Ice Final Presentation

FAILURE ANALYSIS OF ICE (INTER CITY EXPRESS) , GERMANY - 1998

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ABSTRACT

Complete failure analysis of ICE

In June of 1998, one of the Germany’s Inter City Express (ICE)884 train slammed into an overpass killing 101 people & injuring over 200 severely. This paper gives an overview that how this catastrophe would have been avoided if proper care had taken in the preliminary stage itself & how playing with FOS perhaps can cause fatal errors.

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INTRODUCTION



ICE project started in the 1980s & the first ICE was the inter-city experimental, which gained a speed record over 400km/h. Top speed on high track Top speed on conventional line Speed record Best average speed

280km/h

200km/h

408km/h

200km/h 3

BACKGROUND

 In 1971 IC rail system was introduced in Germany connecting towns & cities.  Up gradation of IC was implemented in 1980’s to provide high speed rail system across Germany.  During 1990’s tremendous growth of ICE was noticed (30% boost) & it was expanded to connect neighboring countries like Switzerland, Austria, Belgium & Netherland.  In 1994 two German states railroads were merged into the Deutshe Bahn AG & privatized.

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BACKGROUND CONT 

ICE are the modern hotels which include the amenities like



Dining car



Telephone services



In-seat video BACKGROUND CONT



Audio attachment



Smoking area



Internet access

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TYPES OF ICE GRADE

CLASS

YEAR

SPEED Km\h

ICE V

410

ICE 1 ICE 2

810

1985

200

401 801 802 803

1991

280

402 805 806 807

1997

280

808 ICE 3

403 406

2000

330

ICE 4

TILTING ICE

2002

300

ICE 5

TRANSRAPID

2002

400

2001

200

MAGLEV VEHICLE ICE VT

DEISEL ELECTRIC TRAINS

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SEQUENCE OF FAILURE •

The rim of a wheel on the third axle of the first car broke, peeled away from the wheel, and punctured the floor of the car, where it remained embedded.

•

The embedded wheel rim slammed against the guide rail of the switch, pulling it from the railway ties.

•

Steering rail also penetrated the floor of the car and lifting the axle carriage off the rails.

•

Derailed wheels struck the points lever of the second switch & changes its setting.

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The rear axles of car No 3 were switched onto a parallel track, and the entire car was thereby thrown into the piers supporting a 300-tonne roadway overpass.

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SEQUENCE OF FAILURE CONT •

Car No 4, likewise derailed by the violent deviation of car No 3, passed intact under the bridge and rolled onto the embankment immediately behind.

•

As the second half of car No 5 passed under the bridge, the bridge collapsed and fell on the car, flattening it completely.

•

Remaining cars jackknifed into the rubble in a zigzag pattern as the collapsed bridge had completely obstructed the track.

•

Cars 6 and 7, the service car, the restaurant car, the three first class cars numbered 10 to 12, and the rear control car all derailed and slammed into the pile.

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WHAT ARE THE CAUSES?



Technical Causes

 Wheel design Use of a rubber damping ring between a metal wheel rim and the wheel body.

 Bridge design Bridge supported on two thin piers. 

Management Causes



Poor response by the train crew.



Reducing the factor of safety by Duetshe Bahn.



Pressure resistance windows & rigid aluminum frames hobbled the intervention of the rescue workers.

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UNDERLYING ISSUES 

Operation Maintenance decision

 The Fraunhofer Institute had told the DB management as early as 1992 about its concerns vis-à-vis possible metal wheel failure.  Permissible error in Wheel diameter is 0.6mm but error noticed in failed wheel is 1.1mm.  Insufficient failure detection system.



Design verification flaws

The rubber cushioned wheels, which has been used successfully on street cars were not suitable for heavier loads of ICE train operating at much higher speeds.



FOS Worn out wheel diameter suggested by Fraunhofer Institute was 88cm but DB kept this value to 85.4cm. So a only of difference of 2.6cm is also one of the causes of this failure.

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NEGLIGENCE TOWARD NDT TESTING



It was committed to use ultrasonic testing every 250,000km operation, in fact no appropriate testing method was developed for in service inspection.



Wheel in question was first put into operation in 1994 and ran 1.8 Million km until the accident in June 1998. It is significant that during its 4 years of operation through testing of the wheels have not done.



No fracture mechanic testing of the wheel was carried out after implementing.



The limited testing that was done did not account for dynamic, repetitive force that result from extended wear.

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CONSEQUENCES



LEGAL

2.

In august 2002, 2 DB officials & one engineer were charged & fined.

3.

The remarkable growth of ICE of about 30% per annum was hindered by this incident.

4. People in Germany started traveling in car after this accident after few month. 

Technical

6. All wheels of similar design were replaced by monoblock wheel. 7. All 59 ICE1 train were recalled for ultrasound examination of the wheel.

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CONCLUSION •

When such a train is involved in accident , the energy released is high & damage done is much higher than for lower speed train.

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Purely material defect has caused this accident.

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Poor reaction by the manager after noticing the violent vibration had quintuple the after of this accident.

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The passenger traveling in such a train should be given some basic preliminary coaching.

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Train manager refused to stop the train until he recovered the problem himself claiming this is against the company policy, such policy need to be noticed carefully.

•

A difference of 2.6cm can cause such an unforgettable catastrophe.

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STATISTICS



Length : 358m



Weight : 850 tons



Max seating capacity : 651



Total no of passenger traveling : 287



Dead : 101



Severely injured : 88



Unharmed : 106



Hazard (0-1000) : 292



Range (km square) : 1



Fear factor (0-10) : 2.2



Media effect (0-100) : 70



An example of Price: Brussels to Frankfurt(313km) 1st class : 125 euros(7875 INR) 2nd class : 84 euros(5292 INR)

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THANKS

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