Philippine Judges Association (pja) Vs. Prado I 229

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PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION (PJA) VS. PRADO I 229

EN BANC THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, et.al., petitioners vs. HON. PETE PRADO, et.al., respondents [G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.] CRUZ, J. TOPIC:

V. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT A.8. Journal and Congressional Records – Sec 16 (4), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution DOCTRINE: (1) The Enrolled Bill Theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills  authenticated in the manner stated." Thus, it has also been stated in other cases that  if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.  

FACTS:  

  

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 or "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith" on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its nal form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUES:

this in the

1.

Whether Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 (An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Power, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith) which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the aforementioned law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

2.

Whether Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION (PJA) VS. PRADO I 229

RULINGS: 1. No, the contention of the petitioners is untenable. The Court does not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. The Court is convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. The Court’s ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law. Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows: Repealing Clause — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. cdphil All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof. 2. No, these arguments are unacceptable. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81). It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons where the Court explained the reason thus: To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. CONCLUSION:  Petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION (PJA) VS. PRADO I 229 

Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Registers of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED.

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