "War and Public Opinion in Renaissance Italy." Renaissance War Studies, London: Hambledon Press, 1983, pp. 359-387. Hook, Judith. "Justice, Authority, and the Creation of the Ancien Regime in Italy." Transactions o f the Royal Historical Society, fifth series, Vol. 3 4 (19 84), pp. 71-89. I lard), Vincent. "Fifteenth-Century Diplomatic Documents in Western European Archives and Libraries." Studies in the Renaissance, Vol. XI (1962), pp. 64-112. After more than twenty-five years, this is still the best survey of the archival holdings of diplomatic papers in Italy, France, and Spain in any language. Especially detailed on Milan, Florence, and Venice. Kent, F. W. "The Making of a Renaissance Patron of the Arts" in Giovanni Rucellai ed if suo Zibaldone, Vo 1. II: A Florentine Patrician andHis Palace. London: the Warburg Institute, 1981. Mallett, Michael. "Pisa and Florence in the Fifteenth Century: Aspects of the Period of the First Florentine Domination." Florentine Studies, Politics, and Society in Renaissance Florence. Edited by Nicolai Rubinstein. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968, pp. 403-441. Mallett, Michael. "Piero Capponi." DizionarioBiografico degliItalian/'. Vol. 19. Rome, 1976, pp. 88-92. Mallett, Michael. "Diplomacy and War in Later Fifteenth Century Italy." Proceedings o f the British Academy, Vol. LXVII (1981), pp. 267-288.

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Moncallero, G. L. "Documenti inediti sulla guerra di Romagna di 1494." Rinascimento, a. IV, no. 2 (Dec., 1953), pp. 233-261; a. V, no. 1 (Jun., 1954), pp. 45-79; a. VI, no. 1 (Jun., 1955), pp. 3-74. Pampaloni, Guido. "Gli organi della republica fiorentina per le relazioni con 1‘ estero." Rivista diStudiPoliticiInternazionali, Vol. XX (1953), pp. 290ff. Pampaloni, Guido. "Piero di Marco Parenti e la sua Historia fiorentina" Archivio Storico Italiano, Vol. CXVII (1959), pp. 147-153. Although the title would suggest that this article would be especially important for this study, it is very brief and provides only a minimum of information on Parenti. Partner, Peter. "Florence and the Papacy in the Earlier Fifteenth Century." Fiorentine Studies. Edited by Nicolai Rubinstein. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968, pp. 381-402. Piazzo, Marcello del. ' I ricordi di lettere di Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici." Archivio Storico Italiano, Vol. CXI I (1954, pp. 378-432; Vol. CXI 11 (1955), pp. 101-142. Del Piazzo herein publishes a fifteenth-century register of all letters sent by Piero de' Medici. Missing from the register is any notation of the six letters Piero wrote after Oct. 25 when he had left Florence to meet King Charles VIII. Picotti, Giovanni Battista. "Per le relazioni fra Alessandro VI e Piero de' Medici." Archivio Storico Italiano, Vol. LXXIII (1915), pp. 37-100. Picotti, Giovanni Battista. "La neutrality bolognese nella discesa di Carlo VIII." A tti e Memorie della Deputazione de storia patria per le provincie di Romagna, Serie 4, Vol. IX (1919), pp. 165-246. Picotti, Giovanni Battista. "Caterina Sforza Riario e la Romagna alia calata di Carlo VIII." A tti e Memorie della Deputazione di Storia Patria per Jeprovincie di Romagna, New Series, Vol. XV-XVI (1963-1965), p. 207-221. Rubinstein, Nicolai. "I primi anni del Consiglio Maggiore di Firenze (1494-1499)." Archivio Storico Italiano, Vol. CXI I (1954), pp. 151-194, 321-347. Rubinstein, Nicolai. "Politics and Constitution in Florence at the End of the Fifteenth Century." Italian Renaissance Studies. Edited by E. F. Jacob. London: Faber & Faber, 1960, pp. 148-183. Rubinstein, Nicolai. "Florentine Constitutionalism and Medici Ascendancy in the Fifteenth Century." Florentine Studies. Edited by Nicolai Rubinstein. London: Faber & Faber, 1968, pp. 442-462. Rubinstein, Nicolai. "Lorenzo de’ Medici: The Formation of His Statecraft." Proceedings o f the British Academy, Vol. LXIII (1977), pp. 71-94. Rubinstein, Nicolai. “The Piazza della Signoria in Florence."

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Festschrift Herbert Sieben Huner. Edited by E. Hubala and G. Schweikhart. Wurzburg, 1978, pp. 19-30. Rubinstein, Nicolai. "Oligarchy and Democracy in Fifteenth-Century Florence" Florence and Venice: Comparisons and Relations. Florence: LaNuova Italia Editrice, 1979, pp. 99-112. Santoro, Caterina. "L’Organizzazione del Ducato." Fondazione Treccani degli Afieri, Storia di Milano .Milan, 1956. Sapori, Armando. "II bilancio della filia le di roma del Banco Medici del 1495." Archivio Storico Italiano, Vol. CXXXI (1973), pp. 163-224. Sapori, Armando. "La cacciata di Piero di Lorenzo il Magnifico da Firenze: Giovanm Tornabuoni e la filia le di roma del Banco Medici." Spoleczenstwo GospodarkaKultura. Warsaw, 1974, pp. 303-318. Tognetti, Giampaolo. "La fortuna della pretesa profezia di San Cataldo."

Sul/ettino dell' Istituto Storico italiano per i l Medio Fvo e Archivio Muratoriano, No. 80 (1968), pp. 274-317. Warburg, A. "Francesco Sassettis letztw illige Verfuegung" in his GesammelteSchriften. Leipzig, 1932, Vol. I, pp. 146-151.

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