Why Do We Need A Uniform Civil Code?: Supra Note 69 At 420

CHAPTER 6 Why Do We Need a Uniform Civil Code? So far this paper has read like a litany of negatives. Turn where we will, the government, the press, the politicians, the academics and even the minority organisations - none of them have taken any substantial active interest in the Uniform Civil Code. At best they have ignored it. At worst they have spread false information and impressions about it. The topic has become much more communalised today than it was in 1947, as the speeches over the years against a Uniform Civil Code go to show. Why then has this subject become important and of immediate concern now? Is that in itself a mistake? Are we merely rebelling against some 5% odd people for thwarting the will of the rest of the country? After thinking as much as possible about the topic, this author is not inclined to dismiss the Uniform Civil Code in this manner. It warrants more serious attention. As we have seen, the non-Muslim founding fathers of the Constitution thought that a Uniform Civil Code was necessary for our national unity and for secularism. There are, of course, two views on the matter. The above mentioned Christian organisations would agree with this view. So would other minorities, judging from the interviews with them."5 So also would most Hindus. The effective Muslim leadership, as expected, would disagree. Some academics would also disagree - we have referred to two of them above.96 Another distinguished academic who also disagrees is Prof. Paras Diwan, who feels that |T]he Uniform Civil Code has nothing to do with Indianisation or national integration or interfering with the religion of one community or the other. It is simply a question of equal facility of laws to all sections of our people... (A)ll people of India in all matters - except ~ the matter coming under protective discrimina­ tion should be governed by one set of laws."7 This author is personally inclined to agree with the founding fathers 95. 96. 97.

See Appendix 2. Ms Kamita Tyabji and Prof. Rajkumari Agrawal. Paras Diwan T h e Uniform Civil Code: A Projection of Equality" in Mohammad Imam supra note 69 at 420.

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who saw the Uniform Civil Code as a means of achieving national unity98 and with the Christian organisations who see the seeds of prejudice and communal violence in the separation sown by separate personal laws. For those who do not think of the Uniform Civil Code as an instrument for national integration, I would recommend the criminal justice system of India before the British. Before the East India Company handed over India to Queen Victoria, British magistrates who asked the Kazi and the Pandit for the interpretation of their law and of evidence had already begun to create a legal fiction. Supposing the witness was not a woman (ora Kafir) how would you evaluate the evidence before you, they would ask. Similar questions would be asked to the Pandits to do away with unequal punishments based on the caste of the offenders and the victim. In 1860 the Indian Penal Code started by laying down the same punishment for all offenders. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, completed the process and not without much heart burn and resentment amongst the faithful, including those Englishmen who had genuine love for India and wanted the country's culture to be respected. Fortunately they lost and we got a system of uniform Criminal Code. But now, with the Muslim Women's Act, divorced women claiming mainte­ nance from their husbands will have to prove not just their marriage but also their religion to the Court. Should the husband decide to throw a spanner in the proceedings by claiming that the parties.were and ,ftad been Muslim at the time of marriage then proof ^nd challenge thereto will add to the time the case would take. As the Muslim Women's Act does not provide for cases where the husband has converted to Islam after t/ie marriage that will create even more problems. In any situation the word will go round the court that the parties are Muslims, a fact that had been irrelevant to Criminal law of India for well over one hundred and twenty five years. Several reasons are advanced for exacting a Uniform Civil Code. They range from the constitutional and philosophical to the stolidly practical. They have also spanned a long period of lime during which they have changed. The same of course may be said ol reasons advanced against the Uniform Civil Code. We hope to show that the arguments in favour of a Uniform Civil Code are logically, inextricably and organically interlinked. As mentioned above, when the majority of the founding fathers of our Constitution supported inclusion of the Uniform Civil Code in the Directive Principles of State Policy they had reasoned that national integration and unity, and secularism demanded it When the Constitution was ready, the words secularism featured nowhere in the Preamble. It was inserted only in 1976. After that date the Preamble said We, The People of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India 98.

See generally supra note 3al 546-552 for the minute of dissent of Mr Minnoo Masani. Hansa Menta Rajkumari Amru Kaur.

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into a (SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUB­ LIC)99 and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the (unity and integrity of the nation); IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT ENACT AND GIVE TO OUR­ SELVES THIS CONSTITUTION. At least one Hindu respondent, Mr P.W. Sahasrubudhe, Advocate, and scholar of Hindu Law, has perceived the Uniform Civil Code as a safeguard against political domination by means of minority fundamentalism, as a harbinger of genuine democracy, and means of preventing encouragement to communalism by political parties in order to achieve their political ends. He is not alone in holding these opinions, though perhaps many may not have been so forthcoming in expressing their views. One may now add another ground viz - clarity. A Uniform Civil Code will make for clarity which arises out of simplicity. The legal maze is bewildering enough without retaining a wide permutation and combination of laws which create rights in some and take them away in another depending upon their religion. Yet another reason that was advanced100 was that a Uniform Civil Code will cut away the ground in which prejudices breed. That which is different and mysterious is difficult to understand and is condemned by most people for that very reason. Perhaps the most important ground today is the apprehension that unless something is done to promote the Uniform Civil Code, we shall lose the little ground we have gained. As with the grounds advocated in the Constituent Assembly, so with the ideals advanced in the Preamble and in the chapter on Fundamental Rights. They are all in imminent danger of being forgotten altogether, or at best of being dismissed as so much verbiage. Principles lose their sharpness and turn into platitudes in no time. This is nothing new. It happens because 99. Inserted by Constitution (forty-second amendment) Act, 1976. S.2, w.e.f. 1977. 100. By our Christian women respondents.

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certain words are used without scrutiny, as emotive counters in the game of polemics. As a result they become an effective way of stopping all discussion, all thinking. In a little while the ideas turn into cliches and are ignored. However, we wish to show that the reasons so advanced for a Uniform Civil Code still remain valid. Secularism, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity are all inseparable from one another. So are clarity and security. No one of them can stand without the others. Justice without equality or fraternity is meaningless. The personal laws of this country did try to separate the two by creating distinct systems of justice for separate groups on the basis of their race, religion, caste, creed and sex. This was not palatable to the British law-givers. Thus it was that we got a uniform criminal code, uniform property and commercial laws. This was also not palatable to our social reformers and we therefore got a host of new laws freeing women from their legal bondage.101 It is, of course, argued that only few women have dared to lake advantage of this legislation. But that is no reason for keeping them in shackles. Over the decades, at least amongst the educated classes, so many of the evils contested by the reformers of last century have become less commonly practised, though some others, notably dowry murders, have sprung up. Justice without equality was not palatable to the framers of the Constitution. They included both in the Preamble, and reinforced it with the right to equality to which no less than five arts. 14, 15,16,17 and 18, are devoted. Art. 14 roundly guarantees to every person equality before law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It does not make exceptions on basis of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Art. 15 prohibits discrimination on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them. Art. 16 promises equality of opportunity in the matters of public employment. Art. 17 abolishes untouchabilily, and Art. 18 abolishes titles. The concept of justice could have been worked out within the parameters of religion specific, caste specific, and sex specific laws. But it was not. It is important for us to remember this at all times. 101. Forexample theSati Regulation. 1829, Hindu Widows Remarriage Act, 1856, Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929.

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Inequality between men and women in matters of marriage and divorce and succession exists in many personal laws which gives a bigger share to the man. Inequality is further created between people of different commu­ nities. It is also created between the state and the individual living within it. The right of a destitute divorcee to demand that the state should secure her maintenance from her husband will now depend upon her religion. The husband's immunity from such a claim by the government will also depend upon his religion. In other words, for one and the same act, the state will have duties towards some citizens and not towards others. Many personal laws are iniquitous and inegalitarian in their perception of other religions. We could examine some of them. The Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866 (NCMDA) makes provisions for a special circumstance in which a native Christian could seek dissolution of his/her marriage which had taken place before conversion. The word "Native" was omitted by an administrative law order in 1950. But the Act stands till today. The Interpretation Clause of this Act (S.3) defines husband "as a married man domiciled in India, who shall have completed the age of 16 years and shall not be Christian, Jew or Mohammedan". Wife is defined in exactly the same way. Section 4 deals with a male convert whose wife (as defined in S.3) deserts him or repudiates him in consequence of such change. S. 5 deals with a woman convert in the same situation. The convert-spouse may sue for the conjugal society of his/her spouse at the end of six months of continuous desertion or repudiation. Under S.16, if the situation continues for a year beyond the suit so filed and the judge is convinced that the desertion was solely on account of the conversion of the petitioner to Christianity "he shall by decree dissolve the marriage". If the judge is persuaded that the desertion or repudiation was partly or wholly on grounds of adultery or cruelty the suit shall be dismissed. Thus, the Act provides that the convert to Christianity can sue for restitution of conjugal rights, as a preliminary step to divorce. Although the divorce law of Christians is dominated by the concept that the guilty party may not ask for divorce, there is an exception - person who chooses to convert, i.e., technically the defaulting or guilty party, may initiate

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action leading to divorce. However, he/she may not do so if the other spouse is a Christian, Jewish or Mohammedan. That is, if one spouse is already a Christian, and the other converts to Christianity then the second spouse may not claim divorce under this Act. This is logical enough. The same privilege is extended to spouses who are Jewish, though the reasoning is not explained, making it arbitrary. The reason for including Mohammedan spouses of Christian converts was quite different. Prof. Derrett explained it thus: Under Mohammedan Law, if a Muslim spouse converts to any other religion, his/her marriage stands dissolved immediately. That is why the Mohammedan who converts to Christianity cannot use S.4 and S. 5 of the Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act, to get the company of the other spouse. The marriage does not exist from the moment of conversion.102 Even if both spouses converted to another (and same) religion, their marriage stood dissolved.103 While hesitating to differ with so eminent a writer as Prof. Derrett, one ventures to say that the position of Muslim wives who convert to Christianity may be slightly different after the enactment of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which would have been better named as Dissolution of Muslim Wives Marriage Act. It must be remembered that this Act, which gives Muslim women a statutory right to divorce, was a response to conversion (chiefly to Christianity) by harassed Muslim wives. S.4 of the Act expressly provides that the marriage of a Muslim woman would not be dissolved by her conversion to another religion. It is interesting and noteworthy that no Muslim leader or scholar protested against the interference with the Shariat. S.4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act reads as follows:S.4: 77ie Effects of Conversion to Another Faith The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage. Provided that after such renunciation or conversion, the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in S.2. 102. J.D.M. Derretí, Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu IMW Vol. IV. 54 (1978). 103. Amina Begum v. Saman (1910) II.R33AII90. Both had become Christians yet the marriage stood dissolved.

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Provided further that the provision of this section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith who re-embraces her former faith. The NCMDA was not amended to take into account the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (DMMA). As a consequence, the Muslim woman converting to Christianity is in an odd position. As per the DMMA which governs her as an ex-Muslim, she is not free of her marriage. As per the NCMDA which applies to her as a neo-Christian, she cannot sue for her husband's company. Thus, she gets the worst of both worlds. The DMMA is also silent about the effect on the Muslim marriage in two other situations. One, conversion of the Muslim husband to another religion without first pronouncing talaq. Second, conversion of both the spouses to another, even same religion. In both the situations, the Moham­ medan law may still be as Professor Derrett describes it, and the marriages may be dissolved instantly. But, in a situation one spouse wishes to convert and the other does not, and yet they wish to remain married to each other, why should the law step in to break the marriage? A question that is even more relevant when both spouses have converted together to the same religion. The Effect of Conversion on Christian Marriage Under Christian law a most curious situation exists. The person who converts to Christianity can claim dissolution of marriage under the Converts Marriage Dissolution Act. But the Christian whose spouse converts toanother religion has vno ground for divorce under the Indian Divorce Act. The wife has some latitude, in so far as if, and only if, the husband commits bigamy on conversion, she can obtain divorce from him.104 If there is no bigamy the marriage will continue for her. Conversion of a Christian Male to Hinduism Conversion of a Christian male to Hinduism will not dissolve the marriage for the man nor give rise to a right to divorce for his wife, unless he commits bigamy. The convert to Hinduism will acquire the right to adopt, his rights of succession will be protected under the Caste Disabilities Removal Act (CDRA) and he will inherit under the Indian Succession Act from his family, and from his wife unless she has been able to get a divorce. On the man's conversion succession to his property will be determined by the Hindu Succession Act, under which there is no bar to succession by non104. Indian Divorce Act 1869, S.10

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Hindus. Conversion of a Christian Male to Islam Conversion of a Christian male to Islam will not give the wife the right to claim divorce under the Indian Divorce Act, unless the husband commits bigamy. It will however dissolve the marriage for the man; he will also be entitled to marry bigamously. The CDRA will protect the man's rights of suc­ cession in his family's property. However, as per the Muslim law which is his new personal law a non-Muslim may not succeed to his property. In Jivan Chandra vAbinash'05 a Christian male, married to a Christian woman converted to Islam and married a Mohammedan. It was held that the marriage was valid and that succession would not be governed by the Indian Succession Act, even for the Christian wife. Conversion of Christian Woman to Another Religion For the Christian woman her own conversion to another religion will not terminate her marriage. If she converts to Islam, under his law her Christian husband cannot ask for dissolution and under her law there is none available. If a Christian woman converts to Hinduism, under neither law can the marriage be terminated. Neither the aggrieved nor the guilty party can obtain relief from the marriage under their respective personal laws. It is difficult to visualise the impact of this impasse on Succession. The CDRA will protect the woman's rights regardless of the religion she adopts. However if she converts to Islam her husband and her family stand to lose all claim to her property. If she converts to Hindusim her husband and her family can inherit under the Hindu Succession Act. Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the person who has remained a Hindu (whilst the spouse has converted) alone can ask for a divorce.106 There is no provision to allow a person who has converted from Hinduism, or to Hinduism after getting married under another law, to ask for either restitution of conjugal rights107 or divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. At Christian Law, the spouse converting to Christianity can, with the above exceptions, take the initiative. 105Λ\ί7;ι Chandra v. Abinash, AIR 1939 Cal. 417. 106. S.13: "Any marriage solemnized, whether before or aflcr (he comencement of (his Acl, may. on a petition prcscnled by cither the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground (hat the other party (ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion" 107. S.9, Hindu Marriage Act.

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At Muslim Law, if a non-Muslim married person converts to Islam, his/her marriage is not dissolved. The man who so converts can, however, marry polygamously while the woman who converts to Islam can only hope that her husband will seek divorce, under the original law of marriage. There is clearly a conflict of laws over here. Which law takes precedence? The original law of the spouses or the law of the converting spouse? Why should the spouse who remains in the old religion lose its protection especially if that law is monogamous? Another example can be taken from the Christian Marriage Act, 1872. S.4 of this Act provides that "every marriage in which both or one party is a Christian shall be solemnised in accordance with the provisions of the Act and any such marriage solemnised otherwise....shall be void." Exception was made for areas where the Act was not in operation.10* The Act provides for solemnisation of the marriage in accordance with Christian rites. In 1917 a marriage that took place between a Hindu and Christian with Hindu rites was held to be null and void109 except in areas where the Act was not in force. Under S.68 of this Act the purohit who performed the marriage was liable to punishment upto ten years transportation.110 Under Muslim Law if a non-Kitabi woman marries a Muslim without converting but with a Nikkah, she does not become the man's legally wedded wife.1" In a recent case, a Hindu woman, Chellamma married a Muslim, Ummar, under the above mentioned circumstances in January 1973 in Kerala. They executed what was described as a marriage udampadi. Ummar was a government servant. He died in August 1976. He had nominated Chellamma to receive his Provident Fund. When the wife filed an application for a Succession Certificate in respect of the deceased's assets the latter's relatives challenged her application on the ground that there was no valid marriage between Ummar and Chellamma even though they admitted the existence of the udampadi. The trial court, the appellate court and the Kerala High Court all treated the marriage as void. The trial court set aside the nomination and held that the woman petitioner was entitled to only l/3rd of the amount under the provident fund and gratuity as her name was nominated by the subscriber. The trial court construed the nomination as a gift. Both the appellate court and the High Court regarded the nomination not as a gift but as creating a weaker right to receive the amount. The High Court held that under the Muslim Law no 108. E.g. in Mysore the Christian Marriage Act was introduced only in 1951. 109. In iv Kolandaivcit (1917) 1I.R 40 Mad. 1030. 110. See supra note 68. 111. Chellamma v. Hamsa. 1986 K I T 793.

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valid marriage is permitted between fireworshippers and Hindus on one hand and Muslims on the other. The woman was a Hindu, so her marriage without conversion to Islam, but by Islamic rites, was void. No rights of inheritance were created in an irregular marriage, and the Mohammedan Law of Succession rightly applied to the inheritance of the deceased's property. Thus even in the case of nomination of the provident fund of government servant the personal law of the deceased has to be applied. Under the Parsi Law if a Parsi Zoroastrian man marries a nonParsi, she cannot go to the Fire Temple, but their children can, after the Navjyot. But if a Parsi woman marries a non-Parsi, she herself is denied all privileges, spiritual and material, of her religion. This is rightly regarded by Liberal Parsis as discriminatory and violative of the Constitution. The Hindu Marriage Act recognises any number of caste customs for marriage. The only difficulty - and a real one - is ascertaining them. The High Court of Maharashtra went through a phase of not recognizing Buddhist marriages because they were not performed according to established caste custom as the religion was too new in India to have them.112 In 1981, the same High Court has revised its opinion and acknowledged the non-Buddhist rites on the ground that since the religion is new to this group, so are the customs.113 In a secular country the state cannot recognise a law which refuses to recognise inter-religious marriages. We may not countenance a law that more or less compels conversion by refusing to recognise inter-religious marriages as happened in Chellamma's case. The state also cannot, in effect, deny freedom of religion by forbidding one to convert by holding out the threat of instant dissolution of marriage. The law cannot in one instance uphold the concept of the guilty party and in another allow that very parly to benefit from the wrong he/she has done. The law cannot allow a conflict of (personal) laws to create confusion. Under no personal law should parties be allowed to deny the fact of marriage by sheltering behind rituals. This lacuna is all the more glaring, when a marriage is not declared null and void on account of the bride or groom being under-age.11·* None of thesesituationsensurejustice or equality. By creating barriers between two individuals they erode the sense of fraternity, create prejudices and resentment and a sense of injustice, all of which may lead to violence all round. They also emphasise religion rather than any other facet of a person's 112. Shaktmtala v. Nilkantha 1973 Mah. I J 310 (Nagpur Bench). 113. Sml. Baby v. Jayant Jagtap, AIR 1981 Bom. 283, (Bom. Bench). 114. The Child Marriage Restraint Act. 1929.

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identity, thus going directly against the ideal of secularism. Any discussion of equality sooner or later brings us to the tribals and the special rights accorded to them. Right down from the British period until today, the tribals have been allowed to keep even their civil and criminal laws given the marked difference between their cultures and those of the rest of India. From their need for protection from rapacious plainsmen, it is easy to concede their need for special laws. The Constitution itself permits discrimi­ nation in favour of the deprived and the weak sections of society. This should therefore cause no problem on principle though it would need to be worked out. For example, in order to prevent fak° adoptions and false marriages, which aim at depriving the tribal of his land, surely we cannot pass a law which bans such marriages and adoptions altogether and for ever. It might be more a matter of rules, supervision and self-awareness rather than of separate laws. Yet another victim of this state of affairs is clarity of law. If a person's rights vis-a-vis another in familial relationships are to depend entirely upon the permutation and combination of their respective race, religion, caste and sex, there can be no clarity. It isoften said that the solution to incquitous matrimonial laws is theSpecial Marriage Act, bul so long as it remains one of the many laws of the land, it is not likely to clarify the situation. It will remain available only to those who arc well informed and educated. It would be better to make a law declaring thai no marriage would be void because of technical reasons such as different religions of the parties or rituals followed, no marriages would dissolve because of conversion unless the parlies so desired it, and that the intention of the parties, as demonstrated by their conduct would be sufficient to constitute a valid relationship. Our major constraint should indeed be the fact that we know little about our cultural minorities. The Scheduled Tribes are at least a name to us. We know nothing about the social customs or economic compulsions of the nomadic tribes, or the innumerable groups that live on the socio-economic periphery of our national life. They arc a very large number. What we are pleased to call, in a self-centred way, the national mainstream, is in fact only a trickle, albeit much more visible than the main course of the river of life in India. Lastly, a very real fear has begun to make itself felt, which is that if we do not make efforts now to move towards the Uniform Civil Code, and as the majority loses patience, we shall lose the little ground that we have gained. The major sufferers, as always, shall be women and children. We cannot afford to regress to a time when the country will be governed by personal laws in more and more spheres of activity. Doubtless, the majority can be just as paranoid as the minorities and see slights where there are none. But, unless their genuine fears are quietened, there is no possibility of pointing out to them

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the baselessness of their other apprehensions. As with the minority, so with the majority; it is not enough for us to dismiss their fears as misplaced or imaginary. It is absolutely necessary to carry conviction with both of them. There are signs that the majority is losing patience, and signs that we are in danger of going back or regressing. While the loss of patience could be expected to trigger off regression by the majority, the latter could certainly occur independently as well. To take instances of regression by the majority, without any visible trigger, we need only refer to the two amendments to the Special Marriage Act, 1955. The amendment in 1963 permitted uncle and niece marriages between Hindus to take place under Special Marriage Act wherever there was a caste-custom permitting it. The amendment in 1976 once again subjected Hindu couples marrying under the Act to be governed by the Hindu Succession Act with its notions of joint family."5 The most infamous instance of regression occurred in September 1987 when Roop Kanwar was burnt alive on her husband's funeral pyre. The intensity and extent of support that the "Sati" could evoke in both the common man and in the politicians was as astonishing as it was frightening. Even more terrifying was the fact the opposition to Sati was described as interference in the religious and social practices of a minority, i.e. the Rajputs. The Govern­ ment of India did not speak even when the well planned "Chuñan" ceremony bestowing Sati status on the hapless Roop Kanwar took place twelve days later. Both the Rajasthan1"' and the Central " 7 Anti Sati Acts that were eventually passed held the woman liable as the principal offender regardless of whether the Sati was voluntary or forced. No action has been taken against the Shankaracharya of Kanchi Puri for his highly provocative speeches at Meerul in March 1988 despite the strong penal clauses built into the law against anyone who propogates Sati. That the majority is losing patience and is becoming obdurate is a fact to which attention is being drawn repeatedly. Why should the majority lose patience? Even if one or more minorities are not prepared to change, why should the majority foolishly give up whatever benefits changes in its personal law have brought to it? These are pertinent questions and need tobe answered. The answers to this question may be many. The one that concerns us is the perception of the majority about the way the minorities arc treated. There is a distinct perception that claiming minority status is a way of getting unfair advantage. This was clearly the view of many with regard to the Muslim 115. Bui it also extends to the protection of the concept of strcedhan which is solely the wife's property. 116. Rajasthan Sati Act, 1987. 117. The Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act. 1987.

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Women's Bill, and those who championed it by raising the bogey of Islam in danger did everything to heighten this perception. Similar was the impact of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution which went so far as to ask for virtual autonomy for Punjab, principally because Sikhs were a religious minority. Inter alia, Resolution 10 also demanded a change in the Hindu Succession Act to take away a woman's right to inherit her father's property, and to confine her rights of succession to only her father-in-law's property."8 Needless to say, this would open the flood-gates to enforced marriages between the widow and her deceased husband's brother. Levirate marriages are not unknown to North India. It is the compulsion that would be anti-women, as indeed Resolution 10 is. After the November 1984 riots, many young widows had to take divorce from their fathers-in-law before they could remarry. This divorce was on the poignant ground that there was no surviving son in the family to marry the widow.11" The law does not recognise a grotesque and bizarre phenomenon such as divorce from the father-in-law or indeed anyone other than the legally wedded and living spouse. A widow is, therefore, totally legally free to marry. She needs no such document of "divorce", yet social forces are such that she cannot marry within her community without it. The revolt by some Sikh battalions after the Operation Blue Star has also shaken many who see it as the result of permitting religion to be put before the country. It is significant that while many of those Sikh soldiers have been re-absorbed in the military or para-military forces, the jawans of the Central Reserve Police Force who revolted in 1978 in Bokaro have received life sentences. The saddest part is that the minorities are «oí pampered, though their obscurantist, self-serving leaders may well be. This is especially true of the Muslims whose socio-economic position leaves much to be desired. On the other hand, unless education (other than reading of religious texts) is promoted for both boys and girls, the situation can hardly become better. Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution120 has been used by minority institutions to claim carte-blanche in dealing with their employees. The latter could, therefore, be underpaid, overworked, hired and fired at will. Recently, even a Ramakrishna Mission School claimed minority status, on the grounds that Ramakrishnaites were not Hindus. Even more curiously, the Calcutta High Court upheld their contention.'21 118. Resolution 10 says: "By suitable amendment in the relevant clause of the Hindu Succession Act. a woman should be given rights of inheritance in the properties of her father-inlaw instead of the father." 119. Indian Express, 22 February. 1985. 120. Article 30(1) of the Constitution reads: "All minorities whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice." 121. M.B. Bandhopadhyay v. Sate of West Ik-ngal, 90 CWN, 305.

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Fortunately, this trend has been halted by the Supreme Court who have held that minority status does not give to the institutions exemption from external control vis-a-vis their employees, and that the employees have to be treated on par with government institutions of the same nature.122

122. Frank Anthony Public School Employees v. Union of India, ΛΙΚ \')H7 SC 311.