Identity & Identicality

IDENTITY & IDENTICALITY Philosophy Interest Group Robert R. Wadholm Trinity Bible College & Graduate School Presented at the 45th Annual Meeting of the Society for Pentecostal Studies INTRODUCTION Identity and identicality are not a single concept, but are rather two concepts related in a complicated and non-reflexive way. Understanding how they relate may help us to clarify various problems in philosophy and theology. In the following argument I will compare and contrast these two concepts, and outline how distinguishing between them may resolve various difficulties in metaphysics, epistemology, and Christology. First, let us briefly define our terms. An identity is some one thing that may be picked out from other things. I will not deal here with what gives a thing thing-ness—let us just say that at the very least a thing must exist to be a thing. We usually think of identities as being able to be discovered or perceived in some way, and we use their identity sometimes to refer to them—that is, to pick them out from other perceived things. I don’t think identity is dependent upon the ability to be perceived or referenced, but we definitely cannot refer to any things in our arguments that are not perceivable or referenceable in some way, so we may act as if identities are perceivable and able to be referenced. Identities seem to be indexical as well: “I” refers to me when I speak, and to you when you speak, yet both refer to the identities of the speaker only when he or she speaks. I (Bob Wadholm) live in the real world, and if there is a possible world out there, or infinite possible worlds, I do not live in them (my identity does not live in them). When possible Bob eats a hamburger, it is not me that eats it, but is instead someone else (even if that someone else shares many properties in common with me). In this sense, possible Bob is a different identity from me.

Robert Wadholm, “Identity & Identicality”

Identicality here may be taken to mean identical-ness. Identicality is sameness between things, or between properties of things. For two things or properties to be identical they must have no differences between them. Things may be absolutely identical (all properties are utterly in common), or they may have relative identicality (they share one or more identical properties in common). The purpose of this paper is to answer the question “What differences are there between identity and identicality?” ABSOLUTE IDENTICALITY ENTAILS IDENTITY Things that are absolutely identical with each other are also the same identity. That said, I may have a so-called “identical” twin who shares all of my biological characteristics, and yet who is not me. We are different persons. I have one identity, and he has another. However, my twin fails to be absolutely identical to me—we do not share every property in common (which makes us not absolutely identical). For instance, we are not in the same place at the same time, nor do we share all other characteristics in common. If it were the case that we were in all ways identical, I must concede that I do not actually have a twin. There is only one of me. Absolute identicality entails identity. This is known as the identity of indiscernibles: if there is no difference between two things, they are the same thing. People can identify me (mark my identity) based on my exact identicality with myself (if that even makes sense). If I look like a duck, swim like a duck, taste like a duck, etc., I must be a duck. If A and B are exactly identical in every way, A shares the identity of B (they are not two, but one thing). IDENTITY DOES NOT ENTAIL ABSOLUTE IDENTICALITY While absolute identicality entails identity, identity cannot always be said to entail identicality. I am not always identical with myself. For instance, I changed my clothes this morning, my mind this afternoon, and my haircut this evening, yet I remain me. I can be non2

Robert Wadholm, “Identity & Identicality”

identical with myself at a different point in time. In fact, being in a different time means that I am now different than myself yesterday, even if everything else about me remained exactly as it was yesterday (if that were possible) because I am in a different time (a non-identical property)—I am different relative to the external world. Even though my brain cells change (for instance through learning/growing, through new cell growth, and through loss of cells), I can continue to be me. I seem to hold on to my identity through change. So I can be identical with myself (I am), and non-identical with myself (for instance, myself from a different point in time) and continue in my identity. This is a source of great confusion among philosophers, who tend to equate statements of identity with statements of identicality and say things such as: “if identity is behaving itself and is reflexive, transitive and symmetric, it is an equivalence relation that satisfies Leibnitz’s law, of the indiscernibility of identicals.”1 A proposition such as “Bob is a man” would be taken not just to mean that Bob has the identity of a man, but that he is identical to a man. But this is obviously rubbish. Not only is Bob not always identical with himself, as we noted above, he is also often not absolutely identical with a man. If “Bob is a man” meant “Bob is absolutely identical with a man,” then if there is a second man named James for whom it can be said “James is a man,” then Bob is absolutely identical to James, which is false (James and Bob are two different men). A statement of identity is not an assertion that the subject and the object are identical. A numerical identity claim is thus not a numerical identicality claim.2 I am numerically one with myself tomorrow (I

1 Thomas McCall, An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015), 114. 2 Dale Tuggy, “Evangelical Apologists Take Note: Hurtado on Jesus and God,” Trinities Blog, May 6, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015. http://trinities.org/blog/evangelical-apologists-takenote-hurtado-on-jesus-and-god/. 3

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have numerical identity), though I am not numerically identical with myself tomorrow (in the sense that there is not exact parity of all properties). Where does this confusion arise? Leibniz’s law, and its formulation in formal logic, seems to problematically confuse identity with identicality. The identity of indiscernibles is formulated as the following in symbolic logic: ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y From left to right, this reads: If and only if all properties of x are shared by y, and vice versa, then x is y. The converse is known as the indiscernibility of identicals: x=y → ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) If x is y, then all of x’s properties are shared by y, and vice versa. Here, I believe the problem is with the symbol “=” (as well as the “if and only if”). At times, this is taken to mean identicality (as in the name “indiscernibility of identicals”), and at times to mean identity (as in the name “identity of indiscernibles”). If I am myself today, and myself tomorrow (i.e., I retain identity through time), then according to the indiscernibility of identicals, I must have the same properties today as I will have tomorrow (if identicality and identity are one and same concept). But this is obviously false—my properties change through time. While it is true, following the identity of indiscernibles, that if I share all properties with myself, I am one identity, it does not necessarily follow that to retain identity I must not ever change. You will note that Leibniz’s law only seems to hold true in all cases if we take “=” to mean “identical” (and not identity). If and only if all properties of x are shared by y, and vice versa, then x is identical to y—this becomes a mere definition of absolute identicality. The inverse is true as well: If x is identical to y, then all of x’s properties are shared by y, and vice versa. But this only works if we remove any mention of identity (including in the name “identity 4

Robert Wadholm, “Identity & Identicality”

of indiscernibles”), as this introduces confusion. The difference is that the concept of identicality includes reflexivity, while identity does not: while all things that have exactly identical properties can be said to be both identical and to be one identity, a single identity may have non-identical properties with itself (for instance, through time). IDENTITY REQUIRES AT LEAST SOME IDENTICALITY One puzzle presents itself in this analysis: how different can a being be from itself before it is not itself? We might answer, tongue in cheek, that a being can be as different from itself as possible and still be itself. It does not cease to be itself through loss of some identical attributes. Or does it? If a shovel has its handle, wood stem and scoop replaced multiple times, and has had different owners, is it the same shovel as when first created? Most would agree that it is not absolutely identical to the original shovel. Does it keep its identity through all of these changes, or is there a point (for instance, when the last remnant of the original is replaced) that it ceases to be itself, and some other thing is there (for instance, a new shovel)? If it is still called a shovel, it retains at least one attribute of the original. Perhaps to make the original shovel cease to exist, it must cease to exist in totality (no properties shared with the original). If this is the case, is it even possible for things to lose their identity? Can’t things always be said to retain at least one attribute that is identical? In admitting that identity might be lost through loss of every identical attribute, are we still holding to some form of “identity equals identicality”? No, instead I am arguing that identity requires at least some identicality (though not necessarily total identicality), and that complete absence of identicality (parity of properties) entails absence of a singular identity. On the other hand, identicality of some properties does not equal identity (you are not me just because you are also human). Loss of all properties that are identical might mean loss of identity, but this would 5

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also require loss of being, since one of the properties of the original identity might well include being. I suppose it should come as no surprise that if a thing ceases to exist entirely it also ceases to retain its identity.3 PERCEIVING IDENTITY The difference between identity and identicality can be further illustrated with reference to perception. I perceive the way a thing is outside of me, and I believe it is a certain way—the way I just perceived it. For instance, I perceive the cake is hot (I see steam rising from it), and I am thereby justified in believing the cake is hot (in the absence of defeaters). I perceive the way the cake exists (hot), and I believe it is a certain way (hot). For the purpose of this argument, however, let us say that the cake is actually cold, and there is a hot cup of coffee behind the cake that is letting off steam (because it is hot). I mistakenly think the cake is hot, though I might still be justified in thinking the cake is hot.4 The reality of the cake (that it is cold) is not exactly 3 I do not actually believe in the existence of properties of objects as things in themselves. How might this change the conversation? It seems to me that what we describe as attributes or properties of objects are actually merely “the way the thing exists” in its relative relation to other things and itself. “Being” is not part of the way a thing exists. While “being” could be construed to be a property of a thing (that which makes it exist), I don’t believe in properties. Instead, in my framework “the way the thing exists” presupposes the thing’s existence in order to describe it. So if (as in the example above) a thing suddenly ceased to exist completely, we could not speak of “the way it exists,” since it does not exist any longer. So, in reiterating our previous thesis, identicality of some “ways a thing exists” does not equal identity (though identicality of all the ways a thing exists does entail identity). For a specific object, loss of all the ways of existing that are identical ways of existing might mean loss of identity (though not necessarily loss of existence). It would take a loss of all ways of existing (even those that are non-identical) in order to lose existence entirely. Why would existence cease when ways of existing ceased? If a thing does not have any way that it exists, it should also be said to not exist. For example, there is no way of walking for the person who does not walk. And if a person loses all ways of walking they should be said to not walk. Similarly, if a person loses all ways of existing, he/she does not exist (that is, if existing is conceived of as a verb). 4 Robert Wadholm, Essays in Philosophy (Ellendale, ND: Grace Publications, 2014), 42–54. 6

Robert Wadholm, “Identity & Identicality”

identical with what I perceive (that it is hot). Yet my perception matches the identity of the cake with the cake in the external world (and the way it exists). How? The cake looks brown to me, and the cake actually does let off a brown hue in this light (my perception in this case matches how the cake exists). Something of my perception is identical with the way the cake actually exists, meaning the identity of the cake is perceived, even though my perception (and resulting belief) do not identically match the state of the world that is external to me. So the statement “the cake is hot” is false (it does not correspond with external reality—the cake is actually not hot), but I am still referring to the same cake nevertheless (though it is not identical with what I believe or what I perceive). As long as some one way of existing is perceived, and I pick out some one thing’s identity correctly based on that true perception (even given other false ideas or perceptions about the thing) I might have (at least imperfectly) perceived the identity of the thing. THE ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL IDENTICALITY ENTAILS THE ABSENCE OF IDENTITY This last example presents an interesting problem. What if I perceive a way of existing for the cake that is not possible for cakes? What if the identity of the thing is irreconcilable with one of the ways of existing that I perceive (and I go on to believe this perception)? For instance, I perceive that the cake is alive and walking around. It is not possible for a cake to be a real cake and also to be alive and walking around. That’s not a possible way of existing for cakes (at least, for what we mean when we say “a real cake”). In those circumstances, the identity is broken. A real cake cannot be alive and walking around, but I perceive a cake that is living and walking, and therefore I do not perceive a real cake. The identity of the real cake is lost entirely, not as the result of missing all identical ways of existing (as before), but only by the perception of one way of existing that is not possible for that identity. For instance, a human being cannot turn into a 7

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cloud. If that is true, then if I suddenly become a cloud, my identity as a “human” is lost (in other words, “I” do not become a human that is a cloud—rather, a cloud is where I once was as a human, or in some other way the cloud shares some identical attributes with me as a human, though it is not me). At what point does something cease to be itself? If we continue taking away a thing’s ways of existing and/or substitute them with non-identical ways of existing, at what point does it cease to exist as its original identity and have a new or different identity? For instance, I have a cake in front of me. I eat the frosting, yet it is still a cake in front of me. Or perhaps I change the color of the cake, yet it remains a cake. What can I do to the cake to make it cease being a cake? It is the essential ways of existing, which, when taken away, cause the cake to lose its identity as a cake. If we are to differentiate between identity and identicality, the concept of essential properties/ways of being helps us to answer “How non-identical can one identity be from itself?” and “How identical can two things be and still be two identities?” What this amounts to is an admission that while the concept of identity is not identical to identicality, the concept of identity might still have a close relation to essential identicality. If all essential ways of existing are identical, a thing might be said to have a single identity (and if the thing lacks any identicality in essential ways of existing, then the thing is not one identity). We might call this the “identity of essential indiscernibility” and the “essential indiscernibility of identity”: If and only if all essential properties (ways of existing) of x are shared by y, and vice versa, then x is y. If x is y, then all of x’s essential properties (ways of existing) are shared by y, and vice versa. Note that at a minimum only the essential properties are shared, not necessarily all properties. One problem arises here with the idea of referencing an identity. Does a person need to reference (or understand) every essential property of a thing to identify it (pick it out from all

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other things)? It seems that a person need not reference all essential properties to reference an identity, else I have never referenced any identities in my life before, because I have never enumerated any identity’s essential properties in a reference to it. But a person must at least reference enough identical properties to identify the identity (even if these are non-essential properties) AND must not reference properties that are mutually exclusive with essential properties of the identity, else the reference fails to properly pick out the desired thing (meaning a case of mistaken identity). How can we discover what these essential properties are for any given thing? What makes a property essential? If we take it away, does the thing lose its identity? If so, that property is essential. If not, it is not essential. Essential here refers to the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for inclusion in x.5 Essential properties are ways of existing that are individually necessary for an identity—together all of them are sufficient to constitute that identity, and some other identity cannot have all of these essential properties without also being the same identity.6 Without all essential properties, the identity fails to obtain. So if we take away humanity from the identity of Bob, I no longer have my identity (humanity is necessary for my identity, though it is not sufficient). While it may be the case that things have some essential properties, this does not necessitate that a person must know, understand or reference any or all of those essential properties to properly identify the object or person (to pick them out from other identities). But we must be able to pick out the thing from other things by some property, and we must not 5 Thomas Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 22– 23. 6 Alvin Plantinga, “Essence and Essentialism,” in A Companion of Metaphysics, eds. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 139. 9

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mistake the identity (through mistaking it as having properties that are mutually exclusive of its essential properties). One sense is epistemological while the other is ontological: knowing an identity does not require perfect knowledge of all essential properties (epistemological), but being an identity does require all essential properties (ontological). UNDERSTANDING HUMANITY This distinction between identity and identicality might help us to understand humanity itself. I am me (I share the same identity with myself, if that even makes sense). I am not always self-identical though, as we discussed above. Further, my spirit is me. He (me) is the spirit of Bob. My spirit is not identical with me (we do not share all properties/ways of existing in common, such as having material substance and dying in the future). I do have material substance and will likely die in the future. Yet, contra Aquinas, my spirit is me. My spirit is fully Bob (it is me, my identity). The same goes for my physical body, which is me, is not a part of me (it is wholly me), is not identical with my spirit, and yet is truly me. When you point at my body, you can truly say “You are Bob.” My body has the identity of Bob. My body is not a part of Bob (a part of my identity), my body is Bob (it is my identity, though it is sometimes non-identical with itself). If my body dies, I die. I cannot be said to die if my body is not me. If my spirit lives on, I live on. I cannot be said to live on after death if the spirit that lives on is not me.7 If my body is resurrected, I live on bodily. I cannot be said to live on bodily if my resurrected body is not me. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRINITY This idea might be fruitfully applied to our understanding of the Trinity. In the Trinitarian conception, there are three persons of the Trinity, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy 7 McCall, Analytic Christian Theology, 120. 10

Robert Wadholm, “Identity & Identicality”

Spirit, all of whom have the identity of being God, yet are not identical (they do not share all properties in common). Many of the properties of God are enjoyed by all of the persons of the Trinity, such as being eternal, but some others are specific to specific persons. For instance, Jesus underwent death. The Father did not (he is a spirit). In this they are not identical. This does not mean that they are mere modes of one thing (or parts of one thing). Jesus is all God. He is the exact representation of the Godhead bodily. When we see Jesus physically, we see the Father. Yet no man has seen God (that which is identical with God). Nevertheless, Jesus, who is said to sit at his right hand, has seen the Father (he who has the identity of God), and testified of him, revealing him to the world through his own person. In this, Jesus can change, and yet God does not change. Jesus is identical with Jesus, and is non-identical with Jesus (himself from a different point in time and space or with differing properties), and he continues in his identity as Jesus. Jesus is non-identical with God the Father, and non-identical with the Holy Spirit, yet continues in his identity as God the one and only. So being God is not the same as being identical to God (because God can be non-identical to God). In this way Jesus can empty himself of the glory of God, and yet be God. He can live in time and be timeless. Jesus in time is not identical with Jesus transcending time, but Jesus is the timeless God, and Jesus is God in time. The following argument has been formulated which problematizes the metaphysics of the Trinity: P1 - The Father is God. P2 -

The Son is God.

C-

Therefore, the Father is the Son.

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“If each occurrence of ‘is’ here is interpreted as identity (‘absolute’ or non-relative identity), then this argument is indisputably valid. Things identical to the same thing must also be identical to one another. The relative identity Trinitarian argues that one should read the ‘is’ in 1 and 2 as meaning ‘is the same being as’ and the ‘is’ in 3 as meaning ‘is the same divine person as.’ Doing this, one may say that the argument is invalid, having true premises but a false conclusion. But does this rebuttal work?”8 Given our earlier discussion, we might say that “is” might be taken to mean “shares essential properties with” as a substitute for identity (as long as all essential properties are shared in common, the identity is single). In this case, the Father shares essential (though not all) properties with God, as do the Son and the Spirit. Therefore, the Father shares essential properties with the Son and Spirit. This seems to me to be unproblematic (that is, until we ask “What are the essential properties of God?”). Similarly, Plantinga’s critique of the doctrine of divine simplicity might be overcome with reference to the difference between identity and identicality.9 Plantinga argues that if God is identical with each of his properties, then he has only one property (if God is identical to love and God is identical to justice, then love is identical to justice, and therefore is a single property). Further, God could be said to be merely a property (an abstract object), since he is nothing more than identical to a property. This seems to be a fair argument. However, if modified, the doctrine of simplicity could be reformulated to state that God is identified with or by his attributes. “God is love” would mean “Love is an essential attribute of God, and can be used to identify him and to know something true about him” rather than “love is identical to God.” 8 Tuggy, Dale, "Trinity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), ed. Edward Zalta, last modified September 13, 2013, accessed December 22, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/trinity/. 9 Alvin Plantinga, Does God have a nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980). 12

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Other Christological concerns might be addressed using a similar approach. For instance, it seems that Jesus did not know the time or hour (Lk 2:52) and he grew in wisdom (Mk 13:32), both of which assume some area of ignorance (and thus not omniscience). There are various ways to get around this theologically, one of them being some kind of kenosis. But if identity and identicality were identical concepts, then Jesus should have identical properties with God for all of time (that is, if he is to have the identity of God). If identity and identicality are one and the same concept, then when we say “Jesus is God”, we must either mean that Jesus is identical with God in every way (which seems to not be the case) or that Jesus does not actually have the identity of God (which also does not seem to be the case).10 If, as I argue here, identity is different from identicality, Jesus does not have to be identical with God to be God. And contra Merricks’ physicalism, Jesus does not have to be identical with his body.11 Jesus can be nonidentical even with himself. Further, he can be one person (identity) with two non-identical natures (human and divine). He may have the essential property of omniscience with regard to his divine nature, and the common human property of non-omniscience with regard to his human nature. He may die and yet be immortal12 precisely because he has two non-identical natures yet a single identity. Jesus may be both God (having all of the essential properties of being Jesus the son of God) and man (having all the essential properties of being the human Jesus), and yet may be non-identical with either the son of God or the human Jesus. 10 My argument here is informed by McCall, Analytic Christian Theology, 108–113. 11 Trenton Merricks, “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation,” in Persons, Human and Divine, eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 282.

12 While death and immortality are two seemingly non-identical and even exclusive properties, they are possible in one person because death is not an essential property of being a human (not all humans die), and if a person lives after death (for instance, through resurrection), they are still immortal. 13

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If it is true, as I have argued, that Jesus is not identical to the Father (though they are one), and God’s revelation is not identical to God (as I posit in the next section), then it might be the case that more can be known about the Father than is revealed in Jesus Christ. God the Father may have other properties that we can know that are not identical with God the Son’s properties. While Barth seems to argue that there can be nothing else known about the Father beyond what is revealed in Jesus,13 the proposition “nothing more can be known about the Father than is revealed in Jesus” does not seem to be revealed in Jesus, thus making Barth’s argument a claim of knowledge that is impossible in his own view (we cannot know the proposition to be true outside of revelation in Jesus, and since Jesus does not reveal the proposition, it cannot be known to be true). I will not answer here what knowledge we can have of the Father outside of the revelation of Jesus, or how we could come to have that knowledge, but I do think it is appropriate to point out the possibility. A PERSPECTIVE ON HERMENEUTICS The argument regarding identity and identicality might be applied to hermeneutics as well, if we take meanings as abstract “things” that have identities. The meaning I get from a text might share identity with the meaning of the original author, though it might not be identical with the author’s meaning (it might not share everything in common with it). The meaning I get might share some (though not all) identical ways of being with the author’s meaning, and as such retain its identity as the original meaning, while not requiring identicality with that meaning. Essential meanings, not absolutely identical meanings, are in view here. So I can understand without fully understanding.

13 Kevin Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide a Unified Response (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014), 210–211.

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The analogy of faith can potentially be brought in under this idea as well. While we cannot perfectly know our God, we may know some of him. While our knowledge is not identical with God as he is, our knowledge may share some properties with God as he is (made clear through imperfect analogies like the concept of the father), and may be true (but incomplete) knowledge. Our faith is in a God that we know, but we know the identity of God even without having a knowledge that is perfectly identical with God. Epistemology is not identical with ontology—the first concerns knowledge, the second being. Any knowledge will be non-identical with that which is known, requiring a disconnect between identity and identicality if we are to know anything (even incompletely). While God is not identical with his revelation, he may still reveal himself (his identity may be known) through thoughts, experience, and words, and ultimately by his Word.14 “In his self-revelation we are grasped and given acquaintance with the real referent, by means of the transforming gift of faith.”15 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS In summary, identicality and identity are different. Exact identicality entails identity (if it quacks like a duck…), but identity does not entail identicality (I can be different than myself). Some identicality is necessary for identity (there must be something that is the same). Loss of all identicality entails loss of identity (loss of every identical attribute entails loss of identity), though it should be noted that difference of identity does not entail the absence of identicality (two different persons may have many things in common). There are essential identical ways of existing that, if absent, entail absence of identity (for instance, there are some ways of existing that are not possible for humans, or that are not possible for God). Conversely, there are essential 14 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 9, 231, 246–7. 15 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 294. 15

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identical ways of existing that, if present, entail identity, and identity entails at least essential identicality. What use is an analysis of the differences between these two concepts? I have shown here that an appreciation and analysis of the differences may help us to better understand who we are, to address metaphysical questions about the Trinity and the person of Christ, and to speak to the problem of the acquisition of knowledge without having perfect knowledge. It is because identity and identicality are non-identical that we can come to know and to identify objects. Newborn babies may identify their parents, though their parents change from day to day, and they do this without requiring knowledge of all of their parents’ attributes. This is because the identity of Mommy is not necessarily identical with all of her properties. Similarly, we may know the identity of an infinite God whose ways of existing we do not know in full.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Diller, Kevin. Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide a Unified Response. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014. McCall, Thomas. An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015. Merricks, Trenton. “The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation.” In Persons, Human and Divine, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, 281– 300. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Morris, Thomas. The Logic of God Incarnate. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. Plantinga, Alvin. Does God have a nature? Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980. ------. “Essence and Essentialism.” In A Companion of Metaphysics, edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. Tuggy, Dale. “Evangelical Apologists Take Note: Hurtado on Jesus and God.” Trinities Blog, May 6, 2015. Accessed December 22, 2015. http://trinities.org/blog/evangelicalapologists-take-note-hurtado-on-jesus-and-god/. ------. "Trinity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), edited by Edward Zalta, Last modified September 13, 2013. Accessed December 22, 2015. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/trinity/. Wadholm, Robert. Essays in Philosophy. Ellendale, ND: Grace Publications, 2014.

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