Philippine Judges Association Vs Prado

Sec. 26

statute; and it is the subject not the effect of law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders" (Par.1) Philippine Judges Association vs Prado FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. ISSUES: 1) W/N Section 35 of R.A. 7354 is not expressed in the title of the law, thereby unconstitutional. NO. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippines Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and of Other Purposes Connected Therewith." Section 35 of R.A. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition is the "Repealing Clause" of the said law. The second paragraph covers the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioner and this Court under E.O. 207, P.D. 1882 and P.D. 26. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. The reason is where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the

The Court is convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of RA 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.

Sec. 26 Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders" (Par. 1) (supra, Sec. 5) Tobias vs. Abalos FACTS: Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect. ISSUES: 1) W/N RA 7675 is in violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule" NO. Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of RA 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Contrary to the petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

Verily, the title of RA 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

Sec. 26 Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders" (supra, Art. 6, Sec. 2) Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy FACTS: The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” This law allows that “any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Petitioner Francisco S. Tatad contentds that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the constitution requiring every law to have one subject which should be expressed in its title. ISSUES: 1)W/N Section 5(b) violates the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution. NO. The Court does not concur with petitioner's contention. As a policy, the Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title - one subject rule. The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court ruled that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The Section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

Sec. 26 Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders" (par. 1) De Guzman vs. COMELEC

objective it seeks to achieve, and if all parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated to the general subject matter stated in the title of the law.

FACTS: At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 otherwise known as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996" Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside original congressional district." By Virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, COMELEC promulgated Res. Nos. 97 - 0002 and 92 - 0610 for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives reassigning the petitioners, who are either City of Municipal Election Officers, to different stations. Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, the petitioners found their way to the Court via the present petition. ISSUES: 1) W/N Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution. NO. Petitioners' contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable. Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general

The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter's Registration of 1996." Section 44 which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. It bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and minute details therein.

Sec. 26 Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created.

(par. 1) Cawaling vs COMELEC FACTS: Before the Court are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite. ISSUES: 1) W/N RA 8806 violates the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution. NO. Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City.

Hence, the title of the law, “An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,” cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence. It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.”

Sec. 26

(par. 1)

These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

Abakada vs. Ermita

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.

FACTS:

ISSUES:

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits… these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its passage.

1) Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Because of the conflicting provisions of the proposed bills the Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a committee conference. The Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate and the House of the Representatives did.

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders"

On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act 9337. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law. Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.

2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution. 3) Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. 3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

Sec. 26 Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders" BANAT vs. COMELEC FACTS: At bar is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) assailing the constitutionality of RA 9369 and enjoining respondent COMELEC from implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of SB 2231 and HB 5352. Less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA 9369. On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multisectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.

act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.’” Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),[15] Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),[16] and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and

ISSUES: 1) W/N RA 9369 violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. NO. Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections. The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an

(2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.

Sec. 26 Subject and title of bills - general prohibition of "riders" (supra. Sec. 16) reiterates Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. Accordingly, the law granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office", which are the subject of the petition. In G.R. No. 197280, petitioners also challenge the validity of RA 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2) Article VI of the Constitution. ISSUES: 1) W/N RA No. 10153 violate Sec. 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. NO. The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days. The EXCEPTION is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

“The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.” In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following the Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

Sec. 27 Procedure in Law-Making Passage of bills (supra.) (Bicameral Conference Committee - BCC) Arroyo vs. De Venecia FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos. ISSUE: 1) W/N RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.