Mario Robles-báez, On Marx's Dialectic Of The Genesis Of The Money Form.pdf

On Marx's Dialectic of the Genesis of the Money Form Author(s): Mario L. Robles-Báez Source: International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 3, Marx, Keynes, and Money (Fall, 1997), pp. 35-64 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40470707 Accessed: 29-06-2019 22:51 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms

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Int. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, no. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 35-64.

© 1998 M.E.Sharpe, Inc.

0891-1916 / $9.50 + 0.00.

Mario L. Robles-Báez

On Marx's Dialectic of the Genesis

of the Money Form

As is well known, Marx's presentation of the value form is one of t

most difficult parts of his critique of political economy and one of t

most clearly dialectical passages in Capital. Even today, Marx's d

lectic of the value form has not been treated adequately. Backhaus' article "Zur Dialektik der Wertform" (1969) can be considered one o the first works that has been influential among academic Marxists drawing attention to the form of value. After Backhaus's article, mo Marxists have begun to appreciate the importance of the role of for determination in Marx's theory of value and therefore in his theory the money form. Those Marxists who have developed some of th theoretical research on the dialectic of the form of value include Arth

(1979, 1993), Zeleny (1980), Eldred and Hanlon (1981), Faus

(1983), Dussel (1985), Uchida (1988), Williams (1989), Smith (199 and Murray (1993). For all of them, Hegelian dialectical logic play

central role in Marx's construction of the money form. Consequent

reference to certain aspects of Hegel's Logic conduites a feature

their writings on this matter. The works of Arthur and Fausto hav

another characteristic as well: Their dialectical analysis is develop together with a critique of interpretations in terms of formal logic.

Translation © 1998 M.E Sharpe. This paper is an enlarged and modified versi of "Notas para una crítica a la interpretación de Carlo Benetti de las formas valor de Marx," Economía: Teoría y Práctica 3 (September 1992). Translated b

the author.

The author is a professor in the Departamento de Producción Económica, UAM-Xochimilco, Mexico. 55

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36 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

his "Dialectic of the Value Form," Arthur develops the logic

value form as a critique of Stanley Moore's argument that the v form relation is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. In his M Lógica and Política, Fausto responds to Benetti and Cartelier's no

of Merchands, salariat et capitalistes (1980), where they cri

Marx's construction of the general equivalent (Benetti and Carte

main critical arguments are reproduced in chapter 5 of Bene

Moneda y teoría del valor, 1990). The present paper has a double objective: to develop further so aspects of the logical argument on the genesis of the money form Fausto presents in his response to Benetti and Cartelier's interpr tion, and to present new aspects not treated in the works of all

authors mentioned above. Although the critical analysis will

rected mainly at Benetti and Cartelier's interpretation, some imp

aspects of Zeleny's and Eldred and Hanlon's views will be crit In particular, the paper focuses on the specific logical relatio connections through which Marx proceeds from the simple form value to the money form. I will not treat the development of th manent difference between value and use- value of commodities,

is actualized as an external opposition between commodity and m it is here presupposed.

The objective and character of Marx's analysis of the forms of value

First, let me briefly refer to the place Marx assigns to the analy

the money form within the logical structure of his theoretical wo capital as the subject of the capitalist mode of production and to

relation ofthat structure to the structure of Hegel's Logic. In cha

of Capital, Marx presents the transition to the essence of capita is, capital-in-general. Capital is defined there as value that va itself, that is, value in process that maintains and increases itsel alternatively assuming the forms of money and commodities. A a process, value requires money as its general and independent for existence "by means of which its identity may at any time be e lished" (Marx, 1977, p. 152). Money as an independent form of e tence of value is a simpler and more abstractly determinate cate or form of being, than capital: Value as capital, Marx says, "is not an independent expression of value as in money, but dynamic va

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FALL 1997 37

which "is raised to a higher power than in money" (Marx

131). This implies that the development of capital must pres Marx says, "the full development of the exchange- value of

ties and consequently its independent form of value as m 131). Marx thus links the movement from money to capital.

money provides a definitive (external) measure of the being modities as values and, at the same time, establishes the s

mensurability of commodities as manifestations of social lab is said by Marx in Theories of Surplus Value:

[I]n considering the existence of the commodity as money, it i

necessary to emphasise that in money commodities acquire a d

measure of their value - since all commodities express thei

the use-value of the same commodity - but that they all beco

festations of social, abstract, general labor; and as such they a the same form, they all appear as the direct incarnation of so

and as such they all act as social labor, that is to say, they directly exchanged for all other commodities in proportion to

their value. [Marx, 1972, p. 136]

The role Marx assigns to money in Capital parallels, to

extent, the one Hegel assigns to the moment of measure in th

of Being of his Logic, Moreover, since the section on m Hegel's Logic, which includes a chapter on the becoming o precedes the doctrine of essence, I would argue that Mar Hegel's sequence of categories: The analysis of the money

value precedes the transition to the essence of capital in Capit

Furthermore, since money is the form in which all commo compared with and measured against each other, the commo quires money. The commodity is thus a simpler and more ab determinate category than money, hence the analysis of the must precede the analysis of the latter. Marx thus links comm money. According to Marx's theory of the commodity, com have two opposite determinations, or a double form: a use- va that is, their physical or natural form, and a value form, tha social form. Contrary to the "physical objectivity" of comm use- values, the being of commodities as value is a "social obj which they acquire only insofar as they ^re expressions or co of the identical social substance - abstract labor - common to all of

them. The value of commodities, crystals of this social substance, is an

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38 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

abstraction, but a social abstraction that belongs to the capitalist mo

of production. As a social abstraction, the value of commodities is a essence that is truly actual only through the specific material form

its neccesary manifestation. As an essence, it cannot have an immed ate appearance; it is, as Murray points out, "a being of reflection, a essence in the dialectical sense, that is, the kind of being that must appear as something other than itself (Murray, 1993, p. 51, emphas

added). A commodity cannot express its value in its own physic

form: "Turn and examine a single commodity, by itself, as we will, y in so far as it remains an object of value, it seems impossible to gr

it" (Marx, 1977, p. 54). It is only through the social relation of com modity to commodity that, according to Marx, the being of a comm

ity as value can manifest itself. Given that in this relation commodi

as values are identical, while as use-values they have different (phy cal) forms, the dialectical relation of identity and difference of com modities resolves in that any commodity only acquires a value form different from its physical form, in the physical form of another co modity. The universal commodity through which all other commod ties express their values and which becomes their material independe existence is, for Marx, the money-commodity, the money form of th values. All this is what makes money necessary, and consequently Mar analysis of the forms of value corresponds to this particular neccesity.

The genesis of the money form of value, or the development of th

expressions of value ending with the money form, is the subject section 3 of chapter 1 of Capitali:

Here ... a task is set us, the performance of which has never yet even

been attempted by bourgeois economy, the task of tracing the genesi of ... the money form, of developing the expressions of value implied

in the value-relation of commodities, from its simplest, almost im

perceptible outline, to the dazzling money form. By doing this we shal at the same time, solve the riddle presented by money. [Marx, 1977,

54]

Is Marx's analysis of the process of genesis of the money form historical or logical? Influenced by Engels, many Marxists have believed that the object of the first part of Capital is simple commodity

production as a historical stage before capitalism (see, for example, Meek, 1973; Duménil and Levy, 1983, among others). They consider that Marx's method in Capital is logical-historical. This is a misreading.

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FALL 1997 39

Part I of Capital I provides not analysis of the prehistory of c but an analysis of the immediate appearance of capitalist pro

The sequence of categories developed in Capital is, as Mar

"determined ... by their relation to one another in modern b society, which is precisely the opposite ofthat which seems to natural order or which corresponds to historical developmen 1973, p. 107). The logical-historical method is followed by

his materialist dialectical derivation of the money form o "Marx's real interest is concentrated here on 'genesis' in sense, on the inner connection; one could say: on the essen

historical process" (Zeleny, 1980, p. 52). The money form of value is thus considered by Zeleny as a

sequence that mirrors its historically necessary process, "which would not be completed if it were not accompani second chapter by the derivation of money in the form 'historically' necessary sequence" (Zeleny, 1980, p. 52). A

some moments of Marx's analysis of the genesis of the money value and the process of exchange have historical or temporal r

its general character and ultimate aim are not historical but l

historical is to a certain extent presupposed by the logical pres

On the other hand, Carlo Benetti argues that the subject m section 3 of chapter 1 is "the analysis of the conditions or p of generalized exchange in a society composed of private pro and not the study of the origin of money" (Benetti, 1990, p. translation). Benetti' s interpretation supposes, to a certain ex

the subject matter of the first part of Capital I is the theory of a

of simple commodity producers, and that, consequently, the a the forms of value corresponds to the analysis of the logical-h construction of generalized exchange in such a society. Howe trary to the dialectical derivation of Zeleny 's method, Benetti

corresponds to that of formal logic. On the basis of a purely analysis of exchange, Benetti rejects not only Marx's logical co of the general equivalent, but also his theory of value. As will below, Benetti's interpretation is a misreading of Marx's method.

Marx's analysis presents not the historical genesis of money

logical genesis (or the logical development of exchange val with the constitution of money form as money). The histori

ences introduced by Marx in section 3 of chapter 1 and in cha

Exchange) of Capital I must be read as subordinate to a logica

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40 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

sis. This means that the context of Marx's analysis is the "log

origin" of money, and therefore the logical prehistory of money, th

is, the process that embraces all of the forms of expression of valu that precede the logical constitution of money as the universal form expression of value. According to Marx's dialectical presentation, th

analysis of generalized exchange can only be done after the mon

form as money has been posited. This is why Marx's analysis of the process of exchange in chapter 2 of Capital I is preceded by the ana sis of the form of value, which is later supplemented by the analysis the logical development (or the logical history) of the forms of mon (which is the subject of chapter 3). A final point to consider here is that, since the money form of val is at the same time a commodity and the universality of commoditie or the universal commodity in which all other commodities can press their values, it must be understood as an entity that conta within itself the individual and, at same time, the universal - that is, is a concrete universal. As Marx refers to it metaphorically,

It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all othe actual animals, which form when grouped together the various kinds

species, subspecies, families, the animal, the individual incarnation of the entire animal kingdom. Such a particular which contains with itself all really present species of the same entity is a universal (like animal, god, etc.). [Marx, 1976, p. 26]

Or, as he puts it also metaphorically in the Grundrisse, Money is

"the god among commodities" representing their "divine existen while they represent its earthly form" (Marx, 1973, p. 221).

Marx's dialectic of the genesis of the money form of value as

concrete universal is developed through three moments: the moment

unity, the moment of plurality, and the moment of unity in pluralit

which correspond respectively to the simple form, the expanded for

and the general form of value. The sequence of these moments goes fr

the simplest and more abstract to the complex and less abstract expression of the form of value. Let us present the analysis of each in turn.

Simple or accidental form of value (form I)

Marx begins his analysis with the moment of unity, which, as point

departure, is considered only as a simple unity, a unity in which plur

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FALL 1997 41

ity is presupposed. This simple unity as the seed out of whi money form is developed is considered by Marx as the simplest relation between two commodities. This form is to a certain extent the

cell form or, in Hegelian terms, the in-itself of money. As Marx pointed out: The economists have hitherto overlooked the extremely simple point that the form: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat is only the undeveloped basis of 20 yards of linen = $2, and that therefore the simplest commodity form, in which its value is not yet expressed as a relation to all other commodities but only as something differentiated from the natural form of the commodity itself contains the whole secret of the money form and

with it, in embryo, of all the bourgeois forms of the product of labor.

[Letter to Engels, June 22, 1867, in Marx and Engels, 1975, p. 177]

Thus, for Marx, the secret of the money form lies in the simplest value relation between two commodities, which he represents as follows: x commodity A = y commodity B, or

x commodity A is worthy commodity B,

which can be expressed more concretely as: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth one coat,

where the "one" commodity A (linen) expressing its value in an "other" commodity B (coat) has the relative value form and the "other" commodity (B) which serves as material for the value-expression func-

tions as the equivalent of the "one" commodity (A), or has the equivalent form. The value of commodity A is what has to be measured and commodity B represents the measure. In this relation, commodity A thus plays an active role, commodity B a passive role. Howard Williams claims that Marx "draws on Hegel's notion of the unity of opposites to explain more fully the relationship of the equiva-

lent and relative poles" (1989, p. 171). Indeed, the simple form of value as a simple unity implies not only a unitary relationship between

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42 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

the relative and equivalent value forms, but also an opposed one: "T relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connecte mutally dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of val but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extreme i.e., poles of the same expression" (Marx, 1977, p. 55). This oppositio is expressed in the three peculiarities Marx assigns to the equivalen form: the use- value, the concrete labor, and the private labor belong to the commodity, which functions as equivalent, becomes the form manifestation of their respective opposite, the value, abstract labor, a social labor belonging to the commodity occupying the relative form Since the simple form of value is a relation between two commod ties, it can be thought of as representing the analysis of an effecti exchange. Does it represent an effective exchange? Marx's response

this question would be negative. However, there have been autho

who read it as an effective exchange, including some who have foun reasons to reject Marx's theory of value. This is the case of Eldred a

Hanlon. They reject Marx's simple form of value as a value relat

for two reasons: On the one hand, because the exchange relation be tween only two commodities does not correspond to the derivation Marx's concept of value. "For ... the derivation of this concept relie on the existence of universal exchange-relations" (Eldred and Hanlon 1981, p. 32). And, on the other hand, because the relation between tw commodities "has little to do with practical relations in capitalist so ety" (p. 32). Eldred and Hanlon situate Marx's analysis of the sim form of value in the context of an effective exchange within capit ism. For Marx, it neither refers to the analysis of an effective excha (this is the subject matter of chapter 2 of Capital I) nor is it situat historically or temporarily within capitalism. On the contrary, it is t

logical analysis of the simplest value-expression of a commodity

which is provided by the relation between two commodities, and wh

"contains the whole secret of the money form and with it, in embryo, of

all the bourgeois forms of the product of labor." It corresponds to t point of departure of the logical analysis of the money form.

However, if the analysis of the simple form does not correspond t the analysis of an effective exchange, what is analyzed when the si ple form of value is analyzed? It is the expression of value. Howeve since the money form has not yet been constituted at this logical st of the analysis, it must be explained where the expression of va appears in the simple form. This explanation may imply a contradicti

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FALL 1997 43

because if it is true that the expression of value cannot appear

bly in a logical stage where the money form as a particular co

has not yet been posited, it is also true that the expression o must appear in the objective relation between two commoditi where does the expression of value appear? According to Faus only possible answer to this question is that the expression of "appears in the judgment - the expression of an expression modity A is worth y commodity B9 " (Fausto, 1983, p. 155). B

this not amount to treating this expression as a subjective on

answer to this question is negative, because as an expressi

objective relationship, the expression of an expression is not tive. It is, in terms of language, the expression of an objective the value relation between two commodities.

To what type of logical relation does the simple form of value belong? In the first place, Marx says that the expression of value is not a reflexive relation in terms of formal logic: It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen

= 20 yards of linen is not a expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definitive quantity of the use- value linen. [Marx, 1977,

p. 55]

No commodity can express its own value in itself nor, therefore, can

stand in the position of equivalent to itself. The relation commodity A = commodity A represents a mere tautology. On the other hand, the

expression of value is a reflexive relation in terms of Hegelian dialectics: "one" commodity relates to an independent "other" commodity that is the same as the "one" commodity; therefore the relation is a relation of self-reflection. This is expressed by Marx as follows: The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively - i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other - here the coat under the form of an equivalent. [Marx, 1977, p. 55]

Marx presents the opposite relation implied in the original equation immediately after the above passage: No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen

are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of

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44 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. [1977, p. 55, emphasis added]4

Here the roles of the commodities are reversed. The commodity that

previously played the relative form now becomes the equivalent form and the commodity previously having the role of the equivalent form now assumes the relative form. Carlo Benetti refers to this passage

when he affirms that Marx's analysis of the simple form of value contains an ambiguity because Marx attributes to it "the property of symmetry, according to which one or the other commodity can alternatively perform the role of equivalent" (Benetti, 1990, p. 164, emphasis added, my translation). From the perspective of formal logic, this passage could mean that

the original relation, a = b (20 yards of linen = 1 coat), implies the opposite one, b = a (1 coat = 20 yards of linen). This would indicates that the simple form of value corresponds to a relation of implication, the logical operation allowing us to pass from the first relation to the second. If this were really the case, this would imply two things: on the one hand, the sign "=," which Marx uses in both expressions, would

designate logical-mathematical equality, which is a particular case among relations of equivalence, relations that are always symmetrical. On the other hand, like any implication, it supposes that the truth of the

first term (a = b) is always followed by that of the second term (b = a). Moreover, it must be pointed out that, in formal logic, implication is, in

general, the passage from an implicit determination to an explicit determination.

However, to think of the simple form of value as a relation of implication, as Benetti does, is a misundertanding of Marx's logic. For Marx, the relation is not (analytically) symmetrical, nor is the logical operation that allows one to pass from the first expression to the second an implication. To explain this, let us refer to the passage that follows the one quoted above: But, in this case, I must reverse the equation in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that, the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, there-

fore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive.

[Marx, 1977, pp. 55-56, emphasis added]

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FALL 1997 45

In the German edition of "The Value Form," the following follows the one above:

Let us consider transactions of exchange between linen-producer A and coat producer B. Before they unite in their transactions, A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 2 coats (20 yards of linen = 2 coats), but B says: 1 coat is worth 22 yards of linen (1 coat = 22 yards of linen). Finally, after they have haggled for a long time, they come to agree-

ment. A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, and B says: 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. In this case, both linen and coat are situated at the same time in the relative value form and in the equiv-

alent form. But, (note carefully!) the circumstance obtains for two different persons and in two different value-expressions, which only

at the same time come into existence. As far as A is concerned, his

linen (we speak this way because the initiative has its origin in his commodity, for him) is situated in the relative value form, and it is the

commodity of the other person (the coat), on the other hand, which is situated in the equivalent form. // is the other way around from the

standpoint of B. The same commodity thus never - not even in this case - possesses both forms at the same time in the same value-expres-

sion. [Marx, "The Value Form," pp. 10-11]

In the above passages, Marx indicates clearly that the inverse expressions of value involved in the simple form of value correspond to a relation of exclusion. In term of dialectics, a relation of exclusion implies that the opposite expressions can be considered as different relations of value, although they are manifested simultaneously. From this perspective, the relation of exclusion implies two aspects that are different from that of formal logic: (1) it is possible to pass from the first expression to the second without making false the first one;5 and (2) the relation between both expressions is one of opposition: As far as content is concerned, both expressions: 1. 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat 2. One coat = 20 yards of linen or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen are by no means different. Asfar as form is concerned, they are not only

different but opposed. ... If I turn expression 1 around, I obtain expres-

sion 2. The commodities change places, and straightaway the coat is

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46 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

situated in the relative value form; and the linen, on the other hand, i

the equivalent form. Because they have changed their respective place

in the same value-expression, they have changed their value form [Marx, "The Value Form," pp. 10-1 1]

These two aspects mean that, for Marx, the operation that takes from the first expression to the second is not an implication (passa from an implicit to an explicit determination), but a movement from presupposed determination to a posited determination, or to the po tion of a presupposed determination - the passage from an in-itself t for-itself.6 This changes the truth value of that which was implici When the first expression is reversed, the second expression, which a presupposed determination - and therefore negated - in the first o is posited, while the first expression is kept as a negated determinat of the relation.

According to Fausto, all of this means "on the one hand, that the order of the operation is not simply analytical (as one could say, general, of implication and of formal operations), but, as Hegel wri in the Logic (in respect to the grosso modo analogous passages) it is the same time analytical and syntheticar (1983, pp. 156-157, emphasis added).7 This explains the possibility of preserving the first pression as a negated determination when it is inverted and th second one is posited, a relation that cannot be defined in stric analytical terms. All this allows us to affirm that, like any relation of inversion in dialectical terms, the simple value-relation is n symmetrical. In the analysis of the simple form of value, Fausto argues that Marx includes another aspect that supports the idea that this form does not have the property of symmetry. He refers to the role played by use-

value, or the material determination, within this form. As is well known from Marx's theory of commodity, the use- value of any com-

modity functions as the material depository of its own value. But, in the expression of value, x commodity A - y commodity 5, the usevalue of commodity B is transformed into or serves as material for the value-expression of A, though it continues to be the material depository of its own value. The nonsymmetry means here that the value does not appear in the same form for each of the two commodities in the expression of value: The value of commodity A is expressed in the use-value of commodity B, qualitatively and quantitatively, while the

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FALL 1997 47

value of B is also expressed but only qualitatively because it ser mirror, as equivalent form, for another commodity.

On the basis of what was said above, we can conclude that

Marx, the simple form of value is not (analytically) symmetric therefore its inversion does not suppose an implication in term

mal logic. According to Marx, the deficiency of this form is evident: "it is a mere germ, which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before it can ripen into the price form" (Marx, 1977, p. 67). If the starting point

of the genesis of the money form is inadequate and, paraphrasing Arthur, provides for conceptual movement because it has been abstracted from the money form, the presentation is impelled to reconstruct the money form precisely through negating the starting point.

However, that it is a mere germ does not mean that the starting point is in no way money: It is the germ of money. It can be said that money

is and is not at this point of departure: It is there, but as the simple equivalent form which, for the moment, is not the money form. Thus, the proposition that expresses the simple form of value can be written

as "money is the simple equivalent." According to Fausto, this proposition can be expressed by a judgment of the type "A (money) is B (the simple equivalent)," which is the expression of a reflexive relation in dialectical terms. In that judgment, the copula "is" expresses a reflexive relation: "A 'is' B says that ,4 'passes' 'into' B, which means that ,4

is 'negated' (not suppressed) in 5" (Fausto, 1983, p. 158, my translation). It means that, in that proposition, the subject "money" is only a presupposition which, as such, "passes" to its predicate, "the simple

equivalent" which is the only term posited there. Thus, the simple equivalent form is not money because, as a predicate, it does not correspond to the money subject as posited money.

The following metamorphoses of the value form correspond to the more complete form which is presupposed in this simple form: "One" commodity can express its own value not only in "one" "other" commodity but in "many" other different commodities.

Total or expanded form of value (form II) The transition to the next stage in the dialectics of the constitution of the money form of value is the moment of plurality, or in Hegel's dialecti-

cal terms: The being of "one" commodity as value has to exclude itself

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48 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

and posit as "many other" commodities, the repulsion of the "one

therefore the position of "many." This moment is represented by

with the expanded form of value: A form in which the "one" com

ity expresses its identity as value in the use-value of "many o commodities, each of them figuring as a single equivalent of the

of the "one" commodity. Or, as Marx puts it, the Form II "yield

most variegated mosaic of relative expressions for the value

same commodity" (Marx, 1976, p. 23). The particular series that stitutes the expanded form of value of a commodity A is represen Marx as follows:

= u commodity ß, or = v commodity C, or

z commodity A = w commodity D, or = x commodity E, or

= etc.

where the "one" commodity (A) expressing its value in the "many other" commodities (2?, C, D, etc.) is situated in the expanded relative value form and each one of the "many other" commodities (5, C, D9 etc.) which serves as material for the value expression functions as a particular equivalent of the "one" commodity (A), or it is situated in a particular equivalent form.

According to Marx, the expanded relative value form has three defects: First, it is "incomplete because the series representing it is inter-

minable"; second, "it is a many-colored mosaic of disparate and independent expressions of value"; and third, "if, as must be the case, the relative value of each commodity in turn, becomes expressed in this expanded form, we get for each of them a relative value form, different in every case, and consisting of an interminable series of expressions of value" (1977, p. 69, emphasis added). These defects of the expanded relative form of value are reflected in the corresponding equivalent: "we have, on the whole, nothing but fragmentary equivalent forms, each excluding the others" (1977, p. 70, emphasis added). The two first defects represent "insufficiencies" of value form II: It

is neither a single and unified nor a closed form of appearance of value. However, the third defect could have important consequences for the transition to the general value form, depending on how the relation of the "interminable series of expressions of value" of all commodities is understood. Let us call this multiple relation the multiplication of

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FALL 1997 49

Figure 1 The multiplication of the series of expressions

of value in a simultaneous form

the series of expressions of value. In general, there may be two types of interpretations of this relation:

1 . A multiplication in which all of the series are presented simultaneously, or 2. A multiplication in which the different series are presented successively, or better, in a separate form in which each excludes the others.

To present both interpretations, we will refer to the relation between three commodities with which Benetti illustrates this value form: "Let

Xa, Xb and Xc be the quantities of commodities a, b and c. The relation 'its relative value is expressed' is represented with [dotted arrows], and

with [solid arrows] the relation 'figures as equivalent' " (1990, p. 166, my translation). Figure 1 shows the case of multiplication of the series of expresions of value of the three commodities in a simultaneous form. In terms of

formal logic, multiplication in a simultaneous form represents a relation of conjunction. As with any conjunction, it has the property of symmetry among all the elements of the series. Figure 2 shows the case of multiplication of the series of expres-

sions of value of the three commodities in a successive or separate

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50 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Figure 2 The multiplication of the series of expressions of value in a successive or separate form

form. In terms of formal logic, multiplication in a separate form repre

sents a relation of exclusive disjunction, or alternation between the

different series. In term of dialectics, it represent a relation of exclusion, in the sense that each element of the series excludes the others. Seen purely from the formalist point of view, both interpretations of

the multiplication of the series imply that, as is evident, it is not poss ble to derive, either directly or by reversing each of them, the existence

of a unique equivalent from any of them. However, we will try t

prove that, according to Marx's dialectics, the only way to understand the multiplication of the series is the successive form because it is the

only form through which it is possible to derive the general equivalen

when the expanded form of value is dialectically inverted. Carlo Benetti criticizes Marx's presentation of the expanded form of

value. One of his main criticisms is that the general equivalent canno

be derived from a formal inversion of the expanded form of value as, he claims, Marx tries to derive it. This critique is based in an interpre

tation of Marx's presentation of the multiplication of the series o

expressions of value of the expanded form in a simultaneous form. Le

us briefly look at Benetti' s main arguments. First, Benetti believes tha

Marx's presentation of the expanded form is obtained through the generalization of the simple form when more than two commodities are considered. Each commodity now expresses its relative value in the (n-') remaining commodities which constitute

its equivalents. Given that only particular equivalents exist, the exchanges are impossible. [1990, p. 164, emphasis added, my translation]

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FALL 1997 51

To prove that the exchanges are impossible in Marx's Form Benetti introduces to his critical analysis a particular situation of tration in a context of generalized exchange, which, according to

is analogous to Marx's expanded form. After examining this parti situation in which the exchange relations between three commod are realized simultaneously, Benetti concludes that "it is not possi have any exchange at prices expressed in terms of particular equ lents, according to Marx's expression" (1990, p. 165, my translati To show that Marx argues this himself, Benetti refers to the foll passage of chapter 2 of Capital /, a chapter that (we note) corres to the analysis of the exchange process:

To the owner of a commodity, every other commodity is, in regard

his own, a particular equivalent, and consequently his own commod is the universal equivalent for all the others. But since this implie

every owner, there is, in fact, no commodity acting as universal eq

lent, and the relative value of commodities possesses no general fo under which they can be equated as values and have the magnitude their values compared. So far, therefore, they do not confront each o as commodities, but only as products or use- values. [Marx, 1977, p.

From this, Benetti concludes that "[f]rom this incompatibility tween the relative values of the same commodity, Marx infers w

reason the impossibility of the equivalent relation and the conse nonnexistence of the relative value, and, therefore, of value itself Given that the conditions of existence of relative values are not realised, the total form is indeed not a value form" (Benetti, 1990, pp.

165-166). I think that Benetti' s conclusions result from a misreading of Marx's presentation. In the first place, considering the expanded form as a generalization of the simple form, Benetti attributes to it, along with the simple form of value, the property of symmetry.8 But, as was shown above, Marx does not attribute the property of symmetry to the

simple form and therefore he does not extend this property to the expanded form. Marx's expanded form is not a generalization of the simple form in Benetti' s sense, but, as will be shown below, a generalization of the simple form as a relation of exclusion and therefore its negation as the starting point of the money form.

Second, by extending the property of symmetry to the expanded form in a context of generalized exchange, Benetti cannot understand

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52 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

the multiplication of the series of expressions of value as a relation conjunction, which supposes the simultaneity of the series.

Third, what Marx is saying in the statement to which Benetti refe

is that one cannot derive a commodity acting as universal equivalen under which all the commodities can express their relative values in unitary form, from the expanded form. This is a result of the defect the expanded value form. Let us explain further. Marx argues th when Form II is referred to the context of exchange - which is not of a generalized exchange - the process of exchange appears to e

agent, on the one hand, as an individual process in which his ow

commodity functions as (subjective) general equivalent of every oth commodity - that is, it is a "purchase," acquisition of a commod

from another whose use-value satisfies his own need (an individ transaction); on the other hand, the process of exchange is a soc process in which every other commodity functions as a particu

equivalent of his own - that is, it is a "sale," the realization of the va

of his commodity (a social transaction). This implies that the va

relation appears in an inverted form: On the one hand, the (subjectiv

general equivalent form appears to be inverted in relation to the obj tive form; it is posited on the side in which the relative form is obj

tively situated. And, on the other hand, the relative form is posited the side in which the (particular) equivalent form is objectively situ

ated. But since this is supposed to be true for every commodity own as Marx says, "one and the same set of transactions cannot be simu

neously for all owners of commodities both exclusively private exclusively social and general" (Marx, 1977, pp. 89-90, emphasi added).9 Precisely because the two processes (the individual and social) cannot be distributed among the agents of exchange, any com modity can take the form of general equivalent. The impossibility this polarization of the process among the agents can only correspo to the logical stage of the expanded form. This polarization is o achieved with the constitution of the universal equivalent (or mone that is, when the agent with money buys (individual process) and t agent who possesses commodities sells (social process). Given this, Benetti is wrong to postulate the nonexistence of any

equivalent form because each commodity really permits its own own to acquire the other commodities, no matter at what exchange valu (not prices, as Benetti argues) this happens. Therefore, we cannot s that there is no equivalent at all. Moreover, it must be remembered

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FALL 1997 53

that, for Marx, the expanded value form corresponds to a stag logical prehistory of the constitution of money, where money

yet exist as money, but where something like money already Similar to the simple form, it exists there as a still inadequate enal value form: as a particular equivalent and as a (subjective equivalent. On the other hand, since the form of value emerg the concept of value, the expanded value form as well as the form correspond necessarily to different stages of the logica tory of the constitution of value as an independent form of e At the level of these stages, value is and is not there, that is

the determinations of value already exist there, but there is no

dent form of existence of value, neither as money form nor a

that is, as capital.10 In conclusion, it cannot be argued tha

expanded form is not a value form, or that the multiplicatio series of expressions of value corresponds to a relation of conj as Benetti would have it. I think that Benetti's misreading of presentation of the expanded form is due to his attribution of erty of symmetry to the value-relation of commodities and to that relation from the formal perspective of generalized excha precapitalist society of private producers. Contrary to Benetti's interpretation of the expanded value f relation of conjunction, Marx considers it as a relation of exclu

the one hand, it is precisely the emphasis given by Marx to th of exclusion throughout all his texts that deal with it that allo

say that the value-relation that corresponds to the expanded f relation of exclusion. First, the relative expressions of a serie

one another. This is shown by the emphasis given to the logic nector (or) in the expressions:

20 yards of linen = one coat or = u coffee or = v tea or = x iron wheat or = etc., etc. z commodity A - u commodity Bor-v comm

Corw commodity D or-x commodity E or- y commodity Fo [Marx, 1976, p. 24]

The relation of exclusion among the relative expressions of a series is also expressed in the exclusion of the equivalent valu corresponding to them: Since the natural form of each single commodity-type is at this

particular equivalent from alongside of countless other par

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54 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

equivalent forms, there exist (in a word) only limited equivalent f

each of which excludes any other. [Marx, "The Value Form," p. 22] l

Second, the relation of exclusion in the multiplication of a

series of expression which correspond to all commodities is show Marx through the separation of the series: 20 yards of linen = one coat or-u coffee or = v tea or = x iron or wheat or = etc.

One coat = 20 yards of linen or-u coffee or = v tea or = x iron or = y wheat or = etc.

u coffee = 20 yards of linen or = one coat or = v tea or = x iron or- y wheat or = etc.

v tea = etc. [Marx, 1976, pp. 31-32]

In the above passage, Marx emphasizes the relation of exclusion by

the separation among the series and by the emphasis given to the logical connector of the expressions within each of the series. This means that Marx's expanded value form corresponds to a relation of

reciprocal exclusion in dialectical terms. As a relation of reciprocal exclusion, the expanded value form can only be expressed in the multi-

plication of its series as separate ones, each excluding the others, and not as simultaneous series. In terms of formal logic, this relation between the different series could correspond to a relation of exclusive disjunction, but not to a relation of conjunction, as Benetti argues.

Considering that the expanded value form is composed, as Marx says, by "the sum of the elementary relative expressions or equations of the first kind" and their "corresponding inverted equations" (1977, p. 70) and that, as argued above, each of the simple forms excludes and therefore negates its corresponding inverted form, the relation of recip-

rocal exclusion implied in it can be easily seen by taking the case of three commodities shown in the multiplication of the series as separate

forms of figure 2. In each "one" of the series, the value of "one" commodity is expressed relatively in the "other two" commodities that serve as its particular equivalents (for example, in the first series, the value of commodity A is expressed in commodities B and C), while, in

each of the "other two" series, the "one" commodity functions as a particular equivalent of each of the "other two" commodities express-

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FALL Ì997 55

ing relatively their values (in the second series, commodity A as particular equivalent of commodity 5, and, in the third equivalent one of commodity Q. This means that the multi the series of the expanded form as a whole contains in itse relative forms and all the particular equivalent forms, takin modities in turn, not within a simultaneous relation, but i

expressions, each excluding the others. The expanded form

thus presupposes or contains in itself the general form of v

commodity not as a relation of implication but as a relation of e

Third, Marx considers the expanded value form as a tr phase: "the never-ending sequence of simple relative val

sions - which sequence forms at first a transitional phase in

opment of the value form" (Marx, 1976, p. 32). It is imp consider the multiplication of the series as a transition t general equivalent because if this multiplication was consid

alternative form of the general equivalent, the universality o

is lost. In effect, when each of the series of the expanded va

inverted, many general equivalents or a nonconsolidated gen

alent are obtained, but not a general equivalent. Marx says itly in the passage that precedes the one above:

But each of these equations reflexively yields coat, coffee, te

universal equivalent and consequently yields value-expression coffee, tea, etc. as universal relative forms of all other comm

is only in its opposition to other commodities that a commod into the universal equivalent form; but every commodity turn universal equivalent form in its opposition to all other comm every commodity confronts all other commodities with its ow

form as universal equivalent form, the result is that all com exclude themselves [from the universal equivalent form, a fore]^2! from the socially valid displaying of their amounts [Marx, 1976, p. 32]

Notice that, for Marx, the relation of reciprocal exclusion the expanded form of value is also shown by, or is reflecte

reciprocal exclusion of all commodities from the universal form. Thus, the expanded form of value must not be consi

alternative form of the constitution of the universal equival

but only as a transitional phase to its constitution. It is preci all the deficiencies or defects of the expanded value form t

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56 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

justifies the transition to the general form of value. Or, as Uchida pu it, in Hegelian terms:

Each of the "many" other commodities is also one "one," and each has

been used for the expression of value of one commodity. There ar

"many ones." The more these many other commodities take on the role of medium for the expression of value, the stronger their impulse to express their own value. Each of the "many" also turns to "one," with the same warrant to express its own value. . . . These mutual claims to be the value-subject bring about the conversion of the second form t the third. [ 1988, pp. 54-55]

Precisely because value has not yet acquired a unique and indepen-

dent form of existence in the expanded value form, there is the impu to transcend it.

The general form of value (form III) and the money form The general form of value corresponds to the moment of unity

plurality of the form of value in which "[a]ll commodities now expre

their value (1) in an elementary [simple] form, because in a sing

commodity; (2) with unity, because in one and the same commodity (Marx, 1977, p. 70, emphasis added). It is my belief that this momen corresponds to that in which repulsion is considered as equal as attrac tion in Hegel's discussion of Being-for-self:

But the many are one the same as another: each is One, or even one o

the Many; they are consequently one and the same. Or when we study all that Repulsion involves, we see that as a negative attitude of many Ones to one another, it is just as essentially a connective reference of them to each other; and as those to which the One is related in its act o

repulsion are ones, it is in them thrown into relation with itself. The repulsion therefore has an equal right to be called Attraction; and the

exclusive One, or Being-for-self, suppresses itself. The qualitative character, which in the One or unit has reached the extreme point of its characterization, has thus passed over into determinateness (quality) suppressed,113^ i.e., into Being as Quantity. [Hegel, 1991, p. 143]

This transition to the general form of value is presented by Marx through the inversion of the expanded form of value:

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FALL 1997 57

1 coat 10 lbs. of tea 40 lbs. of coffee

1 quarter of corns = 20 yards of linen 2 ounces of gold

1/2 ton of iron

xcom. A., etc.

However, if the inversion of the multiplication of the series of the expanded value form is simply considered formally, it does not yield the general value form in any of the two cases treated above. If, on the one hand, it is considered as a simultaneous relation between the different series, the constitution of a universal equivalent is impossible to achieve by reversing Form II. In effect, if the expanded value form as presented in figure 1 is formally reversed, the same expanded value form is obtained. It is on the basis of this fact that Benetti rejects

Marx's deduction of the universal equivalent as commodity: "If the total form of value can not be reversed, then the universal equivalent can not form part of the set of n commodities or, in Marx's terms, any

commodity can be excluded by means of the inversion of the total form, in order to take the role of general equivalent" (Benetti, 1990, p.

167, my translation). Since, as was argued above, this interpretation supposes that Marx considers that the value form has the property of symmetry, no equivalent can be achieved because, as Castaingts argues, "the general equivalent disappears from Form II because, in fact, it has been eliminated since Form I" (Castaingts, 1991, p. 5, my translation). If, on the other hand, it informally considered as a relation between the separate series, the constitution of a universal equivalent is also

impossible to achieve by reversing each of the series of Form II. If Form II as presented in figure 2 is formally reversed, many general equivalents or a nonconsolidated general equivalent are obtained, or, in Marx's words, "the result is that all commodities exclude themselves [from the universal equivalent form]."

If, then, the universal equivalent cannot be achieved by any of the two formal ways of reversion, how can it be achieved? The answer to

this question is: The universal equivalent cannot be obtained by excluding directly one of the series implied in the multiplication of the series and reversing it, but only by the exclusion of "one" commodity made by the "many other" commodities implied in the expanded form in which each of the "many" commodities are immediately "one" commodity.

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58 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

According to Marx, to achieve the universal equivalent it is necessary that a single commodity become the generic form of equivalen for all other commodities, that is, the value of the "many other" com modities can be reciprocally reflected in "one" and the "same" commodity. This means that, as such an general entity, the universal for of equivalent must be considered as an entity that contains, at the sam time, the universal and the individual, that is, it must be a concrete

universal. Or, in other words, the universal equivalent must be an individ-

ual commodity extracted from the universal world of commodities that, a the same time, becomes the general or universal commodity.

Marx presents the transition to the general form of value by mean of the inversion of the expressions of the expanded value form corre

sponding to a given commodity: He presents the case of the commo ity linen. As argued above, this inversion can be justified at least fo two related reasons: On the one hand, the inverse general form exis in-itself in the expanded form:

Thus if we reverse the sequence 20 yards of linen = I coat, or = 1

pounds of tea or = etc. - that is, if we express the converse relationship

which is in itself implicitly contained already in the sequence - we ob tain [the general value form]. [Marx, "The Value Form," p. 22]

On the other hand, the general equivalent form is subjectively foun in the expanded relative value form:

Meanwhile the mere difference of form between Form II and Form II already reveals something peculiar, which does not make a difference between Forms I and II. Namely, in the expanded value form (Form II)

a commodity excludes all other in order to express its own value in

them. This shutting-out can be a purely subjective process-, for example, a

process of the linen-possessor who estimates the value of his own commodity in many other commodities. [Marx, 'The Value Form," p. 25]

If the expanded value form contains in-itself the general value for

and subjectively the universal equivalent where the relative expande form is objectively situated, it would appear to be sufficient by positi objectively - by means of the inversion - the subjective equivalent pr supposed in the relative expanded value form to obtain the universa

equivalent. Although the universal equivalent is presupposed an

therefore negated in the relative expanded value form of a given com

modity - for example, the linen - the inversion is not sufficient to obtain

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FALL 1997 59

objectively the universal equivalent. It requires in addition, as M says in the above passage, that this commodity has been exclude equivalent by all other commodities. Marx says this explicitly in following passage:

[A] commodity is situated in the universal equivalent form (Form

only because and insofar as it is itself excluded as equivalent b

other commodities. The excluding is in this case an objective proc independent of the excluded commodity. In the historical develop of the commodity form, the universal equivalent form may inhe turn now in this commodity, now in that. But a commodity never

functions as universal equivalent except insofar as its excluding (a hence its equivalent form) is the result of an objective social proc [Marx, "The Value Form," p. 25]

In this passage, Marx indicates that, in order for "one" comm

to take the form of the universal equivalent, it must be the result, n

a subjective process, but rather of an objective social process th

which the "many" commodities exclude one of them as un

equivalent or make it the material in which they uniformly exp their value, consequently excluding it from taking the relative This is a process through which the "many other" commodities exclude themselves from taking the equivalent form, and so ado unified relative form of value.

Since, according to Marx, the development of the equivalent fo

the passive pole - is only the expression and result of the develop

of the relative form - the active pole - the force of the being o "many" commodities as values, and therefore of value itself, to a

a general and independent form of existence means that the "m commodities must exclude and thus posit "one" of them as the m

adequate for the expression of their value, as their universal equiv

Through this process, the being of the "many" commodities as and therefore of value itself, is posited as a concrete universal. Hegelian terms, the attraction that was presupposed in the repuls the "many" commodities of the expanded form is posited throu mediation of their repulsion.

All this implies that the general form of value is not only

supposed and therefore negated in the multiplication of the ser the expanded form of value, but also appears as the inverted fo one of the series. Marx presents the transition to the general fo

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60 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

the inversion of one of the series of the expanded form, and it can be

seen, as Marx sees it, as a transitional phase in the development of the value form to a general and independent form of existence, whereby social labor becomes universal abstract labor. The universal equivalent form can thus be deduced neither by considering its deduction from a generalized commodity exchange process without money, as Benetti tries to do, nor from the external difficulties that the concrete develop ment of this process encounters, as those who follow the logical-histor ical method do: Economists usually reason that the emergence of money is due to external difficulties which the expansion of barter encounters, but they forget

that these difficulties arise from the evolution of exchange-value and

hence from that of social labor as universal labor. [Marx, 1971, pp. 50-51]

Finally, it must be observed that with the inversion does not only each of expressions of the relation change its position and its function, but the logical connector also changes: The "or" that joins the expressions of the expanded form is transformed into an "and" which joins the expression of the general value form: At the same time, they are qualitatively compared or manifested for one

another as determined value-magnitudes. For example, 10 pounds of tea = 20 yards of linen and 40 pounds of coffee = 20 yards of linen. [Marx,

"The Value Form," p. 23]

This means that, when the expanded value form is inverted into the

general value form, the relation of exclusion of the latter is transformed into a relation of reciprocity in which all commodities express reciprocally their value in one and the same material of the excluded commodity. The transition to the money form has to be explained by reference to the role played by matter or the material determination within the value

form. From the simple value form on, Marx refers to the use-value or natural form of the commodity as material for the expression of value

within the value-relation between commodities. Since the "many" commodities make the natural form of "one" particular kind of commodity the material in which they uniformly express their value, the specific material qualities of the use value of this particular kind of

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FALL 1997 61

commodity to which the equivalent form is socially fused are

nants for its exclusion as universal equivalent. The material qua

commodities such as divisibility, nonperishability, easily man ity, and so on, make them strong candidates for the universa

lent. However, the natural qualities do not make them equ social properties are not given by nature. To explain how a

commodity, for example, gold, became the excluded commodi

therefore took on the form of the universal equivalent an

quently became the money commodity as soon as it monopoli position in the expression of value for the world of commodi necessary to refer to the historical process, a process that can treated here.

The above analysis of Marx's form of value indicates, on

hand, that the universal equivalent cannot be subjectively defin abstract standard of price, which must be postulated as initial

the theory of value, as Benetti argues; and that, on the other money cannot be considered as a noncommodity, but absolute as Eldred and Hanlon argue. Notes 1. "The difficult thing to grasp here is that, although the possibility of determinate measure is grounded if value is of essence of the commodity, this essence

itself is actualized only in the development of the process of commensuration itself. It is that very process of commensuration that posits commodities as value

masses in the first place. The actuality of value and its expression or measure develop together at the same time" (Arthur, 1993, p. 78). 2. For an excellent critical analysis of the content and history of the interpre-

tation of Marx's method as a logical-historical one, see Arthur (1997). In "Marx: Sobre el Concepto de Capital" (Robles-Báez, 1997), I develop the argument that the object of the first part of Capital I is not "simple commodity production" as a historical stage that precedes capitalism, but the analysis of the immediate appearance of capitalism. 3. "Marx begins the anlysis with the 'simple, isolated or accidental form of value.' What is this beginning based on? The value relation of the commodity to any other kind of commodity, according to Marx, is ''obviously the simplest value-relation.' What is the logical character of 'obviously,* of evidence? It has not purely logical character, as if it were derived from nonderivative, presupposed logical and ontological axioms. It possesses ... a logical-historical character" (Zeleny, 1980, p. 48). 4. The same passage is found in "The Form of Value," which was published as an appendix to the German edition of 1867. It was published in Spanish as an appendix to El Capital, tomo I/vol. 3, Siglo XXI, México, 1977.

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62 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

5. This does not refer to another of the alternatives of the judgment of implication

the accomplishment of the second term (b = a) together with the nonaccomplish ment of the first term (a = b). However, it could refer, to a certain extent, to t inverse relation between the judgment of implication and the judgment of inver implication: "When a judgment of implication is inverted, the judgment of inver

implication is obtained and vice versa. However, although the logical relation

equivalent, the meaning of the mutually inverse implicated judgments is differen

because this relation in not symmetricar (De Gortari, 1983, p. 225, my transl tion).

6. In the passage from Form II to Form III, Marx writes explicitly that the inverse form exists in-itself in the original form: "Thus if we reverse the sequence 20 yards of linen = I coat, or = 10 pounds of tea or = etc. - that is, if we express

the converse relationship which is in itself implicitly contained already in the sequence - then we obtain the universal value form" (Marx, "The Value Form," p. 22). 7. On this relation between analysis and synthesis, Hegel writes: The method of absolute cognition is to this extent analytical. That it finds the further determination of its initial universal simply and solely in that universal, is the absolute objectivity of the Notion, of which objectivity the method is the certainty. But the method is no less synthetic, since its subject matter, determined immediately as a simple universal, by virtue of the determinateness which it possesses in its very immediacy and universality, exhibits itself as an other. This relation of differentiated elements which the subject matter thus is within itself, is however no longer the same thing as is meant by synthesis infinite cognition; the mere fact of the subject matter's no less analytical determination in general, that the relation is relation within Notion, completely distinguishes it from the latter synthesis. "This is no less synthetic than analytical moment of the judgment by which the universal of the beginning of its own accord determines itself as the other itself is

to be named the dialectical moment" (Hegel, 1993, pp. 83O-S3 1). 8. "The same occurs, obviously, for the simple form if, as by Marx, the property of symmetry is attributed to [the expanded form]" (1990, p. 166, my translation). 9. All this is explicitly said by Marx in the following passage: Every owner of a commodity wishes to part with it in exchange only for

those commodities whose use-value satisfies some want of his. Looked

at in this way, exchange is for him simple a private transaction. On the other hand, he desires to realise the value of his commodity, to convert it

into any other suitable commodity of equal value, irrespective of whether his own commodity has or has not any use-value for the owner

of the other. From this point of view, exchange is for him a social transaction of a general character. But one and the same set of transactions cannot be simultaneously for all owners of commodities both ex-

clusively private and exclusively social and general. [Marx, 1977, pp. 89-90, emphasis added] 1 0. Because of space, it is not possible to explain this here. For a discussion on this matter, see Robles-Báez, 1997.

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FALL 1997 63

1 1 . This is also said by Marx in Capital I: "Since the bodily form o single commodity is one particular equivalent form amongst numberless we have, on the whole, nothing but fragmentary equivalent forms, each ex the others" (Marx, 1977, pp. 69-70). 12. This part of the text does not appear in the English edition. It app the Spanish edition; see Marx, 1977, p. 1006. 13. To translate Aufhebung as suppression does not express correctl meaning Hegel gives it as negation-preservation. References

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