Wippel J. - The Metaphy. Thought Of Th. Aquinas

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Th( C;IIholic Un;"( fsiry of Am(r;C"~ Press

All tigh •• fe.«:fVW PrimM in ,h( Unital

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of Amnia

Th .. 1"1"" u~ in ,hi. publ ic.. i"n m,""l~ d,e minimum "'qui",m.. mf of Am .. r i<'~ n N,t io nal S(~ndlrd$ fo r Informar;.;m Sci."c.:_I"',ml".." u of P~ f><'r fOf I'rilllN Lib,uy m~tcri~I, . ..... Sl ZJ9. 48-L')g4.

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Wippd. John F.

Th. me"ph)"jnl thought of Thoma, Aqui nas : from fini t.lxing 10 1I"".m'd being I John F. Wippd . p_ em. _ (Moll..,.,.. ph. o f rh .. Society (0 ' "·Ied ;ev.1 and R..u is,;a nco Phil<w>ph y: v. I) Indud es bibliogr;lphic~1 .&rcnccs and ioo;('O, I. Thom. s. Aq"ina~. Saini. !H j?-I! 74- C"IIuibu';
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' 5" '" o-8I jZ-09h -x (d . : .1Ik. papa) ISQN O· 8I Jl-o<) ~\-S (phI<. : . 11e. P' P"' )

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Contents

Acknowl~g,"m"'""" ' .,-

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••__________________________________________________-"xi

Ahbr ~~uon

lor [(){t IIel jon

I.

Illi

Aquinas on the Nature of Metaphysics

J

I. D ivision of .he: Theoretical ScienCes and .he Place of Melaphysio, l. The Subjccl of MClaphysio . II I I.

oJ

Our D iscover):, o f the Subject of Metaphysics I. Our Knowledge of &·;ng as Rcal, lJ 2. Our Discovery of Being as Being, 41

PA R T ON E.

Aquinas and th e Problem of the One and

the Many in the Order of Being II I.

The Problem of Parmcn idcs and Analogy of Being I. The Problem of P;lrmenidC$ as Form u t:m~d by Aquinas. 66 1. Thomas's Views coneero;n!; the AnalogY. of Sting. 73

IV. Pan icipalion and the Problem of the O ne and the Many I. The MC:l.Il ing of " anicip.u io n. 96

Em-. Jl O

1.

P~n icip'lI ion

j.

Pan icipadon. Com posilion, Limilal ion,

in

94

114

v. Esscncc-Eslt'Com posil ion and ,he O ne and the Many I. The I"ulkuus wr11lill( Argument. tJ?

T..b..1...&

1)2

one

vi

Contents Arguments Based on the Impossibility of More Than One ~ing in Wh ich Essence and Es.s~ Arc Identical, 150 j . The "Genus Argument, I ):] ; . Arguments Based on i'arti,ipation, 161 S. Argumentalion Insed on Ihe Limited Characler of Individual Beings. 170 2.

M

VI.

Relative Nonbeing and the One and the Many

177

Relalive Nonbeing, 177 1. Distinction of Any Finite Being from Other Beings, 18} J. Essence as Relative Nonbeing, 186 I.

4. A YWilt. 19 0

s. Derivation of the Transcendemals. 191 PA RT TWO. VII .

The Essential Structure of Finite Being

Substance-Accident Composition

197

I. General Undemanding of Substance and Acddent, 198

Derivation of the Predia ments. 108 ]. M Defini lion5~ of SubSlan'e and AQ:idenl, 1U1

1.

V II I.

Substance. Accidents. and Es.se ~ and

the Individual Subje<:t (Sup'p"!!!'irum)1 1 ]8 l.. Accidents m d Accidental Being, 1S3 }. The Guul Relationship bctw«n Suhstance and Aceidenu. 166 ; . The Relationship bclwet'n the Soul and Its Powen, In I.

IX .

Prime Matter and Substantial Form I.

2.

• 295

The Distinction between Maner and Form, 296 The Nature of Prime Matter, 312

PA R T THREE .

From Finite Being to Uncreated Being

1. Aqui nas md the: Ansc:lmian Argumentation. 391 XI.

Argumentatio n for God's Existence in Earlier Writings I.

In I &nt.. d. }, 4 00

2. Dr mu rI ~JJmfla. c. 4. 40 4

q. 5. a. 2. 4iO 4· Summa contra Gmtiln I. ce. 13. 15. 4ll ,. f), vt'rilau.

5. Compmdium

I~ologillr

I. c. ,.

440

400

Co mems XII .

T he Five Ways I.

..

VII

441

The FirSI Wa y, 4+1

2. The Stcond Way, 459 ~.

The Third W"y, 161 • . Tht FOUHh W"y, . 69 5. T ht Fifth W"y, . Ro 6. The Uniqucne~~ of God. 48S 7. The Unity of (he Fivc Ways, 197 XI II .

Quidd ira[ ive Knowledge of God and Analogical Knowledge

50 1

Q uidd itativt Knowlt dge of God, 502 1. Analogical Knowl td ge of God, 541 3. Conclusions on Our Knowlt dgt of God, 572 I.

XIV .

Concludi ng Remarks God·!O· C ttaturts Argumentation for Esse nce-Ess~ Co mposition and Disti nctio n. S8S 1. From Un panicipaced co Parcicipaled Being, S90 3. Quiddila(ivc Knowledge of God l nd the Subjc(f of Metaphysics, 59)

576

J.

4· Epilogue, 194

Bibliography

):97

Indt x ofN"mes

6tZ

Index of Topic.s

• 6"

Acknowledgments

Initial work on this volume btgan a numbe r of years ago, but the lime: required fo r completing it was extended subSl:illltially by my acceptance in January 1989 of a full -time position in the cen tral aciminisn-alion of my University. Only in Septe m ber 1997 after having fu lfill ed my admin istrative respo nsibi lities was 1 able to retu rn to this manuscript. 11 is now my pleasant obligat io n 10 thank ;111 of those who have assisted me in this undertaking, J would like co begin by expressi ng my gra titude to the Nation:!l Endowment for the Huma nities for a Fellowsh ip for Independent Stud y and Research which, joi ned with a sabbatical leav(' from The Ca tholic Uni versity of Arm' rica, fim enabled me to take up this project. I must

than k the Universi ty nOE only for That leave bu t for another which allowed me to devote full time [0 it duri ng the [997- 1998 aCldem ic rear. I am grateful to The CaTholic Universi Ty. of AIlu;riCJ Press and to The Socicty for Medieval and Renaissa nce Philosophy for join tly accepTing Th is book:ls the firSt in the Society's monograph series, and again 10 The Society wgtther with the Billy Rose Foundat ion for a subsidy which has assisted in defraying the publication cOsts. My special thall ks afe owing to the OUtSide readers selected by the Sociery and by The CaTholic University of America Press for Their careful reading of and valuahle com mell l$ on the text. Although I am nOt at liberty to disclose all of their names here, I can aT least ment ion Professor Stephen Brown, Chairman of the Society's Comminee o n Publiclfions. J am deeply grateful [0 him for the all Ihe time and altemio n he devoted to my text. I must also thank Dr. Dav id McGonagle, D in.·ctor of The CaT holic University of America Press, for his ever generous cooperation, and Mrs. Susan Needham, also of the Press, for her carefu l reading and skill ful copy editing of the manuscript . I am grateful to a number of profess ional colleagues who have read one or other part of it over the years. or who have called to my atTentio n certain releva nt items in the secondary literature. Although I will nOI attem pt to mention all of tltem by name, les t I inadvertent ly omit some, ! do wish

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x

Acknowledgments

single Out two who carefully examined pam of an earlier draft. Dr. Thomas Prufer and Dr. Bonnie Kent. My special lhanks are also owing to my fonner research assistant , JO$eph Brink,)" and my preSt'1H one, Stan Grove, for their generous help in many different ways, and to various staff members of The Catholic University of America's John K. Mullen Library, especially Bruce Miller. for their ever willing cooperation in my seemingly unending search fo r sou rces. Finally. I wish to thank the Journal of tilt History of Philosophy. the American Catholic Philosophical Association, The C:.uholic University of America Press, and Professor Georg Wieland, Vice-Rector of the Eberhard-Karls-Universitat Ttibingen in his capacity as an editor together with the Felix Meiner Verlag for permission to use in adapted form articles or portions of articles which had originally appea red in their respective publica.tions: "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Ariswtelian Catcgorics," journal of Ih~ J./islOry of Philosophy 25 (1987). pp. lJ- J4; "Presidential Address: Substance in Aquinas's Metaphysics," in Procu dings oJthe Amnican Cltholic Philosophical Associtltion 61 (1987), pp. 1 - 12. (Copyright by The American Calholic Ph ilosophical Association), ~ Thomas Aquinas and Partici pa(ion," in Sllldi~J in Mulievnl Pbilosophy, J. F. Wippel, cd. (Washingwn. D.c'; The Ca tholic Universiry of America Press, 1987), PI" 117-58; "Thomas Aquinas on Substance as a Cause of Proper Accidents," in Pbi/osopbit im MitttlniuT. Emwick/ullgs/illim und Pilradigmm, J. r. Beckmann, L. Honnefclder. G. Schrim pf. G. Wieland, cds. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), pp. 201-12 . to

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r

Abbreviations

,

AHD LMA CCS L CSEl. PC

Ar{"iv~$ d'Hiuoire Doctrinal" ef

PL

Palr%giat

ST SCC

Summa theologiar. Tho mas Aquinas Summa contra Gmti/rl, Thomas Aquinas

Litteraiu du Moynt Age

Corpus Chriuif{1l0rum. Srries '-'uina

Corpus ScriptOrum Ecdtiiasticoru/n l.minor/lm P{lfr%giu(' r UrJw {o mplmlJ. SaiN CTlUC{{, ed. ClIIJUJ

(ompk lw, Sfr;rs Lm;,ul, cd.

J. P. Migne J. l~

Migne

• •

.

"

Introduction

In order to

l I I

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SC t

the stage for this study of Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical

thought, 1 would like 10 recall briefly the esSt'mial moments of his life and career. He was born:H his family's castle in Roccasecca, h al y in 122411225. I-I c. received his c!cmclHary education at the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cass ino, located only a few miles from his fiunily horne. In 12J9 he lx:gan the $Iudy o f the liberal am :u the newly founded Studium gnlf'rtllr J.t Naples and remained there until about 1244.

II was undoubtcdly there that he received his first formal instruction in philosophy, and it was also there that in 1144 he joined the recently esrablishcd Dominican O rder. This step did not fit in wiTh his filtllily's plans for him. A careeT wilh the more prestigious Benedictine Order would have been much more ro their liking. $0 Strong was his fami ly's resistance to Thomas's entering the Dominican Ordet that, upon learning that the Dominicans were sending him to Paris for furth er studic.~. his mother arranged 10 have him intercepted by his brother (o r brothers) and some other soldiers in the Emperor's service and de tained at the family castle for a year or more. hnally. however. since his resolve remain ed unb roken. he was permiHcd to rejoin his Domin ica n confreres and made his way to Paris in t:Z.45. ' At Paris he first came into contact with Albert the Creat during the period t:Z.451248, and in 11.48 he accompanied Alben [Q Cologne in order to co ntinue h is theological formation there. In Il.jl. he was scnt hack to l'aris to begin working for the highest degree offered by the University there, that of Magister in Theology, and pu rsued the rigorous academic progra m required for this until 1256. Not least I, On Th(}m~$'s ! i f~ ~nd wrirings .~ J.A, W~i$heipl. Friar ThonulJ d"Aq"in". His Lift. TIJo"giJl ami Wi r*. 1J rev. ni. (Wa.>h iu!;lOn, D,C.. I,}S,). ~!ld 11,,= mo re r ~enr ~rudy by J. · l~ Torrell./nitiatiDII winl Tht!l"tJs d'AIl";" Sa /'fI"fOlU" rI SO" ",""If" (Frioourg. 199'). English !t~nsbriOfl. StUnt ThomnJ AquimlS. VoluIll" I. TlK Prrnln ami His U''t>rk (Wa~hinglnn , D.C., ' 996). A~ reg~ rd5 the daring of Thom~S5 v>r;ous wrirings I will follow rhose propo"l~d in Torrcll~ srudy un'es~ Qlhnwisc: ;ndic m"(l, On rhis urly p<:riod i" lllOrna~'~ !if~ SC'C' W~!hei pL pp, j - j(,; l Orrdl. pp. J- 17 ( Engli~ h rr.ln~ b!ion ciu'd hef(: ~nJ rh ro ugho" r). and for rh~ nenu surroundiIIg rh~ inre rvem ioll of his film Hy. Afb" 1 0ThomllJ; y/,{'/(d U"lrili'lgs, S. ' 1i,!;wdL ed. (New Ynrk_Mlhwah. [988). pp. 104-7 ,

a

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XIII

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xiv

Introduction

among his duties during this period was his responsibility 10 comment on the &,,tnlcel of Peler ,he Lombard , and this resuh ed in the eventual publication of his first major cheologic21 writing, his Commentary Oil the &mmw. By 1256 he had completed Ihe rcquiremellls for becoming a MaS[t~r of T heology and in Ihe spring of Ih31 year deli vered his inaugural lectUre as a Regenl MaSler. H owever, owing 10 Ihe hostili ty of a num ber of secular M as ters in the theology faculty aga in.~1 the twO recently founded mendicant orders, the Franciscans and Ihe Dominicans, neither Thomas fl or his Franciscan coun te rpart , Bo naventure, was fo rmally admil1ed imo the assembly of Masters until August Ill 7. They had, howc\'er, been lecturi ng as Masters in (heir respecti\'e religious houses. During this period of preparation at Paris (12-52-12j6) Thomas also produeed (wo important philosophical (realises, De principiis naturae and De n lte n tHtntia. ! l:rom 12j6 until 1259 Thomas carried OUI the li.lllcrions of a Master (Professo r) of Theology at the Un iversity of Paris. These duties included cond ucting fo rmal disputed questions (result ing in his Quamio" N diIpllfatat Dt writau) and quodlibetal d isputations (where an y appropriate question could be raised by an y member in the audience, and would ultimately have 10 be answered by the presiding Master). His Quodlibets 7-11 and his Com mentary on the De Tnnirate of Boethius resulted fro m this period.' Thom as returned 10 Italy in 1259 and ser.ed there at various Dominican ho uses of study as ucturcr or as Regen! Masrcr, continuing to lcach and 10 wrile at a rapid pace. Du ri ng Ihis period he co mpleted his C ommentary on the De anima, thereby commencing a series of illlensive studies of AriSlOtie which would evemu· ally rt'Suh in panial or IOtal commentaries 0 11 twelve works by the Siagirite. He completed his Summll COl/ fra Gt1Itila (12.59-1265) and the Prima Parr of the Summa dltologillt (1266-1268). Also dating from Ihis period are his Exposition on tbt DilJine Namer(of P:reudo-D ionysi us), DiJPured Qut$liom on tIlt POUHr olGod (De pountia), Disputed Qumiom on Spiritttlll CrMtll"S, Displlted QUNtiom 011 till! Soul, and many olher works of a theological or religious nature." in laIC 12.68 o r early 12.69 he returned to Paris to resume his fun ctio n there as Regent Mas ter of T heology a1 the Uni versity. Various controversies dcmanded his attention during this period. Certain more conservati\'e theologians, heavily in-

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l. On Thomas's rime al Puis (1l"U- 1l -4S) IoC":C" Wc-ishd pL pp. S6--4I; Torrell, pp. 1?-4. On rhe p"rioo at Cologn" s« Torrd\. pp. 4 - 35.0" Thomas'! hu t ruching ye-
•

rhe Sentcnces (11P- I1.j6) IoC":C" Wcishcipl, pp. 67-80; Torrell, PI'. J6-so. On Thomas', inaugur.IIl lcc. lure sec TorrelL pp. SO- H. On the oomplication~ for Thomas and Bonaventure IQulr ing rrom the quarrel bet""ccn rh e sccubrs and mendian{s IoC":C" Torrdl. pp. 76- 79; W~i~htipl. pp. 80-96. u3-tS. }. On Ih iJ peri«! sec W"isheipl, pp. 116- j9; Torrell. Pl" ~-t-7-t. Fo r fu ll",. di$Cusio n of d;spul".j quo rions lind quodlibcl31 di spuruio ns.KC" B. Bann. J.F. Wippel, G. Fr.lln'K"n. D. JKquan. Ln qWlti01l1 dUP"lffl" In ,/umi(nlI qutHilibhiqut;S Jam In focuft fi tk IlKelogit, tk dro;t tt tk mhi«,nt {Turn· hout. 1985). PI. I, "l.cs (Iu a(ion~ d i~l"' r .:o. princip~lemcnt d3ns ks fKulia dc thrologic' (Bazan): Pt. II : ~Quodlibcl31 Q ua tions. C hieHy in Theology rnuhi es" (Wippel). -t. On {his period in [l3 ly SCC" Wci.u. eipl . cc. IV_V: Torrell. cc. VI_IX.

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Introducti on

xv

sp ired by the md idon of 51. August ine (ahhough also fumiliar wit h ArislOtle's thought). were challenging the mOle Aristotelian versiOIl of C hristian wisdom Thomas had becn developing. To cite but one hotly contested issue, against the prevai ling view defended by this group Thoma.~ maintained, as he had th roughout his caretr, that unaided human reason had not proved that the world began 10 be and , indeed , could nOt proVt th is poinl. Finally, writing in 11.70 in his Drnrumilt1tf mundi, he went so fa r as to hold that an etcrnall y created world is possible. Like all of his C hristian contemporaries. of course, he believed on the grounds of r{'velation that the world began 10 be, but for him this was and could be only a mailer of religious belief.' During the 12605 and earl y 11.705 a radical form of Aristotelian ism was bei ng developed by certain Masters in the Faculty of ArtS ar Paris (by now really a facu lty of philosophy) , such as Siger of Brabant. Iloe.thius of Dacia, and ot hers. Ofren if not accu rately referred 10 as Lat in Averroi.~m , this movement was marh-d by the tot"J.1 dedication of irs leaders 10 the pursui t of the purely philosophical life. At least in some instances, initially they were not particularly concerned if some of their philosophical conclusions happened 10 be at odds with orthodox Christian belief. So nue was this that in De<:ember 1270. Scephen Tempier, Bishop oeParis. singled out thirteen propositions for special condemnation , includi ng at least four which Siger had already defended. Aquinas himself, while sharing with these thin keT$ considcr;lble respect for rhe thought of ArisTOtic and for ph ilosophical reasoni ng, opposed the views of this movement all Vlrious poinrs. 6 Pcrhaps mOSt nOTOrious was the defense by some. members of the Arts Faculty such as Siger himself, at least prior 10 December 127 0. of the Averroistic view of un ici ry of the possible intellect. According TO this position there is only one pos-

s.

FQ r diS(:uniQn and d..ren~ of a blc Seplember 116S da tc f", Thom:tS's ,eturn , 5« Torrell, pr. r81 - 81. who follows R.-A. Camhie. on Ihis. On ,he oppOJirion of ,he ~on~ r"luivc theologians to Thomas's views during this p<'riod (126811l69 - U71), eSp«ially rhose whQ might be (":m golized as Ixolonging 10 Ihe Nco-Augustin ia n IlI o,·cment inspired by Bon~ \"cnturc but rca!!y founded by John !'.:cham. 5CC E Van St~enberghell , I-IJ phillJJllph" a" XII I, Ii"". l d rev. ...t. (l.ou;.in _la_Ncuve. 1991j. pp. J9S-~ !I. 0 .. Thomas·s d ......clopmcnt of his pOjilion ill his [.H lurt, niratr ",,,,,d; ~e c. VI! in Illy Mrtaphpi,"/ TMmrs in T~mlll A'f"inal (Washin gton. D.C.• 198.. ). For rcfcrcn cc:s 10 more { ("Ce rn di.scuS.lions orTho rn:u'~ views on thi s gcne,altopic sec V~n Stcen bcrghcn, p. 40S, n. 101 . Cf. lorrcll, pp. 184- 87. Al we will Stt below in C h . IX. -il'oll\:I.~·$ d efense of un id ry o f sub!il; :•.1..., hi l Mai,..· Sip , d, 8,.,.ba'll ( Lou .....i n-Par i., 1977): Thoma, Aq,,;'I4J l1>1d RAdical Aristol(/il1nism (Washington. D.C.. 1980): Wipp<'!. Mrdiaro.tl Rtaetion! to 1M f,uoumrr bftwrrn Faith and Rtl1JOl1 ( Mi lwau k«,. 1995), PI'. jJ- S9; and mOSt r« emly, E-X. I'ulall a:r. and R. Ill\b~ch , Profmion: I'hifiJ1ophe Sit" it B'olilimt (I'nis, 1997) . On Soc,hiu! or Dacia sec Van Stccnb.."ghen, '-" phi/morhir au XlII iih". PI" J61-70; Wippel. &mhiUl of Doteia. On 'lit S"P""" (,,,,,,d. 0" tI" /:,1,.n;ry flf thr U?or/d. On Dm,m! (lOrOnlo. (987). PI'. 1-2 ). On the Condemna tion o f 1170 $«' Van Slccn!x rghcn, Mail" Sign-, PI'. 74 - 79: Wippel. "The Condemnations of !l70 and 1:77 at !'~ r i,,~ joumal of MrdirLliJ/ and Rm;1;WI>I" Studirs 7 «(977). PI'. 16,)- 201, '·51'. pp. 179-85.

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lmrod uclion

sible. i.e., aile receiving and spiritual intellect for all human beings. a separaIe and immaterial substance, which is ultimately responsible for the thin king that each one of us apparently does. Un like the defense of one separate agent or abmact ing intellect for the human race, a view espoused no t only by Siger but by various perfectly orthodox thinkers of the time. this Averroisric position undercut the possib ility of individual immortal ity of the human sou l and hence of personal reward or punishment in the life to come. In 1270 Thomas directed a well-crafted treatise against this position. his D r: unitalt' imrlltCtllJ COntr4 Avrrroi$laJ. In this work Thomas cha llenged Siget's interpretation bOlh on histOrical grounds (it was not the correct readi ng of Aristode's Dr 4I1ima), and on philosophical grounds (i t was not good philosophy). This tightly reasoned work is a lasting tcstimony to Thomas's phi losophical skill and power.1 On sti ll another front, the mendicants, including both Franci5Cans and Dominicans. were again under atlack by certain secular Masters in Theology at Paris. Indeed, the very viabili ty of the mendicant way of life was being challenged. Against these dissenting vo ices Thomas d irect<..-d the concl uding chapters of his Dr prrftctiolle spiritun/is villlt' and his Comrd doerrinam rrmilmltillTn {l rr/igionf.8 Also dating from Ih is period (1269-1272) arc many of his commentaries on ArislOtie, Supfr Librul/I tit fdmis, soml' scriptural co mmentaries (on Matthew and John). major portions of lhe Summa tbf% giar. his Disputed Quesfions Dr virturibm, Quodlibets t- 6 and t2, and mos! likd y, his Disputed Questions Dr maio and Of IllJiOIJ( IJtrbi incnmati." In the spring of il7l hc was r('1:alled by h is religious superiors to Iraly and charged with establishing a studillm gm fmlro f theology for his order in Naples. His tcaching and writing activities co ntinued until ncar the end of il7}. Early in 1274 he departed !O take pan in a general cou ncil of the C hu rc h at Lyons, but died whi le a ll the way at the Cisterci:m Abbey a l FOSS:1nova on March 7. 1174. 10 Even this brief survey of Thomas's life leaves one with the impression of a vast amount of teac hing and writing compressed into a relativdy short professional career (a lillie morc than lwenry yea rs if we begin with his lectures on the Srmmrrs in 12 51). At the same time. it is also clear ,hat, so far as his professional teaching 7. On uniciry of the poss i bl~ i nt dl~t in Siger and Thom;1~'S I~act ion st'e Van StU nbcTghcn, Thcmas Aquinas Imd Radirl1./ AriItOlllill'lism. "Monop.)'C hism." pp. 29-'7" ; u. philoU/phil. pp. i 87...,7. 8. cr Weisheip1. pp. 16J-7 ~; Torrt ll. pp. t8z- 84. 9. For mote d('!~ib cunccming "Ill umas's writ iu gs during th is pt'riod set Torrell. pp. 196--lt l . Sec pp. ll1- l} for a seriC'S of ,hulle, wril ingJ; al:lO Jaling ('Olll thi s ti me. $/,c pp. 114- }6 on tl"" Ari$!ot". lian commenTaries. For th ~ lala t pm:isioos conc"ro ing ,he rci a,i vt dalings of Thom as'~ Quodlibets se" 5.:'Il'ti Thcmlu dt Aquino Opml omnia. l.«Jo jo~ cd. (Rome. ISh- ), Vol. lj. 1, ~Avant.Propos: p. ix ' (rdume) = Leon . .!.s.Lix' , :.L\ wtll :l,\ disc ussion of particular dalings in the te
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In[rod ucrion

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XV II

obligations were concerned, he was a teacher, a professor of theology. And if his writ ings may be divided into various categories, the majority of them may be described as theological or religious rather than as purely philosoph ical in character. In shorf, T homas Aquinas was a profess ional theologian. !! This poi nt has been especially em phasil.ed by various twentieth-century iOleTpreters of his thought. owing in no small measu re to the gradually evolving views developed by Etienne Gilson concerning what he called ~C hri st ia n Phi losophy" and his application of the same to Thomas's ph ilosophical thought. Indeed, G ilson's position concerning th is eventually went beyond his ead ier claim lhat we should nOt study Aquinas's ph ilosophy as a purt ph ilosophy but as a Christia n Philosophy. and thereby take into accou nt certain positive influences titat it received from Thomas's religious faith. I n later writings Gilso n emphasized tht point that Thomas's original philosoph ical thought is contained in his theological wri tings, not in his philosophical opuscula and cornmtntar ies. Because it is found in theological writings. it has been transformed into theology and fa lls under the formal object of theology. Hence we should srudy it from that perspectivt, i.e., as tran$formed into lheology, and should not aHempt to eXlract il from its theological home so as to prest'11I it as a pure philosophy By doing this we will thereby gai n knowledge of all the ph ilosophy his theo logy contains. 1: On other occasions I have examined and critically eV
phik>wphy imo Thornis!ic lheulogy sec £1mrmIS. p. lh. 11 . 6; also; " ... lh~ n3lUle of the doctrine in
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Introduction

writings, a point to which I shall return below. Second , Thomas has ta ken the trouble of explaining in considerable detail his views concerning the distinction bcno.'ccn philosophy and theology. the different kinds of theoretical philosophy, the distinctive subject of meraph ysics, the methodology to be used in metaphysical

thinking. and the difference between following lhe philosophical order and following the theological order. Si nce all of these dements arc present in his wrilings. they constitute a standing invitation for today's historian of philosophy to take Thomas at his word and to draw upon them in reconstructing his meraphysical though!. h is this that I shall anempt to do ill th is book. I ) To return to the point mentioned above. let me now add a word about the di fferent kinds of writings Thomas has left fo r us. While they m.ay be grouped or

divided in various ways, I would propose the following in the interests of simplicity: (,) ph ilosophical commentaries (twelve commentaries on Aristotle and one on the Liba d~ cnusu); (1) commentaries on sacred scriprure; CJ) theological commentaries (on the D~ Trinilnuand lhe D~ H~bdomadibmof BoethiU5, on the D~dilJinis "o mi~ nib u$ of Psclldo-Oionysius. and on the Smlmm of Pe('er Lombard- of these only two are commentaries in the strict sense, i.e., on the D~ H~bdomadibUJ and on the D~ divilliJ nomil/ibus; the other tWO offer brief expositions of the texts of Boethius and ofreter and use them as occasions for much fuller and highly personal disquisitions by Thomas himsclf); (4) works of theological synthesis (Summa contra Gm~ liln, Summa tI)(ologia~, Compmdillm the%gia!', and if one prefers to include it here, the Commentary on the Sm u ncrJ listed above); (5) Dispured Questions and Quodlibetal Questions (resulting from Thomas's functions as a professor of theology); (6) theologic.tl opuscula; (7) philosophical opuscula (Dr mu rr rsst:nria, Dr principiis narurar, D~ unirau i"u/l~ctm, Dr luumitau ml/1IIIi, D~ IUbsranriis upararis [the first sixteen chapters, although the second and unfini shed part (ce. 17-19) considers sepa rate: substances in the light of C.atholic teaching and is therefore theological !). H IJ. FOI my critique of Gilson's position sec MrtaphYlknl TlNmn. pp. ll- j}. Sa pp. 2}- 14 fo r a qualifitd " 'ay in wh ich I would accept dQUibing ~ philmophy such as Thomu's as · Christian ,~ Le., in Ihe moment of discovery bur no! in die momcll1 of proof. Also s« my ~The l'ouibi l;ly of 3 Ch riS1i~n Ph ito!>Ophy: A Thomis!ie Perspective, ' Faith mltl Phi/DWPhy I (1984). PI" 172-9<). H.>r 3 good rdume of his long-run ning disagreement with Gi lwn on thi.\ i!»Ue see Van Sto:..:nbcrghen, "Etienne Gilwn, historien de 13 pens« mwic\'alc ,- Rm~r pbiw.wphiqur dr u,ulJtlin (t979). tsp. PI" 49'- S05· For a more m :enl criliquc .stt J. Acmen. Medin..! Phik>wplry and the Tramundrnl/lu. TIN u~ DjT/H)>nm Aquinm (Ltidc n. 1996), PI" , - 10. fur another vt'uion of the tendency to th eologi~m in iUlerplcl ing Aquinas's philosophicallhough l set: M . Jordan. "Theology and Pb il()SOphy," in TIN umbridsr Compa nion ro Aquinas, N. Kret"lmann and E. Stump, td5. (Cambridge. 1991), PI'· Zjl- SI. 14. This i~ fundamema lly th c same class ifiCliion proposed by Van Ste.: nbcrghen in his u. pbir-,· phir au XIII, siirk. PI'. 180- 8), alt hough 1 am incl udi ng under !heologiClI opusc:ula wri lings he lim under .pologelical opuscula, 0puKub for the defense: of Ih c ,\iendica nu. opuscul a on $pi ritu~ 1iry, and !ihlrgiCliI wririn~, !eilers, and 5(;rmon~ . The Gualog in Torrell. preparC
n

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. m

(n considering possible sources which we may use in Tcrovering Thomas's metaphysical thought, IV..O of these catego r ie..~ of writings, the philosophical comlllemaries and the phi losophical opuscuJa, stand out si nce both are clearl y philosophicaL This notwit hstand ing, Gi lson lended 10 min imize their importance for any effon to discoVt'r Thomas's personal metaphysical thought. According to Gilson, [he philosophical opuscula are not all that significam as sources for Aqu inas's personal metaphysical thinking, and the commentaries on Aristotle :lre really only exercises by ThorTlru; in the hislOry of philosophy; in them he writes as the commentator or the expositor, nor as an original phil 05o pher. l ~ In my view the philosoph ical opuscula are extremely important sources for our knowledge of Thomas's personal and original phi losophical positions. This will become dear below from my citalions from them-especially fro m the De nltl' l't l'1semia. the Dr principiis "atl/rar, and the Dr mbslIIlltiis uparatis -in scHing forth some of his mosl fundamental metaphysical positions. I have already referred 10 the philosophical sign ificance of Thomas's Dr unildll' imr fLrctllS co ntTlf AVrrro;staJ bmh as a cont ribution to the study of ArislOtle's thoughts on the matter, and as a personal philosophical critique of Siger's views. And for final clarificat ion of his views o n the possibiliry of:1I1 eternally created world, I have found his Dr al'urni((fU mu"di 10 be of till': urnlOSt importance. \~ As regards the sign ificance of Thomas's commcmaries o n AristOtle and Ihe Libn dr r(1UJis, it wou l{j be a very strange procedure for us 10 ignore or minimize their importance for our understanding of his perso nal phi losophical views on a priori grounds. After aI!, he did devote a considerable amount of time and energy to prepari ng them. This is especially nOlewort hy since it was nOI one of his rcrognizcd dUlies as a professional theologian to wri te extended lileral commentaries on Aristotle's works. ' 7 Commcmario on Ariswdc; (s) Olhel Com,"c1\l~';ClO; (6) Polemical Wriliflg~; (7) T,ca(isc5; (8) Lew:rs and Req~QI5 (or F..xpt"11 Opinion; (9) Lirurgi(al Workl. &rn1On5, f'r.l)·crs. Sec pp. BO- W. 15· 5« Gilson. Thr O,,·ist;" n f'J,il()wphy fllSt. Thflmas Aqu;nfls (New yo,k, 1956), p. 8. Stt p. H: "There i~ ~ s.crio of w(lrks in which SI. Thoma.< "sed the philosophicrl method-Ih .. Commcnruio on Arislotlc and a small nurnber of OpUS{uia. But c~c h opusrulum gi,'cs but a rr.lgmelll or his (hough(, ~nd (he cornrn",nr~ rio on ArinOilc ... only 1(1 u~ SUS! ":C( impcrf«lly wh~1 might h~vr Ott" [he namre of ~ Summa of ·!1lOmi' lic phi!oSQphy organ;1-td by 51. Thollla.< him~lf... :· Cf. E/rmrms q/Ch.;,,;an l'J,ifo,ophy. p. IS!, n. 6; T}" /'biwwpl". and Tbrq/qgy. PI" 110- 11: '"S;a.inl Thom~s ;~ only a com menUior in his "".ili nS$ On AriswLle. f<)r his p<"rsonal thi nking onc 111UM look a! [he (wo Summar :md ~i mi br "'riti ,,~ .. .. Even in (he 35 !Oni~hing rr.ICl, On !kin!. and Essrnrr, the level of(h~""Ulul9' h nul f~1 (rulll (h~ .\Urfacc. - As (oommen[ed in Mrtapbysira f r IJrmrs(p. [5, n. 41 ), if in this lasl ((XI Gilson seems !O lake Ihe Dr rnu more seriously. Ihi, is l>«::Iu5<' /", hrrr rrs,,,,h il [00 1lS a Ih<'Qloginl wr;I;ns' 16.5« my Mt'lapby,i(al T}"mN, c. VII, cit~-tl aoo.-e in n. 5. 17. Scholarly opinion is dividrtl concerning Tholl1u's rC:lXIns for "'riling !lIe AriSlmeiian comrnemuics. Wcishcipl belic" cs lha( he »W; I Oll; PUt oflds ilUdl«w-..l apo~loblc to produce ,e1i~ble guido fo r yQung maStefli in UI$ which woukl en~ble Ihem -10 understand AriSlOlelian philosophy in h;ulflony with (he 2C1ual\cxt ';I.nd Ihe guideline o(ra; lh. where n~ry" (hiar Thom4s, p. 181; d. PI" 180- 8s) . Hence he ';I.scsig!>s con,jidcr:lhlc impon2ncr 10 Ihem. For 2 brief prest'nu(ion of (~ )

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Introd uction

Even 50, as I have nared on another ocC'.v;ion, I do th ink that considerable care must be exercised when we consult them as sources for Thomas's perso nal philosophical thinking. So me twentieth-century interpreters seem to assume th.u almost any statement made by Thomas in these works should be taken as an ex p~ssion of his personal thought . G ilson, at the other extreme, would reduce them to mere exercises in and contributions 10 the history of philosophy. The truth seems to fall somewhere in between. One cannot immedia tely ass ume that every position exprc:ssed in such a commentary is merely Thomas's understanding of the text on which he is commenti ng. On many occasions such expositions also seem to represent posi tions Thomas himself holds. On other occasions T homas's discussion goes beyond the thought of ,he rext on which he is commenting, and he indie-oues as much to us. However, when he docs not clearly spcUlhis out fo r us in the commentary itself, we need some kind of control to determine whether Thomas is accepting as his own a panicular position he is selling forth in his commentary, or whether he is merely expressing his understanding of the text on which he is commenring. Frequently enough such a control is at hand, either in the Proocmium to a panicular commentary irsetf. where he is more likely to speak in his own name, or in other writings where he deals with the same topic and is clearly expressi ng his own views. Whcn lhe views he presents in more independent writings agree with (hose he exposes in a panicular commentary on Ari5{Olle, we may ass ume [hat he accepts {he Iau er as his own position as well. When there is disagreement bcrv.·eeil lhe rwo discussions, we should be very hesil"ant in assigning such a posi tion from one of his commentaries to Thomas himself, unless Ihere is also some evidence poimi ng to change or development in h is thinking on that poi nt. lt As fo r our right to draw upon writings which fall under the other categories we have distinguished 3bove, all of wh ich appear 10 be theological in some sellse, CC f differrm ~iew$ conce rn ing wh~ t Mr and !() W~~t ex tent we m~y use t~m in r('CQMtrucring ThomU'$ pel"lOn~1 thoughl >« "orr~ll , I)P. lJ7- )!;I. H ~ hi mse lf e.mpha~iWi the poi nt that in writing them Thomas whhfli to dCl('rmi ne the mind of AriSl()tlc in the teX(~ on which he commentS, but Ihalthis des ire 10 disco\'("r wha l A rinod ~ "wi$hed 10 Sly· al limes leads Thomas 10 go beyond the textS them· seh-es in his ~a rch for truth. A1 SQ cf. J. Doig. AfJui"tn 0" MntlrhFio: A hisumil1-dom'i"tll study 0/ l~ Commtnla'J on rhr MnapbJIio (Th e H ague. 1971). pp. ix- xiv. 18. S« my M~(tlpryi(aI7Mmn, p. 17. r will appl y th is mcthod in Ch. II below when de~ling with T hom:l.!'S views on f4'pa rtllio and Ihe discovery of Ihe subj<:(:t of met",lphysio. For a useful colle<;o linn (in L;uin an d in German tr;msb lion) of the Prologues (I'rOO<'mia) to Thom:U'$ C(I mment:l.ril'S on ArislOde ~nd on the LilNrtb (IlUJ is s« F. C he\"en al and R. lm~eh. ThMIJlS 00'1 Aquin. Prologt zu tbn AriJ lolr/n·Ko mmr"10rrn (Fran kfun am M~ i n , 199J). From the Introd ucrion Stt pp. Ivi i- ll iY, on Ihe philosophical 5ign ific~ nce of I he ['lOlogul'S. There {pp. lviii---lil} Ihey offer J helpful corrC'Cli"e 10 the some'",ha! a~ggcr:ll cd emphasis placed on the .hoologic:al ch~ruter of thCSC' romrnemaries by Gauthie r (Srt Lron. 'u . 1.l88 · -9 ~· ) and proposed. alb!,ir more tentatively. by J. Owens in his ~Aqui. nas as Aristo tdian Commen{a l or.~ in St. TixJmlU Aquinas /174 - /9701. u,m mnnolllriw Studit.J, Vol. 1 (Toronlo, t914), pp. 11J- }8. \XIhile one may readily agr~ with Gauth ier and ~ns Ihat Thomas Saw hi. writing of th t$( commcm"ries a! co ntributing ultimat ely 10 his thrologial enterprise by helping him perfecr his perwnal ph ilosophy, he commented on ,hem philosophially. i.e.• ff(lm lhe p-hilosophia J pcrspecli,'c wh er than the Ihoologial.

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tai n distinctions are in ord('r. Van Stel:nberghen has suggested that al times we find in such writings self-colHained philosophical discussio ns inserted as such into a theological work.'Y For instance, in Chapters I and II below we shaH IUrn to a num ber of questions and articles frOIll T ho mas's C ommentary on Boethius's Dr Tri"itau where he presents his views on the d i\,isio ns, s u bj ~ ts, distinct ive knowing procedures. and mcrhodologies of the three theoretical sciences, physics. mathe, matics, and metaphysics. Discussions such as these may and should be used as important sources for reco\'cring his metaphysical though t. Or again, we mar find a running series of philosophical discussions joi ned together as succeed ing questions or chapters in works such as the Summa rhrologi(u (see [he so-cal led Treatises on God, or on Man , or on Law) or the Summll contra Gmtiln (St.'(' Ihe reliance on argu ments based on natu ral reason thro ughout Bks I-TIl ). o r in the earlier part of the Compt!fldium tlJroll)giar. We may easily remove such d iscussions from the general theological contex t of lhe writings in which they appear and from the refe rences to Scripture and the Fat hers con tained in some of their lIidrtltTS or rrd (omra!; and use them as imporr:lIlt sources in reconstructi ng Thomas's metaphysical thought ,lo O n still other occasions we will find similar self-contai ned ph ilosophi cal discussions proposed as individual questions within Disputcd Q uestions (sec, for instance, the discussion of trut h and the associated derivatio n of the transcendentals in D~ l!rrilaU, II {, a. t} o r in certa in particular questions within his various Quodlibets. These 100 may easily be removed fro m their general theological settings and uS(:d as im portant expressions of Thomas's personal thought. Finally. on stil! ot her occasions we will find Thomas using philosophical reasoning as an instrUlll cnt in working out a strictly theological argumen t. In such cases I wou ld agree with Gilson that the particular ph ilosophical reaso ning has here become theo.logical. Nonetheless. we may still exam ine this u nderlying philosoph ical or metaphysical reasoning in order to determine what particular philosoph ical choice o r choices Thomas has made in dc\'cloping this particular theological argumentation . Because he himself [faces diversity in theologies 10 diversity in their underlying philosophies, we may, if we make approp riate distinclions, use even such texts as add itional sources for our effort 10 rC1:o\'er his meraphysicalthough t. 11 19. Ul philoJ()phi" au Xlllr rik/r. p. 318. l O. WI' C'~n do t h i~ bea us<: in th ese CilSeS Th omas h~~ dC'o'd op<'d h i~ phi lo5Op h ic~llh ; nk i ng O
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xxii

Intro duc tio n

In sum , as regards the different categories of Thomas's writings distinguished above, to the extent lhat imponam elements of his thought are contained in any of them, (Q that extent 1 will fed frt:e 10 draw upon those works in presenting his metaphysics. And I will preSCnl this as his metaphysics or his metaphysical thought , not as his theology or as his "Christian philosophy." 12 In rhis eRon I will be guided by Thomas's explicitly stated views co ncerning the nature and subject of metaphysics, the distinctive processes involved in arriving at metaphysical thinking, the disrinction between ph ilosophy and theology, and the difference between following the philosophical o rder and following the theological order. Before concluding this Introduction , therefore, I wish 10 consider brieRy his vie ....'S o n the distinction between philosophy and theology as well as his understanding of the difference between fo llowing the ph ilosophical order and following the theo logical order. Thomas deals with the distinction between philosophy and theology 0 11 different occasions. He offers perhaps his clearest discussion of this in (I. 2., a. 3 of his Commenlary on the Dr Trinitatt of Boethius. In Ihis particular article he is concerned with determin ing whether or not it is permissible to use philosophical arguments and authorities in the science of the faith, i.e., in theology. The genera.! sett ing fo r Ihis discussion is, therefore. theological, and this is app ropriate; con fli ct between faith and reason should not arise fo r someone who has no religious bith.n After presen t ing a series of arguments against the legitimacy of using philosophical arguments and aut ho ri ties in one's theologizi ng and then another set of arguments in support of doin g thi s. Tho m as offers his solution. The gifts of grace: are added 10 namre in such a way that they do not destroy nature but perfect it. This is an important presuppositio n on Thomas's part. since it indicates thai the gifts of grace. includ ing religious faith, should not be regarded as inimical 10 or as destructive of nature. As his texi continues, Ihe light of faith , which is given 10 us as a grace, docs not destroy Ihe light of natural reason, which is also given to us by G od. 1 ' In saying this Thomas combines something which he accepts only on fai th (that the light offa ith is divinely given) with something else which he undoubtedly philosophorurn 5e(:1:ItOlt$ (ucrulU. ~ quib u! in philosophicis ~ rudili lUlU: Abo se~ Ae r(S(On. M"fin",1 f'hiu,f()phy and rlN Tmns,mdmla/s. p. 7 , n. I. wh o C;lelo fk '''-'110, q. I. ~. 1 as ~n illusu.uion of ,his. Thefe Thorn~s indic~l es Ihal \P~udo-) Dionysiu$ scrms 10 be following Ih~ Plalonins when hr plOiCO the good btfor~ being (Sana' Thumar.u Aquino Dpaa tlmnia [Rome. ,881- J. Vol. l}, p. II. lines IS9- 161= l.con. 1j.II;l 59- 16I), H. This is no! 10 d ~ny ,hal Thomas will draw upon his faith as a neg~tive norm in developing hi~ phil ~phy even in purely philosophio. l wo rks such a$ hi~ Com m"nLl lic:s on Ari~lod~ or Ih~ philosophical 0 pu$Cula if and when h~ finds it necessary 10 do $0. Nor it it 10 d~ny Ihal one mighl refer 10 his philoj;(lphy a~ Chrisrian in {h~ "momem of di$Co\'ery· a~ o pposed to Ih e "moment of proof~ (see uOle IJ above). l}. See lown. 10.96-'00. 14. Uo n. 10.98:114- 118. NOle: " ... unde "t lumen fidei. quod nobi s gralis infundilUr, non d .... SHU;I lumen natural;.' I"llionis divinilUs nobis indilUrn:

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XX II!

also firsl accepted on faith but for wh ich he will also argue philosophically (that , like everything else Ihat is distinct from God, the light of natural reason is created by him). l) Thomas gocson to explain that while the natura l light of human reason is incapable of arriving at knowledge of those things which are made known 10 us only Ihrough fai th . i.e., revealed mysteries, it is nonetheless impossible for truths which have been revealed to us by God to be contrary to (hose instilled in us by nature. This is so, he reasons, b<.·cause in ,hal evelllualiry one or the other would have to be fa lse. (Two colllradictory propositions cannOi both be lrue simu ltaneously.) And since T homas has traced both of these sources of knowledge back to God, this would make God himself [he author of fa lsity, something Thomas rejectS as impossible. He adds that, since in imperfect things we find some im itation of those thai are perfect. in th ings we understand through natural reason we find certain likenesses (similiwdi'lNj of things which arc revealed 10 us through failh Y' So fa r Thomas has been discussing the relationshi p and lack of opposition or the harmony between failh and reason. Now he goes on to speak explicitly of philosophy and theology. JUSt J..S sacred teaching, i.e. , theology, is based on the light of faith, so is philosophy grounded on the namrollight of reason. Wherefore it is im possible for things wh ich pertain 10 ph ilosophy to be opposed to those wh ich belong to rel igious belief, even though the form er fall shorl of the Ialler, Thomas repeats the point that truths discovered by phi losophy contain certain li kenesses and, he adds, certain preambles, for those thi ngs which arc of faith, just as nature itse!fis:l. prt'amble fo r graceY However, nOI being blind 10 historical realit ies, Thomas continues. If something is found in the sayings or conclusions of the ph ilosophers that is controry to failh, this is not really philosophy but an abuse of it that follows from some deficiency on fhe part of someone's exercise of human reason. Here, therefore. Thomas is assuming [hat we will remember the paim he has JUSt made. that there can be no real contradiction between what we discover through phi losophical investigation and what we receive through religious belief. This is because of his conviction that both come to us from God. Hence if an alleged philosophical conclusion contradicfs an article of faith. both cannot be uue at the same time. Because Thomas is mindful of the possibility that human reason can fa ll illlo error, in such a case he assigns greater weight, greater certainty, to revealed truth. He does so because he believes tha i such lruth is given to us directly by God through revelation and is nOt :). For rhe poim rh~r all rh~r diff~rs from God 'sen:alM by him s« C h. XI V hdow, pp. 57,)-l j. 16. Lroll. jo.')8:118-99'1;0. NQI~: " .. . !:I.m~1l im possibil ~ ~Sl quod ta quae PC' fidem traduntur nobis divinilUS. sim c..,mraria his qu~c sum per namr:.r.m nobi ~ indila: opont1l:t cnim ~lterum = falsum . . .. " l 7. l.eon. 50·99:I; I- lj 7. NOle: "... undt impossibilt t~1 q uod ta qu~c ~unl philO$1)ph i~e ~inl cQnm"i, h i~ quae SUn! fidei .. .. "

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Imroducrion

subject to the weaknesses and possible mistakes to wh ich unaided human reason is p rofle. l~ Here we have Thomas's justification for the right of the C hristian believer to use his or her religious fai th as a check, as it were, as a negative norm , with rcs~ct to a philosophical conclusion if th;n conclusion clearly conuadicts revealed truth. At the same time, it is intercsting to observe that T homas does not apply ,his same thinking to a conclusion based on thcological reasoning, i.e., to a position a theologian might reach by reasoni ng about or even from a revealed premise. Presumably this is because Thomas is keenly awa re that if human reason when used by phi losophers is fallib le, it is equally fallible when employed by theologians.l') T homas goes on 10 draw OUI an intercsting consequence from the point he has JUSt made. In the case of conllict between all (alleged) philosophical conclusion and a rl'vealcd truth, it is possible by using the principlcs of philosophy 10 refu te an error of this kind ei ther by showing that it is altogether impossible or else by showing lhat it has nOl in fact been demonStrated. He must allow for these twO possibilities because, as he explains, JUSt as those things which ~rtain to faith (alone) cannot be demonstra tively proved, SO too, certain things which are opposed to them cannot be demonstratively shown 10 be false. The)' can, however, be shown not to be necessary, i.e. , not to have oc-en demonstrated:!O While continuing to defend a real harmony between faith and reaso n, Thomas i ~ allowi ng for what we may call revealed mysteries, such as the Trini ty or the Incarnation. Because such an icles of fa ith ca nnot be demonstrated by natural reason, if someone denies such a tru th the beSt the believer can do in respond ing is 10 show that [he denial ilSeif has nor been demonstrated. If Thomas wer. . 10 al10w for the possibilit), thaT one could demonst rate that the denial of such a [(mh is itsel f false, he would in effect be admitting that the revealed mystery cou ld itself be demonstrated, Fi nally Thomas su ms up three ways in which one may lise philosophy in theological inqu iry: (I) to dernollS1Tale what he calls preambles for faith, i.e., truths that should be known by onc who believes, such as those that are proved by natural argumentation about God-fo r instance, the fact that God exists, that God is olle- and similar truths which are proved in philosophy about God or about creatu res and are presupposed by fai th ; (2) 10 manifest through certain likenesses truths 1&. L<:on. jO.?9" J7- L'IO, "$ i 'Iuid ""tern in dicl is ph ilosophorurn i n""n im, con .",rill'" fidei. hoc non Ci t philosophiae. sed m~gis ph ilosophiat :lbu~us ex dcfeclU r.l1io l) is. . .. •

19. T he righ r of lhe C hris.;:!n believer to usc reli gious f..it h liS ~ n"'~tive norm ;s gr:Lmed oo.. h by Gilson and his fo IlO" 'en ;n Iheir defense ofChrisli;n Philosophy, and by mlny of his critics who are .hcmsclvcs believing ChrUti~n J. 11,c poim of dingr«mcm r:L.hc r h3S 10 do wilh tht j:>O$ilivt inllu ences which Gilson claims w find running from 3 bel i~tr'$ f~jlh. ;IS in the a sc of Aquinn. to his philosoph;~;ng. }O. Uon. 50.99:' 41 - 147: "... ct id eo p<mibilt 01 ex principiis philosoph j~c hu;ulmod i crrorcm refellerc. ,·d <»tendend o om ni no ts.lC im pouibilc. vel ostendendo non esse nrcessari um, sicut enim C'a qU1C sum fidei non possum demonstr.l.live p mb~ri . i !~ qu~«bm com"' ri~ cis non possun! demon Sln!;ve os!cndi essc rJ l ~a . rocd pOles! oslcndi non CiSC neus!hlr;~. "

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which we know through faith, as Augustine docs in his Dr Tnnita/(; h) to oppose claims made against faith eilher by showing them to be false, Of else by showing that they are not ncressa!)" i.c., that they have nOt been demonstrated.'! Thomas also identifies two ways in which a believer may fall into error while using philosophy in theology. First, one might employ philosophical concl usions which a rc opposed ro faith and which, he remarks, are not really philosophy but an abuse or corruption of it. Second, one might reflise to accepl on faith anything which philosophy can not demonsnate and, ro IISC a more f:tmiliar terminology, fall into rationalism.'" In order 10 fill in one point Thomas has nOt explicitly developed here, we may turn to his Summa cOflfm G~flfi/~ I, cco 3 and 4. In c. 3 he distinguishes tWO kinds of truths concerning God which arc accessible to us: (I) those which completely surpass reason's ability to disco\'er and which, therefore, can be held only on tile grounds of religious belief. such as the Trinity; (1) mos<: whi ch human reason can demonstrate philosophically, such as God's existence or his uniqueness, which , Thomas says, philosophers have demonSlraled. JJ In c. 4 he argiles that because there arc these two kinds of truths concerning divine things, those which can only be believed (revealed myster ies), and those capable of being demollSlfated philosophically, it was filling for God 10 reveal both types to us. Rather than develop here Thomas's imeresti ng argumentation to support this claim, it will be enough for us to nOle Ihat he is now allowing for what we might d~scribe as "mixed truths" concerning God and divine things, i.e. , truths which can be demonstldl'cd philosophically, hut which arc a!so contained in revelaLion. h is hen' that the preambles to faith he mentioned in the text from his Commentary 011 the Dr Triniuut should be placed ..H Since these fall within the realm of philosophical invesl'igation, Thomas's disw ssion of and efforlS to dcmonstrate them will be of grea l iru('rest 10 us and all important source in our effort 10 recover his metaphysical thought about God. With Thomas's views on the relationship between fa ith and reason and between theology and phi losophy in mind, we may now turn 10 Summa (o",ra grmi/(1 I1, Co 4 for some
Leo" _ jO_99:14l1_.6!_

p. '-tO il. 50. \l9: 161 - 17l. H. Sec Su m",a ((lmm Gt-mil<"1 (Ed 'iio I.eonina man"Jfi~ = Ed. Ll"I)n.rn an. [ Rorn ~. 19H n. p. 1. H- !-::d_dc, pp. 3- 4- For mOle on 111;5 {~):I s« en. x belo...., Scctioll I, and 1l0(es 7- 14.

•"

",•

xxvi

Introduction

reverse order, begin ning with a study of God, and only subsequently considering creatures insofar as they are o rdered and related to God.' ) Accordingly, after a p reliminary discussion in C hapt"cr I of Thomas's views on the subjcCl and the narure of meta physics as a philosoph ical science and the relationship of its subject to divine being, in C h. II we shall consider his account of the way we arrive at knowledge of the subject of this discipline, ~ing as being. Subsequently in our effort to follow thc philosoph ical order as T homas has described it, we shall devote Pans One and Two to his metaphysical analysis of finite being. Only in Part Three will we move on [0 consider his philosophical discussion of divine being (God). Within Part One itself, because of Thomas's dcfrnse of being as being as the subject of metaphysics, we will concemr.lte on (errain issues which arc as broad in extension as this subject itself, with spc:.'Cial emphasis on the role the act of being (mr) plays in his understanding of finitc being. Hert' wc will consider his debt to Parmcnides in fo rmulating the problem of the O ne and the Many in the order of being. alo ng wilh his views on analogy as appl ied to finite being (Ch. III). his metaphysics of panici pation in being (Ch. IV). the central role played in his resoluTion of these issues by his theory of composition of essence and tlU in finite beings (Ch. V), and his appeal to a kind of relative nonbeing as part of his response to the issue of the One and the Many in the order of being (eh. VI). In Pan Two we will shift our emphasis to his explanation of the essence or essential StruClure of finite being as this is expressed in his general theory of su bsrance-accident composi tio n (eh. VIl ) along with certain rel:Hed issues (Ch. VlIr) , and then to his understanding of matter-form composition which , against theories of universal hylemorphism, he restricts to materi al beings (eh. IX). In Part Three we will consider in detail his argu mentation for God's existence (ehs. Xl , Xli ). In C h. XlII we will examine his highly nuanced views concerning the possibiliry of quiddit"ativc knowledge of God, and will then return to his theory of analogy of being, but chis time as applied to divine being. 1n C h. XIV we will fi rst complere some addit ional poinu which he establishes philosophically aboUT God. and will then revisit cerrain issues concerning finiTe being which we had previously considered without assum ing God's existence. At this point we will bring this stud y to a close.

x.

FA. c il., pp. 95-96. Note: - Exinde eli~m 0 1 quod non rodem ordine u1raque d()Clrin3 proc.edi l. N~m in d()c!rin~ phi!oS(l ph i~t, quae cre~turu $t(:u ndum ~ oonsider:u et 0: ds in lXi cognitionem perducil. prim~ t $1 consider:n io de cre~!U ris er u!t im~ de Dto. In docl,ina ~ro fidei . quae crearun~ non nisi in o rdin e ad Dcum c(>nsi dent. primo CSt consi denlio Dei c( po~t rnodum crt~1Ur~ " rum. ~ !n his various prescruarions of Aquinas's -Chr inian~ Philorophy, G il so n WQUld ~Iwa)'$ intiS! on following the t heo logial orde r !""athtr than ! he philosophia!. Stt TIN Chrillian Phi/OJoph) 0/St. T/;.omas Aqu;nas. pp. II - H, 44l- 4j, n. H; t"irm(>lli o/Om'srian Phi/lIJ(Jphy. p. 4 1 aoo p. 190, n. 4 1. For crit icisms of Gilson 0 11 Ihis p-oi nt $ec: my MrtapbJliraf TINmts, PI'. 1.9- 13; Aerl!lCo, Mtdi,,,,,1 /'hi/oJvphy ,md "It 1"u..a n,u,w,h, pp. S-<). j ).

•• ",•

Introduct ion

..

XXV] ]

In sum , therefore, in This sTUdy I propose !O SC I forth T homas Aquinas's metaphysical thought, based o n his own texIS, in accord with the philosophical order, in the way he h imsel f might have done it had he chosen 10 writc a Summa mnaphysicar. My hope is that it will prove to be of interest to any reader who is interested in exploring thaI metaphysics.

• •

'.

The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas

•

••

Aquinas o n th e Nature of Metaphysics

I

O ne of (he more notable developments in recent decades in OUf understanding of Aqui nas's Incta physical thought has been a growing ap preciation of the d isti nctive way in wh ich he accounts fo r our discO\'cry ofbcing as real or as existi ng and, consequent upon th is, for our knowledge o rl)Cing as being. ' T hat th is is of im porlance 10 anyo ne interested in his metaphysics goes witho ut saying. Accord ing 10

Thomas, as we shall shonly see in greater detail, metaphysics has as its subjcCI being in general or bei ng as heing. J-Ience in considering his treat ment of ou r d iscO\'cry of being as being we arc really ta king up his account of the way in wh ich o ne gels 10 the subject of this science o r, to put it in o ther terms, h is \·i<:w$ concern ing the cond itions of possib iliry fo r mel'aphys ics. Progress in th is area has been facilita ted by the n.· co\'ery and ed itio n o f an au tograph of o ne o f T hom as's mOSt impo rtan t discussiolls of lh is issue in Q uestions S and 6 of his C om mentary (Expositio) on the De Trinitau of Boethi us. This was followed by B. Decker's critical edition of h is enti re C o mmentary on , hat same Bocth ian treat ise and most recen tl y by the Leon ine ed ition of the same.l Especially significa nt fo r our pu rposes is a statemcll! made in q . 5, a. 3 of (hat Com menta ry, and wh ich appears in o ther ea rl y texts as well. Thomas's point is th is: if il is through the irueIJcCI's first o per:ltioll thar we d iscover (luiddi ties o r u nderstand what th ings art', it is only rhrough its ~co nd opc{",nio n Ihat we discover theil existence (me). This second operatio n is rcferr(.-d to by Aqu inas as th:lI whereby lhe intellect ~ com " in , hi $ rc~pec' is G iI ... n·, /kittS ,,,,d So ",~ P/'iltm'plu., (loro nw, ' 9 ~? : ;tel ~. ' 951). c. VI. and in .h\,: $e(ond ~ilion, "App<:ndi ~" (pp. H6-p). Here I shall qUOit from th\': s«ond ~ifion. Al so help ful and widdy cirrula (~ W\,:le certain remarks m~d e by J. Marita in in his E)tisfmu ,md rbt- f::riSln" {New Y.... k, '948), ap«:j ~!l y PI)' H - J). I do no. wi~h. ho_vet. to <:ndo~ M~rif:l.i n'$ views ~boUi an in tuit ion of being as 3n authcnr Ie inrerpretation of Aquin~s . 1. S« ThIJmas "" n Aqui n. [ " Iibrum &,.,hii dt Trillilau, QUlll'ltiIJII(I Quima tf Sara. P. "l,Xly$\':r, ed. (frioou rg-Louvain, 1948); .sattrri ThIJmat dt Aquj,IIJ & pmifiIJ SUP" Iibrum &>tthii l:k 7;';II;lalt, B. Decker, ed. hd M., It-iden. l ~m. repro 1959); and mQ5\ rr<\':nti y. Suptr Bonium Dt Tn'lIi,au in V<>I. 10 or . h<: L~t\i nc <..ii rion. from wh ich I will h\,:f(' cirr. •.

I~ "e",dy i "'f)or, ~",

,

• • •

4

Narure of Metaphysics

poses or divides" and is ocrrer known 10 us loday as judgment.} Thomas's appeal 10 judgment 10 accoum for our d iscove ry of the existence of things has been stressed by various writers, but especially so by Etienne G ilson and OIhers who have dcvelopcd his work in this d irC<:tion.~ Equally imporlant for our app reciat ion of Thomas's undemanding of mClaphysics is anmher point which he makes in q . 5. a. 3 of this same Commentary. There he singles alit a special kind of judgment , a negative one which he refers to as UpllMlio. which he clo~ly connCCIS with metaphysics and presuma bly wilh ollr discovery ofbdng as bein g. ~ A numocr of recent writers have also emphasized Ihe importance of this aspect of Thomas's thought. 6 Before taking up these man:ers in grealer detail, however, il will be to our advantage 10 consider his views about the place of mrraphysics within the division of the IhcorelicaJ sciences, and his understanding of its proper subject. The pre.sem chapler wililherefore be devoted 10 these two issues. The next chapter will examine his account of the way in which we arrivc at knowledge of thai subject.

1.

Division of the Theoretical Sciences and the Place of Metaphysics

In q . 5, a. t of his C ommentary on the De Jrillitl1tr of Bocthius {ca. 1'Z 57-12.58 or possibly 12.59) ,7 Thomas examines a number of questions which Boclhius's remarks about the theo retical sciences have raised for him. The first of these is rhis: Is the division of theoretical science inlO three pails {nalUrai science, mathematics, and }. l«>n. IO , I"7: 101-1O~ . Fo r discu5sion and for 3ddil ion~1 r~f~r~ nc~ ~ the following c:hap t~r. ,.. Xc nOl~ 1 abo,·c. In addit;on.\tt, for instance, Gilson, 'I'M Chrisrian Philuwphy o[St. TiHJmJU AqllinllS, pp. 40- 41; j. Owens. An Ekmm lary ChriJfian Mrlllphy,jo (M ilwaukec, 1963) , pp. t7- 41; ~Jud gmcnt ~nd Truth in Aquinas: J,'f~di,mItl1 5Iud;u}l (1970), pp. IJ8- \8. rcpr. in his 51. Tho mllJ AqllinllJ on liN &i>fOlrr of God. TiN Col/rad Pdpm ofJD>rph Owt-m, ] . Catan, td. (Alblny, N.Y.. (980), pp. }4-jI ; "Aquin~ on Knowi ng Exislence,· Rrvi~w of Mrlaphytio 19 (1976), pp. 67~, repr. in 5:. Tiwmm AquinllJ on ,hi &iJlo.cr olGod. pp. 1.0- J}. Also ~ hi ~ An /"urprruuion of £xu. rrnu(Milwau ke('. (968), esp. c. 2. I· Von. \0.148- ,.9· 6. Fo r refcrences 10 somc of these SC~ R. W. Sc hmidt. "Lcm ploi de la sepHation en m':'laphysiquc," RrVUI phi/l»Ophiqul dr ~ur.'Iljn 58 (1960), pp. J7 J~J . t'$p«ially }7 J- 7S. Among e~ r! ic r trc~t· menu Schm idl corr«tly mC5.SCS Ihe imporr:ll ncc of thu by L. -/l..\. R~git . · Un livre: La phiwwphi~ tU /.z m:ru.." Q uelques 'Apo rics''- Erudn'l rrtlNrrhN I (1936), pp. 1l7- 16. cspa;i~lIy pp. [)i- 18. AJso $tt J. Owcn~, "Mctaphylic:r.1 Sep;!t:llion in Aquin:u.~ M,d;,It"'ll Srutiin }4 (197l ). PI). 187- J06; L Sweeney. A M~J(Jphysics ofAUJIN..,ir & isJm,ialiJm (Englewood Cliffs. N.J., 196j ). pp. )07- 29 and pp. )07-8, nn. [3. 1\. 16, for rctell'nC~ to othe r litet:l ture (:Oncernin!,; this. Also ~ thc di.s<:uuion~ ot th is in the smdies by S. N~u m:lnn and L J. Eld ~rs, wh ich ~r~ cired below in note 9. Also sec H. Weidem~nn , Mrlaph]li/t lI"d 5prtlcM. £in, spr(JchphiloUJphisclN Ul1lfrju(h~ng %II Thomm IIDn Aqui.. und ArisJoults (Fll'iburg-Munich, 197$). pp. 17-J2, 4J- 47, 7S- 78. 7. On thc dalirlg of (hi.! work $C(' Tomll, Sain, Tbomas AquinaJ, p. H 5: Ihe I're!':lee (0 th(' l<'on ine edition (Leon. 10.6-9); D. Hall , TiN Trinity. An Ana",is 0/51, Thomas Aquinas' ExposiliQ of thr ~ Trin;tau (Ldden- Ncw York-Cologne. 1992), pp. J8- ,.1.

•

• •••

Nacure of Metaphys ics

5

divine science) a fitting division: As Thomas himself recognizes. the remote ancestry for this threefold d ivision in Boethius is to be found in Aristotle's Ml'Iophysin, Uk V I. c. L~ Thom;l$ hegins hi s fuJi exposilion and defense or (his division in the 11. 50" J6: ' - -I )' s.:c p. ' 37:8-1- 87 in .he u d r"ntm, for Thom as's refw:nce to MrlllphJlio VI. '" I (' 0163 18- ' 9). 9. ~ .. . (h~ricus si"t: spC( u l at i"u~ intell CCI\IS in hoc proplit ~b opcF.uivo si,'c praclico d iSlin_ guiwr, quod spccub.i\, us habel pro nile "erit3.cm quam cOllsi.\cral, praclicus "cm vcri ld~ da Ih~ormKhnl WisstllsriJII.fi~n mil}, TJw mllJ ' IVn Aqul'l aufgrund tkr /Ixp()flti() Jupa {ifJrum Hl!(if}ll Or Tn1ll11lir (M (l nstCI, t 96~), pp. 71- ;4: L. J. Eld,,~. Faith ,wd Stim ('t". An /wrt}d" u ion 10 St, Thomas "£"fH'1;Ii" in &rIMi Or 7ri nillltr ' (Rome. 197.d. pr. 9 1-9 4' ]i,,,,mast) "'AII',ino. Comm~nti II &nit), imm. and t",ns. by [~ l'orro (M ilan, 19\17), pp. t } - t 4 ; R. ~-k l ne"'y. Bl!(l bj" , m Id A'I" jnJlJ (W~sh i nglon. D .C. , 1990). pp. J Jl - j 6. '0. l«>n. 50 ,I J7, LOQ- U O. No!,,: ". . . "I in !! Mct aph ysicac d ici lu r quod fi nis sp«tI!~fiva e cs, '·erit~; . se
,

•••

6

NalUre of Metaphysics

science, and hence of defend ing the un iry of that science by reason of a unified subject-maner, wou ld be undermined. Instead, notes T ho mas, when habi ts or powers 3rc disti ngu ished by reason of their o bjects they arc d ivided nOt by reaso n of any kind of difference whal'sQCver, but only by reason of d iffe rences wh ich are essemial fO such objccts considered precisely as such. I! '10 ill u$(r:t te this T ho mas notes (hat it is incidenta l to an object of a sense power whether th;n object is a pbm o r an an imal. Sense powers arc distingu ished not by reason of such d iversity bUl by reason of the kind chac oht:l ins between color (the specifying object of sigh t) and sound (the specifyi ng objcct of hearing). As fAr as the theoretical sciences arc concerned, therefo re, they tOO arc to be d ivided by reaso n of diversity in objects of theoretical consid eration (spnuutbilia) considered precisely as such, !J T homas com ments that one aspect belongs to an object of theoretical science insofar as it is conside red from the side of the intel lective [)Ower; and something else belo ngs to it insofar as it is considered from the side of the habit of science whereby the imelleet is pc r fcct ed. l ~ As reg:mh rhe firs t poim , insofar as something is an objeci of the intellect. it must be rendered im material in some way. Th is is so because the intclle<:t itself is immaterial. And it also follows, we may add , for Thomas as wel l as fo r Boeth ius. fro m thei r common ly shared convictio n that whatever is received in something is received in accord wi th the mode of bei ng or th~ capacity of that which receives i!. l ~ In mcntio ning the second point Thomas is remindi ng us lhat science may be viewed as a virtue and therefore as a ha b it of the speculative imellec!. 16 H e reaso ns tbat insofar ;IS sometbing is a n obj ~t o f a babit of 5(:icnec it must be rend ered n ec~$ary in so me way: for science deals widl that wh ich is necessary. But every 11. -$cicndum 1~"'Cn quod 'Iu"ndu habi t us vd pol<'miat penos ..,biecra d i~linguumu" non dislinguu n.ur pcnes q" ;lSlibel diffcrcmiu ob'e.:lOrum. scJ pcncs illas quae sun t PC'!iC obia::to,um in qu"ntum su nt obi e.:I"~ (t <'On. SO.l j8'''}-1I7). 11. Leon. 50. 1)8: II 7- 11.1. Not .... in pl n icu lar: cl id<'O op
M

126).

15. -Ex pUle siJJ(Jlllli(J philos(JphilU. Sk V. p~ 4, in 'fk T"~o/ogir,,/ 7iwtJlm with mr Engli," Tmn$ia,io,/; Tly Gmwialion o/Philosophy. trans, H . E SleW:ln, E. K. Rand . an d J. T(:5fn (C:!.rnbridgc. Mus., 1978), p. 4IO:]S-]7: · O m ne {"nim

.s.

quod cognosdcur non secundum sui vim fed !iCCundum

cogno$C~ntium

po,iu. c.omp.ehendicur

rxulra({"m. ~ For Thotllu", dcvelopmtn( or !hi ~ Botfhian (h Cllle Stt, ror in5!:ln«.

<1.1 ,3.

1. ( M ~n donnct

16. See

In I &nt .. d. 38,

ed. , Vol. '. p. 901).

SUm"''' rorU-ril Gnuiln 11 . c. 60 (Ed.le..,n.man.). p. 160, "&<1 con side.a", intdHgendo,


• •••

Nature o f Meraphysics

7

ne<essary thing insofar as it is necessa ry must be immobile. What is moved is capable of being and of nOt bei ng, either in the absolute sense. or at least in a qualified sense. Consequently, it follows from all of this that separation from ma([e! and motion or some degree of application to the same will belong to an object of thcorelical science cons idered precisely as such.' 7 AI this point , therefore, Thomas has sClIl ed on a criterion for divid ing the thcoreriG,1 sciences. T hey will be distinguished in accord with the degree of freedom from maner and motion of that which they stud y, th:u is, of their objectS (or subjew.) consi(lercd precisely as s uch .'~ Thomas now begi ns 10 apply Ihis criterion. u n~i n ohjeclS of theoretical science depend upon matter 10 such an eXlent thaI they cannot exist apart from it. T hese in turn arc subdivided illlo Ihose which depend o n maHer both in order 10 ex isl and in order to be understood, and others which, while depending o n mailer in order to exisl, do nOt depend on sensible m:lltcr in order 10 be undersrood . (By sensible maner Thomas has in mind rn~u er insof:lr ~s it can be perceived by tite externa l senses.) As he explains, sensible maneT is incl udtd in 11](: vety definition of objects of the fi rs! kind. This is why such th ings cannol be undersfOod wilhout sensible mailer. In illuSITff<:' ~cdp"'~ O:~"'C'" CI QS!,~~ fLe",•. ~o. lJ8:t ~ ' ­ (4 9). On "!o('llsiblt t1l~I!cr" sct' q, 5, a. J in tlii s ~~ m<> COmmtm~ fY : "Undc q UJm il a5 pot c:.llfll"d ""'/ MnJNHi~.l'p, 6)-64. !O, Q. S. ~, t: "QuJ<,tb m "en) ~Unt. quae q uamvis d.opend<::lnt a mJteri~ secund um tsS<'. Ilon lamell ,,-'C:u ntl u m il"dkclUtlI. q\li ~ in <-orunl diffinit ion i bu ~ non l)Qltiml m~teria semi bili ~, ~kUl linca cl fI .. me",.' : e. de hi., CSt m~thcln"tic~" (i-c<"'. jO.'J8;1 4)1- ' 54). 0" tI,i , .CC A. /I.·burer. SI. T/)otl/{/J )!(I,,;"/11I. TIt~ Didsion I/Ild MrlhodJ of Iltr 5ci,."u1. 41h ~-d . (loron 10. (986) . pp. )(~ i-n ii. ,8. II . 15; Eldc l~. ' ';,ith "nd Srirna. PI)· 96-99.

• •••

8

NalUfC

of Metaphysics

which docs nOt depend on ma([er in the order of being ((!S~). This kind of object (an exist apart from maner, either in the sense that it is never present in matter, or else in the sense that in certain cases it is present in matter and in certain GISCS not . To illustrate the first of these, Thomas singles out God and angels. As examples of rhe sC'COnd he ci tes substance, quality. being (nil), potency, act. the o ne and the many, and things o f this ki nd. l l In other words, o bjects of the first ty pe are nOt and c::mnot be realized in maner because they POSiTively exclude materiality. Hence one may, as I have suggested in another comext, describe Ihem as positively imnlalcrial. 12 Objects of Ihc second type do not have to be reali'l ed in matter in order 10 ('XiSI, even though they may be. As Thomas puts it, in cerrain cases they are present ill maner, and in certai n cases nOi. Being, for instance, may be realized in malter, as it is in every material being; but it may also be realized wi thout being presen t in matter, as in immaterial beings. H ence we may d escribe th ings of this type as neg:nively immaterial, meaning thereby that they do nOt have to be presem in maner in order to ex isl. We may 31ro describe them as neutrally im material, meaning by this that they mayo r may nOI be p resent in matterY Thomas concludes this discussio n by no ti ng that divi ne science deals wi th all of these, that is, wit h both types o f objects which do not depend on maner in order to exis!. H e also writ es [hat this sc i ~nce is named theology or d ivine 5cience because fore most among the things considered in it is God. II is known as metaphysics because it comes after physics in the order of learning. This is so because we must mo\'e from a knowledge of sensible th ings !O an understand ing of things whi c h are nO I .sensible. This same science is also known as firs t philosophy insofar as the other sciences take their principles fro m it and therefore come afler it.H As I havl.': explained in so me dcta il elscwhere, T ho mas does not always o ffer this same reason for descri b ing metaphysics as first philosophy. In his Cornrnent3ry 011 the Meta· pbysicshe will say that it is so named because it deals with the fiTS! causcso( thin gs. ~) 1.1. "Qu<'ndem :.. ma!cria sc..:undum ~ , (lui:.. sine

mac eria elSe po.<.S un!. si,'c IlUmquam siUI il l m~ [("ria. s icu [ deus e! ~ngdus. siV'{' in (Iuibu.sd~m sim in rnaleri:.. e! in quib usdam non. lIC s llb5C a nci~. qualif1l5. en.<. po!emi3 . X I US, unum el mull':l. CI huiusmoJ i" (l eon. 50 .1, 8:114- 160) . 1l. Scc my M f'ltIphyJirlll Tlm'ln in ThomaJ Aquintlf. c. IV (· ,'>.1ec:.physiCii and Sqtlwri(J in Thom~~ Aquin:u"J. pp. 69- 104. ~p«ially pr· 7 ~-74. <)1.-9}. ~J. He,e [ have ~ pccified my reaso ns for rcferring!o lhesc 3S negad"el y and ~s nClIu"Uy II"!II aceri~1 !oOmewh~ ! more fully than in !he ,dcrence mem iontd in nQ! e H. 14. ". . . d(" quibu5 o mnibus dI! !I\ <:,()!ogia. id e5! oc icnd~ tli .. ina, 'luia praecipuum in ea cognicoruln e5! Do:-us. Quae ~ I io nomine dici tu r mrl':lph yska . id est 1r,InS phys icarn, quia poSI physiC'~1lI diocenda occu fl i f nobis. quihu5 e~ ~usi bi hhus o pon( ! in i nscnsibi lia dc\'('nire. Dic;t ur ct;am philo$Ophi:.. prima. in qu~ntulll :l.1;~e omncs 5Ciemiac ~b ra su~ princip ia accipiemes ram cOn~q UUll\Ur ( l.eon. ~o.IJ8:I(>O- 1 67) . 15. Stt MtMphJ$itlll T/umf'S. c. III (" ' First Philo~phy' According !O Thomas Aquinas"). pp. 15- 67. s...~ {II duodnim lilmll Mrftlphys;rlJrum /lrjJltlu/is r.>:/X'siri(J. M .• R. Cal hala and R. SpiJ'!,zi. ros. (Turin-Rolllt'. 19S0). Pr~mium . p. 1.. In br ief. in the srudy jU51 ciced I have a!temptro w show how

I h('.'''' 1"'0 ~n'om do no.

e~d ud r O"~

anm hrr by ~ppc;o!ing [() Th()ln"~·. dis! in cI;on

bc!v.~n

synt hr-

• ,•

•

Narurc

or M e raph ysics

9

In ,h(: pr(:selH context Thomas also remarks that it is not possible fo r there to be things which depend on maner in order to be understood but wh ich do nO! depend on maucr in order to exist. This follows from the immaterial natu re of lhe intellect. An imnmerial intellect can hardly impose dependency upon matter in order fo r objects !O be understood if those same objects do not depend on ma11er in the order ofbei ng.M Th is is an important point, since it indicates that in Thorn· as's eres the threefold division of theoretical science is exhaustive. There is no fourth distinctive ki nd of object of theoretical science which might lead one to postu late a founh theoretical science. As far as metaphysics is concerned, therefore. '1. 5 J. [ of Thomas's Comment2ry tells us that it deals with a special kind of object of theoretical knowledge, that is, the kind thai does not depend on maner in order 10 exist. T his kind is subdivided into the type of objoct thai cannot exist in matter (t he positively immaterial) and the type that mayo r may n O! be present in matter (the negatively or neutrally imm aterial). Metaphysics deals with bOl h rypes of objects, [hough Thomas has not yel indicated how this is possibk' and how Ihese IWO TYpes fit together. If he has offered God and angel.~ as illustra tions of dte posit ively immaterial. he has listed being (I'm) and substance along with a number of others as illustrations of the ncg:Hivdy or neU! rally immaterial. Th is reference to being (I'm) is import.. nt since, as we shall shortly $('e, for Aquinas txing as being or ocing in general is the subject of memphysics. Thomas's reply to the sixth objenioll in this same article merits considerat ion before we conclude Ih is section. He notes that one may indeed say thallhe sub jens of the other theoretical SCiences- physics and mathematics-also enjoy a certain ki nd of being and can therefore be described as be in g~. But eve n though being (nu) is the subject of metaphysics, it does nOI fo llow frottl this that these other sciences are themselves pa n s of metaphysics, as the objection would ha\'e it. :? Each of these m her thOOrelical sciences examines one part of bei ng (such as mobile being or quantified being), and docs so accordi ng to its special mode of co nsideration. T he special mode of co nsideratio n of any such science is different , cont inues Thomas, from that whereby the metaphysician studi es being. Ir is he~ cause of this that Ihe su bjec t of such a particu lar science is nOl a pan of lhe subjen of metaphysics. It is nOt a part of being under th;u formality whereby being i£self is the subjeCl of metaphysics. l8 ~i> (via compoJllJumJ)

and

ru~.t)lljng

i nlfin~ic <,~u5<'S

in !<'rlllS or

~naly.i~ (Ili"

uwbJlh",iJ) ~nd 10 ~no tl,c' Ji~linCiion h<, m~ka IxIWl":t'1l (Ju ulIdum nllil"um) 3nd in !erlllS of eXl rinsic C:IUSCS (un" I'

dum Irm). l6. Q.~,~. 1 (L<.'<:In j O. I}8: 168- (7 1)·

l7. For obJcction 6 1":<' Leon. \ 0 .1 )6- j ]. F(>r Th omas's reply S<"C I..eon. SO. I4I: }U- P S; ~Ad ~CKIU m di c<'ndum. quod qual11\"i$ subiccia aliuum scicmia rum sin! pants ("nlis. quod ",I ~ll bicr lUm mcl~' physiCic. nonlamrfl opon el quod a!ia( scitmiae si m panes i!,5 i u$.~ 28. ~ . .. aceipil t ni lllllna quaeq ll~ $
• • •

JO

Nature of Metaphysics

In sho rt , T homas is here acknowledgi ng that in a particular theo retical science such as physics o ne stud ies a special or restricted kind of bci ng, i.e., mobile being, but nOt in the way one slUclics bei ng in met:l phys ics. In physics one doo nOt stud y mobile being insofar :ls it is being, but u nder some other perspective, that is, insofar as it is mobi1e. l'I In metaphysics, on the other hand, one studies being ta ken as such (rather than as rcsu iCl('d to a gi\'en kind of being). And ont' slUdies it as being. T homas's discussion in this rep ly is im portant , for it suggcslS that in identi fying the subject of a science such as met:lphysics it is not enough simply to take in to account the kind or range of object stud ied therein - in the prese nt case, being as such rather than any r('SHin ed kind of being. O ne mUSt also bear in mind the perspective from wllich such objects are considered , i.e., as being ra ther than as mo bile or as quant ifi ed . Moreover, T homas's ans"\vcr at least implies that one may exam ine the same thing, taken materially, from two d ifferent fo rmal perspectives and therefore in twO di ffe rent sciences. T hus one and the s:une material thing may be examined in physics insofar as it is viewed as mobile, and in metaphysics insofar as il is co nsidered as bei ng.'w Wi th these points in mi nd we are now in position to tu rn 10 the second section of ,his chapter, where we shall consider T homas's views co ncern ing the subjeCT of Illeta physics.

lum iHius f10 n esl pus subiecti meu p h y~icae, non t nim esl p~ rs t nlis 5CCundu m ilbm "uionem qu~ en> cSt 5u bk'C turn mctaph~s iQ.e. ioed hac r~1ione cOI1 ~idc r~ ta ipsa CSt sp«ialis 5C~ru'a aliis Cecauioe i( is in (h is book (.he P"Jii~) .h~. o ne Pl'1)\'CS .ha. ""cry mobile thing is a hotl y, And hc adds; "nulla ~ lUeJ1l scicnt b prob:11 suurn subk"ILUl1 . ~ jO. As 'Illomas ~p<'ns Ih is out in hi s CoJ1lmeru~r)' On f\·,rlilpbpics VI, c. I: ~ ... quod licel :w.l C non t:lmen ,~I um (';1; ~d etiam de seosibi1ibus. inq ,,~mum sun! enl i~> PhiloS<'lp hu.~ jX'rscfmatur, " Ed. cil .. p, !9!1. n. 1165. No(e that he ~"()ntinucs in this (ex t' 'Ni$; rOrtt dicamus, Ul Avicenna didt , 'Iund hui usmodi communi, d~ quibus ha~-c Kimt i~ perscrutalU r, dicumnr SCPllrara s.:'C undum use> nnn qu ia sempet sin t ~i n c mataia: ~ qui~ no n de nc<:cssi tate h,b.onr esse in materi" sin n rn,thrrnatica." In other wo rds. (\'el\ se nsi ble I hin ~ may ~ !-:lid 10 be Kp,r~te from rn~ f!1:r in WmC sen5(", Ih,t is. when lhey arc oon~idercd insofar as they at'(" bein&-, and t«:nce as fitl ling tlllder .hat which is n<"g:lti~cly O. neutrally immaterial. The gc<><,ral re(en:-nce to Av iceon ~ is p,oh~bly 10 the latter's d~la i lOO di scussion o( the subi~"("t of metaphysics in his U/N, dr /'lJjfoJlJpJ,jil prima I;"" St-ifllriadll,hw. l:lk!. c. l (5 . V,n Ricl. 00., Vol. I [Louvain· Leiden. 19771. PP' ro- tJ) . See p. 10 where A~iee n oa argu~ ror .h e nl:<'d folr a separa te ...::ien<:e which will oon~idCl subs'~I\Ce "inquafllum CS ( ens vel es t , ,,h,,, mi, >,·d de corpore inqu ant um CSt ~ 'll>.S,a nt i, .. .. "

• •••

Natu re of Metaphysics

2.

II

The Subject of Metaphysics

Something of the Aristotelian (and Boethian) background for T homas's threefold division of the thf,;oretical sciences has already be<=n ment ioned. Aristotle's prc$cmation and discussion of Ihe science of being ;IS being in his MrfllpIJyJiu evidently exercised considerable influence upon Thomu's development of his own concept ion of metaphysics. E.ven so, cefrain texts in Aristotle's treatist have posed difficulties for commentators down through the centuries, and continue to do so today. One of Ihe mOSt serious of these has 10 do with the proper relationsh ip, in Aristotle's eyes, between the science of being as being wh ich he presems in Mrtaphy/iu IV. cc. ht, and the divine science or theology to which he refers in the latter part of Mnllphysia V I, c. r. Simply put, the qucstion is this: Arc these ont and the same science? And if Aristotle believes that they arc, how can he bring them tu getllt~r ?3'

In brief. in 13k IV, c. I, ArislOtle refers 10 a science which swdies being as being. He contrasts this with more particular sciences which CUI off a pan of being and study the :mribulcs of [hal part. They do nOt treal universally about being as being. The impression is here given Ih:lI, unlike such sciences . in the science of being as being one does not limit oneself to any given part of being. One rather studies about being universally, taken as being. And if one must seek for principles and causes in any other science. the sa me will hold here. In this science one must grasp lhe first causes of hei ng as lx:ing.J Z In develop ing his undeur:lIlding of being in e."! of this same Bk IV. Aristotle assigns primacy to substance. [ven though the term "being" is uscd in d ifferent ways, its various meanings :Ire united to some degree because of their relationship to something wh ich is one and firs!. This first or primary referent for being is substance. Therefore il is of subslancc(s) that the philosopher- presumably lhe s[udent of being as being-must grasp the first principles and causes.3J j l. r o r 3 bricf O'·cr.-icw or th is comm'·...-r~)' ;11 the rncdicva l l)("rilbridgr HiJfIJry of1..IlIa M rdin'llf PIriUJfOpiJ)~ N. Kret7.man n CI 31.. cds. (u mb, id!;c. 1981). PI" ,S~-9I. Fo r a mu ch f"lkr {r~a { men! $<.'(: A. Zimmermann . O",ol"K;r cd", /l{I"I:lPhy" Jik?pa,)im . Also. L. Honncfdd...-r. "Dc, ·,.wern· Anfang JC{ MrrJphy5i k. Vorausscl"'lungcn, AmalU tind 1'011,"''' dt r ll'icdClhq,rii nd un g der l'>1tuphysik im 13 . 1t ~. JJ hrhundcrr , ~ in "hiforol'iJir I'll Mil(ti,/fUr, J. I~ 1kckrn~n!l CI ~ I., c,h. ( H ~ mbu rg, I')S7), PII. 164- 86. I'or SOffl (· recen[ inlCfPfC{~iion ~ of Ih is i!Su~ in Arisroilc .~e I. Dhring. Ar;SfO ldrJ. /){lTStdlulIg I",d IlIIrrpUI,1II0" St'j,m O",kms (Hti dcl berg. 1')66). PI'· 5')4- ')'): E. Ki>n;g. 'Ar;~{()lclo:s' trsrt Philosophic als u ni vcrs~k Wissc nsch~ rl von dc" AI'XA I . ~ Ard"l! for Grsr/"dm dn "'"WWpiJU)l (1 970). pp. llj- 46 ; J. O wtn s. l1Jr /)(Klr1l1f IIflkillg in Ih< Ar;lIouli"" Mmlphpir1. 3d ~d . O o ro m o. 1<;178), c.
a

32.

Stt

jj.

Ibid .. ,ooja .IJ- {ooj b I').

/l{rltlphyi i rJ IV. Co

I

(U)()P

I l - jl).

• •••

Nature of Metaphysics

12

In Bk VI, c. I , after referring to his in\·estig:nion of the principles and causes of bei ngs as beings and presumably, therefore, to his science of being as being, Aristotle again contrasts this with more restriCied sciences which limit themselves to a given class of being and concern themselves with tha.t rather than with be:ing taken as such and as be:ing:H Until this point Aristotle's text presents no insurmountable difficulties for the reader. Bur after discussing physics or natural philosophy (which studies the kind of substance which has within itself its principle of rest and motion) and mathematics (some pans of which study theiT objectS as immutable and separate from maner), Aristolle becomes concerned about the ontological status of the things STUd ied by another science. j ) If there is something eternal and immutable and separate, it belongs to some theoretical science [Q invcstigate this. Neither physics no r mathernarics will quali fy. Therefore there must be a first science which studies things which arc both immUtable and separate (and which does not merely study them as immutable and separate). This Aristotle refers to as theology (or divine science) ..l6 This immediaICly raises a question for the reader. Has not Aristotle's third theoretical science itself now become a science of a particular kind of being, that is, th ~ immutable and separate and divine? If so, what is the relationship berwecn this third science ~lheology -and the science of being as bei ng? Umil this poim Aristotle's emphasis in presenting the science of being as being has been on its nonparticulariry and therefore on its universal iry in seopcY Unlike the panictllar sciences of mathemat ics and physics, it does not remict itsclf to any g iv~ n kind of being; it studies being taken si mply as such, and it studies it as being. Now, however, divine science has been presented as the science of sepa.rate (,miry. To his credit Aristotle himself n w this diffi culty. O ne might be perplexed, he writes, concerning whether first philosophy is universal, or whether it deals with one given genus o r nature. In reply he comments that if there is no o ther subsrance apart from those which arc composed by nature, physics will be (he firs! science. But if (here is some immutable substance, the science which studies this will be prior; it will be: first philosophy; il will be universal insofar as it is first; and it will belong to this science to study being as being.')! In other words, Aristotle wants 10 identify his d ivine science o r theology with his science of being as being. This much is dear from his text. H ow h(· does so and whether he is really successful in this effort is a very differen t maner, and one which continues to be disputed by comm c ntators.3~ Rather than enter intO that question here, it will be enough for us 10 Stt 10 !Sb 3-10. JS. For his discU5Sion of physics ~ 102Sb 18- 1026 :17. On mathem3tics Sa'

H.

See 1016a IO- H . Stt hi5 pres<"nra,ion in Ah/Ilp"ys;o e. r. For the bt1~r 5C~ n. 14 above. 36. }7 .

IV, CC. 1- 1, ~oJ

38. Sec 1026a :23- J1.

j9. Stt. for in.sunce,

lh~ r~fcrro((S

gh'rn abo",· in o. JI.

10 16a 7- 10.

io ,.he ope-oing lioes or Mnaphy$ics VI.

,

,•

•,

Na HJre of Metaphysics

13

note that di\'ergent readings of Aristotle concerning this point had surfaced long before the time ofAquina5 and that tWO such inrcrpret':l.t ions wer(' known to him, that is, those otlert d by Avicenna and by Averroes. In his Metaphysics (Liver de phi/mopbi" prim(l) Avicenna examines ill some detail the claims of different candidates for the title subjeCt of metaphysics. He considers and then rejects the possibility that God might be regarded as the subjett of this science. Since no science can demonstrate the existence of its own subjeCt, and since according to Avicenna God's existence can be established in metaphys ics and on ly in metaphysics, he concludes that Cod cannot be regarded as its subject. Nor wi ll it do to suggest that the causes themselves might be regarded as its subject. Only being as being can serve as the subject of this science.~o Agai nst th is line of reasoning AverrOC$ argues that it is in physics rather than in metaphysics that one establishes Cod's existence. T herefore, Avicenna's rl.":!.sons fo r rejecting God as the subjeCt of metaphysics must themselves be rejected.· t While Averroes grams tb:!.t Aristotle does refer to this as the science which stud ies ~ bei ng as bei ng," he notes that in this usage the term "being" really means substance. 40 . Sec his J.ib(~ ir l'hiuJJoph!a pr;'~II!. e. t (Van Rie l W .. pp. 4- 6), whe re he :n gues Ihal God is not Ih,· s'lbj«1 of lhis sc ience. Sec pp. 6--<) fo, hi1 prl'.S<"fltalion and eriti'l l!c of the view th~t the auscs might >'<'f\'~ a~ rhe l ubj...::t ofme r~p!t )'SiQ, wh"rbcr taken in thc un'lu~lifinlK'n>C' , or inwfar 3 S c~eh i~ ~ a uK' acco rding 10 i(l l'mpcr !tlo1r(;/p"'tin: A 11I!tonro-Jor/rinal lrudy oftl" Co",m""ar! " n I~ Mrrap"pi(J, pp. lJ- J1 ; S. Brown , "Avicenn~ and the Unity of the Con
•• • •

14

Naturc of Mctaphysics

Accordi ng 10 AvcrrQCs, therefo re, one must study substance first and foremost in its primary instance. thai is, as realized in that separate substanCe which serves as lhe first form and the ultimate end or final cause of everything clse. 4! One knows that such a being exists because of one's demonstration of th is at the end of Physics VIII. Therefore, separate substance or the d ivine is really the subject of this science.'!) Averroes seems to think that he can safeguard the general or no n particular charaCicr of meta physics by reason ing that when one studies the first form and ultimate end of all else. one studies all else as well. Whether this solutio n can do justice to the immediate nonparriculariry of the science of being as being as this is set forth by Aristotle in Mnaphysics IV. c. 1 is highly doubtful. in my opinion .H Be that as it may, here we arc interested in Aquinas's position . H e agrees wilh Aviccn na tha t the subject of metaphysics is being as being ((TIS hlqlllUirum n t em), or as he also describes it, being in general (rm communr). T h is is already at least implied by the text we have examined in q . S, a. I. ad 6, of his C om memary on the De Trinitarr. It is confirmed by re marks Thomas makes in q . 5, a. 4 of th is same trea tise. as well as in his Commentary on III Smrrnus. d . 27. q . 2. a. 4 . sol. 2, and in his C om mcmary o n rhe Metaphysics (P rooemium) . 4~ At rhe sam!." time, he offers .p . O n this at ~he scie ner which inveslig~t es ~ing at bei ng see I" I

phyt., <:om . 8j. r. 4 7"~b:

' Omne enim de '1uo loq uitur in hoe libm prineip.a liler 0 \ pro ple r illud pri neip ium; el il lc est primus locus in '1uo natu ra lis inspicir .Ilium modum ascnd i ~b iIlo de quo C(msidera r. et apud ilium cesUI. CI dimisit considcra rion em de C'Q usq ue ad scienl iam oobiliorcm, quae colUid erat de cnlt' $C'C unJum q uod ~I en s. ~ Also sec In I V Mn , com. I, f. 64 rb (th i $5(;ien~ in YO tigatl:S ~i n g "inquantum CSt ens"); <:om. 1. f. 6f rb ("Cum aut .. m declaravil quod una ocienli a ddx\ w nsiderare de ent e secundum quod r ns ~ I ... , ~) ; fr. 65 rb-66 rb (on substance as the primary refereot of m s). Hence Ihe "rh ilo$O pher", i,e.. Ihc mClaphy$ician. must stud y Ihe principles of $ubn an ce. Sec In XI/ MrI. . co m. 5. f. l \l}rb: "u dicemus nos quidem quod Philo$Ophus inquirit quae sum princi pia sulmanr;ac secundum quod substantiae Cl dcdan f q uod sub$l'lImia abs n .tcta est ptincipium , u~ wuiae nalUIOllis: sed hoc panendo aeeepit pro constam ; hoc quod dedaratum (:li l in naluraHhus de principiis substantia e gcncrab;l is et oorrupli bilis.... quod decb.r:lIum est in Qcl'llvO, scilicel, quod movcns aClern ~ t11 su bsranr iam "5t abslr.lctum a materia ... .- Also s« f. 1\l}"" wh ere I\verrQej ootes th aI in thi s book, i.e.. MrrapJrysil'J Xl I. AriSlotle m~kcs rht mi nt; ". .. quod p.in~;pi"m prim~ e ~"bslanliac absrracta~ cliam cSt 5ubnant ia ct fo. ma (;1 fin is. el quod rnOv~t mTOqu e modo. " 43. s.:e the lUI fro m his Commentary on I'hpio I as ciT..d above in nQte 41. AI~s« In XII Mfr_ (f. 19}va) o n th e ,c~p!'C\ ivc rol~ of the fi.st philosopher and the oatul"~J ph i lo~ph ct in duli ng wi d, s.epante ~ubsla nce (or $ubsra nc<'S). 44. Av.. rroes does nOI bri ng OUI Ihis difficul ty as clearl y as OIlC might wish. His .cmulls at th e cnd of his Commentary o n Ml'laphyli('J VI. I 3rC not vcr)' helpful. C f. Doig, "ScienCe premiere CI s<:i.. ncc universcllc," pp. B ~60; Z immermann. Ontol~it OM' M(/aphpik?pp. 151- H ; E. G il$(ln, jrlln Dum &-or. l"rroJu(tion In fX'liriom fo n@mmlilln ( [~ . is, t9P), PP' 77-78. TIle problem is this. If melaphysics hlU $epar" ,c .. m i,y and eJp«,all y rhe div ine aJ in subj~'Ct. il. 100. sums to deal forelllas!. and immedi alely wilh a r~ tricl ed range of reality and not with being taken un iversally or as unrCSlri ClW 10 any given class. By sfUd yi ng (he cause (fi rst formal .nd fin al) of aU else onc does not immedialel y and dircClly stud y aJl else. i.e" being as bei ng, but o nl y medi at ely and indi rectly. 45. For the Comrncnruy 0 11 Ihr ~ Tdnihlu. q. f. a. t. ad 6, sec nn. 17 and 18 ahove. For q. J, a. 4. su nn. 51 and ~4 below. For ( 'II ro mml.NIr as the subject of this science ~ Thom as's Co mmentary o n rh e Mttaphpirs. Pr(>I)Cmium . ciled below in nOt .. 6z. Sec In /II &nt., d. 17. q. 1. a. of, 1i01. 1 (Sc-riptum s,,~, & mmtiiJ. M . F. Moos cd .. VoL } [Paris. 19HI. pp. 886-.87): " ... SicUI philOK/phia

a

fi.".

• •••

Nature of Metaphysics

IS

a new and high ly original solut ion to the issue concerning the relationship betv.·eell being as being (or being in general) and divine being. Thus in q.~, a. 4 of his COllunelliary on the Dr Tril1itdtr, Thomas continuC$ to defe nd the view that divine science. deals with things which arc without maner and motion. In devdoping th is poin t he explains more fu ll y what he understands by divine science (as Bocthius has named it ill the [ext on which Thomas is commenting). If every science slUd ics a given subject-ge nus, it must also co nsider the p ri nciples of that genus. But principles arc of twO kinds. Certain principles arc complete natures in themselves and at the same time serve as pri nci ples for other thinb>S. Thus heavenly bod ies may be regarded bodl as comple te beings in themselves and as p ri nciples oflower bodies: and the same holds for simple bodies in that they a re also principles for mixed bodies . If [his is so . such principles may be c)(:lm ined in t\vo different sciences. that is. in the science which studies that of which they are principles, and in anothe r science which studies tht'm as complete natures in the mselves.• ~ Othe r principles, however, are not complete natures in themselves but are only principles for other things. 11 is in this way th3t 3 un it fun clions as the principle of number. ~ point as Ihe principle of a line. and matter and form as principles of natural body. Such principles arc studied in the science which is directed to that of which they arc principles: but un like the first kind of principles, these are IIOt also considered in another sciencc whic h wou ld treat them as complete natures in themselves. 47 With these genera! gtlideli n e.~ est":.tblished , Thomas goes on 10 nOle that any given genus ha.~ cerra in common principles which eXtend 10 :tlJ the other principles of rhat gen us itself. So i[ is [hat all beings, insofar as [hey share in being, have cemin principles which arc the principles for every being. Such principles arc said to be common in one of two ways, as Avi ccnn~ has indicated. They may be common in [he order of predication in the sense in which a fo rm is said to be common to all ot her fo rms because i( call be predicaTed o f eac h of them . Or [hey may be common in the orde r of causa! iry as, for instance, one ;md the same sun is said to be the principle for all thi ngs which a re subjt'1:t 10 generat ion . AIl beings have ce rtain common pri nciples in the first sense, (ha[ is, in [he order of pred ication. By this Thomas means that certain names <':1.11 be predicated of all such principles Jt'cun p,imn <:.~. ~p«; ~l i • ..:ic ,,, i~. qll~"W;! .;<>n~;Jcrc, cn~ ~u"du'" quvd co ' o", n'bu. co' nm unc, 'lu ia specialcm r:n iQn~m t nris considCr.lt S<:'C undurn quod n,H! depend ....1 ~ maleria CI mOIll: Th ough [hc ICUIl "n,bj«l" dOQ no t appea r"ol.S such in Ih is passage. Ihe point i~ clea r. 46. In & Triniulf(, q, 5. :.t . 4 {Leon. 50.ISJ:8o - ro l}. Not e in partk u! ...!: " _ .. C( ideo iSla non solnm consider.lnlur in S(icm iis u( pr i ncipi~ sum . so:! eliam 111 sum in sc ipsis res 'lu~edam. Et propler hoc de ci~ no n .solu m Ir.lCUlUr in S( icni ia q uae consi dcrat ipsa pri neiriala. Kd ~Ii lm habcl1l • per sc .Klelmam K II:l.r.l lam . .. _• 47. leon. \° ,1 \3: 10 1-107. No\(: Cl'fK'Cially:~ . . _ und, hu iusmodi principia non tr.lcunlur ni!i in 5Cit nl i~ in qua de princip ia (i$ agitu/:

•

\

16

Narure of Metaphysics

dum analogiam. But as he points OUt , beings also h;we certai n principles which arc com mon in the second or causal sense.~~ To illustr:lIc this point Thomas preS('nts what might be regarded as an outline of an argument for the ex istence of God. The principles of accidents may be reduced 10 the principles of subsrances. And the principles for corruptible 5ubsranCl's may be Haced back 10 incorruptible substances, so that all beings are:: reduced to u n ain principles accord ing 10 an ordere::d grndation. Ikcausc that which is the principle of being for all thi ngs must itself he bei ng to the maximum degree, principles of this kind (the highest principlc::s for all other beings) must themseh'cs be most pcrfer:t and therefore in act 10 the m;uimum degn.-c so as to have either a minimum of potemialiry or else none at all. This follows from the fact that act is prior to potency, as ArislOtle has pointed out in MrttlphYiia IX. Hence these Sllpreme principles will be free from matter (for mauer always implies potentiality) and free from motion (the act of that which existS in potency). Divine things arc principles of this kind . As AriSlOtie n:IIC$ in MnaphJfiu VI, "if the divine existS anywhere, il exists in such a nature," i.e. , in one that is immaterial and immobile.49 After offering this brief argument for the existence:: of "divine" things or principles, Thomas applies the distinction between the kinds of principles which are also complete natures in themselves and the kinds which are not. Divine things themselves arc both complete narures in themselves and the princi ples for other beings. Therefore they can be studied by fwO sciences. On the one hand, they can be studied insofar as they arc the common principles for all beings. But if such first principles are most irnelligible in themselves, they arc not most knowable to us. We:: Gln arrive at knowledge of them through the light of nalllral reason only by reasoning from effect to causc, as the phi losophers have done. (Here Thomas finds support in the well-known text from Romtllls t:20: ~ Th (: invisible things of God are:: seen, being understood frolll the things which arc made."po Therefore divine things arc not studied by the philosophers except insofar as they arc the principles of all other things. Thai is to say, they arc considered in thai discipline which treats those things which arc common to all beings, and which has as its subject being as being (,m inquantum m ms). This S(:ience, remarks Aquinas, is referrc::d to by the philosophers as divine science.}' 48. In.ln. jO.ISPoS- 1l4. Fo r Thomas's rcr~ r~nce 10 Avicenna Sn" the IaIier'S Su/fil"lmria, J, c. l (Venke, 1508). f. ,~ ..~. Thomas also refers here 10 Ar;!wrie'5 MtI:lphysics Xl (i.e., XII ) in oflkr ro show that c( rtain prin ciples arc colllmon in thc lint way ~nmdu>n anaipgia1l'l. For this sec Mrr. XII,

c. -{ (to7Q:,\ ;1 - jJ): c. 5 (1071a 19- J5). 49. I.ron. 50. tI3'l14- 154:tO. Thomas inuoducc$ Ih i ~ argum ent wilh this remark: " .. . 111 sint quacdam res eacdem numno cxiSlcnl O o mnium rcrum prill(;ipia ... : Sec Arililotlc. MrlopJrysin IX, cc. & and 9; Mrrop!rysiNVl, c. t (1016a /9- 11). 10. leon . ~O. I54:t4 1- l j7. ror ano th er and fulle, imerpr('r.l.rion ofRoman$ 1:10 in this s;!mc "cin cf. T hon]",ts'.1 Co mmenlary on Paul's leiter 10 Ihe Rom a n~ . Scc S. Tholllor Aquilllllir "",",orn ongr/iri in or>lnnS. Il,,,/' Apoiloli £piIlolas CO"' r'lmrari4. Vol. , (Turin, 19t9), c. I, Iccl. 6, pp. tl -11. II. ~ .. . unde CI huiusmooi
• •

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20

Nature of Metaph ysics

amined , si nce without the m complete knowledge of the things which arc proper (0 any given genus or s]x:cies cannOt be had. At th ~ same time, knowledge of such things cannot be entrusted to anyone of t he particular sciences; fOf these un iversal principles are needed for knowledge of every class of beings and could with equal justification be examined by each particular science. Therefore they should be invest ig:l1ed in o ne general or univer~al science which, because it is supremely intellectual, is ruler of the others . ~' Thirdly, something may be regarded as most intelligible from the standpoint of the intellect's knowledge. Si nce a thi ng enjoys intellective power only to the extent that it is free from m:iltcr, those things will be most intell igib le which arc supremely free fro m matter. This follows because the intellect and its obj«:t should be proportioned to one anot her. BUI those things are supremely free from matter which abstract nOI on ly from designated maner (as do natural fo rms when they ar~ grasped un iversally, and wi th which physics deals), but also from sensible matte r entirely. They abstract from sensible maller nOt only in the order of understanding (as do mathematicals), b ut also in the o rder of exiSH:nce. Such is true of God and intelligences. Therefore the science which studies such things-God and int ellig~ n ces­ seems to be supremely intdlecmal. w At this poim Thomas seems to have identi fi ed three different classes of objects which are sup r~mely imcll igible: (I) [he fi rsl causes; (2) tlta! which is most un iversal , such as bei ng, etc.; (3) Cod and intelligences. Can he b ring these lhrce classes together in some f.lshion so tha t all will fa ll with in the scope of a single science? This he immediately proceeds to do. First of all, he commenrs, the aforementioned separate substances (God and the intelligences) are the universal and first causes of being. T hus he col lapses classes [ and j into one. MOf('Over, he contin ues, it belo ngs to one and [he same science to consider the proper cau ~ of a given genus and that genus itself. So it is that the natural philosopher considers the principles of natural body. In like fashion. T ho mas continues, it belongs 1'0 one and lhe same science to consider the separate substa nces and being in general (ms commw u). Being in general is the Ugenus" of which these separati' substances afe the u niversal causes. (T homas does not intend for liS to t3ke the term "genus" litera lly as he uses it here, of course, si nce he would never admit thai being is a genus in the proper sense.) Now he has un ited the science which has class 2 (being in general) as its subj«:t with the science which studies the p rinciples and causes of that sa me subject, that is, Cod and intelligences. G' 59. Ibid. Nor .. in panicub r: "Unde et ilb scien ti a maxim .. CSt in lelieclu;llis, quae cira princi pi;l maxime univeruli. VNsatUI. QU:I(C quidcm 5Un l ens, el ea quae wnS<"(juuntur ens, lit unum el muln. . (I actus.. .. " potrnr,;l 60. Ibid. Sec in I'an icular: "bl vero su nt maxime a m.teria se p;l!·~n. qU;lC non l;llllum a signala mal", i~ ~bstr:l.hunt , ·siclIl form~e naturales in uui"eruli acceptac, de quibus trJC[:l.1 sc icnti;l n31l1· ralis: s..d omnino ~ m;l l tl i~ scnsi bili. Et non solum secundum ration<'m. sicu l m;llh~rnatjC1l, sed el;~rn secund um~. sicU! [)ru'tl inldlisemiae." 61. Op. cit., PI). 1- 1_ "Nam p,.,.ed;"ac sui»tantiu sep.r.llae sunl uJ\;vcrs;oJes <'I primae ca usae

• •

Natu re of Metap hysics

11

As Thom;ls explains. it foll ows from this that while the science in question stud· ies the three classes of intelligible objects which he has dist inguished, it docs not consider each of these as its subject, but only one, that is, being in general (fill (OmmIUlt)."l Tht;: subjt:ct of a science. cont inuC$ Tho mas. is that whose principles and Causes one investigatt:s. T he causes of that subject-genus arc not Iht:mselves the subject of the science. Knowledge of the causes of such a genus is ..Hiler the end or goal al which the .sciencc·s investigation aims. Therefore, while only being in general is the subject of this science. the emire science may be said to deal with Ihings which are separate from matter in the order ofllCing {mt} as well as in the order of understand ing. Not only are those things s;tid to be separate from mail er in this fashion which can never be present in matter; the sante is true of rhoS« which mayor may not be realized there. such as mf ( OIlWJUfIl'.(,j At this poi nt, of cou rse. T homas has once again aplX'aled to his distinction between tht· twO ways in which things may be said to be free from matter and Illotion in the order of being itself. BOth what we have described as the positively immaterial (God and intdligence$) and the negatively immaterial (being as such) will be studied by the mClaphysician. But it is only the l:mer, being as such or being in general, whidt is the subject of this science. God and separate substances are not its subject. Nor is knowledge of mclt ent ities presupposed for one 10 begin metaphysics, at least so lar as one ca n dete rmine from the texu we have examined unli l now. On the contrary. such knowledge is held out by Thomas as the end o r goal of the metaphysicia n's invcstigation. 6oI <:sscndi. E.iusd em a,uem sc:iemiJ" C'li~ cotuiderare C'~u'<;;u propri:u alku;u, generi! el gcn u~ ;psum' sie U! nallln!i} comidefll! l)ri nci pia corporis narurJ.!is. Unde oporrc! quod ad umd cm 5dc mi~Jl1 p<'"inea' considera,e snbslJrlIill scpan"ls. ( I cn$ w rnrnun c. q uod ( $1 genus. cuiu$ sum p~.-diclae 5ubS!:l.miac co mmuncs tl un;"(:[5.11<') Cl.usac." 62. Op. cil.. p. 2: "Ex quo 3pparet. quod quanlYis ;~Ia sciemia pl1lcdicta lIia considere! . non um..n consider-It q,mdlilxt '~>lum ul sul>icc!Uln . ",-..J ipsu m solum enol commune." T ha! Tho tn~s al50 !~kc:s il !O Ix Aris!mle's ,-lew that bdng :l.5 being or bci" g in gelter-Il is dlt subjcct of ,his scic m:e is cka r from other paS$:igts_Sec. ro r in5tance. I" IV Atf/.. le<:t. I, p_150. n. 5l9: - ... ideo d ic it primo. quod a t quacdalll sci ctlt;~. quae spe.:ulatur ens sec undum quo.:! ens. ~;cut subic\;IUIll. e l $p«ublur 'n q"~c insull! <'nti per soo', id""'l em i$ p<'r sc acddemi a. - 5«- p. Ij t. n. IJJ: ~ _ .. efgo in ha<: sckn tia nos qu~~rimu5 principia enli~ in'lunntum e.'tn, ket. t. pp. "Ol- j. n. t 6S ~ : "CUIIl " ";'" haec ~; ~", ia cor15 ider~' ens commune sicut pfoprium 5ub i«IUftT. .. _ ~ 63. Ed. ei l.. 1). l -Hoc cnim CSt subieCl um in scicmia, CUillS c:t usa5 CI pa.lsiones qllaertmus. non autem ipsae Cl.U\.3.e a!icuius generis quacsiti. Nam engnitio C'au~rum a!icuius generis. a t finis ad <ju,-tIl considcr.t t;o scic miate pef!in~it . QuanlYis ~utem . ubiet:lUtIl hu iu£ sc;cnt1ae £i, (" S commune. dicilllr IJmen lOla de his 'IlIac sum S<'par.t !~ 3 mau:ria s«undum esse ({ rnt;onem. Quia secundum esse ~t rntionenl 5tpa rari di cumu!. non 501um ilb quae nunquam in mat eria e!.SC possu m. sieU! Dem el ;ntdl''Clua!~ substantiae. S<'d ct;am iUa 'Iuac poss u'" 5ine matn;a tslte. sieut ens eornrTIune .~ 64. s"e the !exl ciled in the ptl:ndin g no!t. This is..\ uc will be of im rof!~t1ee in ou r discussion

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22

Nature of Meraphysics

Th is suggests thac in the order of discovery one n1ll5t first arrive at 1u1Owiedge of being as being or ofbcin g in genera l in order for metaphysics ro have its proper subject established. And this in turn brings us to the issue to be discussed in the following chapter: Precisely how, according to Aquinas, docs one go about discovering being as being, thc subject of mctaphysics? below of the rondjtjo n ~ requ ircd for fhe judgmem of SC'r~r.f1 ion 1nd hc-nee for one's di.~cover y of the ~ubre.::1

o f meraphY$iC$.

• • •

Our Discovery of rhe Subjecr of Metaphysics

11

Since Aquinas holds lhar being as being is the subjccl of metaphysics, it remains fo r us to determine how he ac(;ounrs fo r Ollf discovery of (his subject . In order to do this we must first consider his explanation of the way in which we arrive at

knowledge ofbt-ing as real or as exiSting. fu already noted a1 the beginning orCh. I, Thomas's m OSt importJIH single discussion of these issues is in q . S, J . 3 of his Commentary on the De 'irillirmcof Boelhius. At the very beginning of the corpus of this article he makes a point which is crucia l fo r our understanding of his view of the way in wh ich one d iscovers being as existing or as real. Farther on in th is sallle article he offers his fullest account of all operat ion which he rlJ.mcs scpai.1tion (upnrari()) and which he explicitly CQnnttrs with metaphysics. In taking up these

points, therefore, this texl will serve as our focal poin!.

I.

Our Knowledge of Being as Real

Q.

5, a. J is explic itly directed 10 the question whedler mathematics considers

without maucr and moti on things which are present in maner. This queslion itsclf is raised for Thomas by lhe Boethian text on which he is commenting. I In setting up his rcpl)' Thomas begins by observing thaI one mu.~t understa nd how lhe in tellect can abm:lcl in its operation. As will become dea r from prcdsions wh ich he introdlu.:es into his text ar a later poim , Thonus is here using [he term wabsrract" veT)' broad ly so as to signifY any way in which the incellcci distinguishes ICllio uUum mluhcmal ica consider:llio sit sine:- motu CI maleri;!. de his qu~e sum in maleri,- (i-«lll, ~o" J6 :{>-7) ' &~ lx..,lhi us·, d~~r;pl;Oll o r malhcmalics in c. ~ o f his lfl Tri nirau: "... fflar/'allarira. sillc rnol u inabSlf acla (hue en i rn forrnas rorporum Speculalu r si ne rn'f eria aC po:r hocs; nc molU . qu~c formae cum in m a l cr;~ 5; 111, ab his scpuari non p;.:t»UIII) ... ~ (ed _cil .. p. 8: 10 14). For Thomas's literal exposition of this passage. before he introduces his mo rc original (re~t· ment haK'd on questions ~IlJ articlcs. ,I Ce l..con_ ~O_I 14:86-,00. As he o:pl~ins Ihere. whi le m~, h('mal ' ;e:.ts can Ix: (on ~idcred aparl from (se nsibl e) mailer. Ihey ( annOI exist apan fwm il. I. - . . .

'J

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24

Discovery of the Subject of Metaphysics

o r divides. In developing a rathe r brief remark made by Aristotle in Dr. Im i mp, Bk II I, Thomas writes that the irHelle qua < lircr> inr e!loctlls SC'C undum suam opcl"3lionem abslr.lilcrc pos$i l. $cicndum ~$I igiru, quOgnosei t de unDqlloquc quid en , al ia vero qua componi t t r di yidil, scilicet enllnriat ionem affi rm alivam yel ntgalivam formando~ (Leon. 10.r -.6:87- 91). For Arist otle SC'~ t:Hanima III. c. 6 (-.3Q;1 lQ-18J. j. "I::I h~e q uidclll duae opcflitionC5 duobus quae .Iu m in rebus r~pondcm. Prima quidem oJX'" r;uio r~pic il ips;tm n~lur~m ~i . secund um quam rcs imel lecta aJ iq~tem gr.ldum in cnribus ool in ct, s;ye 5il res COml'!cla, U! IOrum aliquoJ , 5;\"C res incornpkl"a , til patj >fd acci den5~ (Leon. 50. 1-.7:96101). 4 . "Scc:unda ycro opeTlH io lapki! ipsurn esse lei; quod quidem ~ul ul 0" consrcg:l( ion~ principiorum rei in COm p<)iil is, ,·d i~m simpli o:m n ~lUram rei conoornilal ur, ur ;n su\..;;t2nliis simphcibus" (L :on. 50.1 47:10 1- 105). j. Herc Thomas is di scU5Si ng Ihc n~llJrc of relations in thc Trin ily. ! n respon din g 10 an objeclion hc commcnts: ··Sed Kicndurn. quod c."i!iC dic; lUr ITip lici lcr. Uno modo d ici lllr ipsa quiddil1lS yel natura rei , ~icu( d icilUr qu<">d ddi. nitio est oratio signi fj caf\S quid esf ~: defl n ilio t n im qu iddi l~lem rci signifiCll" (r-.b.",km n~1 Vol. r. pp. 761-66).

=

w.,

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Discovery of the Subject of Meraphysics

25

but its first act, i.e., its actual existence. laken in a third way, mr signifies the rruth of composition, that is, of judgment , as this is expressed in propositio ns. In Ihis sense, continues Thomas, the verb "is" is referred to as the copula. \'V'hcn used in this third way fiSt is reali7-cd in the full scnsc in the intellect which composes or divides. Nonet heless, when so used this NSf itself is grounded in the mr of lhe thing, that is, in the ac t of its essence (i ts existence) juSt as truth is.(' O f these three usages the fim may m ike the reader as somewhat surprising. In many other contexts Thomas is content simply to distinguish between mf insofar as it signifies the composition of a proposition which the intellect effects through judgment, and rssl! taken as :lclllal existence o r, as Thom:lS oflen expresses it , as the aCiUJ i'S!rndi (act of !xing) . In ot her words, he o flen limits himself to the second and third meanings he has si ngled OUI in the present ['exi. For instance, he appeals to this rwofold distinction in Summa t/H'O/og;lU I, q. j, a. 4 in order to meet an objection against his d:lim that ill God essence and Nft' (acl of being) are iden tical. 7 In our text fro m Thomas's Commentary o n Ihe Df: 7,iniUJu he has distingu ished between the nature of a thing to which the intellect looks in its fi rst operalion, and the very rotof:! thing 10 wh ich the intellect looks in its second operat ion . In this text it is d ear that tsst'cannot mea n natu re or quiddity ; fo r it is wi th this that (fsr is here cont ras ted. It would seem 10 follow that it must mean either a th ing's act ual existence, or else that au which is formed b)' and exists only in the intellect when it judges. l3ut since Thomas has refe rred ht' re 10 the very (/u of th t" th illg (ipJllm tnl' rei). rhis suggeslS that he docs no t here ha ve in mind (Sir si mply as it exists in the intellect as expressed in judgment, that is. as the copula. By process of elimi nation we seem 10 be left with the remaini ng alternative: esu as used here signifies the aClual existence o f a thi ng. It is thi ~ wh ich is captured through judg· ment. Nonetheless, this interpretat ion is rejected by various Thomistic scholars.s 8<'forc pursuing this controv<,rted poin t in greater detail, it may be useful fo r us 10 recall another d istinctio n which Aquinas also makes, and Olle which Gilson has 6_ "Alio modo di<.'im r esse: ipse: aCtl.lS ('SKmi ae; sicU! vivcrc. quod CS t esse viW nl ibU$, CSI ani m ac lcm s; non awu secu ndl ls. qui CSI oper1llio, ~ OlCHIS primus. ltnio modo did lll r esse quod 5igniti. en vcrillu cm composit ion is in proposilioni bu~, ~und um quoti 'e5I ' tiicilu, copula: ct ,~cu ndum hoc CSI in imd[cr lu co"'p,mcnIC CI d ivi dtnt" qu~n{Um ad ~ ui comp[cmcnm rn ; !-Cd fundltur in c~ rei, quod eM aC1l1J CS$(Cntiu. SiCUl ~Up'3 de I'CrifalC dictum est" (p, 766). Conce rning !Iulh cf. luI Snll .. d. ' 9. q.~ , ~ . 1 (e i,,:d !x,[ow in n. ,6) _ 7. l~n . ~,~ !. NO!~: ~Ad .s«.undum d jc"".!"m 'l''''lod tSH dupl1dl<:1' eli ei ' "" u nO mod". , igni ti<;3' aclUm cssendi; l lio modo, ~;gnitica( oo rnposi tio nem propositio n's quam alli nla adin\'cnit con·

Alsu :;« QuoJl ilx-\ XII. q. I, a. " ad , : ~ .. _ CSfn. ed. (Turin·Romc. '9SJ). p. ' '.I I. Alw oS« /" V Aftt.. [<'(:1 , 9. pp. ~j8-40. nn. 889-896. 8. S~ t he rcfcr"ncc$ given below in notes 19. 10, and l l. iunS""'

pned i.:~,um ~ ubic-<: to_ "

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26

Di scovery of the Subjecr of Meraphysics

highligh ted to good effect in various publications, especially in c. VI of his Bri"g ami Somr Pbilosopbl'rJ.' As Thomas develops this in his C om mentary on Aristotle's D r inurpwatiof/r, the \'erb "is" as it appears in propositions is sometimes predicated in its own right, as when we say; "Sorces is." By this we wish to indicate that Sortes is in reality, i.c., that he aC[ually exists.lo As Gilson develops th is poim, the verb "is" often appears in what we may d e.scribe as existential judgments, or judgments of existence. I I But, Thomas continucs, on other occasions the verb " is" is nO[ p red icated in its own right as if it were th~ principal predicate, but only as joined to the principal p rediCltc in o rder to connect it with the subjeCt of a proposition. So it is when we say: "Soncs is whi te." In this case the speaker does not intend 10 assert that Son es acmally exists, but ralher to attribute whi teness 10 h im . As G ilso n explains, such judgments may be described as judgments of attribUlion. lz As we return to our text from Thomas's C ommentary on the Dr Trif/ ifllLr, we should recall another point which Tho mas makes in the same immediate COntext. Because truth ariscs in the intellect from the fact thaI the intellect is conformed to reali ty, it follows that in irs second operation (judgment) the ill1dlect cannOt truthfully abstract what is united in reality. For the intellect 10 abstrac t (that is, 10 distinguish or d ivide) in this operation is for it to assert that there is a corresponding separatio n with respect 10 the thing's very ~fU. For insta nce, if I am speaking of someone who is actually white and separate human being from whiteness by saying ~this human being is nOt whitc,n my judgment is fal se. 1.) In other words, Tho mas is reminding us that uuth in the suict sense arises at the level of judgment. Any composi tion or division effected by ,he intellect through judgmcll1 must correspo nd to a composition or di visio n which obtains in reality if that judgmell1 is 10 be true. While this point appears to be evident enough in itself, 9. Ed. d f. , pp. ' 90-104. Abo sec his T," Chr-isritm I'hilowplry IIiSl. Thomas Afluinas, pp. 4O-..g . ' 0. "... cOllsidenlldum dl quod hoc v<:fbum 'esl' qU~Ildoqut ill c Ilulld~tionc pr.ltdicatu r Itcundum s." U( cum dicilu" 'So ri CS en'. J>!' f quod nihil ~Iiud imcndimu5 signili c~ rc quam quod S..m es 5il in rcrum rwura .. ." Expmirio Libri Ihyrrmmiasll , 1 {(..con. '.1.88:36--40). This .... ork hil s l.crwcen D«embt"r r1 70 and Octobe r ' 17 t (!.ron. ,. 1.8S·-8S·). II. ~ /Hint and £mlt Philosoplun. pp. lOO-lOt as well is the citat ion and di$C u>sion of rh is rell by R~is as rcprod uc«I by GiJ.~n ill Ihc $:I mc soun::e. pp. lI8- l0. r1. • ... q ll:l.ndoquc vcro noll praedia rur per 5<", quasi I)ri nci pai( pr:aedic:uum, o:eJ q uas; coniun· Clurn prill cip~li pracdiGIlo ad cOllncclcnd urn ipsurn subi«lo. sku l cum dicilur: 'SortC$ est albui: non cnirn C$t inlenlio loqll.:nlis III asscrat Sonem e»<: in rcrum namr..l, $l-d III allribua[ ci al bcdinem medi~nre hoc ,-.::roo 'e:>; [' . (Lron. l ' 1.88:4()-46). In the rhlme conrext T homas also explai ns why in Ihis stCond ell(" m is rcferred to as iUliilu1IS pri 'lriptrfi prtudicfl/O; •... CI dicitu r = "::flium lion quia sil Icniurn pr~edicamrn, sed quia e:>1 ten ia dinio posiu ill tnU llciuiOflC, qU2C ii mul cum nomine praedi.::llo F...cil ullurn pnedic>l um, ul si" cIlUneialio divid..llUf in d,,~s parlC$ cl Ilon ill Ires" (4S-5~). For Gilson on judgments of amib ut;o n 5tt' &ing , pat ti quod )CCundum bne $ttundam opcrationcm intdlCCIUS non po tes! vtrc abSU"ll.hcr~ quod It· CUndum .em coniullnum el l : quia in abSlnhClldo ~ ignificr,re. ur e<sc ...::v~rat io J«Y ndulIl ipsum esse rei... .- Cf. I" V MrI .. lccl. 9, p. .2.)9, nn. 89S-8.96.

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Discovery of the Subject of Me taphysics

27

it is important to keep it in mind in the present discussion . If, as we arc suggcst ing. Thomas holds chal the intelleCl's second oper'Jt ion (judgment) is ordered 10 the Wt of thing$ and if this means their actual existence, one might concl ude that such is the case on ly in judgments of existence, Thomas's text indicates that the same holds for judgmerHs of anribmion such as "Sones is white. " Even in such judgments there must !x- some reference 10 real ity or, as Thomas has put it , 10 Ihl' very me of the thi ng in quCS!ion. In f.1CI, as Gilso n ha.~ phrased ii, in judgmenrs of attribu tion "is" has correctly been chosen to serve as a copula ~because all judgmenls of attri bution are meant to say how a certain thing actually is. "l~ Our text from T homas's Commentary on the Dr Trinifflu is more or less paralleled by rwo others ftom his Commentary on I Smfmm. In the first of these, taken from d. t9, q. h a, I, ad 7, Thomas draws the same distillCiion be(l.\'cen the imcllcrl's rwofold operation. Olle of these is named by some "imagination" (that is, conCept formation) or "formation" on Iht' part of the intellect, and is referred to by Aristotle as an understanding of indivisibles. The other, which some refer 10 as belief (jidn), consists in (he composition or division expressed in a propositi on, T his, of course, is what we mean by judgment. While (he first operation grasps Ihe quiddity of a thing, the second has to do with its NIt. Because tTllth as such is grounded in (,Sst rather than in qu iddity, Truth and falsity properly speaking arc found in this second intci leclUal operation and in the sign of this same operation, that is, in the proposition. l~ Thomas has offered a fuller explanation in t he corpus of Ihis same an ide of his poim concerning truth . In addition to things which enjoy their complete !x-ing (mr) outside Ihe mind, and ot hers which exist only in Ihe mind, thert~ are still Ol hers which have a foundalion in reality OUlsi de Ihl' mind, bUI which {""xiSt as such (as formally perfected) only ill the intellect. Such, for instance, is the nature of a universal or of time. Truth is still anot her example. While truth has a foundat ion in extramental reality, it is perft'ctcd as such onl)' by an act on the p:1TI of the intellcct. Moreover, since both quiddity and me are realized in a gi \'en thing, lTuth is based 011 a thillg'~ (IS( more so t han on its quiddity. , 6 I~. l ~.

/hi,,! and Somr Philowp},rn. p.

w..

100.

M.ndonn ct VoL!. p. ,,89. NOI~: - ... diccndum. quod cum ~it duplo ope ratio inle l· k<:lus: una qU"lfum diei",!. 'Iuibus.;bm irn.gi n.tio inldlesi, ionc ,.ej div;~i()ne proposition;s: prima opt" r~l i\) respicil quiddita!ctn rei: ~cunda n:sp;ci l = ips;"s.' For some helpfu l cummClHS on lhe usage of Ihe lelm forme/in 10 dcs ig"a ,~ k" owlcd~ by forming' con ccpl S<.~ J. Owcns. "Aquinas On Knowing F-'l is<-I fund"rn elHum in re. sed "'tio ei us complctur l><-r :>Clionem in!d l <"C,u~. (Jumdo Stille" 'pp,ehendil ur w moJo quu eSI. Cum auttm in re si t quiddit;l.s ciu~ <:1 i uum cue, vcr;tas rUnd~tllr in ~ Iti m,gi! quam in quiddilat e. SicUI '" nomen ,'mis ~ b O:S~ imponitur." Stt my "Truth in Thom~s Aqu inJ5.- Rrliiru10fMrtaphpics ,0 (' 98911990 ). pp. 196--98. SSG-56.

• •

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Discovery of the Subject of Metaphysics

Thomas also writes thaI it is thro ugh that same operatio n by which the intellect grasps the fflt'of a thi ng that it complCl(~s o r perfects the relation of adeq uatio n in which trut h itsdf consists. ' 1 In Other words, it is through j udgment lhat one grasps t'lU JUSt as if is through judgment that Huth, properly speaking, is realized . T hroughout Ihis discussion, therefo re, Thomas has co nt rasted NJt' wit h natu re o r q uidd ity. And througho ul this d iscuss ion, i'SSt' is said 10 be grasped by the intellec· mal operation we know as judgment . Since ~ is conrrasted wilh quiddiry in this d iscussion, it $CCms cleat that when il is so used i1 must signif)' actual existence. It is th is which is grasped th rough judgmelll rat her tha n through the intellect's fi rst operation. T his being so. it also seems thaI. as ffltappeau in our leXl from Thomas's comment
I'

e. in ips::> oP<'.~.iont imdJcc.us ~rc ipiemis C$$t ,d sicU! ~I per 'Iu~mdam ~i mibtionem ad ipsum, comple.u! .c\a.io ad ~(qua.ionis. in qua oon!i~fi. r~tio "eri[aris. Unde diro, quod ipsum euc rei ~f aus::> ve.ila.is, secundum quod~. in cognilione imelle<:lUs· {cd. (iI., p. 486). 18. Sec the Int (iled alx",: in n. 4. 19. $.:c L · M. R~gi ~. £piJlrmolDt;J. rmns. I. M. Byrne (New York, L<)~<», pp. ,'1- 13. JU- Jl. Ro l Iht It XI 'IuoINl5<'e p. J2). 10 . R.:gis, EpiJltmo/cgy. p. j2S. He (p_ jZ4) (i.~ ,he following ,01 from Thomas's Cornml'mary on /Lfcutphysia V in M.ppon of his imcrp.cr3rion, "Ess., ,·tro quod in sui nalu" un3qll~equ~e res ha~1, ~ t subm.ntiak E{ idffi, cum dicitu r. Soc'3te.'i c.\1, si illt Es, p.imo modo accipialUr (n signi· fyi ng .hal which oblai n$ outsidc ,h~ mind). 0 1 de pnooicaTo $ubSl2nr iali. Nam cns ~ . superi liS ad unumqu
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D iscovery of [h e Subject of Meraphysics

29

ccrncd Thomas imends to sign if)' aClu:!1 existcnce by his usage of thl' term t$U. He must rather mean thereby a thing's mode of existing. 11 One remark ill the same immediate co ntext from Thomas's Commentary on the De Tr initllfl!, q. ), a. j, mi gh t be taken as suppOrt for Regis's read ing. After writing that th e imellen's second operation looks 10 the very t"SU of a thing, Thomas ~dds that Ihis t'SSr resul tS from the unit ing of the principles of a thing in the case of composites. or accompanies the thing's nature as in the case of sim ple substances.l: How can Thomas say tha t tIll' results from the joi ning tOgether of the principles of a thing in the case of composites if m e means the thing's act ual exis· t e n ce~ Is it not rat her the thing's emire being {tm} including its cssence and its ex i .~ten ce which resultS from the uniting of its pri nciples . th:u is, of its maner and its form ~ B Reinforcement for Regis's reading might also be sought from another parallel text from T homas's Commentary on I Smfl'1l rn (d. 38, q. t, a.. 3) . There, while seeki ng to determi ne whether God has knowledgt, of our individual judgments (t!1JUmitlbilia), Thomas again disti nguishes between a thing's quiddity and its l'ssl! qU Lddilas rd , el esse d us. his duohus respondel duple~ oper:lrio irudlocI us. Un~ qu ae dic,itur a phi lt»Oph i~ fVflllJl io. qu~ apprehend;1 quiddirJles lefUm. qUle Cl i~ m a l'hilosopho, in 111 o, a";"'II. dic;tur indi\'isibiliurn i!lld1it;~nli., Alia aUl cm comprch~nd i l C5S<: rei , componendo .ffirm~lionem ... " (Mandonnct cd., Vol. I, p. \10 1). 1'1. " .. _ q\li~ et;am eM<' rd a ma leria el fo rma compositae. ~ qlU .;:ogn itionem accipit. comistil in qu adam comp()~ir ione furma~: ~d maleriam. vel 3ccidrnris ad 5ubieCl urn" (ibid.).

.-

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JO

Discovery of [he Subject of Metaphysics

exemplar for all ot her em. And jllSt as by knowing his essence he knows every other thing, so by knowing his NU he knows tht' Nuof everything else. But , as Thomas points Ollt, chis implies no d iversity or composit ion in God since his m .. does not differ from his essence, nor does it follow from anything which is composed . Since Thomas has already argued at length elsewhere in this same Commentary on I SmrmcN that essence and rot' (existence) are not identical in creatures, we can assume that in speaking of the nature and rsSt'of a crea ture in COntraSt wilh that of God, he has in mind the creature's naUirc and its actual existcnee. M H ener it fo llows that this text also should be taken as implying that the intellcct grasps actual existence through judgment. St ill, against this interpretation Olle may insisl: H ow can Tho mas say in the lastmemioned cOlllext that the rMr of a maner-form composite consists of a certllin composition of mauer and form or of an acci
The answer, it seems to me, rests on the distinction between different orders of mutual or reci procal dependency. Thomas's views co ncerning the dis ti nction and composilion of essence and (fS( (aci ofbt'ing) within finile beings wi ll be examined in detail in C h. V below. Suppose, for the sake of the present discussion, that we concede his theory of real composition and distinction of essence and fiS~ within material bei ngs. This will im ply that tht' essence of any such entity is itself composed of maner and form and thai if any such being is to exist in actuality, its essence must also be actualized by its correspond ing actl.! ~JJmtli (act of being). For Thomas this means, of course, th,u such a th ing's existence must be c.lused efficiently by some extrinsic agen t. Bm it also means that such a thing's intrinsic act of being must be received by, measu red or specified by. and limited by its corresponding essence principle. On ly in this way can Thomas accou nt for the fuct {hal it is this ki nd ofhcing rather than an}' other kind . I-Icnce in the order of intrinsic dependency. its r SIr (act of being) 3Ciualizes its es~nce. And its ('ssence pri nciple simu ltaneously serves as a receiving principle fo r its aCI of being. Since its act of bein g is received and limited and specified by itS essence. Thomas can sa)' Ihat its z6. · Simi liter (riam in ipw 0...0 ~ r co nsidcf"Jrc natut:lrn ip!ii u~. el <:SSe .,jus; <"I siew natu ra sua cst cau~~ ct n e mpbr omnis na(Uflic. it a cliam es~ suum elil Cll U!lcmplar onlll;s esse. UnJ(: sicU! wgnoscenJo ~(!lIiam suam. (:ognoscil Omncm rem; ita cognosc(:ndo C!iS<': suum , cognosc;r C!.SC cuiu.lilxt n:i ... qu ia CliS(" suunl non CSf aliuJ ab e5SC:mia, nee CSf compo~if urn C(}n~'qu~ns ... " (cd. cit., pr. 90}- 4). For eadi~r di scussion ~!ld affirmalion of thc Cl'S// Smt.. d. 8, q. 5, a. I. wI., a~ well as du.: 5eCOnd argumcnr in the wdrontra (ed. cit., pr. 116-z7): d . 8. q. \' a. l (pp. 119- jO). Alw:>« q. J. a. J ofl he sa me d ;~ t ; nCl ion, where Thoma~ wlilCS: -Cu m ""ult'm it'd . ;1 qllOJ in quaJil,... Ie cr(~ta ~semj a ,ua diff"cflll a suo C!.SC. res ili a prop. ;c dcnominalur a quiddirale SUl, el non aD acIU ts~ndi ... " (p . 19d. l 7. $n. t h~ le~'s cito:
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Discovery of [he Subj ect of Metaphys ics

31

rsu (ta ken :l$ its act of being) results fro m its essence or even that it consiSts of or is ~o/lS t'i t u{ ed by Ihe union or composition of its maHel and ilS fo rm, that is, ofils essence principle. l8 At this point another disrinCl ion should be ment ioned, and one which Thomas does not al ways bring out expl icitly. [n light of what we, have now seen, it is th rough judgment Ihat we b(.'Come intellectua lly aware that th ings actually exist. Btl{ as already noted, ill Thomas's m elap hysic.~, if a given subsl:lnce act ually exists, this is owing to t he presence within that thing of an intrinsic act pri nciple (flClIlHSUlldi) which actualizes its essence, is distinct from it, and enters into co mposition wi th i(. Accord ing to Thomas the distinction of this in tri nsic act of being from its co rrespondi ng essence principle is nOt immediately evident to us, but needs co be justi fi ed by philosoph ical argu mentat io n. T his bei ng so, one may ask: In which of these twO closely related $Cnses is T homas using t'J5f when he writes that it is grasped th rough the intellect's second operat io n (judgment) rather than through its first oper:l!ion (simple apprehension)? Ooc.~ he si mpl>· intend to Signify by eSJt thc fil et that somethi ng actually exists (its f.1eticity)? Or dues he also have in rn ind ,he thing's dist inct in tr in ~ i c act of bcing (IICftIJ I'sJl'lIdi )?29 In our texts from T homas·s Commentary on the Dr Trinilflu, q. 5, 3.3 and his Commcllt"ary Oil I Smlmm (d. 19 and d. 38), he has 1I0t explicitly distinguished between these twO usages of f SU. And umil ,his point, by using the expression ":lcma! existence" in IlHerprcti ng these pa&~ages , I ha\'c ancmptcd 10 preserve in English somet hing of the ambiguity of the Lati n mi·. III examining lh is issue, tWO points should be kept in mind. FiTS! of all , if a given Llling's intrinsic act of being (lIn us f'lJmdi) may be said to be constitutcd by Ihe principlcs of its essence insof:1T as it is measured and limitcd by thaI essence. mlltfltis mlHlmdis lilc same may be t Ho For ~ br it:fbu! h~lprul discu5SiQn o f !h ;~ ~e O"'~ n5 . "Aq ui nas o n Knowing ExiS lenc~. " p. 18. AIS() S"" I" ffl ~m.. d . 6 . II. 2.~ , 2 . rtlpO>lJio. ,,·hert. in the COUf.o;e of p,,·paring to add ress tht issue concc rning whttlicr {he.e is only on e mr ill Cl ltiM. Thotn~~ ~g~ in nmc. thJ r tJU'cm hc u.1ed in tWO differenr W1t ys, ei the r ~5 si gn ifyin g d\( !.mh of ~ proposi tion. i. c .. ~s a cupub, or d sc II th at which com sponds {pmintl} to th e n~llI re of ~ t hi ng. Thi.1 second t1Jf is fo und in the th ing and is ~n "K IlU cm '$ re~uha !" n princip Iis rd. , icUl lucne ~I ~C1US lucem i~. " Thomas aga in add5 t h~t s.omelim~ rot is al~ I ~hll in 3 Ihi rd way. a. =~nCC . So:<: Srnp"'''' 1Upr ~/Umlih. ,\1, F. .\1OQ). cd., V"t J . 1" tJ8. I'm alloth crwcll -know Il tCllI 5e<: In IVMtl. ,eti. cil .. I;:.;1. ! , 1'. IH . fl. 518: " F..sscenim lei qu amyis sit aliud ab d~l.\ c:t.\c tl!i a, nO" tam~ n ~M i ntd lig" nd~lm quod sit ali<" "" Cd~)· .1l><"U .,d",; u ing d, h d .. {i" c, ion . Ih"ugh he mi,'!!) hi, ,loul>ls ill th e conte~ t o( cril;ciling C. Fah,,)s way o( pr~nt i n g if: nistence a, actual ifY w<)uld b<" d isl in guished from a isl{'"nce a. " fe~lI h ." Fo r Owens .o;eC "Aqu ina, on Knowing Existencc," pp. }l- B. Fot Fabm ~ his "The In lens;n, 1·I ~rmcncu \ i4 o f T h<)rn;,I" l'hi low ph y: The NOl ion of i'ani ci pal io n,·· Rrr'irw !c>C llt ing it. r regard Ihis d i" iucl ion as <:xtlcm dy imp""~l1t.

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Discovery of {h e Subject of Metaphysics

said of ils existence (elu) when this is taken in the sense of fa clicity. If this presupposes (he presence of an intrinsic aCI of being (aclUJ nsmdi ) in that thing. it also p resupposes a corresponding essence principle. The difficulty remains in determining in which of these senses Thomas is using m~ when he writes that it is grasped though judgment. Secondly, no matter how this particular que..aioll m:l.y be an swerl-d. a philosophic.llly more significam poim remains. According 10 Aquin:ts, rSJ~, when taken as a thing's intrinsic actus mmdi. cannot Ix: red uced 10 the status of another qu iddity or essence. Any such reduction would destroy its dynamic character as act and would indeed, as Gilson and others have warned, reduce Thomas's metaphysics 10 another version of essemialism. In 3He1l1pting to d iscern Thomas's answer to our question, we should re<.:allthat in his Commentary on Aristotle's Dr i1ltrrpmatiol/~ he has dist inguished between what we may call judgments of existence and judgmen ts of an ribution. In speaking of judgmems of existence in that context he d early has in mind those judgments whereby we recognize things as actually exisling, whether or not we havc yCI concluded 10 disti nction and composition of essence and elU (act of being) withi n such beings.J(I So, tOO, as w(: shall sec below in eh. V, in his Dr ml( (( rsmuia he begins to argut.: for distinction and composition of essence and existence within nondivine beings by starting from the fact that it is different for us to know what so mething is (i.e., to recognize its quiddity), and 10 know that it actually exists (presumably ,hrough a judgment of e:.:islence). If he evenlually concl udcs to COIllposition of essence and an imrinsic act of being (me) within such beings, he can hardly begin with this.J ' Hence in such passages me sccms merely to refer 10 the ['1(t that the thillg in qucstion actually exists, i.e. , 10 its :lcma] existencc. On the other hand. in the te:.:ts examined above from Thomas's Commenrary on ] Srlllf'1lCfS in which hI' co rrelates judgment and existence (flU), he can take his theory of im rinsic composition of essence and m e within creaturcs as already given Y Hence in these passages he can, if he so wishl's, mean by me (hI' intrinsic act of being preselH within such beings. Thus corresponding to the diYcrsiry between intellectual operations whl'reby we know what something is and rt-,cognize that it exists is a composition and diversity witbin the thing itself, that is, of its essence and its act of being. And it may possibly be this meaning of ror that he has in m ind in our tcxt from his Commeruary on the Dr Trinitau, q. 5, :I . 3, though I am less inc1ine
• • •

Discovery of the Subj ect or Metaphys ics

J3

Be th:H as it may, in the order of discovery an intrinsic com position and disdnction of eSSC'nce and me within finite beings is not immediatclyevident 10 us in our prephi losophical experience. And since here we wish 10 develop Thomas's metaphysical thought by following the philosophical order, we need only conclude from the above that according to T homas it is through judgment that we come 10 know things as actually existing. We need nOi and shou ld not yet assume lhat a distinclion and composition of essen ce and act of being with in finite beings has been established. Th is can only come later, after one has already discovered b{'ing as being, (he subject of metaphysics. l3ul presupposed fo r (hat discovery, I am suggesting. is an initial recognition of being as real or as actually existing. And presupposed for thaI is an initial judgment of exis[ence.}J Allo!ll<'r poil1l shou ld be mcmiolled here. Thomas closely associates eru with actuality. In fact. he refers to me :IS the actuality of every form or nature (ST I, q. 3. a. 4). and in a classic text from the Dr pOlr1uiadescribes it as the "actllaliry of all actS and because of this [asl the perfection of all perfect ions.".\< While this understanding of "$It' as aCluality IJkes on ils fullest mean ing only when il is considered in light of Thomas's theory of composi tion and distinction of es$ence and mr (act of being) wi thin fi nite substJllces. it seems to be 'lVJibble to him prior to his demonstr:n ioll of tha i conclusion . T hus he often explains Ihal a thing is or exists by reason of Ihe (;1C1 rh:H it has m ... TIle very name being (~fJJ) signifies "that which is," or ~ that wh ich hJS m ..." JS Moreover. as we sh:\ll see below in e h. IV, in his fJirl y early Commentary on the De Hrbdonutdibw T homas holds tha t a being (em) is or exists inso(;lTas ir participates in the Il ctltJ mmdi.)l, This last-mentioned passage is significanl for our purposes since il JPpears in Tholll:tS's Commen tary before JJ. If I tn~ )' rcw ." !O Ih,· poi'" of d is:lgr"UI ~ II' IxlW"('1I F~bro ~nd o.,..·cns (~cc 11 . .I.') ab",·c). I would d i5li ngui~h Ix!twecn (h ~ o rd er of di5Cowr)' ~ nd , h,' order of n~lUrc. I11 (h~ Ordef of d isco,·~ry, .... ha. We lim know is ~[l exisling .hi,,!:. or" b('ing. l,) recogni ze lh.1 il exisls ""p...~ mCIl ph)·sia. an)' such Ihing aClualir CXi51S hcr':lIIloC of Ih e I" CJCncc wi l h in it o f an i nHim;c aCI ()f!X';l1g ("Ci1l1 ffl",di ) .... hi eh aClU alil.o its d istinc I e»t" nce princi ple. This .cl pr in ciple is prior in Ihe ort!er of nalure 10 the thing's aClual cJ(i~ . e nce or 10 il.l t: 'C!iciIY, hill 1'01 in Ih e ord~r of lime. H . "Scrundo, q ll ia o.'IC 0'1 ,lClua lilJ.s
sec

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34

Discovery of th e Subject of MClaphys ics

he offers his argumentation fo r real distinction and composition of essence lnd t'su in such participating bdngs.J7As he explains in ST l, q. 5, :1.. I, ad I, Ihe term being (m s) indicates that something is in act. But act is ordered to potency, he adds. T herefore, something is said [0 be a being (ms) in the unqualified sens<: insofar as it is distinguished from thaI which is only in pOIenc),. And it is so distinguished by reason of its substantial es$~.JS In his late Commentary on the Dt' inurprnariollt' 1, 5, while commenting on a doubtful Lati n rendering of a passage in Ar istode's text, Thomas rema rks that the verb "isH when ta ken alone "consignifies" composition (judgment). but only by way of consequence and nOI in its primary meaning. In its primary mea ning it rat her signifies [hat which the intd lC(:t grasps in the manner of unqualified actuality. since il means "to b<-. in act." T he actual ity which th is verb ("'is") signifies is that of any form or act, whether substantial or accidental.}? But as he had explained in his much earl ier Quodlibet 9, q. l, a. l, the term ~lS~ may be taken in one sense as signifYing Ihe act of being (nctl/! mlis) insof.u as it is being. By Ihis Thomas has in mi nd Ihal whereby somelhing is dcsignaled as a bei ng in act in lhe nalllTe of things, thai is, as something which acrually exists. As he also explains here, in this sense ~JU is properly and truly appl ied to a thing which subsists in itself, that is, to a subsisting subsrance.40 Wh ile freq uelll r('fercnce wjll be made throughout this study to Thomas's emphasis on m
S« th c tCXt$ eilN in n. ,,6 aoove.

38. Hc", he i ~ defending his claim lh ~ l Ixing and goodn ess~ ", identical in rc~I;IY, bUT diffcr oonccplUaUy (f« undum rtlt;Qlln rel="nofollow">1 ). Note in plrficub.r: ~ N~m cum cn$ diCl1 aliqu id proprie c:ssc in :Kill ; aCIU$ aurcm proprie ordincm halxat ad potcnti am: $«undum hoc simpliciter ,.liquid d iei,ur ens. scrundurn quod primo di$Cern ilUr ab eo quod CS I in p<.lftnria tamum. Hoc ~ulenl est esse suh~ l ,. nti~1t ,lei uniu.c:uiul'I.J ue: unde pcl .....,urn ~ $urntant iak dicitur un umquooqu c cn ~ .I;mpliciler" (I.ron. + ~6). 3'). L<.'Qn. t. - Ljt: )91- 400: "Id eo >litem dici t quod hoc verbum 'ell' ooll1ignificl1 composi tion em. quia non principaliter ca m ~igni fic;lI. sOO e~ cunsequenti: sign ific:u enim id quod pri mo ~~dit in inrdlt<:tLl pcr mod"", acl l!~tit ~t is ~hsolul~; "am 'cst' simpliciter dictum sign ific:u cs,;,r 3Cru . CI id eo sign ific:lt p<:r mooum v('rni. Quia ,",,<0 acrualit 3S. quam prineipali tc. signifiC'.. t hoc verb"", '~I' , t.u communir cr iKllIalira.• omn is formae vel ael l!~. substamia1is vel accid{"nn.1 is. ... • 40. Leon. : p.94'4t-50 . Then' he nore$ that " .... c:t n be rued in two WlIy~, eil her a~ the copula, or: "Al io modo e5K dicilUl
•

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Discovery of (h e Subjecr of Metaphysics

35

in other comeXls T homas stJ tes o r implies dla[ it is dHough the intelleCl's second o perJtion (judgmerl[) that we discover that th ings actually exisc 41 The impl ication is th is. Evt"n at this pri mi ti\'!.: or preph ilosophicdl level in our understand ing of being or o f realit),. we m USt undcrsta nd something as aemal if we are 10 gras p it as

existing or as real. Before conclud ing this part icula r sectio n, therefore. I would li ke 10 offer a brief accou nt of the Steps through which o ne must pass in d iscoveri ng bei ng as real or as existi ng it) acco rd wi th Thom as's general theory of kno wledge. Because T ho mas has nOt spelled OUt this procedu re for us in d et~ i l. m )' accoull1 must be regarded as a reconstruct ion. Others have ~I rt'ad y 3nemptt'd to o ffa such reco nstr uctions in accord with Thomas's thought, and Those presented by J. M:Hitai n, by R. Schmidt, and by A. M. Krapiec h ~ \'e p roven to be helpful. Nevertheless. my accoulll will d iffer in vario us respcClS from each of dleirs, and I must accept full respo nsibility for an y $horlcomings that may rema in in i1. 41 As is well known, Tho mas holds that all of ou r knowled ge begins with sense experience and m ust in so me wa}' be derived (rom it . ~J Supposc th:lt we have come:: into contact with one o r more objccts 3t the level of external sense perception. In o rder for perce ption to occu r. in some wa}' Olle o r more external scnse power nlUS! be acted upo n by the ob jecl wh ich is 10 be pcrceivcd. That there is a passive element in percep tion is a po int repeated ly made by Aq uinas. [n reacting to this impressio n from WiT hout. Ihe sense in question will directl y perceive the th ing insofa r as it falls under that sense's pro )>er St'nsc object, that is, insof.-u as it is someth ing colo red, or sou ndi ng, o r sm eil ing, etc. , and hence imp licitl y w meth ing wh ich act s . ~4 ~I.

~nd J I abo,·c. Fo. Sti!i3ru;nhcl (anri·wuistc mi dl") imctpm ~tio n or mra, it is used in the leXIS from 'll'OIll:l5's Com mentary on the Sm tmCfl Stt B. G~ I C<::lU. j "Jifium: ~'iKabu f:1i".

Cf nn. 10

Jo"rrt"t. d(l(tri"rd~JJlint Tho "" l! dllqu, ,, (Mo mreal. PJris. r968). pp. IW-19. ~ l . For these St."" M ari uin . b :;utrlrf ,,,,d I/'~ Ex;sunl. pp. 16- jo. c~p<·da ny {he kmg nOlc w hicl-, bcgiu5 on p. z6; R. W. Sch rni "IU' app.ehensio inl e11ccl iV"J in nobis. cu m l,hll ntaSmala si1l1 imel· ICC1;\";lC ~ n ; rn~ ~ UI o/)i« la . . ." (I..("()n. SO.164;7t-76); fk ",,"rillllr. q. 11. a. , . ad 1:·&d q u i~ p. in",m princip iu flI IlOS Ir.1e cognil ioni s Cil scnsu ~, 0P0rlC' ad ~ ns ulll ql .oem cl' tU I scmu i: s«un do. i m~g i ua lion i; lerl ;0 . in Id lccw i pos.s ibil i. q ui im mutalll I ~ spcdcbus I' h~ nl a j ma lu m $«und um i!iuma lio nern inr d lcclUs .1scmis" (Loo n. 10.}86). 4-1 . Sec. fOi jnsrJl1 cc. I" I llkl1>1i''''I. I ) : MEl idCQ ali re. d iccnd ult, ' lund ~nr;.~ (ons;S.;r ;u quo d~ m pl ti ct ~ltcr:..ri . ut sup.a dict um C:; I ~ (It-Qn. 45.!.120: IlS-1l6). Sc~ In II & Ilnima. 10 (\..cou . 4\.1.1 0 7-9) . Cf. Quod li bet VIII. q. 1. a. I: "Sc IlSU~ aU1 ~m cx [crio.O" susci p;unI I ~ nll"n ~ rt:bU5 p<'r modu m p, (icnd i. sine hoc q uod , li'IUid cooperCnI '" ad sui fo rm>! ionC I!l. q ua rn\'is iam format i ha· I,..,,,, prOfl.i am "'pcf"~r ion c ltl . ' IliaC <'$1 iud ieiu", de propriis nhi«ris" (!..ron. 1.j.1.56:69- n ). No!c

• •

36

Discovery of (h e Subj ect of Me(aphys ics

Goin g hand in hand with this, accord ing [0 T homas, wi ll be rewgnit ion by an internal sense power known as the common sense (U1IJIIS communis) that the external senses are indeed perceiving. At the same time, this internal sense power is requ ired to account fo r the fact that, even at the level of perception, we can distinguish the proper object of one external sense from that of another, for instance, that which is white fro m that which is sweet.·' If these [wo aClivities lead Aquinas to d efend the need for the commo n sense as a distinct internal sense, the first of these also suggesrs that the common sense. may play an im ponant role in our d iscovery of the existence of extramemal things. Li ke the external senses th emselves, the com mo n sense presupposes that the external senses are in direct contact wi th thei r app ropriate obj&:1S and , as noted , it also enables o ne [0 be aware th at one is indeed sensing. 46 Even at this levellherc seems 10 be an implicit aw:lreness o f the act ual ex istence of tilt: thing which is perceived by one or more external sense; for in being awa re that one is sensing, one is also aware that one's power of sense perception is being acted upon by some object. Strictly speaki ng, what is perceived is an existent rather than existence as such . Hence such knowledge of existence itself is still o nly impliei!. Exislence will not be singled OU I or isolatt'
and "judgi"S" fu,";:oio n :u.
prolX' obj<x'~. Fo r diK ussi on St~ Owens, "Judgmenl ~nd Trulh in Aquinas,' pp. }7- 41. 45. Stt III II Dum/mil. I) (!..:on. 45.l.IlO:104- IOS). Notr in panicutu: ".. . ~n~u enim communi pcrcipimus n05 videt.. .. ' d iscemimui ime. 1Jbum el duk ... • 5« III II 1:kI111i ma. 26 (Leon. 4.\.1.178:3I,, ): " ... huiusmooi aUICm ~"ionC$ sum duac: una CSt $CCunJum quod nos p"'rcipimus ~ctjo n es sen$uum propriorurn. punl quod. Stmimus nO$ vide", et ~udirt; ati~ cs r secundum quod d isc.. rnimus int er sens ibili~ diver,sorulll scnsuum. pura quod. 1liud si! Juice, CI a1iud album. " Also see rh e futln discuu io n in cc. ! 6 ~nJ 17 ~nd (hc open ing rem~rk in c. 28 aOOUI rhc twofold activity which h.. a~signs 10 thc commo n sense (p. t87=1 - 6). A1,so see ST I, '1.78, a. 4 , ad 2 . w~re Thom3S argu C$ Ihat i f 1 part iculal eX I.. rnal scm .. c:o n judge about iu prop"" itnsible obj«l, i, c:onnO! distinguish ill' p~r Stn~ible obi~-.:: t from tho"",, of the other nt e rn~l it nSC!;. Nor c:o n il aCCOUn t for rhe fan Ihal one perc.. iv~ (lit~r:lny; ~sces~) (hat One is seeing. For both of th ese ~ni\'ities th~ commo n sense i~ requited (Leon. S.1\6) , Though $Orne of the t.. xtS <:i tc-d abo,'e have bttn laken from Thomas's Com· mem1rYOn the ~ I",ima. they dearly ~Ao:<:t hi s persona l posiTion :as wdJ. On Ihe relalio n OCro..·et'n the common sense and Ih e p~rTic ullr exl.. mal sen$C$ a1w St'C his !j,mOlrill libri Dr sm su. Co 18 (Leon . 4S .~. 9 8-99). ~ 6.

In addition to rhr rcxt$ d uxl in the previous note. see his &mmria {ibn' ~ mmlOnd. C. 2 (!..:on. 4\.1.109- (0). There Tho n' as follows Avicenn a in ddending th .. disti nction of lhe , ommon se nit from Ihe imaginal ion a!ld Ihe se nst-memory. For the dis linctio n uf , he four infernal SCflSC!; it(" the d auio.l text in ST I, q. 78, a." (Leon. P SS- S6). ~7. 5.:e In I So-m,. d. t9 , q. ). :1. t, ad 6 ( M~ndQnne' eti .. p. 489); " . .. qu:anwis esse sir in rebus se nsih ifibus, lamen "' Ii on.. m csscndi, vel ;mrOlioncnt .. ntis. sc.n5US non :applehcndi( , skul nee ali· quam ((milam subslanl;alem, ni~i pe l :acc idells. , , " In his "The Evidence Ground ing Judgm .. nts of Existen ce: Schmidl brings QUI nicely IWO poinls J havc in mind: (I) The mere facl that the sense:

•• ",•

Di scovery of the Subject

orMeta phys ics

37

According to Aqui nas's general theory of knowledge, however, other steps are req uired for this to happen . Still :11 the level of the internal senses, another internal sense power will produce an image or likeness in which the fo rm of the external objttt. as appropri:lle\y distinguished and o rga nizcd by the common sense. is preserved. This likeness is known as a phantasm and is p roduced by the internal sense known as the ima g i na { io n . ~~ This phantasm in turn is submillcd to the liglll of the intellect's active or abmactive power, the agent intellect, which abstracts the potentially intelligible COll[etH contained therei n from its individuating conditions and renders it :Ictually intelligible. Th is abstracted illlcll igible cOlllcm ill turn is im pressed o n the oth er intellective power, the pos.~ i b l e int ellect (inullertld pom'~

bilis), and is grasped or apprehended by ir. At th is point one will have arrived at some kind of general or un i\'crsal knowledge o f the whatn css or quiddity of the thing in question. though one wi ll not yet know it in tellectually as this thing or pow~r

is mod;fi~d and actro ,,['On i$ nOt su llici~nt "for thc eviden(c of sm si blc being. " T hrrr must ~ at rhe level of rhe lema an awareness o( this mooific:nion, or a COn!ICiOll5ness ,hal We arc sensing. This is ddi~crecl by the co mmon s.. nse. (1) ["en ~ r rhi s kvd "<'X im,n c( as sllch is not dirtttly and prop4"S as judging: Quodlil",' 8, q. 1. a. I; fA Vt'ritlltt. '1' I. ~. tiC; ST I. q . 17, 3. l (: ST I. q. 78.~ . 4. ad t . With the possible 4eep tion or thc text from [), ,,,ritaft, q . I. 3 . fl. these te~ t5 do not state thar ,h .... senSC5 dircctly grJSp ai,rence 3$ 5uch. Their poim rather is rhar the s<"nscs iUd!;,· Of discrirnin~tc w; tllin th,' ra nge of their propel iK'n 5C objecls. 'Ille text (rom the fA l....ritau llppears to S3y !IlOIl:: " .. . er sic dicilUl CS5e v"r ilas ..eI (alsitas in sensu sicU! et in intellectu. in quantum videliccl iudiat esse quod ($1 vel ,]uod non esr" (l oon. n.r,J4:~6-~9). 1 tak( this and T hom as's ensu ing discussion as m e~ning that there is truth in the :;ensc when it judges thaI t hin~ arc as thry ue. and falsi ty when it judga otherwise:. Xc the remark nea, th e eml o( , he eo'pus ~bout a k n.-: ~ pprc hcntl i " g (nu, judging) i.s pn',,,,' .enli!.>le II, it i, (lron. H.l .)S:llo-llr). 48. For a helpful de.o;cri ption o( the tok o( th ( itn agi n ~ l io n in rh e production of the phllnr.L5m. and for ,he illum ination of the phantasm by the agent intcll cct and the consequent product io n of spccin Of !ikenC!o~ in .h e pO§5ihle i ntdl cc~ M:~ Quodliixt 8, q. t. a. I ( Lron. 1).LH- S7) . Th is articl~ is dir.-ctcG to this qucslio n: ~ ... utru m an;m~ aceipi at sp«ies q"i bu~ eognoscit a rebus qu~e SUtH ex ira um." Here. as io a text cirro abovc in n. 43 (ST II- II , q. 17J, a. ~), Thomas's docu inc concc rn· ins S(osible an d inH:lli giblc sp.-cies ~pp<:ars. Spc6es arc invok(d in his ~"ount of external se nse percep,ion. i m~si !I~,;on , and imdl ection. although C\"irl~mly in d;ff~r~nt W:lys. 'Whil~ a full account of his views o n ~nsiblc ~nd inrdligihle spco h",h it"dliSihl c and scMibl" 'pecic! a nd i;ly~ as mueh o( ~ach: "U ndc species vi~ibilis non ~ h a~t tit quod Y;d~"' r, sc:-d UI q uo ,·idctur. E, simile CSt de intdltttu possibi li; n;~i quod imellcrt", possibilis \<·A.-clinH supn seipsum et supr~ sp« ient suam, non aut~tll " i.
• • •

38

Di scovery of the Subject o f Meraphys ics

as an ind ividua l. To PUI this in ot her lerms, Ihe intellect's first operation-the undemand ing of indivisiblcs- wi ll have occu rred, whereby the intellect grasps its natu ral object, the abstr.lcled quiddity of a material [h ill g.~~ For the intel lect to grasp an individ ual another step is required, which is refe rred 10 by T homas as a kind of "'flail) o r IUrn ing back upon the phantasms. ~ O nly at th is point will o ne be inlel lccmaUy aware of this thing o r xno[ merely in uni versal fashion or as x but as Ihis thing or (his x. And here, I would suggesl, owing to its cooperation with the common sense, the intellect will be in position 10 judge thai [he object one is perceiving (and wh ich is aning upon the external senses) aCUIaHy exists. In shorr one will now make an initial judgment of existence regard ing the panicu!ar thing one is perceiving. Th is may be exp ressed in c;(plicit terms such as '" This x is,n or ~ T h i s man is," or perhaps in some ot her way. [n any event, o ne wi lt now be inrellecmalty aware thai t he th ing in queslion is real in the sense lhat il

acntal1yexists.)1 Presumably one will repeat th is procedure as one enco u nters other exrramema[ objects. Correspond ing to our perception of these diffcrenr objc<:ts wi ll be ~ series of ind ividual judgments of existence: "This x is" : ('This J is": "This z i$~: etC. At some point, possibly even ~fter one's first existcru ial judgment , perhaps aflcr several have been formula tcd, onc will be in posirion 10 reAecr upon {his procedure and as a consequence to fo rm in SOlll e vague and general fas hion one's idea of realiry, 49. 5«. for in5tance. ~T I. '1.

8 \. ~ . t. Not~

in pJrtic"br; -Cognosccre VNO it{ quod ~t in rnueri a ind ivi d,,~Ii. nOn prout C>f in ,~I i m~t cri~ , Clot ab"mh",e f~m ~ ",~, cri a i ndi v idu~ti, qu~", reprJ~ma1lt ph J tl{3s m~{3 . 1::1 id<:"O na:($$t eIIl dicerc quod im ellccrlls tlo~ter intdligi\ nmeriaJia abo 51f:thendo a plmmsmatibus." Also sec 3d I (Leon. HJO). See Quodlibel 8, q. l . 3. J fo r a good e~posi'ion of the Ilccd for GOII~b01'l1iol\ bc lwccn ,he agent intellC'C1 and Ih e phanr:unu fo r the production o f ;nlclligibles in :l(. u:.llil Y in rh e po~sjble imellcct (1..("00. tP .!6-s7). C r. lk spinnulibUJ lTtlllUTlf . a. 9 (especiall y for the di,linction bc:fWrto the agent intellect and th e possible intellect): QUllesti ones JispuulfIu
•

•

Discovery of the Subj cC( of Metaphysics

39

or !x-ing, or whalever leTm one may use, meaning ,hereby ",hat wh ich i s. ~ At this poi nt one will have arrived al what [ shall call a primit ivt' (mea ning thereby a premetaphysical) nOlion ofbcing. O ne w ill nOI yel ha\'e reached a metaphysical understanding of bei ng as being. For this another and diSl inClive kind of judgment will l>c re{[uired, which we shall lake up in the final sect ion of th is chapler. '~ Before we !Urn 10 th is, rcfeTe-flce should be m:lde 10 certain difficulties which remain for interpreters of Tho mas's thinking concerning this process whereby we arrive al a primit i\'e understanding of being. First of all, among those who rl"Cogn i7.e th t' importan ce of judgments of existt'nce. some have stressed the role of another internal sense. the cogitative power (v/; cog/1m/WI). sometimes also rcfe-Trt'd to by Thomas as the panicular reason_ T hus M arirain mel1lions th is power in h is acco unt , and Krapiec makes il the ccmer-piece of his descri ption of judgment s of t'x istcnce. Unfonumndy, however, the most imporralll lext cited by Krapiec in sup port of this in tnprct3tion need not and, in my opinion, should not be taken as assigning a specia l role 10 the cogitat ive power in our discovery of the existence of external o bj ecls. ~l W hile Thomas assigns a fun clion to this power in accoullIing for our applica1ion of general principk'S to particular aC1ions in pr:lC1 ical affairs, that is a ,'Cry Jificn.:nt mat ter. llccause of the immediacy involved in sense perceplio n both at the level of Ihe external SC IISC.~ and at the level of the common sense, SZ. It is im ponarn IV note that th is It'Sult ing notion of !x-ing. " I h ~ t wh k h ~~, ~ is co mplex. and Ih31 i{~ complexity i~ ~(,(oul11ed fo r hy appt'alin g 10 Ihe cOl11 ri budvns both of the in a'llea's fi~t ope ration (10 K count (o r ils quiddit~ti\'e 5id,,- "Ihal whichH) and of iudgmen t (10 ~ ccounl for il~ t xiSlt nt i.. 1 ~Sp<'CI - ' is-). 1·lena it ~ hould nOI I:>" rq;:lfdro as t h.. produci o( "it ht" intdleclual 0P""" tion :lIon". cr. G. Klubcmm.. [nirfx lul'tio n IIJ til( PhifbUJpb, IJ! lki/lg (Ntw York . 196}), pp. 4S- St. A5 I shall do hele. he di sl inguisht'S belwet'n 2 primit i,'" nOli.m of !"'ing and I ht "'''Iaphysi('al underM2nd ing of hcing r~'\ju i rcd I'm tn tla ph)'~ics . n. For t.hr;lain sec E...iJl m rr fwd Ilx f.;xi!ftlll. p. :7. n. Ij . For Kr.1 piec 10<: .. his "Ana lp is (01 ",,1I;o"is conCtpfUS "m;) . . . ," Pl" Jj t-j6. 1-1" huilJ$ his Cdse in b 'l;t- mcasure o n a te~ t la ken (rom Th()m:u'~ Commentary on th" 1)( flI/ima. Rk II. k X:l. fJ. Th ere. ~ftCf diseu$~; ng fU r ~ " ot$ibi/itl i Ilduding Ix )! h CQ m mo " ~ n.! prope r 5e llsib!cs. "homa~ tum, to AfisIO tl ~'5 ,efcrcIlu 10 Ihat which is "nJibil~ "" "tyidtm. !'o r Stlmethi ng «I Ix OJ "nsibil~ pt. "(ridms. it must " h~p pen" to Ihal which is a ltotJibilr pt. It. ~llJ il lull~t ~,illix apprehended by Ih ... M' llsing bdng t hrough some olh er knowing fK>wer. If il is somt'thing uil iven:l l. iI can oil ly Ix grasp.. J by lilt intellect; and ifknowlroge of 11 occurs iIII media Idr willt o n..·s gra51' of the ItnJibilr pt. It H> wh ich .1- h~ l'l'efls . - then 't it~lf can Ix ("~1I e.J a It/llibilt pt. tlt(idn JJ (X'(!. fur in~'ancc . my in ,clJe.;-tual ~warencss th~1 someont whom J ."Ce sp<'.kin g is .lso Jiving). If t he vmibi!, ptrt1rrid'''1 is !.Om'" hin\; tnd ividuAI. ~W'~,,""'ss o ( i, is df"""".1 in hllm~ n Ixi ngs, soars ThOlllas. hy Ih~ cogi I3Ii \'" powt ! lot pani cuh r Ie:lson ). in Ihal I, mmp.m-s pa rt icula r intentions. In bnH<' anim al. this ;, known a~ Ihe ($, imat"·c [,<)wer. I-Ie wnte.~' ".. . na m cogil:l{iv. 21'l',d,,,,,d it tnd ,viduu lll ot n:iJm Jlrm mb 1If1/"r.1 rOllwlI<1Ii, q ltod comin gil d ill q ltamum u" ill. t int cll t-Ctivac in ~.. )(km .<"hiC'C w . undt' cog,>(>scil htl"c I",mil>et" prout < "', hie ho mo, '" 1"-,,, lignu ", pro ut ~'li t hoc lignu m- {I.<.-;)n . l5.l.tlO- !l; ciu l ion. r. 111:106: i,al 'o mint). Kr~piO'C ~($ in {h" wotds"ur esistcIIS ~ "h n~lur.l CU IllIllUf)i- 311 illdi CJI ;nll Ih:ll TIt "tM~ a>-C'ftarw.. 7711' f) istlmh... " (IIlY'r: 50 ,,"-(1 mlrllJorlrinr oft/x 'Vir CogitlJ!it~I ' Arrllrdi "K t~ Sf. 71)1)"'''1 A'll/ inti' (51. L"u i~, '!l H)

• •

40

Discovery of the Subject of Metaphysics

and because it is th rough the common sense that one is first aware that one is sensing, it seems to me that the cOlHrihution of the common sense should be emphasized in accounting for our original judgments of existence, that is, the kind required for LIS 10 disCover bcing.)c4 Another difficulty has do 10 with the issue of priority. The process as I have spelled it Ollt should be taken as implying that there is priority in the order of nature regard ing the steps indicated. But when it comes to the intelleds apprehension of an object's quidditati\'e conwn through the process of abstraction and its judgment that the thing in question act ually exists, which is first in the order of time? Thomas's reference 10 the one as ~ firs t " and the other as "second ~ might lead us to think that the illlellect's firs! operation- its understanding of indivisibles-is prior to any judgment of existence in the order of time. Another view would hold, how('ver, that these fWO intellectual opera tions are simu ltaneous, with the understanding of indivisibles depending on judgment in the order of formal causal ity, while judgment would depend on the unde rstanding of indivisibles in the o rder of material causality. s~ Though Thomas himself d~ not explicitly resolve this issue for us so f.1.r as I can determine, I am incl ined 10 accept the I:m er suggestion. The twO operations may indeed be simul ta neous, but the undersr:mding of indivisibles may be regarded as first in the order of nature frolll the standpoint of material causal ity; for it provide;<; the subject for an existential judgment. Such a judgmen t, o n the other hand, may be regarded as prior in terms of fo rmal causality, though again only in the order of nature; for it grasps actual existence, which may be regarded as the actualization of the subject. A final difficulty should be ment ioned. Frequently Thomas refers to being (ms) as that which is fi rst grasped or conceived by the intellect, and o ft cn enough he H . Her.: I h ~'"t;n mind ~n,.>!h.,r disti nction which Th omas m~k~. for in$UnCl in & w riultr. q. 10, a. j. We may arrive a( knowledge ofindi\"iduals in two d iffercnI ways. On Ihe one hand , one may consider the motion or Ihe )t nsitive po""r insoF.ir as it lerrninal<'$ in (he' mind o r soul. Here, as already nOled , Tho mas accOUnlS fOI Ihi) by a procm of Ihe mind 's turning back [0 Ihe phanta5nl produced by Ihe imaginalion {l« (he fellS , il td aoo,'c in n. 50). On tile mhe t hand, one may ha''t in mind knowl edge o r ,hc singub r insofar as such knowltdge proceed~ from the mind to the ~nsith'c pan of Ihc sou l, and in'lOI\"t'S the app! ia rion of some univcB:.I1 principle which Ihe imellect al=dy knows to a p;anicul al and p~l iC":t 1 siru3rioll. that is. 10 anion. Herr Thom:U Cllls UpOI1 the "'8ilal ive """"cr ( Of porlicu lar rC',uon): "... univ<:, ,,,,lem .,n'm ~ntemianl qu~m mens habcl de ope .... bilibu$ non ell possibile appliClri ad particular~rl1 anum nisi per 3liqll311l potent ia m met!i:.tm {Ihe e08iI31;\'e power! ~ppr{'h(!nde n!em singulare .... (u.oll . 21.1.309:')0-9.4). c r. Klubcrtanz. "St. Thol1la5 and is Knowledge of Ihe Singular: pp. I )O- jl. K.... pj~(:'J lexl from Ihe C<.>m m~nI3ry o n lhe Dr imended 10 aCCOUIll for the St"Cond- pt";\cliClI k!lQWblge uf dI e si ngul ar. IS. Set: "·brilain . &is"~ro",d the F.xiSlr1ll. p. L6: Owens, "Judgment and Trmh in l\quin3~: pp. • J- .H. rcrh~ps I ~ hould com,,1<"1"11 here ,bt I lin d lillie (exllIal ('Viden ce in Aquinas 10 suppon Marinin's theory of an inlui(io n of being eilher as dcvdOl'ed in his £XisWI« ""d tM £Xislmlor as prcsenlcd in hisl~ltl "RdleKiol1$ SUI la nalllte bl~ el sur !"imuilion de 1"bre," Rrvur IhomiJu 6S ( 196&). pp. \ - 40. Cf. Gilson'~ criliqu c in his "Propos SUI I"etrr ( I sa nOlion." in Sm, ,ommdlO r j/ ptllJirro mqd,~"o. Studi (omin;ci j (Va( ic:m Cily, (974), pp. 7- 17.

,,,i,,,,.

• • •

Discovery of [he Subjecr of Meraphysics

4J

citt"s AvicenllJ as his aulllOrity for this. Thus in the Prooemium to his very early De enl( tt NUflt;a he wri tes that being {ms} and essence arc fi rst co nceived by lhe imellect, as Avicenna says in Bk I of his Metaphysics.'i6 In De writQI( q. t. a. I Thomas wriTeS: ~ Tha t wh ich the intellect fi rs t conceives as mOSt known and imo which it resolves all of its conceptio ns is being, as Avicenna says in the begin ning of his Mttllphyr;(J.~ )7 The same poi lll reappears in other writi ngs, somct imes wi th and sometimes without explicit reference to Avicenna.)3 Moreo\'er, 0 11 a n umber of occasio ns Thomas draws a parallel bern'cen {hal which is firs t grasped by the intellcct in its apprehendi ng role, i.e., being, and that which is fi rst in the o rder of principlcs, i.e., the principle of n o n cont rad ictio rl. ~9 56. ", .. ens ~'Hem~! CSM' ,\!i~ sun! qu~~ primo in!dlecl u concip iunlUI, U1 dici l A~jce nn~ in p rincipio ~uac '\'Ielaphpiac , .. " (Leon. 4H6~n -1). r'Ql Ihe leXI from A" ice nna 5« h is Librr Phi/i!WpIJiJl P,i"Ul Ji!~ Sri,."ia diui"" I- IV, S. Van Ricl, cd. (louvl in -....,iden. 19n), u . L c. v. pp, jl-j l: " Di et mus igirur quod res et ellS el necessc talia su m quod Sf:n;m imprimunlUr in anima prima impress ion~ .... ~ Un l ike his usual ref~rences to this, here Thomas $p"~h both of being (ml) and of CMence ~~ lim concei~cd. One wondcn why. Fim nf ~IL this i~ consinem wirh rhe tirlc and celll ..,,1 purpoS(' of lhis ue~Iisc , ro develop dIe meaning of CSSC'nce and (''IS, &.::ondly, in mher rOlrl, when accoumiug fOl the namo "being" (('t/J) and "Ihing" (m ), Thotna~ notes that Ihe fint is assigned 10 $Omcrhing becauS(' of ils ('J U', and Ihe .second b«~\I5C of irs quiddity o! es.~ n(e (see, for inwAnet, ~ "'f'ri/alt'. q. I , a, te [leo n. 21.t.p,6-1,9J; I" IV /.fu" ~d . eil., len. 1. p. tH. nn . \5) . H8). In the c;ra rion flom Avicenn~, OIl and m a t~ both mentioned , along with nuNSt'. T hi$ 100 may ha"e in flu enced Thomas at thi s c:.Irly poim in hi s ottX r. 17. ", . _i!lud aUlem quod primo inrcllttws concipit quas i nori)si mu m cr in quod eonccpl iones omncs r<:soI,,;, C$I cn~. ti t A~icc nna dicit in prim:ipio suac Mct 3physicae" (Leon. 1l.t.p OO_ to .. ). sR. See I" Ifl Trinitatr. q_ I. a. J, obj_ J: " .. _quia ens CSt illud quod primo cadir in cognitionc humana, U! Avice nn3 d ici t .. ." (l con. 50.86:18- 3°). T homas's Rply iml ic.1!CI' that he acetpu this pan of the objection, and adds a refeT\:nce 10 unity: " .. , quam"is ilia qual' sum prima in gcncrc corum quae i",dl~ct ". a bst r~hi , a ph~",a;ma!ibu~ si n, 1).il\1o .:ugnila ~ nobi s, ut <:'0$ ~t "num _ " (p. 88:174- 177), Alw.sec In I fj,nr .. d, q. I. 3. 4, obi. 4: " . . primum adcn. in 3pprehen$ioJl( intcll<'CIU5 CSI ens, ut A~ icenn ., tu el _ [ MnaphJf_. ca p_ vi. d id l . .. " (M."donnN ed _, VoL I . p. 90S). lbom~s rcpli($: ". , . dicendum. quod qu;dquid cognoscitur. cognoscirur ut ens, "eI in propria naIU!OI, "el in au~a ~u~, vd in cos '\iti<>n~ ~ I iqua .. " (p_ 9(6). cr. I:N t'mtJlu. '1_ 1 t . ~ . t: "Cum ~U l em ens sit id q uod primo ('~dil in conccplione intdlC'Ctu~. tit Avicenn3 dicit . . .. Sic crgo su pra cn~, quod O t prima concepf io imd lectlu .. ." (Lron, 12.),\93:I404- l\ 7) . 5.:( & potrm;tI , q. 9, ~. 7, ad 11 , where Thomas m3ko the s.une poim in showing how Olle mOves from knowlffigc of bei ng. to its ncgatio
,u

,8.

cr.

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42

Discovery of the Subject of Metaphysics

Thus he wriles in Summa rI)('ologiil~ I-II , q. 94,:1.2: "That which first falls under one's apprehension is being (mi), an understanding of which is included in everything else one understands. Therefore the first indemonsl rable principle is that 'one cannot simultant:ously affirm and deny,' which is based on the notions of being and nonbcing. And upon this every other principle is grounded.'"'100 One immediately wonders whether the kind of priority assigned by these texts to our grasp of being in the order of conceptions is to be taken as temporal. If so , does this not imply that we must grasp being in tellectually before we can be intellectually aware of anything else, including the abstract quiddity of a material thing? And docs not this in turn run counter to my suggestion that even our primitl \'e understanding of being presupposes both sim ple apprehension (the understanding of indivisiblcs) and judgmem, not merely simple apprehension alone? I have already suggesled Ihal temporal priority ne ..:J not be assigned either to simple apprehension or to judgment insofar as these twO opera rions are involved in our primitive judgmetHS of existence. Moreover, certain expressions which Thomas uses in referring to being as that which we first understand imply that even in these passages he does not necessarily have in mind temporal priority. For instance, in the text JUSt ment ioned from tht' Dr vrrililU he refers to being as that into which the intellect ~reso lves~ all its conceptions. And in the [ext from ST I-II , (1.94, he explains that an understanding of being is included in everythi ng else one may understand. These texts strongly point not to priority in the order of time blU to priorit), in the order of resolll(ion.,q For Thomas r('solwion is a tct:hnic." He ~rs up a similar panlld betwUn propo~itiorl5 which must be "reduc({j" to prillciples which are ptr It 1I()111 and the order in which we Sttk 10 determine ·what it is" abom each thing in Dr writiitr. q. r, a. r: "... sicut ill demOIl$trahilibu5 o port~t heri rro.uctionem in aliqu~ principia per sc inrdle.::lU i nota ita illvcstig>.rIlio (Iuid eSt unumquodque. ~l i;lS utrobi<ju~ in inhnimrn i~tur . .. " (I..«ln. n.L+9S-~ :99) . Then the pas~ge cirfil in nOle 57 appe~rs. Fur another ck~r prcscma tion or this p~ralldisll1 Stt In IV Mtt., Icct. 6, pp. r67-68, r1. 60\. 60. ·'Nam illud 'Iuod pri 1110 "":ldir in ~pprchension~. CSt ens. cuius imdlecrus ind uditur in om nibU!i: qu~ecu!llque qU;$ app rehend;t. Et ;.1...... primum principium il\d~mol\strab;l~ nt quod ,ro" m limul4firn",u fr "'-gtlff". quod fundawf supra rollinnem emi~ c. non em is: et super hoc p rincipio omnia alia fund aruur .. .~ (1-",,,,. 7·' 69- 170). 61. Sec the texiS cited ab.wc ill nn. 57 and 60. Col1fl rma t;on for my 5Ug&e$tN nplanation mar all.<) be found in rh e t~X' d ,cJ in 11. 59 from I" I &111.. d. S. q. r. a. J and. for th at matter. in T homas's derintion of genual and ~p«ial modes oflx-ing in Dr r~r;I(lIr, q. r, ~. 1. Even when dc~ling "'ith thosc characteristics or properties which are as broad in eX tClls;o n as being and rcally convereible with il. primacy is to be ~ss i gn o:-d !O being inwfar as it is imp!ieJ in ou r undcrst"nding of th", othef ! f""~l1sc"'nd~mals. A fOffiori. being is implied in less ex tended con«.':pU or in bs cxlcndr.:1 mod<"S o f being, as i~ illustrart"(! by th~ p'nlic~ mel\l$ Of cJtegori~ . cr. rhe impon:.ml di'ictlssion in ST I. q. S' 3. I ufbeing's rO Il ~~ptuall'rioriry to rhe 1;;01"'.

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Discovery of rhe Subject of Mer:tphysics

43

rained in il. And this can happen in terms of l'xrrinsi c causes (unO/dum rem) as when one reasons from effeCT 10 c,1I1se. It can happell in terms of inrrinsic causes or forms (uflwduIII rarionem). when one moves from the more particular to the more univerS;l.1 Ihal i.s implied thcR·in. Indeed, comments Thomas, the most univcrsal arc those things which pertain 10 all beings. Therefore the terminus of this kind of resolution (ucl/lldum rtllio1/~m) is a consideration of being and those things that pertain to being as such. It is \Vilh Ihis thai div ine science or metaphysics is concerned. Hence its consideration is mOSI imellectua1.r.l [n sim ilar fashion, I would suggest. Thomas would have us apply Ihis same kind of procedure to those texts in wh.ich he rere r~ to being as that which is fi rst in the order of our conceptions. This docs not mean Ihal we ~gin in the order of time with an expl icit concept of being. [t rather means that whatever il is we may COIlceive about a given object of our understanding, if we pursue our analysis Elf eno ugh we wi ll discover th:lt the thillg in qucslion must enjoy being. eilher real being (whether actual or possible) or at least being in the illlellecl. Otherwisc il could not be conceived at alJ.6l 61. Th()m~s's di $Cussion (hcre is f~ r

compli ca r....t (han "' y brief ~u"'m~l"r m ~y suggest. For ~ fld ler di$Cussion !itt my •. h r~r Ph ilo§Ophy' Acco rding ro T homu Aquin~s." in MtI.:physi(ll! 1"//(",."rs ;'1 Thom.:s Aquilltv, pp. 60-65. In brief, hc i~ conccrned with ~ pdling ou! more f<:..ui _ IUr , rcso!"cndo autcnl quando e cOnVerSO. ro quod urliv<:l"SOlliu 5 CSt ~ifl\p l icius: maximc ~UI~rn uni,·crs;r.!b ~unt qu ae SU IlI communia omn ibus <:tltiOU5. Ct ide<) trrrn inu s resolution is in hac vi. ult i lllu H~ t cOllsideralio cntiset ~"(), um quae sunt rm is in q uantu m h u iusmodi~ (lcQn. jO. 161 :j 74- j8I). In order to m~kc th i~ tina! st<:p to .he disco,'c!)' of being ~5 being, h/)w~"r, • spccb l pr<)UdlHC known >.S It"pJl"'ti() wili be rCY'm Iidmodum rrw>Y'Iuli 1'.JtriJ RaJmu,.,1i jl}l'pbi Mimi" (Brugcs. r\>48) , pp. JOJ-JO: S. E. Do bu. "Rewhrtion a"d Composition in Sprc ul~ti\"c .nd l'ract ;cal D'$(O II ("!;e'- i..1llm/ rhrolvgiql
• •

44

Discovery of [he Subject of Metaphysics

Likewise. Tho mas's references to bei ng as that which is first in the order o f thaI which we grasp through the intellect's first operatio n need not be taken as elim inating any role for judgment in o ur in iti al discovery ofbci ng as real or as existing. On the contrary, what one first discovers th rough original judgments of existence can be summed up, as it were, under the heading being. or realiry. or something similar. Once the intellect makes this discovery. it expresses it in a complex concept or notion. as "that which is . ~ This. I am suggesting, is what Thomas has in mind when he refers 10 being {ms} as that which is fim known. Intellectual awareness of this presupposes both simple apprehension (the intellect's first o pe ration) and judgment and, of course. sense experience.

2.

Our

Discovery of Be ing as

Bei ng

In the preceding section of this chapter we have attempted to reco nstruct the process th rough which one must pass. according 10 Thomas's theory of knowledge, in arriving at a primitive or premetaphysical understanding o f being. This no tion ofbc.ing is ba.sc':d o n our origi nal experience of material and changing beings. While its content is complex ~ Mth:u which is" - this notion has not yet ~ n freed from restriction to mailer and motion. Hence it cannot be identified with our understa nding of being as being-the subject of meta physics. This is so because, according to Aquinas, metaphysics deals with a spe<:ial kind of object of theoretical knowledge, that is, the ki nd that does not depend o n matter and motion in order to exist. We have seen him subdividing chis kind of object into what we have called the positively immaterial (which can not exist in matter), and the negatively or neutrally immaterial (wh ich mayor may nOt exist in matter). If the subject of metaphysics- being as being- is immateria.l in the second way, that is. negatively or neutrall y. how does Aqu inas account for our d iscovery of this? In other words, how does one move beyo nd a primiti\'e notion of being (as restricted to the material and mobile) to an understand ing ofbci ng as lx:ing?6-4 In order to determine Thomas's answer to this. we shall re tUrn to q. j, a. 3 of his Com mentary on dw De Trinitarl'. As we have al ready seen, there he introduces h is discussion by ind icati ng thaI we must note how the intellect can abltraer in its operat ions. In develo ping this he appeals to the distinction between two intellecapp .eh~ ns um ; ~

ila habel al iquo<.\ es.sp!Jy"JIV;ng. 1d cd. ( N~ York , 1963), pp. 4S- S1; R. W. Sch midt. "t:ernploi d~ b separa tio n ~n mCflIph Y5iquc: pro ,n--lio.

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Discovery of rhe Subject of Meta phys ics

45

lUal operations, one (the understanding of indivisibles) by wh ich we know what something is, and another whereby the imellec! composes and divides. Whi le the fi rst has to do with a thing's nalUre, the second is directed to its m~.c.s As we have also .'><'en, immediately after this Thomas comments that because truth in the imellect results from the fact Ihal it is conformed 10 reality, in its second o peration, that is, in judgment, the in tellect cannm truthfully abstract things that arc united in reali ty. In so abstracting (or judging negatively) one would signify thaI there is a correspo nding separJtioll with respect 10 the th ing's ("ilf. For instance, if I judge that this individual hum:ln being is not white, I state that there is such a separat ion ill reali ty. If ill fa cl in this given instance hum:m being and whiteness arc not separated, my judgment will be f.1 Ise. Therefore, in its second operation, that is, in judging, [he imellcct can truthfully abstract only th ings which arc separa ted in reality!"'" Unlike its second operation or judgment. however, Thomas indicates tha t through its fi rst operation the imellect ca n abStract cetrain things which are not separated in realiry.b? It cannot do th is in all cases, however, but only when the intelligibility of that wh ich is abstracted docs not depend upon that with which it is uni ted in reality. Only in such instances can the former be abstracted from the laner, wheth er (hey a fC united as part and whole or as form and matter.6/! At this point Thomas introduces some new precisions. As he explai ns: Accordingly, through its various operations the inlelk"
abovc in nn. :., J. and 4. 66. Set· n. I} aoo..·( ro r Ih" I C~I . AI$() nOte: ~ I ..b c ergo opcr:ltionc imd l<"("tus verc abstrah ur non POIOI nisi ca quae su m 5("(u ndum rem SCparJI~ , UI cum d ici tur 'homo non a l :I.sinus'" ( I1on . 6S.

10.147', IS- 118) . 67. ' Scd )«"uJl
quu ~un dunl rem SCp~ralll non

SUnl. non t~men o mn <~ , sed ~!i!]ua" (I.con . 50· ' 4 i;1I 9- ' ~ t ) . 68. l.L"OIl. 50.147'11 9- 158. On ,his sc<: Neum ann, C.q;omllnd ~"d Mr/hoiU, pp. 79- 81. 69. As l "l.n~!~, ~d hy A. Ma" "':f, St. 71wmllJ A'Iuin",; 7'JN Di"iJion Il"d AtrtlliHh ({1M SriNlrt"J. 41h cd. (Toronlu. 1,63). p. 37 (;llIlio; minC'). Fo r Ih e L:ui n S<'t'! I..tQn. 50.148:1 59- t71: ·Sic Cfg<J imel l<'"ClUs di sti ngui, un um ab ah~ro aliler Cl alitel $I.." !] U~ inlcll igi, quid CS I unumquodque. d is,ing"i l unum ab alio dum inlcll igi l quid CSt hoc, n ihil inldl igendo de alio, n<'<jue l! llOO $;1 cu m co , neq"c q uo.! si t ab eo 5Cpar~lum; unde ;$1':1 d illincl
, •

46

Discovery of rhe Subjecr of Meraphysics

Signifi cantly, in this text he substirutes the term "dist inguishes" fo r the term "absrrac ts.~ This implies that until this point he has been using "abstract" in an eltfremely broad sense so as to apply to either way in which the intellect ca n distin guish. Now, however, he restricts "abstraction" 10 the way in which the intellect distinguishes through its first operation, that is, simple apprehension. He assigns another technical name 10 the dist inguishing which is effected by the intell('{:t through negative judgment, that is, "separation. " Thomas goes on to propose two sulxlivisions of abstraction when this is taken Strictly in accord with the twO modes of union he has already mentioned. Corresponding to the union of paft and whole there is what he calls an abstraction of the whole, that is, of the universal from the particular. Corresponding 10 the union of form h he accidental for m of quantity) and its appropriate maltt'r (sensible maltcr) therc is an abst raction of the for m.70 While T homas's discussion of each of these is tOO detailed to be presented here, it will be enough fo r us to nme [hat he correlates these, along with the nega tive judgment (separation), with his threefold division of the theoretical sciences. It should be sn cssed that he ag3.in refers to these as Ihrec ways in which the intel lect diJti!lg/(iJ"~J in its operations, not three ways in which it abstraw. We conclude Ihal there are three kinds of distinction in the operation of the intellect. There is one through Ihe operadon of Ihe intcllect joining and dividing wh ich is properly called uparl1tioll,' and this belongs to divine science or mct3.physics. There is another through the opc!m ion by which the quiddities or things ~rc: conceived ..... hich is {he abSfTI1(tion of form from sensible matter; ~nd this bd onb~ 10 maThemaTics. And there is a third through thc 5:lmc opel"'.l.I ion which is the abstraction of a universal rrom
Sl-8 j. 71. MaUlel l rao~I~ !ioll. pp. H- 14 (i !~lit'S mine).

dl(' L:l! in s« Lron. jo.149:l7S- 2S6, "Sic ergo in o peralio n" imd l.nu s triplex di ~lioclio illveo;lur: uo. s«uoclum oper:nio ll"m imdle<;elU$ oornpon"m is . , di"id.n!is. qu •• scparario dicilUt propr; • . • 1 ha« compelil scicm;." clivina" 5;". melaphysicae; ali~ 5tCundum op"ralioncm qua fo rmalltur quiddirat ts r.rum. qua" CSI ~bsmlCl jo fo. mae a male ' ;. ~o~i bi!j , el haee romp"Iif rnuh.rn al;,ac; ICrl i~. ~undum canclem operationem. un iversalis a parricula ri. "I haec compelit .Iiam phYl'iCl.c "I est communis omnibu$ scieol iis. quia in omni sciemia praetc rm il1ilUI quod per accidens CSt . t acci pil ur quod P'" S(' est. ~ 72. S« .bow io ,his chaptci. Section I. pp_14- 27. r 'Ol

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Discovery of the Subject of MCl3physics

47

prcsem contex t, however, he is eo ncel1l r.uing on lIeg:nive judgments. This is 1I0t surprisi ng. of course, since he now includes separation, along with tWO forms of abstraction in the st rict sense, under the general heading of different ways in which the imelleet disri ngui shes. H If Thomas has now explicitly conncctcd sq)anll lOn wi th melaphp ics, and assod:lled the ["\110 kinds of abs tr~C1ion with fh e other theoretical .sciences, one may wonder why. JUSt what does scpar.uiol1 cormibute {() metaphysics or to our discovery of its subject? It would be considerably easier for us to answer this question if Thomas had devoted a fuJI arlide 10 separ.1tion itself. Since he did not do SQ, we must base our interpretation on the few remarks he mJ.kcs about it in q·S,a.J. First of all, separation is a judgi ng operation, wherehy the intellect distinguishcs one thing from another by noting that the one is nOt found in the other. [n other words, it is a negative judgment. Second ly, Thomas also writes wi thin this same artide that when we arc dealing with th ings which (ilIl exist in separation from one another, separatio n obtains rather than abstract ion .7 4 Thirdly. he remarks that substance, which he also refers 10 as the intelligible matter for quanti!)" e m exiSI without quantity. The refore to consider s ubsran cc as s uc h apart from quantity pertains 10 separation rather than to ahStr;lcrion.7S This t!lird poi nt is csJX-cially importantlxcausc ill q. 5, ~. I of this Same Co mmentary, Thomas has included substance along wilh being {em} as illustrations of that which is found in matter in ccrtain insta nces but not ill others. that is, of that which is negatively or neu trally immaterial. [fit is through separation 111;11 one may consider substance as such rather than as quantified (or as material, we may add), so tOO it is through sepat'Jtion that one may consider being as such or as being rather than as quantified or as material. In sum , it is through separation that on~ discovers being as being, t he subject of metaphysics. This follows bOth from the faCI that Thomas cites substance and bei ng as illusnations of that which is negati vely or ncurrally immaterial. to use our term inology, and oceause for Thomas, as for Aristotle. substanct'" is thc p rim~ ry fcfcrmt ofbeing. 76 73.5« thc textS ci tcd above ill nn. 69 and 7 1. 7+ For th(;SC tWO poilll~ ~ thc Int C;t l-d all\)Vc in notc 69; and leun. SO. 1 4~ns6-2~8: "!n his :l.U!tm qU:l.~ $(."cundulll ("S!><": PUIo5U1U es..«.. {I i~;n "'~ r,i, hah.:, !oo:;u,,, 5<' 1);I1J! ;0 quam ~b." ,""c.io.• n. "SubStalllia :l.,ucm . qll J C esl materia irnd!igibilis qualuitar is . pol CS! l'SSC si n~ qua !l! it~ tc: ultd., <:on. id ... ,a", .llIhs'~"' ;:"n sine 'l u~lIIitate m~!;i~ pertine, ad g~n us .«:PJr:uionis 'I"'~'" ahsu~Clion h· ( Lwll. SO.149:l70-l74). 76. Fo' the Itxt from'!. 5. a. , s« l,ron. jO.I}8" )4- !(io. cited alx we in C h. L n. M. For the »"'~ point in,!. s.~. ~ SC~ loon. SO.!H:,8z- I<)8, citro aho...~ in Ch. l. n. \}. On ~uh!{allc~ as lh~ pr;m~ry ",f~.cnr for being ~ Mnap"Jlio IV. c. l (I OOlh S- (9 ). For Thomas s« I" IV Mrt.. cd . C;I .. leet . I. PI'. '51- H. nn . 539- )47, and fo' other 'C~ IS , e h. L n. 6l ~lxwc. Aho s« /" VII Mtt.. leci. I. pp. JI6-I S. nn. IZ-l 6-nQ<) . This is not 10 den)'. of courS(". tim be ing (rm) ~I)pl ics imri,u ic-.t.lly to the ot her ninc preJicam~nts a, well . at Icu l for Thnmas (~ In VI/I ,\In. lcct . I. pp. -I02-}, n. t68z (aflcr t tXt ( ill...!;n Ch. I. rI . 6 ll). or th~t being is hrwd ... , in c~len siorl than su bH'Arlu (~for ins,""llcc. fk wrUiltr. q. t .~ . I).

•

• •

48

Discovery of the Subject of Metaphysics

This also at least suggests why Thomas associates ~pa ration with metaphysics and why he does nOt have recourse to abstraction taken in the strict sense in order to account for our discovery of being as being, the subjcn of this sciC'ncc. As we shall S('C in greater deta il in th(': following chapt(':r, for Aquinas being is nor a g(':nus, not even the most universal genus of all . In accounting for our discovcry ofbein g, therefore, and especially of being as being, the subject of metaphysics, it is important not to exclude anyt hing from irs range or scopc.n If this notion were reached by a process of abstraction taken in the strict sense, in formulating it one would have to abstract from various charactcristics. For inSlaIl CC, one would abstract from existence itself, it would seem; and yet th is must Ix retained in one's underStand ing of being as ~ that which is." Moreover, olle would abstract from individua['ing differences, from specific differences, and apparendy even from the diRc rences which obtain Ix-tvieen the supreme genera or predica· ments. Yet all of these must be included in some way in one's unders tanding of being. Otherwise, they will be relcg:Hed to the realm of nonbeing.71 And whi le one's absuacted concept of being would be the most general of all. it would also be the em ptiest. By appealing \0 a positive judgment of existence in formulating one's primilive undemanding of being, one includes existence withi n that notion. By appealing to separation in moving from such a prim itive norion of being 10 a metaphysical understanding of being as being, onc avoids the unhappy consequences JUSt mentioned which would result if this wefe achieved only by a more refined kind of abstraction.'" To su m this up in other Icrms, for Thomas sep;lr.u ion is Ihe process through which one explicitly acknowledges and a~sc rt s Ihat thaI by reason of which some· 77. This rem ark ~hould be lim;le'e al,,:~dy ~en, Tht)m:lS dOl'S nOf include God under fns comm,mt. Hence it ~11iQ follO"-'S that God will nOt be ,neluded under th e nOt ;on of being d i" oyered th rough ,he scp~r:tf ion "wolvetr;\Clion SCCmS to be retjuired 10 rneh an anilogial undtr· m nding of being. S«- the helpful ",muks by }.· D . Roberl in his "La melaphysique. Kitnce disd ncle de roU!~ aUI", d iscipline philosophique. scion Dim Thom:lS d'Aqu in: Di"", rIJ"rnm {Pia,-) So (19.17). PP' l 06- H. eip..:c iallr pp. 114- 11 and n. 29. AI; h~ upbins, tht differences which comraet being nc niH included within being according to Thonla~ , though in a coufu5Cd way. BUI ~pttific and individual diff~ ..enc.eJ a,.., only p()!~n,;olJy and no, .cmally P'CSC!l! in non ·l..:.n~ndenr..1COn· cepts. Roben refers the readcl to Ot u~riro:ltt, q. I. a. ,. 79. C [ Geiger. "Ab5! r.tCrion er sC l)ulItion d'apru Thoma~ I" dr l'ri" itllft. q. 5, a. ,,- RtlJU f tin Kinrrtl plJiu,wphi'lutl tlllJ;"/Dgiqutl Jl ( r947). p. 18. No te in particula r: "Mail d irt cda, ,'m dire !qni""lemmem que r~tre ne pcut ~I "" ab5\ rait :i propremenl parle r ni de I~ maTiere IIi des reali res ;mmati'ridl~. pui.sque roUl cela e5' de r~lre. Finalem enr c'e$1 done Ie ,~''''tCr<'- lra nscendental, et avec lui Ie Clr:ICICr(' analogique propr, a u ~ donnees rransccl1dell t'JIl cs qui uigc Ie iugemcnr de • • • scpara"on .. ..

• • •

Discovery of the Subject of Merap hys ics

49

thing is recognized as being need not be identified with that by reason of which it is recognized as enjoying a given kind of being, for instance, material being, or changing being, or living being. It may be described as a negative judgment in thai through it one dt:nic.~ that lhat by which so mething is recognized as bei ng is to be identified with that by rcason of which it is a giw'n kind of being. It m:J.Y be de· scribed as separ:J.t ion because through this judgment one distinguisht:s lVo' O intelligibilit ies. and denies Ihat one is 10 be identified with or reduced ro the m her. O ne distinguishes thc intelligib ilifY involved in one's underst:J.nd ing of being from all lesser :J.nd morc restrictcd intell igibilitics. Thus one negates or el iminates restricti on of being 10 any given kind from one's understandin g of being. One judges that being, in order 10 be realized as such, need not be material. or changing, or quantified , or living, or for that m:J.ller, spiriwal.!IfI H ence one est:lblishes the negatively or neutrally immaterial character of being, and prepa res to focus on being as such or as being rather than on being as restricted to this or that given kind. T hrough separarion one docs not den)' that beings of this or that kind also fall under being. On the contrary, by denying that bei ng itself mU$T be limited to any onc of its actual or possibl(' ki nds, one opens the way for considering these, including lhe differences which are realized in each, within the realm of being, and as being. Even purely material beings can be studied nm only insofar as lhey are material and changi ng as in physics, hut simply insof.u as they share in being. This kind of study, of course, will nm take place in physics, but in metaphysics, the S(:ience ofbcing as being. sl Before concluding this d iscussion , I should ment ion two points concerning separation which have ocen disputed by studems of Aquinas. First of all, it ha.~ been pointed OUt thai his fullest discuss ion of this appears in a relatively early work, and that his clearly drawn distinction in terminology bcrween abst raction and separation di.sappcars in his later writ ings. Does this n OI suggest that Thomas may ha\'e given up his earlier view of separation and that in the end he fell back upon abstraclion in accounting for our discovery of bei ng as bei ng?8! So. 5«, for instancc, Th(lm~,'~ remar k ~ boUl ~ub5.~ n(e in (he ( C~ . cilcd ~bovc: in n.

n 'IS a g()()
il!u~lr~r io" , ~f ~pa"mQ.

81. For

~omc: adJ ilional !elliS in which T lwm:tS 5i ngb Out the lllcl'-'physician'$ ".~y of viewing

Ihin!;~ St:t:

I" !If Y m .. d. 1.7. "l' .!.. ~ . 4, so l. 1: ' " _ sicU! plii!(}!()plJill prima 0;1 sp«ia!is K i crll;~. quam\"i~ consider' l ens 5«undu 01 quod CSI o m nibm COm III llnC, qllia spc-ci ~lcm rationem emis COn· sider... 5«unJum quo.! nOn depe ndt'l ~ ma (cri~ e. mOlu" (Moos <"<1 .. Vol. j, pp. 886---37): /" IV Mtt.. Iccl. I. PI'_ 110 - 11, n. no' "Dici. ~ul ~ '" -see un,!.,," quu;J c>' ~,,~-, q uia scicn, iac ~l i~c:. quae . unl de entib.u p~r! iCU !~ l ibu~, cO"5id cr~ n ( (Iuidern de eme, wrn o mnia subiccta scien tiarum si nt en (ia, nOn Um Cn co nsidcranl em ~cundum quod ens. sed secund um quod est huiuslllodi ens. K ilicel wi Il U · Il.erl.ls. ,·d linea, ,·d igll;s. ~ur aliquid hu iusn>Odi -: In VI M n .. Iccl. " p. t5lS. n. 114]: "Dc quo!i~1 cnim en. C inq ll~ntum ~t ens. p.op. ium es. me.aphysici conS idt,~.e· : In VI Mtf.. 1«1. I, p. l')8 , 11. rr 6s: "Advcn endu lJ) CII ~lII c m, quod liccI ad cOll5idcra ti onCfll plimac philowphiae pcninc~nt C2 qu~c sunt sepH::IIa seeundum css.c <:. talionem 2 ma .... r;" el motu, non tamen willm ca; s.:xl ctiam de scnsih ilibus.

in,!l1~" 'um

St, Th omas wu

SlInI

.·" r j~ , l'hi!"..., phu~ P"t~tut"'u,,-

e~ l remdr careful

in working Out .his dis.i nClion in 'I' 5. a. j orh is Co mmcn.3ry

•

•

50

Discovery of [he Subject of Metaphysics

Secondly, in texts citro above from Thomas's Commentary on the Dr Trilll'tatr, :H times he wri tes that du ough separation we distinguish one thing from another by understanding that the one !Ired nOt be united with the other. But on other occasions he writes that through this judgment we distinguish one thing from another by understa nding that the one is not unitl-d with the other. To apply thi s 10 the prcseru issue, in order to begin metaphysics is it enough for us to judge thro ugh separation that being, in order to be real il.ed as such, need no t be mat eri:t l ~ Or mUSt we nOt first already know that in one or more instances being iJ not material? As for the firs! [>oim, a lengthy discussion in the Summa tiJroiogiar(l, q. 85,:l. I) might lead one to conclude that later on in his career Thomas aba ndoned his earlier views concerning separation. In replying there to the second obj~tion agai nst his comention that our intdlect understands ma terial and corporeal things by abstraction fro m phamasms, Thomas again revie.ws the kinds of abstraction associated with physics (abstraction frolll individual sensible matter) and with mathematics (abstraction of quamity frolll common sensible matter). Certai n things, hc com· ments, can be abstracted even from co mmon imelligible maHer, i.e., from sub· stance insofar as it is subject to quantifY, A;; ill ustrations he lists being (rill), the one, potency and act, and other things of this kind. Such th ings, he adds, can also exist apa rt fro m mauer, as happens wi th immaterial substances. G iven this, o nc might maintain that T homas is now appealing 0 111 )' to absnact ion and not 10 separatio n in accou nti ng fo r o ur knowledge of being as being.s, in reacting 10 this suggestion, one should not overlook T ho mas's reply to the fi rst objection ill this sa llIe art icle. There he comments that abst raction may take place through the operation whereby the int ellect composes and divides, as when we understand that one thing is not in :lIlolher or that it is separated from it. Or abstract ion may occur through that operation whereby the intellect sim ply understands one th ing withou t underst:mding anyt hing about another. This T homas now describes as simple or absohuc considerJtion, and is what we have frequently referred to as simple apprehension or as the understanding of indivisibles. As he had al ready indicated in his earlier discussion in his Commemary on rhe Dt'Trim'Mit' ('1. 5. a. j ), here again he notes that falsiry wi ll result if one abstracts in the fi rst on th .. &

T~i"'Il1U.

This ;s ~"id em not only from th .. fi rlal 1"lI1 itsclf, hut from th .. fact Ibl his

autogr::lph indiC'lICS that he began his response 10 q. I. ~. } ~'1':r::Illirn es. &-e Leon. jO. I~ 6 for a aMtr::lClion to co~er n"gali"c !r:lflKrip'lion o f th e~ rtworkings. Fot hi$ u!;;Ige of ,he bnguagc judgment a$ ..... dl in an ('arlier red hoc non ($5<' in hoc." On th e diffnetll redactions !itt Gcigrr. ~Ab-­ SHan;on ct ~paraliQn : pp. 1';- lO; Ma'"er, Sl. 711<)1)0"" A'lu'~aJ; TIN Diuil;(m lind MnhtJdJ 0/ I~ !V;tnrN, pp. 1(Xv-xx~ii. S}. Leon. j .JJI. Note in particula r: "Qu~e(b,n Vl:ro SUnl quat po55unt aMl/ah; etiam a materia intdligib;!i communi, sicut ens. unum.l)() tcntia et actus, cI11ia IlUiusmodi. qua(, eliatn ~ pos.Ium ~bsque omn; m aler;~. llt 1)3tCI ;n 5ubsl~m;h immaletialibus.·

or

• •

Discovery of (he Subject of Meraphysics

51

way, tim is, Ihrough judgment (composit ion and division) things which are not separ:lI eJ in realiry. This is nOt necessarily so, however, when one does so in the other way, i.e. , through simple apprt'hension.li!fra f,ef<' conting;' d uplicil<'f. Un() modo. ptr mooum romposili()nis CI di"i5ioni~ ; sicul cum inrdligim ns :l.liquid non CS$C in 31iO. "d CMc >epu:.o m m ab l"O. Allo modn. 1'<" moo"", "i mpl icis cl ~ bsolut"'~ considcr~ l ion is; ~icul cum intdligimm unum, nihil considerando de ~Iio. ~ 8S. Ibid., cnd of reply!O obj. 1; "[I qui~ I' laro 11011 con~ idcra"il quod diclll!ll eM de d~'plici r11odo abSIrOClioni s, om nia qu~e di~i mus abSlrahi pe r imcll«lum. ~uil abslnela ~s.c $Kun dum rem : f..,.:I. ~i milar cri Ticism in his Commenf:l rr on .he Lk Tr;n;"lfCscc "1' 5, a. 3 (Lron . so.1 49:l87- 190). T here Thorru s also charges I'rl h~gor:u wi,h ,his s.:lme mislake. 86. Tn repeal a poinl already m,dc, Ihis b<-<:nmd dear when o ne conn CCIS Thomas's dixUMion in rcp1 rillJ; '0 obiccdon 1 ifi ,he IC .. from ST!. q. 8\, a, I ,,,ith hj~ rtpl)' to objcclion !. Cf. Elders,

Faith lI"d Srimrr. p. 109.

• •

52

Discovery of the Subj ect of Metaphysics

existcnce of the First Mover in physics (ph ilosophy of nature). O thers requi te, at the very least, prio r knowledge of the $piri rual character of thc hum an soul. All of these writers agree thai il is only beca use o ne already knows that in at least o ne instance being is realized apart fro m man er that o ne can validl y judge that being in orde r to be realized as such nrrd nOI be maleriaL17 We shalt see that certain lexts in Thomas's writings, especially in his Co mm e n ~ rary on the Mrtaphysics, m ight be laken as support ing such an im etpretation. O ther texts, however, suggeSl a d iffere nt procedu re. As will be recalled from our d iscussion of T homas's views concern ing (he subjeCi of metap hysics, at limes he refe rs to this as em commune, and at times as being as being. In his Commen tary on the Dr Tri"itaU' he has indicated that mt>taphysics treats both of things which arc positively immaterial, to use our suggested terminology. and of those which are negatively or neutrally immate ri al; but it docs not do so in the same way.88 Thus in q . 5. a. 4 of that Commentary T ho mas wri tes that philosophical theology (m et'aphysics) treats o f those th ings wh ich need not be fou nd in matte r (the negatively or neutrally im ma terial) as its subject , and of thaI whi ch Glnn ot be found in maner (the positively immaterial illumau:d here by divine th ings) only as the pri nciples of its subj«:(. ti" T his shou ld be con nected with his earlier rem ark in that same cOnlext to th is effect: if every science has a given subject-genus, it belongs (0 that science itself to study the principles of that subjcct-genus.?(l Si nce being as being is the subject of metaphysics, as he aJso indicates there, it will belo ng 117, Sec. for i"",,,,,,c, A_ Moreno. ~Th~ N.", .c

Or

"rM~taph y,·;a .~

71" rb..",iJI,o

Ir

(1~60.

p.

II , :

" Is Ihc a iSlence imm ~lcri a l bdn~ ~ n ~bsolulC nccnsiry for mctaphysics? hy meraphysics we mean a .science 5p«ifioHy differen t from physics, rhen, thdr e,li$tcncc ;$ abliohudy n~~$S>.ry": V Smilh. "The Prime Moyer: PhysiClhnd MetaphysiClI Considerations: in Prw«di"lgso/rlN Amrr· ;r,1>'/ GuhlaI Aq"inaJ, in Rfllirw l!fMrfllph]1;1'I }8 (198j). pp. 699- 700; L J. Eld.:l'S. Failh and Srirnu . Pl'. 107-8; ~St. Thomas Aquina$' Commenf3ry on (who appcab (Q adem· th e 'Mmphysiq;' of Arinolle: Dil'UJ Thomas (Piac,) (1984), pp. 309- 10. onllF.llion of .he immaterialilY of Ihe hUlllan soul as ThOtnil's junificalion for his discoy.:ry of CQlIltnon being); M. Jordan, Ordering Wisdom: TIl' Hirrarrhy of Phiwrophiral Disa",rKI in Aquinas (NOH~ Da",,,. Ind., 1986).1'1" 'Sll- f.o R8. Stt my discussions of q. s. aa. I aod 4 above in Ch. J (pp. 8-9. t7), 89. leon. W. I ~.p99- lOt. Her.... we should reCllI Thomas's desc:ription of the neg:lti\'dy or n . . u · .ully imma.e rial: ~ . . . alio 1'11000 sic quoo non sil de r:llione .... ius quoo $il in mate ria CI motu .. .. (Uon. 50:154"90- t9 ' ). 90. -Sciendum siqu;dcm CSt q uod quat'Cumque scienri~ conside.." aliquod genU$ subi<."C'um. ol)(lf[el 'luod cOllsidcf.:t p,ind pia iHilis l;.:nc ri5, cllrn Kicmia non pc r fici~"'r nisi P<" cogni tion"m principiorum . . ." (Leon. 50.IU:8I-S6).

,12

• • •

Discovery of r~l e Subja::t of Metaphysics

53

to the metaphysician to investigate the principles or causes of the subjcct of thaI

science, tha t is, of bei ng as being. In no way docs th is text imply that prior knowledge of positively immaterial being is presupposed for the metaphysician to discover bc:ingas being, the subject of his science. On the comrary, it is rather assumed tha t the metaphysician will take this subject as gi\·en. presumably as discovered th rough the process of uporatioas described in q. 5. a. 3 of this same Commentary. Only then will he be in posit ion 10 inquire about the principles of thar subject , tha t is, about div ine things or the positively immaterial .'" T hi s interpret-ation is confirmed by Thomas's much later discussion in the Prooemium to his Commentary on the MnopiJysics. That these remarks appear in the PrOQemium is significant since it seems d ea r enough that here, at least, Thomas is speaking in his own name. \'(fhcncver we turn to the body of the Commentary proper, since it is :l liter..J.l com men tar)" on Aristotle'!; text , we must constantly ask ourselves whether in explaining the Stagirile's thought, Thomas is also presenti ng his own. In the Proocrnium, at least, he clearly seems 10 be. This is co rrobor:ltcd by the faci that Thomas's presen tation here is in full accord wil li views he has developed in his Commentary on De TrillifflU, q. 5, a. 4 . On(' can be confident that Thomas has presented his personal position in that teXl because he has developed it nOt in his rdatively brief litem! exposition of the Bocthian text, but in his much fu ller and independent discussion through quest ions and art icles.'! Reference has been made above to the general context for th is d iscussion in the Prooemium.' .l Here it will be enough for us to concentrate on Thomas's expl icit remarks about the sub ject of metaphysics. "That is the sub ject in a science whose causes and proptrties we investigate," he writes. The cau$Cs of the subject arc nOt themselves 10 be idcntifit:d Wilh the subject of the science. Knowledge of such causes is rather the end or goal at which the sc ience's investigation aims.9-I Once again, therefore, Thomas's words do not suggest that he would have us presuppose prior knowledge of [Xlsitively immaterial beings or separate .~ubs t atlces 91. On being ~ s being as the 5ubj« t of Ihis Kiene<' ~e~ Lron. 50.1504:161- 162: - ... qu~e habel 5ub i«lum ens ;n quantllm CS I ens." cr. Iht ~on f i " u; "g d iscuss io n on p. •5-4 . 92. O n Iht I)!ool{""m of def ermin ing wh{""lhn in h is Comm ~llI ary o n Ih e MnaphyJin Thom~s is si mply prese nting Aristot le's thoughr ~s he undc/Sr~nds il. Of whe th~r he u ~ his CommentalY to I"e.' tnt h i~ own views, o r wh~rhtf he I"oc«ti~ in on ~ way .\ rimts and in anorhn on othe r oc~ion5, itt J. Doig, Aq/iiml1 0'1 Mtlapbysin. For my Itv iew SI:"C" Spm.lum 51 (19 77 ), pr . Ij)- )S . Also s« L. Elders. ~ Sl . T ho mas Aqu inas' Commcfilary on t h ~ ' M~t3ph )'S icl: pp. J07- !6. es p. PP' 3-4- :6: J. OWC
• •

54

Di scover), of [he Subject of Metaphys ics

(God and intelligences), as he here describes them, in order to jusTifY separation or in order to begin metaphysics. On the contrary, it is only after one has discovered Ihe subject of metaphysics-ell! cQmmllne- that one is in a position 10 inqui re aboUt its causes or principles. Since these- separate substances-are the on ly positively immaterial bei ngs mentioned either here or in the discussion in q. 5, a. 4 from the Commentary on the De Trillitau, no support can be found in either lext for Ihe claim that Thomas would have us begin with a knowledge of posi tively immaterial being in order to be enabled ro discover being as being. In confirmat io n of our interpretation we find Thomas repeating within this same Proocmium a paim he had made in his earl ier discussion in the De Trillirau: it belongs to one and the same science ro consider the proper causes of a given genus (or subject) and that genus itself. Thus the natural philosopher considers the principles of nat ural body." In li ke fashion, cominues Thomas, it belongs ro one and the same science 10 consider em communt and to study separate substances; for ellS co mmUNe is the "genus, ~ that" is, the subject of which separate substances are the general and universal causes.'!6 We may develop the analogy which T homas has drawn between physics and metaphysics. JIISt 3S naeural philosophy does not presuppose prior knowledge of the causes or principles of its subjecr (mobile. being) , nei rher does metaphysics. In each case knowledge of such principles can come only after one has discovered the subject of the science. Such knowledge is held oue as the end or goal of thae science's inquiry: it is not presupposed for knowledge of its subjecI.97 In the case of meraphysics. eherefore, knowledge of ies subject comes firS(. O nly afeer one has discovered this is olle in position to inqui re about posit ively imm:ltt'· rial bei ngs such as separate substances. In faCl, in a telling addition to Aristotle's text, Thomas obscrves whi le commencing on Bk VI, c. I of che Mnapby!ic! that even sensible things can be stud ied insofar as they are beings. 9 " T hat is to say, even ')s. Ed. cil.. pp. I- l. quo l.-d .tbovc in Ch. I. 11. 61. 96. !bid .. p. l: - Undc OPOf1C I quod .td camd~m .Kiemiam IXnincal considtr:l.K subsl.tfllias sepa"'las, el en.< commune, quod en gen<.ls, cuius .Ulll p",edicl.te sUWI~flIiae commun~ el universalc, 91· Thom as ho!d~ th.tr rill m(}bi~ is Ihc subjeci of nalUml philosophy. T ha i mobilc beillg also is co rpore.tl is something whi ch mUSI be shown in physic.... Sec In I Phys .• !eel. J. l~ M. Maggiolo • .-d. (Tu rin-Rome. r9504). PI'. }- ~ . n. 4- He", Thorml5 eitts an undcdying principle for his posilion: "... nulla alllcm .Kientia probal suum subi telum. " However, Ih e analogy he draws in the PrOOCl1liunt to his Co mmentary on the Mrtllphytiabetwcc-n the physicist and the met..lphysicilln holds. Each mus' be concemn! with reaching knowkdgc of ,he princi pl(S of hi1 $Cienu's subject-genus. cr p. }. nn. l - j in ,his u me (onten fo' another brief prncntal;on of Ih e Ilm:efold division of Ihe Ihrow ical sciencts. and for Ihe d islinCiion bel,,"",n Ihl' nq,,:;nively o r 1lCt.II",lIy immatctial.tnd Ihe positively ill1m~lerial. 98. In VI Mn.ltet. r. p. 1.98. n. 1l6~ (c i!ed abovl' in n. 81). His immwialdy following words also meri! 'IUUlal;On: "Ni$i rorte dica m<.lS. U! Av;eenna die;!. quod huiusmooi communia de quibus h~ec .Kiemia pl'rscrUiamr, dicumur scpa"'la s«undu m «SC, non quia sempe r sill( 5ine mau~tia: sed quia non de necessitate h~hent «sc in materia. sicul malhemalica."

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Discovery of dIe Subject of Metap hys ics

57

Moreover, Thomas's distinction berween considering something d irectly as the subje<:t of a science and considering it only indi rectly as a ca use or principle of that subject would seem 10 be endangered. If prior knowled ge of separate emilY is presup posed for us to discover being as being, the subject of metaphysics, [hen why not make separate emity itself the subject of this science? This, of course. T ho mas has refused to do. Given these considerations. therefore, il seems w me thai in this part of his Co mmentary we have Thomas's cxpbnarion of Aristotle's text but not T homas's personal view co ncerning the conditions of possibility for the judgment of sep;lration or for rhe discovery of being as bei/lg. 1 G~ A seemingly more compelling text appears in Thomas's Co mmentary on the concluding lines of MelllpbyriCl Vl . Co 1. Here Thom:ls repeats the question raised by Ariswdc himsel f concerni ng whether fi rst ph ilosophy studies bei ng taken un iversally or only some particular gen us and nature, that is, the divineY'(; In commenti ng on t\ristotle's reply 10 this T homas does little more than repeat the Stagirite's tCXt . If chere is no substance apart from those which exist by natu re, wit h which physics deals, phys ics will be the first science. But if there is some immohile substance. Ihis will be prior to natural substance. Conscqucnd}', the phi losophy which studies th is kind of substance will be fi rst philosophy. Bci:ause it is first it wi ll be uni versal, and it wi ll study being a.~ b('ing. Tho mas's concluding remark is not fou nd in Aristotle's t e xt : ~ . . . for the science of the Fi rst Being and the science of (m com mune are one and the samt', as has been indicated at the begi nning of Bk IV." HI?

sec

lOS. II is aho in Ihis way Ih al I would im erpm an in tcrcsting rem ark rn~dc b~' Thoma.s in I. c. 12, abou t the oHlcr of thc sciencC$. There he is offcring a ~c r io of brief argume l1 l$ ~gai n5 t thc claim that God's ai$ tencr al1r1ot be: dcmon5trated hr reason. Thomas CQunlcn that the fa15 ity of 1),;5 claim ca n 1><. ~ hown ftQ m (I) Ihe an or dcmo n51ralion which tcaches o ne 10 rcaso n frQm d rl'ClS loauses; {ll ~ . . . ex ip.... scicm;uull1 o,dinc. Naill, ~i non sit ~tiqua sci biliHUbstalllia supra SU b5lantiam s-o:n~ibilrm. non e,il aliq ua s-o:i.·mb su pr:. Natur, leln. ut dicit ur in JV M"tlph." (perhaps a rcrercnce to Mrtap/;Jlio IV. (:. ) , tbt is. to our p~ SS3gC in Aristo tl e. as the rtIi!ors suggest. but certainly not l itcr~l); (,1 the efforts of the philosopher. 10 dc"'ons (l"~tc tim God ui~ls; (.. ) Rom ani 1:10 . (Sec cd. cit., p. 10.) T hc last tWO argument5 a~ clea rl y b~scd on authority ~nd w, I would suggest, is Ih~ 5<"(ond. MOt e(lv~r, Thomas's pu. pose he,,, is n')1 10 uptain the W:l.y in wh ich we di s-o:ovrr being a.s being. bUI 10 offe r wmc dialcCl ical aq;ume11la lio n and somc aU tholi ti..-s ag~ itl51 tl1os-o: who den)' tha I G od '~ eXiMenCC C"~11 be detllOnSIrateJ. His ph i!owp hical demon5tr.r.tion of hi ~ pmition is YCI 10 cOJlle. wilh hi, for mal pre<1>"e. pp. It - I,. 107. So....;: /" V/ /lin. kCI. " p. ~9~, II. " 70. ThOfll a~ t,.,gin~ by tcf~ rrin g 10 Ar;~ I Olk "$«undo soJ vil . . .. " Note in particula r: "5«1, si C:St aliqua subS!~nlia itnmobi l i~, ina cr;1 prior subsmflli~ nalu ra!i: CI pcr COllS<."luens ph ilosophia considl;r.lIIS hui usmodi sub5l":l.IItiam. el it ph ilosoph i~ prima. E! quia CSt prima, id eo crit uni'·Ns:tlis. et e, il eius sp«ul ari de ente inquatHUm cs( ens . .. ewem en im cs. scien l ia primi en ,is et cnd ~ C()mmu"i s. Uf i" I" inei pio quart; habilUtn CS I." cr. I" IV Aln, Ic". t, p. 151, n. HJ. T here Thom:u comment$ that in this scien ce we uc ~k ing (o ll he principles ofbe:ing insofar as il is being. "J11erefoK, he conlin ues, bei ng is the iubj«t of thi s scien<:e beaus-o: <:very science seek5 afle r the pmpcr ClIIISes of ill subi~l. Th is passage argu es for Ihe identiry of th~

• •

58

Discovery of the Subjecr of Mcraphysics

In commenting 0 11 the parallel passage from MttaphysicJ Xl Thomas adds another remark to his repetition of Aristotle's text: " For th~ First Beings are the principles of the others. This remark also ~xpla ins his addition to the text from Mttaphysicr Vl. His poillt seems to be thar in studyi ng the First Beings one studies the principles or causes of everything else. Therefore one sludies everything else. O ne should not conclude from [his, however, Ihat Thomas himself accepts Ihis position or holds that the First Beings const itute lhe subject of metaphysics. This would be to impost' upon h im the Avcrroistic solu tion for the AristOtelian aporia about the identiry of d ivine science and the science ofbeillg as being. 1M Th~ texts from Thomas's Com mentary on Mrraphysicr VI and XI arc obviously importanr for our immediate d iscussion. If they do reAect his personal position, it will foll ow tim for him the existence of the science of being as being is conti ngent upon our prior knowledge of the existence of separate emity. 'lPt As already indicated, i{ is very difficult to re<:oncile this p rocedure with that implic(1 by Thomas's mo re independent discussions of the subject of metaphysics. In those COntexts knowledge of God o r of separa te entity is nOt presupposed for knowledge oflX'ing as being o r the subject of metaphysics; it is rather proposc.-d as the ~ nd or goal or the meta physician's investigation. Moreover, there call be no question of thinking lhat Thomas ever made God or separate entity the subj<.'Ct of metaphysics. T his can only be being as being or lx-ing in general (rnscom mulI~),I ' Q M

scicnce which 5«ks af!er Ihe firs! and highes t pri nciples (I.enee- the firs! being) and ,he science of b.,·ing~, being, II docs nOI i",ply th.t o"c ",,,n discove r the fim be((He the st'Cond. 0" ,he com r:lry. JUSt the oppo~i,e procedure .secm~ to bc indicated. Cr. my remarks aoout this passage in M(t.ophysitllf 7J,l'mrt, p. 89. 108. Stt In Xl Afn, II'CI. 7. p. 536. n, H67. In this 'nt he follows Aristotle's text "ery dO$d)' in writing ,ha, if nafUr:l1 SUMta
• • •

Discovery of lil C Subj eC[ of Mctaphysics

59

GiV{'1l this, I would offer the same im erpretation of T homas's Commemary on the indicated passages from Mnaphysin VI and XI as I have for the tex t from his Corn " mentary on Mnaphysin IV. In each of these cases we have Thomas's explanation of Aristotle's text, but not Thomas's personal J>osi tion concern ing the co nd itions of possibility for separ:nion and hence for the discovery of The subjecr of meTaphysics. It should also bt, noted, if only in passing, that in none of these texts is there any suggest ion that one must h~ve prior knowledge of the ~p irilUal charaCier of the human soul in order to discover hcin g as being. Some writers would require this r:l.(her than prior knowledge of separate entity in order to justify separarion . III But the passages we h:lve just eX:lmined from Thomas's Commentary on the Mn.lphp in rather refer to immobile Ix'ing, meaning thereby the hrst mover of the Phpin. It is this which is idemilied with the First Being studied by first philosophy and hence by mClaphysics. 11Z So f.1 r as Thomas's view is concerned , therefore, if these passages do indeed reflect his persona l position, prior knowledge of separate and immobile entity will be required to enable one {O discover being as being. Knowledge of the soul's ~ pirituality will nOt sullice. In rejecting such passages as expressio ns of Thomas's perso nal thought, I do nOt wish to deny th:l1 when he considers the pedagogical issue about the order ill which young students should study the various sciences, hc recommends that one int roduce them to philosophy of nature before attempting to teach them metaphysics. In brief he propo~ th is sequence; logic, mathemaTics, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and finally, metaphysics. In these discussions, however, he is not concerned with the conditions of possibility for metaphysics or for the other sciences but with the grndu:llly devdoping capacity of young students to learn th ~e different disciplines. Ht·nce such textS can hardly be used to settle the is~ue now under cO/lsidcrat iOIl. 113 In addition to the historical (luestion, anot ht'r line of reasoning seems to influCommc11I:1.f)' on Ihe Ml'laphp uu r.J. in h i~ Com me111~r)' o n Ih ~ p:w.;lgC$ ii, qUO'li<)r.. Or. Ihc Olhcr hand. j.FX. Kr.~5:ls .sttms 10 Ihi"k Ih31 for T homas one tl1~y h'-gin ,.ncl3pnysia ariel diKovcring beillg (...,1) as habO/I "I<' (a ppucmly wha l I ha'<e dCK. ihed as a prim ili,'c nOI;on of bein g). Then. while pfOlcficing melaphysics. Olle would demo l151 ral e the exiSlcnee of ~pame subSlance and onl)' Ihell di$(o,·e. tm (qn""u,u . .se., TJu p,yfiu~ 10 71NJ m;JIil' Muapl'}J;<1 (Ne .... York , 19')0), I)P· 9j - 113. ·nl h appro~ch faib 10 do ill5lice 10 Tholl1as·s ulIJentanding of Ihc subj e-cl of a $(;CII«", knowledge of wh ich i~ required for o n.. 10 !l<egin th .. 5Ci~lIcc . !I ~ ISQ COll1radiCIS a prin ciple Thoma~ accepl$ flOm Ari~ IOIlc to Ih e effecl Ihal no 5Ci.'ncc C3n CSlablish Ihe elis tenc. . of ill own sub iecl. HI. Scr fo r ill.112r.ce. C . . iga ~nd Eld en a, cil(:d abo,.., in n. 8J. !1~. S« Ihe l"~') from ·nlOrn as'sCo""l1cntary011 Mfl. IV. II . 19}: AIr/. VI. n . 1J 70 ~ and Mn. XI. II . H67; CiH-d above in nn. 101, 107, and loll. Th .... !a.\I·mcntione,J pa~~&.... rc-quim. nOI o nly a sub~fan«" which is immobile but olle which is flp;<,ahifir. For a discussion or the rdat ed but CUllt esled point conccrning whedlC/ for Thnm~s !ll . . FiTS! Mo,·c. of PJYf /;n V!Il i, God. see A. I',,&i$, "51. T hom as ~ nd Ihc Coh{" .·ncc of dIe A,islOld ian Thro!ogy,- Muiiafv.,/ St"Ji~ jj (1973), pro 67-117; J. J\tUIU5, "u Ihrorie du Premier MOIeur cha Arino!.. ," Rrwr dr philof(}phir, n.s. 4 (IS/H). pp. 219-<)'1. 394- '1 1 4 ~ J. Owell s, "Aquillas and the P,ooffrO rn Ihe' Ph )'sia· ." M~d;,u"al Siudirs ~8 (1966), pp. 119- jO. Pegis dcfends Ih ;~ ,den l il}", ill dis.:rsr«mc111 wi l h "",,u!us ;wd OW<'ns. ll J . 5« Snllmlin fibri Ell;irqr",,, VI. 7 ( L.."(>n. i 7.1.Jj8:178-3S9: lIj): Stl nui 71NJnuJt d, Aq"illo

• •

60

Discovery of Ihe Subject of Metaph ysics

ence many of those who wou ld rest the possibility of metaphysics o n prior knowledge of positively immaterial being. For them it is a necessary ph ilosophiCl I posi. tio n. As they see it, prior knowledge of the existence of immaterial beings must be presupposed if one is to begin metaphysics. As one recent writer has put it in a generally positive review of an earlier stud y of mine: ~ Bu t o ne may legitimately ask whether mere possibility is sufficient to ground the new science of !lletaphysics? Whence comes this judgment of separability? It is easier to prove thc faCt of onc separated being than to prove itS p<):>si b i liry. ~ll · Here we have a k-gi ti ma te difference in philosophical positions. In defe nding my own inte rpretation , [ would recall cerrain ]lOints. First of ali, we are interested in ar ri ving at an u ndersta nding of being as bei ng which may serve as the subject of a science of being as being rather than of being as material and changing. Secondly, according to Thomas himself, it is quitt: possible for LIS to study mate rial being in metaphysics, not insof.1T as it is material OTmobile, however, but simply insofar as it is being. When it is so viewed it enjoys the negative or neutral kind of immateriality Thomas associ'Hcs with the subject of metaph ysics. Th irdly, in referri ng 10 separation in his Commentary on the De TriJlilal(, at times Thomas indicales that what is d iscovered thereby is without maHer and motion. At times he writes that it can be withoul maTter and motion . It is the laner kind of immaleriality which he assigns to being as being, the subject of metaphysics. I would as k the reader evaluati ng my approach to distinguish TWO questions and, corresponding to th is, twO kinds of intelligibilities. One question searches for that by reason of which something is recognized as rcal or as sharing in being. Another seeks afler thai by reason of which something enjoys a given kind of being. Supa '.ibn""

d~

rtlusi! rxpositil). H.

Saffre),. eo. (Fribourg-I.
s....

I).

• • •

Discovery of the Subject of Meraphysics

61

If these are fV.'O different questions, it seems that one is justified in offering fWO different answers for them. That intelligible content in a th ing by reason of which it is recognized as en joying realiey or being should be distinguished from that intel ligible cOlllent by reason of which it is recogn i1.cd as enjoyi ng this or that kind of being. To be material. or livi ng, or mobile is 10 enjoy a given ki nd of being, it would seem. Without presupposi ng that there is any being whi ch is nO! living and material and mobile, we can still ask why any thing which we experienc(' enjoys ueing. 10 ask Ih is is vcry diffe rent from asking what kind of being it enjoys. If these (wO questions are not idcllIical. it follows that the answer to the one does /lOt have to be idenritled with the answer to the Olher. That by r('ason of which somet hing is recogni1..ed as enjoyi ng being nced nOt be identified with that by reason of wh ich it enjoys this or that kind of being. Therefore, we may invcstig:nc one and the same physical and changi ng th ing from different perspeni\'es. We may st udy it insofar as il is material and mobi le, or insofar as it is li\'ing, or insofar as it is qualllified. But we lIlay also study it insofa r as it enjoys reality at alL i.e., insofar as it is a being. An objection might be raised: Is this not 10 make memphysics a sciencc of the merely possible Not al all. To exam inc somcthing from the standpoint of being is to continue to apply to it the intel ligible content contained in our primitive underslandingofbeing as "that which is." As a resu lt of separation we con tinue to recogni1.e whalever we study in metaphysics as enjoying being, or as an illSlance of '·that which is." We do not abstract from this inclusion of existence in our primitive understanding of being when we apply separalion 10 il . We ralher judge dial the intell igible content in virtue of which wt' recognize any thing as a being ("that which is") is not to be restricted to or identified with tim intelligible content by which we recognize it as being of Ihis or Ihal kind. Otherwise bei ng could only be one in kind. At this paim I should emphasize that il is not T homas's distinction and composition of essence and an intrinsic existence principle (act of being) which is discovered through separ3 tion. Through scp:uation one simply recogn izes lhe legiliInacy of investigating any given thing in terms of its reality or as a bei ng {"that which is"} rather than from any ot her perspective. Investigarion of the relationship between essence and existence (esse) can only come laler in the order of discovery, and presupposes (hat one has already discovered bei ng as being. In concludi ng this chapter I should add that I do not wish to exclude the possibility that one migh t proce<:d in a different way. If one has succeeded in demollSl ratillg the exiSlCllce of some positively immaterial hei ng in physics, well and good. lIS T hen it may be easier for sllch a person 10 formulate the negative judgment with rrs . On Ih i$ poim, Klllb<·tlanl. l ~ ktes:l. ver y 51rong posi rion . As h~ :;t:,,~ il. il is nor possiIJI" fOI one 10 b~s<: onc'~ knowl("(lgc of bdn!; ~~ l)(Ojng 011 3 prior dClUons,r~, i()tl of ,hte te~islcntec of imm:l.l cri31 emily. "Ei lher ' is' is (feted !"rom ils S("miblte ~nd cha llging con tO'! (prior 10 the proof of the teXiSIence ofimm~ lerial !xi ng. ~ nd Ih liS is m", ningfu l ..... h"n ..... e mnclude 10 r he exi51elKte of 5uteh !xing) or .is' l{"m:l.inS:l.~ we fi m fi nd il imlllciX"d in seosini li l)" ~ nd ch3 ng{". In Ihe !aller C3>C". ' is· I"r1 teJ ns ·is >C"tuibk

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'"

The Problem of Parmen ides and Analogy of Being

N; we have now seen in some detail. according to Aquinas metaphysics has as its subject being as being or, as he also puts iI. rns communr. In C il. II considerable anemion has been directed 10 his accou nt of the way in wh ich we arrive al knowledge of being as real and then of being as being or of (w rOln llllOlt. Now we must take up a problem with wh ich Tho m3s himsdfhad to corne to terms - the see mingly conflicting claims of unity and of muhipliciry (and hence of diversiry) wit hin being itself. This problem ca n be raised at tWO differen t levels. bw rwo levels which are closely imerconnl'(:ted. Thlls onc may ask: \'(Ihat is the nature of:l not ion or concept which can in some way express bot h the unit), and the diversity which Aqui nas assigns to being in general (rm communrJ. As we shall sec, Tho mas's answer to this is developed in terms of his theory of analogy of being. But one can also raise this issue at the lellel of individual beings themselves: How call there be many such beings. given the unity of being as indicated by the fact that each of them shaKOS in bei ng? Thomas's answer to this is compJicated, but will include his theory of the part icipat io n of beings in being (mr), the com posit ion of essence and mr (act o f being) which he find s in every participating heing, and his defense of the real ity of nonbeing in a qua lified sense- relative non being, as I shall describe iI. While subselJllent chapters will be devoted to each of thes<: issues, in the prt:Sellt cha pter we shall first consider the I'armenidean d ilemma concerning unity \IS. multiplicity of being insofar as this was know n to Aquinas. The concluding section of Ih is chaptcr wi I] be dirccted to Tho mas's answer ;u rhe level of o ur concept or not ion of being, that is to say, his theo ry of analogy of being.

6,

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Parm cnides and Ana logy of Being

69

begins (Q formulaic Parmenidlos' problem in terms which Sf't' m to refer dire<:tiy to the nature of our notion or concept of being. [n facr. Thomas immediately cririci7.es Parmen ides for viewing bei ng :15 if it were one in defin ition or natu re, li ke a genus. In ot her words. without using the technical term. Thomas criticizes Parmellides fo r regarding being as univocal. AgJinsr this Thomas immediately protests. Being is not a genus bur is said in different ways of differenf things. l~ In effe<:l, therefore. T homas !faces back to Parmcnides the two levels of the problem of rhe One and the Many which we h~ve distinguished above. On the on tological level or the level of being itself. it seems that being ca nn Ot be divided from being. It cannOt be di\'ided from itself by being, si nce it already is being. Viewed from this perspective. it is simply one. Nor can it be divided from itself by non bcing, since th is is nothingness . Therefore it cannOt be divided at :Ill. and all is one. On the level of the concept of being. jf being is regarded as univocal in the fas hion of a genus, any differen ce wh ich might Serve w divide it wi ll then full outside one's undemanding of being. Therefore ~ny such difference will have to be dismissed as nonbcing and will be unable 10 differcmiate being. In commen ting on Bk I of AristOtle's P"piN Thomas follows the St:lgirite in citing Parmenidt'S and Mclissus as hold ing that there is one immobi le principle for n~ture. Thomas comments that strictly speaking it docs nOt belong 10 natural science cit her to reject the position of Parmenides and Mclissu$ or 10 resolve the argumentation they have offered ill suppOrt of it. This is so because it does not belong to a given particular science 10 refute a posi tion wh ich destroys the \'ery principlcs of that science. For instance, geometry as such need not argue against one who rejects the firs t principles of geomet ry. This task wil[ rl thcr fal1tO lnother particular science (if geometry itself is subalternated to any other particular science) or else 10 a general science. that is, logic or metaphys i cs.l ~ In holding that there is on I)' one being and that all is one and immobile, Parmen ides and Mclissus h~ve in effect underclH the very meaning of the term "princip le.~ A principle must be J principle of some other thing O f things. This prcsupposes multipli city. In eli mi nating all multiplicity they have also rejected all principlcs. 1G Moreover, Thom:IS finds Aristotle m:tilHain ing that it docs not belong '4. - SeJ ill hoc dcripicbamu f. quia ll!eballmr eme

qua~i Ul\~

r:tlionc e! una na lUr:t Si':ll l est non .:5! genus. sed m "It ipl ici! et dici! ur de

natu... alicuiu; gcneri5; hoc en i", C$ t impussibik Ens ~n i l1l djv"r~j,- (pI" 4' - 4 ~. n. Ij')). Immcdia'd}" Ih t reaftcr Thom~5 ref... ) 10 AristO! ie-s criticism in i'frysifJ I o f the cbim (h,,, hll) being is one. For Thomass commentary on this. ~t btlow. For Thomas's repet ition of I'armcnid c:;' argu mclUalion b~sed on th" n~!Urc or bting. ~ho S« p. 41. II. !41. What evc, is mhe/ than tx-ing is 11011h.: il1g. What is no"being i~ '0 be reganled as nothing. H ell~e he I ho~lgh! !hal l)o("i nl: i~ one. all
1\. ~ In

uS. Srr p.

is nOl hingnl:Ss.

I Phyr.. 1....:1. 1. 111" 9- 10. nn. I). 15. cr. Ar istot le. l'IlYlies !. '" z (t!J4b l S- IS Sa J). 10 .

n. ' \. NOfC c:;pecially: ·Sed pnedina IlOsitio deS lluil pr inci pia

na!Ur~c . . . .

igilur nega! III ~,[ t it lId inem. 101Ii! principia; non igi l ur d d X: I com r.l. hanc p<»i,ioncm dispur>fc

r:tlis.•

qui

ll~ !U­

• •

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Pa rmcnides and Ana logy of Being

73

flonbc ing (not hingness) and nonbcing in a qualified sense (relative non being). But as we shal l sec below in C h. VI, this distinction is an important part of T homas's solut ion to the problem of the One and th ~· tvbny :l! thl: lev.:.:! of bcing. Finally, as Thomas remarks, if one adm its that being taken strictly applies not on ly to a subject or substance but 10 an accidcrn such as whitcncss, it will follow that being signifies many different things. But thell there will IIOt be merely one being, since a subject and its accident are many in in tdl igible COntent. O nce again , therefore, with om using lhe lechnical expression, Thomas is crit icizing Parmenides for viewing being as ifit were purely univoca1. 1·' Thomas has repeatedly sounded this theme ill his Commentaries on MnaphysirJ I and Physics I. Being is used in many differen t senses or, 10 PUI il in other terms, being is not univoca l. \Vhi le these passages arc found in his comrnentaries on ArisIOtle. there can be little doubt that in making this point [hey reflect Thomas's personal position as well as his understanding of Aristotle. And this brings us to the s(.'Cond major se<:tion of the present ch:tpter.

2.

Thomas's V iews co ncerning [he A nalogy of Being

As certain recent st udies of analogy in Aq uinas have: shown quite: effectively, the problem of I n:llogy of being arises for him on rwo very di(ferell1 levels. Fi rst of all. the issue may be raised :It the level of beings insobr as they are given [Q us through ~ r1Se experience and fall under I'/JS (OIl /llll/lIl"- th e subj("ct of metaphysics. Certain writers. influenced by the terminology im roouced by C. Fabro, rekr to this as the predicament:r.lleveL '" Here Thomas is conce rned wi th showi ng how being can be 29.

Scr 00. ci!., p. t5 . n. 4J' "U ncle

~i

:.d (:vi l"Jn d,un IlOc inconwnien$ d icam u$ quod ,-ere .'ns

non SOIiUll si!;Tlili c~ r sub kctUflI, s.:d "Ii~m ipillm album, Sl"(j ui rur '1u(){1 ell! muha . ignilicct. Et ira non Cf it talllum unu III ~n ~, quia su bi''( tunl {'I ~ccid"fl~ I'lu rJ $1"11 se..:u "du," r:ltio,,~m."

}o . &.: c. Fablu, !'a rlirip,uion (I rall!II'il; uloll s. Tbomi/i li"Aqllill (I.ou,·ain- Par;s. r961), pp. I rO- l j; 52j. For expli" ir acceplJnce o r this rermino lq;)' ami d ivision orhis own lrc~r i~ in accord wir h i r Set: II. MOil r~g ll<"S. f.1l liM/rinr di' limlllogi( (II' l 'ilu " ilp";s 1<1;111 T/romlll Ii 111";" ( l.ouvai n · I'~rh· . r96}). PI" H - 40: c. II (p I" (,S- 114) Oil ",," ~en,ktll,,1 an alogy b,·i ng. "I'll<' li.e ... t"rc un Thonl ~s'! "iew! «)ncerni Ili; allalog)' i. ,·xtc",i,·". Mn.> ( hd[.f,,1 f"r my I''''I)O'C~ h,u htt n Mo n l~g",:s' OOok. For rdc"~llco 10 mlll )' other H(~lmC!lI~. Ii« IU5 IliblrOSr:r.phy. Among these mcnriOI1 ShOlIId I"" made of 1·1. Lyn kcn" .,.,,~ A",'fng,r Imu"i'f"n C"III ",,,I,i,.. WQrM: An {""mil-'I/;Im ofIts /1;ukgro,,,,,1 (/lid Im(rpr('liItilln of Irs U,t by T/,onllls ofAq"'tUi ( Uprs"t'~, 19\ ~). which is opeci~ II}' hel pful for rhe h ;~to,ica l h~,·kj.;"'und i, " fI(-' $ On ~ ,,"I01;r I"i". 10 A'lu j""•. 'h ou!;h "V' s<> rd i~bl<· i" i" tr~JI"'crl' of t Ilc hC~ T1 of Thoma$$ mcuph ysic~ in ;t)Clf; G . P. Kluhcm ,rL. S,. 7110111111 A1"i",1J 1m AlIilloX,r: II ";-';I""! AII4'pil ,md Syum/llik Sy,"h("JjJ (Chicago. t~60) , ~ hd phd cull('Ct ion or must or Th()ma~·~ !nts cVllcc rning analogy. with sensit ivity to i5S uC$ of ctHonology Jnd d e"d0l'mrn l in Thomas's ! hi nking co ncerti in g tI, is, and l':t ft r r1. s«! . 1 of FalJro'.< bo()k (I'P. ~O<)- Ji) cited ~b<:o-'e ill !hh nOt e. nll«):> srudy is csp•.:dalty ;mlJOrtallI fOl i" (ul\lribwion ro Thomas's rnoor}' o f p;lflicipJtion in ~. ing, ~ n d his appeal In t hi> H' br ing OUI thr mCI"physiC"JI fOil "d.I io"s o f Thomas'5 Ih~Ofy of amlngy. All of th"5<: sources a,~ a~rud in f~i~'C,in s the hi5toric~1 ,diJlo ility of C~ i~t m'. in1ctl',el'dtion as pr~scnted in h;~ Lk 1II,,,,inuIII 'Ula/~i". 0.. ronupru tmiJ, I~ N . Z;o",rni t. 00. ( H,<.>mc. t~H) . and of the mJn ), b tn Thomistic imf'l)l ct:lliuns bJlrd '!I)On it. For a J;OOhl ~nd rn:ent tl.")!alemCm vi hi s

(.r

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Parmenides and Analogy of Being

77

csti ng com binat ion of analogy raken as proportion (or proportionality, according 10 the terminology of the slightly latl'r Dr writau, q. 1, a. I I), and analogy by reference 10 a first.' s In Aristotle himsel f the term analogy is often taken in The sense of proportion , bur when Aristotle so uses il he does nOT apply iT to the case of being. On the oTher hand, Aristotle mllST be rega rded as the original source for lhe theory of analogy oflx!ing by reference 10 a first, lhaT is, 10 subsTance (ooo{a). At the same Time, it should be noted thaT Aristotle himself never refers 10 This as a case of analogy. n pOC; £.v equivocation is his way of describing it.''; If these TWO aspens of anJ.logy, uni t}" of proportion(aJiry) and uni ty by reference to a firs!' had J.lready been brough t together within :m t:arlie! philosophical tf'Jdi[ion,' 7 it is instructive 10 note how Thomas correlates them in his ~ principii!. On the one hand, in applying his views concerning analogy to intrinsic principles, he has coordinated such principles according to a proportion. JUSTas the matter of substJ.nce stands in relation 10 substance, so does the matter of qualllity in relation to quantiTy. On the other hand , he has justified This by noti ng thallhis pwportion holds on I)' becausc of somc causa! relationship. As substance itsel f is the cause of the OTher predicametHs, so are the principles of substance the principles of the otlter predicaments. And in contrasring anJ.logy with univocity and equivocation, Thomas has strongly emphasiud the c;!usal relation which obtains between second;uy instances of the analogical perfection and the primary instance. Whether this rel:ltion hJ.s to do with tlnJ.1 causal ity or efficient causality or the causality of a receiving subject, it is in any event a c;!usal relationship which grou nds analogical predication. In The case of bei ng. it is because seco ndary insunces of being, i.e., 4 \ . A~ i$ wdl known w smdenu of Jo.1101;,)" in Aqu inas. in

lR ,.,.r;/I//(. q. l. ~ . " T homas dim in, t<$ univoo.l and c'l"i\"OCl1 ptctl ;c-~Ii()n ..,f OamCS such u srir",ia of Go..J ~nd crea l lJre~. Such names a ll be pnodiclIed of Go..! onl y analogicJlly: - ... (]\l0<1 nihil CS I d;~ 1U quam secundum proponionem." Thomas nOtes Ih:"1 such agreeme nt acwrding to propou ion c-.m be I,-,'Ofold :"lId acwrdillgly ,hal co mmunity according 10 an Jlogy may ,Iro be 1v.'Orold- lhe kind Ih ~ ! obuinl belween I hill~ wh ich h ,,~ a dir~1 Id al;o ll to o ne ,nOlhe!. ~ nd Ihe kind which "lIher re:m o n Ihe agreement berween IWO rdal;onS. Th omas here rel",."O' w Ihe tim as agrctlll cnt i1\ tetnH of proporti on. and 10 Ihe .w-.::ond ~~ agreement in term~ of proPO!lion~lity (Loon. ~l. 1. 7 ~:ljj -,65) · Tht lR 'Itr;"zudatC!i (.om tls6-nS9· ~ lonell. Samt 17wmaf AquillflS. p. J54 · 46. Sec Mon tagnes. p. ! •. who ciles G . L Muskens in suppo rt o r Ihe I>oim r h~ . Ihe propor· ,ion(aJilY) w which Atisto tle up ~)Cals in his biological wnrb is Il~Vc r appl ied (0 th e case of being. Fo r Mu ; k~ n .• 5<''' his Dr w";r<.hllAoyia<;: rig"ijirutJ(mr at" mu upud Arimmfon (G n,l n'nsell, '9'U), p. ')0 . Aho sce Lynkens. Tit,. A'II/Iug) btrU't"r'l God ,md thr World. PI'· !9- j6 (u n ~ na logy in Ar;510de'~ bi()logic~1 ~ Ild erh in l writings), 36-S8 (on ,h b ill h i~ meraphy~k:s and logic). Sec pp. \2.-\8 on Ar;s,o llc'$ uSC of lip.); el' pr~diCJ l i() n 10 ~CCO" n l for Iht mal\ifokl w.l.ys in wh ich being is pr«l i~".l l cd . The IIIOSI imp<Jrta.ll 50",((, for lh is. of cour;.c. i} Ari slode's Mrwp1lysiq IV. c. z. for which ~ ~low. C[ Mclncrn y. Aqui1llu ami AMI R Clmsilioclfllr 10 be iden ti fied widl a n~logjc:l ls . Sec op. cil .. 1'. 30. n. I) . Cf. p. 14. n. I.

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Parmenides and Ana logy of Being

81

study all of these instances of being.6J That science ~th e science of being as being- can do so because what it co nsiders fi rst and fo remost is substance. As Tho mas interprets this, thi s science deals primarily with substances and therefore wi dl all instances of being, since il considers [ha l lirSI thing upon which all the others depend for their be ing (mr) and from which they receive their name. Fo r Thomas as for Aristotle this first thing is su bstance. Therefore the philosopher who considers all beings, {hat is to say. die metaphysician, must firs! and forcmost rake into consideration the principlcs and causes of substances. Moreover, as Thomas also explai ns, all substances insofa r as they are bei ngs or substances will fa ll under th is sciencc's fi dd of investigation.(" When we compare this d iscussion of analogy with [hal presented by T homas in his Dr principiis IJfifUrar, one slight bu{ interesting development appears. In the earlier tre:HmelJl Thomas had referred to something as prcdic:lted analogically when it is applied to things which haw differem intel ligible contents (rationes). but these ratioll" 3re ordered \0 one and the sallie thing. In explain ing analogical predicat ion in his Commemary on Ml'tap/'ysics IV. c. 2. Thomas explains that in this case something is aflirmrd of d ifferent th ings according t'O rationt's which are partly di verse and pardy nOI di\·crsc. Because cach of those (seco ndary) things to which the analogical term is applied is itself relat ed in diffirm t fashioll to some o ne Ihing, the variOIlS mtiOfit'S of these things will differ. BlIt because it is 10 one thillg that the various secondary instances or analogates an;: orden;:d, their rationn are panly not d iverse o r are partly the same. This goes hand in hand wit h Thomas's ins istCIIC(' (hat the single thing to which being refe rs in its other and secondary applications enjoys nu mericalu nilY. nOI merely unity in definition. T his im plies that all thc ot her qu:d ities :.In(j charaw::ristics we fin d in a given emi lY may be named bei ng because they bear so me ontological relationsh ip 10 the substance of that very cllIi tr M Thomas frequently repea ts th c po im thar the imelligible content {ratio} corresponding 10 analogicaltcrms is pard y [he same and partly diverse. For instance. in Summa r/u%giaf I, q. I), a. l he again poims OUt lha[ in the case of thi ngs which Jre said analogically, there is not a si ngle ratio as with Il nivocal,crms: nor arc the rOliOlIfJ totally diverse, as is the case with C(lu ivocal terms. Rather the name which ca ll

6J. 5« lI1t ",pl"J;,-r !V. c. 2 (IOOJ!> II- H). 6 .. , Ed. ci t. . pp. rp - 5J. nfl. j46-H7. NOlC hi~ concl ud ing Icmark in n. S.. 7: - N ,m OOln CS sub· M ~ n d~ e. i",! ua ",um , ,,,,, c: ,,, i, "0;1 . "b'I~",iac:. pert inenl ~d consi.-jCF,lI io,,<: m huiu$ sdcm iae: in'luanlum ~ul e m sum l~!i ~ ,·d Idli s :;uhSlanl ia lit I"" vd bo.~. ~nine nl .d sc i"nt ;~s sp,..ci~l cs : T h is renu rk should Ix: joined wilh Thomas's "iews aboUl God and the subi~ ( or mc['ph ysics wh ich We have: l'.Xa mi n~' HI>rt:iSctl in [h e I'rooelll ium w his u [nmenI:lrf on [he MrtapIJpin. w [he eff«:t [hal di" inc being do.:s nm Iilil under [h~ $ubj<:C1 o r mct:lphys· io - being ~s Ix:ing ollleing in !;t !lcral- hu l is sl\lditc{' nn, H ~nd 55 abowc in this , haplcl.

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Pa rm enides and Analogy of Bei ng be called good if they have di!lt'rem meanings

85

(rariOllN)? Thomas commems that

something may be said of different things according 10 differcIH rtlt;onN in rwo ways, eit her according to raliOlW which are e!Hirdy different and nOt related to anything that is one (equivocals by chance), or else according to rrtti ollf! which arc not completely diverse but which agree in some way. In the latter case the rati one! may agree (I) by being referred ro one principle, i.e. , an agent, or (2) by being referred to one end (as in the example of healthy), or (3) either accord ing to diverse relations (prop(m io/J(s) which they have to the same subject (as quality is called being because it is a disposition of being pa U' or substance, and quantity bL'(;ause it is a measu re of the same), o r according 10 the s,lflle relationship they have to different subjects (liHis sight has the same rdationship 10 the body as the irnclle<:t has to the souJ) JJ Thomas comment s thaI Aristotle herl' is stat ing that the good is said of different goods (t) insofar as all (other) goods depend on one first princi ple of goodness, or (:z.) insofur as they arc ordered ro ont end . or (3) morc so accordi ng 10 analogy. that is, according to the same rl'lationsh ip (propor{ioj {hey have to different mbje<:ts {thus, JUSt as sight is a good of (he body, so is the intellect a good of the soul). Thomas adds that Aristotle prefers (his th ird approach because it has to do with a goodness (hat is in herent in things, whereas (he first (wo approaches juslify naming things good merely because of their relationship to some separate goodness . ~~ In ligh t of this one might object that here T homas gives priority 10 analogy of proportion ra ther than 10 analogy by reference to a first and, moreover, that he seems to regard analogy of propoT!ion as better suited [Q safeguard the intrinsic presence of a charaCteristic such as goodne.~s in all or the analogates. To this Mon~ ('agnes has rightly poilllet\ OUI that (his passage need not be taken as rdlect ing Thomas's personal view aboU! whether one should usc analogy by reference to a first or analogy of proportion when dealing with the good. Indeed, here we rath{'r have Thomas's efroT! to explain Aristotle's leX t which ilSClf. il will be recalled , is part of the Stagi rite's refutation of Plato's theory of a separ:l1 e Form of the Good. To this I would also add that al the beginning of leclio 8, in commenting on AristOtle at 1096b }O- 3 I, T homas nOtes (hal il is necessa ry here (in the Ethin) to set aside this issue concerning how the good may be predicated of different good things according to one or according to differem ratiol/'J; for to establish this with 73. h ,l Erb,(.. II."(L 7 (I.<."On. 47·l. l6:168- q:(98). H. S,'c L~u n . 47.1.2; " 98- " j . No( e in par! icub r: "Vd ~l i 3rn di cUluu r o"mia bull~ ",~gi5 Sl'CUll dum ~ n~logi~m. id ~ l proporrioncm unclem. quamum 5(: ;I;c(1 'Illod Y;SIl5 a( oouum corporis ( ' imdlccll1S e
,,

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Parmenides and Analogy of Being

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Wh ile the second approach leads Thomas to his dcrivat'ion of what are often caJled the transcendental properties of being (rrs. umml, a/iquiri, boman, Ilrrum), the first is of greater interest for our im mediate pu rposes, According to th is approach. evay such mode is a more panicubrizcd mode ofbcing. There are varyi ng degrees of being, Thomas observes, and in accord with these, different modes of being aTC realiu::d. And it is in accord with these different modes ofbcing that the different genera (or predicaments) are derived. Here again we should note Thom as's metaphysical approach to thc predicamcnts. They :lrc grounded in different modes ofbcing, and those modes ofbt-ing in turn reflect differcllI grades or degrees ofbeing.~ ~

Thomas cites substance in order 10 illustrate his point. Substance d oes not add 10 bei ng a difference signifying a nature superadded to il (being) from without. Rather, by the name substance a specialized mode of being- a sl>ecialiud way in which being is realized-is signified, lIlat is. being prr Jr. So it is with the other supreme gcncra."" In other words, if being is predicated of substance and of any given accident analogically rather than univocally, th is is beGLUse the mode ofbcing designaled by substance differs from the mode of being design:ned by the accident. To say thai the mode of being des ignated by substance differs from lhat designaled by any given accident is to imply Ihat lhe one is Ilot the other. But is this 110t to d~fend the reality of nonbeing and, if Parmenides is correCI, 10 iJcmiry any such mode with nothingness? This is 10 rai~ the problem of the One and lh~ Many at lhe more fundamentalleve1 al ready mentioned in the opening page of this chapler, the Icvel of individual beings thcmselves. ruller di.s<:ussion of this will be deferred until the following ch:,pters. As we shall sec, Thomas's metaphysics of parricipation , his theory or real composition of essen(:e and me within finit e beings, and his defense of th e reality of a kind of non being (relative nonbeing) will all enler into his 5Ollllion. At Ihe same lime, 10 amicipalc that discussion for a moment, we should nOle thai the lex t from the Dr IIrriultr makes it abundantly dea r that being is reali7.ed intrinsically both in substantial being and in accidental being. Hence. unlike Pa rmen ides, Thomas is allowing for a way in which one (substantial bei ng) can be said tlO\ to be another (any given accident) and sliII not full inlO absolute nonbeing.~7 And we should remember that Thomas remains f:,ithful to his generall y 85. " ... SUn! enim di"er~i gradu.\ ~mi l ali~ s«u ndum quo~ ao.:ipiumur divers; mod ; c~"d; <'I iu~'~ h mooo) acc;piulUUf di,'crsa rerum gcnc r~ ... " (s: " 6-119) . 86. " ... 5ubJ;[lI m i~ enim nnn ~dd;! i up<.:r en. th is poim bccau~e of Thumas'~ frequent US<' of AriSlodc'5 exam pIe of heah h 10 ill"S\fate analogy by refercnce 10 :1. fif$!. If onc applies Ihis enmplc 100 rigid!)'. onc may conclude Ii13! jUSI:l.5 health i$ realized imrj n5icaHy only in !he pri mary analogale. a li ving body. SO 100 being i~ prescm inl ri n.;olly only i 1\ Ihe primary analogalc for heing. $UbSlan C<'. This would result in deny-

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Parrnenides and Ana logy of Bein g

93

differellt conclusion, If individual substan ces belong to the sallle species, being may be predicated of them analogically, no! univocally. To say anything else would be to run the risk of reducing th e diffe rence.~ between an}' two such bei ngs- their individual differences. if you witl - IO the realm of nonlx-ing. If being were predicated of any tWO substances univoca!ly. thei r individu:l1 and individuati ng differ. ences wou ld have to be added to being from with out.~~ In add it ion. as Fabro has pointoo Out, some textual evidence can also be offered for the interpretation we have JUSt proposed. In his Commeillary on I Smuncn, d. JS. q. t, a. 4 Thomas nOt es that somet hing may be com mon to cliffe-relll things univocally or equivocdlly or dnalogically. In support of his con tention tltdt not hing can be sa id univocalJy of God dnd of any creature, Thomas reasons that we mliSt take into account both the quiddity or nature of a thing and its m~. In things which are commOIl univocally, there m lt,~ t he community ill terms of the definiti on of the nature, but nOt in terms of n!~. A given m~ is present in only Olle thing. Thus the condition ofbcin g hu man (!Jabitur IJllmanita til) is IlOt realized with the same (SlI! in fWO difierell1 human beings. G iven this, Thomas concludes that when· ever the form signified by a term is tlU itself, this cannm pertain univocally to different things. Consequently. he continues, bei ng (till) is not pred icated univocally:J6 Since he has been discussi ng roe as realizoo in ditTerell1 human beings, presumdbly he would apply this concl usion to any TWO individuals within the same •

spec h~5.

Though Thomas d oe.~ not spell th is out Cor us in great detail, his reasoning seems to be this: because being (ms) itself is complex, includi ng both quiddity and tiSt, and bCCl use ~s.s~ is not realiZt:d univoca lty in tWO differem members of the $dme species, neit her is being so realized. II seems 10 follow, therefore, that for Aquinas, whether being is predicated of substances which differ speci fi cally or of subst-:lnces which belong to thl' same species and differ from one another only individually, it mUSt be predicated of [hem analogically, not un ivocally. on ly ma ( ~ri3ny unequal. For dj5Cu ~ion ~ C. Fabro. Lt "qUq,ll' mtltl.foira di ptl.rtfriptlz.;ont smmd{J S. Thmmmod'Aquino, ld ed. n i lrin , 19\0), pro171- 7l. 9}· So:e nn. 1$ and 14 abovt, 96. "Huiu 5 t"Jlio c.ll quia Cum in rc d uo ~it considen' t: scilice t nam rlm ".:I qu ;dd;I"-t~m r~i. et ~ !UUm, opon et quod in omnibus univocis si t eo",mun;t:.s ~ccu"du m r:uionrm namrae. ~I non secund um es5(', quia unum cSSt non d t nili in un~ re; unde h~birus h"ma n i l~ l is non est S<"<:undum ide m CSS<' in d uob u~ homin ibus: CI idt'"\l quandocumquc fOlm 3 sign ilicara pel nom(n d[ ipsum ess(. nOn PO' ''''' "ni,~><:" ,"O",,,,,, j,,., 1''''1'«'' ,t,,,,d "",m en. non '''';''''';0: p.a",I'<:3t"" ( M " n J " n "CI c.J ., Vol. !, p. 8(9). Cf. F~bro. La noz;lJnt IIJfllljisictl., I)· 17 l . n. l .

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Partici pation

97

we ~nd a quality or perfenion po~e$sed by a given subja ! in only panial r:t{hl':r than in total &shion, such a subject is said to participate in that perfection . If in fact other subjects also share in Ih al same perfection, it is because each of them only panicipatcs in it . None is identical with it. Thus, appeal 10 a participation structure is also a way of accoulliing for the fac t rh:u a given kind of dlaractcristic o r perfection can be shared in by many different subjects, or of addressing oneself to the problem of the One and the Many. T homas immediately goes on 10 observe Ih,l1 participation can rake place in differem orders and in different ways. Thus (I) man is said to participate in animal because man does nOt pos~S$ the in tell igible content of anima l accord ing to its full univcrsali!)' (ucundum totmfl commullitatem). So 100 , Sones is said to panicipate in man, and apparently for the same reason , My understanding of So rtes taken as this individual man does nO! exhaust the intelligible content expressed by man in ils full unive rsali ty, I n like fashion. ( o n('iIIU es Thomas, (1) a subject participa tes in an accidcm, and maner in form; for a substamia! o r an accidental form , while being general or unive rsal in [erms ofilS iOle1ligible COlllelll, is restricted [0 this or thaI subject in which it is received. T homas concludes [his general descript ion of the kinds or partieipa lio n by noting (3) Ihat in like fashion an effect is said 10 parricipalc in its cause, and especially when it is no t equal to the power of that cause. 9 In sum, T homas has here singled OUI three major kinds of part icipation. The first ty pe is represented both by the way a specific notion such as man shares in a generic not io n such as animal. and by the wa y my understanding or an ind ividual such as Sones shares in my notion of the species of man as such. In each of Ihese examplt'".$ wc are dealing wilh a less extended intelligibility which is said to share in a mo rt' universal o r mo re eXlendcd il1l clligiblc- contC'llt. Si llce in each of these instances we are dealing wi[h the fa ct [hat one intelligible COJ1(C!1l shares in another without exh:H1sling it, we may describe it as a case of participation; bu[ sinct' we aTe only dealing with i ntdli g ibl ~ W illems, the parricipalion is logi.:'.!.1 o r imcnlional. not real o r onlOlogical.·' pmt" ni h il ~ I i ud e~1 quam ab alio pmia litel acc ipcte." AI!iO 5.,e F~ b ro. La 119Zi(Jnf fII((ujisiOl, pp. }J(;.... ' 7,

II. u • • • SicUI homo d ici tut part icipate a ui ma l 'lilia nOli h;tbet rat iOll cm alii 1lt~lis 5«11 ndum t<}tam (ommUn i{~I ~ m: el e~dcm .. (io ne So rtc.~ pa rl ic ip3t ho minem. Similiter eda m subiC"Cl um pJ rlicil)at accidens et mateda forrn~m. !.juia fOt Ina subSl:I.n tialis vel ~ccjdc!lla! i s , quae d e sui r:ll ione commun is CSt. de lcrm; n~ tur a., ;uIl o r , hi, ...,' Fab.o. t" 1 "/J~i{)"r IIUr.zjiJicJI, 1'1'. 17 .... ! 8, !·n.... 46 , 1.19 .... S0; G";S"r, Ln pan irip,lfjon d.,m /.. pI,j/oftJpJ,jr dr S. 1IJO/I/I/i d'A'I"j" , PI" ~lI""~9: I e Vddc, l 'a rriclpal i(JI1 and S" hl tlmtiJl/ity. PI'. 76-81. 0" t"i ~ s<xouti gcnt ral ' YP<' of l);j" ki padon ~ Iw S<:<' sec l, c . Jl: "Amplius, Omnt' q uod dc plu, ibu s p racJ iC'"J tuf lIni voce. se<:"ndum l'''ll ic; r~ ,ioncm c" ilibe, eorum c" n ven; t de <J UO prJCi!iat l1l r: nam Jprrln pllm cip" " diril~' /:(11/11. CI ;',ah'idlll,m s/,,"ciml. I)c Dco ~ul~m nihil dicitu, P"" p~rI ic; p~t iom:"" n~rn o mnc '1"00 p~ n k ipat ur dClcrrninal u. ad Illoou m par! icil»{i l pa,, ;ci p~ nlis, St'<:ms 10 b<: dema nd ed I,>' the ~Il>c l . cl sic pm i ~l ;,cr h~I"' lU r cl non ~u ndum om-

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Parriciparion

10 1

IxcauSt: it indicates that ifsomething is 10 serve as a subject for an accident, it must it sclf rx isc And in order fo r it to exist. it must panicipat c in me, or as Thomas has also phrased it , in dte aClUJ NSl'I1di (act of bein g) . Here, Then, we find Thomas very deftly insert ing his own metaphysics of mt laken as ac t of bei ng intO his C ommentaryon Boet hius. 1'1 This becomes even clearer as Thomas turns to ano ther Boethian axiom: in every composi te, m t and Ihe composit e itself differ. Here Thomas finds l30cthius formulating axioms which penain to the nature of the one (1/1Ium) rather [han of being (nu), as had umil now been the C;ISC. Alld, comillelliS Thomas, al thi s point Boethius has shifted frolll diversity in t he order ofinwu ions to d iversity in the order of realiry. " . . . juS! as tSSt and 'that which is' differ in the o rder of intentions, so in composite entities do they differ really !rtaliur} ." zI> In order to support Ih is, Thomas first recaUs a point which we have al ready considered- tllat mt itself does not participate in an yt hing else so tha t iu intel ligibl..- content (mtioj might consist of different factors. H e also recalls another po illl wh ich unt il now we ha ve nOI ment io ned- that nu does nOI admit of Ihe :Iddirion of anYT hing ex ninsic to ilS formal content. Therefore, he quickly concludes, mt itself is nOI composed . But ifit is 1t0t, then a composite or com posed enti ry ca nltot be idcn tified with its ~JJ(' (act of bei ng) . Here. [hen, we seem 10 havc an argumcnt for thc real d istinclion berween essence and act of being in composi ll' entities. although not one ofThoma5'$ morc usual argumcIHs for Ihat co nciusio n . ~1 O ne might immediately ask, however, about fi ni te or caused simple enritics. \Vill L'Ssence and m~ be distinct in t h e m~ [t seems that some other kind of argumentatio n will be required 10 establish [h is. In appare nt ant icip3t1 on of o ur query, nem ' !'SillS CS~. rC~lal "I partlClpt quocun"lu,' a/,g, ~" hO( scilicel 'luod sil ~J i'l uid " (I...,o n. ):0. I 7l " 80 - 191) ·

l!l. In additio n 10 mher pass~ges rrom Ihe Commentary On Ihe 1ft /1fbdoml1d,bus (set: n. 1-1 above), One m~y cOih iI PUI icif"l l. Uncle .I i si t al;quicl quod si! if>5l.1m es~ subsiSien. , sicu l d,· Oro dicin\us. nihi l pUlici · pare d'cimus. NO r> e SI a U!W1 simil is ral io de aliis form iJ ~ubj islen! ib\lS, 'lU:l.\ ueccssc e.e of paff icip~l ion of bein g.<; in ro~. anJ a co nfirm3t i011 of ,he vi ews <":XPf~!oSt:d in his C' :II1lmr ma ry a ll {he lk /1,bdom,' secund um ip.3.< inlcm;one;. Hie os, end II quo modo applicnUl ad ~ ... . Elf ergo prill10 cOluider:l nd um <\,,00 sicU! CIS<: el quod CS I differmll <ecundum in t("m ionrs , ila in compruid ~ di tferum ~Jliter~ (Ll-o n.so.27u 96-2n:206) . ZI . "Quoo quid cm Ol anifrs. um el l '·' I' racm;n ;'. oien"" <:.> 1 "n;1ll s"pra 'luod ipsum Cli:;C ""'1"" lurricil)J I ~Ii'lu id ul ti us r.u i(J (Onsl; lUllUI ex Il1Ulli.~. neq ue ha!x,1 aliquiJ ('nrin$l."C um admiXlUm lJt sil in eo com posil io acciJcm alis; e! id'~1 ipsu m esse non C.
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Parti ci p:uion

105

rogether with its mauer in the ca.~ of a composite emity, is in potency with respect to its aCI ofbe;ng. Another importam difference between the first type of parti cipation, tim of a species in its genus or of an individual in its species, and other kinds of part icipation includ ing lila! of beings in m~ is brought out in Thomas's Commentary on the Dr HebdomadillUI and in Quodlibet ;;, q. 2, a. t. In Irclio 3 of the former text Thomas is com menting on a que51ion raised by Boelhius co ncern ing whether beings are good by their essence or by participation . T homas remarks that Ih;5 qucstion assumes that to be romt~ thing essentially is opposed to being something by participation. He concedes that this is truc acco rding to the second major kind of participation he has distinguished (thar of a substance ill an accident, o r of maTter in form ). This follows because an acciclem is not included with in the nature of its substanrial subject, and form is not included within the naTUre of maner. Bm this does nOt apply to the first major kind of participaTion he has dist inguished, at least not according to ArislOde, although it would app ly if, wiTh Plaw, we defended distinCTform s or ideas, for instance. for man, fo r biped, and for animal. According 10 ArislOdc, whom Thomas here follows. a man is Truly ThaI same thing which is an animal. Because an ima l do~ IIOt exist apart from the \ ;:o an;n,a!i. nOll ubrl'm t l'r~~" t. J i ffc...,,,, i~ m homi ni s. nihil pwhi!>e! id qucll.! pcr Illrt ki palionc:m d id l UI (I jam ~ llll!ll an dalil e! praedic~ IL - Hence i" d ,,: I""ub le~w' ~ tc.' , [,,'''' I" V(! loIn. (ci,ed in n. 9 ab<:>vc) Thunld$ m USI Ix: UndtrSland ill j5 I)Jlt ki p~doll only illlhc !oC:cun", l Ultlll crealur.! pr:lcJ k altif IlI: r p:lnicip;u ;,)n<·nl: "nib tn im .:Iel".Ira ~'S, 5""111 ~,5<...I 1'$1 habc n5 (sSI.' • .. . - Th()m ~s Ihen applic:s Ihis 10 g,K>dnc:ss as wd l. \'(Ihilc God ;., u id 10 Ix b'()(){\ o S('"llIially

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Partic ipation however, he then also rders objection 4.\1)

In his

to

~JS~

11 3

.

comm unI' JUSt as he had done in his repl y \0

C ommentary on the Libt'r dt' caw;; of 127 1- 11.72. Thomas fi nds ils unknown amhor considering the following objection. Someone might argue that if the first c;m$(' is pure t'lff (mt' ta1ltIlm), it is t'lff communt' which is prcdic:llcJ of all thingsi therefore il is nOl something exist ing indi\'idually and d ist inct from al! others. That which is common is not rendered individual exc..:pt by being n.""ccived in something. Si nce the first cause is, in fact, somerhing individual and d istinct from all others, it seems Ileccss;uy 10 co nclude that it has )'Iilllim, that is, somethi ng which fcceive.~ its t'Jft'. ~ l T ho mas comments that to this the Ubn dt' {{lusiJ replies that the very infinity of the divine we, insof.lf as il is not restricted by any receiving principle, plays the role in the first cause which )'Iilllilll ext'reises in other things. Th is is so bl"CJuse the divine goodness and the divine meJre rendered ind ividual by reason of their very purity, thai is, by reason of the (,1CI that Ihey arc nOi received in anything else. Tho mas explains th:1I something is said to be an ind ividual because it is /l Ot its nature to be found in many things. Bur Ihis m ;l}, happen in two ways. It may be owing to the fact that the Ihing in question is delermined 10 some one subject in laI C

SO. For ST I. q . .I. a. 4, ad I. 5<."<.: l.cQn . ~.4 1 : "Ad pr imunl ergo dicendum quod uliquid cui nonfil adt/ilio po. r$1 ;nldligi .I"plici!cr. Uno m<.>do. UI .I.., (;"io"" "i us , il qllOtI non fial ci ~ddilio . . . . Alio rnudo inu:l!igi, uI aliqlliJ cui non iiI aJdi rio. 'lui~ nOn ~M dt· rd lion c ..,ius quod sib i fi~1 ~Jdif io... . Pri UlO igim f modo. ('15<.' , inc ~ dd il iont·. C~I ~ divin uUI ; 5<."i:Undo m"do, O.>C si ne add iri""c, Cli! CSK (Omm11nc. " He, e he is al~wering an o hjeclion which wou ld ident ifr God ...... ith t'S1t' (omm",u o r OIl ("mm~ lIf i( one rn~i!\taiIlS thaI ill God tSscn(c and f$Jt'a rc 11,1' sa!l1C. Thornas:~ rcpl)' 10 Ob~l io n 6 in Dt petrlllil/. q. 7 . ~. z is add r(S.>(!d fO OM'!Ui~!I.I' Ih e ,';"ll<: objccrion. Cf. /n I !it.". , d.li, q. ~. ~. I, ~ d I. whne a si mibr obj('C lion and T hom:lSs ICp\}' art· C~P ICSSl...,j in ICrlTlS of 1m (Otmm"u (Vol. I. p. If !) . for dte ,\.amc dis. inclion set: SCC !. c ~(,. "SCC l,lud um" (rd. CiL. p. !8). p . "!\)sse. eni m aliqu is dicc,,' quod . si c~usa prima ,il <''is<: lalltum . videlu , 'l uod Stl esS<.· OOfllmunc 'l'IOO de omnibu~ praedic"~I I,l! cl quod non ~i l aliquid i nd i vidu~\il ~r ~ns ab ~Iiis tl i ~{ in ({um ; id ell im '1uoo 0:$' Ci)mmunc nu n ind ividual ur " i~i pel hoc 'lu.:xl in al;'luu rcciptwr. C~Us.;l ~ul tm prim~ '-'$1at iqu id ind i viduali ter diS! inCHml ab omn ibus ~ t i is . ... Erg!> "id tlll r {[ u.:xl '1lY"fflnil d ictrc c:1 USJm prilll~ln h~lhcrc )/iat; m. id eM al;: 1)~ n d cU Up!>11 a hrief SrJl ell1 ell I of Ih i.' objcct iOIl by (he alii hor or fhe Lib" dt' r ill" ;! (M'" J>f()I" 9). and ~m~ to have te~d inlo il his own con cnn aboul nOI idcmifyin g dIe first came wilh nit' rommunt. T he origi nal objection r<'aik "Q lIod si d ixer;1 ali'lu is: neccS$C ~'Sl UI sit < habcns> y l;l/lim. diccmus .. . " (I" 57). Th!>1l13S had anclll pted an clYlllotogica l expt ~ llal jon of Ihe (;Ilher myslcrious cx p'n<>ion ,!iatim in ! he i III mctl ia lely pr<::cC(ji nl; C" nI O >"" '<1"0.1 cs. mJler;a" (p. 6 ~ ) . ln fa(l. Ihe A",hi..: ur igin~\ (rum which Ihe co rtupl ~d Latin IF.lnsliter:lI iun w>.s ta ken n n meall ~orn amnll." ~ atlriilUlc.- " Ij ,!~!il )". ~ •' Ialt". " •cond i. iun: "appeAran ce," or · fo'm . ~ Sec R. T' ylor, "5(. Thmnas alHl the Uhu dl "'mis on the H)' lomo q)h k Co mpo,i. io n of SCp~ "JI C SuhS' ·Jn c<"S." M,dl"t',itJl 51"'/;(1 1' ( P)].,), 1'1'. 510 - 1J. Nc,·cn hdcss. as Ta )'lo r aho po inl~ om. while being miMakcn in thinkitl j; Ihal )1idtirn is derived rro m ,he Gf~k lefm for 1Il~l t("r. T huma$ . .......~, 'lu il e eo n .,.;t in maimaining Ih~1 in Ihe £Ncnu';f lh ~ imd l igcnc~ do nO! h ~ vc rn~lIer. " On Ihe gc ncnl accuracr of Thomas'~ Com mcmalY Stt C. d · An con~. R(chlrrlrt"S mr It f.if,..r m um (l'ad J, 1')~ S) , JlI)· u ') - S8. C f PI" 11 8- ' 9·

s.:c

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Partici pation

121

(act of being) would simply be a piece or a part. &u (ommIUl( docs nOl ex ist as such apart from ind ividual existents, except in the order of thought. (1) On other occasions Thomas refers to such entities as parTici pat ing in the Fi rst Act, or the First Ene, or the fi rst (king, and as he often adds, by si milirude or by imitation. This does nOl imply that they have a part of Gad's bei ng. It rather means that in every finite substantial entiry there is a participated likeness or si militude of the di\'ine 6!C, that is, an intrinsic act of being (me) wh ich is effi ciently caused in it by God. (J) On stil! other occasions. when Tholl13S refe rs to such enti ties (0 1' natures) as participating in nit', he .seems 10 have in mind immediately the eSjf wh ich is reali'LCd within such entities:\s their particular :\Ct S of being (awlS m mdi). While this usage may stri ke Thomas's reader as ullusual. il may be helpfu l 10 fc<:aU that frequently in such contextS Thomas uSt':'; ~ pa rti cipa t e~ (participart) as a transitive verb with rift' as its direct object? 1 E.ven so, for Thomas 10 speak in this third way is also for him 10 indicate, at least by implication, that any fi nite substance simply has or part icipa tes in me C01mmm( withou t exhausl'i ng it. The first usage. whereby such subs(:IllccS or natures participate in me co mmllne, whether explici tly expressed or implied by the th ird usage, d()('s not exclude tile second major usage, whereby they panicipate in self·subsisti ng we. In facc. as we slw!l suggest below, ill lhe order of philosoph ical discovery, [he first usage shou ld ultimately lead 10 the second. In rhe order of na· ture, on the other hand, rhe second usage is lhe ult imall: rnetaph),siul foundati on fo r the first. If fini te llalUres or su bs(ances do in [leI panicipare in me commune, th is is ultimately bc!cause thc), participate in ('su f/(bJiHl'IIS?~ 7 1. FOf ~ 11

ea rly l'xl' l;';;1 I<:XI which hm . U!%C>leJ I h i~ reading 10 me "" 1.,1 .5..m., d. I'), 'l 5,~· 1 ( M~nd()n net cd .. Vol. 1).1" 49 1:" ... l1uadibcl ,es pan i( ipal suum r.s~ ( ' catll m. quo fo,malile! est, el ll11Usqu isq uc i11!dle'::l us pan it i1)al lumen Pc! quod tcsio l1}: LJr submmriis gP'lrtlt;, (t ;led in nn. 65, 66. 67) . W l,ile the pa~gc CiH'd in n. liS might It":Ivc one in douh, as 10 whelh~1 T homu has in mi nd ("igr9mmu" ..."! the pUliciparn 's i llHil1~ic arlU, mm di. •he h Iler im crprc'31ion i~ 51rongly sugg~'.:J by Ihe remailld<:! o r Ihe .ext a~ <ju<)1~d in nn. 66 ~nd 67. Aim 5<-''' Ql1O-dlihe. I l. ' I. 4. J. I (sc..' 11 . (8 ). 7l. It i~ nOl alw~y$ <:J~y 10 del"nn inc whit h of Ihese Ih.ec 11.131;<::5 of as<' ThomlS has in mind . and on occ uion if i~ r:sp«ially difficult 10 dec ide bcrw n:n .he firsl and lhe ,hird U$.:l~. i.e., 1);urll os.- esc aCTus uhitn,,~ 'lui p~ "ir i pab;li s eso ~h ornnihu$: il'i um ~u":m l1 ihil I'l 'lic' l,at. Unde ~i sil aJiquid 11u1Jd Sil ipsum C.\,:o: )u hsi~len s ~ieul de Dco dicimus. nich;! panieipare dicim us. Non ~1 au(em s;mi!i s ':llio de ali is !ormi s suhsislcnlihus. QU3S 11tCCSS<: CSt p3flid p~rc ipsum <:li~ e. ~oml'a .a .i ~d il'sum U' p()1<:n( ia ad 3Clum" (L<:
ro.

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Parricipatiol1

125

calls participation by composit ion or to what he calls participation by simi litude or formal hierarchy: In account ing for the limi ted charaCter of finite bei ngs, Fabro ass igns primacy to panicipaIion by composition, though he refuses to separate composition and im ita tion as sharply as he believes Geiger has done, Geiger, on the other hand, assigns primacy to participarion by similimde in accounting for this. If the m~ of a given being is limited, this is first and forem ost because it imitates its divine source a ni), 10 a limited degree, not because it is limited by the essence which receives it. Limitation is prior in nature to composition. s l This disagreement in interpretation centers in large measure on what Fabro calls Transcendental participation rather than predicament :!] participation . Hy predicamental participation he means that all the partici pants have in themselves the same formality in terms of its essential content. and that the participated characteristic does not exiSt as such apart from irs panicipants. u Here one has to do with "univocal formalities, such as genera with respect to species, and species with respect to individuals."so [n ot her wo rds, Fabro here has in mind the fi rst tWO major kinds of partici pation distinguished by Thomas in his Commentary on the Dr HrbdomadibUJ-Iogical participation and real participation, whether of maller in form or of a substance in i15 accidents. By transcendental participati on he rather means that the participants have in themselves only a lesser likeness or similitude of the part icipated perfeCt ion , which does exist in itself either as a property of a hight'r entity, or in the pure state as a pu re and subsisting fo rmality in full possessiun of itself. In the last-mentioned cJ.se we arc dealing with lhe part icipation of beings in (Sir, with rhe consequence that the participated perft'ction can only be predicated analogically of the participants, not univocally.8S Geiger, on the other hand , distinguishes tWO different systems of pan icipation, that is, participation by composition and parti cipation by sim ilitude. In the first case, participatiun is b;lsed upon a duality of a receivi ng subject ;lnd an dement which is received. Here dte fundamemal element is co mposition . To participate is 81. For ~n on;rv;cw of rh;~ Controversy .<ec Helen James )01111, Tilt Tlwm;J' SpraTUm (N t"" York. 1966), pp. 88-97, 108- r8. For ... good resullle of l'Jb ro:1 personal re~ct ion s to Geigers approach see F~bro. l'oJrlidp.1lio>l rl mrllnfil; st/un I. ThomliJ d'Alj ui", I'p. 63 -7 J. 8}. See La 1I0~;O "t mmljiJim . PI" J 17-18. 800\. Sec F. . hro, · Th~ ! J\len~i\"(' H crnu.'m·mics of 'l "homi~ , ic t'hilomphy,' Rrr'1(UI of/i/rttJpbYlio 1.7

(197-4 ), I'P· ~ 7 1-7J. 81. S~"C /." IlP:';lI'lt mrrdjisirll. p. J r8. A ~ Fab,o ~ h;" wr; rei: - La parrlXipnionc "",dptil. in eon ~rCfO. i: 'luella della ,'CJH>r~ ,hi C realO rc che, OSCIl<Jo !'.,..scrc pcr USC"1l'1..l. in r.C fia~UIIl( ... IUIIC Ie ah tc ~rraiof!i , flrma lmmrt sc w oo ~,ff"Zioo i purc, ~'irtulilmm/( loI: m inc ." Fa' SUPl'orl he cilt:s rwo inreres rin g re~w /" /I &-111. d. 16. q I, a. r. ad J (M.ntiolln cI ....... Vol. :. 1'. 398): -. . . coovcnienr ia pol t:5r CS$C dupl ici rer: aU! dUt/rum p~n icipa!lliu rn aliquod unum. <:r 1:llis conveni~mil non POlesl ~sc Crealoris cl (:rearurac ... ; aU! .se<:undu m quod un um per sc esr sirnpl ici lt l. CI ~Ir<:rum Ilatt id pal

=

de .Ii mili mdine ;,ius q"aomm por esl . .. <:1 ralis (O n\"co;,mi ... poreSI cr'·... m rJc ad Dcum ... ;" ~ 1'(r;/IIt(. 'I· ~j , •. 7, ~ld ,0: "... crc~rur:> noo diei"" con fu rrllar; Oro quasi parlid panfi cand em formam quam ip!<J panicip.lf. ~I Gui~ o...,,~ (~ I " u h~ra",ial;rer 'p,a rorrua c" ius c...,;t\u,.,. p".' <j ua n_ dam im ira rioncm Cl r p:m icipali..... . . .- (I..<"()ll. u .).671:)j6-)40).

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Panicipati on

129

Thomas's ~ rspe' l ive, (here is lillie justification for Geiger's fear thaI appeal to pa rticipation hy composition might lead to the defense of some kind of preexisting subject or essencc which wou ld Ix independent fro m God and would wait fo r cx istence to be created and poured into it at some subsequcm poill! ill time. Ally such readi ng of Aquinas would, of course, be a caricatu re, but one Il ot tOO br removed from an interpretation actually imputed to a more traditional T homism by SOme, such as William Ca rlo. Such a fea r also seems to haunt Geiger's discussions of this issue. Perhaps this is because he has assumed without justificat ion that an applica tio n of what he understands by participation by composi tion to the case of Nfl' will cafry with it unacceptable consequences which were part of certain theories of paflicipalion prior 10 Aquinas, or whid! may apply to participat ion of mat tCf in form or of a subject in its accidents, but not to participation of beings in (U(. ?, Moreover, SQme .such misundew:tnding seems to have led te Velde to the m i .~ _ taken view that if one holds that essence receives and lim its its corresponding act of being (mt'), it must be prod uced by God before its ac! ofbt'ing and only subsequently actualized by its act of bei ng, wh ich God also produces.?) Such an interpreta tion would lead to lhe absurd consequence that essences would preexist (taken temporally) before receivi ng their acts of being, somethi ng that T homas would, of cou rse, nevef have ad mitted. [t seems to me, however, that both Geiger and te Velde have r.liled to sec:: (I ) tha t here Thomas is applyi ng in an appropriately ,Idapted way the adage Ihal causes call be causes of one anOt her si multaneously accord ing 10 diRt-rent causal Jin es, or in this case, that principles can be murually dt'pendent on one another according to different lines of dependency, and (l) [hat priority in the order of mLlure does nOlnecessarily imply prio rity in the order of lime. Thus, while the ,let of being acrualizes the corresponding essence principll' of a given ent ity and ..sse h~bt~l, ni hil esl , niSI font in im dlt'<.:Iu crtamis. ubi nOll CS I C'~:" I IIJ • .~! Cn';l lril ts.Semiu" kd. ci l .. p. 49). C r. Dr pO/mllll .
ror

!,a rr ;cip~ (ion"):

p. 89 (~cmrJin g 10 I'Jhlo', qu .. ntly <·"Jo,,",,! ,,";,h aCIU.liIY).

~cco"",

=

n,.. would be <:reJted as 1}O'){ enc), and sulll<"

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Essen ce-bse Composition

145

In my judgmcm , this pan of Thomas's lrgumclHlt ion is much more imcrcsring and promising tha n phase one. Phase twO also rests on certain presuppositions, of course. Fi rst of all, thert' is Ihe fact o f m ult ipl icity. If m ulti pl iciTY of imelligences is ~d m i rt ed, in such inrelljgcnces essence ~ n d rMt' must d iffer. The rc~so n for th is is that at must there can be o ne th ing in which essence and m rare id entical. At Ill(: same time. il seems 10 me till! Ihis arguillem , if valid, will apply as soo n as multi plicity of subs[lmial enti ties of ~ny kind is ad mined . If twO or morc things cxis\ wh ich fo r Aq ui nas is an undeniable dalu m of sense experience- in nonc of them with the one possible exception can essence and m rbe ide ntified. T h is is so bcc;)use there cannO t be mo re than one being which i.~ its very m~. "lence, this argum ent may ~ lso be regarded as an early attem pt on Thomas's pan 10 add ress himself to the problem of the One :lIld the Many. Secondly. Ihe argument seems to rest on the exhaustive charaCier of the three possible ways of accou nting for mu ltiplicity wh ich it d istinguishes. Is there no other way of :lccou nting for the multiplicatio n of beings? At l!;::lst as of this wri ting T homas , h i nk.~ thaI , here is not. MOH:oller, as we sha ll s<.:c below when considering the next class of his argum ellls, he evenlllaJ[ y seems to have concl uded that this th r~efo l d way of accoun ti ng for mu lt iplici ty could be reduced to tWO fun da men tal types: (I) multi pl ication by the addition o f:l d ifference (cc. possibi liry o ne as proposed in the Dr rnu); (2) mult ipl ication by receptio n in different subjccts (joining possibi lit ies (1-110 and th ree of the Dr enfe, apparcntly}:P O wens has maint:li ned (hat Tho mas's argumenta tion in rhe De mu presupposes and musr presu ppose thaI God's existence has already been C1itahJished before it can conclude fO a r~al d isti nct io n between esse nce and flU in o ther entities. Owe ns :a nd I conti nue 10 d iffer o n this issue. O n my reading, ullIil this point in the argu· mentation , God's existence has ente red in on ly as an hypothesis. At mOSt then" can be one being in which esscnce and me arc identical. In all other beings they mUSt )7. Sc-c Flbro, "UII itillcr:l.i re d e SlI ilH Tho I!l J~ ." p. 99. To ill ll5tDle th e mo re co mmon appeal !O tWO war~ o f ~cco tm d n g for Illlll d pl ic l! iOIl , r abro c itell Compndium rlmJWgillr. c. 15: • . . . d upl~ K ellt modus 'I"O ali'l";!' rornu p.,HQ[ mu lt;I"'''''''';: unus I"" d ' ffcre""a~ . sicul fO tm~ ge ner:.!i., UI (olor in di "clU' spcc il$ ("oloris: a!ius !>cr s"biec ...~ . •icUl albedo" (Leo n. 41.87:H - l \). Here Thom~s is al[cm pt ing 10 show lh ar th ert' is on ly o n ~ God. H is arguni cllI COnt ill 11($ 10 lhis dr~t : if a form c::umo l ~ mu lt ipli.-d by Ihe aJ d it ion of J ilfcKnces. and if il i~ flO! a for m Ihal exim in a ~ "bj«I . ; 1 o n only be! o ne. BU! such i. H ue of th e divi ne. <":SSI'IlCC which b ident iC"~1 with th e d ivine (Sfr . It sho uld be no t« t th~t F:lbro ~ I,;o W:ltn ~ h.-re ag~im t !iCpar:u ing dl<' th rec argumcnu of Ihe Dr "'''. Hc regards ,h., I"" !" "" on.,. "·I,;,,h he C"~II, " ,e.al'hY"i",,!' :l.' tI,,, 1"01""1:"''''' ~ n ' ! " "",,,,1 ~om pk'n ~ n l o r the firsl one. whi ch he .efen lO;!'~ logi o l (PI'. 98-99l. ['ab ro ci les In / d . 8, q. 4, a. I, ad l ~s a contem p.. r~ ry vcrsion of tI,,! th re~ fo ld d i"i~'o " of d 'e I~ ~mr. The.e T homas writes Ihal ~ mong crca lW Ih ings so melh ing may be J elermin ed so as 10 be Illiq" id eit her (I) by Ihe addil ion of a di ff~,en ce, Of (t) hcc-~" SC 3 commo n naTUre is rC'Cdvcd in so lll<"thin g, o r (J) by d a' addil io n of an accident. Non e o f ,h e.~ wal appl )" (0 God, whose )i mpi icil Y T homas is here defend ing. However, wh ile th e fi rst IWO d ivisions mOte o r 1m par.rllcl lhc fi rsl Iwt) in Ihe [R mIt. the Ihird member of Ihe division in /" / S",, 1. fl nd s no par:l lld in Ih t Dr mIt. And thei. purposes are nO! Ihe SlI me. See <.J. Cil., Vol. I . pp. lJ')- lO.

.xnt.,

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Essence ~EJse

Composi ti on

149

from somcthing else, or must be efficiently caused. H ea' Thomas uses the conchl+ sion established in phase: twO as the point of deparrurc for his argument for God's existence; for he grounds the radically caused or contingcll1 character of all beings. with om' possible exceprion. on the disti nction within them of essence and NJt. 4 ~ After com pleting his argument for God's existence T homas observes that this First C.ause is the cause of m~ {((w s(ll'JJendi) for all other things by reason of the fact that it is pure Wi . He again nOtt's that an intell igence is form and mi (sec the conclusion of phase two), but now goes o n to show that form and mr are related as potency and act. 4J That which rt'ceives someth ing from another is in pOtency with reSpect to that wh ich it r«eives, and that which is received in it is it s act. Hence the quiddi ry or form (or essence) which is an intelligence is in potency to the mr it receives from God. and its m~ is received as its act. In o ther wo rds, only now has Thomas complcted his general effo rt in [h is chapler to show not o nl y that essence and ~su are re;llly distinct in all nondivine beings and the refore ill intelligences . but also that they are united in intelligences as potency and :IC t. His text shows that he is again using m~ [Q sign ify the int riosie act of being of any such being. ~ Ekcau5e . . _ the (luiddi1)' of an intelligence is [he intelligence itself, there· fore its qu iddiry or essence is identical wit h that which it is, and its m~, which it receives from God, is that whereby it subsists in reality."H Thomas also wmments that for this reason substances of this kind are said 10 be composed of quo est and quod ru, o r as Bocthius puts it, of quod ru and uu. Though T homas has not used the term ~rC:lr' [Q d escribe the diversity and com· position of essence alld me which he has argued for in th is chapter, he will usc such term inology a few yC"JI"S later in imerprcting the Bocthian couplc[ in his C ommentary on the Dr H~bdom(ldilmJ. Th is we ha\'t' already seen in the previous chaptcr. Hut it is worth mentioning again , since it suggests that the kind of diversity .g. l..ron. 4}.J7p27- 1J7. Note the concluding remark: "'Ergo "POlltt qllod omni~ t~lis r~ CUi ll~ as(" est ~Iiud ql .~m natura sua hahe~t esse ~t. alio" By Ih's S"OIcmcnr Thnm~~ b s consider....! ~nd

eliminated a thi rd po~ibil jt y, i.t .. thlt something which bt-longs 10 ~ thing is simply idtfJl iC:lI with that thi n" ill.dr. H I' ciiminates it by concemr:ning on ix-ings in which n~!ur{" and rw rally diffn In "II such b<-ings Ihl'ir t"f.1~ mUSI I~ gi"cn ,0 Iht m from .... i,hom. which ;s '0 s.>.y. tll{"Y mU5t bt dfic.icnl ly GluSI'd . .01 ; . For
"Omnc awem quod n:..::i p;t 31iquid ab alio CSt in potenlia quidditas vd fo rma qual' e.
4 H n :l.ol7-16 3)·

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E..sence-Essf C omposiliol1

155

As in Ihe argument from Dr spiriruali/Jus creaIUriI, so in this one as well Thomas joins his case for composition of thi ngs Other th:1tI God with his metaphys ics of panicipation. And like the previously co nsidered arguments, this one also rests on thc impossibility of there being morc than one substance which is its very m e. The by-now familiar parallel widl whiteness is again drawn. If whiteness cou ld subsist in itself, it could only be one. If rot' does subsist in itself, it roo can only be one. Once more, therefore, the argumem woul d nOt have to assume th:u there is such a thing as self-subsisting mr. The impossibil ity of there being more than one casc of th is would be enough for Thomas to conclude to nonidcntity of essence and act of being and , :lccordi ng to the present argumen t. to tilt: composition of potency and act, in ('very other substance. Our final text in this section is mken from Thomas's \'ery late Dr JUbuamiis srpararis, c. 8 ( 1271 or later). There he again argues against Avicebron that there is no need to hold dlat created separate s ubstan ce,~ are composed of mattcr and form in order to avoid identifying them with God. Some potency is present in them since thcy are nor tsU irscl fbur only p:lrricipate in it.('() Thomas aga in insists that there ca n only be one subsisting thing that is l'Su irself. [n support he reasons thai if any other form is comidered as separate, it can only be one. JUSt as a spc<:ies is onc in the ordt'r of thought when it is simply considered in i t.~df, a specific naturt' would be olle in reality if it could ex ist in itSelf as such. The same may be said of a gen us in relation to its species. JUSt as it is one in tht· order of Ihought whcn it is considered in itself r:llher than as realized in ils species, SO too l genus would be one in the ordt'r of rc:!lity if it could subsist in itself. By applying similar reason ing we fi nllly come to W i' itself wh ich, says Thomas, is mosl un iversal (commllniSlimum). Therefore, he quickly concludes, mr mblisum is only one. His point again is that since mr does subsist as such and in itself, subsisti ng ( 1St' ca n only bc one. O nce more he contrasts this with everything else. Everyt hing wh ich exists has rlit'. Therefore in everything apart from the Fi rst Being there is both m( as its act and the substlnce of the thing which hlS rIit' and is l receiving potency for th:n act.f,r Like the previously considered argumentS, this Olle does in fact take God's ex istence as granted. Bm like the others, it would nOI have to do so in order to remai n valid. It. tOO, rests o rr the impossibiliry of there being morc than one bei ng which is its very mr. Beforc concluding this particular section , some remarks should be made about the different w::r.ys in which Thom:lS attempts to show that then: can only be one thing in which essence and mr(act of being) are idcntical, or on ly one case of mr mvsiut'lls and hence, by contrast, that essence: and ;rcl of being differ in everything else. 60. loon. 40 .0 5S:164- 16<).

6r. lron. 40 ,05sa6!l- rgi .

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E.isence-Esse Composilion

159

Fundamentally the same reasoning reappears in D t: potrlllia, q. 7, a. 3, in Thom· as's first argument there to show that God is nOl included in a genus.?1 We find this repeated in its essentials in ST I. q. 3, a. 5. In his third argument there 10 show that God is nOt in any genus, Tho mas reasons that all things which are included in a given genus share in the q uiddit y o r essence o f that genus; fo r (he genus is predicated of them in quidditativc m hio n. But they di ffer in terms of their I.'Ht:. Thus the t:JJt:of a human being is not ident ical with that of a horse nor, for that malter, is Ihe fiji,' of this human being idemieal with the me of another human being. Therefore, in all things which fall into a genus, ml'{act of being) and quod quid m. or essence as Thomas also specifies, difle r. But they do not differ in Cod. n As I have already indicated , in none of these :Hguments does Thomas appcallO God's exislCrlce in order 10 make his point about essence and mI.'. On the cOlllrary, he rather argues that if so met hing belongs TO a genus. essence and wl.'(au of being) differ in thm thing. Si nce essence: and Nit: (act of being) do not d iffer in God, he cannot belong to any genus. Moreover, appeal to any version of the ;1/I('lIut/IJ m alrial.' appro.1eh has disappeared fro m these bter prCSt~ nt:llions. Before exam ining this line of reason ing more critically, it will be helpful to ltJrn to the version offered in DI.' !lffimfr, y. 27, a. 1, :Id 8. There Thomas is considering the question whethet grace is something positive which is creared in the human sou l. In defending h is affirmJtive reply, Thomas must meet this objection: Only things wh ich are composed can belong 10 a genus. Grace, being a simple fo rm , is not composed . Therefore grace is not present in an y genus. But since everyth in g which is created belongs to a genus, grace is nOt something created .7J While the context for this object ion is theological. Thomas's reply is of considerable philosophical int ereSL I-Ie begins by agreeing with the objt'etion, but only in part: if someth ing belongs to the gen us substance, he specifics , it IllUSt be composed, and by real composition, he adds. In sup port he reasons Ihat whatever f311 s within the predicament substance subsists in its own (SSt!, Therefore its rot! (act o f being) mllst be different fro m that thi ng itsel f. Otherwise, such a thing could 110 t differ in terms of its t!S!t,from all other th ings with wh ich it ~l grees in quidditJtive CO ntenL Such agreemelll in quidditative COll(t'I1t is r('(luired fo r things to belong to a given pred icament. Therefore, he concludes, everything which is includ(:d directl y with in the predicament substance is composed , at least of mi' and quod (Jr, that is, of a CI of being and essence. On the other hanO. he cont inues, .romcthi ng does not have to be composed by n:al compo~ ition in order to belong to an aceidcn~~ i~":nf i~ ~. \ Pr:l-:I(f g~IIt'ri ~ tluit!t! i l~' ~ Ill_ H oc i. UI " m

ill Ow inlPQssib ilc

C!;'-

J)"Ul

igitu r in

s"n ~ f(

nun est" k d. cit., p. 16). 71. Ed. l'i l., p. '9,. Norr: "I'timo {I uid~m . qUIa nihil POll ltU! ill e.cll ~ re sc<cundulll esse Alum, scrl r:lli()11~ '! l,; t! d ilari •• uae; <\"00 ~ ~ hoc pa,,,,. lCSI esse c.m,m unis .. , ." 71. L('un_ + 4-1 . Nmc Ih~ ( ondusion: .. 1:1 sic op.)" el quod 'luaec.m "que ~u " t in g.. n~r". di!feranl in cis l'S,<e l'I '11/(J(i quid <'1t, ides! c.ls~ !Hia. In [);:o ~ ut<'m non diffen . . . ," iJ. 1.<'011. H -3-7?O:j l-'j5,

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Essence- bSt' Compos ition

163

ipation at least to somc cxtCIH because of the fi rst claim; WI' itself docs not p:micipate in anyth ing elsc even though. as Thomas has shown earlier in this same Irrtio, "that which is~ or being (ms) does panicipatc in t'H1'.Bi Thomas's ra:ognition tha t this kind of argumemarion is restricted to manerform composites may accoulH for his immedialc illl roduclion of a second approach which is more direcdy based on participation . And il cou ld be that he realized that the first argumelH needs some reinforcemem. Be dial as it may, he first distinguishes between [hin g~ which arc simple in the absolute sense SO as to lack all composi tion, and things whi ch arc simpl e in a quali fi ed scn~. If thefe arc certain forms which do nOI exist in man er, every such form will be simple insof..... r as il lacks maner and qllanrit),. If such forms subsist. it docs not immedialely foll ow from this that they arc perfectly simple. Suppose for the sake of discussion that one admits the existence either of subsisting and separale forms or ideas in dte PlalOl1ic senS(: or of ArislOrle's separate cll1ities; in eilher CdSe any such form will determine mr with respect 10 irs kind of being. No such form will be ident ical with m~ com mun~ ilself, but each will only "have" nil'. Each, insofar as il is distingllisht'd from other sepa rat e form s, will be a specific form ,hat participates in mI'. None will be simple in tlw unqualified sense; but each will be composed , we may co nclude, of its form or eSSf;:nce. on the one hand, and of ,he me (aci of being) in which il participat es, on the otherY Thomas moves flOm this '0 the concl usion thal the only perfectly simple being is one wh ich does not pan icipale in m t but is subsisting mI'. Again he reasons Ihat such a being can only be one; for if mt insofar as il is tsSe admirs of nOlhing extrinsic to itself, that which is subsisting t'SStCJ. ntlOI be mu ltiplied by any diversifying principle. This un ique being, of cou rse, is G O(J.5-~ Th e.~e twO argumen ts are of considerable imerest to our prcSt:nt discussion , firSt because in introduci ng !hern T homas has explicitly distinguished be tv.'een d iversiry Un i,-ersi.ii t5bibl io.hck "Sl , f. ?9 r:1 . ' 4.h Century.: and V'" = Va. ic.:1.11 l ihr.ory 808. r. H va. c~rl y 151 h un m fr). Rut Ih" .m angcs. evidence po int ing .o o m itt ing tn! is. in Illy o l'ini,m. ph i!Qsophia l and cont",m 'J I. FQr d", po int .Ill. I'W' ~dmi t.S of nm hing eXi ranoou~ 10 its ; nt elligible cOIu em s« L,·o n. 50.l71: 1'4 - l 7 l ': 146. I n b rief Thoma) b,,:;e,; • his o n the faCE tim UH i, cons;der,-d abSI rJcliy. 8 1. /l.kl ncrnr d elllCS Iha . Th {)ma~ illl cnds rOI Ih is 10 be ~ ,kmonSl rJlio n of a re'J I disl inCi iofl Ix lwcl'n ffll' and 'llUM m . It ;.1 t ru ~ .ha. o ne mi ght opect Thom ~5 to imroduce anOlh cr 51ql ~ rla wril ing th at ro~ itS<'lf is nOt com posed. i.e .. that m~ i=!f can not Ix id cntifi,-d wilh ~ny co m po, il r Ihi n!;, and t hen hycon\"crsio n r ~ch , he c""el Lls'on ,h3' a C'''" l'o~i fC thi ng h no, rn... Bu' '" Mcin _ erny no tes, Tho m~s wri tes tha t a compmitc , hillS i.l not IfJ es.«". &e Md ll~ rn )', Honhius um{ Aquj tlflj, 1)1). U)- I + I would ~ ugg.CS t , ho,,"<"vet. lhm Tho rn~s f(J50I\~ ~5 fonow~ : If ipsI< m roranno , I,.. id ~ n . i ­ h<:n . sO.ln ' U I- 149. Nm .... in pa rt icul~, lines 1}(r--49 as ci'ed ahov~ in e h. IV. n. l J . Tho mas had ;nm)jj uQd .I" s dis.-u.ss;oll w it h [h is rcm n k: "Si en; m esW[ al; ud ,cali. N id q uod CSI ,.• ipsUll1 CSSC', iam !lOEl ~ I si mpl ex. 5("d com pos;t ul1l" (U !)- UO). f or more d iscussio n sa: C h. IV 31>0>·..... nil . Zl. 13. and the correspo nd ing leXI. 8). I..e.:.n. \0.171 :149-1\8. s.,~ C h . IV ahoY\", n. 24.

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Essence- ESse Composicion

167

and composition between the nal'llre and the act of being which is intrinsic 10 each of Ihese entities. Would it nOI be enough to say thaI each of these different natures or emifies panicipales in the act of being viewed in general (mr communt') and is Ihercfore merely conceptually distinct from rSJt' commune in the wayan individual inSlance of human nallire as realized in SOrles is ollly conceplUally distinct from the human species in which he pani c ipa t es~ Thomas evidently thinks Ihat a merely conceptual distinCtion between nature or essence and act of being will not be enough 10 account for participation of beings in me. In facl, the present text suggesls {"wo additional reasons for this_ The fi rst is nOt fully developed , but runs something like this_ If m e (the act of being) is to be multiplied, this ca n only be owing 10 diversiry on tite par! oflhat which panicipates in iL Therefore, bee,lUse d ifferent natures or entities participate in it , it is realized in different f:tsh ion in each of them_ Not only d oe.~ this requi re real diversity betweell one participating nature or emit), and another; it also requi res real diversity within every such bein g between something which receivcs and diversifies me (the act of being) and the received and diversified act of being itself_ One may ask why_ This follows because ~u as such is not sel f-dividing or self-diversifying. As Thomas has explained in a number of other conrexts, NU insof.""I r as it is NU is not divided. It coin only bt: divideJ by something that is different from itself, that is, by a nature or essence which receives and diversifies it. If the rsu (act of being) of this human being is different from the Nit' (act of being) of thaI hum:ln bei ng or lhat stone, this is because in eadl of them the nature or essence which receives and diversifies tJSf' is distinCi from th e mt' which il receives and di\'c rsi fies. ~! The sttond reason is mOTe directly suggested by our t(,XI and will be developed in the following section of this chapter. It foll ows from Thomas's oft-repealed claim that act, especially the act of being (rot), is nOt self- li miting. But if mt is pareicipaled in by a subject or participant, it is present in tim subject on ly ill partial or limited fashion. This follows frorn the \-ery nature of participation , as Thomas understands it. If one is to aCCount for the limitation of that which is not selflimiting, one must postulate with in such a panicipant an inuinsic pri ncip le which receives and limits mrCthc act of being), and a really distinct act of being which is received and li mited . Hence for both of these reasons, appeal to a merely logical or concepmal distinction between essence and act of being will nOt be sufficiclH 10 account for Ihe hlet that given beings :lc[Ual ly and really do participare in me. Real 9~. Th is

nOli"n;$ a['('~dy implicd by Th()m~s'$ Com m('ntary on the fk Trin;ll1u of lIoclh iu$, q. 4,~ . t, althou gh th(,l(' it is applitd to I'm: ··Non POIes l ~UlCtl\ hoc~~. quod ens d ividJ tlll ~b Cllte in qU3nfUm C$f ens; nihil ~uttm divid; tur ah ClU e nisi non ('ns" {I..('Qn W.1:ZO:96-"Kl. It bc-cOI11(s ", "eh "'Of<: ~):pl jd l in sec II. c . ~ z, within Ille fi tst ~rJ;ume"t for COHrPQsi lio u of nlf ~ nd 'luOti tit in rrea\~...J ;nrdlcctu,,1~ "b5t ~IKt~. where it i~ "pplkd 10 fflr (sc<' n. Sl 31>ov(' (or the tc~ '). h is CU Il firmed hy a remark in l"k pomlfia. q. 7, ~ . l. ad '): MEr pe, hunc lll00um. hoc nsr ~b illo mr di.ll;" guitu,. in 'lU~nfUlll eS I I:l li.l vd lali, n~lUrJe" ( l'e5.\i QlI ed., p . t'.lll.

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Essencc:-Em·Composi ti on

17 1

This argUIlIt:nt begins widl th e fact that cream res only have finite or limi ted me. This f.'1Ct would be so evident to Aqu inas that it would hardly need justificat ion . Nonetheless, he also formally argues elsewhere tha t there can not be twO com pletely infinite beings. Thus in sec II , c. p., he reasons that completely unlimited NU would embrnce the lotal pc:rft'ction of being. Hence if such infiniry were to be assigned to (Wo different beings, Ihert: would Ix:- no way in which one could be distingu ished from the other. IO! As for the argument in Thomas's Com mentary on I Smterl(N. this reasoning assumes that if enr were not received in :lI1y subject, it would be unlimited. In other words. it is not self-limiting. Because m, is found in limited fashion in every creature, it must be received by some limiting principlt· in evcry such being. Otherwise: we could not accoun t for the limitat ion of that which is not self-limiting, (In light of what T homas says ill Ihe corpl/so( this anicle, the argument and ilS conchlsion should be resrriclr..'(\ to the It'vel of complete beings or substances, Complete beings or substances full shon of the divine simplicity by being composed. And since in Cod alone is there identity of qu iddity and ml', in every creature Ol1e mUSI find both ils quidd ity or nature and its me which is given 10 it by God, And so it is com posed of quiddiry or nature and of me. Th is is nOI true of what we might call incomplete beings or principles of being, such as prime 1l13tler, or a given form , or even a univt'rsal.) 'O) As we have noted, the argumcnt in the Jed comra r('Sts on the presupposition that unreceivoo ~Sl' is unlimited. The view that aCI as such or, as in this case, that we as such is not self-l imiring appears frctl ut'lltly enough in T homas's writi ngs, from the earliest 10 the latest. He often uses it as a working principle CO e51ablish other points, for inStallCe, divine infinity "" When it comes to Thomas's reaso ns

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102. F..d. cit., p. 1.15: "Adhu c. Imp.mibilt'" C51 quod sir duplex C»C Qmnino infinitum: t'"ttim quod umninu ~~. ; nfin;""". o n",,,,,, p.,rf.·c. ;0""'" c.o;~" d ; eQ'''prchcnd;.: e. ~i<;, ,i <.Iu"b"5 .,.1;) ~d~. ~I infi nilllS. nOn i,,,"cni.('wr quo unum ah ,hclO di!fern.:t. " 10). Ed. cit. , pp. n6- 27. NQlc in p~rrieul3r; '" D im clgo quod Cle~llJr'J C5t duplex. QUJcdam cnin' ('s ( quae halX't c,s<: eomlliclUm in ,;c, sicut homo ~I huiu.modi. ~t t... li. CfeJluD ita defi ci t a .implicit atC d ivin~ quod ,ucid;, in c"UlIX'.itiunem. Cum fnim in solu DC(> esse su um sit sua quiddi. las. op•.m<"l quod in qu~libc( Clf.tUD. vel in (oq)(1r:11t ,·eI ill spi ri ,"~li. imeni. tur (Iuiddita~ vel natur:I ~u~. CI e.'SC5uum, quod c:.l sib; ~cq\(isi1Um ~ Dco, cui us es..:nt;a CSt suum <'SSC; ft il"lI comlX'ni! ll r CK ~, vel quo esl. fl quoo e;t . ~ Here Thumai muves frottl ident ity of f=m:c ;!.nd tiH in Goo to di stinctiOn o f thc same in (o mplcu CfC~(UlCS or subSt~llco. This Jues not implr tim !he '~ rgumenl based on limil~!ion .... hi,·h he prGenlS in (he 5rd ( /).urll rem on (he same ~.\.SumpI;oll , ' O~. I;" Sum ,' r~I""",,,,",j,·,, "' XIS sc.· f" ! SOli .• J . S, 'I. ~. ~. I (e<1. d •., Vol. " I"~ ~o~), ", .. ,'1 hoc moJo sohlnl divi num ose non C"S t IcrminalUm. quia non CSt rcccplUnJ in aliqulI. quod si t di "(' sum ab cQ~ ; /" / ~m., d. 4.\. 'l'.~ ' , (p. (00)). wh~,,' Thomas fi rs! applies Ihis to form , and then to me: " I~t ideo illud ' I"od hao.:1 ~ ~bMlluwm el nullo 1ll0'\" n:CeP1l1nl in aliquu, i!llmu ip!
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Essence-Esse Composi[ion

175

If one ag rees with Thomas that what he calls m r (thc aCl of bei ng) is indeed the actual ity of all actS and the perfection of all perfcrtions, wherever one fi nds it realized in on ly li mited fas hion , ont' must account fo r its actual realization , to be sure, but one mUSt also accou nt for its lim itation, fo r the fact that it is nOt rcal i-LCd accordi ng to its full power or plen itude in th is pan icular instance. For Tho mas, appeal to an extrinsic cause is necessary but not sufficient to account fo r this. He is convinced that a d istinct int rinsic li mi ti ng pri nciple is also required , in orde r to account for the limitat'ion of tha! which is nOt self-l imiting. II " Closdy con nected with this issue is another q uestion: Does th is argument fo r a real d isti nction and composition of essence and rur in fi nite beings presup pose knowledge of God's existence? Recognit ion of its starting point, the fa ct that limited beings exist, dearly does not. But what abo ut its ap peal to the axiom that un rcccived ('!Sr is u nlim i ted~ Does not this presuppose knowledge that God exist's? I have suggested that acceptance of th is axiom reSts on Thomas's particular way of understanding esu. Does not h is undema nding of me as lhe actuality of all acts and the perfe<:tion of all perfeclions p resuppose the Judeo-Christian revelation of G od as subsisting me as im plied in Exodus p 4 ~ 117 As I see th ings, il docs not. !f T homas ulllJerstands by tlU that principl(' with in any given substantial emity wh ich acco un tS fo r the f'lel q"od hoc quod dieo rnr ~I ~n"ar if:U omnium ~ctuum, et proptet hoc CSt p<:tfl·"io o mnium pcrfcctio num" kd. cit., p. 1')1). Tholll:t.'i th en immediatel y ~dds tha t tIlr C"~nnOf be dctcrm;ncJ by ~"yth;ng cis<: th~t would he more formal ";lnd would be added to it as act tu potency. Hence flit is nor detCfl11inffi by 50mething cI~ in , he W'
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ReLuive Nonbeing

' 79

to a consideradon of first principles in the order of thought. He notes that in the case o f first terms (and principles, I would add), negat ive propositio ns arc immediatc. This is so because the negation of o ne term is, as it were, included in one's understanding of the other.6 Though Thomas immediately shifts from this refe r('nce 10 first terms and principles back to the ontological order. his int ent is dear enough. I take him to mean by this that in the order in which we discover fi rs t principles, the principle of noncontradiction comes first, and not , fo r inStance, the principle of identity. As he indicates in other writi ngs, we first come to a knowledge of being and then, by negating being, 10 a knowledge of nonbeing. When we compare these twO not iom we immedia tely sec that bein g is nOt no nbei ng.7 In OUt passage from his Com mentary on the De Tr,n,rau, however, Thomas immedi:uely returns to the ontologica l order. He notes that when the very fi rst creature is considered together with its calise, plurality is thereby introduced into the realm of being. Such a first creature docs not attain to its fi rst cause. Apparently with some so rt of a Neoplatonic emanation scheme in mind, Tho mas observes that some wo uld int roduce plura lity into the realm of being by arguing that from the O ne: o nly one thing can proceed (imrnedi:lfely). This very first effect, taken together with its cause, would constitute a many or a plurali ry. And fro m this first effect rwo things would proceed - one from the first crearure when it is simply considered in itsclf; and another from that same fi rst Cft':ttuTe when it is vic-wed in rdation to its cause.'

•

6 . ~ ... unde in prirn is rc rmilli~ propo~ irio nt5 neg~ ri""c sunt i mmcd ia r~e, qu";!si negatio uniu! sir in inte!lecl u ah crius' (I.etlll. SO.HoOl oo-ro l ). 7. As Courl Cs poi,1I5 OUI , $()!1le Iwem ierh -<:ennuy inl~fpr~rcr$ of Aquinu ha.·c d efend ffi the prio ri!)' of the pri neiplc of ide nt ity r.r. thcr th an t hat or noncom r.ld iCi ion. He Cill'S j. Marit ain :'lf1d R. Garrigo,, - I..agr~ngc to thi ~ clfccl. Stt his " I.·etr~ c( Ie lli>ll -erre scion !>aint Thomas d'Aguil), fl PI" 584- 87. As regards the order of d i~(l\"try, rhis is clearly not 'n tO rnas's vicw. Sn-. ror insunce. {n 1 YnI., d. S, 'I' I, a. J , M~lI donnc! cd. , Vol. I, p. zoo: - r ri rnu m cl1im <Juoo cadit in irnaginalione imdlec! us. ("~ r l·ns. si ne q uo nihi l pm C$! appreh end i ab imdlcn ll; sieu! pI imum quod cadi r in erc.:lu111Jft iludleclus sunl dign iIJtl'S, et pr.r.ecipue ;5Ia, contradictor;,. non esse simu l ."(1:1.... .. Also see S~ mmJJ r" lIIm C~mjfrJ II . c. 8} (cd. cil. , p. zoo): "Natur al iter ig;!u r imd lec rus nOSter eognosc;t en~. et ea quae sum per 5e en ri~ inqu~nrum huiusmoo i; in q u~ cog ni!ione rund~tur p rimorum prin cipio rum notiti~, III 'Ion rot sim,,! affirm,," tlIUgil". el 31ia h uiusmodi. " EspcciJlly signifi ca nr is the following t(;< t rrom ST l- lJ , q. 94. 3. 2 ( I.COIl. 7. IG9 - 70)' " In his Jlltem qUJe in apprehcnsiont: omnium caJun!, quida rn o .do inven iwr. Nanl illud quod primo cadi t ;n 3pprenCl15ione, est ens, cuilu in relIcctu l indud i!Ur in o mnibus qu~<'Cumque <j uis appr~hen di t . Er ideo p r;murn princip ium indem onst r.rbilc es t quod ,,(m f.S1 si", .,l affirma" n "tg
or

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Relative No nbci ng

183

diverse from one anOlher. Hen ce .....e might say that diversity is the princi ple or cause of plurality in such things. But now he in rroduces a funhe r precisio n by distinguishing becween division and d iversity. rn accord with the theory he has jusl presented, d ivision is prcsupposed for the plurality of things which are prior (or fi rst); but dive rsity is not. T his is beGlUse d ivision docs not require that each of the things which arc so distinguished must enjoy being. since it arises from affirmation and negat ion . Unlike division, ho .....ever, di versity presupposes that both of the things that are disti nguished enjoy hei ng. Therefore, d iversity presupposes plu rality, and plu r:llity presupposcs division. Or to reversc our perspective, di\'ision gives rise to plurality, whicll in !Urn gi\'cs rise to d iversity. Hence, reasons T homas. d iversity cannOt be regarded as the cause or explanation for the plural ity of thi ngs which are first un less one takes diversity as equivalellt to di vision. Therefore he concludes that thl' B()(:thian dictum applies to the plurality of composites. In the case of composites, the ca liS(' of plurality or JIlultiplicity is otherness, i.e. , the diversity of things which are first and simpleY' Of greatest interest 10 us here is Thomas's appeal to the opposit ion and division between being and nonheing in his effort to accou11I for any kind of plurali ty o r mul tiplicity within the real m of being. This most fundamental opposit ion between being and non being will be enough for him to distinguish a first crealed effec t from God. the uncreated cause. And it will also be required for h im to d istinguish any given creature from an y other. If we concentrate on one such e(fcx:t, we may say that it is or enjoys being, presumably because it exists, and yet Ihat it is not (or includcs nonbeing) in some other way, since it is not its d ivine cause and is n Ot any other efTe<:t. And if we can refe.r to a plu rality or multiplicity of such primary and sim ple things- effectS immediately produced by God-th is is because the power of the original opposition between being and non being is preserved in each of them. 17

2.

Distinction

of Any

Finite Be ing from O the r Beings

If we grant Aqu inas all of this, we may slil l wonder what it is with in the st ructure of any such prio r and simpler being which account s for the fact that it is not God and dtal it is not to be identified with any other p ri mary and simple creatu re. It seems that in some way Thomas is goi ng to have 10 defend the. reality of some kind of nOll being if he is 10 account for this. Moreover, we may wonde r whether these primary and simple effects to which he has referred in our tC)(t are complete beings in themselves, or perhaps so mething still more fun damental. [ shall now mrn 10 these fWO issues, although in reverse order. 16. [--<:(In. jO. I'U;l j8- l j l. NOI ~ ill PHliculu: "... ql1~mvis ~UI~m divi ~io praec~d.t p[uraljt31~m pri(m)orum , IlOIl Umell diWfSita.~, qui. di visio nOll requirit u"umque co ndiviWlUm esse rns, ru m si t di" i$io p"r . f!i rm3I io,,~m 1'1 ncg.tiollem. $/:'d di"crsi( as requi. i( mrumque esse ens, unde Prae:l;UP' ponj. plu rJlitatcm.· 17. s.:~ n. IS .1.M...c.

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Relative Nonbci ng

191

its an of being. Th is in turn would seriously compromise the meaning of and even eli minate the nee<j fo r one of Thomas's most ccntral mctaphysical positions- real composition and disti nction of essence alld act of being (me) in fini te suhstances ..I!i Moreover, such an interpretation seems {Q undermi ne a number of crucial roles assigned by Aquinas 10 the esscnce principle of finite substances. First of all, as wil] become dear from the immediately following chapters of this study, Thomas turns to the essence of any given substant ial entity in order to account for the determination or specification of the kind of being it enjoys. if is because its essence r(.'Ceives and specifies its act of being that a given substance is of this kind ra ther than of any other kind , for instance, a human ki nd of being rather than a canine kind. To the extent that we may con nect the structure of a given substance wi th the det ermination of its kind of being, St ructu re tOO i~ conferred on that substancc by its essence. This follows because within a given substance its essence principle receives and limits, 10 be sure, but also determines and specifies its correlative act of being. [f essence is equated with absolute non being, or even if it is viewed as nothing but a gi\'en mode or degree of existence, Thomas's way of accounting for (he essential structure of p:micular beings will be severely compromised.)" Second ly, as we have alr('"ady seen in eh. V in SOO1('" detail, according to Aqu inas act as such is not sel f-[imiting and Iherefore the act of being is nOI self-li miting. [f we do encounter fin ite instances ofbcing and therefore of the act of being, Litis is because in every finit e substance its ;lCI of being is received and limiled by its corrt'lative essence principle. \'Vhile differing from the aCI of being, therefore, essence mUSt enjoy some positive COntent if il is to receive and lim it the act of being of any given cntity.-IO Essence will be unable to fulfill this function either ifit is reduced 10 absolute non being or if it is regarded as nothing but a mode or degree of existence. Thirdly, my illlerprctalion in this chapter has concentrated on T homas's explanat ion of division and multiplicity within the realm of being. [n th is order of ex38. C larke. for o ne . i5 aware of Ih is diRi cu l!y. Stt h is Preface 10 Clllo'$ book as ci red in Ihe prcviou~ 1I0te. pp. lii- liv: also 5C:e hi s " What C~nnot Be S3id .. . .~ pp. )7- }8. 3\l. &:.0. r.... in s, anc~ . ln 0.- f1~"'il)m,.dibur. lcc, . 2: - QI,io .arnen '1"aelilx·, (om,. Oi t dete,minat ''''' ipsius es5C:, null~ ea rum e:\"( ipsum .:sse. sed CSt h~ben$ esse .. ." ( I..eon. jO. 2 7 3' 2)4- 2)6) . Aho ~ sec I. c. z6. especiall y th .... following: ~ Rdinqu it lJr ergo quod to pmpl cr hoc diffclOInt q ,,00 habcnt di'·cls:ls nOlluras. quibus acquitil'" di,·ersimode (cd . C;I.. I). Z7 ). Cf. SCG II , c. Sl (c ited in C h. V aho.we. n. ~ 2) : f:k pMmtia. q. 7. a. t . ad 5. ~nd ad 9· NOI .... in the b£t-rnention~d p3S$:1ge: - £1 I""r hunc m()(tum. hoc d SC ~b illo r$S~ distingu;(",. ;n 'lu~ntu", CSI t~l;s vel t~ t i ~ nan.,""c" (cd. C;t .. p. 19z) . AI !U~ I ~ccotd i ng 10 til }" im ~rpremion, Ihe indivicllt auo n of m~(~lial SUbM~nCC!; nlllSI ~Iso come rro!>llhc~ ide of ~~IlCC ""h(. Ihan from the side of exiSlcflC"'. ~s will b<: ~cn in Ch. IX below. I' inally. as both Geigcr and F.b.o ha~e recogniu"<1. .h" rompo.»i lion of essence and h U dilr"", ftom Ih~1 or malll·r and form in I",ms of thc spccifying principlc in e~ch c".I.\.('. While mallcr {th" pol .... m ial principld ;$spo.-.:ifi.-
=

H

!",lion ( I (lluJ/dhi. p. 6S. 40 . For 5l)m" rcpre.~n tal ive (eX IS and for discuss io n $C<'; C h . V. &crion j

Aqu;n as and th e A... iom Th at

Ul\rccdv~xI

Act h Un limi1<:d : paSo,;n>.

abo,·I:. ami m)" "Thomas

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VA RT TWO

The Essential Structure of Finite Being

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200

The Essemial Structure of Fini[c Being

upon being and exists only in the order of thought, that is to say, negations and privations. A second class is closest to it in the weakness of its claim upon being, because its members still include some admixture of negation and privation. Here Thomas has in mind generation, corruption, and motion. Thirdly, still others are described as beings not because they share in non being but because they cnjoy only a weakened kind of being and do not exist in thei r own right (per $<) but only ill something else. Thomas lists qualities, quamities, and the properties of substance. Finally, there is the most perfect class, which both exists in reality without including privation and enjoys what Thomas refers to as a firm and solid being (tsS~). This kind of bei ng exists in its own right o r p~T u and is, of course, identified by Thomas o nce again as subSlance.6 For our present pu rposes we are especially co ncerned with Thomas·s third and fourth d ivisions. Ihal is, wilh the kinds ofbcings which do not exist in themselves but only in something cise, and with others which exist in themselves. Although Thomas has only mentioned qual it ies, quantities, and properries as members of this third class, we may assume that he wishes to incl ude therein accidents in general. In short, in his third and fourth classes he has int roduced the fundamental distinction between accidental being and substantial being.' As we have mt,ntioned above in our discussion of analogy, in his Commentary on MrraphyriN V Thomas offers what lUay be rega rded as a derivation or kind of deduCiion of the ten supreme categories or p re(licamentS intO which being itself is di\'ided. Since this issue wil! Ix taken up in detail in the following section of the presclIl chaptc r,~ we nel>d not delay over i{ /lOW. [t will be eno ugh fo r us to nOle [hal Thomas develops this ded uction or derivation in lhe course of commenting on Aristotle's treatment of the mode of being p~r Sf. Of three precisions Thomas find s Aristotle applying to this mode of bcing, the first is the Stagirite's division of cXlTamcnt"dl being imo [he len pred icamentS. 9 \X/ithin [he p redicamentS them6. Ed. ci f., p. 152. fill . H O-<j 4j. 7. See Il. !.p : «Terti..,,,, ~U IC'" did lurquoJ nih il h~h<:1 de Ilon Cnl e ~d",i"lu"" h~h<:II~mco d5C

debit.-. quia non pc. 5l:. 5l:
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220

The Essemial Structure of Finire Being

rial and formal causes are int rinsic to the essen ~ of the subjecr or substance itself, predications based on these fall under (he predicamem subs(ance. A final cause cannot exercise its causality apart from an agent , since an end can serve as a cause only by moving an agem.1O From this it follows that something may rC1::eivr irs name from somrthing else by being caused only in the order of effi cient causality. In this case we have (5) the predicament "being acted upon" (pasJio). Or something may be named an efficient cause by reason of an effect which it produces. Here the effect itself is exuinsic 10 the subjcrt. In this caS(: we assign (6) the predicamcm action (at'rio) to the subject which acts. ~l As regards modes of predicating which arc. based on something else wh ich serves as a measure of a subject. such measures may be e"uinsic or illl rinsic. By intrinsic measu res Thomas has in mind the particular lengt h, width, and depth of a given thing. In this casc the rhing is so named, for instance. as being so long or wide or deep. from something whi ch inheres in it intrinsically. This docs not rcsult in a distinct mode of predicaring or in a distincr predicamem. but is included under the predicament quan tiry.u As extrinsic measures Thomas lists time and place. Insofar as something is named from time, that is. from the time in which it is realized, (7) the predicamem "time when~ (quando) resu lts, Insofar as something is named from place, the predicamcms (8) "placc where ~ (ubi) and (9) position (rilus) resu lt. As in his Commentary on Mnap;'Ylics V. Thomas here explains that the predicament position adds to the predicamcnI "place where" the note that the partS of [he localed body art: ordered 10 one anorher.u He also now commcnts that th is subdivision into "place where~ and position does no! apply 10 the pn'dicament "time when. ~ An ordering of pa rrs within rime is already implied by the definition of time itsclf Time, Thomas reminds us, is the numbering of mmion according to the before and the after.~

Finally, he returns to the case where a given kind of subject, a human being, is named from something which is extrinsic to it, There is something unique about human beings, he explains. Nature has sufficiently equipped other animals with all Ibid . Thorna.s'$ rcrn"rk her~ "bow mmer "nd form sqUH~S Wi lh his ~"r1ie r npl"nalion of the first way in wh ich so meth ing is prroic llro of somethi ng d~. i.e .. a~ belonging 10 il$ C$Sence and hen ce:lS pertaining to the prroic,,- ment substance (sec n. 76 above). 81. -Sic igimr sn=umlum 'luod "liquid den omin,,-tur " cau$.:! :agente. ~t pr::lediCl.m~mum p41" lion;'. nam pat; nihil est "Iiud qu"m susci pere aliqu id ab ,,~ntc: secundum autcm quod CCO[l\"er.so denorni""tu r ('au.\'-'. "ge", "b df.... tu. eo t p....edi c:l.rntnturn IIn;"";I. " an, ac,io eo' acms ab "gen", in aliud ... ' (ibid. ). 82. - ... ab his ergo dcnomi namr aJiquid sicUl ab init ri nS«(l in h"crcme; und e pcrtincI ad pracdi· c:r.menrum 'lu1ntjt"'tis~ {ibid.). S). Jbid. 84_ Ibid_ Note Thom~s'~ final remllrk cOll(crning t hcsc: "Sic igiuu al iquid dici tu r e.<5C qU'1IIdo vel ubi per denominationcm a tempore \"elll loco." 80.

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214

The Essential Structure of Finite Bei ng

Naples, from 1269 to (272). As Weisheipl also warns, we should nor assume thai Thomas composed his Commcntary on rhe Mt'lapbysia. at leasl in irs final version, in rhc order in which we number irs books IOday. While accepting this final poim, Torrell places the o,mmemary on the PlryJics during the earlicr pan of Thomas's second teaching period at Paris, ca. 1268~1269. Although he acknowledges the uncertainties surrounding the dating of the Commentary on the Mt'taphysia, he suggeSlS tha t its beginn ing may date from the academic year 1270-127 1, with rhe Commentaryon Bks VII~XII falling after mid-Ill! bUI before 1272- 1273. Since Torrell has been able 10 rake into account more recent research concerning this, he should be followed on this poin t. Consequen d y, it now appears that Thomas's derivation of the predicaments in his Comme ntary on the Mnaphys;cs expresses his most malure thought on this iSSLle.'16 From another siandpo illl , Thomas's emphasis on the point that Ihe differenr modes of predication follow upon and refleci different modes of being, while present in bmh deri"alions, is developed more fully in the passage from the C ommenta ry on Ihe MnapbYlics. This is im po rrant if we arc to view the len predicamenlS nOI as purdy logical calcgorie5 but as of importance for the science of being as being. T his t"mphasis on being is wh:n one would expect in a Commentary on the MrtaphysjC5. Somewha t morc surprising is tht" fact thar Thomas devoted 50 much artemion 10 deriving all ten predicamenlS in his Commentary on the Physia. and especially in this particular context. Th is full derivation of Ihe prt.'d icamenlS hardly secms necessary there for him to clarify AristOtle's undcrslanding of action and passion and defend the claim that they cons!"itute fWO different predicamenrs.?7 Before concluding this seCtion , we shou ld raise anOlher questio n aboul Thomas's de riva tion of the te n predicaille ms. in particular about the last six - the ux principin as they were often refe rred 10 by mcdievallhillkers. D id Thomas regard his de ri vat ion or deducl iOIl of [hem as definiti ve? I! seems that he did , although doubl would be expressed by othe rs in the lhirreemh and founeemh centuries concerning whether they really are [en and irreduciblc. Thus thinkers such as Henry of Ghent. and in the fourteenth century. Wi lliam of Ockham, would sharpl y rc{\uce the list. And even someone as sympathet ic to Thomas's views on substance and accidcms as Godfrey o f Foma ;nes did not regard the number of the \)6 . W(ish~ipl. Fr;ar 71""""1 J~qu;,,(), pp. Ji S-76 (. ,. con e<:tN.!). 379: -';;m~JI , SAilll 7oom41 Aqui·

pp. l 31- jJ. H1. 344. 97. It il true dm TllOm3s h~d r~i$Cd • seco nd difficu lty in introdu cing his derivation of the prwio ",e" l! in his Co"'Ill~rlt"ry Oil the 1~ljo, concer nin g whether mOlion is ~IS() fOllnd in subSt~nce. qu~tiIY. qu~ntj(y. ~"J uhi. if i, is ~n ~Cl io n ur passion (ed. ci (., p. tW, n. }u). For Thomas's answer set' n. j24. wht'r<' ht' di ni ngu ishC':S Ot'rwe-c-n motio n U; I is realized in ntr;tmem1l,1 l~aJi'Y (i" ,n "", ''''IUra) ~nd in termS of what i~ !<"<jui.ed for ;t$ (ull i nr cUigibl~ 'om ~ m ("U;IJ). lfThom~~$ brief reply to this obj~liull would h~rd ly retju ire the d,,~i kd dcri\":lcion (Jf (he predi ca ments which he offers here. his fulle r di scussion of Aristot le's rC$ni ction of mOt;"" to quality. quanl it y and "bi in Bk V. ce. 1- 2 dots ~m.utlc rh~ rhoory of to prcdiaments. 5c-<- In V Pkp .. Icct. j, pp. }l8-}l. C':S p. nn. 66 rtf. I1a1.

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228

The Essemial Structu re of Finite Being

an operative power, or as an ultimate act or s{"(:ond act or second perfection of an agelH. I07 Th is in rurn is closely con nected with another distinctive view defended by Aquinas-that any created agent or subSTance can act or operate only by means of really distinct powers. These powers fall within the predicamem quality (its second species) and are related fO their subst".mriaJ subject as acts 10 potency. An action, including a transitive action, I would suggeSt, nllly in rurn be viewed as a second act which directly inheres in and informs its corresponding operative power. II)' From this perspective il will again follow that action, includ ing transi tive action, resides in the acti ng subject by means of that subject's operative power. Viewed from the side of the motion which is produced by the acting agent, of course, Thomas can continue to say that actio n is present in the recipient as in its subjecl. l ......

3. "Definitions" of Substance and Acc ident Though Thomas's derivation or deduction of the predicaments is interesti ng, slill more sign ificant is the fundanlenla.1 distinction he draws between that which cxists in itself (substance) and that which exists in somethi ng dse (accident) . H e does nOt appear to hold that we first discover accidents as such and then reason from them 10 knowledge of substance as their cause. What we firs! discover arc be (i led 10 su ppofllhis fe~ding. for inSlan(c. fk esse: I!SI aCluatiru quaedam e5S("nl;ae, ila opefllri CST

1()7. Cenain lUIS cUllcernin g operation mig}l1

.pirir",dibus (rrollllris, a. II: - Sicu! ~U!em

i~um

aCli.lalilaS opeulivac pmendae seu vinuI;s· (ed. cil .. p. 41 ~): ST 1_ 11, q. J, 3. 1: ~ ManifcslUm CSI aUlcm quod opcraTio Cll llilimus :>CIUS operantis: unde CI a CIU S so:<:undu~ a Phi!osopho nomina lUr. ill II Dr anima . . : (Leon. 6.17): II, c. 46: "Amplius. Perfccfio secun da in rrous 3ddit supra prima", PCtrecl jon~m" (cd. cil .. p. I19): ST I. q . H , a. I: "AcI;o enim I!SI propri" Klualila, virlul;s: SkU I CSM" CSI aClIIalius !ubstam iac ,·d d~rlliae" (I...con. 5.J9). [n all of Ihew: COIlICXfi, howc"~r, wi!h Ihe poS$iblc exception of !he firSI leXI. Thomas nuy ~ refe rring onl y 10 im man Cnt action or opera· lion. and nOllO lI'U1silivc aClion. [n dIe fits! leXI he may have 1)(:>Ih in m in d, since he subsequently g~~ <.HI 10 argue for Ihe spccific point lhal the powCfl; of the 50ul arc distinct from the wurs essence. On mosr of these lexl$ $U l\·l tthan, Efficirm eaJiJllliry. PI'. 116ff.. and on Ihe first {)o.o,·cns. An Elnnm· /'l'J ChriSfian Mrl4physio. p. 197, n. 16. 108. Sec the com;n ual;on of Ihe I("XI from Dr Ipirinm/ib", r"aturlJ ~s d ied in Ihe prcvioui 1l01 C. Al50 on Ihis gerleral ii~ UC s« ST 1. q . H.~. 1 ("Unu m intdligcre angel; Si\ eius sub.slal1lia~); ST I, q. 77, 1 . I (· Urrum ips:! essemi a all imae sil tius polemia"): Quadtillel X. q. }. 3. I ( I...con . lp. I }O- }I): Qu"mi(l" ff d~ ani,.,,,, q. 1l «(.cQn. ~.j. 1 .109-1O). For a very carl)· Ilcallnelll $tt "II Smt.. d. J. q. 4, a. 1 (Mandc.IIInel cd., Vo l. I. pp. JJ6- 17). For di.scus.sion $tt J~ Kum.le, D" , l'"h;;{tniJ tkr Suk:z:u ih"n I'Qlrnu" . Probk,.,gru:-hirht!ir," Um,,.,,,rlmnf,fn IJ(}" A ug,oj/in bit lind mit T},,,mll! IMn A'Iuin ( F~iburg, $wirlCrblld. 1956), pp. /71-118. Fo r more on th is su C h.Y1I1, Seclion 4 b!,low. 109. MC<.· h~n m empl$ 10 fe5Qlve th is appa/elll dilemma by suggest ing Iha! wh en Thomai refers 10 Transi!i\"t anion a$ Ihc lJC,rcclion of Ih<" Ih ing aCled upon he is uI'irl8 Ih~ term • perfcctioll" in the se nse o f dli., ient C"~u~I;(y. Arld when he refeu to suc h action ~s a perfection of Ihe xli ng .rubjttt he i~ I~k;ng Ihe lum -f~,fcclion" in Ihe Sl: ns<: <.>f f{)rmai Glu>alily. This ;, to »y th~t a~tion when '"" viewed f1m".Uy peTfee ls Inc aning subjc<:I. though ;1 docs so as an accid ent.1 Or seco ndary formal ca U$<:. S<"C pp. lI4- 16. Promi5i ng though M~h.n'~ suggcslion is, il is an interpretat ion ralher Ihan a SOIUl ion Ih a! on be fo ulld in T hom as·s texts.

sec

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232

Th e Esscmial Srruclurc of Finire Being

ues Thomas, for then being (on), which sign ifies the act of being, would itself be a genus. m Thomas's poim here is that given the identity of essence and act of being in God, we cannot say that God is present in a genus by reaso n of his essence without implying that he is included therein by reason of h is act of being (~su). And this would be to make rrsr and therefore being (ens)a genus. In order to prove that being (em) is not a genus, Thomas refers to Aristotle's procrd ure. If being were a genus, we would have to identify a difference which would rem ict being 10 its particular species. But no difference participates in a genus in such a way that the genus is included within the imelligible coment of the difference; for then a genus would be ['I.·ice included within the definition of the species.'lJ (For instance, if the difference rational already includes the genus animal in ilS imelligible content, to define man as a rational animal would really be to define him as a "rational anim;lJ animal.~) Therefore a difft"rence mUSt be somcth ing in addi tion to the intelligible content of tht" genus. Blil nothing, and therefore no difference, can fall Olilside the intelli" gible content ofbcing, since being is included within the imelligibili ty of all rhose things of which it is predicated. Therefore being cannot be contracted by any difference. It follows from this that being is not a genus and in [urn from this that God is not present in any genus. 114 Thomas then poses an objection fo r himself. Someone might argue that while the name ~substance" cannot prope rly apply to God for the reason that God does nOt stand under accidents, the reality signified by the name substanct" does apply to God. Therefore God is in the genus substance. This follows because a substance is a being in itself (per se), and to be such is also Hue of God YS To this Thom:ts replies dl:tt ~bc ing in itselr is not the definition of substance. He has already shown that being (I'm) is not J genm. The ~ ;n itself" pan of the proposed defini tion seems 10 imply nothing but a pure negation , lhat is, rhc f2c r th:,\( .'io tllething does not cxist in somcthing else. And a pure negation cannOt serve as a genus. It follows from this (hat substance should rather be understood as a th ing to which it belongs to exi~t not in a subject. The name ~thing~ (m) is taken from the substance's quiddity, and the name ~ bcing" (('w) from its act of being (mr). Hence implied in the meaning of substance is that it have a quiddity 10 which it belongs 10 exist not in something else. And this, Thomas contends, cannot be said of God. I .¥. "Ampliu$. Unllmqllooqlle (ollUCItur in gencr;, pl:t r.l(ion cm .IU~ 'Iuidditaris, gCllu~ cllim prJ~inHUt in quid rif. Sed quiddir.ls Dci CSt ip~um ~ullrn esse. S«undum quod non co lloc;uuf ~Iiquid in gt,~rc: qui~ 1ic ens esset genus, quod lign; fint ipsum esse" (ib id.). nl. Ibid. NOIc in panicub..: "Nulla aUl('rn diffcTt:tllia p~tti(i p~t gen us, ita scili cc t quod genus sit in r.t tionc diffcrcntiae. quia ~ic genu1 ponereHu bi5 in dennirionc ~pecici. .. .- Fo! Ari~ !()!!( sec Afuaphysio HI. c. } (998b U - l7). a ... Ed. ci t.. p. !6. ! l~ . Ell. cit.. p. ~ 7. 116. Ibid. Note ill partieul~r: · Opone! igiruf quod r.uio ~ub5rami ae imdligalUr hoc modo, quod Ill.

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thinking once more. This time an objection was raised by a panicipam at the quodlibelal disputation against the possibil ity Ihat in the Eucharist accidents can continue to exist without their substantial subj('(:t. Accord ing to the second objection, of whalever a definition is predicated, so is thai which is defined also predicated. But the definition or description of substance is a "being in itself. " If after Eucharistic transubstantia tion accidents remain in themselves wit hout their substance, it follows that these accidents themselves will then be substances.I)' Thomas begins his reply by recalling that. according to Avicenna. ffll"CannO t be included in the definition of a genus or species. Th is fo llows because, while all individuals have in common the generic or specific defin ition, the genus or species is not reali7.cd in the individual members according to a single act of being (esit). Thomas quickly rejects the descript ion of substance as Kthat which exists in itself" or of accident as Kthat which eltim in something else. ~ These are only circumlocutions for the correct descriptions. A substance is a "thing to whose narure il belongs to exist nOt in somet hing else." An accident is a ~ th ing to whose narufC it belongs 10 exist in someth ing clse." 13' In light of this, Thomas concludes that if miraculously, i.e .. th rough divine power, an accident does not exist in a subject, it docs not thereby meet the definition of substance. In other words, it will not thereby be turned into a substance. It will still nOt be owing to its nature nOt to exist in something else. Nor does such an accidcllI cease 10 be defined as an accidem; its narure will $till be such that it belongs to it 1'0 exist in something eJse. '40 Finally. ncar the end of his career, Thomas makes lhese same points once again in Sum ma lhto{ogiat Ill , q. 77, a. I, ad 2 . ' .' These passages arc important Ix-cause they rcoinforce the poin t that Thomas refu.scs to define sub~tance as hcing in itself. or to define accident as tha t which exists in someth ing else. But they are itlleresting (or another reason, (n the texts we had previously considered. strictly philosophical concerns accounted for Thomas's reo fu sal to define substance as that which exists in itself. These concerns followed from 1)8. Leon. l S.1.97-9B. NOlt in p3rlicular:" . . . si Ngo;n sacr:lrnenlO ~huis accid"nl i~ $unt ~r 5e. non in 5Ub i ~lO. SC<jl.lilllf qllod sint substantia", ... ' Also 5eC Ihe note 10 lines 15- 16 for 2 \'llluable 5e1 of r<:fcrences 10 u di er and coniemporary u5Sl~ mi~c: 'SubSiamia esl q uod pcI ~ tsr', vel < accidtmis > : 'Accidens ts. quod CSI in alio·. sed (SI cin:umlocutio verae descriptionis. q ~lat 1~ li ~ imdligilUr: 'Sub~I~ JHi~ 01 re~ cuius tJalUrac debclUr ts5e non in alio'; 'Accidens Ve IO I'lIt Ies, (uiu~ natu"' ... dcl>cl1u esse in alio''-

q o. leon. :\.I.99:'}o-<)STh is ~"icle ~.\ks: "Umuu accid('mi~ remane~11I in hoc SacramcnlO si ne subil"Clo" (leon. I l .19;). Sec p. 1'}4 for Ih ... reply 10 objC'C.ion 1_ Afler rCjccti ng ,he faulty denn it iOlls of subsnncc llnd 3ccid... nt Tho mas 5urnlilUles: ~scd quiddil31i seu esscn tiae SUOstllll li ac compC in 5u"icclO_ ~ '41.

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The Essentia1 StruClUre of Fini(c Being

As we have seen Thom:lS indicating in his Dr potl!ntia q. 9, :t. I, substance taken as subject has (Wo characteristics. First of all , it needs no ex tri nsic foundation which would support it; it is sustained in itself and is therefore said to subsist . This means Ihat it exists in itself and not in something else. Secondly, it serveS as the foundation for accidents. Insofar as we wish to emphasi7.e the first characteristic, the faCt thai it subsislS in itself, Thomas nott..'S that we may describe it in Greek as oumWmt; and in Latin as ;ub~iJrmtia. J nsofar as we stress the second characteristic, we refe r 10 it in Greek as "JPo5tllJis and in Lain as prima sUbUdlltia (fim substance).J Hence if "JPosrllJis and first subsl"ance differ in name, they are one and the same in reality.(, In his attempt to account for ,hat which distinguishes an individual subject or supposil (rom its essence or nature or quiddity, two possibilities seem to be open to Thomas. On the one hand, he might simpl y appeal to the difference between the individuat ing characteristics which are presem in concrete m aterial subjects or substances, and the nature which is realized in each of them. H e often !Urns to this in accounling for the dive rsil)" between lhe twO, as in our passage from Dr pou",;a, q . 9, a. I. Since according 10 Thomas there is no mailer in angel ic substances, il wi ll follow from this approach that in Ihem there is no rcal distinction between nalUrc and the individual subjct:t or supposi1.1 On the other hand, Thomas might appeal to his theory of real compositio n and diSl inction of essence and act of being (mt) in all finite substances. If we include the act of being in our understanding of lhe subjct:t or supposit, it will follow from rhis approach that in every finil e s ubstan ce, angels included, the subject or supposil will differ frol11 its essence or namre. Thomas reasons in this way in Quodlibet 2, q. 2, a. 2 , as we shall shortly see.~ Puzzling, however, is the fact thaI he usuall y does nOt speak this way. More frequently he holds that namrc and supposil arc identical in created s pirits or angels. For instance, in his earl y Commentary on 13k III of lhe SmunuJ (d. 5, q. I , a. J), Thomas is concerned with showing ,hal in C hrist there is only one person. He observC$ that in cermi n cases namre and person differ really and in other cases only conceptually (Ircundum rat;onnn). By na ture he has in mind rhe quiddiry of a lhing which is sign ified by its definition. By pcrson he rather means this particular something (horaliquid ) which subsists in its give':n nalllre. If we bear in mind that fo r Thomas a person is a rational or intellectual supposit, we': can easily see thar here': 5. [d. /:;f., Vol. I, p. ll.6; /:; I<'d;n Ch. Vil abo,·~, n. p. 6. On !hi ~ idclllific:nion of !h~ individual s ub~lan"" as fit")! sub.ltanC(" or Iry/J'OlI(lsifsee ST I. 'I. 19. ~ . I. Cf. III 1&111 .. d . 1.3, q. I. a. I (Mandonn c! <'d., Vol. I, pp. 55}- 5]). <'..'I pecially: ' Id~ :I.!il<~:r d icendum dl, S«;undum Bact;um, Ul SUIl1:!.tu. d;ffercnli ~ ho ru m nom; num , 'essc:nti3, !ubsist~n t ;a, substantia,' s«undum si gnifiC:l!ionem a~t uum a quibus imponuntur, Kil ictt esse, subsisterc , subsure" (pp. 554- H). A1so~ In VlIMtt.. lccl.!. nn. 117O-U74. and th~ Ie.. ! ciled in Ch. VI I above, n.

}B. 7 . Ed. Cil . , p. u6 . s.:c Ch. VI I, n. H8. S« n. 11 ~Iow.

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244

Th e Essenrial Structure of Fini te Bei ng

In matter-form composites, essence or natu re is nOt restricted to the substalHial form alone, but includes both matter and fo rm. G iven this, Thomas asks whether in such enti ties (he subjecr (supposit) or ind ivid ual natural being {individllU m 7111tum/f} is identiClI with its essence or nature, He refe rs to Aristotle's M(tl1p/'ysiCl Vl I where he finds the Stagirite holding (hat in th ings wh ich arc pred icaK'd prr sr, 3. th ing (rrs) and iu quiddity (quod quid m ) are the same. T his is not tr ue of things which art" pred icated prr flccidms. For instance, contin ues Thomas, man is noth ing ot her than what it is to be a man, since man sign ifies a rwo-foot"ed an imal capable of walki ng. A white thi ng, o n the other hand, is not altogether identical with what it is to be white; for while the quiddity white signifies a quality, a wh ite th ing is a substance wh ich has (hat q uality..!O Given all of this, T homas develops th is wo rking principle. If a th ing is such thai someth ing else can ~ h3. p pcn" to it which is nOt included in th t" defini tion {ratio} of its nature, that th ing (m) and its "what it is" (qllOd qllid mY, or that subject and its nature differ. Th is follows because the meaning or defin ition of nature incl udes o nly that which belongs to its spttific essence. But all individ ual subject includes not o nly this bllt othcr th ings which ~ happen " to that essencc. For this reaso n the subject (supposit) is signified as a whole, and its nature or quiddiry as a fo rmal part. This point, of course, is consistent with Thomas's earlier remarks concerning nature and supposit in material entit ies. They arc related as part and w hole, and they d iffcr from one anothcr!' In this teXT, however, Thomas makes no except ions for created spirit ual beings. Only in God arc there no accidel1ls in addi tion to his essence, and th is is bttause the divine cssence and lhe divine aCI o f bcing arc idcmica1. It fo llows from this that in Gml (h e subsisti ng subject and nature arc com pletely identical. But in angels 10. !..ron. l\.1.1I6:'U- 117:84. NO!~ in panicubr: "Resl~1 <'Igo considerandum. cum supposilum \"d individuum nalurak ~ il compos;lUfn ex materia ..1 forma , ulrum ~it idem e~ n l iae vd natura ... EI h:tn c qU2cstion~m m()".· ..! Philowphu,' in Libm VI! M"!2physiCI... ubi inquiri(, utrum sit iibm unumqutwiqur, rI qulHi quid nt du!.. F) dClcmlinal quod in his quae dicuJ1!ur pcr sc:, idem esl res el quod quid est rei. in his 2U!em Iluae d ku nlUr per accidens. non esl idem: homo <'nim nihil esl aliud quam quid esl ho mini$. nihil cnim aliud .
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248

T he Essenti al Srructure of Fi n ile Being

supposiI . [n some way n>r is now incl uded within his undemanding of a subsisti ng subject (supposit). Yet , as T homas ind icates ill replying to the second objection , [his does not imply [ha t the defin ition of a subject or supposit incl udes NU." Schweizer cites anot he r interesting text from Summa thtoiogiat Ill . q . 2 , a. 2 . dating from ca. 11.7,h272-11.73. H ere T homas raises a strictly th<."Ological issue concern ing wheth er the hypostatic union is a union in person or in nature. In defendi ng un ion in person. Thomas again examines the meanings o f person and nature. N atu re signifies the essence of the species. tha t which is expressed by a defi ni tion. If noth ing else could be :Idded 10 those th inb'S wh ich fall under this specifi c meaning, there would be no need 10 d istingu ish nat ure fro m an ind ividual sup posit in which that nature is realized : for an ind ividual subject (supposi!) is thaI which subsistS within such a nature. Hence every ind ividual wh ich subsists with in a given nature would be IOtally idelllical with its nat ure:u I n certain subsisting th ings, however, somethi ng is present which is not included within the spt'cifi c meaning of that th ing, namely, accidents and ind ividual'ing princi ples. T h is is most evidt'lll in maner-form composi tes. T herefo re, in such enti l'ies nature and sup posit reall y d iffe r. This does not mean that they arc com pletely sepa rate from one ano ther, but that the nature of Ihe spC1:ies is contained with in the sup posit. along with certain other th ings wh ich arc not incl uded with in the specifi c content of that nat ure. Therefo re the subject or supposit is Sign ified as a whole, w hich incl udes the nature as a fo rmal part." If there is someth ing in which no th ing whatsoever is present in addition 10 the illld ligibic Co ntent of its nat ure, SUppoSil and n:uu rc will not reall y d iffer in that being. Such is true of G od . In sud l a bei ng SUp poSil and nature will d iffer onl y in the order of though t, i.e., co nceptually. It will be referred 10 as a nature insofar as it is a given essence. wh ile this sam e nat ure o r essence will be describeri me appu ci in his qull.~ ~Utl! ex 1ll 31 Cli~ (I fOfl1l3 comp05 ir.l. EI ideo in [:I.libus eliam .'i«und UIll rem differ! natura ct supposi(ultl. "on qu asi onmino aliqua scp3ra t'3 . . . .~ j4. uS i qua vem res <'$ T in qu~ Onln ino ni hil esTaliud praCter I':I.tion(nl 1p«iei vel nal uru 1Ull.(. Si(.UT d t in Dl'\). ibi non CSt :l.Hud secund um r~m supposi wrn et na tura , sed .~lum secundum ra tio"em intclligcndi: ' Iuia natura di citur s«undum q uod C$I cS!>e nlia <juled:l.m; caJ"m __e.o J iciwr suppwi lU m soxund ul\1 quod c~1 suhsistens- (ibid.). Cf. his ~pl )' to obj. ,_

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252

Th e Essemial 5rrucrure ofFinire Being

and in more rceell( limes has especially been defended by 6illot. 44 Still more recenily, however, another reading of Capreolus has been proposed: he did nOI really hold that it is existence {mt} itself, but rather an ordering to existence 011 the part of an individual thing's nature which serves as the formal constituent of the supposiL H It is not my purpose here to en ter illlo the controversy concerning the views of Cajetan, Capreolus, and Billol abom Ihis. [I seems 10 me Ihal when the problem is stated in these terms it is difficult if not impossible 10 find an answer in Thomas's lexts. Th is is because he usually casts the issue in other terms, having to do with the relationship and distinction between nature and supposit. h will be enough for us to recall that al least in Quodlibet 2 Thomas incl udes the aCI of being (mr) within [he ontological structure of the individual subject or supposil, This suggestS that the act of being pla}'5 an imponam role in Thomas's mind wilhin Ihe Structure of any existing subject or supposit. It reminds us again that for Thomas the act of being {(1St) is the actuality of all actS and the perfection of all perfections within a given bcing..t6 This is 1)0 1 to say, however, that Thomas has explici tly raised or answered the question concern ing the formal cOI1$[i tuent of the supposit or person. It is to suggest that if one wishes to answer that question within Thomas's metaphysics, an important role should to be assigned to the an of being {mt}. Reference to the act of being raises some other points. Thomas is convi nced that there I:an only be one substantial act of being in a given subjeCl or supposit, at least in the natural order. The act of being wilh which he deals in Q uodlibet 2, q. 2, a. 2 is, of course, substantial NU, not accidental rot. Whether accidems also enjoy distinctive actS of being (~ss~) is an issue we shall take u p in the following &Cetion of this chapter. As reg;uds substantial (SU, Thomas's conviction that Ihere can only be one substant ial act of being in a given supposit or subject assists him in meeting olher questions. For instance, he usually appeals to [his in addressing a +4 . On th is Stt Schweiztr, pp. 1}- 18 (on Clpreollll an d fO/ sollie ..... ho would deny thaI he mak($ ex iSTence Ihe fo rm~1 cOnStitul ent); )l- H (8illol ~ nd his folloWC"r.I). Also sec J. Hernand n -P:rchuo, Act<> J fubJumria. ESluJhl Il mn>N d~ !i.uuo To ...;11 d~ Aquino (&ville. 198 ~ ). pp. 'H-S ~.

For etlOru in this direction Stt F. Mufii~. "8 eonsliTmivo form al de la persona creadl en la Ir.ldicion tom iSla: La Gorda tom iftll 68 (T~~5). pp . .\-89; 70 (1946). pp. 201-93: E. Qua ~llo, " II problema scol mico dell a per.sona nd Gaetano t nd Capreolo," DiulU TiJomas (Piac.) 5S (1951) , pp. H- 6,: "Discussioni ndl 'i merprer:u ione di Ca preolo $ul problema ddb. persona," s"Irsianum 18 (19~6), pp. 1~7- JIO; Mullaney. "Crated l'erso na! iIY,~ pp. J8.1-91. For crilicism of Mu ii il and QulTelit) .~~ Degl"lnnoccnd, ~De nov~ quadam rarione," 1'1" 311- , 8; ' up reolo d'acco rdo w i Gaen no a proposilo ddb p"rsonal it:l~~ f umn docnr 7 (19 S4). pp. 168-10}. For agrcc mem with the " iew th~t Capreol u, did defend th~ existcn cc theory ~ 5..:hweiur. p. 17. Norc that Schwci'.cr himself ult i· mat ely mncludes thaI T homas defendt
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Th e Essential Strucrure ofFinirc Being

of gre-,m:sr imerc:st to us here:. By saying that such an accidental being (NSt') results from the union of a subjea and its accident, I take him to ml'an lhat the accident in som e way causes (as a secondary formal o r determining cause) this accidental being in its subject, As he pms it in the second passage: JUSt analyz.c:d, the supervening accident does no t cause a thing's substantial act ofbcing, but a ce:nain secondary being (t'su). We are still very much in the dark concerning Thomas's understanding of this secondary being (mr) . But at least this much is clear from T homas's remarks in the Dr rnu. He disti nguishes bcnveen a thing's substantial act of being and a superadded secondary o r accidental ml'. In this discussion Thomas docs not indicate how this secondary or accidental being (mt) st:!.nds in relatio n to the accidcnt
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260

Th e Essential Structure of Fini re Being

(inm e). T herefore an accident is not described as a being because it has roe. hut rather because by mea ns o f the accident, something is. Hence it is herter described as "of a bei n g~ than as "a being."n In his Commentary on MetllphysiCl Xl. leet. }, Thomas mentions the different ways in which being is said. T hat is described as being in the unquaJ iJid sense (l'IlS simpliciur) wh ich enjoys existence in itself, that is to say, lhat which is a substance. Other things are described as beings beeause they pertain to that which exists in itself. Such is true, for example, of a pllssio or a habi t o r anyth ing of th is kind. T hus a qualiry is not said to be a being because it has es.u hut because a substance is disposed in a certain way by that qual iry. So it is wi th the other accidents. It is fo r th is reason that they are said to be "of a bei ng. "7r. Thomas makes the same poim in his CommelHary o n MttaphyliCJ XlI, leet. I. There he adds that accidents and pri vations differ from o ne another in this respect, that by reason of accidents a subject enjoys some kind of being (elu aliqualt), while by reason of a pri vation it does nOt but ra ther lacks a certain being (me).n NOll(: of these passages should be read as implying that T homas is now de nying thai there is an accidental bei ng in d istinction frolll the sub$tantial Jct of being in a given subject. His purpose repeatedl y is to guard against the mistake n impression that an accident has existence in itS own right , o r that it su bsists in itself, o r that it is a substance. Only substances are bei ngs in the un'l ualified sense/ s Thomas had already made this poi nt, bUI with all interesting ptecision in terminology, in ST I, q. 45, a. 4. T here he attempts to show that accidents and fo rms and other thi ngs of tb is sort which do not subsiSt arc more properly said to be concreated than created. O nly thi ngs which subsist are created, strictly spea king. To justify this co nclusion he reasons Ihat 10 exist belo ngs properly to that wh ich has being, i.e. , that which subsists in ils own act of bei ng. Forms and accidents and other things of th is kind arc not described as beings as if they themselves exist, but ral her because by means of them something is in a given way. T hus whiteness is said to be a bei ng because by means o( it a subject is white. T herefore, an accident is morc properly said 10 be "of a being~ than a being. And things of this type which do nOt subsist arc morc ~coexis l e nt sn than beings and hence morc properl y 75. Here Thomas is defend ing the point that one kind of grace- habimal or whn is o rten known :.l~ s:mnifying- is a q uality of the $(Iu!. In ,eplyi ng to obj«tion J he oomments: u.. . aceide ntis e~ e<:d qu i~ IlIagis ipsis ~Iiqllid ~iI." Fot rhe cQrnpa';$Ofl wit h p,i\'at io n.~5« n. 2-{ 20. 78. AI$O ~e Dr po rttlfjll. q. j. :I. . 8, 00. ci l .. p. 62: ".. . Sic UI <:t accid(mia d icu fllur (mia, quia s ubm.mi~ cis tsf vel qualis vel qu~nt~ .. . ."

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27 0

The Essenrial St ructu re of Finite Being

A number of passages d:ll ing from Tho mas's more manIre writings also poim (0 the same. conclusio n. For instance, a tex! we have already consider«l from SlImma contra GI'1IIilN IV, c. 14 (daling from ca. 1264- 1265) is al leasl open to ,his ilHerpretation. There Thomas remarks {hat all accidents are certai n forms wh ich are superadded to their substance and caused by t he principles of the substance. In this text , however, he dOl'S not indicate in what way accidents arc caused by their substance's principles, whether only in the order of receiving causaliry, or in OIher orders as well. I " In the De potm tia, q . 7, a. 4 (dating from 126s-1266), Thomas offers a scries of arguments to show that there are no acciden ts in God. In his sccond argument he rcasom that since an accidell1 is extrinsic 10 the essenct' of its subjecl and si nce lhings which are diverse can on ly be unilCd through some cause, to admit thaI an accident is present in God would require a causc. No cxtrinsic cause could be admined (0 account for th is; for something would then be prior 10 God. Nor will appcal 10 an intrinsic cause suffice in the case of Cod, although this situatio n does obtain in the Ca$C of prr sr or proper accidcnts. They do have a cause within their subjcCl . But a subjeCl cannOi serve as a cause of irs accident by reason of that whereby it receivcs the accident ; for no potency can move itself to act. Therefore a subjcrt must receive an accident under o ne aspect and serve as the cause of that accident under another as pect. This is to say that the subject must be composed in so me way, as is [rue of [hose subjects which recci\'c an accident by reaso n of their mallcr and causc the same accident by reason of their form . I II T h is is an intCTcsting text fo r a number of reasons. In it Thomas appeals 10 hiS general theory of aCI and pOlencr to make the palm that a subject canllOi re<:ci,'c an accidclU under the same aspeCt in which it causes the accident ; for no potency can reduce iuelf 10 act. We shall sec more o fllis thinking concerning this when we take up his argumenr'Jt ion from motion for God's CJ[istence in ST I. q . 2 , a. ) . II ) But Thomas's remark again suggests that , at least when hc is dealing with proper accidents, he assigns somt' kind of causat ion to their substall1ial subjcct which is d istinct from material or receiving causal ity. We would still like to learn more about th is non rcceiv ing kind of causality. This text is also important because in it Thomas am icipates a possible objection agai nst the claim that a substantial subject can both receive and actively produce one and the same accident. He attempts 10 meet th is objection by distinguishing within Ihe subjcct between thaI by means of which it receives and that by means III , S« n. 84 abcr.·e , Il l . Ed. ci, ., PI). 19J- 96. NOle in part ic ula r; "Simililer Cl tam lIon PO' O I esse ex causa imrinseca, "~C UI CSTin \,<, r S(' accidell1 ibu s {fo r: 1">C1!it: in aecidc l11 ibusl . quae habcm causam in $ubiK IO. Su bi~. lu m cn im no n PO""$I t1k ca u~ acc idtnt ii ex tOOC'm N. quo susci pil accidens, qu i:.\. nulla potenti a move l !iC ad ~Cfum. Uncle oponer
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274

The Essential Suucture ofFinirc Being

jeer of a virtue. In preparing his answer he fi rst notes that a subject is related to an accident in th ree ways: (t) by sustaining or supporting the accidcfl[, since an accident does not exist in its own right apart frolll a subject; (2) as potency to act (dlUS a subject st'3.nds under an accident as a certain potency for something active; for this reason the accident is related to it as a form); (j) as a cause to its effect, since the principles of the subject are the principles of a per u (or proper) acciden t. 1.U Rather than explain more fully how a substance may be said to cause its proper accidents, Thomas goes on to examine if and to what extent onc accident may stand in similar relationships to other accidents.1l4 BUl si nce he has referred to a substance in one way as sustaining or supporti ng an accid{,nt , and in the third way as causing il in some &shion, Ihe ki nd of COlusality he has in mind S<.'Cms once more to be distinct from material or rCi:eiving C!.usat ion . In sum, we have seen that throughou t his career Thomas holds that a substance serves as a rL'Cciving or material cause for the accidents which inhere in iL Hence the subject is in potency to such accidents, and the accidents may be regarded as its secondary acts or secondary forms. In itself this poses no great difficulty, But Thomas refers to certain accidents as being "created" or "caused" from or by the principlcs of their substantial subjcn, or as bei ng "ed uced" or "flowing fronl" or "resulting fronl" the same, This is rcpeat'edly said to be true of proper accidents, i.e .• those which follow from a thing's essential or specific pri nciples, though some texts suggesl that it applies to other accidents which fo llow from a thing's individual principles- but only, I would suggest, if lhose aceidenrs arc inseparable from that individual. m Thomas has also indicated that a subjecl may be regarded as a productive principle or Cluse of its proper accidents. This follows from the fact that the subject is in actuality in some way. In the case of a composite substance, Thomas has traced this producing role back to the substamial form of that subject. In the case of a simple form such as the human soul, the form itsel f is in act insofar as it is actualiz.ed by its correspond ing act of being, although it is in potency to any accidental fo rms which inhere in it. Thomas has noted that a subject is a cause of its proper accidents in three ways, i,e" as a hnal cause, in a certai n way as an active cause, and as a material cause. And in the last teXI we have examined (Dt' lIirtutibus, a, 3), he has remarked Ihal a subject is related to its proper accident as a c.mse to its effect; for the principles of the subject arc also principles for such an accident. IM 113. A. Odwo, ro., in Quantiolln dhputar;u, Vol. ~, p. 71S: •.. . $uhil'ClUrn lriplicil N compar.nur ad accidens. Uno modo , 5icul pr.le~ns ei sum:n,amenlUm; nam accidens ~r so: non ~ubsislil, fulcilur V<:'o p<:t subie<:l um . Alio modo sieul polenlia ad aClUm: nam 5u6iN:fUm aC(:ide nli $ubiicilur, sicUi qU2e.:b.m pOIcmia xlivi; l1nde ~I accidens fOlm3 dicilur. Tenio modo skU! Clusa ad etl"eCfum: n3m prinCipia subiN:li {wnjcclUral corre<:lion ror; subjcctal sum principia pc'r S(; 3ccidentis." 124. Ihid. IlS. l:Ur tCXU where Thomas applics Ihis to accid~nts which follow from a thing's individual principia 5CC till. 99 and 104 alx)\"c. Iz6. Sec n. I:J abo,·c.

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Th e Essent ial Srructure of Finite Being

is viewed as an image of the Tri nity within the sou l, is to be taken as the essence of the soul or as a power. 'JS In developi ng his reply, T ho mas nOtes that the {erm "intellt."C[," insofar as it is expressed in rel:nionship to rhe aCI of (understanding), dCl;ignates a power of the souL Such a virfllJ or power is intermed iate beTWeen the essence of the soul and its operation . Fartht'r on Thomas remarks that the human soul includes the highest level of powers of the soul. And from this highest level of power the human soul receives its name. T hus it i$ known as the intellective soul, o r sometimes simply as the intellect or mind, $ince this power (i ntelle<;t or mind) naturally fl ows from the human soul iucl( ,'''' Given this, Thomas concl udes that the term ~ m i nd " expresses thaI in our soul which is highest as a power. And since the divine image is fo und in us according 10 that which is highesl within us, the im:lgc of the Trinity wiHnot belong to the essence of the soul except by reason of "mind," its highest power. in other words, insof.1r as the image of Ihe Trinity is expressed by the tCTm "mind ~ (mfm), it refers not 10 the esscnce of the soul but to its highest power. Or if it does refer to the soul's essence, Ihis is true· on ly insofar as the power of mind flows from the soul's esst:nce itsclf. '.l7 in this discussion and in replies to certain obje<;tions in this article Thomas takes as given the distinction bem·een the soul and its powers. Important fO Tou r later consideratio n of any evemual evolution in his position is his remark that the soul is known as the intel lecti ve soul , but also as the intellecf or mind . This SUggCl;ts (hat we must carefully delermine when Thomas uses the term "intellect" to signifY a power of fhe soul, and when he uses it 10 designate the imellenivt: sou l itself. ' ''' In the o nly slightly bter Quod libet 10, q. 3. a. I of 1258, Thomas again responds to the question whether the soul is ident ical with its powers. In re plying he notes thaI we may speak of the soul in [\\10 ways, either (I) inSO(lr as if is a certain substanet", or (2) insofar as it is a certain potential whole .l ~ When taken in the first way- as a certain substance-the soul C:Ulnot be identifi ed with itS powers, and th is for twO reasons. First of all. it is impossible for one IJS. Of t primo qU2~ri fllr utrum m~n s. prol1l in e:I HI im~go Tri nil~ lis , ,i , ~nl ;~ ~nima~, ,.t! aliqu3 potenti3 e;us~ (l«>n . U.2.1,9j:l- S). With Weil heipl I am 2Si'uming t hat TI.omas di!puu:d q. 10 during hi! $«()nd yur as Regent Mana (5« FriJl r TJ,omaJ d"A'luilffJ, pp. J61!f.). IJ6. leon. U. l. l'J6"07-297")~. Note: "... sed anim2 hum2na (Krfingil ad altissimum gr.l.dum ima polellIias ani mae el a hoc denom;nalU r. unde dici lur imdl«{;va cl q uandOiJ ~ "';2m imd· l~lUs. el ' imili le r men, inquanlun, scilicet ex ipsn. 15. 1.1 }O-JI' • ... primo utrum ani ma sit ~U2e ,";lIem;u."

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282

The Essenri al Suucrurc of Finirc Bei ng

In q. 77, a. [ Thomas offers a second argumem which is immediately d irected to Ihe human sou l rather than to c rea!(~d being in general. With obvious reference to Aristotle's descripl ion of the soul in the De animtl and his own view rhat Ihe human soul is a substantial form, Tho mas remarks that according 10 irs essence the soul is an acl. If the cs~ n ce of the soul were its immediate principle of operation , one who always posscsS(."
See U1

(om,o~'t'r$t.

pp. 91-9). WdlCr d.xs llI ('mi Ofi Ihis poim in paMin!; in fl. II, p. 107. He ~lso ~[(osc:o; Ihe inAuencc on Thomas or a Slalelll cnl from I'scudo·Diony$ius's Crkftiol Hi~"-drrhy. C. II. c il ed in ST !. q. n.~. I (~st'd contr::l1. accord ing 10 which heavenl y spiriTS:l. rc di vidlotle'~ descriptio n of In c soul io ~ nn imn II, c. T. as klhe fir~t actuali£), of:l. oatu r::ll body wh ich hu life in polcncy~ (4lta. t 7-l..8). " Ef sic ipsa ani· ma. secundum quod SUbesl suae polcmi ~ e, dici\UI O(/US primus. o rdinatus ~d anum sec ondum.~ In''cnilur autcm habens animam non st' mpcr esse in aCIU o pelum vila .... Undc etiam ;0 ddinitione animae di ci tur quod ~I /trlUS rorporis /KItolt'n uit.. m Imb(ntis. quae lamen p(nemia n07labiidt nni"'.."'." C f. Ora";,,, .. II, c. I (41lb 15- 16). 150- On lhi ~ argument see Kunde. D/tf V~rhiilmif & r &rk. pp. l IT - T,,; W~ber, La conrrowrY. pp. 9J-97 (who<;(; imerprcIJlion differs co n~ idcr::lbl)' from mine).

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286

The Essential Structure of Finite Bei ng

possible for the princi ple by means of which il is produced to be pan of the agent's essence. In other words, in such a case the agen t is not im mediately operarive. For support Thomas IlIrns to natural agency. In the case of subsranrial generation. a natural agent acts by changing matter with respect to the form that informs it. In other words, the agent introduces a new substantial form into the matter. This happens only insofar as the matter is first properly disposed fo r that form. Only the n w ill the maner actually receive the form. T hus generation (the inrroductio n of the new substantial fo rm) is the termin us of alterat io n (in this case, a change in the previous dispositions of the maner). H ence in such nalliral changes it is neces· sary that what acts immed iately from the side of the age", be an accidenral form . On ly such a form will correspond to the disposition introduced into maner. In other words, beca use the dispositio n which is introduced into maner by an agent is an accident, the proxi mate principle which introduces th:!.! disposition must itself also be an accident Y..o Thomas also remarks thar such an accidental fo rm can aCI only in virtue of a substantial form and as its instrumen t. Otherwise the accidental form would be incapable of inducing a substanrial fo rm illlo the m:ltter through its aClion . For instance, in the case of the elementS the o nly evident principles of action are :lctive and pa~jve qualities. which lhemselves ael in virtue of substantial forms. It is for this re:lson that such anio ns terminate nOt only in accidental dispositions, but also in substantial form s. The on ly agent which can p rod uce a substance direcdy and immedi:ue1y th rough its own essence or substance is one that at ts through its es· sence; in such an agent there will be no distinction bern'een iLS essence and its active power. For Thomas, of cou rse, God alone is such an agelll. 16 1 UllIil this point Thomas's 3rgumem has concemratcd o n rhe need fo r a d istinct aClive power in every case where wh:1I is do ne or produced is something accidental. He now includes passive powers. It is evidelH th:lI a passive potency which is di· rC{;tiy ordered to a substantial act is in the genus substance, though by reductio n. And a pa~ i \'e power which is in potency to an accidental act must be in the genus accident. but by reduction once again. This fo llows because every genus is divided by potency and act. BUI it is dear that the powers of the sout. whether active or passive, are not so named because they are directl y ordered to something substaJltial but rather occause they arc ordered 10 somelhing accidental. Fo r instance, to un· derstand in aCI or to sensc in act involves not substant ial being but accidental bei ng; :lI1d il is 10 this accidental being that rhe powers of intellect and sense :Ire respec~ tively orde red. 1 6~ 160. Leon. 24.1.109:1p - r6, . NOH' in panicubr; "Quando igirur id quod agiru r non pt'ninc! ad esse iulxlanti~l~ rd. imp<)s.\'bil ... e; l quod principium 'luo agirur $i, aJiqu id de ~gntia rrr (i!~li($ mine). 161. Leo". ! 4.1 .' Oo) :,64- ,'h. Thomas also rema rh Ihal Av;c.,nll~ ~ ;d Ihe lame of hi s scpaUIC Agrm Imd l.,("!. ,61. l.roll. 1,p.1 0') "Sj- 197·

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292

The £Ssenrial Suucrure o f Finite Being

Weber also ci tes passages from the Compmdium rhl'o/ogial'. In c. 85 Thomas writes: ~ Th e imel lect, therefore, by wh ich a human being understands, is the form of this human being.... ~ Fanher on in lhal same chapter, he remarks: ~ Th e intellective soul, fro m the natu re of its species has th is (characteristic), that it be un ited to some body as a fo rm .. .. ~ 1 " [n c. 87 Thomas statcs: ~ It is therefore necessary fo r the agent intellect and the possible intellect 10 come wgether in the si ngle essence of Ihe soul ." BUI Ihis passage should be read in context . Earlit:r in c. 87 Thomas has argut:d that since the agent intclk'Ct and the possible intellect are fo rmally un ited 10 us, it remains to indicalt: that they come w gether in o ne and the same essence of the soul. For what is formally united to a thi ng is united to it either afte r the manner of a substantial fo rm , or aller the man ner of an accidental fo rm . In the latter case, each will be all accident of the SO Il 1. In either case, he reasons, the same conclusion will follow, namely, that they come together in the essence of lhe soul. m Since Weber's thesis has been eff(.'Ct iveiy challenged by OIhers and in considerable detail, here I shall limi t myself to a few observations. 1M First of all. the texts we have seen so far am be given a much simpler interpretation. As T homas has already reminded us as early as his Dr vl'rirlll(', o ne may use the term "intellect" to refer to the intellective potency o r power of Ihe soul, and hence to a power {hat is distinct from the soul. O r one may take il as a way of dcsignating rhe imellcctive soul itself. This is confirmed by the remark from ST I, q . 76, a. " cited above. ,n 184. ~ ... il'lldl!!'Clus igimr quo homo il'llclligil, CSt (orml huius hom inis ... ~ (lton. 41. I O~J:SS16). Noo" ,hu t Thoma. ;. here ~s~; n ars";"g agai". , ~ nyo"~ who .... ould d"fe"d ,n., ""p~r'l! cd (hu~c. Itr of Ihe ptmible inlell!!'C l. AI$<) nOle from neat Ihe end of Ihis chapter: •Anima enim i nldlcctiva t x n~Ul ra suac spedei hoc habel U! unialUl alicui t orpori Ul (olma . . . " (p. 110:1\8- 160). Sc:e \'('H)(Cf, "I.t:s di!CUS!i ions," p. JOO for cilal;o n of Ihe first of Ihese pas»g6. HoYo't"Vcr, he should ha\'C abo C; led lilt StOOnd o ne; (or il shows ho .... tasily Thomas !nova from .Ipt"iling of Ihe i/lul/eN as Ihe (orm of Ihi. irniiv idual man 10 rcferring 10 lilt inu{vaiw Sl}u{:U lhe form whic h is unilcd 10 a body. 18\. "Oponet igilu t quod im ellecl'lls a~ns (;1 possib ilis in una csscmia animac conveniem' (Lton. 4 1.11I~17- 1 9). Ci ted by W~bcr, "L(;$ d i5C1JSlions: p. joo. For T homou al$<) ~ the firsl pa rt of Ihi ~dlapln (pp. 110- (1 1). In c. 88 11>0"':1.1 e:Ole ncy by .... hi ch il allsl r:lCIS intelligible 'P«~ from phanl:l.lms is ca lied Ihe agent inlcli!!'C1 (lints Sl- 58). He ~ on in c. 89 10 ~pp!y I h i~ to all the power) of Ihe $Oul, not ing th~t all a rc in a CClIain way "rooted in \he soul" (" in anilll~ .... dicant l!r~) . Sorne, such a~ Ihe powe r~ o ( the ""gelali"" and .stnsiri,'C part. ~rc in the $Ou l as in thei r priaeiple and in rhelXlmposill' ~s in Iheir subjtct. Others, suc h IS th e powe rs of lhe intell!!'Cliv( pari. arc in Ihe soul both :1.1 in Ihei r principle and as in their subiecl ( I.eon_ 41./11). Thc.~ lUIS do nOI give th" imp~ion Ihat Thomas ha~ nuw idcnlifil..J the soul wilh ilS powers. 186.5n' n. 128 above fo' ,ef( ren(tS 10 l.ercvre and B~,j n . AI$<) SC(' RaJJrgnll Iii Itt/rm/ura romiJfira ~ (11I7l). pp. 6S- 71; F. Van Sl"enh<'rghen. Mlli," Siger dr Brubam (lou""i" . I'>.r;! , 'Sl7]), pp. )5760.4 11- 14.

187. Fo r Ihe It~1 from fk wrifllfr. q. 10, a. I, n. 17l.

set'

n. 1$6 abov..-. For Ihal from ST I, q. 76 , a. 1, $
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296

I.

The Esscnrial ScrucllI re of Finice Being

The Distincrion betwee n Matter and Form

Before taking up Thomas's physical and metaphysical approaches to the distinclion beTween maHer and form, it may be helpful for us 10 turn 10 one of his ~arli('St overall discussions of these twO principles. This is to be found in his Dr: principiis mlturol', and has the additional advantage of bei ng presented in an independently written work, nm in a commentary on Aristotle. 1 This treatise begi ns with an explanation of the distinction benveen potency and act. T hat which can exist but does not is said to exist in potency. That which already exists is said to exist in actuality. Bm there aTt' tv.'o kinds of existence (l'Jft}-the esscntial o r substant ial existence of a thing, as for a human being to exist (this is to exisl wi thout qualificatio n [tisr rimplicim1); and accidental existence. as fo r a hum'ln being co be white (this is to be ill a qualified sellsc j t'lft Stcundwn '1uid ]) . ~

Corresponding to these twO ways in which existence (tift) may be realized, i.e .• as substantial and as accidental . arc tWO ways in which something may be in potency, For instance, somethi ng may be in pOlency to be a human being. such as spe rm or menstrual flu id. Or something may be in potency to be white, such a~ a human being. Both lhal which is in potency to substantial existence and that which is in potency to accidental existence may be described as maller, bIll with this difference, The kind of maHer which is in potency to substamial existence is refNred to as matter ~from which" (~X qua), while the maHer which is in pmency 10 accidental cxistcnce is rather known as matter " in whichn (in qua). St rictly speaking, the ki nd of matter which is in potency to accidental existence is known as a subject. wh ilt Iha! which is in potency to substantial existence is known as matter in the proper sense. Th us we nOie that accidents arc said 10 be in, i.e., to inhere in their subject , but that substant ial form is not described in th is way.' Presumably by this final remark Thomas wants to avoid assigni ng to matter when co mpared with substantial form the kind of o ntological priority substance enjoys with respeer (0 its accidents. Thus, he continues, a subject does not derive its existence from that which ~comcs" to i1. i.e., from itS accidents; but matter does receive existence from that which ~comesn to it, si nce in itself i! only has incomplete being {ml}. Hence while substJnt iai fo rm may be said to give existence {me} 10 I. A5 w ill !)t r<'(:alk-d , Ihi5 work w'!! wtiu cn Juring T ho ma5S ti me as ~ BachdO t of th~ Se ntences ~1 l'~ris ( 1~ p- l l 56) ,

or poss ibly even carlin

S~

"lomU, Saim Tbomili Aquinlls. p. 349. On the qucs-

lio n of ma rtn and form i, anticip:I.I<:'1l much o f the think ing we shall ~ in Tho ma$s laler wo rk!, ind udi ng hi5 Conltnetw:uics 01' ,he I'hysiu ~ nJ rhe Mrr",,"}!;'" 1 . • NOI ~ q uod quoddam POle." 05(' licel non ~i f, quodd~m "efO es t. IIlud 'llJod pof esf ~ dicit Ut tiM potentia. illud quod iam cs, dic;tur l'S5(' ~C fU " (!.ron . 4}.3'):1- 8). For Ihe eoruinu~tion or this

text see Ch. VII ! aW·e. fl . 60. 3. u :on. 4}·1,):,)- z6.

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The Essential Structure of Finite Being

300

After poin ting o ut that the principles of change are twO in one sense, i.e., if we take them as the colHraries, and three in another sense, i.e., if we include the contra ries and that which underlies, Aristotle cominues: w~ ha,"~

now stated the numlxr of the principles of natur.l1 obj~cu which are subj«"t to gener-nian, and how the nu mber is reached; and it is dear that th t re must be something underlying the contraries, and th~t the coruraries mllst be two.... T he underlying n~ture can be known by analo!,,}'. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the mJller and the formk~ before r«eiving form to Jlly thing which has fo rm, so is the underlying natu re TO substance, i.e., the 'this' or existent. '7

In commenting on the fina l pan of the second passage, T homas remarks that according to Aristotle prime matter cannot be known in itsclr, since whatever is known is known by means of its form; bu t prime matter is regarded as standing u nder every for m. 13m prime mailer is known by analogy, that is, T homas explains, according to a proportion. Thus we know that wood is differelH from the form of a bench and from the fo rm of a bed because the wood is now subject to one form , and now to another. So tOO, when we see that what is ai r now becomes water, we must conclude that something which existed u nde r the form of air is now subject t"O the fo rm of WateT. Therefore, JUSt as wood is d ifferent from the form of ... bench and from the form of a bcd, we conclude ,hat the underl yi ng subject is different from rhe form of water and from the form of air. Hence this underlying subjttt is related to natural subStances in the way b ronze is rdared to a statue and wood to a bcd , a nd anyt hi ng material Olnd unfo rmed to a ro rm . This unde rlyi ng su bject , Thomas concludes, is called p rime mauer.1 1 T homas also remarks that prime m:Hlcr is one principle of nature, although it is not one in the same way as is a determ ined individual which enjoys a form and un ity in actuality. Prime maHer is said to be a nt' (and to enjoy being) insofar as it is in potency to form. Thomas also commenls that form {or mrio} is another princip le. and that the privation which is conlra ry to the form is a third . H e refers back 10 h is earlier explanation in this lurio of the ways in wh ich these principles may be regarded as twO and as t h ret' . '~ 17· Su 191a }- Il; English Irms., p. p6. 18. See /11/ PIIJI. , I<"CI. I}, p. S'), n. !IS. NOI~ in p~rticulu: " Sed scilu, KCundulIl analogiam, idest secundum pTl)poffion~rn .... Quod igitu, sic ~ habet ~d i~s slIbnanrias naturales, sicU! S(: haber aes ad 5t:llllarn ( I lignu III ad Icctum. ct quodlibet mater;al~ .,1 inform~ ad fo rmam, hoc: dici 111115 CS5C. 11I~\c ri~m pri nlam." Cf. pri"cipii} c. 1; (l«m. 43.41:78-$S). As A. r"Q rd t has paimed OUI, Thomas would have us ur;\'c al a knowledge of maner by rollowing twO roUles: (I) by knowing il in INm) ,he iorm which 3C1uali,.e..< il: and (z) by analogy or proportion (LA Imur~rr mir"phJSiqu~ du ( on( rr"/, p. l12). For lerercncc to both of these way).see /" {), 1;.j"irau. q. 4, a. 1 (lAln. 5o.I~}:9 4100): ~ ... uno modo pcr analogiam $;\"e per proportion.,m. ul dicitur in I Ph)"sicorum . .. al io modo cognos.:imr pcr fo rm.m, pcr<.:ju~m habet O~ in aelU .... " Cf. q. 5, a. j (li 7:118- 1.l0) for Ih e KCond way. C f. [k ~!(rilllrr. q. 10. a. S (Lron . ll. 1.309:H-4 ~) . Ill. In I Pbys., leet. !J. p. S\l, n. 118.

rx

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J I8

The Essential Structure of Finirc Being

degree of acma[ity to primt': matter, ont': would thereby compromise the essential unity of a maner-form compositc. For instance, as Thomas pUIS this in his Commentary o n MnapbpiCl VIII, Icrt. I , if prime matleT included any prope r fo rm in and of itself. it would enjoy some actuality by reaso n of tha r form. When another substantial form was introd uced, matter wou ld not receive unqualified or substantia[ bei ng from that form, but o nl y some kind of accidctHal bei ng.n H ence, we may infer, the mane r-fo rm com posite wo uld nOt be essentially one. Before ending this discussion of prime m an er as pure potentiality, we should refe r to anOlher point. [n many of the t'CXtS we have now examined. Thomas identifi es prime mattcr wit h potentiality. He seems to allow for no d isti nction between prime matter, on the one hand, and its potential ity, on the other. By i t.~ very nature it is a potcncy to substantial being or [orm.'I(\ H owever, there is a diffic ult passage in his Com mentary on I SmuT/us (d. 3, q. 4. a. 2. ad 4). There he is m(."Cting an obje('d on against his defense of disdnction between the soul and irs powers. According 10 objection 4, prime mamr is identical with its potency. But JUSt as p'.lssive potency follows upon prime matter, so does active potency follow upon fo rm, Therrfore a substant ial form such as the cssenCl' of I he soul m ust be identified with irs aCtive potency o r power.?! In Trplying 10 this object io n, T homas introduces a d istinction. If by passive potency o ne has ill mind the rel:HiOIl of matter 10 fo rm, marreT is not identical with its p
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)22

The Essemial $lfucrure of Finite Being

therefore, a di vine idca does not correspond to matte r alone o r 10 form alone. There is one divine idea for the composi te whole, and it serves ao; a produC[jyc principle for the entire composite, including both its maner and its form. How(.'Ver, he adds thai we may also take a d ivine idea in a broader sense as signi fy ing a simili tude. Ac* cording to this usage things may have disti nct di vine ideao; if they can be considered d ist inctly even though they cannot exist separa tely. When taken in this broadcr sense, one may gra nt that there is a d ivine idea for marrer considered in itSelf. ! OJ In repl yi ng to the third objection in this same ;micle, Thomas once more remarks tha t maHer C3n nOi exist ill itSelf, i.e .• apart from form. Nonetheless. it can be considered in terms of itself (ucundllm u) and to that extent can have a divine likeness or idea. 104 (Thomao;'s remark abou t matter's being considered in terllls of itself will have 10 be kept in mind below when we return to thc qucnion of how we know prime mauer. He docs nOt mean to imply that we have any direct inlelle1:lIIal grasp of it.) But for the mom ent, it will be enough for us to note that here Thomas insists Ihat prime m aHer is not realized in actual existence except in a composite. a point which he reiterates in replying to the first objection for the contrary position. H e also offers an imeresting clarificatio n while replying to the s(:eond objection for the com~ry position: st ricdy speaking. prime mallcr docs not itsclf ha\'e an essence; it is a pan of the essence of the composite whole. to} I n Summa contra Gmtifn ll , c. 4}, T homas is arguing against the view of "cett;un modern h ere ti C$~ who say that G od created the maner of all visi ble things, but that it was then d ifferent iated through the agency of an angel by different fo rms. In one of his arguments against this posi tion he reasons that prime matter could not have preexisted in irsdf before all form ed bod ies, since it is nothing but pote ncy: all being in acr uality comes from some fo rrn Y" In ano ther argument he reasons that the firs t introduction of fo rm in m m ancr ClnnOl be produced by an agent which operates only through motion: for every motion to a fo rm is fro m a determi ned form to a de term ined fo rm. But martcr cannot exist without some form and therefo re some form mUSt be presupposed as present in the matter. 107 Again, therefore, even though the context is very d ifferent, Thomas si mply accepts as a given that matter cannot exiSTwithout some form. And ao; he indicates in the first argument we have JUSt considered. this follows from his conviction that maner is nothing but potency. IO}. Leon. U. I.IU:}'j- H. NOI ~; ~sro t,.m~n I i propri~ de idea ln. 11.1. t I>.:68-7'. Nou: : •. .. quamvi5 materi~ sC'(;undu III S< eSse non pon;t. t1lmen pot~St ~undulll $C cons;dcr-ari c\ s;c I)()( tst habere per S<' si mi1i\Udinem. ~ Ag~in Thom:t! is 5peak ing of 11 divine ide~ for matter only in th~ bro3d 5<:nS<'.

leon. U.t.llz: 76-8l. 106. Ed. c il .• p. ' H "Arnplius. M ~ ter;~ aUl" m pr ima non POI e.~1 pr-a..-fui5SC pt"r scipsam ~ ntC omni~ corpol""~ form~t~: cum no n sir n isi potentia nntum: o mnc en;m esse in aem <'.S{ ,.b -al;qua rorma " 10 7. Ibid. (·1tem"). lOS.

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)28

The Essenrial Structure of Finite Being

Also in the D~ p rirlfipiiJThomas commcms that generation is a motion IOwards a form. Gtneration in thc unqualified sense is ordered [0 a substantial form . whi le genera tion in the qualified sense is orde red to an accidental fo rm. When a substamial form is introduced, something is said [0 be made in the unqualified sense. I ~ s Frequemly enough Thomas refers w substalllial form as the act of m;tuer, for instance in D~ spirituolibUJ (TYotllriJ, a. I , as cited above. At the same time, he holds that form is limited by maner. 11(, This is another ap plication of his conviction that unrl'Ceived act is unl imited. If we find a substantial form in lim ittd fashi o n in a particular em iry, this is because its corresponding principle- prime maner- receives and limits it. l l1 For Thomas substantial form plays a primary role within the metaph ysical structure o r essence of any being, including corporeal entit ies. A thing's type o r kind (species) is determ ined by its essence. Within the essence of corporeal entities, a thing's specific kind of being is dClcnnined by its substantial form. In the case of created spiri tual enti ties- angels-a thing's substantial form is iden tical with its $ubstaOlial essence. ll~ As has already been noted at leas! in passi ng, Thomas ma intains chat both macr.er and form aTe included within the essence o f a corporeal en tity. Accordingly, each must be incl uded within the definition of such a thing, AI the same time, he v.'3S aware that the view that matter is included with in a th ing's essence had been contro\'erred, and that Aristotle's mind concern ing this was also subject to dispute. Thus in his C ornmenrary on Mnophysia V II , c, 10, Thomas refers to twO major op inions concerning (he definition s and essences of things. 1:, Some hold tha t the enrire essence of a species is the form itsclf, just as they hold Ih:1l a human being's ent ire essence is to be idcJHifi<.-d with Ihe soul. r"Or this reason they also maintain thai the ~ fo rm of the whole" (forma (OrillJ) a5 signified bya term such as " humaniry~ is to be identi fied with the "form of the part" (forma partil), as illustrated , for instance, by the name "soul. " Defenders of this view acknowledge that the twO d iffer co nceptually (uC/llIdum rarioll(m). Thus the name "form of the pan" is ap plied to a substantial fo rm insofar as the latter is viewed as perfecting (Lron. 1..l.3.ILt o: 146-r50): -. .. simi liler mau'ria at c:\ Us;I rormae aliquo modo ill quantum $lIstillet form~m, tl forma at ali'1uo modo c:\us:> maleri"" ill 'l"~nlUm dat ma{~ri ae t$SI' 1ctu"; II. c, H (td . el l., p. 147): " ... pn. 4}.j76:6 1-89) _ 1t9- In VII M((" leer. 9. p. 158. II , 1467.

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)36

The Esse ntia l S rrllcrure

orFinirc Being

3nd passive powers were not yet ro nferrl-d on rhe va rious pam of the wo rld in rhe way they would subsequently be d istinguished and ordered. H e argues l hat this suggestio n is possible if o ne accepts Avicenna's \'iew that deme ntS remain in a mixture in terms of thei r substantial forms as regards their primary fSU even though they arC' cha nged in terms of their secondary mr, i.e" in terms of their active and passive powers. Therefore, he suggests, it is also possible fo r matter to be subject 10 a given substa.nt ial form without possessing the corresponding active and passive powers in perfect fashio n. l)(' In d. 18. q. I, a. 1 of this same Com mentary on [I Srntm crs Tho mas wonders whether and to what extelll the nOlion of seminal reasons is acceptable. H e nOtes that some hold that the fo rm of a species is not rl'Ceived in maner excep' by means of a generic form. H ence that form by reason of which fire is fire is numerically distinct fro m that form w hereby fire is a body. Some would refer to this incom plete generic fo rm as a ~mi nal reason, because it leaves all incl ination in m atter to receive specific fo rms. T homas rejectS Ihis approach because every form which comes to sOlllelh ing after its substantial being (me) can only be an accidental form . If such a form can be added to something which already enjoys substantial being. when that for m is removed the' individual su bsrance wi ll still remain. , S7 In s hOT( , here ab>ain, as in o ur first text, Thomas rejects a Iheo ry which would defend plurality of substantial forms. Thomas also offe rs a second version of this argumen t against p lurality of substant ial fo rms. Since every form gives me, and since it is im possible for one and the same thi ng to have rwo subS[amial acts ofbcing (esse), it follows that if the first Sllbst'am ial form coming 10 maHer gives a suhsr-aillial aCI of being to iI, any second and superadded fo rm can o nl y contribute an accidental ny. Therefo re, and once again with Avicenna, he concl udes that it is by reason of onc and the same form that fire is fire and fi re is a body. '~ As we move forward a few yea rs to the Dr vrriwfl', in q. Ij, a. 4 we fin d Thom;u writing that for the soul to be united to the body no addi tional factor (imrmio) is required ; for this union does nOt depend upon the will of the soul but on ll31Ure. The soul is not u ni tt·d to (he body as a fo rm by means o f its powers but by its essence, si nce there is no intermediary between fo rm and maner. Thomas goes on to ob$eTVe that it does not follow from this that the human soul is united 10 Ihe body in such fashion 3S 10 be to tally dependenl upon the bodily conditio n. I S' But of greater interest fa us here is his claim [hat there is no intermediary beTWeen fo rm and maner. Hence there is no inter mediary substantial fo rm between the prima ry substantial fo rm and Ihe matter of a given substance. 156. /l.b.ndonncl cd., vol. 1, p. j lS' " NOle: "Undc possibi lt est 1l\3ttriam ess.>' sub forma substan' tiali 5 i n~ hoc quod habcu qU3l i t~td ~C(iv;tS CI pm;\';tS in sui complemt nlo.... • 157. Ed. Cil" pp. 4jI - p. 158. F..cl. cit., p. -451 , tilt
Lron. lZ .l.. -418'109- 41?;UI.

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Prime Maner and Su bslanrial Form

H'

Thomas's argument continues. Ifit is by reason of one form that something is called an :lnimal and by reason of another that it is called a human being, it will follow that one of these ("animal") cannot be predicated of the other (" human being") except per (luideliI if the fWO forms a r~ nOt ordered to one another. If the forms ar~ ordered to one another so that Olle is presupposed for the Olher, one term could be predicated of the other anI), according ro the second mode of pfr 11' predicat ion . But neither of these alternatives can be accepted. In fact animal is pre
Thomas recalls thaI only substantial form gives the act ofbcing in the unqualifi ed sense (substantialI'Slt) and that it is only through the acquisition or loss of this that something is generated or corrupted in the unqualified sense. Therefore, if in addition to the intellective soul some other substantial form were present in matter by reason of which the subject ill which the soul inheres enjoys being in actualiry, the soul itself would not give the substantial :ICt ofbcing. T his wou ld in turn imply that the soul ilsd f is nOt really a substantial form . 17~ Hence Thomas remains stead· ily - thal 10 which .somcd\in g i5 amibmro 5("r\"(;5 as Ih t pro~r 5ubj«"t and as m~lH:r for what is prcdic,m ..:!. 17;. !..('Oll. S. HI. Not e: "Ergo Op
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350

The Essential Strucrure of Finite Being

In sli lllaler discussions, however, Thom;ls rejects the posit ion of Averroes as even less acceptable than that of Avicen na. The Averroistic theory implies [hat a substa ntial form itself can be changed es~ntiany, i.e .• that it can undergo intensifica tion and remission (or admit of greater and lesser degrees in i[self) . For Thomas's discussions one may consult Quodlibet I, q. 4, a. t, ad J; ST I, q. 76, :t. 'I. ad 4: Dispu ted Questions De anima, q. 9, ad 10. Tn these texts Thomas concludes [hat the forms of the clemtlllS do not remain actually present in mixtures but only vi rmally. In other words. they remain insofar as the power of their respective substantial fo rms remains in a mixtu re in the quality of the element. though in weakened degree and. as it were. approaching an intermediary level.20} Of more im mediate interest 10 us here, however, is Thomas's steadfast refusal to allow for the acmal presence of the substantial forms of dements in mixed bodies. Ifhe was will in g in the fi rst of these discussions to entertain the Avicennian distinct ion berv.een the primary and the secondary being of elementary substantial forms, he did not then regard this admission as mil itating against his defense of unicity of subst:l.mial form in mixed bodies. Subsequently he rejectt.-d both this Aviccnnian approach :w d the AverroiSlic solution (after being:u one point more sympathetic to the latter). In preference [Q either of these, he developed his own vie'.v about the conrin uing virtual presence in mixtures of the qualities of the elements. His apparently changing view about the role of determ inate vs. indeterminate dimensions in his explanation of individuation will be exam ined in the final part of this chaptcr. Ifr may antici pa te that discussion, I will on ly comment here that his posilion{s) concerning such dimensions never implied that he was defending a plurality of substantial form s. Hence one may safely conclude that from the beginning 10 Ihe end of his career Thomas defended unicity of substantial form in all substance5. If he was wi lling [Q speak of a form of co rport'ity in some early leXtS, his usage of this terminology does not imply his acceplance of plurali ty of substalll ial forms. Ie may well be thai hi5 lerrn inology concerning this beca me morc precise as time WCIll 011 and that he became more sensitive to fhe possible misunderstanding to which some of his ea rl i!o,. ~T I, q. 76. 3. 4> ad 4. AnN ,ejecting bOlh the Av;unnian and A,·,,,,,ui$fi c positions, T hotnu wri l~: ~EI id eo dicendutn <:St. ~undum Philosophum in I fk (;rn~rarion(> qu()(l fo,ma~ d~­ Ill~Jllorum m~nctH in mixlo non aCIl1. sc:d v;nU!e. ManetH cnim quali[l\t~ propriae demcmorum , licel remimc. in qu ibus CSt virtu$ {mmarum clementaril.lm- (Leo n. s.n.). Cf. Ql.lodlibct I, q .•, a. t. ad , ",he'e> after r"~ling the "iews of A"iccnn3 3nd A,·crrocs. Thom:u comments: NEt ideo alilcr dicend"m . secund um I'hilosophum in ! D.: g~ncr:in ionr, quod FO rm3e miscibilium nun m3nent in mix!o acto, sed "ir!u!e. prout scilice! virtllS FO rmac sllbs[l\n!i~li$ manti in quali!1l.tf demtl1l;lri. licc! rtmis~, et quasi ad mediulll redJc!1I.: quali!1l.s tnim demcntaris agi( in " irtute format jub$lant;al is . . . - (Lron. 1;J.l. ,SS: '44- t sll. For Qu. dilp. 1k 11,,;ml1, "I. 9. ad '0 sec Leon. 14. z.8\'4P 467. Fur Aristotle sce all Gt,uT,lfiqll alld Con-up/ion L c. 10 (P7b 19-jl). For additional discussion of Thomas's changing views concerning th e problem of miXlu,Cj; see Denis, pp. 160- 64_[)en;s docs no! find Thoma~'s hC:lil'

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)62

The Essential Strucwrc ofFinire Being

Unti l this point I have attempted to preserve in English the difference between the three Latin terms Thomas appl ies to d imensions, i.e., hdet erminal(~" (urminaflU). Kindeterminate" (inurmintwu). and "d ctcrmined ~ (dl'unninnrad In the present text, how(.'Ver, the distinction between determinate {urminaIQl'j and determined (rbtl'rm i ntlltll') seems to have broken down , al leasl by implication. Now we read thai when dimensions arc considered without any determination (deunnintuiojof their dimensions and hence, o ne assumes by implication, as undetermined {iruuurminmaej , they may be described as indeterminate (imerminl1f1u). This invitt'S us to take indeterminate as equi valent to undetermined . And it also invites us to take as the opposite of the indetermina te not o nly lhe determina te (urmintltlu) but also the determined (dnrrmillQt.1rj , Hence I find it difficult to agree with those recellt inrerp relers who sec no real difference between Thomas's appeal to determined {or determinate} d imensiOIlS and h is appe:t11O Ihose {hat are indeterminate (or undetenn incd). If he has turned 1O indeterminate or undetermined dimensions in the p rescru [ext, he has dOlle so deliberately and, as we may gather from other passages, wit h awa reness of his debt to A\'erroes' terminology in making this choice.m Ifhe will eventually drop this l(~rmin ology and retUrn to determinate o r dClcrmi ned dimensions in accounting for ind ividua tion , ch is, tOO, will point co a real shift , nO! merel y to a change in h is way of expressing him.self. In the following li nes of Ib is text T homas paims OUt thac maner taken in itself is nOt the p ri nciple of specific or numerical d i\'ersity; but JUSt as it is a princi ple for diversity in genus insofar as it is subject to a common fo rm, SO is it a principle for numerical dive rsity insofar as it is subject to indeterminate (imt'rminaris) dimensions. He acknowledges lhal such dimensions are accidents, and therefo re, that numerical di versity is sometimes reduc~ to diversity of matter. and sometimes 10 diversity of acciden ts by reason of these (i ndeterminate) d imensio ns. Thomas apparently accepts bOlh explanations when appropriate qualific.Hio ns arc added. Th is implies that for h illl the principle of individuation is matter, but not merel y maner. Indeterminate or undetermined dimensions al$O serve as anothe.r and secondary p rinciple ofindividualion Yl! Thomas also adds in a noteworthy commell! that accidents other than such dimensions arc not themselves the principle of indi imcrmin~tis nm cria cffieitur h~<:"C matc ri~ s ign~13. <'I $i( i ndj"idu~t formam. £1si( ex m:ucria CiU$1-

rur diWfsit;lS .o;e<:undl.lm numctum in eadem speck" (Leon. ~o.n~:ll )-, 1). ~J7 . ro r insu nce. l~ J. EMu s. Faith ami !it-imu (Rome, 1\17"', pp. 7S-77. 80-81; Owms. "Thom as A'luinas: Oimensj"e Qu~n!iIY: pp. !89-90. 193- 9 ... 301- j; Bobik. " Dimension~ in lhe lnd ivid l.l31 ion of Bod ily Sub.mrKts. ~ pp. 69-71; • Ll doctrine de sai nt Thom ~s,' pp. 19-)8. For th e ulin Averroes' lerm inok>gy;n IX submmr;1l orbi. s« n. 11l abo,e. 138. leon. iO.I!S:ljl- 14l. Note , " ... i t~ ~ t pri ncipium di"c rs it~li5 se.:u ndum numerum prout ' UbcSI dimen.lio n ibus imerm i n~lis . Er idco. CIIIll hae dilllensiolle5 .im de genere accidenlium, quan . Ooque divers; l a~ .
.x.r.

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368

The Essemial Srrucrure of Finite Being

That Ihis is indeed Thomas's view in Dr w ritdtt', q. 2 , a. 6 is supported by a similar sratemem in q . 10, a. 5. There Thomas writes that it is not matter viewed in unin:rsal fashion that ser..es as the principle of individuation , but rather mauer insofar as it is considered in an individual, thaI is 10 say. designated maner as it existS under determined (d£tt'rmimuis) dimensions.lu In Quodlibet 7. q. 4, a. J (Easter (256), Thomas was asked whether God can make whiteness and somc other corporeal quality exisr withoul quantity, J USt as he makes quantity exist in the Eucharist without a substantial subject. In discussing this he distinguishes between the nature of a quality such as whiteness and its indi viduation as this sensible whiteness in disrinClion from any othcr sensible whiteness. Hc concludes thaI il is nOt possible for this individuated sensible whiteness to exist without quantity, even though it is possible for individuated quantity 10 exist by divine power wilhout a substantial subject, as in the Eucharist. This is becausc q uanti ty is individuated nOt merely by its subject (as are other accidentS). but also from its posi tion, which is included in the norion of dimensivc quantity.m Although this u::xt casts 11 0 light on the respective roles of determined and undetermined d imensions in individuation, it shows that dimensions and position co ntinue to play an impo rtanc role in accollnting for the self-individuating character of quantity. In Quodlibet 9, q. 6, a. I (Christmas 1257), Thomas faces another theological question-whether charity may be increased in terms of its csstnce. In considering this he draws a parallel with changes involvi ng increase in quantity. He notes that in the case of co rporeal growth the esscllce of quantity is not destroyed . si nce indeterminate dimension re mains. But insofar as the quantity receives different limits (urminariolles). it changes from smaller to greater. So t OO, he co ncludes, the vinue of charity is not destroyed in its essence if its limi ts or degree change. n • Whilc this teXI does not address the application of indeterminate Ot delerminat'e dimensions to the issue of individuatioll, it does o nce again illustrate Thomas's willingness ro d istinguish between them at this poin t in his C<1reer. In later texts Thomas makes passing references to the issue of individuation , but usually without manifesting any preference fo r determinate o r indeterminatc dimensio ns. For instan ce, in Summa (omra Grntiln, 13k IV, c. 65 (ca. 1264-126S), he is again discussi ng the Eucharist. Once more he writes that it is peculiar to climensive quanti ty amo ng all the accidents to be individuated of itself. This is be· cause d imensivc quantity incl udes posi tion , thc ordering of pans in a whole, within its intelligiblc content. Because d irnensivc quantity alone is self-i ndividuating, thc lll. Here Thomas co n ~idcll wh elhel the hu m~n mind a.n know ma t~rial l h i n gf;u indi vid ual. He comme nts Ihal when if is vieww un ivt"T!:IlI y~ ... materia non elil irnih'iduat;onis pt'incipi um. 5«und um quod consideram r maleria in singula ri q uae est ma lcri;t signata sub aClenninalis ai· rnensioni bus CI iSltns: c~ h~( en irn form a ind ivid uatu r. _. " (leon. U.l.l09:18-U ). lH. Uo n. lp.l):p-S}. 1\4. Lcon. 1~. I . II .. :.. o- 6}.

sro

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374

The Essemial Srrucrure of Finite Being

identical concl usions. As Aertsen notes (and as we have seen above in C h. IV), the medieval Latin translation of a term from the Arabic text of this work as yliatim posed a problem for Thomas.!70 The Latin text of the Lib" d~ callJiI indicates that an intelligence has ylialim because it is W~ and form , and that in like fashio n the soul has yliarim and so does nature. But the First Cause does not. Thomas mistakenly thinks ,hat this term comes from the Greek term fo r matter (y'~' in its medieval Latin transcription), when in fact the Arabic original rather signifies form or something like it. Nonetheless, Thomas adapts this meaning sufficiently so as 10 fit it into his own thinking. He interprets it broadly as signifYing either matter or something that behaves like maner, that is, something porenrial or receiving. Thus he can agree with the Ubrr tU CdUStS that the quiddiry of a (created) separate eIHiry or intelligence, bei ng a subsisting form a.nd nOi being identical with its erse, is related 10 the ersr in which it participates as potl'ncy to acl. So tOO, the soul may be said 10 have , Iiarim not merely in the sense that it hJ.S (or is) a form (which is in potency to l:su), but also in the sense thai it has a body of which it is the form. In like fashion nature (or a natural entity) has ylintim si nce it is really composed of form and maner. N01 having any participated mr, the First Cause: in no way has ylintim but is pure em' and, adds Thomas, pure goodne.ssY ' In developing [his point , Thomas notcs that something may be said to be an individual by reason of the fact Ihal it is not suited to be in many tilings, as is a universal. But something may nOt be suited to be in many things in twO different ways. FiTS! of aJl, Ih is may be IX'cause it is determined to rhe single subject in which it is present. Thus this whiteness, precisely because it is received in this subject, cannot be present in another. Be1:allse this method of explanation cannot proceed to infi niry, Thomas concludes that one must arrive at something whose very nature it is nOllO be received in something clsc. and which is individuated of itsdf. This. he says. is prime mailer which in corporeal things is a principle of singularity for them. And this leads him to lhe: second way in which something is not suited to be multiplied in other things. namely because: it is not of irs nature 10 be in something else. It is in this way ,hat individuation occu rs in separate substances, which are forms which have mr, as well as in the Fi tst Calise, which is subsisting tiSt it 170. ~ "Die Th~1l1. ur Jlldividu~lioll in del Veruneilung vo n Il77. Heinrich "on Gent \lnd ThomOl$ "o n Aquin, - in MiJuliu.,wJ M~dil1(L..(iIl 24 (JkrJi,,_ New YOlk, (996), pp. ~9-6S. csp«ially pp. 2~9-60. Sc-e our rema rks cooce rn ing ,his in eh. IV, n. SIl 7 1. For 11M, Latin le,,1 of the Librr tk ,/lWJis .\('e S4n(ti T"oma~ dt- Aquilll} 11<1'" Librum tk rotusis rx/>6Sllio, SlIffro:y ro .. p. 57. FOI Thomas'~ UJmmemary Iil'e p. 6~ . Note csp«ially: "Nam inulh&m rill hllbn }limim, id e:!"l al iq uid ma reria!c vel ad modutn maleriae se habcns; dicilU r ("jill Ji;arim ab }/~. quod <'SI maleril..· ~r di.scu.ss ion s~ R. Taylor, ~SI. T homu ~nd the Lib,. tk cllUJil (as cilro in Ch. IV. n. 51 aho"e); ACrl$<.' n, ~ D i e Thesell,· pp. 159- 60; A. Speer, "Ylilllhin quod m principillm iouiiviJullndi. Zut Dis ku.ssion urn das lnd ivid ualionsp rinti p im An $(:hlUM an prop. 8{91 de! 'liber de causis' bei Johannes {Ie Nova 001110, AlbertuS Magnus und Thomas von Aquin,' in Misafiu.lltll Mfdill(t"<slia 14 (1996). pp. 171-7 2, ~82-85.

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Argum emarion for God's Ex istence (Inrroducrion)

381

uni(lu cn cs.~

or unicilY, and other Ihjn~,'s of this kind . These, he expl icitly srarcs, arc proved in philosophy and arc presupposed by faith ." Certain com ments should be made aOOm this im po mnt passage. To begin , T homas li~ts as first among the preambles to fu ith that are to be demon strated the proof that God exists. There can be no doubt, thererore, tha t Aquinas was con vinccd that God's existence can be proved or demonstrated in philosophy. Stt· ondly, he remarks thaI truths such as God's existence or God's uniqueness- preambles to faith - arc proved or demonstrated in philosophy and prcsuppo.'\ed by fa ith. One should not conclude from this either that o ne cannot believe in God unless o ne has already demonstrated his exi5[cncc, or thai it is an easy m;lu er to work out a valid demonstmtio n of God's existence. ~ What Thomas is mther ~tti n g forth here is an ideal for the adult mind whereby one would move from philosophically demonsrrated conclusions (dtat God exists and other muhs of Ihis kind) to a mature act of fuith in divinely revealed lrut h concerning God . The demonstration that God exists would not of itself be suRlcieO! to establish the truth of revelat ion for the religious believer. For this an act oHaith would also be req uired. 6 If we rn:ly develop mort' fully one point JUSt made in the preceding paragraph , while Thomas was convinced (hat unaided human reason can demonsrTale God's existence, he d id nOI regard this as a simple matter. In facl, in Su mma col/tm Gm· ~.

· Sic ergo in >?

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Argum enrarion for God 's Existence (Jruroduction)

399

In his SOIUlioll Bonavent ure again concedes [hat someo ne may in f.·te t deny thaI God exis15 . And he also arguC"S in other ways for G od's existence, especially in pre· senting [en self-evidcnI p resuppositions in h is "second way" and ,hen reasoning from them 10 [his co nclusion . Even so, he still maintai ns that a hum an im elleCt that fu lly understands the lI1eani ng of ,he name " God ~ can not dou b, ,hat God exists and can not thin k of him as no t existing. Bonaventure co ncludes that [he argumentS (wh ich he has prest:nt ed) p roving this art: to be grJnt ed .~· Jn light of Bonavcnlure's discussions. therefo re. we may more easily undersrand why Thomas h imself d id not hes itate 10 place Anselm's argumentation within the broader com exl of arguments offered in sup port of the daim that God's existr nc(' is self-evident or. 10 use Thomas's terminology. known peTsr. T he 1:1 CI that Thomas did so. howe \'('r. d oes not of i[self imply tiw he fa iled 10 app recia Te the force of Ansclm's argumem atio n fo r God 's existence befo re sub jtcling it to criticism. Thomas has pointed Oll( ,hat because God's essence is to exist. such argumentatio n wou ld succeed , o r Jt least God's ellistence wou ld be evident to us, if we enjoyed di rect knowledge of the divine csS(:nce o r q uidd ity. Acco rding to T ho mas's theory o f knowledge, no such knowledge is available 10 us wiTh in Ihe present life, :1.1 least wilhin lhe nJlUral order. H ence he cannol juslify any immed iate movement from our undemand ing o f G od as tilat [han which no greater can be thought 10 his aClUal existence. G iven this, only o ne ro ute remai ns open fo r th t" ph ilosopher who would ,mive at knowled ge of God. One must reason fro m effects wh ich arc accessible 10 us [0 knowledge of G od as their unseen cause. S6. Ed. ( if .• pp. .. 9-~o. For Soll~\"e n m re's discussion of f h( len "manifeu ~ n d evid.ent presu ppo.»i lions" (.... hich he uses 10 rca~ln (rom cre3 lUfe~ to God ) ~ pp. 'f6-47 (nn . rr- 20). For more on Bona"em ur,,'s a' Su menlal io n (or God's cx i$fc nc ... esp«iatl y in Ihe IW\I lU IS we ha"" b<-en "o nsid" ring. s«: G ilson. /.a phiknophi( d( Saint &"'111("1"'1'(. 3d «I. (paris. 1953). PI'" 10 1- IS.

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Earlier Writings o n God 's Existence

4j l

preferred personal way of proceeding, whereby one arrives immedia[Cly at a first and separate immobile mover. H e comments that even Aristotle introduces his conclusion disj unctively: either ont' must immediately arrive at a first and sepa rate and immobile mover, or else at a self-mover from which one may dlcn reason to a first and sepa rate immobile 1110ver,8.1 Perhaps in pan because Thomas is presenti ng these as Aristotle's argumentS, he allows for either side of the disjuncti on. Either ahernarive will ultimately lead ro the same conclusion, the existence of a separ:tre and immobile mover. Such, the refore, is Thomas's long and laborious presenralion in sec I, c. 13 of two argumen15 from motion for God's existence. BOfh arguments are explicitly drawn from Aristotle, c\'cn though Thomas has reorganized them in his own fashion . In my opinio n, to some eXlenl each runs the risk of end ing al best with a bcsoulcd self-mover of the outenn ost heavenly sphere rather than with God, at least when each is placed wi thin its Aristotelian and medieval physical world-view. Tho mas h imself explicidy recognizes this difficulry in h is presentation of the second argument , but it seems that he could have raised it when dealing with the fi rst argument from motion as wei!. If, as Thomas has i ndiGlted, AristOtle's argumentatio n in PJrySiCl VIII leads only to a besou led self-mover, by appeali ng to MrIap},}!in XI I Thomas believes that he can enable it to conclude 10 the existence of a perfectly immobi le fi m mover w hich is separate and which is Cod,~~ As we shall see in the following chapter. Thomas illlroduces a much simpler and more direct argument based o n motion in ST I, q. 2, a. 3 as his first way. Thomas concl udes I. c. 13 by brieAy pre5eming thrCt'" more argu ments fo r Cod's existence. T he first, which he ta kes from Aristotle's Metaphysics II , c. 2. focuses on the inadequacy of ap pealing to a regress to infinity in efficient ca uses and the conse(luent need 1{) conclude to a first cause. 1r might, thereforl', si mply be reg-arded as anot her way of meet ing that difficulty. H owever, it is presented b}' Thomas as a separatc and self-comaincd argumcm for God's existencc. In all es.scntiallyordered (ordiflluis) efficient causes, the first is the Coluse of the intermediary and the intl'rmcdiary is the ca use of [he last. This holds whether the in termediary causes arc Olle or many. And it holds for the reaso n that when a cause is taken away, that which it ca uses is also t~lken away. In the present case, therefore. when the first

sec

8J. "Untl.. Cliam AriSIQldes sub di5iun( l ione han ,

(ondu~'io nem

indue;r: quod K ilic\"! op<:>rtcal .. d sr:.u im dC"cnirc ~d primum mo"cns immobile !'Cp~r:l.tum. ".-] ~d mo,'cns scipsunl, ex quo irer urn d~vcn iu" ad ''''WCn~ primum irnlllobik scpar;ttu,n" (ih id. ) . On Thoma •• rt."cogn itit)u of ,hi, d i~­ jO!lClion s<:e Owens. "Aquinas ~!Id rhe ProofrrOnl the ' Ph ysio' ." pp. 133- 34. I}6, Ij8, 14}- 44; Kretzm~nn,

71w M~taphy!ill ~fl1}mm, pr. 8.z.- 8J.

84· A.< J h~vc:: ~lready ;nd ic:ued, Ill)' difficu l Iy concern ing the first general ... rgumenl fmm mot io n has CO do wirh Ihe highl y physical way in which Thom3S Ihtre mempIs 10 justify irs fim main premi$<': rhat whatcn-r is n,,_)\".....:1 ;~ mo"cd by ant)rhcr. Only rh e third juslification which he offe.s for lhi ~- Iha r bascl on [nt" bINder rheory of polcm ialilY and aClUalil)'- sc.:nls 10 ove rcome [his limilarion and lhcrdore .~hould apply 10 any kind of morion or change. Significantly. Tho mu uSt-S only Ihis rhird approa ch in jusrifying the si milar ~tcp in his fir~1 way in 51' I. q . l.~. j.

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Earlier Writings on God's Exist ence

435

Th is leads him to a discussio n of divine et!:rnity in c. 15. In brief, Thomas rca· sons thai because God is completely immutable he mliSt be etern al.?· In the course of developi ng a series of arguments for this. Thomas also offers one that is in effect another argument for God's existence, that is. Olle based on contingency and necessity. We will sec another version of th is as the third way of ST J, q. 2 , a. 3 below. In SCG I, c. 15, Ihe argumenr runs as follows. In the world we see certain things which can exist o r nOI exist (possibifia m~ n 110 11 mr) or, as Tho mas also puts it , which afe capable of bei ng gem·rateo and corru pted. But every being of this kind, every "possible" being, has::t cause. This follows, reasons Thomas. since considered simply in itsdf any such th ing is equally open to existing or not existing; hence, if it enjoys aemal existence, this can only be owing 10 some cauSt'. But olle cantlot regress 10 infin ity in caused causes. continues Thomas. with a reference back to his proof of this in c. lJ. Therefore we must acknowledge that there is something which is a necessary being.'s (By :1 necessary being. Thomas evidently has in mind any kind of bei ng that is nOt subject 10 gencration and corruption.) Every nccessary being eit her depends upon some olher cause for its very necessity, or it does nOt and is necessary ofitsclf. \Y/e can not proceed to infinity with necessary beings which depend upon something else for their necessity, or to phrase it differently, with caused necessary beings. Therefore we must conclude to the existence o r a first necessary being which is necessary or itself. And th is, Thomas concludes, is God, si nce he is the first cause, as has already been shown (in c. 13) .96 This argument will undoubtedly strike today's reader as unusual because or the tWO ways in which it takes the notion o f a nece.~sary being, that is, as a caused necessary being and then as the uncaused necessary being. In order to appreciate Thomas's thinking concerning this it is important for us to bear in mind that with which he has contrasted a necessary being, that is. a possible being. As we have JUSt seen. by a possible being as he uses it here he has in mind any being which is capable of being generated or corrupted. Any being which is nOt capable of being genera ted and corrupted is not to be regarded as a possible being but as a necessary 94. 5c-<: Thom:<s's nf'"lIing ~rgum~fl[ II) , how {h~. God is e{~ ",al : "N:un omlle <Ju<)(1 illcipi. t$~ vel d~i l\il . per rnOlum vet rnur arioncm h<x p~ri!Ur. O$I~n~u rn aUlWl C~ I Deum c~j.C omnino ;mmuubi!cm. F..\\ igi,ur ~ctCrrlu •. C;IIcn S pritlci pio Ct fin~" kd. ci' ·. I" ' 5). 95. "Amplius. Vide mU5 ;11 mundo<Juaed<1m q U<1C SUI\! possibilia euc et li on esse, scilicct genct1Ibil ia CI corruptibilia. Omn( ~Ulcm q ,,00 (5t poss ibilc ~, ca u~~m h~bcc: q Ilia, cum dc sc acqual it cr sc h~beat ad duo, Kilicci cue el 11011 cue, oportct si ei ~pprop .ictu. (ssc. 'luod hoc sil ex ali<J"a cau$:!. ScJ in t~,,,i. no n esl proceJer~ jn infini lUm . UI .upr~ probat .... n csl lJ. Ergn oportet po,]( rc ~li<Juid qllod sit n<:ceuc c~ - (pp. 15- 16). 96. ' Onme m.cm nc.;.:nsarium vd h~IJeI C"~ui
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The Five Ways

X"

anyone with even a casual acquainta nce wilh Aquinas's writings is aware, it is in the Summa rJJt'ologint I, q. l , a. 3 that he presents his best-known formulation of argurnem:nion for God's existencc. A number of the arguments we have considered from his earl ier writings foreshadow most if not all of the "five wa~" of the Summa thrologiar. These points of similariry notwithstanding, Thomas gives a personal and particular (Ouch to each of the five ways Ihcmseh'cs. Because of thc rdatively taler date of this treatment (ca. 1266--1268), because of the apparently wider readership at wh ich the Summa du % ginr is aimed, and because of the comprehensive way in which the fi ve ways ~re fin ed togethe r, these argumems for G od's existence have received morc attention from Thomas's students than any of his other <:frons 10 establish ~hi s poin~. + Al ~h e same rime, il should be remembered that the ~mount of space accorded to each of the five ways is relatively brief and dlat in certain instances, at least, fumiliariry with some of Tho mas's most fundamental metaphysical options is presupposed by them.2 Finally, the q uestion has oflen been raised. concerning whether rhe five ways arc intended by Tho mas to fo rm one developing argument for God's exis tence. or fi ve distinct and m ore or less independent arguments. To put this in Ai;

O n T ho mas's imcm ion ~o wrile the Summll for begi nm:rs (in thrQlo-gy) ~ C h. X :l.bo,·~ , n. 50, and the referenco Ihcr" to Boy!". To " ,,!!. :l.nd O ' Mea ra. A!!;O sec Wcisheip l. Frillr ThIJm1l1 d "Aquinl1. PP' lt S- I?: /1.'1-0 . Chcnu , InmJduclion trtutit- dr usim ThomaJ d"A quin, ld td. (1I.Io ntrral-l':uis. 19H ). PI" 1~ j -j8 . We isht ip! also obse rvcs t h:l.l wh ile Thom;u m:l.n~ged w ClI rry OU~ his purpo:ose of add ~ing beginni ng slUdcnu in thrQlogy in ~he h'St pari of hi! wo rk, the ~ond and thi rd partS ~uc far from !x-ing a ~irnp! e i ntroduelio n~ (PI" 111- 13). 1. Some of thif backgro un d h;u a!rc:ady Ottn prov id ed abc.... c ill our consideration of ea d ier Y"rs iOn5 o f argumentation fo r God's n i$(encc in Tho lll~s's In tS. At th e S:l.llle time. it h good to bc~t in mi na Ih al Thom;u him5("lf sets h i ~ fiY~ ways wilhin Ih t b2ckgroun d of his own philO5O ph y ~I\d mt taphy)ics. T h i$ in t urn s ! uggCSts that it is ~ h ighly qU<:$lion~b k procfiiur., ! imply 10 eXl rac! the fiy.. ways from thciT btmldeTSl:u ing with in Tho llli.« ie mt ... ph )l!k s and 10 CXptcl .h~m 10. :l$ it ....-ere, • St:l ll d on Ih~." own. • J.

a

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4,.6

From Finite Bein g to Uncreared Being

so as to apply i[ 10 only o ne of these three species. W hen motion is taken in this restrieted sense it may in turn Ix divided into motio n in qual ity (aJreratio n) , motion in quantity (in crease or decrease) . and motion in place {local motion} . Substantial change (whether generat"ion or corruption) is not motion taken strictly; it is onl y change (mutatio).l ' To return to Thomas's h rst way, therefore. we wo uld seem to be j ustified in regarding motion taken Strictly in an y ofils three kinds as a possible starring point for the argument, i.e., alteration. local 1l1000ion , and increase or decrease in quantity. If Th omas is using the term broadly so as to eq uate it with change. we could even use substant ial change as a possible point of departure fo r [he first way. In f., ct he will explicitl y appeal to generation and corruptio n in developing his th ird way. Given all of this, I am inclined to lim it Illo t"ion as it appears as the starting point of dlt, fi TS! way ro some fo rm of mOlion take n strictl y. bur to suggest that in rhe course of justifying the principle of motion- whatever is moved is moved by something clse- T homas uses motion broadly enough 10 apply to any re
sec

""fl·.

". /" V lee •. ~,p. Jl.l. n. 6"'9' "Uh i wnsidu "ndum est quod AriSIQtd es sup'" in ten io ub i ,not um deli ni ,·;t, :I<X
• •

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452

From Finire Being to Uncrcatcd Being

respect 10 poilH 4 it sho uld be noted that at times Thomas uses the language of first cause and second cause rathet than that of principal cause and instrument to express this relationship bem'een God and ot her agents.!7 In the Summa duologiar 1, q . lOS, a. 5, Thomas makes this same point in slightly diftc n:1I1 fashion . God works in the activities performed by created agents: (I) by serving as the fin al ca use of such agents; (2) by acting as an efficient ca use of their opemtions inasm uch as second causes act by reason of the first cause which moves them 10 act; (J) by giving 10 created agent's the furms wh ich arc their principles of opera tion and by keeping these in being. As 1 have indicated elsewhere, we might combine inlO o ne the thi rd and fourth ways mentioned in the text from the Dr poumia, as Thomas himself seems to d o, and view this as eq ui valent 10 the second way of the text from ST I, q. t OS . l~ It is this particular form of divine c:ausaliry that is of greatest interest 10 us here, because it shows that Thomas honors lhe motion principle in all cases of crcaturely agency. It is also impo rtant to nOte Thomas's view that if God serves as an effi ciell{ cause of creaturely operations, including human volition , he does so as the first cause. Created agents arc true causes, and even true principal causes, of their appropriate operations. Moreover, although this is nOt our primary concern at the moment, Thomas insists that this di vine causality or di vine motion with respect !O free human operations does not detract from thei r freedom. Essential to Thomas's position is dIe point we have just seen above-that God , the first cause, moves created agents to act in accord with their natures, If he moves natural agents to act in accord with their natures, that is. necessa ril y, he moves free agents to aCI in accord w ith [heir nature, that is, frec1y. ~9 My reason for introducing this discussion here is not to examine Thomas's de· fense of human freedom bllt 10 show that in his eyes even free human activity does th~ t

he is ~ppl ying th is fou rfold way in whi ch God is

Ihecau~

of (fcued agents 10 volition5 3$ well: ", .. Stquelur quod ips-e in q uoli!xt opera ntt immediate O?<,relor. nOn nelus.. opcr~tio n t volun · t:!t is et na rura~" (p, s8). 1.1. Cf. th e t(ott from ST J. q, t O ~. a. s. ci u~-d in n. !8. Cf. Dt writau. q. !4. a. I, ad 5, ci ted in Ch. Xl. n. 6S al)O.w~. 18. Scr ST I. 'I' lOS. a . S (I.t; tlf nit. 19. For OIher I«IS On Ih is conch,ion betWCCfl (:rea roo agents ~nd God Stt . fOl inn:lnec, SCG 111 . c. 70 (td. til .. p, 306). This docs 001 tl\~~n Ih~l one pdr! of lhe effe<:1 is ClUsW by God ~nd ~nOlht'. by the CrealM ~g.. nt. but ruhe. that Ihe ( nt ire effect is to be wigned to God. (a~ principa l eau~) and to thc c.~a rc-t.l !law",1 agellf (as all j.mrumcm). rXlf add ilion~1 laD where Thomas ~pplies Ihis ttl ft~!y aClingc«"ated 1gen 15, .~ SCG I. c. 68 (p. 6. ); III . cc. 88. 89 (pp. JJ I- j l). No,,:· Ihal Thomu condud~'S his d iscussio n in c. 89 by ~ l'pcaling 10 the lext from Ih e F.udr-mian Ethia Vll . e. t4 . !'<.Ir teXiS where Thom~s anempt 5 to t.x:on.cile Ihis Ih~ry of diyi ne ag~n cy with hum an freedom s«. fOI in~t afl(:c, & jXJlr-ntii/, q. j, a. 7. ad I j; ad t4 (cd. cit .. p, 59): ~'T I. q. 19, a. 8. and ad J (leon. 'PH); ST I. 'I' 8}. a. t. ad j (Leon. S·j07-8); ST I- II. q, 10. a. 4, ~nd ad 1 (Leo n. 6 .89); Dt malo, q , 6 (u cited above in n, IS). Fu. disc uss ion set' m y MtlaphytimIT~mr-l, PI" 1.58-63.

sec

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The Five \'V'ays

459

is noc. It is in the course of doing this, according to Thomas's own plan. that he establishes God's simplicity, and then his perfection, infi ni ty, immutability, and unity, Throughout this discussion Thomas takes il as given Ihal he has already (in his five ways) proved that God exists. With litis lingering question still in mind,iJ therefore, we shall now turn 10 Thomas's prcSt"nmt ion of hi s second argument for God's ('xis(lmce in 5T I. q. 2 , :1. 3.

2.

The Second \Xlay

As Thomas himself tells us. lhis argulllent is based on eflicienl causality. Again il rakes as ils point of depa rture something thaI is given 10 us in the world of Sl;'nsible things- the f.'lCt 11131 there is an order of efficient causes. By this Thomas means that we find [hat cenain th ings efficiently c:luse other things, and that they depend on prior causes in order 10 do so. He immed iately reasons thaI nothing CJ.n be the efficient (.";I1IS(: of it.~dl~ for then it would he prior to itself. and this is impossible. If we may supply the reasoning lhaT is implidi, his point is that for somcthing to (".iUS<: itSelf d Jicientiy. il would have to exist in order to cause (itself), and yel would nor exist, insofa r as it was being caused. FrOIll this he expects us 10 conclude IhaT s in c~ we do experience causes Ihat arc causcd, lx."C:luse they cannot cause themsclves they !THlSt be caused by something elsc. 4" If this is gramed , the possihiliry of a series of effi cient causes which are them· selves caused by something else must be faced . Thomas argues that one cannot regress to in finity in orden'd l' Rictcm causes. As he explai ns, ill such .1n ordered series of effi ciell t causes, the first member is the cause of the inTennediary, and that in turn is the cause of the laSt member in the series whether there is only one intermediary cause or whether there an' m.1ny Bu t if tllt"rc were no fi rsl anlong efficient CHiSes there would be no imermediary causes and therefore no last cause; for if one takes away a cause. one also eliminates the effect. In;tn infinite series of caused efficienTcauses. there will be no first effici ent cause. Hence there will be no inll"rmeumu5 quid sic S<'d quid no n sit, non po»umus co",;{kr. fe de [},:,(, quomoJo Ji •. S(:d po. iUJ "IuomoJo non .il. I',i 11\0 crgQ Co n);,j.,ra"Jum " SI qUQ' moJo non ,i,: s<,<:unJ .." <juu mUC" lu,; '"fI;O, qu"",udo noulinelur" (Leun. 4- J!). T he li 'l!l"ring qu rsdon ;. Ihis: Al .his po;m ;n ST I. .ha l ;5. ~ fltr complc!;'11; hi s fi,·c ways. dOf;S ThO!lu) think I h~t he has ~Ir"ad y demonSfr>l <--.l .h,1 o nly onf Grn! c.w:is.~' .+4- ·Secunda vi" <-";1 CX r.uijc e~M" prj\!) K; P>O. quU
I~r Thom~$ 'i«

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466

From Finitc Bcing

[0

Uncrcared Being

fo r the generat ion of any and all possible beings.hl This, however. would be to intraduct' into the third way a different kind of reason ing, based on causality, a kind which we have al ready ~ n in the first and second ways in con nection with a proposed regress to infinity in moved movers o r in orde rC!d caused causes, and a kind which will reappear in the second phase of the third way itself (as ap plied to caused necessary beings). W hile such an interpretatio n is defensible from the metaph ysical standpo int. it would entail a substanrial addition to Thomas's text and a serious recasting of the first pari of the third way. So true is this that one might then doubt that one was still dealing with T ho mas's third way, for the temporal references in the fi rst parr would now Jose their importance.6.! In order to understand more fu lly T homas's procedure in his third way, a number o f recent comillentators have concentr.lted on vario us possible historical sources for this argument. Aristotle. Aviccnna. and Moses Ma imonides have all been proposed, and not without reason. Nont'theless, careful comparison of these with the text of Thomas's third way shows that wh ile he must have been influenced by some of them , cspcrially by AristOtle and Maimonidcs, in penn ing his version of the argument. he has developed it in his own way.M In shOT!. recourse to such 6z. O ....e:n$ appc::.! l$ 10 the Ari5totrlian procoourr in Mrtapbys;l'f XlI. c. 6, according to which rlrrn~1 motion Jnd time: ar~ not destru ctible alld prrsup~ rhe: existence: of St'11llr:ne: !;ub:Slanas. "Thc suicidal supposition that all things arC p(mibl.$ e:xdudc$ ipJo fo((l1 any e:temal $U(,wion' (p. ~ 6l). "In the: Ar;$!OIe1ian $c:ri<'$ no $c:ries all go backward e:1e:maJly, if aJilhings arc pmsiblcs" (p. 46 J). [n his dfor! to defend the argumem agaimt the: charge of a quamifie:r shift. he contends that the: argument docs not rc:;l$On Ihat bc:au.se - (4rh pmsible was non"e:xisten! at one: time, Ih .. rcfo~ all things if possibles we:re togelhe:r non -<,x i.~te nt at Qne lime:.- R:uhcr it rcuons ,hal · unive:n:al po~ib;l. iry ('all ha''e the possibility for 1I0n·n:istencc') e:nta ih universal non-t:X i$te:nce" (p. 46,,). But how is thi~ point demonstr:ll ed? Owens argUl'.!' that to propo.se an infinite: regress in tim e of possible: beings WQuld presume: gt:lnting the ~a liry of wmclhing n~=$sary. In ordcr to eslablish this. hO....'e' ·e:r. he iJ introoucing a different kind of rC'Olsoning which in f3e:t leads him to view this ~aS()ning as CS$l'ntially the nme: as that in sec I. c. ' 5 (sec pp. 464-66). In my judgme:nl. hov.'CVcr, Ih is reasoning is miSliing from the: toa of the third " '1I.y. 63 - In filct , the reformulation is so pronou!H:cd ,hat the: third ....':Iywill no longer be: tlte th ird way ofST I. 'I' L, a. ). MorC'Over. unlike: ~ns (pp. 46S- 66), [do not regard Ihe: third way:u;t .
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472

From Finite Bei ng ro Uncreared Being

upon its mode of being (nsr). Accordingly, I would suggest that by this term T homas wams 10 sign ifY the varying degrees of pure ontological perfeClion or excellence we discover in the differen t beings we experience in the world abo ut us. JU St as some share more fully in omological goodness and truth than do others, so too they may be regarded as being more perfeci o r mo re excellent, omologically speaking, than ot hers. Excellence (nobilitas) should not be regarded as a distinct ua nsce ndental. 7t This in turn leads 10 another questio n: Does Thomas wish to restrict the starring point of the fourth way 10 gradation in transcendental perfections such as truth and goodness~ (Interestingly enough, he does not melllion ontological unity.) O r does he wish 10 include what we might call pure bUI not transcendental perfections such as lift. knowledge, will. e t c.~ Whi le nor found whe rever bei ng is realized , such perfectio ns also admit of degrees and, when freed from alll imimion, may be applied analogicAlly even 10 God, o r so Thomas will maint3in .7' These perfections have the advantage of bei ng readil y recognizable in va rying degrees in the world about us. But since Thomas has nOI explicitly singled them out in present ing the fo urth way, it will be bener for us nOt to base his argument upon them. For then one m ight wonder whether the general p rinci ple 10 which he appeals is also intended to apply to them as well as to strictly transcendental perfections. H ere, therefore, 1shall reslfict the argument to transcende ntal perfections such as goodness and Lruth. As Thomas cxpn::sses Ihis principle in his leXt, Ihe: mo re and less are: said of different things insofar as they approach in dive rS(: fashion someth ing which is such 10 thc maximum degree. As some writ ers have pointed out, the example 10 which Thomas turns hardly proves his point. It is unnecessary for us to aSsume thai somethin g en joys a m:o::imum degree of heat in order to be aware that one kettle is honer Ihan another. Nonetheless, since this is on ly an exam ple d ra wn from an outmoded medieval physics, we need not regard it as ccntral to Thomas's argumen!.8/) But we may still ask: H ow does Thomas justifY this general principle? Is it 78. For bri~f dicu.j,.,i on~ of thi ~ sec G:u rigou. Lagrangc. Gxi: H is Eximnu lind His N,lfUrt, Vol. t. 1" )06; Van St t~ nberghcn. U probkmr, PI" 209, l16. FOl I. ~. 18. Stt ed. cie, p. 19 dico uni~trsaliTel-). NOle Ih al in Ihi~ CO lllnt Thomas also applies nabilirIV 10 wisdom. Wh ile gran ting thil. for the ~ake of simpliciry I will retHiC! it wilhin Ihe COntCXt of the fourth w~y to tr.lnsandemal fX'rfeclions. Al.<;(l ~ Wagntl, Dir philasaphiU"lxlI tmplikau. PI" 9j-97. He considers and righrly rcjecrs idcm ifying !he ncb.u wit h tht beam iful. 79. Sc.: Thom~s's diSC1..lssion of God's U"itnlill, "ila, el //Ohm/IV in ST I. qq. Ii , I~. 18, and 19. 80. Sec Fabro. -Sv;luppo. ~ ignifi c;"o e Yllorc ddb 'IV Via',- pp. LO I - l; Va n Srttnbe rghen. u probf"nr. pp. lL s- r6. As V, n Stttnberghen poinlS (lU!. for AriS!0I1t and hi ~ medi,""al followers. fire i ~ hot of ilS cs~nce and !O Ihe maxim um degrce. Wh ile they regarded the 5Un a.o; the C1.u~ of h<":lt in emhl y things, they did no! ~gard it as hOI in it~If(~e n. w. where ht corr«u I:"'bro on Ihi5 deuil ). For full er diK uss ion sc:e Wagner. Di~ pl,,"((JJOph'rrhrn !mp/dra/r, pp. LLS- 11. While he conc1 ude~ {hat Ihi\ cum pIe would ha\"c been illuminaTing for Thoma.o;·s eonfemporui~ who $harcd his world·¥iew. Wagner denieo; Ihar til<: conIToiling principle of rhe lim part of (he fourth way rests upon .he eumple for its jU~liliC:ll ion (I" no).

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Quiddira(ive Knowledge orGod and Analogy

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So 100, God is the di vine p rinciple, and all olher things arc one in him . Thomas's implied conclusion is that, becausc of this similariry uerween mr and God, rSJr is the m OSI proper name of God. ' Thomas derives a fi nal argume nt from Avicenna. If the name "th ing" is applied 10 something by reason of irs quiddity, the name " He who is~ or ~ bei ng" (m s) is im posed by reason of the act of beillg (actus (lSmdij. 'r!lOmas reasons lhat oc-causc a cream re's essence differs fro m i(S rsll', such j thing is properly named from its quiddi ry and nor from its aCI of being. BUI God's act of bei ng (rut) and his quiddity are identical. Therefore that name wh ich is deri\'cd from the divine act of being " He who is" -names God properl y and is his proper name.' As Thomas explains in replyi ng 10 the first objection, mr is applied 10 G od properl y, not in the sense that it cannOI also belong to Cfeatures, but in Ihe sensc thaT in God it is no t joi ned or mixed with privation or pOle ntiali ry. ~ Thomas's replies to objections 3 and 4 arc particularly inte resting. The third objection contends that if created wisdom falls short of the uncreated wisdom, so docs cre:Hcd rut fall shorl of the uncreated rsSt'. But the name "wisdom" falls short of signifying perlectly the d ivine wisdom since we impose this name on God only in accord with ou r underSTandi ng of crealt'
J. EJ. ci r.. p. r9S. For much or rh i ~ rhoughr in I)studo-Di onpiu~'s [kdi~'mis nl1minib/is ~nd i" Thomu's C.()mmen l... ry on r he !'lime ~ In librum h,"li Dionp ;' [H d;~in;s nomini/J", r.rpo,itio. Per:> ed .. c. V. !. p. lJO. nn. 166-169 (D ionY5i us) and c. V. leel. !. pp. ljS- )7. nn. 6)1- 641 (Thomas). 4- Ed. (il., p. 195. NOle especiaJly: -Cum m1<: m i l~ 5il quod in qualibcl re w :ara cs5Cnl;a su~ differal a suo C$st, res illa p. opr ic denominalur a qu id dil a l ~ sua, el non ah aClU cucndi. sieul homo ab hUI1l~n il~l e_ In Deo ~U1(m ipsum esse SUllnl esl Sua quiddin.l: el ide<> nomen qUQli su mi lUr ~b C$S(', propri~ no min~1 ipsum. ~I est p rop rium nom ~n ~ ius __ . _ ~ C f Avi..x"n na. Libn d~ phi/mophi" prim", I, c. S (V~n Ri~1 t-d_, Vol. I. pp. H - )'j). Fm d i ~u»ion 'iCe my ~ The Larin Avicenna as a SoU fe(. ~ pp. 67- 69 and n. JI.

5. Ed. ci,. , 1'1'. 19S- 96. 7. r:.d. dl., p. ' 96.

6. Ed_ d .. , 1 ~,I4 -

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508

From Fi nite Being

(0

Uncrc3ted Being

God, we must deny of h im the meaning signified by such names (1(1 signijicara), or in the case of names sign ifying pun: perfect ions, at least the creaturely way in which they signify, Even with respect to the latter, something imperfect is implied by their mode of signif)'ing,H This fi nal point will be developed more fully by Thomas in Bk [of his Summa {olltra Gallil~J, as we shall see below.

b. /11

D~ 7rinitate (12)7-1258/59)

Thomas develops very fully his though ts on the human intellect's possibilities in knowing God in his Commentary o n the Dr Trinirau. [n q. I , a. 2 he asks whether the human mind can arrive at knowledge of God.l < He repl ies Ih:u something may be known by us in one of m'o ways: (I) through a fo rm which is proper to tha t thing itself (as when the eye grasps a stone through the spt.'Cies, i.e., fo rm of the stone), or (2) through a form of something else which is like the thing known (as when a cause is known th rough its li kcness in its effect, or a human being through the form of a picture o r image),n As regards the first situation , where a th ing is known through its own form, this may take place through a form which is simply ident ical with the thing itself, So it is that God knows himself through his essence and, adds Thomas, so tOO docs an angel know itse1fin this wa)'. Or this may take place through a form which is derived from the thing itsclf, either by being abstracted from that thing, or by direct infusion when a form o r species is d irectly impressed on the mind of the knower by the object known. zt. As regards o ur knowledge of God in the present life, in accord with his general theory of knowledge Thomas points OUt thai our intellect bears a determi ned relationship 10 forms it abstracts from sense experience, Hence in th is life we cannot know God through that form which is identi cal with the d ivi ne essence itself. Such knowledge is rescrved for the blessed in the life to come. 27 Even any like ness which might be directly impressC'd by God on the human intellect in this life would not be sufficient (0 make his cssence known to us; for his essence infinitely surpasses every created form. And, Thomas repeats, in this life we do not know God by means of purdy intelligible forms which might be likenesses of him~again becausc our imdlect depcnds upon forms abstracted from phantasms. l~ l}. Ed. cil., pp. SJS- }6. Cf. E. Wi[la[lc~ , "l:esst'nce divine Cl fa (onn~i$~a ne~ hum1ine d1nS Ie Commcnui re sur les Scnlene~s de Saim Thom:H: Rn!~ phifolOphi'lur dr Louwi" 51 (19~7), pp. '90-91. Alro S('(' Thomas'l reply!O objcction 1 ((d. cil., p. SJ6). l4. "uttum lm~n~ humana ] possit ad [ki nOt;ti1m [Krv~n ire" (Leon. ~0.80:J-4). IS. " ... uno modo per formam propriam, si(ut oculus vid~ bpidem pcr 'p«icm bpidi~, aBo modo pcr formam aherius si milem libi, l ieu! cognoscilur ,,"ur... [Kr ~imilitudincm dftttus, et homo pcl form1m suae im1ginis" (Lwn. SO.84: 48---p), 16. Leon. SO.8,nl-6j. 10 ili umOltc rhe last-mentioned po~sibilir;y, Thomas refe rs to Avicenn1's lhcory according to which wc know 5<'p.r.ne intdJig~nce. by ~ direct infusion of notions of them (imprruic1ItJ) in our infd!ttr~. 17. Ed. Cil" p. 84:64-70. :8. See p. 8470-80.

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Quidditacivc:' Knowledge of God and Analogy

533

one (unique), i.e., that there is only one God. Si nce these have been discussed in the previous chaptcr, I would sim ply note here that of these 3t least the first twO follow the way of nega[ion." ~ According to Thomas's announced plan , with the end of q. II he completes his effort to show how God is not. Thomas had indicated that with q. [ 1. h{' would begi n to show how GOO is known by us. At the beginning of q. 11 Thomas comments thai in whal has gone before (qq. 3-11) he has considered how God exists when he is si mply considered in himself. Now in q. J2. he will seek to delerm ine how God enters into our knowledge, i.e., how he is known by creatures. I 16 A number of the articles in q. t2 have \0 do with the knowledge of God which is avai lable 10 Ihe blessed ill the life \0 come. No netheless, 10 the extent that these discussions cast addi tional light on Thomas's views concerning how God may be known by liS in this life, they, tOO, will be examined. In 3. I Thomas simply asks whether any created intellect can see God's essence. Thomas rejects the view of some who hold that no created intellect can ever see the divine essence. A llllman being's highest happiness must consist in that being's highest operation, an operation of the intellect. If the created intellect could never see God's essence, eirher il would !lever aHain beatitude, or itS beatimde would consist in something other than God. Thomas rejects this position as opposed 10 faith , because the ult imate perfection of a rational creature must bc the principle of ils being. (Although Thomas does not here spell this Out , this appeal !O faith directly eliminates the second alternative, according 10 which the intellect's happiness would consist in so meth ing other than God.) Thomas also rejects this as opposed 10 reason. He notes that there is in human bei ngs a natural desire to know a cause once an dfeci is undcTSlOod. If the r;Hion~1 intel ieci could never reach the first cause of all things, this natural desire 10 undersland would remain unfulfilled. H ence o n both theological and philosophical grounds Thomas concludes that the blessed do see God's essence.' 17 Even so, Thomas's replies 10 objections I and 3 indicate dm not even {he blessed can comprehmd the divine essence, although tbey can see it . Th is point is important for our purposes, for it suggests that even if a creature may see G od's essence, no 11 5. For:l. 15-ee Lron . .401 07. For 3. j di$Cu~s ion

$«

p. 1If. Aho $« abo'·e. Ch. XI! , /In . [14, 115. I}[, and my

[here or Iht:S<' passages. u6. ~ q. j. Introd uct ion (Leon. 4.35) . From q. Il. Innoduclion. note, "Quia in sUpC"rioribu. , onsiden.vimus q uali[e[ Deus si [ .K<:und uill SCipsUIll, ' d lal consiJ en. ndu III qualite. , it in ' osn itio nc no:;mt, idest quomodo cognO$CIIllI a creal uris" (po114). 11 7. Stt q. Il, 3. 1 (Leo n. 4.JJ4- [S) . No[e in p3Tficulal: " ... 5i nunquam C"osem ia m Dei "iderc POles t inldJ«IuS crutus, vel nunquanl bca li\ udinem o brinebir, vel in a[ io eius bcati tudo ~on.liSlct qU:lm in Deo. Quod est ali cnum a fide.... Sim ilirer er;~m est p(a~ln ti lionem . . .. Un d~ $i mplici I tt conccd .. ndum (;S [ quod beari Dei ~ llIi am videanl. "' Han k0' rerelS [0 [he kimmen$C" [i[eralUre otllhe qut!l;[io ll whel her [here is nalUr~[ d~ire and cap~d [y of man for bcatirude in Aquin:u" (God ill Him"if. pp. 83- 84. n. 8). [n addi tion [() ,ho:- rtretcnces he offers there, 1 would recommend J. !.aporia, LA dNrinh dr k nill,," """,,,i'l( "lim ThomilJ d"Aqui'l (P-His. 1965). Fo r m y rev iew ~ Sprculu", 44 (1969), pp. 47 ~-76 .

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540

From Finire Being [Q Uncrearcd Being

and unqualified, the more properly they may be applied to God. The name " H e who is~ determ ines no mode of being but stands indeterminately with respect to all. For this reason, as he again reminds us, Jo hn Damascene refers to God as having m~ as if it were a certai n infin ite and undetermined ocean of substance. Thirdly, this name is most proper because of what it consignifi es; for il signifies to exist, 10 be sure. b ut also to exiSt in the present, and ,his is most properly said of God . fo r whom tbere is neither past nor future. 1l7 UlHil this poi nt Thomas's treat menl of ~ He who is~ as the most app ropriate or proper divine name is consistent with his earl ier discussions. But in his reply 10 objection I he argues th:u this name " H e who is" is more proper than the name "God" with respect to that by reason of wh ich it is imposed , i. e., mr, and also wi lh respect to its mode of sign ifying and consignifYing. H owever, as regards [hat which the name is im l)()Sed to signifY. the name ~G od" is more proper, since it is intended 10 signifY [he divine nature. And viewed from this perspective, in terms of that which the name is im posed to signif)'. the name ~ TetragrammafOn" (YHWH) is even more proper: for it is imposed to signify the incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular substance of God. 1.;8 In summing up thi s lengthy discussio n of Thomas's views 011 whether o r not we can know what God is. I would now like to recall the following. From the beginning to the end of his ca reer Tho mas has consistently denied to us in this life quidditativc knowledge of God. We can know that God is, and what God is not, but not what God is. H e has also consistently defended the possibility of some kind of nonmctaphorica l prcdieat ion of divine names, and one which we may describe as proper. Secondly, I have nOt found in h is earlier treatm entS with in similar contexts an y explicit ad mission thai certain namcs may be predicated of God substantially or esst'ntially, .although th is is clearly dcfended in ,he De potentia and in the Summa thrologiar. As [ have suggested in an t'adier study, this seems to me to be owing, at least in part . to a greater concern on Thomas's part to avoid in these later works the extrt'mely nega tive \'icw he has associated with Moses Maimonides in particular, .and I)] .

Ed. (i i. , p.

162.

1)8, Ihid. Fo r a hel pful d iS(:ussion Stt A. M~u~r, · SI. Tho mas on Ihe £i(red N~me 'Telragramnmon': Mrdii1rl'i11 Studin H (1?7 !). pr. 175- 86. I~pr. in his &ing Ilnd Knt/wing: Studic in 71""'1111 AqwinllJ Ilnd Lar,., MrdirlJaI PI,ilOJopiJrn (To rom o. (990). pp. 59- 69 (ci red here). Maurer .;;ondudes ,hal rh is .,.iew rhar rhe name · Teu .. S"'mm3 , on~ i$ in One ~ n~ mort' pl<)pcr ro (;o.d , han ,he na me «Ht Who is ~ is uniqu e 10 the 5 U""1111 TI"olcgitU (po6\ ) and itknrifies Maimo nides' Guidt;U Thom· a$'s souret fOl this lat t precision (pr. 66-(9). C( L. C1a.,.ell, EI "ombrt propio fk Dios, pp. r.u- . 6. II sho uld ~I KI ~ nOTed rhar in a. Il Thom3J txpl~ins ,h;l! alfirm3Ii"e pl'1lpo.silioru em be formed ~boul God wi/hou r doi ng any "' iol~nct 10 Ihe divine si mpli ciry. n,is follows fl<)m Ihe f..Cl thal ou r ;nteJlecl fll un U~ di fferen l notions or ideas (ro"rrprio>ln) in undenrandi ng God. si net ir d(XS nol see him as ht ;s in himsd( E"cn so. in U5i ng Ihnc difftrtm nolioll$. Ihe human imdkct m:ogn itts Ih;ll it is one and Ihe .same d ivin e rulity which co rresponds 10 aU of Ih~m. The im dlecl expre$5d this (Onccplual plurality by using a distinCl mbjecl and predical c, And il up~ Ihc underl yi ng Teal unily by composing Ihe .mbjecl ~nd prtd ic;rle in a judgmcm (I.eon. 4- 16. ).

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Quiddilae j"c Knowledge of God and AnaJogy

545

common to other things in ont of fhree ways-univocally, equ ivoGl.liy, or analogically. As he will continue to do in his later major discussions of th is same issue, he proceeds by el iminating oolh univocal and eq uivocal predication of knowledge (or of any pure perfection) of God and of creallites. 1.7 To show that nothing can be said univocally of God and ofa creature, Thomas builds his argument on his metaphysics of essence and act of being (m~). In all cases where univocal predication is approp riate therc must be some kind of common ness in the order of nature (or esst'nce), but not in the order of the act of being. This follows because only ont' (substantial) act of being ca n be foun d in anyone substantia l entity. Thus the condition of humanity is not realized with the same act of being in fWO differenl human bei ngs. Therefore. whenever the form signified by a name is m~ itself, 11m name cannot be pred icated univocally. Given this, neither can being (ms) be predicated univocally, since, as Thomas often reminds liS, the name being (mf) is derived from the verb ror. I ( ' What we have so fa r is a general argument against predicating f"lJ~ univocally at any level. And this in IU rn is broadened so as !O apply to bei ng (ms) as well. Underlying all of this, of cou rse, is Thomas's conviction Chat in creatures essence and act ofheing (tlu)ca.nnot be idelllilled. Thomas imml-diatcly goes on to apply this thinking 10 the case of the di\'inc names. The nature or form of whatever is affirmed of God must be identical with the divine act of being. This is so because God's act ofbcing and nature (e.~nce) are identical. Therefore nothing can be prcdic.lIt:d univocally of God and of any crealllre. Implied here of course is Thomas's unwavering cOllviction that lht're can be no composition in God. Also assumed is his previous conclusion that the act of being (mr) can never be predicated univocally of any twO creatures. Hence neither it nor anything else call be predicated univocally of a crearure and God; for in God any ot her pcrfl.'Clicn nHiSI itself Ix: identical with the divine f'lJt". w, Ag;l.in we sec that the difference in ontologicJI situations- idcntity V5. composition of essence and a u -grounds the distinction between God and :lIly crealllte, and the rcsulting impossibilit), of our univocally predicating any n:lIlle of both. In assessing lhe general argument against univocal predication of mr I am reminded of one of the ways in wh ich Thomas argues for the distinction and COI11J)Qsition of cssellCl' and f"SJt" in substances other than God, i.e., the genus argu,h,1t Gods know\( dge o r Ih ing,; o,hn

Ih~n h im sd r is p roper ~lId (e m ill (pp. S lj~1 8) ; ~Is()

s<"c ~d "

(po 8IR). 147. I II a. 4 h~ ~$k.s : ~ Ulrum Ki( m ia su B il un i."oca IIOSllOlt :\.:i~lI{i ac· (p. 818). lho Jll~5'~ fQCpon sc lxgi n~ on p. 819. Stt p. 807 (or 'n"'nl3S'i ini,i~ 1 phr:l..l ion. 148. St" p. 819. Note cs~iall r: " Hu ius I";lI io ~S{ qUi3 cum in rt duo 5il w nsidn:lrt: .« ilicel n~1 Ur..\111 .'d '1"iJdi{~ ICm lei. CI <sse 5ilLIIII. ()I'(lrl e{ q Llod in OinnibU5 un j.ucis )'i, colnlliuni llU 5(~un ­ JUIII I":II;on elll nalur..\,·. el nOll S«"und um e~se. qui~ IIlIlIm CSW 11 0 11 CSI n i~i in 1111;\ r( . •• e l iJ oo qU~lIdoculll'l"r fOlm;1 5;g nifica,~ p;.'r nomell (";Sf ipsum <S~ . non poles! un i,"oc," (OIlH: nirt . plXlpl e!
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Quiddi [arive Knowledge of Cod and Analogy

H9

bodies share in the nOfion of corpo rcit}', body is defined in the same way in its various applicalions. H ence the logician, who considers meanings only and not the order of being, says lhat the name "bodyH is p redicated univocally of all bodies, including the terrestrial (corruptible) and the celestial (incorruptible), But the metaphysician and the natural ph ilosopher must also take into account the existence (rn~) of any nature. They realize that the existence (mr) of corporei ty is not the same in terrestrial (or corruptible) and celestial (incorruptible) bodies and therefo re deny that the name ~ body" or anything else is prediC3ted univocall)' of the corruptible and the incorruptible. Even fo r them. however, this analogy applies only 10 the order of existence, not 10 rhe order of meaning, l"l (3) Finally, the analogy may apply both 10 the order of meaning and the o rder of existence. This happens when there is no perfect equalit), either in mean ing o r in existence. It is in this way that being {mt} is said of substance and accident. In such cases the common nature or perfection must enjoy some existence (mr) in each of the things of which it is predicated. but one that diffe rs in terms of a greater or lesser degree of perfection. It is also in this way that truth , good ness, and names of this kind (i,e., pure perfections) are said analogically of God and of creatu res, Whence it follows that all of these arc really present in God and in creatures, each with its appropriate existence, and at the same time, that they are p rcsent in varying degrees of perfection. Thomas concludes from this that there are ditTerent truths, and each of these must have it s appropriate existence. 1'3 Important for our purposes is the f;lCt that Thomas explicitly applies to the case of the divine names lhe thi rd kind of analogy he has here distinguished- that which applies to both the o rder of meaning and the order of existence. Without dwelling at length on this passage, therefore. we may assume that in other passages 161. Ibid. NOle: ·Vd SITundum ~ CI non ,~cundulll imcmioncm: el hoc «Inti ngil qu~ndo pi u r.r. parificamur in i mCllI ionc alicuius ( ommu ni~. ~ illud commu ne lion ha~1 (~ un jus r:llionis in omnibus. situ l omn ia corpuF.! p.rific:IJlrur in in.cmionc corpurc;l~tis ... . U n(1c 'tu~mum ~d mCI.physiculll el n";l. lur.ltm. qui co nsidnanl res se<:u ndum $uu m es~. nee hoc noml'n, corpu s, ntc :o!iquid .!iud dicilU' un i\"(xe de corrup. ib ili bu5 e. incoffup.ibil ibus... : 16j. - Vel $t.'Cundum in ICllIio nem CI S<.>::undum esse; CI hoc CSI quando n~'que parifiaJlUl in iHlen fiD ne communi, n<:que in e~~; ~ icUf ens dici l ur de 5ubstamia el accideme: el de talibus OpO" p,,»inc ~-s>C ><.-.:undu lIl unum "';5<' UHQhi,!uc. '!I",.J sim J i ver~c ,..,,;caICS" (ibid ,). This p~ss:tge bs b<::en subjecI 10 cons iderable comm~ "lar)' on Ihe p.rt of Thomistic co",memalOrs, bO(h da"-!ic:ll and cOJllclllpor~ r,.. It wa~ (("1111"3.1 10 C~j elan'$ imcll'tC"1 3Iion as SCI fonh i II his {)( '1omi'lum Ill'lalogill. Sc..., Ch . 1[1 .bove, n. 87 fUf crili ci~m of hi s ifll("fpn:lalion of this 1(");1 and hi s way o f ~pplyin!:: il 10 Thomas's 01 her d'seu.ss inns of an alogy. On Thomas's Ic~1 sec M()Illagnes. 1...1 dortr;"r, p. 61 and n. 100; Mcinern y, TIff Logic ofAnalogy. pp. 97- 115: Aqu;mu lind Anafov, pp. 5- 14 (on Cajcl an's mjsr~~d illg of Ihe lexl ); S. M. Ramil"C'L. ~ En lorno ~ un famruo IUIO d(" SJmo l omas .wbrC" [a analogia: !iDpi(llIia S (19U). pp. 166-91 (also of i lllerc~1 for Ihe poinl d i~u.~cd abo"r in my II. rS9), <:>pcd ~lIr pp. '69- 76.

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Quidditacive Knowledge of God and Analogy

555

In this text Ihere is neither a decisive rejection of analogy of proportion, nor an exclusive acceptance of analogy of proponionaliry, Proponionaliry is proposed as an alternalive war of accounring fo r a crearu re's similitude or likeness 10 God. Even so, Klubertanz is surely correct when he writes that "the absence of any subsequent text which teaches proper proport ionality berv.'een God and creatures constitutes strong evidence that St, Thomas quietly abandoned this docuine after 1256. ~ lU At the very least, by the time of 01' writau, q. :!) Thomas no longer regards proportionali ry as Ih(, only wly of accollming for a erealure's likeness 10 God ,l" c. Summll comrn Gt!1Itiles I (1159/60-1264/65) With this we 1l1;J. }' re!Urn to Thomas's discussion of the divine names in Ihe SlImma contra Gentiles. As we saw in the previous section of this Chapter, in Bk I, c. p, Thomas defends the point (hat a plurality of divine names is not repugnant 10 God's s ill1pli ci ry. lI ~ In cc. J2 and fo llowing he explicitly takes up the issue of univocal, equ ivocal, and analogical predication of lhe divine names. In c. 32 itself he offers a num ber of argurnellls to show that nothing can be prt'dicated univocally of Gad and of creatures, The first argument maintains that if the form an effect receives from its cause is not Ihe saml' in species as Ihe form through which Iha! Cluse acts, a name taken from that form in the effect cannot be predica t~d univacall}' of the cause. For inst"dnce, according to Thomas's medieval world-view, fire as generated by the sun and the sun itself arc not both said to be hot univocally, But no form which is Gtuscd by God can attain 10 the species of the divine power itself, for that which creat ures f('Ceive in divided and partial fashion is present in God in simple and total fashion , Therefore nothing can be said univ0C2lly of God and of other th ings. 1M This argu ment is interesting becau.~ it maintains that specifi c likeness berv,een th\! form preselll in an effecl and in it s cause is req uired for univocal predication of a name of both. And because Thomas has previously denied that God belongs to any genus or that he (an be designa!ed by any substan\ial difference (and belong to :my spl'Cies), il will follow th:u the form of no effcci call agree in spe<:ies with its divine (';;IUS('. Morcover, as Thomas's :lrgumelll here assumes, in c. 28 he has just prop';', " On this s« Klu i'K:rUfl7. ~s cited in the p,«wing nOte. H is rem u ks On p. 9 ~ indic ll c .h:.. he dJ. C$ thi s disputed qucstion ('I' 13) C~. J"l.16. i.c.. at roughly the s:nnc lime :l.Hll.:I. . • [, As I h3\'C i ndiclI ~...t in n. 181. Wcishcil'l pba:< " . 1) in 1158- 19, and ,his s«m s ,,, mc "" be: ",,,ch "'O'~ likdy, since this qUe.$fion na,,,,,,Uy faUs int o T homas's th ird }'tO~ r as Regent Mas.c, (1!58- 1!j9). h !iC'1.'Cms 1l1~' unlikely that Tholll~5 would b\'e com! "c,«I ,h .. Ii'M 1; <:jUC:51io ns of Ih.. [H wril"u i n one },(:I ', 18J. Op. d t., p, 94. S« my r~mJ.rks in th .. prf'Ceding nOle ~boU! the d31e for q. lJ. Since il P'.:MIl U Ilroport iOl.. lity as 0111)' Ihe ,;ccoud of ,WQ l)(Wible wlUlion~ , il ;l.1,eady ma rk.! ~mt ~dvallce O"CI q, 1,~. It . !8~. H<';IwC\'"" IInlih.. Klllhtrull1:~ 3PP~!em vicw (S« pp. 91. , . ), 1 do no< sec tht tCXI from q. :,. a. 7. 3d 9 ~ indicalin!; an ~~d u.liw choice fOI proporrion~!ify. 18\. Ed. Leon. man_, pp. Jl- jJ. •86. Ed . cit" 1'. Jj.

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560

From Finire Being

[Q

Uncreared Being

Finally, Thomas reasons that there would be no point in predicating a name of a thing unless we cou ld understand something about (hat thing through the name. Bu t if all (he names applied to God and creatures were purdy equivocal, such names would tell us tlOthing abom God; for the meanings of such names are known to us only insof-ar as they are said of crealUres. It would then be useless for us to say or to prove of God thaI he is '" being, or good, or anything else of this kind.lOl Against this one might reply (hat through names of this kind we only know what God is not. To describe him as living would mean thai he does nOI belong 10 Ihe class of inanimate things. In response Thomas coulllers Ih:H in thai evem a name such as "living" would at least have this in common when it is applied to God and to creatUres, i.e., the negation ofbcing inanimate. Even this is enough to show that i, is nOt purdy equi vocal, he cOllcludes. ~\H tn su m, the added contribution of [his series of arguments against purdy equivocal predication of the divine names is to show Ihat it fui ls to express the likeness that obtains betv.-cen crearu res and God. T his likeness ilsclfhas been esrablished , Thomas maintai ns, by reasoning from created things viewed as cffecLS to God as their cause. And because that reasoning presuppost'S that in so me way every effect is like its cause, the success of such reasoning itsclf undercuts, in Thomas's eyes, any theory of merel y equivocal predication of such names of cream res and of God.lO S H aving now eliminated to his own satisfaction both rheorie.s of univOClI :md purely equ ivocal predication of the divine names, Thomas concludes in c. H that such names can only be predicated analogically of creatures and of God . ~ he here explains, [his means [hat [hey arc applied according to an ordering or relationship to some onc thing. But analogical predicat ion based on an ordering or relario nship 10 some one thing may happen in tv.'0 different ways. In the first way, this is based on the fan that many differen t Ihings all bear a relationship 10 something that is onto For instance, il is in relationship to ont and the sa me health that an animal is said to be healthy as its subject. medicine as its efficient cause, food as that which prescrves it, and urine as its sign. In the .second way, all analogical name is predi cated of tv.·o things not because they arc both related 10 some th ird thing, but because one of them is related to the other. Thus being (ms) is said of substance and accident because an accident bears a relat ionsh ip 10 substance, not oc-causc substance and accident aTe both related 10 some third thing. Thomas concludes that names arc nOt said analogically of God and other things in the first way, beIb id. H ence argumenl$ J, 4 , and 5 are all b:>~d o n the I.Inae.::tp(~ blt agno.lticislll (hat would res ult from a (hoo ry o f (he purdy equivOCII Char-Kter of divine names. Not appearing here i5 lhe 31gumcIll from :l.gnosddsm on ('.od's parI Ihal would alfO result , ..... hich Thomas had UsM in [N ,,..ri'au. q. 1., :1.. I!. !04. Ed. ci! .. p. )4. No!e esp~·ciall r: •. . . ad m im.s ol'onebi! quod vivum de o.e..:. tT ( <<"am,i! d;c!um (:On,....n;a! in ncga!iont: in~nimati . EI s;c IJon er;t pUrl! KqUi VIXllm.W'j. MQIlI ~gnc:s (p . 70), ~f,ef (IUOlill g a's. I f'oll> our I C~I. 1~Il>arks ,hal Ih~ Mnoel ic· Mgull>enl1l don h~s now bttu rcinfor.:c-d by ~ mCr.lphrsiC'~1 argul1\elll. He also comnl("nu !hal this rn=physical ~pptG:l ch firs! appears in the Summll Gm ,if<'S. Al~ ~e p. 70, n. I). l O J.

(''''tn,

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Quidditative Knowl edge of God and Analogy

571

In concluding th is discussion of an:llogy al Ihe lranscendcntal level, I would like to ward off a possible misunderstanding. An oversi mplified view of Thomas's position mighl infer from what we ha\'e seen th:\[ the imel1igiblt" comen! (rmio) signified by an analogous name such as "good" or ~ (rue" or "being" remains exactl y the same when Wt· abstract it from the panicipated way in which it is re:llized in creatures and Ihe unpanicipated way it is present in God. If so, we m ight then speak of a commo n intelligible co re or content which is retained by such an abSlractt"d concept of an absolute perfeCtion. This would remain exactly the same and would be appl ied 10 G od or 10 creatures by the simple addition on our part of the appropriale mode of being, unparlicip:Hed and unlimited, on the one h:tnd, or participated and lim ited , on rhe OIher. And indeed a long-standing school of Th omistic imerpreta tion $Cems iO view manen; more or less this way, as MOlltagnes has pointed out. Whether such writers refer to this absrracted concept as a perfection in itself, or as an absolute perfection, or as a transcendental analogue, Ihe theory seems to be the same. There is some fundam ental intell igible core which we can abstract in the caSt of pure perfections. This common core seryC$ as a bridge, as it were, wh ich enables us co move from knowledge of perfections in their fini te and parti cipated state to such a pure perfeclion considered in i!Sel f. and fro m this co its ap plication co Ihe infinite and unparticipated source of all bei ngyt Howcyer, our examination of Thomas's texts o n analogy docs not suppon such an approach . In his pn:senrarion both of the analogy of many 10 one (at the predicamental level) and of the analogy of onc to another (at both the predicamental and Iranscendemallevels), Thomas's texts ind icate that the rationfr involved, the int ell igible corm' nts, are partly the same and partly nOt the same. The perfc
•

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Quiddil'Jtive Kn owledge of God and Analogy

575

deny of God the cre:Hurely modus JignijiclllJdi we employ in predic:ning names of him . If will never enable us 10 apply names univocally to God and creatures but only analogically, at besl. Thesc limimiOIl S ult imately follow from the ontological situat ion , the r."1CI that in the order of reality effects are not like God either specifically or gcnerically but only "ac<:ording to some kind of analogy ill the way the act of b<:ing itself is COnl lTlon 10 all (bcings)."l11 1~ 1.

Ibid.

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