Special Proceedings Cases 1 43

1.Republic v. Madrona, G.R. 163604, 6 May 2005; Doctrine: A petition for declaration of presumptive death is not a special proceeding. Facts: In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999, [1] granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner's Report [2] and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court's order by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal Issue: WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. Ruling: Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek t he enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. The subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia: x x x Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court,

the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x, Thus, there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.

CASE 2: Manalo vs. CA, G.R. NO. 129242

January 16, 2001

Doctrine: Article 151 of the Family Code not applicable to special proceedings. The requirement

in the Family Code involving suits between family members that there must be a ― verified allegation of earnest efforts to compromise‖ only applies to ordinary civil actions and NOT in special proceedings. A petition for settlement of estate is a special proceeding which does NOT necessitate the said requirement . Facts: Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices. On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. Trial court issued an order 1. admiting the so-called Opposition filed by counsel only for the purpose of considering the merits thereof; 2. denying the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this proceeding3 Declaring that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;4. Denying the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge; and 5. Setting the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, stating that in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. Hence the instant petition.

Issue: WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. And the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ruling: The instant petition is not impressed with merit. It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said pet ition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. 17 The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit; It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentia lly valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate. Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings. The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied). 22 The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 9263626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court. 1âwphi1.nêt WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. 3.Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, 14 March 2007;

―action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.‖ Facts: Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281. The decision became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio. On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner's application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer [2] calling

attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata. After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's application on the ground of res

judicata Issue: WON there is res judicata and WON sec 6 rule 39 of rules of court applies to special proceedings. Ruling: The petition fails. After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied) In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. [9] It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in LRC No. N983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner. As for Ting‗s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976 decision became ―extinct‖ in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-ininterest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie. As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,] The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.

[13]

enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz: THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE. We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to

the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

CASE 4: ONG vs. PDICG.R. No. 175116; August 18, 2010 Doctrine: A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is a special proceeding. An appeal

in a special proceeding requires both the filing of a notice of appeal and the record on appeal within thirty days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. FACTS: Sometime in 1982 and 1983, petitioner Jerry Ong made some money market placements with Omnibus Finance Inc. (OFI), which later on suffered serious financial difficulties. As petitioner's money market placements matured, he demanded from OFI the return of the same. However, OFI's checks issued thereby were dishonored by the drawee bank. It was alleged that OFI sought the assistance of its sister companies which included the Rural Bank of Olongapo (RBO). On December 29, 1983, Jose Ma. Carballo, OFI President, and Cynthia Gonzales, Chairperson of the Board of Directors of RBO, executed in favor of petitioner a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage3 over two parcels of land located in Tagaytay City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-13769 and T-13770, which are both registered in RBO's name, as collateral to guarantee the payment of OFI's money market obligations to petitioner in the amount of ₱863,517.02. The mortgage was executed by Gonzales by virtue of a Secretary's Certificate 4 issued by Atty. Efren L. Legaspi, RBO's alleged Assistant Corporate Secretary, showing that Gonzales was authorized by the RBO Board to execute such mortgage. The deed of mortgage was annotated on TCT Nos. T-13769 and T-13770 of the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City on January 13, 1984. As OFI failed to pay petitioner the obligation secured by the real estate mortgage, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage on March 18, 1984. A Certificate of Sale was correspondingly issued which was registered with the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City on July 16, 1985. Petitioner alleged that representatives of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) had approached him and borrowed TCT Nos. T-13769 and T-13770 for the on- going audit and inventory of the assets of the RBO; however, these titles were not returned despite petitioner's demand. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, a case for the surrender of said titles, docketed as TC-803. The case was subsequently dismissed for being premature as the one year redemption period had not yet expired.

On May 22, 1984, RBO's Corporate Secretary and Acting Manager, Atty. Rodolfo C. Soriano, filed with the RTC of Tagaytay City, an action for the annulment of real estate mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage proceedings, sheriff's certificate of sale with damages against petitioner, OFI, Cynthia Gonzales, the Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City, raffled off to Branch 18, and was docketed as Civil Case No. TG-805. However, the case was later suspended due to OFI's pending application for rehabilitation with the Securities and Exchange Commission. On May 9, 1985, the Central Bank, as petitioner, which was later substituted by respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation5 (PDIC) filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for assistance in the liquidation of RBO, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-85 and was raffled off to Branch 73. Later, upon respondent's motion, Civil Case No. TG-805, i.e., for annulment of mortgage, was consolidated with RBO's liquidation proceedings. 6

On February 5, 1991, petitioner filed with Branch 79 of the RTC of Quezon City a petition for the surrender of the titles of the Tagaytay properties against RBO, which petition was eventually ordered dismissed by the CA after finding that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to try the case, but without prejudice to petitioner's right to file his claim in RBO's liquidation proceedings pending before Branch 73 of the RTC of Olongapo City. Consequently, on February 16, 1996, petitioner filed in Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-85 a Motion to Admit Claim against RBO's assets as a secured creditor and the winning bidder and/or purchaser of the Tagaytay properties in the foreclosure sale. Respondent filed its Comment/Opposition to the motion. Trial, thereafter, ensued on petitioner's claim. On June 25, 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Philbert I. Iturralde issued an Order7 declaring petitioner's claim against RBO valid and legitimate Respondent filed its motion for reconsideration. Judge Renato J. Dilag reversed the June 25, 2001 Decision. On June 17, 2003, petitioner, thru counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal12 which the RTC gave due course in an Order. Respondent sought reconsideration of the Order giving due course to petitioner's appeal as the latter failed to file a record on appeal within the reglementary period; thus, the appeal was not perfected. RTC issued an Order that the appeal is dismissed for having been taken out of time. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction assailing the RTC Orders dated May 31, 2005 and December 7, 2005 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA issued its assailed Decision on July 31, 2006, dismissing the petition. Hence, the present petition

Issues: WON the civil case against RBO may proceed independently from liquidation proceedings. W/N CA GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BASED SOLELY ON TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE. W/N COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITHOUT PASSING UPON THE MERIT OF PETITIONER'S APPEAL. 17 Petitioner reiterates his argument raised before the CA that his counsel's failure to submit a record on appeal on time is an excusable neglect as the failure was due to the serious complications surrounding the case that led her to commit an error of judgment; that petitioner's counsel honestly believed that their claim filed against RBO in the special proceedings and the civil case filed by RBO against petitioner for the annulment of mortgage under Civil Case No. TG-805, which was eventually consolidated with the special proceedings, were ordinary civil actions since they sought the enforcement or protection of a right or prevention or redress of a wrong; thus, a mere notice of appeal would be sufficient to perfect petitioner's appeal.

Ruling: All claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank. It is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. It is not necessary that a claim be initially disputed in a court or agency before it is filed with the liquidation court. As to the main issues raised by petitioner, we find the same unmeritorious. It has been held that a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is classified as a special proceeding. 20 The RTC decision, which petitioner sought to appeal from, was rendered in the special proceeding for the liquidation of RBO's assets; thus, applying the above-quoted provisions, an appeal in a special proceeding requires both the filing of a notice of appeal and the record on appeal within thirty days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. In this case, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on June 17, 2003, and the RTC gave due course to the appeal after it found that the notice of appeal was filed within the regle mentary period. However, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, where it argued that petitioner failed to file a record on appeal, considering that the decision was rendered in a petition for liquidation of RBO which was a special proceeding, the RTC reversed itself as no record on appeal was filed, and dismissed petitioner's appeal for having been taken out of time. The RTC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal, since it is clearly stated under the Rules that filing of the notice of appeal must be accompanied by a record on appeal to perfect one's appeal in a special proceeding. In fact, the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeal was expressly allowed under Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which states: SECTION 13. Dismissal of appeal. – Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu propio or on motion to dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time.

Thus, we find no error committed by the CA when it sustained the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeal for failure to comply with the Rules.

The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents. [14]

Withal, petitioner's ratiocinations that he failed to submit a Record on Appeal on time could be taken as excusable neglect due to serious complications surrounding the case leading him to an error of judgment where "an ordinary human being, courts, not excepted, is susceptible to commit, is highly unsustainable. Petitioner counsel's honest belief that the claim of petitioner Ong and t he civil case for annulment of mortgage under TG-085 were ordinary actions and, as such, mere filing of a notice of appeal would be sufficient, is far from being persuasive. This is not the excusable neglect as envisioned by the rules in order to sidestep on the strict compliance with the rules on appeal. Petitioner was fully aware that Sp. Proc. No. 170-0-85 is a petition for liquidation because they filed their claim in the case claiming to be a preferred creditor, participated in the trial thereof in every step of the way, and filed the disputed Notice of Appeal under the title of the said case. We cannot find any reason to accept petitioner's feigned ignorance that the case they were appealing is a liquidation petition. In fine, such miscalculation of the petitioner cannot justify an exception to the rules, and to apply the liberal construction rule.

On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained. [15] On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus[16] questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. [17] He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. [ The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29] under any resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a courtTtrial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.

5. In re Datukan Malang Salibo, 8 April 2015;

On appeal, Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision. It dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Doctrine :“Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained. . [54]‖

Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"

Facts: From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. [4] "While in Saudi Arabia, Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." [5] He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009. [6] On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. [7]

Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

An erroneous application of the law or rules is not excusable error." 26 Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his counsel.

Issue: First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus

Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. [8] Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not hav e participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. [9] To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents"[10] tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009. [11] The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang. [12] Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days. [13]

Ruling: We grant the Petition. 1.

Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its members, [50] the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by law, [51] or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. [52] The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. [53] A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted. [54] The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. [55] Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas

corpus.]"[56] Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court

there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor.

In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.

Facts: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to determine the merits"[74] of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, [75] respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals. 2.

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued. The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before CA or any of its members, the CA or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted. The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court. CASE 6: VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN Doctrine: Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, the Supreme Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. And alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible.

On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty -one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty -six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos , (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record. In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so. Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court. The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be pervasive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right. A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.) The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court.

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis

[1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.) We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents. The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings. Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done. With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the

negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged. In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered. 7. Fletcher v. Director of BuCor, UDK14071, 17 July 2009 Doctrine: A petition which is deficient in form, such as a petition-letter, may be entertained so long as its allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.

If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment Facts: Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three months and 12 days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal. [1] In its return to the writ, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posited that the petition should be denied for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In particular, the petition was neither signed nor verified by petitioner or a person on his behalf or by his purported counsel. Moreover, it was not accompanied by a copy of the cause of petitioner's detention or commitment order. The OSG further opposed the issuance of the writ on the following grounds: petitioner's prison sentence was never commuted by then President Ramos; he had not been granted the status of a colonist; there were other pending cases against him warranting his continued detention [2] and he was put under custody by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.

Issues: Should the petition for habeas curpos dimissed? Ruling: We disagree with the OSG insofar as it argues that the petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court may be

dispensed with where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus. In Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison, [3] we held that the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally. The petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not fatal. [4] Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, [5] this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. So long as this Court sits, technicality cannot trump liberty. Therefore, a petition which is deficient in form, such as petitioner's petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so long as its allegations sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus. Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of the writ. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. [10] However, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied) Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. [11] It is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. 95-995. [12] On June 24, 1996, he was sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with payment of actual damages of P102,235.56

Case 8: Aquino vs. Esperon Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by a court which has jurisdiction to do so. Since Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article 67 (attempting to begin or create a mutiny) and Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), the legality of his arrest is settled and the writ is unavailing. Furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement, the writ will only lie if what is questioned is the fact or duration of confinement.

-A regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be under the Articles of War. - Only after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof have been made, that a charge be referred to a general court-martial for trial. - This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement but the writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement

Facts: On 3 February 2006, Major Aquino, along with several military men, allegedly met at the resthouse of Captain Aldomovar near Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan to plot a breach of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to take over Camp Aquinaldo, as well as the Headquarters of the Philippine Army. On 26 February 2006, in the wake of the group‘s alleged withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines chain of command and the current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was ordered arrested and confined at the Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, upon the order of Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, (Lt. Gen. Esperon) who was then the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the Army Inspector General to conduct an investigation. During the investigation, Major Aquino denied the accusations hurled against him. He intimated, inter alia, that he had no plan nor did he make any pronouncement of withdrawing support from the chain of command, and that he pledged to continue to support the same and the duly constituted authorities. 7 On 4 March 2006, the panel of investigators submitted its Investigation Report to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. In its report, the panel of investigators found that the troop movement 8 by some military personnel from their respective stations to Manila was illegal, implicating Major Aquino. The panel of investigators recommended that: 1) all implicated officers therein mentioned be immediately relieved from their respective posts; and 2) appropriate charges be filed before the General Court Martial against Major Aquino, among other military officers/personnel, for violations of Article 6710 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny); and Article 97. Further, the panel‘s Investigation Report was referred by Lt. Gen. Esperon to the Judge Advocate General‘s Office (JAGO) of the Philippine Army for review. On 17 March 2006, the JAGO found the existence of probable cause against Major Aquino, among other military officers, for violations of Article 9613 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), Article 97 (Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), and Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) of the Articles of War. Per said Supplemental Affidavit, it was revealed that subj Officers met at the resthouse of CPT ALDOMOVAR near the so-called tower area in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, on the evening of 03 Feb 2006, discuss and plot their plan to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and hatch a plan to take over Camp Aguinaldo and [the] Headquarters [of the] Philippine Army. x x x. 14 On the basis of JAGO‘s recommendations, Col. Jose R. Recuenco (Col. Recuenco), then Army Provost Marshal, signed under oath a charge sheet 15 against Major Aquino, charging the latter with violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) 16 and Article 9617 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, which was indorsed to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). On 12 July 2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order 18 to the Commanding Officer, 191st, MP Bn to exercise custodial responsibility of Major Aquino, together with the other implicated military personnel who withdrew their support from the chain of command in February 2006, and to place them in confinement at the Philippine Army Detention Center, Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal. The same Order also designated the aforementioned Commanding Officer to exercise direct supervision and control over the concerned detainees. 19 On 20 July 2006, the charge sheet against Major Aquino was amended to set forth more detailed specifications of the charges. 20 It, however, retained the charges against Major Aquino as stated in

the original charge sheet—i.e. violation of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create a Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War. On 20 July 2006, the Judge Advocate General of the AFP General Headquarters of the AFP issued Office Order Number 14-06, creating a Pre-trial Investigation Panel21 for the case of Major Aquino, et al. On 21 July 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus22 with the Court of Appeals, praying that the AFP Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are acting in their place and stead, be directed to immediately produce the body of Major Aquino and explain forthwith why he should not be set at liberty without delay. The case was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 95341. In the meantime, the Pre-trial Investigation Panel of the AFP issued a Subpoena/Notice of Pre-trial Investigation23 to Major Aquino, summoning him to appear in person before the panel and to submit his counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses. 25

After hearing, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision Petition for Habeas Corpus.

26

dated 31 August 2006, denying the

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 31 August 2006 Decision, but, the Court of Appeals denied the same and found no reason to disturb its judgment. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Issues: 1.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PREFERMENT OF THE CHARGE SHEET AGAINST ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IS EQUIVALENT TO FORMALLY CHARGING THE LATTER AS CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR. 2.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PLACING ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY DETENTION FACILITY. 3.WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT ARMY MAJOR AQUINO‘S SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY DETENTION FACILITY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR. 32 Ruling: Anent the first issue, petitioner assails the legality of Major Aquino‘s confinement on the ground that the latter had not been formally charged. It is petitioner‘s theory that charges can only be deemed formally filed after a thorough and impartial investigation shall have been made. 33 Thus, petitioner suggests that the word "charge" as used in Article 70 34 of the Articles of War means that a person is formally charged only after the conduct of a mandatory pre-trial investigationThus, according to petitioner, the filing of a formal charge can only be done after the conclusion of the pre-trial investigation, when the case is referred to the general court-martial, akin to the conduct of a preliminary investigation in civilian courts. 35

We are not persuaded. First, it is established that Major Aquino is governed by military law. Article 2 of the Articles of War36 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law only over persons subject thereto. Major Aquino, G3 of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) of the Special Operation Command of the Philippine Army, is subject to military law. As a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Major Aquino falls squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War. Consequently, he is subject to the applicable provisions of the Articles of War and Executive Order No. 178; 37 or the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army. Second, a scrutiny of the confinement of Major Aquino proves that the same is valid. Article 70 of the Articles of War governs the cases of arrest or confinement, viz.: Evidently, Article 70 of the Articles of War empowers the commanding officer to place, in confinement or in arrest, any person subject to military law charged with a crime or with a serious offense under the Articles of War. Article 70 is the authority for enabling the proper military personnel to put an instant end to criminal or unmilitary conduct, and to impose such restraint as may be necessary upon the person of a military offender, with a view of his trial by court -martial We juxtapose Article 70 with Article 71 of the Articles of War. Under military law, the conduct of investigations is governed by Article 71 of the Articles of War No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation[,] full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. Before directing the trial of any charge by general court-martial[,] the appointing authority will refer it to his Staff Judge Advocate for consideration and advice. When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement immediate steps will be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. When a person is held for a trial by general court-martial, the commanding officer, within eight days after the accused is arrested or confined, if practicable, forward the charges to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction and furnish the accused a copy of such charges. If the same be not practicable, he will report to superior authority the reasons for delay. The trial judge advocate will cause to be served upon the accused a copy of the charges upon which trial is to be had, and a failure so to serve such charges will be ground for a continuance unless the trial be had on the charges furnished the accused as hereinbefore provided. In time of peace[,] no person shall, against his objection, be brought to trial before a general court-martial within a period of five days subsequent to the service of charges upon him. (As amended by RA 242). (Emphasis supplied.)

The formal written accusation in court-martial practice consists of two parts, the technical charge and the specification. 40 The charge, where the offense alleged is a violation of the articles, merely indicates the article the accused is alleged to have violated while the specifications sets forth the specific facts and circumstances relied upon as constituting the violation. 41 Each specification, together with the charge under which it is placed, constitutes a separate accusation. 42 The term "charges" or "charges and specifications" is applied to the formal written accusation or accusations against an accused. 43 The first part of Article 71 of the Articles of War categorically provides that charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law, who under oath states that he either has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief. Further, the second paragraph of Article 71 explicitly provides that no charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. A charge is made followed by a thorough and impartial investigation and if the result of the investigation so warrants, the charge is referred to the general court martial. Contrary to petitioner‘s contention, Article 71 makes no qualification that there can be a "charge" against a person subject to military law only if a pre-trial has been completed and the case has been referred to a court martial. What Article 71 instructs is that no charges, i.e. charges and specifications signed by a person subject to military law under oath, may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. Article 71 does not make the thorough and impartial investigation a prerequisite before charges may be filed against a person subject to military law. Clearly, the thorough and impartial investigation is a prerequisite not to making a charge against a person subject to military law, but to the referral of the charge to the general court martial. It is the charge which comes prior to the investigation, and which sets into motion the investigation. We find that there was compliance with the requirements of the Articles of War. As shown by the evidence on record, the amended charge sheets 44 against Major Aquino, containing the charges and the specifications for violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, were personally signed under oath by Capt. Armando P. Paredes, a person subject to military law. The amended charge sheets were sworn to by the accuser, Capt. Armando P. Paredes in the manner provided under Article 71. 45 As it is, Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of the Articles of War.

cell, she alleged that she was restricted from visiting her husband. 53 Petitioner asserts that these are extreme punishments akin to treating Major Aquino as a convicted criminal. 54 We are not impressed. At this juncture, it must be stressed that respondents deny the solitary confinement of Major Aquino. 55 According to respondents, Major Aquino is confined in a U-shaped building without any division/partition. 56 The place is described as a long hall with 50 double-deck beds. 57 Respondents also asseverate that Major Aquino is confined along with 16 other military personnel who were similarly charged in the 23-24 February 2006 incident. 58 While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violations of constitutional right, 59 this Court, however, does not find the conditions of Major Aquino‘s confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the instant Petition. This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. Furthermore, the following guidelines were given by the Court to determine if an action constitutes punishment, to wit: (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. 63 It is also an additional requisite that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. 64 We do not see the attendance of the foregoing factors in the instant case. There are no specific facts that are brought to the attention of this Court to indicate the punitive character of the confinement. The confinement is not herein imposed as a punishment. We do not see that the confinement of Major Aquino causes him to suffer some harm or disability. 1avvphi1 There is no punitive hardship that exists in the case at bar. In fact, petitioner does not even allege a single act which would show such harm or such "disability" as to prove that the same is significantly greater than, or independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. 1avvphi1 To be sure, the first part of Article 70 of the Articles of War grants discretion to military authorities over the imposition of arrest or confinement of persons subject to military law charged with crime or with serious offense.

Perforce, we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner‘s Petition for Habeas Corpus for the person of Major Aquino. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. 50 As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. 51 Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. 52 In the case at bar, Major Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War. The legality of Major Aquino‘s restraint having been settled, the privilege of the writ is unavailing.

Major Aquino is charged with violations of Article 67, for attempting to begin or create mutiny, and Article 97, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. According to Article 67, any person subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes or joins in any mutiny shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. It cannot be gainsaid that in determining the "circumstances" of arrest and confinement in Article 70 of persons charged with crime or with serious offense, such circumstances as the gravity of the offense charged may be considered.

We proceed to discuss jointly the second and third issues raised by the petitioner before this Court.

As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of conditions of confinement; but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 66 Its object is to inquire into the legality of one‘s detention, and if found illegal, to order

Petitioner contends that in his confinement, Major Aquino was not restricted to his barracks, quarters or tent as mandated by Article 70 of the Articles of War; rather, he was placed in solitary confinement in a maximum security detention cell. When petitioner proceeded to the detention

Anent petitioner‘s allegation that she was restricted from visiting Major Aquino, the Court had in the past underscored the "hands-off doctrine"—a deference given by courts to military custodians over prison matters, especially on blanket restrictions on contact visit.

the release of the detainee. 67 It is not a means for the redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief or damages. The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. 68 (Emphasis supplied.) In sum, we find the present Petition to be devoid of merit. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. 9. Ampatuan v. Macaraig, 29 June 2010 Doctrine: The restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers

under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. This is sanctioned by Sec. 52.4 of R.A. No. 8551 (New DILG Act of 1990). Even assuming that there initially was no administrative investigation when placed in custody, the subsequent investigation would legalize his restrictive custody. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. [16] Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment‖ ―a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty‖

―While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed‖ Facts: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor‘s Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City‘s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition. Issues: WON the arrest is illegal and won the writ is applicable Ruling: In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. [26] Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. [27] Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan's restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process. We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To

date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have to dismiss the petition. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit Case 10. Harden vs. Director of Prisons Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of in cases of detention by virtue of a judicial process or valid judgment. Exceptions where the writ may be availed of as a po stconviction remedy: (JEC) (a) There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) An excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

The property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by Philippine jurisdiction. ―While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the courts thereof, yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the court‘s orders with reference to its custody or disposition.‖ Facts: The proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as plaintiff and the petitioner and another person as defendants, commenced on July 12, 1941, and involving the administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a receiver was appointed and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a valuable consideration and with the consent of the court first had and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets, real or personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found in the names of said defendants or either of them. Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash; to Virginia Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000. Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to return all these amounts and to redeposit them with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China. Judge Peña granted the motion . After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Harden in the Supreme Court and decided, and after various motions were filed and heard, Judge Peña, on March 27, 1948, entered an order, which was a modification of that of October 7, 1947, directing Harden "to deposit with the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within five days from receipt of a copy of this order the money and drafts that he has actually in Hongkong, without prejudice to passing upon later on the different amounts that the defendant has spent according to his attorney, after he has submitted to the court an itemized account of those expenses.

The receiver appointed in the main case prayed that the certificates of stock of the conjugal partnership be ordered turned over to him (receiver) so that he might have them registered in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 62. On June 7, 1947, the court "authorized" Harden "to register not later than June 30, 1947 the stock certificates in his possession, notifying the court afterwards of such action. On July 28, 1947, Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to comply with the above order and prayed that he be ordered to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt. In his "compliance" dated August 7, 1947, Harden stated that he had been granted an extension until December 31, 1947, within which to register the Balatoc Mining Co. shares under Republic Act No. 62. In a motion dated January 7, 1948, the receiver informed the court that, notwithstanding the expiration on December 31, 1947, of Harden's extended time to comply with Republic Act No. 62, the records of the Balatoc Mining Co. showed that the certificate had not been registered as of January 7, 1948; and upon his request, an order dated January 17, 1948, was issued giving Harden "an extension until March 31, 1948 within which to comply with the Order dated June 7, 1947." In a motion dated March 15, 1948, Mrs. Harden prayed for the reasons therein stated, that defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificates covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co. shares either to the Clerk of this Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately after registering them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62." On March 24, 1948, Harden filed a motion stating that the registration of shares of stock under Republic Act No. 62 had been extended until June 30, 1948, and prayed that he "be allowed to register the stock certificates in question within such period as by law or regulations is or may be provided." It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to jail. Broadly speaking, the grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or (3) excessive penalty. (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 1 L-1083, Jan. 30, 1947, 44 Off. Gaz., 1231.) Issues: WON the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by Philippine jurisdiction. Ruling: The fact that the property is in a foreign country is said to deprive the court of jurisdiction, the remedy in such case being, it is contended, ancillary receivership. We cannot agree with this view. While a court can not give its receiver authority to act in another state without the assistance of the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391), yet it may act directly upon the parties before it with respect to property beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the court's orders with reference to its custody or disposition ( Id. 118) Whether the property was removed before or after the appointment of the receiver is likewise immaterial. In Sercomb vs. Catlin, 21 N. E., 606-608, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:

It is true that the property attached is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, but the appellant, who caused it to be attached, is in this state, and within the jurisdiction of its courts. If the superior court had no power to reach the goods in Newton's hands, it had the power to reach appellant, who sought to prevent its receiver from getting possession of the goods. It makes no difference that the property was in a foreign jurisdiction. The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court which provides that "when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.

judgment of the trial court in the proceeding wherein the petitioner for habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. (Ex-parte Fisher, 206 S.W. 2d. 1000.). The petition is denied with costs.

Case 11. USAN GO vs . FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005 Doctrine: The writ of habeas corpus cannot be availed of in cases of detention by virtue of a

The latter decision cites Stanley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300, 90 A., 1042, 1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language: In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the other party to do or to refrain f rom doing some act specified in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he many discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket." The failure of the order of commitment to state that the acts which the contemner fails to do are still in his power to perform, does not void the order of imprisonment. Section 7 of Rule 64 does not require such finding to appear in the order, unlike section 1219 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California on which the petitioner's contention is rested. Petitioner is in error in saying that section 237 of the former Philippine Code of Civil Procedure, from which section 7 of Rule 64, supra, has been copied, was of California origin. Former Justice Fisher is authority for the statement that section 237 of Act No. 190 was borrowed from section 1456 of the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure. (Fisher's Code of Civil Procedure, 3rd ed., p. 136.) The exact similarity in substance though not in language between the two provisions is a confirmation of this statement.

judicial process or valid judgment. Exceptions where the writ may be availed of as a postconviction remedy: (JEC) (a) There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) An excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Dimagiba‘s contention that the principle of retroactivity of penal laws would benefit him is not correct since Adm. Cir. 12-2000 is not a law which deleted the penalty of imprisonment but a circular which merely established a rule of preference, subject to the judge‘s discretion, in imposing penalties under B.P. Blg. 22. The SC cannot delete the penalty of imprisonment for that would in effect be a law which only Congress may enact. Nor would the plea of equal protection of laws be appropriate. This is because SC A.C. No. 12-2000 as aforestated is not a law. Hence we apply the general rule that habeas corpus is unavailing if a person is under custody by virtue of legal process or a valid judgment . FACTS: Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which were dishonored upon presentment for the reason account closed. [6] Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22. After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. Dimagiba appealed but was denied. The Decision became final.

At any rate, the order of commitment contains the alleged missing element if it is taken, as it should be taken, in connection with the orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, and with the charges for contempt. It expressly gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as the grounds for the warrant of commitment, and thus by reference makes them part of it. The orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, in turn clearly specify the acts with the petitioner was commanded to fulfill. It is equally clear from these orders that in the opinion of the court the petitioner is in a position to bring back to the Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and the Balatoc shares he had remitted to that colony.

He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest a nd the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. However, it was denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC. Consequently, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. He filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition[17] for a writ of habeas corpus. Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.

Whether or not in truth the court's findings are supported by sufficient evidence is a differe nt matter; it is a matter of fact which can not be reviewed by habeas corpus.

Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11, 2001. [25] That Motion was denied. Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has steadfastly held that habeas corpus does not lie to correct errors of fact or law. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. the writ of habeas corpus can not be made to perform the function of a writ of error; and this holds true even if the judgment, orders or decree was erroneous, provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment or issued such an order or decree. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, supra; Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, supra.) So whether the act charged has been committed or can still be performed is conclusively determined by the order or

ISSUE:Whether or not the Petition for Habeas Corpus was validly granted. RULING: No. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. Here, there is no illegal confinement because the order for his arrest was valid.

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. [37] SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, [38] established a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties. [39] When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. It necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.

In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17. Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007. 19 While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. 20 Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. 21 In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.

In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus. The Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. Hence, let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence. Case 12. MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS vs. SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, G.R. No. 182855, June 5, 2013 Doctrine : Adm. Cir. 08-2008 (Rule of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel) not a

ground for the release on habeas corpus of reporter. The circular cannot be given retroactive effect where judgment in criminal case already final and executor.

FACTS: Adonis was convicted by the RTC of Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel filed against him by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He began serving his sentence on February 20, 2007. A second libel case was likewise filed against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 14. On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge on Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis. On May 26, 2008, the said order was served to the respondent, 12 but the release of Adonis was not effected. On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is meritorious. RULING: No. The petition is without merit. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or discharge authorized, to wit: If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed.

Case 13. MA. ESTRELITA D. MARTINEZ vs. Director General LEANDRO MENDOZA, G.R. No. 153795, August 17, 2006 Doctrine: If what is alleged is forcible taking and disappearance, not arrest and detention, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus but criminal investigation and proceeding. Here the respondents denied having custody of the missing person and there was no adequate proof that respondents had such custody. (Martinez v. Mendoza, G.R. 153795, 17 August 2006). Take note however that effective 2 February 2008 the writ of amparo is available in cases of enforced disappearance. FACTS: Petitioners are the mother and wife, respectively, of Michael Martinez, who was allegedly abducted and taken away by seven (7) persons around 7:30 in the morning. Phillip Medel, Jr. named Michael Martinez as the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren Strunk, the husband of Nida Blanca and alleged mastermind in her killing. In a televised interview with a media reporter on November 26, 2001, Medel narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame where he was being detained. Petitioners then made representations with CIDG for the release of Michael Martinez or that they be allowed to see him, but the same were not granted. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the RTC against respondents PNP Director General LeandroMendoza. Respondents vehemently and categorically denied any participation or involvement in the alleged abduction or disappearance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never confined and detained by them or in their custody at any given time. Respondents thus prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is meritorious. RULING: No. The petition is without merit. The petitioners anchor for the present case is the disappearance of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely consequential to his disappearance. Ostensibly, his disappearance has been stablished. However, the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention. When forcible taking and

disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings. Abduction or kidnapping is a crime punishable by law. Investigations with regard to crimes are first and foremost the duty of the PNP and the NBI, not the courts. Much as this Court would want to resolve these disappearances speedily -- as in the present case, when it is interested in determining who are responsible for the disappearance and detention of Michael (if, indeed, he is being detained) -- it would not want to step beyond its reach and encroach on the duties of other duly established agencies. Instead of rendering justice to all, [13] it may render injustice if it resorts to shortcuts through habeas corpus proceedings. In fine, this proceeding for habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a thorough criminal investigation. Case 14. LEE YICK HON vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No. L-16779, March 30, 1921 Doctrine: Where the person is detained under governmental authority and the illegality of his detention is not patent from the petition for the writ, the court may issue a preliminary citation to the government officer having custody to show cause why the writ should not issue. When the cause of the detention appears to be patently illegal, the court may issue a peremptory writ requiring the unconditional production before the court of the body of the person detained at the date and time specified. The writ of habeas corpus may be classified as: Preliminary citation – If the person is detained under governmental authority and the illegality of his detention is not patent from the petition for the writ, the court issue s the citation to the government officer having custody to show cause why the habeas corpus writ should not issue; and Peremptory writ – If the cause of the detention appears to be patently illegal, the court issues the habeas corpus writ noncompliance with which is punishable

issue. Citation was literally complied with when, on July 30, 1920, the Attorney -General, on behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer. The sole ground relied upon to sustain the judgment finding the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported under the conditions stated he has frustrated the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for which application had been made. That it had been found that he had entered the Philippine Islands in contravention of the Immigration and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his deportation. That answer, so far as appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient Citation is NOT the peremptory writ of habeas corpus. At this point attention should be directed to the fact that the order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular Collector of Customs on July 23, 1920, is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally The order served in the case was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. The practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this character, upon applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has become common in our courts; and upon considerations of practical convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in cases where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory writ is not manifest. No Contempt. It is necessary to take account of the difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas corpus; and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant did not put himself in contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported. The judge could have added to the citation an admonition to the effect that the petitioner should not be deported until his application for the writ of habeas corpus should be heard. If a temporary restraining order of that kind had been issued, it would no doubt have been respected.

FACTS: This is an appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs from the action of the CFI of Manila in imposing upon him a fine of P50 for an alleged contempt of court. On July 23, 1920, a petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the CFI of Manila by one Lee Yick Hon. He alleged that he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to entering the Philippine Islands, but was prevented from so doing by the Insular Collector of Customs, who was detaining him for deportation.

It is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for contempt in the violation of an injunction or in fact of any judicial order unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. A party cannot be punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified in the order. In this case, the deportation of the petitioner Lee was not forbidden by any order of the court, and hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court.

Upon the presiding in Sala IV of said court, cited the collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued as prayed. Citation was served at about 11 a.m., at which house arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at noon on the same day; Insular Collector failed to countermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. As a result:

In the case, Ex parte Lake

Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Contempt proceedings were instituted against the Insular Collector. CFI of Manila imposed upon him a fine of P50. Issue: W/N any lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court or judge below was disobeyed or resisted by the appellant. Ruling: No. The citation that was served upon the appellant required him to appear at a stated time in the CFI of Manila and show cause if any there might be, why the writ prayed for should not

Alleged contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the judge, for there was none of any character made in the case, "and there was no order, decree, writ, or any other process in existence, forbidding him form doing just what he did". Jurisdiction over the party will not confer power to punish for contempt unless some order, decree, or process has been disobeyed or the party is guilty of some act of the nature of malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the reasonable rules of the court. Judgment is reversed and the defendant absolved. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. At this point, attention should be directed to the fact that the order to show cause is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Case 15. CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ VS. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, G.R. No. 166470, August 7, contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian 2009 had allegedly been maltreating her. [19] Doctrines: Examples where the writ of habeas corpus is available where the rightful custody of

any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto: a. b. c.

Parents may avail of the writ to obtain custody of their child as against the grandparent. Wife may avail of the writ to obtain custody of her child under 7 years of age as against her husband. (See Article 213, Family Code). A judicial guardian who was unduly deprived of custody of her ward is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus in order to regain custody. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. However the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts. The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. (S20, Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors).

On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus[20] in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal. On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. [21 Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005. [22] Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. ] ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is valid. RULING: Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. [35] Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward. [36] CASE 16 MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN MILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA, Petitioner, vs. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA,Respondent., G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014 Doctrine: Motion to quash writ and to dismiss case denied. The petition for habeas corpus was

properly filed in the RTC of Caloocan. Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that ―the

FACTS: Lulu, at age of 4, inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the estimated at P50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new petitioner resided or where the minor may be found,‖ is not applicable because it refers to a family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent petition for custody of minors. What is applicable is Section 20 which covers petition for a writ of personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5. Upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu habeas corpus involving custody of minors. Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a was given full control of her estate. judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under While living with the step-family, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. Respondent filed a petition for guardianship[10] in the RTC. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. The RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need t o appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted. Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police. The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently

R102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought. As regards Petitioner‘s assertion that the summons was improperly served, service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under R102 or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. FACTS: On March 24, 2011, Raquel filed before RTC-Caloocan Branch 130, a regular court, a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the said petition, she demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ, directing Ma. Hazelina to produce before the court respondent‘s biological daughter, minor Criselda, and to return to her the custody over the child. The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering Ma. Hazelina to bring the child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at Ma. Hazelina‘s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by Raquel‘s counsel and barangay officials. Nevertheless, Ma. Hazelina failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC -Caloocan. Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, Ma. Hazelina filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Raquel filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia, among others. On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted Raquel‘s motion and dismissed the guardianship case due to

the pendency of the habeas corpus petition before RTC-Caloocan. Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on August 8, 2011. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon petitioner. The Sheriff served the alias writ on Ma. Hazelina at her office in Quezon City.

Section 2. Rule 102. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

Following this development, Ma. Hazelina, by way of special appearance, moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, claiming, among others, that she was not personally served with summons. In addition, she argued that jurisdiction over her and Criselda‘s person was not acquired by the RTC Caloocan as the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found.

Again, service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

RTC: 2012, issued denial of the omnibus motion and Court held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner herein. Also, personal service does not necessarily require that service be made exclusively at petitioner‘s given address, for service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a copy of the court process in person by anyone authorized by law. Aggrieved, hence this petition (certiorari to CA).

CASE 17: Thornton vs. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004,

CA: It held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed a habeas corpus petition to Family Court in Caloocan City. It ruled that service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. According tothe CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a special proceeding. ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition by respondent. WON summons is properly served. RULING: Yes, RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. The petition for habeas corpus was properly filed in the RTC of Caloocan. Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that ―the petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resided or where the minor may be found,‖ is not applicable because it refers to a petition for custody of minors. What is applicable is Section 20 which covers petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under R102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought. As regards Petitioner‘s assertion that the summons was improperly served, service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under R102 or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. In the case at bar, Raquel filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC -Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether Ma. Hazelina resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.

DOCTRINE: The Family Courts Act of 1997 did not revoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. (S20 SC Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation thereto). FACTS: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in CA's resolution dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl naed Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton. However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. Whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp. Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3 that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent‘s cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

Anent Ma. Hazelina‘s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gav e family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where the minormay be found. (emphasis added)

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the

jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: xxxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter. Issue: WON CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors. WON there is an implied repeal of RA 7902 and BP 129 by R.A 8369. Held: RA 8369 did not divest the CA and SC the jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. CA and SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the Family Courts in Habeas Corpus cases involving custody of minors. According to SG, o allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child‘s welfare and well being will be prejudiced. As compared to Floresca case: where heirs of the miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit to the regular courts even if claims fall under Workmen's Compensation Act where the WC Commisioner had jurisdiction over such cases. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus: The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines , and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First

Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369. Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored: The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et

concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject."

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-0304-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. - A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. xxxx The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines . The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. Petition granted.

CASE 18: (Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. 162734, 29 August 2006) DOCTRINE: Where both parents have joint custody of a child, the writ may be availed of if a

father is deprived of his right to see his child.

Facts: This case assails the decision of CA which dismissed the petition for certiorari and MR against the orders of the RTC. Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint. Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the order of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied. Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.

Marie and her parents contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that Loran has failed to present any evidence of any compelling reason. They also argue, that assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy of Loran was not habeas corpus but a simple action for custody. They assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. Loran, on the other hand argues that Art. 213 applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his son. He asserts that a writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice versa. He also asserts that the complaints filed by Marie were merely for delay. Loran also maintains that, under the law, both him and Marie share custody of Lorenzo and when Marie is out of the country, as required by her job as an international flight stewardess, he should have the custody of Lorenzo and not the maternal grandparents. Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father. 1.

2.

Ruling: The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari. The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his libert y. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court‘s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. Thus, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order. Habeas corpus is available to the father. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a juridical grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child‘s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. The order of the court to produce the body of the minor before the court was merely in line with the directive contained in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of the custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. It is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

CASE 19. ILUSORIO v. BILDNER (GR No 139789) 12 MAY 2000 DOCTRINE: Writ of habeas corpus not available to compel a husband to live with his wife. Thus,

Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of right. On July 11, 1942,ERLINDA KALAW, petitioner, and Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio, contracted marriage. They had 6 children, namely, Ramon Ilusorio, ERLINDA ILUSORIO-BILDNER, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, Marietta Ilusorio, & Shereen Ilusorio. The spouses lived together for 30 years. In 1972, the spouses separated from bed and board (separated legally) for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano then lived in a condominium in Urdaneta, Makati, when he is in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club, when he‘s in Baguio City. On the other hand, ERLINDA lived in a house in Antipolo City. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano‘s return from the US, he stayed with ERLINDA for 5 months in Antipolo City. Their daughters, Sylvia and Erlinda(Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft an anti-depressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, US., which in turn effected his health deterioration. On February 24, 1998, ERLINDA filed with the RTC-Antipolo, a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to his old age, frail health, poor eye-sight, and impaired judgment. Same year, May 31 , after attending a meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.. March 11, 1999, ERLINDA filed a petition before the CA for writ of habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that the respondents refused petitioner‘s demands to see and visit her husband and barred Potenciano from returning to Antipolo. On April 5, 1999, after due hearing,, CA DENIED the petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention but GRANTED visitation rights to ERLINDA. 11 OCT 1999, filed an appeal via certiorari, asserting that he never refused to see her. ISSUE: W/N the wife, ERLINDA ILUSORIO, may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel Potenciano to live with her. HELD: NO. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus caters only to involuntary and or illegal restraint.

According to the evidence, there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano‘s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that Potenciano is about 86 years of age or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated – soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Potenciano was of sound and alert mind having answered all relevant questions asked by the court hence, he posses the capacity to make choices. He also made it clear that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. The CA, Exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where ERLINDA never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject‘s insanity. Missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without the threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. 1. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potentciano may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice because such shall deprive him of his right to privacy.

Petition for writ of Habeas Corpus DISMISSED for lack of merit. 20. Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682 Doctrine: A habeas corpus case involving a minor is not limited to the production of the minor before the court. The main purpose of the proceeding is to determine who has rightful custody over the child. The court should still proceed to determine who should have the rightful custody of the child. Facts: Maricel ran away from her parents Antonio and Rosita Gallardo to live with her boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy. Maricel's boyfriend left her. Maricel returned to her parents but ran away again and went to Noel and Lydia. There, she entrusted to the two the custody of Maryl, and left behind a note relinquishing her parental rights over Maryl in their favor. When Spouses Gallardo learned about this, they tried to obtain the custody of Maryl but Noel and Lydia refused. Thus, Spouses Gallardo filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC. At the RTC, both parties agreed to a shared custody of Maryl, where the grandparents took custody of her during weekends. The Regional Trial Court approved the agreement. Unfortunately, Spouses Gallardo took Maryl away and brought her to Samar. Hence, Noel and Lydia filed a motion to cite in contempt Spouses Gallardo. They also filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus based on Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, citing the plaintiff‘s refusal to comply with a lawful order of the court. The RTC cited Spouses Gallardo in contempt and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by them for mootness, since Maryl was already in their custody. Noel and Lydia filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the action should have been dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. They prayed that Maryl Joy be returned to them to preserve the status quo ante. The RTC denied the MR ruling that the sole purpose for the filing of the petition is to cause the production before the Court of the person of Maryl, not a determination of the legality or illegality of custody. Issue: Was the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court and that it would be moot upon said production?

Held: No. Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child. The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without sufficient basis. It is true that Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Art icle 216 also states that in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child. However, in determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child‘s welfare is the most important consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. There are three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving minors: (1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody of the petitioner. In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established because the RTC hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial. Case to the RTC for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of the Antonio and Rosita to have custody of Maryl Joy. 21. SY VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R No. 124518, December 27, 2007 Doctrine: S6 R99 expressly acknowledges and authorizes that the matter of care and custody of the children may be raised and adjudicated as an incident to any proceeding, such as a case for habeas corpus. (Sy v. CA, 27 December 2007). The court could also award support even if not prayed for if the respondent failed to object to evidence on support, based on S5 R10. FACTS: On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 94-69002. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering Wilson to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that after hearing, their care and custody be awarded to her as their mother. In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of the minors be awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained that Mercedes was unfit to take custody of the minors. He adduced the following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her family in 1992; secondly, she is mentally unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to the children. ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the custody of the minor children be given to the mother. 2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide financial support to the minor children not in his custody. RULING: 1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that: ―In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven

years of age, unless the parent is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.‖

In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, and supervision but also have the advantage and benefit Of a mother‘s love and devotion for which there is no substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined. 2. Yes. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. The Court likewise affirms the award of P50, 000.00 as support for the minor children. As f ound by both courts, petitioner‘s representations regarding his family‘s wealth and his capability to provide for his family more than provided a fair indication of his financial standing even though he proved to be less than for the right on the matter. In any event, this award of support is merely provisional as the amount may be modified or altered in accordance with the increased or decreased needs of the needy party and with the means of the giver. 22. Canlas, et al vs NAPICO Doctrine: The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final and executory judgment is not included among the enumeration of rights in S1 RWA. WRIT OF AMPARO: A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by a public official or employee or a private individual or a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings a nd enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (S1, Rule on the Writ of Amparo [RWA]).

included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. xxxx No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Xxxxxx Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ. Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance‖ (emphasis supplied). Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. Therefore the Petition should be dismissed (ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CANLAS, MARRIETA PIA vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS‘N – XIII, INC., et al. G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, En Banc, Reyes, R.T. J.). Facts: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land. Their dwellings have been demolished or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to summon some unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their participation in the issuance of fraudulent titles to NAPICO. Issue: Whether or not writ of amparo is proper in this case.

In Armando Canlas, et. al., vs. NAPICO Homeowners Association et al., the High court also reiterated that the writ of amparo will not be issued where the person‘s right to life, liberty and security is not threatened. Thus:

Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court . As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as such motions for reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of the Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous decision that cannot be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not

Ruling: No, writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The threatened demolition is not included among the enumeration of rights protected by the writ. Their claim to their dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty, and security. 23. Sps. Pador v. Arcayan, 12 March 2013 Doctrine: Writ of amparo not available against Brgy. Captain‘s alleged trespass of Petitioner‘s property since merely a violation of Petitioner‘s property rights. Facts: On 22 March 2008, petitioners filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008, respondents

Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possible violence from respondents gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.

We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners' ampalaya farm is an insufficient ground to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.

The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution finding that petitioners' claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficiently explained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitat ion. It thereafter proceeded to deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.

The fourth allegation of petitioner that, following these events, they can anticipate more harassment cases, false accusations and possible violence from respondents is baseless, unfounded, and grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As such, this allegation does not warrant the consideration of this Court.

Issue: WON Writ of Amparo was proper

On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations."

Held: No. We uphold the RTC's Resolution and deny the instant Petition. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in a petition therefor, as follows: SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person

whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations: first , that respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the latter were cultivators of marijuana ; second, that respondent barangay captain sent them invitation letters without stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that respondent barangay captain refused to receive petitioners' letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners anticipate the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and potential violence from respondents. All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ. Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners' permission, we cannot grant the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners' property rights. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, we ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature, as follows: [T]he writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. (Emphasis in the original)

On petitioners' second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captain's act of sending invitation letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not violate or threaten their constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The records show that Barangay Captain Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions. Moreover, the records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners were coerced to attend the conference through the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the conference, as they have in fact done in this case.

24. Caram v. Segui, 5 August 2014 TOPIC: Writ of amparo FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the latter‘s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as ―Legally Available for Adoption.‖ On February 5, 2010, BabyJulian was ―matched‖ with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced. On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of BabyJulian‘s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together. On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced disappearance in this case. As to what constitutes ―enforced disappearance,‖ the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting ―enforced disappearances‖ as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit: 1.

That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivationof liberty;

2.

That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

3.

That it be followed by the State or political organization‘s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

4.

That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian‘s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD‘s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no ―enforced disappearance‖ as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing. Christina‘s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. Mison v. Gallegos Facts: On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Hence, asked Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportatio n of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711. BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku‘s passport. Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo. Also, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku‘s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family Issue: w/n the writ is properly issued? Held: Writ of Amparo not proper. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides: SECTION 1.

Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court‘s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people‘ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization‘s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Ku‘s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa. More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits. Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under detention. The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that t he Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. t is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku‘s proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP. Navia v Pardico Facts: A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), a nd Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter,

Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert tha t in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens disappearance. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper? Held: Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person. As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia‘s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating

his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons. We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere se curity guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person. DISMISSED Ladaga v. Mapagu ―The inclusion of petitioners' names in the Order of Battle List does not, by itself, constitute an

actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and security as to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo.‖

Facts: Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in what is alleged to be a JCICC ―AGILA‖ 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their life, liberty and security. ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came to know of the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 2007. On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged speech before the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List. The Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into the matter. According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her dutites and functions, she has not committed any act against national security that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008 three men tried to barge into their house Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also included on the OB List. In his petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public interest or human rights lawyer. The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List. On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo, directing the respondents to file a verified written return.

In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners failed to show that they were responsible for the alleged threats. After submission of the parties‘ respective Position Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners‘ life, liberty and security was attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was therefore denied. Issues: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Writ of Amparo. Held: No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Justifying allegations must support the issuance of the writ, on the following matters: 1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner; 2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission; 3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; 4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal circumstances and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals; 5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; 6. The relief prayed for. Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence, and if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of the other known activists to the inclusion of their names or the names of their militant organizations in the subject OB List. However, the existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain personalities. The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat as that which brought ultimate harm to the other victims without corroborative evidence from which it can be presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on account of their militant affiliations. The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

Santiago v. Tulfo FACTS: Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart) and Claudine Margaret Santiago were in the airport awaiting for the arrival of their baggage but were informed that it was offloaded and transferred to a different flight. While they were lodging a complaint before the complaint desk, Raymart saw a man taking photos of his wife. He then approached him and found out that it was Ramon ―Mon‖ Tulfo. The confrontation then, escalated to a brawl, which came to a stop because of the interference of the airport security personnel. Days after the incident, the brother of Mon Tulfo aired on their TV program comments and expletives together with a threat that they will retaliate against the Santiagos. Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo against respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo should be granted HELD: In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are generally characterized as "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,"27 while "enforced disappearances," according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851, 28 otherwise known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity," "means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time." In Navia v. Pardico, 29 the Court held that it must be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. 30 Notably, the same requirement of government participation should also apply to extralegal killings, considering that the writ of amparo was, according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to "hold public authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a high standard of official conduct and hold them accountable to our people. [In this light] [t]he sovereign Filipino people should be assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty are threatened or violated, they will find vindication in our courts of justice."31 Stated differently, the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance out the government's incredible power in order to curtail human rights abuses on its end. Consistent therewith, the delimitation of our current writ of amparo to extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, is explicit from Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, which reads: Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC's first paragraph, does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same section's second paragraph qualifies that the protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security. The two paragraphs should indeed be read together in order to construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly applicable is the statutory construction rule that "clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute [or, in this case, procedural rule] must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. , that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."32 In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it is apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the RTC, through Judge Singh, properly exercised its discretion to motu proprio dismiss the same under this principal determination, regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court, indeed, has the discretion to determine whether or not it has the authority to grant the relief in the first place. And when it is already apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation. Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo FACTS: Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.

in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed. ―May the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP director be included as respondents in a writ of amparo

case solely on the basis of command responsibility? Yes but not for the purpose of attaching accountability and responsibility to them for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes but only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for and has the duty to address the disappearance and harassments complaint of in order to enable the court to devise remedial measures‖ De Lima v. Gatdula ―The RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Respondents De Lima et al., to file an answer rather than a return. A return is different from and serves a different function from an answer.‖ FACTS: February 2012, respondent Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC Manila against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation. Respondent wanted petitioners to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident. RTC JUDGE PAMPILO: Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing to determine whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case . ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members

RTC ORDER: Judge said that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days

RTC DECISION: granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. RTC denied herein petitioners‘ MR. Petitioners thus came to the SC assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45. ISSUE Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in the present case? HELD. No. the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time. The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision" which merely directs the issuance and service of the Writ of Amparo. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered. The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule. It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in and RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. second was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined. third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al. The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. "Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."

Court directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty -eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits. Yano v. Sanchez Facts: Cleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before the Court of Appeals. Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include Marciana Medina ) and to implead other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional respondents. In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the ―wives‖ of Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers‘ uniforms passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp of the Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims‘ bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Issue: Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial evidence to prove that the public officials observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty is ground for the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule is proper in cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance of the alleged victim. Ruling: As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required in Amparo petition. Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty the requirement for a government official or employee to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizen‘s constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the Amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisional remedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition – Section 14 of theAmparo Rule provides for interim

or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. ―While the RWA provides for the interim reliefs of TPO IO, and PO, these provisional reliefs are

intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims‖ ―The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance

of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs‖ Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 15 November 2011; Facts: On September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military camp and was forced to confess to his membership in the NPA. During his 11 days of captivity, he was repeatedly threatened, detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess the whereabouts of NPA camp and his fellow NPA comrades, sign documents declaring that he had surrendered to the military and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset. On his last day of incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media. On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for the Protection Order, Inspection of Place and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The Supreme Court granted the respective writs on December 15, 2009, after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by the members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. Issue: Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of temporary protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. ―Interim reliefs can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it

must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since petitioner was granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The

order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.‖ Reyes v. Gonzalez, 3 December 2009; ―Fr. Reyes‘ petition for writ of amparo to set aside his inclusion in the HDO list was denied since he

should have filed the appropriate motion in the RTC where the rebellion case filed against him was pending.‖ Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. Petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion. Upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety. After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information before the RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City. RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Every time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO. Issue: Whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Ruling: No, the Right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. The restriction on petitioner‘s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner‘s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by the Supreme Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

Razon v. Tagitis, 3 December 2009,(2009 case) ―Technical rules of evidence not strictly observed in writ of amparo case. The fair and proper rule

is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test. The courts should exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases‖ Facts: Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More than a month after his disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The petition stated that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student and according to a reliable source; that he was in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed a complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of helping her she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband. The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Issue: Does the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every detail in st ating the threatened or actual violation of a victim‘s rights for it to be given due course by the court? Ruling: The Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim‘s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim‘s rights to

life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present. 3 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010 (2010 case) Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on December 3, 2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, it was held that Col. Kasim was accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to the case. And held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. However, before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead. Issue: Whether or not Col. Kasim‘s death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic. Ruling: The Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny the petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was in the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his "asset" or network of assets during his lifetime.

Case # 35. GR No. 186640 February 11, 2010 Petitioners: Gen. Yano, Lt. Gen Ibrado and Maj. Gen. Villanueva Respondents: Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina

Summary: This is a case about a petition filed by the military officers as regards the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Reliefs to the case filed by Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina. Reliefs prior to the determination of the amparo petition should not be granted since the petitioners (now respondents) failed to establish through substantial evidence the link between the military officers and the disappearances. There should be substantial evidence established for the issuance of the writ of Amparo to be granted. Pending such determination of the writ, the court may grant reliefs to safeguard the rights of the parties.

In this case, no substantial evidence was established hence no provisional reliefs should be granted for the writ of Amparo does not lie. The CA however decided that no substantial evidence exists but still granted the provisional reliefs which was no longer proper. Facts: September 17, 2006 at around 8:00 PM - Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina (respective sons of respondents) were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac. September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 AM – Nicolas‘ ―wives‖ Lourdez and Rosalie heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers‘ uniforms passing by. At around 4:00 AM of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgunfor catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. September 19, 2006 – Respondents went to Capas Station of the PNP, at the Camp Detachment of the 71st Army and at the Camp Bravo to search for Nicolas and Heherson but no avail. September 21, 2006 – Respondents alleged that Josephine Galang informed them that she had seen two men inside the Camp who later she identified as Nicolas and Heherson after respondents had shown her their photographs. Josephine informed respondents that she saw the victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1, 2006 this time at the Camp Bravo. December 21, 2006 – Respondents filed a case before the CHR which endorsed the same to the Ombudsman for appropriate action contending that the victim‘s life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account of their forced disappearance. Respondents prayed the production of the victims‘ bodies during the hearing and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. December 28, 2007 – Respondents Cleofes Sanchez filed before the Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon. January 02, 2008 – The Court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the Writ before the Court of Appeals of Justice Sundiam who was ordered to hear and decide the case. CASE 38 and 39 lacking 40.Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 178933, 16 September 2009 Facts: Beatriz Silverio died. Her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. - In Nov 2004, during the pendency of the case in RTC of Makati City, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the estate. Edmundo S. Silverio also filed an opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator. - RTC granted the petition and removed Silverio Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Silverio Jr. as the new administrator. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

- In 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, without Authority from this Honorable Court. - On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private respondent‘s motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. - Silverio-Dee received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order which was denied by RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. - On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006. - RTC denied the appeal on two grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dee‘s appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee‘s Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. - Hence, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with the CA which issued a TRO and ruled that Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals. Issues: WON the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal? [Yes, they are interlocutory orders.] Ratio: 1. SC first cited the CA decision which ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final order. CA said that the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. SilverioDee to occupy the property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). CA also reiterated that a final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. 2. The SC added that it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. The Court in Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals said that although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right as provided in Art 493 of the Civil Code. 3. Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court. Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court. In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located in Forbes Park. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. The private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

Doctrine: Once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court. The administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. ―The order of the intestate court for Nelly to vacate a portion of the estate property is only an interlocutory order that may not be the subject of an appeal. It is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.‖

testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner LiwaywayVinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. Later on, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration to the Order granting letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity. Subsequently, Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the RTC and filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato. The Motion for reconsideration of Republic and Imelda was both denied. Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents. The Court issued a Resolution referring the petition to the CA which was denied later on. Hence, a motion for reconsideration was filed to SC. Issue: WON petition for certiorari was proper. Held: No. Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was then in effect provides that, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorarias the law or rules of court may prov ide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as provided in the pertinent portions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case." ―Failure to file income tax return is not an offense involving moral turpitude which would make a person incompetent to serve as executor or administrator. Moreover the conviction was not yet final as Bongbong Marcos had appealed therefrom‖ ―From the probate court‘s order allowing the will of Ferdinand Marcos and issuing letters testamentary to Imelda and Bongbong Marcos, the Republic should have appealed to the CA under S1(a) R109 instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.‖ 42.Aranas v Mercado, 15 Jan 2014 ―Order of probate court that certain properties should be included in the inventory is interlocutory and cannot be appealed under S1 R109. Remedy is certiorari under R65‖ Facts: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate

41.Republic v. Marcos, 4 August 2009

Thelma filed... a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate

Facts: The RTC of Pasig issued an order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and

The RTC granted the petition

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio... indicated... that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory... he RTC issued... an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included Teresita... sought the reconsideration of the order... on the ground that one of the real properties affected... had already been sold to Mervir Realty... the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration... stating that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants' agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded... from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue. the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory... the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership... to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale... had been notarized Issues: Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale Ruling: The appeal is meritorious. Was the CA correct in its conclusion?

Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in... favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed... the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision 43.Republic v. Nishina, 15 November 2010 Facts: Nisaida was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina. Her father later died and so her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondent‘s mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mother‘s second husband, ―Hakamada.‖ Later on, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name ―NisaidaSumeraNishina‖. Hence, she filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 106-M-2007. After hearing the petition, RTC granted respondent‘s petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos ―to cancel the second birth record of NisaidaSumeraHakamada issued in 1993 and to change particularly the surname of respondent from Nishina to Watanabe.A copy of the Order was received on by the OSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Issue: WON filing of a record on appeal is necessary in this case. Held :No. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. It contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to the notice of appeal – is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent‘s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC. every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisa l of all the real and personal estate of the deceased... which has come into his possession or knowledge. The usage of the word all... demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to... the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity. the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator.

―PERIOD OF APPEAL AND HOW APPEAL TAKEN: In special proceedings and other cases of

separate or multiple appeals where a record on appeal is required, the appeal shall be taken within 30 days from notice by filing a notice of appeal and a record on appeal with the court from which the appeal is being taken. (S2[a] & 3 R41). The test for determining if a record on appeal is required is to ask if the court a quo notwithstanding the appeal still needs to hold on to the original record since it has not fully disposed of or decided the case. Appeal from the RTC‘s order granting a petition for change of name is perfected by filing a notice of appeal only. A record on appeal is not required since the case does not involve multiple or separate appeals where the trial court needs to retain the original record.‖