People Vs. Siton, Et Al., 600 Scra 476 Facts

People vs. Siton, et al., 600 SCRA 476 Facts: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were found wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. Respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The municipal trial court denied the motions, directed respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power (or the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property) and justified by the Latin maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” (which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number). Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause. The RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2) unconstitutional. Issue: Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause? Ruling: No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. Sabio v. Gordon 504 SCRA 704 FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding. RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the

mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.” SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ERMITA 488 SCRA 1; 495 SCRA 170 FACTS Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO. The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP. ISSUE : Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress RULING YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it deprives it of the information in possession of these officials. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case. GUDANI V SENGA 598 SCRA 671 FACTS

The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 564 SCRA 152 FACTS On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege.

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. BELGICA ET AL. V HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA G.R. NO. 208493 FACTS The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -ofstaff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional ISSUE Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.” ARAULLO V AQUINO III G.R. NO. 209135

FACTS In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion. On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did nothave actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional. ISSUE Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal protection, constitutional? HELD No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the

law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods. Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code refers to the authority of the President “to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the GAA.” Tan v Del Rosario

Facts:

1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.

2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

-Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. - Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. - Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads, 'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.

5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents. 6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process

NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case.

1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.

2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate. Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp 2008

G.R. No. 166006

March 14,

FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially viable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted the depository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986. After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process. PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a "personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company. ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. What is the power of taxation? RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived.

The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that the power to tax can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.