Cases In Civil Law I-compilation

THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF CIVIL LAW

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I. The Law 1. LORENZO M. TANADA vs. JUAN C. TUVERA G. R. No. 63915 April 24, 1985 FACTS In this case petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Petitioners contend that in order for these laws to be effective it must be published in the Official Gazette. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality. Without showing that the non-publication of these laws would bring injury to the petitioners, they have no cause of action, as provided for under the Rules of Court. ISSUES 1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing 2. Whether or not various laws in question should be published to be valid and enforceable. RULING The petitioners have legal standing. The Supreme Court has already decided in various cases that a party has a cause of action when the question posed is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. Under such, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. As to the necessity of publication, the Supreme Court ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 2

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 2. BPI vs. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE G. R. No. 149454 & 149507 May 28, 2004 FACTS CASA Montessori International opened an account with BPI, with CASA’s President as one of its authorized signatories. It discovered that 9 of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos whose name turned out to be fictitious, and was used by a certain Yabut, CASA’s external auditor. He voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature and encashed the checks. RTC granted the Complaint for Collection with Damages against BPI ordering to reinstate the amount in the account, with interest. CA took account of CASA’s contributory negligence and apportioned the loss between CASA and BPI, and ordred Yabut to reimburse both. BPI contends that the monthly statements it issues to its clients contain a notice worded as follows: “If no error is reported in 10 days, account will be correct” and as such, it should be considered a waiver. ISSUE Whether or not waiver or estoppel results from failure to report the error in the bank statement RULING Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if CASA failed to report the error. Neither is it estopped from questioning the mistake after the lapse of the ten-day period. This notice is a simple confirmation or "circularization" -- in accounting parlance -- that requests client-depositors to affirm the accuracy of items recorded by the banks. Its purpose is to obtain from the depositors a direct corroboration of the correctness of their account balances with their respective banks.

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Every right has subjects -- active and passive. While the active subject is entitled to demand its enforcement, the passive one is duty-bound to suffer such enforcement. On the one hand, BPI could not have been an active subject, because it could not have demanded from CASA a response to its notice. CASA, on the other hand, could not have been a passive subject, either, because it had no obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to respond. Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their own deed or representation, anything contrary to that established as the truth, in legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence even make a juris et de jure presumption that whenever one has, by one’s own act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief, one cannot -- in any litigation arising from such act or omission -- be permitted to falsify that supposed truth. In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or representation that misled BPI. The former’s omission, if any, may only be deemed an innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences of periodic audits. Since its conduct was due to such ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. A person who has no knowledge of or consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it. "Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference x x x." CASA is not barred from questioning BPI’s error even after the lapse of the period given in the notice. 3. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001 FACTS Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Respondent avers, among others that the widow cannot recover for from the company anymore an civil damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the Labor Code.

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After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded actual and compensatory damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto. ISSUE Whether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the Civil Code after recovering from damages provided for under the Labor Code. RULING The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of damages under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary civil action. It ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either remedies. The Supreme Court allowed some exceptions. In the case at bar, the CA ruled that the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because she was not aware and was ignorant of her rights and courses of action. When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. However, waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the petitioner-company. Petitioner’s argument that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that “Ignorance of the law excuses no one” cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that the application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is 5

neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her . 4. DUENAS vs. SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION G. R. No. 149417 June 4, 2004 FACTS Petitioner Dueñas is the daughter of the late Cecilio Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at General T. De Leon, Valenzuela City , Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision. The Land Registration Commission approved the project and the National Housing Authority issued the required Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the time of Cecilio’s death in 1988, there were already several residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision. Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216. Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA. The Regional Director HLURB opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957 was not applicable to Santos Subdivision. SSHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which averred among others that: P.D. No. 957 should apply retroactively to Santos Subdivision. HLURB-NCR dismissed the complaint. It ruled that while SSHA failed to present evidence showing that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law with capacity to sue. SSHA then appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The latter body, however, affirmed the action taken by the HLURB-NCR office. Respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals which granted the petition and accordingly ordered the case to be remanded to the HLURB. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. ISSUE Whether or not PD No. 957 should be retroactively applies in this case RULING The petitioner assails the appellate court’s finding based on the Supreme Court’s previous ruling in Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon which allowed P.D. No. 957, as amended, to apply retroactively. The Supreme Court ruled that Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable in this case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there was non-payment of amortizations, and failure to develop the subdivision. It held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive 6

application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its enactment. Hence, the SC ruled that the non-payment of amortizations was justified under Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project. Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, it has held in a subsequent case that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus: …Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before their promulgation…. The SC has examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and has not found any clause or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.

5. PNB vs. NEPOMUCENO PUBLICATIONS G. R. No. 139479 December 27, 2002 FACTS Petitioner PNB granted respondents 4 million pesos of credit line to finance a movie project. The loan was secured by mortgages on respondents’ real and personal properties. Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The auction sale was rescheduled several times without need of republication of the notice of sale. Subsequently, the respondents filed an action for annulment of the foreclosure sale claiming that such was void because, among others, there was lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure sale. The trail court ordered the annulment and set aside the foreclosure proceedings. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court. ISSUE 7

Whether or not publication of foreclosure sale can be validly waived by agreement of the parties. RULING Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on real property is specific with regard to the posting and publication requirements of the notice of sale, to wit: "Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city." It is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Failure to publish the notice of sale constitutes a jurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale. Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may proceed without need of re-publication and re-posting of the notice of sale. The Supreme Court is not convinced. Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of Act No. 3135. While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.

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6. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CIR, et al. G. R. No. 146941 August 9, 2007 FACTS Filinvest Development Corporation filed a claim for refund or in the alternative the issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) representing excess creditable withholding taxes for taxable years 1994, 1995, 1996. The CIR did not resolve the claim for refund and the two-year prescriptive period was about to lapse which prompted the petitioner to file a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). In the petition, it prayed for refund or in the alternative the issuance of TCC amounting P3,173,868.00.The amount of P1,004,236.00 representing excess/unutilized creditable withholding taxes for 1994 was no longer included as it was already barred by prescription. Eventually, CTA dismissed the petition for review. Motion for review was filed before the Court of Appeals which was dismissed so as the motion for reconsideration, denied. Then here comes the petition before the Supreme Court which was also denied but later in the motion for reconsideration it was at last granted. The petitioner alleged among others that the CA erred in relying on CTA cases where they cited in its decision as jurisprudential basis to support its ruling. ISSUE Whether or not decisions of the CTA are jurisprudential basis for coming up a decision. RULING The SC ruled that the CA was wrong in relying decisions of the CTA as jurisprudential basis in resolving the case. By tradition and in our system of administration, the Supreme Court has the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the country, all other courts should take their bearings from the decisions of this court. The principle of “stare decisis et non quieta movere, as embodied in ART 8 of the CIVIL CODE of the Philippines,enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the SC. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.

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7. DAVID REYES vs. JOSE LIM G. R. No. 134241 August 11, 2003 FACTS Petitioner Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondent Lim and Harrison Lumber. In his complaint he alleged that he and Lim entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land wherein the other respondent Harrison Lumber was occupying as lessee. That petitioner had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the property and if they failed to vacate, he will hold them liable for the penalty of 400,000 a month as provided in the contract to sell. He further alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the property until the 400,000 monthly penalties would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of 18,000. Harrison in their answer denies the allegation of connivance between them and Lim to defraud Reyes. They alleged that Reyes approved their request to extend their time to vacate the premise due to the difficulty in finding a new location for their business. While Lim in his answer alleged that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price and requested a meeting with Reyes but Reyes kept on postponing the meeting and instead offered to return the 10,000,000 down payment because Reyes has a hard time in removing the lessee to the property but Lim rejected the offer and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to the property, and he learned that it was already sold to Line One Corporation. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the act of Reyes constitute unjust enrichment 2. Whether or not the principle of unjust enrichment applies to procedural remedies RULING The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. Courts can extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the pendency of the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the Rules of Court. Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a buyer if the seller himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently sold the same property to another buyer. By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily offers to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a seller may not take back his offer if the court deems it equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution, to put the money in judicial deposit. 10

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim. 8. ROMMEL JACINTO, DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. G. R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007 FACTS On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8. Petitioner was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Silverio and Anita Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth. His sex was registered as "male." He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. The granting of the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. The Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE

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Whether or not petitioner’s claim that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. RULING The petition lacks merit. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. Article 376 of the Civil Code was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. Under the law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed. Petitioner’s basis in the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. He must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the trial court was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

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The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is and that no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, the petition was petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-tofemale post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. 13

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. The Court cannot render judgment judgment to change name or sex on the ground of equity It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. 9. RADIN C. ALCIRA vs. NLRC G. R. No. 149859 June 9, 2004 FACTS The petitioner, Radin Alcira, was hired by the respondent Middleby Philippines Corporation as engineering support services supervisor under probationary status for 6 months. Afterwards, the service of the petitioner was terminated by the respondent on the ground that the latter was not satisfied on the performance of the former. As a result, the petitioner filed a complaint foe illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the respondent. Petitioner contended that his termination in the service tantamount to illegal dismissal since he attained the status of a regular employee as of the time of dismissal. He presented the appointment paper showing that he was hired on May 20, 1996, consequently, his dismissal on November 20, 1996 was illegal because at that time, he was already a regular employee since the 6-month probationary period ended on November 16, 1996. 14

The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that during the petitioner’s probationary period, he showed poor performance on his assigned tasks, was late couple of times and violated the company’s rule. Thus, the petitioner was terminated and his application to become a regular employment was disapproved. The respondent also insisted that the removal of the petitioner from office was within the probationary period. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner was done before his regularization because the 6- month probationary period, counting from May 20, 1996 shall end on November 20, 1996. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE Whether the petitioner was already a regular employee in respondent’s company at the time of his dismissal from the service RULING The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The status of the petitioner at the time of his termination was still probationary. His dismissal on November 20, 1996 was within the 6- month probationary period. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of years, months, and days and nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days, months of 30 days, days of 24 hours and nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is composed of 30 days, then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed of 180 days. And the computation of the 6- month period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. Since, the number of days of a particular month is irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of his dismissal. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. 10. LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 FACTS Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates, after school year, they lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on 15

August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seek among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum. In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. The trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. On October 23, 1997, while the criminal case was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory. However, the appelate court affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto. In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed 16

that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy. RULING The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy. For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia. Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and 17

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of civil case, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, rendered judgment decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. 18

11. PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 FACTS On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzo’s will would encroach her legitime. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition. The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1). “Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. ISSUE Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? RULING The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

20

Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. “ Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. “However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzo’s Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state. As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate 21

dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

II. Who is a Person under the Civil Code? 1.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDO FELIPE G. R. No. L-40432 July 19, 1982 FACTS 22

Herein accused Fernando Felipe was convicted by the lower court of the crime of rape committed by him against his niece-in-law Ruth Pancho. As a result of the incident the victim got pregnant, who was then 25 years old. When the accused appealed his case, one of his defenses was the fact that the victim’s child was born on March 13, 1972 and that the victim could not have been raped on July 9, 1971 because there are only 247 days between these dates. Accused claimed that the normal period of gestation is 280 days and the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of uterine development of a child. ISSUE Whether or not the victim’s child is considered a normal child. RULING Yes, the victim’s child was normal. As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in his brief, "a child born 8 months and seven days after conception is considered normal. ...; that in certain instances the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of the uterine development of a child, but by providing that a premature child is one which has an intra-uterine life of less than seven months (Art. 41, Civil Code) the Code impliedly recognizes that a child which had an intra-uterine life of 8 months, as in the case at bar, is a normal child." 2.MILAGROS JOAQUINO vs. LOURDES REYES G. R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004 FACTS Under the law capacity to act is the power to do acts with legal effects, this however is not inherent it can only be acquired at the same time it can also be restricted. Among its limitations is by reason of family relations. (digester’s own interpretation of the case in relation to the topic) This case is originally an action for reconveyance filed by the legal wife herein respondent Lourdes Reyes against the paramour of her husband herein petitioner Milgaros Joaquino. This case involved a disputed property in BF homes which was registered under the name of Milagros acquired by the deceased husband of Lourdes before his death and during the subsistence of their marriage. Lourdes (wife) alleged that the said property is a Conjugal Property because the same was acquired by her husband from his salaries and earnings. Milagros (paramour) on the other hand claimed that the same was acquired by her form her exclusive income. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of the wife and ordered the reconveyance of the said property 23

ISSUE Whether the property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros. RULING The property is conjugal. It was clearly shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code. Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in the paramour’s name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros (paramour). By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it was "made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation." The prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise apply to donations between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the former.36 Article 87 of the Family Code now expressly provides thus: "Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage." (Italics supplied). 3. BOARD OF OPTOMETRY vs. HON. ANGEL B. COLET G. R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996 FACTS Herein private respondents Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., Republica A. Panol, and the alleged "presidents" of Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP), Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA), Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO), Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines (SMOAP) questioned the validity of RA 8050 known as the Revised Optometry Law in a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. The Regional Trial Court then issued the now assailed order granting a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining, restricting, and forbidding the 24

respondents therein (herein petitioners), their agents, officers, and employees from performing or undertaking any act in implementation or enforcement of R.A. No. 8050, or any of its provisions. In the said petition filed by the private respondents each allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, save for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. Hence this instant petition. ISSUE Whether or not private respondents have the requisite capacity (locus standi) RULING No, private respondents failed to establish their locus standi. Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. 18 Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 9574770 makes no mention of these associations nor state their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements. of the alleged presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations." For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action.

4. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC G. R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 25

FACTS Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. She indicated in her COC that resided in the constituency she sought to be elected for seven months. Thus, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency which under the Constitution requires one year residency for candidates for the House of Representatives. In her answer, herein petitioner asserted that that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. That there was only an honest mistake on her part when she wrote in her COC seven months (residency) while in fact she intended it to be “since childhood.” Not convinced, COMELEC granted the petition for Disqualification, holding that Imelda is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila. ISSUE Whether or not herein petitioner (Imelda) abandoned her domicile of origin and as consequence thereof is she qualified to run as representative of the First District of Leyte RULING Imelda did not lose her domicile of origin. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. The evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium). Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the 26

concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. In Faypon vs. Quirino, court held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. Therefore, petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. 5. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC G. R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007 FACTS Herein petitioner underwent a sex reassignment surgery from a man to a woman. As a result he now files this petition to change his name in his birth certificate from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female,” as he is engaged and wish to get married. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of herein petitioner. However, the Republic of the Philippines thru the Solicitor General petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason alteration. The court of Appeals then rendered a decision in favor 27

filed a no law of sex of the

Republic based on the ground that there is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. Whether or not a person’s first name can be changed on the rgounf of sexre-assignment. 2. Whether or not petitioner can change his sex from male to female in his birth certificate via judicial petition. RULING The governing rule for change of first name is RA 9048 and grounds provided thereof are: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. And it is worthy to note that a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or legal status, thus to allow petitioner would contravene the law. There is also no laws that allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignement. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable (absolute). For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Moreover, the changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wideranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the 28

contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female postoperative transsexual).Petition is denied.

III. The Basics of Human Relations 1. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB INC. vs. RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE G. R. No. 163273 January 18, 2008 FACTS San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special nonproprietary member. The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors. Respondent then purchased a CCCI share where he was issued a Proprietary Ownership Certificate. Thereafter, respondent applied a CCCI proprietary membership but this was deferred. Later, his application was finally voted upon by the Board of Directors and he was informed that it was disapproved. Respondent wrote a letter of reconsideration but he was not answered, letter he wrote another letter inquiring as to the reasons why his application has been denied but still did not receive any reply from CCCI. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner. Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeal rendered decision in favor of herein respondent relying on the basic of human relations found under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner is liable to herein respondent for damages. RULING Yes, in rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. 29

Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide such restrictions The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications. This fraud and bad faith on the part of CCCI was evident when it amended its ByLaws as to how its members are elected changing it to a required unanimous approval of all directors present, this without informing the respondent of such change and as to why his application was disapproved. In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus: This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. (Emphasis in the original). 2. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 FACTS Private respondent, a Filipina filed an action for damages against petitioner an Iranian Moslem for alleged breach of promise to marry. Repondent averred that because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him , agreed to lived with him and surrendered here honor and womanhood. Additionally, by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and 30

chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. All these petitioner denied. Trial court and Court of Appeals awarded damages in favor of respondent based on Art. 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not in a breach of promise to marry Art. 21 of the Civil Code can be applied. RULING Yes, Art. 21 is applicable where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. The essential feature of seduction in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. Article 21 on the other hand does not apply if the sexual intercourse was due to mutual lust or where the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity. Petition is denied. 3. ASJ CORPORATION, et al. vs. EFREN AND MAURA EVANGELISTA G. R. No. 158086 February 14, 2008 31

FACTS Respondents, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged in the large-scale business of buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. For the incubation and hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of the hatchery services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of San Juan and his family. Initially, the service fees were paid upon release of the eggs and by-products to respondents. But as their business went along, respondents’ delays on their payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the balance, as there may be, into the next delivery, out of keeping goodwill with respondents. However, respondent continued to fail in its payments, prompting San Juan to refuse the release of the chicks and by-products. At one instance, petitioner still refused to release the same despite offer of respondent partial payment of the amount due having in mind that the products left in the hands of the petitioner were more than their amount due. Petitioner allegedly threatened to impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatchery compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle their accounts with him. Thus, respondent filed with the RTC an action for damages based on petitioner’s retention of the chicks and the by-products. The Trial Court and Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent based on Art. 19 of the Civil Code. ISSUE Whether or not award of damages based on Art. 19 of the Civil Code in favor of respondents was proper. RULING Yes, Art. 19 of the Civil Code can be properly applied when San Juan threatened the respondents. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.Here, while petitioners had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners on threatening the repsodentns, as aptly found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. Moreover, Respondents’ offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, 32

unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. More so, respondents cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the chicks and byproducts they expect to derive because it is necessary that all the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary character. Needless to say, there was no valid application of payment in this case. Furthermore, it was respondents who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to petitioners’ right of retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other party begins. Since respondents are guilty of delay in the performance of their obligations, they are also liable to pay petitioners actual damages. Petition partly granted. 4. FAR EAST BANK vs. THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR. G. R. No. 157314 July 29, 2005 FACTS Respondent had a current savings account with petitioner-bank, since then he issued post- dated checks to different payees. In April 4, 1988 petitioner had an overdraft , which led to the subsequent dishonor of that check. But a day after that she made a deposit in order to cover up for the said overdraft, her deposit was accepted by the bank. Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check, he discovered that his current account was closed on the ground that it was "improperly handled." The respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his account was unjustified. When he did not receive a reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with the RTC, a complaint for damages against petitioner bank and accountant Villadelgado. Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondent based on Art. 19 of the Civil Code. Respondent claimed that his reputation was tainted by the act of petitioner-bank. The facts of the case also revealed that respondent had several times in the past mishandled his account where he overdrawn 156 times in 1986 , 117 times in 1987 and 26 times in 1988. In all these instances, the account was overdrawn due to the issuance of checks against insufficient funds. 33

ISSUE Whether or not Art.19 of the Civil Code was properly applied in respondent’s favor RULING No, because of the absence of bad faith on the part of petitioner-bank and it has no intention of prejudicing the respondent. This case is a case of damage without injury or often called damnum absque injuria. The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision.The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud.Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. Under the Rules and Regulations of petitioner-bank it reserves the right to close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits. It is clearly understood that the depositor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any other reason. There were also several instances when the respondent issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file with petitioner bank.[16] All these circumstances taken together justified the petitioner bank’s closure of the respondent’s account on April 4, 1988 for "improper handling." The respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden of proving bad faith on the part of petitioner bank or that it was motivated by ill-will or spite in closing his account on April 4, 1988 and in inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, 1988. Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by petitioner bank with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring the respondent. 34

Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently funded checks, would have to be borne by him alone. It was the respondent’s repeated improper and irregular handling of his account which constrained petitioner bank to close the same in accordance with the rules and regulations governing its depositors’ current accounts. Petition is granted. 5. VICENTE S. ALMARIO vs. PHILIPPINES AIRLINES, INC. G. R. No. 170928 September 11, 2007 FACTS Almario is a 39 pilot of the Philippine Airlines (PAL). By reason of his promotion he was sent by PAL to training in Manila and in Australia for 5months with cost and expense borne by PAL. However, after his training and with only 8months of rendering service to PAL he tendered resignation. PAL objected and claimed that as part of their agreement under their CBA he is supposed to render 3 more years of service after his training in order for PAL to recover the expenses it incurred in Almario’s training. Almario denied having such agreement and insisted on his resignation. Thus, PAL filed n action for reimbursement with the RTC as to the cost of the training expenses of Almario. The trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Almario and held that there was no such provision found in the CBA. Upon appeal by both parties the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and held Almario liable under its CBA and based on Art. 22 of the Civil Code, hence this petition. ISSUE Whether or not Almario should be held liable under that Article 22 of the Civil Code (unjust enrichment) with respect to his training costs.

RULING Yes, Almario is liable based on the principle embodied in Art 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment. Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant. 35

Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL expected to recover the training costs by availing of Almario’s services for at least three years. The expectation of PAL was not fully realized, however, due to Almario’s resignation after only eight months of service following the completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust enrichment. 6. ANTONIO CHIENG, substituted by WILLIAM CHIENG vs. SPOUSES EULOGIIO AND TERESITA SANTOS G. R. No. 169647 August 31, 2007 FACTS August 17, 1989, petitioner Chieng extended a loan in favor of respondent spouses Eulogio and Teresita Santos. As security for such loan, the respondents executed in favor of petitioner a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a piece of land. On even date, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deeds and was duly annotated on TCT. Thereafter, respondent issued several checks in favor of petitioner as payment for the loan. Some of these checks were dishonored, prompting the petitioner to file a criminal case against respondent Eulogio for violation of BP Blg. 22 before the RTC. During the pre-trial conference of these cases, petitioner and respondent Eulogio entered into a compromise agreement, which was contained in the Order of the court, that the total indebtedness of Mr. Santos as of July 15, 1991 amounts to P200,000.00 Pesos including interest since the beginning and excluding those already paid for. Respondent failed to comply with his obligation in the compromise agreement. On 17 June 1993, petitioner filed with the RTC, an action for foreclosure of mortgage constituted on respondents’ real property docketed as Civil Case. ISSUE Whether petitioner, by filing Criminal Cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent Eulogio, was already barred or precluded from availing himself of the other civil remedy of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. RULING No. A mortgage-creditor may, in the recovery of a debt secured by a real estate mortgage, institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal 36

action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. These remedies available to the mortgage-creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. An election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. When petitioner filed Criminal Cases for violation of BP. 22 against respondent Eulogio, petitioner’s civil action for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks was impliedly instituted therein pursuant to Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. However, it should be stressed that respondents have not yet fully paid the loan. In fact, respondents themselves admitted that they still owe petitioner the balance of the loan. To allow respondents to benefit from the loan without paying its whole amount to petitioner, and to preclude the petitioner from recovering the remaining balance of the loan, would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of petitioner. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another (Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest) is embodied in Article 22 of the New Civil Code, to wit: ART. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. As can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. The main objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. The principle of unjust enrichment obliges the respondents to pay the remaining balance of the loan plus interest. Relieving the respondents of their obligation to pay the balance of the loan would, indeed, be to sanction unjust enrichment in favor of respondents and cause unjust poverty to petitioner. In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity, we hold, pro hac vice, that respondents are still liable to pay the remaining balance of the loan. 7. SPOUSES JAMES and FLORENCE TAN vs. CARMINA MANDAP G. R. No. 150925 May 27, 2004 37

FACTS Respondents are the legitimate children of the marriage of Dionisio Mandap, Sr., and Maria Contreras Mandap. When the Mandap spouses parted ways, their children opted to stay with Maria. To help support the children, Maria filed a Civil Case for the dissolution and separation of the conjugal partnership. Two separate lots, each with an area of 88 square meters covered by TCT Nos. 44730 and 55847, respectively, located in Felix Huertas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, with improvements thereon, were adjudicated by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in favor of Dionisio Mandap, Sr. Meanwhile, Dionisio Mandap, Sr., until his death on October 2, 1991 at age 64, lived with Diorita Dojoles, with whom he had two children. He suffered from diabetes since 1931, became totally blind in 1940, and was crippled for about 10 years until his death. However, before his death on May 25, 1989, he conveyed the subject properties to his common-law wife’s sister, Elenita Dojoles Vasquez; and her husband, Crispulo Vasquez. On September 11, 1989, the Vasquez spouses conveyed the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 186748 in favor of petitioners. TCT No. 188862 covering the subject lot was then issued in favor of the latter. On September 5, 1989, prior to the sale to petitioners, the respondents filed an action for cancellation of title with damages, before the RTC of Manila against Diorita Dojoles and the Vasquez spouses, alleging that the sale of subject properties by their father was fictitious, and without any consideration. Further, the consent of their father was vitiated due to his physical infirmities. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the sale between Mandap Sr. and the Vasqueses is valid. 2. Whether or not the sale between the Vasqueses and petitioners is valid. RULING 1. The sale was not valid. At the time Dionisio Mandap, Sr., purportedly sold the lots in question to the Vasquez spouses, he was already totally blind and paralyzed. He could not possibly have read the contents of the deeds of sale. He could not have consented to a contract whose terms he never knew nor understood. It cannot be presumed Mandap, Sr., knew the contents of the deeds of sale disposing of his properties. Applying Article 1332 of the Civil Code the party seeking to enforce the contract, petitioners should have presented evidence showing that the terms of the deeds of sale to the Vasquez spouses were fully explained to Mandap, Sr. But petitioners failed to comply with the strict requirements of Article 1332, thereby casting doubt on the alleged consent of the vendor. Since the vendor in this case was totally blind and crippled at the time of the sale, entirely dependent on outside 38

support, every care to protect his interest conformably with Article 24 of the Civil Code must be taken. Article 24 is clear on this that “In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.” Petitioners presented no evidence disproving that (1) Mandap, Sr. was totally blind and suffering from acute diabetes such that he could no longer discern the legal consequences of his acts, and (2) that undue influence was exerted upon him, which vitiated his consent. Thus, the presumption of fraud and undue influence was not rebutted. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that the notary public who notarized the deeds of sale was not duly commissioned and that Mandap, Sr., did not personally appear before a notary public. 2. Invalid. Based on the evidence on record, the sale in favor of the Vasquez spouses is void. Hence, it follows that the sale to petitioners is also void, because petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of the Vasquez spouses. Since the Vasquezes as sellers had no valid title over the parcel of land they sold, petitioners as buyers thereof could not claim that the contract of sale is valid. 8. SAMSON CHING vs. CLARITA NICDAO, et al. G. R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007 FACTS On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal complaints for 11 counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent Nicdao. Consequently, 11 Information were filed with the First MCTC of DinalupihanHermosa, Province of Bataan, which, except as to the amounts and check numbers they were uniformly read. At about the same time, 14 other criminal complaints, also for violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly 14 checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid but were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were filed with the same MCTC . At her arraignment, Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to all the charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal Case. On direct-examination, Nicdao stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she had borrowed money from both 39

petitioner Ching and Nuguid in the total amount of P22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao admitted, however, that she had obtained a loan from Nuguid but only for P2,100,000.00 and the same was already fully paid. As proof of such payment, she presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated August 13, 1996 in the amount of P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the said demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of petitioner Ching. In addition, Nicdao also presented and identified several cigarette wrappers at the back of which appeared computations. She explained that Nuguid went to the grocery store everyday to collect interest payments. The principal loan was P2,100,000.00 with 12% interest per day. Nuguid allegedly wrote the payments for the daily interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave to respondent Nicdao. The principal loan amount of P2,100,000.00 was allegedly delivered by Nuguid to respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of P100,000.00 and P150,000.00. Nicdao refuted the averment of petitioner Ching that prior to 1995, they had another transaction. With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to petitioner Ching. Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise admitted that the signatures thereon were hers while the amounts and payee thereon were written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of Vignette Superstore and authorized by her to do so. Respondent Nicdao clarified that, except for the P20,000,000.00 check, the other ten (10) checks were handed to Nuguid on different occasions. Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Respondent Nicdao said that she purposely left the checks undated because she would still have to notify Nuguid if she already had the money to fund the checks. After the said incident, respondent Nicdao was surprised to be notified by HSLB that her check in the amount of P20,000,000.00 was just presented to the bank for payment. She claimed that it was only then that she remembered that sometime in 1995, she was informed by her employee that one of her checks was missing. At that time, she did not let it bother her thinking that it would eventually surface when presented to the bank. Nicdao was acquitted in CA. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner Ching is entitled to civil aspect of the case even the criminal case has been decided in favor of the respondent 40

RULING No. In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code – ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him. For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that respondent Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching. The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her civil liability A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching. First, the CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right or interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said check," and that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22." Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. 41

On the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well. Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdao’s liability did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex contractu), however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence of these unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred from the following findings of the CA in its decision acquitting respondent Nicdao that the act or omission from which her civil liability may arise did not exist. On the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA found as follows: True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no. 002524 surfaced in the possession of complainant Ching who, in cahoots with his paramour Emma Nuguid, filled up the blank check with his name as payee and in the fantastic amount of P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and presented it to the bank on October 7, 1997, along with the other checks, for payment. Therefore, the inference that the check was stolen is anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. The fact already established is that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store, had access to said store. Moreover, the possession of a thing that was stolen , absent a credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen article is presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237 SCRA 664). 9. MANOLO P. SAMSON vs. REYNALDO B. DAWAY G. R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004 FACTS On March 7, 2002, two information for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. It is written there that above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinson’s Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC 42

On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. ISSUE Whether or not there is a prejudicial question of the said case RULING Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case, which as admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar. 10. REYNALDO V. TUANDA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G. R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995 FACTS On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively.

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Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives. On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC, docketed as Special Civil Action for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 July 1991. Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives in Civil Case entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of Local Government, et al." On 21 July 1991, a Criminal Case was filed before the Sandiganbayan entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners for refusing to pay despite demand the amount P95,350.00 and P108,900.00 representing respectively their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such undue injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes. On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Case pending . ISSUE Whether or not the legality or validity of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives (civil case) is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners RULING The issue in the civil case constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners. All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. 44

More importantly, the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal action. Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations were made in violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case. Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established. 11. MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000 FACTS Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a 45

criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the RPC against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. ISSUE Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife RULING Petitioner's contentions are untenable. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11 The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Art. 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs. Luna where this Court held that: . . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for 46

themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

IV. Marriage and Family Relations i. On Valid and Invalid Marriages 1. EDWIN A. ACEBEDO vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO A. M. No. P-94-1054 March 11, 2003 FACTS Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the MTC of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality.

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Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. By Memorandum, the OCA, disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without pay. Thus the OCA ratiocinates: . . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single man maintained relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with “sexual union”. Based on his testimony, we observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a “Kasunduan” or agreement entered into by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a court employee respondent should have known that said agreement was void despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separated from her husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an immoral relationship with a very much married woman and a co-court-employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees which provides that public employees of which respondent is one, xxx “ shall at times (sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and “sling mud” at complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant case. Respondent would have it appear that a married man with an extra-marital relation and an illegitimate child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another man. ISSUE Whether or not the Kasunduan is valid. RULING No. Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant’s wife with the spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was embodied in a “Kasunduan”, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:

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Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Broke’s (sic) Point, Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod: 1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman; Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties. 2. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR A. M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 FACTS Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation. 49

ISSUE Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct." RULING No. Applying benevolent neutrality recognizes, government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC. Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice. 3. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY vs. NLRC and GRACE DE GUZMAN G. R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997 FACTS On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that 50

memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for nonpayment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. ISSUE Whether or not the policy is valid. RULING No. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

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4. MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA G. R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004, FACTS After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture. On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the RTC, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following: b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each. In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the RTC, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. During the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. ISSUE Whether or not the decision of the lower court is valid. RULING Invalid. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: 52

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38 A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. 5. LEONCIA and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 FACTS Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate. They had an older brother, Gavino, who predeceased their parents. Private respondents brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that they are entitled to the 1/3 share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue. The mayor of Asturias, Cebu testified that he had attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomaoas officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. A family friend of private respondents also testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence, in the presence of his wife. (This 53

contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house.) He said that he was the one who made the coffin of Gavino and the coffin of the couple's son who died when he was six. Catalina Ubas testified that after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together and begot three children. She stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated. Private respondents produced a certificate that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war. The CFI of Cebu City declared private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitling them to inherit from their grand parents. The CA affirmed the decision of the CFI. It held that petitioners failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate. ISSUE Whether or not testimonial evidence is a competent proof to prove that fact of marriage. RULING Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents. In Pugeda v. Trias, the SC held that in the absence of the record of marriage, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses are competent to prove the marriage. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in 54

infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. 6. RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007 FACTS A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against private respondent alleging that he and respondent, without securing a marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall to look for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them. The fixer arranged their wedding before a certain Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. They got married on December 8, 1982 at the stairs of the Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license appearing on the marriage contract is a sham because it was procured from Carmona, Cavite where he nor the private respondent was a resident of the place. Petitioner also alleged that the certification states that the Marriage License number is 7054133 while the marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number. Private respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Private respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong City. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit. The RTC of Makati dismissed the petition. The CA affirmed the RTC and held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued 55

and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent is void on the ground of lack of marriage license. RULING The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. There is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The parties utilized the same marriage license during their church wedding which bolsters the conclusion that the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the 56

civil wedding. Petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED. 7. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO G. R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001 FACTS During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño. SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; and 2) a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that there is no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, thereby ordering Susan Nicdao to pay the former half of the amount that was paid to her in the form of death benefits from the death of Santiago Carino. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the marriage between the deceased and the petitioner is valid. 2. Whether or not the marriage between the deceased and the respondent is valid. 3. Whether or not the respondent has a better right over the petitioner with respect to the death benefits of the deceased. RULING Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a 57

final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. But petitioner avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. However, it does not follow that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to Susan Yee. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. 58

8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE A. DAYOT G. R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008 FACTS On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall that was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC of Binan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of a government agency. The RTC dismissed the Complaint. Jose's claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote the latter’s name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. In his company I.D., he wrote the name of Felisa as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. The CA affirmed the RTC. Jose filed a Motion for Recon alleging that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false. The CA reversed its earlier decision and declared the marriage between Jose and Felisa void ab initio because of the absence of marriage license. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the CA’s Amended Decision be reversed and set aside. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review (G.R. No. 179474) similarly assailing the CA's Amended Decision. The Court consolidated the two Petitions. ISSUE Whether or not the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. 59

RULING The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation cannot be dispensed with. This requirement partakes of a mandatory character. The declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.

9. ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG G. R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000 FACTS 60

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. The RTC of Toledo City, Cebu, dismissed the petition. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio. 2. Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death. RULING The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of 61

the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife. Therefore, the second marriage is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party that is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible and can be collaterally attacked. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, for the purpose of remarriage. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 10. HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ A. M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001 FACTS Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999. Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966. On 22 March 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. Respondent Judge claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their 62

joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. In their separate affidavits executed and sworn to before respondent Judge, Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. And that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage between Manzano and Payao properly fall under the marriage contemplated in Article 34 of the Family Code. RULING Article 34 of the Family Code provides: No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not 63

serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The recommendation of the Court Administrator is ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000. 11. REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO G. R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008 FACTS Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. To push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Respondent gave birth to a child. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the RTC of Pasig City. She alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and their child. Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child. The RTC ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it 64

declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA. The CA denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the partie’s marriage. Petitioner stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. ISSUE Whether or not the false affidavit executed by the parties affects the validity of their marriage. RULING Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio. Petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC is REINSTATED.

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12. HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, et al. vs. ROLANDO SY, et al. G. R. No. 114217 October 13, 2009 FACTS Respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then CFI of Quezon. Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan. Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties, including several businesses. On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bang’s death in 1971 until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widow’s allowance by the parties in possession and control of her husband’s estate, or her share in the conjugal partnership. The Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance was granted by the Court. Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court). During the trial, petitioners stressed that Sy Bang’s marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void. They claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts into believing that Rosita’s marriage to Sy Bang is valid. A DOJ Resolution finding probable cause to file the falsification charges against respondents was issued. On the strength of the DOJ resolution, petitioners contended that the criminal cases for falsification expose Rosita as a mere common-law wife and not a “widow”; hence, there is no legal justification to give her the widow’s allowance. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage between Sy Bang and Rosita Ferrera is valid. RULING 66

A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of falsification against respondents. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang. 13. MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO A. M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002 FACTS Petitioner charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law because he solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations. Respondent judge averred that he was requested by Juan Arroyo to solemnize the marriage of the parties. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the MTC of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Arroyo requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, instead of having it in Balatan because of the health condition of Orobia, to which request he acceded. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him on the same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala. Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license.

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Petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. The Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage. ISSUES 1. Whether or not a marriage solemnized by a judge outside its territorial jurisdiction is valid. 2. Whether or not the subsequent issuance of marriage license cures the defect of lack of marriage license. RULING Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. As held by the SC in Navarro vs. Domagtoy, “a priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability." In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the SC held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he 68

solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. 14. ZENAIDA S. BESO vs. JUDGE JUAN DAGUMAN A. M. No. 99-1211 January 28, 2000 FACTS Complainant charged respondent judge with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar. Complainant alleges that she and her fiancé, Bernardito Yman, got married and their marriage was solemnized by respondent judge in his residence of J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar. After their wedding, her husband abandoned her without any reason at all. When she inquired about their Marriage Contract, the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City informed her that their marriage was not registered. She was also informed by respondent judge that all the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by her husband and that no copy was retained by respondent judge. Respondent Judge averred that the civil marriage had to be solemnized by in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar because he was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margita. And that without prior appointment, the contracting parties unexpectedly came to his residence, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on that specific date, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties. ISSUE 1. Whether or not a marriage celebrated outside of the territorial jurisdiction of a judge is valid. 69

2. Whether or not respondent judge is negligent in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the Local Civil Registrar. RULING Article 8 of the Family Code clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. Respondent Judge should be reminded that — A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. Article 23 of the Family Code states that “it is the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.” 15. MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS vs. BRIX FERRARIS 70

G. R. No. 162368

July 17, 2006

FACTS On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit. Thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. The petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error. Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage in this case should be annulled based on psychological incapacity. RULING No. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. 16. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LYNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO G. R. No. 171042 June 30, 2008 FACTS 71

On August 12, 1997, Respondent Lynette contracted marriage to Martini. Less than three (3) years later respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Martini’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-70 of the Family Code. Respondent presented a psychological evaluation report by Dr. Gerong, a clinical psychologist, stating that Martini shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-centered motive. This situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and incurable because personality and character are stable whether it is normal and adaptive. The RTC found Martini psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and that the same incapacity existed at the time the couple exchanged their marriage vows. The Solicitor General, via appeal, challenged before the Court of Appeals (CA) the trial court’s decision. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition for review is filed. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage between respondent Lynette and Martini is null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. RULING The Supreme Court ruled that the marriage between respondent Lynette and Martini valid because respondent failed to prove the psychological incapacity of the latter. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the defendant by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence presented during trial by private respondent must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity. Psychological Incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about t assume. The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. Moreover, does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological illness, which insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Respondent’s marriage with martini 72

may have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented. 17. EONILO ANTONIO versus MARIE IVONNE F. REYES G. R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 FACTS This is a landmark case on Psychological Incapacity which proclaims, under certain circumstances, habitual lying as constitutive of psychological incapacity which may lead to nullity of marriage. The petitioner-husband claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. ISSUE Whether or not repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity of the respondent RULING Yes. The Court acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. The case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitioners for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. Respondent’s ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior “of perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations,” of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 73

18. RENNE ENRIQUE BIER vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER G. R. No. 173294 February 27, 2008 FACTS On July 26, 1992, petitioner Renne Enrique Bier married with the herein respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier after six months of courtship. As petitioner was based in Saudi Arabia, the parties decided to maintain two residences, one in the Philippines and another in Saudi Arabia. Everything went well for the first three years of their marriage. However, after three years thereof, the couple experiencing marital problems as respondent ceased to be the person petitioner knew and married. According to the petitioner, respondent started becoming aloof towards the later and began to spend more time with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her husband's needs and the upkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife. After being gone from their home for days on end, she would return without bothering to account for her absence. As a result, they frequently quarreled. Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since. Hence, this petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations to petitioner. ISSUE Whether the totality of the evidence presented was enough to establish that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. RULING The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Petitioner was able to establish that respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a happygo-lucky woman who failed to attend to her husband's needs and who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of her acts, as testified to by petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chainsmoking, failure or refusal to meet one's duties and responsibilities as a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as opposed to physical) illness. The Court has been consistent in holding that if a petition for nullity based on psychological 74

incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved. These must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This is specially so since the Family Code does not define psychological incapacity. The determination thereof is left solely to the discretion of the courts and must be made on a case-to-case basis. 19. EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIEREZ YU-TE G. R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009 FACTS On January 1996 when petitioner was a sophomore and respondent, a freshman met in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then attracted to Rowena’s friend; but as the latter had already a boyfriend, the young man courted Rowena. Sharing the same angst towards their families, the two understood one another and develop a degree of closeness towards each other. On March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he has young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. However, Edward’s money lasted only for a month, the two decided to go back to Manila on April 1996 since they could not find a job. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward in his parents’ home. While they were separated Rowena kept on calling Edward threatening him that she would commit suicide, thus Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought them to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old and she 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s house where Edward was treated like a prisoner- he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. When Edward got the chance to talk to his brother, the latter persuade him to go home. Edward relayed the message to Rowena; however Rowena suggested that he should get his inheritance so they could leave separately. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. 75

On June 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The trial court, on June 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity? RULING The court ruled that the seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered it find as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness: and, thus rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make decisions without advice from the others, allows others most of his important decisions, such as where to live, tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has a difficulty doing things on his own. The same may also be said to respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorders makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This findings takes into account her disregard of the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by the society. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void. 20. BENJAMIN TING vs. CARMEN VELEZ-TING G. R. No. 166652 March 31, 2009 FACTS Petitioner and Respondent met during medical school sometime in 1972 and got married on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City . They begot six [6] children during their marriage. 76

After being married to petitioner for more than eighteen [18] years, respondent filed a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on October 21, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that petitioner suffers from psychological incapacity even from the time of celebration of their marriage, which only became manifested thereafter through the petitioner’s alcoholism, violent nature brought about by excessive drinking, compulsive gambling habits which led him to sell their family car and a property, and the petitioner’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure to support his family. Respondent presented as witness a certain Dr. Oňate, a psychiatrist, who, instead of conducting the usual interview, evaluated the petitioner through only the transcript of stenographic notes taken during petitioner’s deposition. The psychiatrist concluded that the petitioner’s compulsive drinking, gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that he suffers from a personality disorder. On his side, petitioner presented Dr. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center , as his expert witness. Dr. Obra evaluated petitioner’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by a Dr. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa , and Dr. Obra’s interview with petitioner’s brothers. Contrary to Dr. Oňate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. The Regional Trial Court nevertheless declared the marriage null and void which was also lastly upheld by the Court of Appeals upon appeal. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Were the lower court and the Court of Appeals correct in declaring the marriage null and void by the basis that respondent’s presented evidence is sufficient enough to support the ground of psychological incapacity? RULING The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The totality of evidence adduced by the respondent is insufficient to prove that the petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband even during the time their marriage was celebrated. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is to assume. In the case at bar, respondent failed to prove that the 77

petitioner’s defects were already existent at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, petitioner was known to occasionally drink and gamble with his friends, but such statement by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduce that such defects are incurable. The two psychiatrists presented as expert witnesses provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations. Nevertheless, great weight should be given unto the report of Dr. Obra because, aside from analyzing the petitioner’s depositions, he went the extra mile by taking into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist based in South Africa , as well as conducting personal interviews with the petitioner’s brothers. The balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra. It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. In this case, presumption has not been simply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail. Petition GRANTED. 21. LESTER BENJAMIN HALILI vs. CHONA SANTOS- HALILI G. R. NO. 165424 JUNE 9, 2009 FACTS Petitioner Lester Benjamin Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona Santos- Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the RTC, Pasig City, Br. 158. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a “joke.” After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decide to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not “fake.” Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioner’s personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It declared the marriage null and void. It was reversed by the CA and affirmed by the SC. However, the SC recognized the motion for reconsideration they filed. ISSUE Whether the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of petitioner. 78

RULING In the recent case of Te vs. Yu- Te and the Republic, this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case to case basisguided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as: [a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behaviour. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by other’s comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection. Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. It has been sufficiently established that petitioner has a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long- term concerns, and thus therapy may be long- term. Particularly, personality disorders are “long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.” From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void. 22. MARIETTA AZCUETA vs. REPUBLIC AND CA G. R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009 FACTS Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Marietta complained that 79

despite her encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always depended on his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he would follow her. He did not. Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, independent, focused, and responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-confidence, constant selfdoubt, and inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, was always out of the house. She added that the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage. She stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his personality. She, thus, concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio. The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based solely on the information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged psychological disorder was present at the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and incurable. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage to Marietta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. 80

RULING Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio. Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain finding of psychological incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn there from by her expert witness. The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by-product of his upbringing and family life. Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals ‘opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not wanting a child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that 81

at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder. A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te,supra)One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of Article36 of the Family Code. This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorders automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply ingrained in his system since his early years. 23. DIGNA A. NAJERA vs. EDUARDO J. NAJERA G. R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009 FACTS Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency. While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live. When he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with 82

another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words†against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk. Respondent filed his Answer wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance. The RTC issued an Order terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties. The RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC. ISSUE Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and 83

unreliable. Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testimony. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 24. ROWENA PADILLA-RAMBAUA vs. EDWARD RAMBAUA G. R. 166738 August 14 2009 FACTS Petitioner had a secret marriage with respondent because the latter's parents are against their relationship. The parties lived together as husband and wife for the first six months of their marriage, after which, the respondent insisted to live apart allegedly because it might affect the respondents application for PAL scholarship where, the respondent stated “single” regarding his status and, in order to avoid public knowledge about their marriage as such marriage may antagonize the respondents parents. The parents of respondent, particularly his mother discovered about the secret marriage and the parties continued to live separately in order to appease respondents mother. Subsequently, respondent failed to send greeting cards to petitioner or even greet her a happy birthday. Later on, the respondents mother died and he blamed the petitioner for allegedly causing the death of his mother due to ill feelings towards them. When petitioner and her mother visited respondent in Davao, they found out that respondent have been cohabiting with another woman. Petitioner then filed an action to render null and void the marriage between her and the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity considering the pronouncement of a clinical psychologist, Dr. Tayag, which states that respondent have a narcissistic personality disorder which is declared to be grave, severe and incurable. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void due to psychological incapacity. This was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals stating that “the illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage”. Hence, this present action. 84

ISSUE Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated, whether or not the OSG certification under the case of Republic vs. Molina is indispensable and whether or not the deficiency of Dr. Tayags report was cured by his testimony. RULING PETITION DENIED. RATIO DECEDENDI: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes and Navales v. Navales have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit. In santos vs. Santos, it was held that am action based on psychological incapacity must be characterized by a.) gravity b.) incurability and c.) juridical antecedence. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997. In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or 85

emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later. With regard to Dr. Tayag's testimony, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case. Further, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. 25. RODOLFO ASPILLAGA vs. AURORA ASPILLAGA G. R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009 FACTS Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication as lovers. In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was “tumultuous.” He described Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave 86

her plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with Besina. During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his psychiatric evaluation of the parties as well as his recommendation that the petition be granted. In this report, he stated that both petitioner and respondent harbor psychological handicaps which could be traced from unhealthy maturational development. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage. Dr. Maaba recommended that the petition to annul the marriage be granted, on the grounds existing psychological incapacitation of both petitioner and respondent, which will hamper their capacity to comply with their marital obligations. Dissolution of the marital bond will offer both of them, peace of mind. RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. ISSUE Whether the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity RULING The petition failed. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to link the parties’ psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper (as Dr. Maaba puts it) their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each party’s condition is so grave or is of such nature as to render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent. 87

Noteworthy, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983, showing love and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other. From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfo’s acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail. At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. 26. VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR vs. REY ALCAZAR G. R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009 FACTS Veronica and Rey were married on August 22, 2009. After the wedding the couple lived for five days at the residence of the respondent in Occidental Mindoro, when they returned to Manila the respondent did not stay with the petitioner until the former left for Saudi Arabia few months following their wedding. In abroad the respondent never communicated with the petitioner and the telephone calls of the latter were even rejected by the respondent. After one and a haft year in abroad the respondent returned to the country without even informing the petitioner as to his whereabouts. Veronica filed an action to annul her marriage with the respondent under article 45 (5) of the Family Code. As a ground the petitioner alleged that the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply his marital obligation. The lower court dismissed the petition because it was not established that at least one of the spouses is either physically or mentally ill to comply the marital obligations. ISSUE Whether or not the respondent in psychologically incapacitated to comply his marital obligations. RULING Petition was dismissed. Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual 88

intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. No evidence was presented that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. 27. ROSA YAP PARAS vs. JUSTO J. PARAS G. R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007 FACTS In 1964, Rosa Yap married Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They had four children. Twenty-nine years after Rosa filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. RTC rendered a decision upholding the validity of the marriage on the grounds that Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary;and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Justo filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which the latter affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC on the ground that Justo’s alleged defects or idiosyncracies were sufficiently explained by the evidence, therefore, not enough ground to taint the validity of their marriage. ISSUE Whether or not the totality of evidence presented shall be sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo to justify the annulment of marriage RULING The petition was denied. The grounds raised by petitioner were 89

insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. As provided under the law, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment. The evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. 28. NILDA V. NAVALES vs. REYNALDO NAVALES G. R. No. 167523 June 27, 2008 FACTS Petitioner filed a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA & RTC, Toledo City, Cebu. It was in 1986 that Reynaldo met Nilda in a local bar where Nilda was a waitress. Because of his fear that Nilda may be wed to an American, Reynaldo proposed to Nilda and they got married in 1988. Reynaldo is aware that Nilda has an illegitimate child out of wedlock. The 1st year of their marriage went well until Nilda began to work when she neglected some of her duties as a wife. She later worked as a gym instructor and according to Reynaldo’s allegations; her job makes her flirt with her male clients. She also drives home with other guys even though Reynaldo would be there to fetch her. She also projected herself as single. And she refused to have a child with Reynaldo because that would only destroy her figure. Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be annulled. He presented her cousin as a witness that attested that Nilda was flirting with other guys even with Reynaldo’s presence. Reynaldo also presented the 90

findings of a psychologist who concluded that based on Nilda’s acts, Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nilda’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo. Nilda on her part attacked Reynaldo’s allegations. She said that it is actually Reynaldo who is a womanizer and that in fact she has filed a case of concubinage against him which was still pending. She also said that she only needs the job in order to support herself because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She also showed proof that she projected herself as a married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to females only. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity RULING No, she was not psychologically incapacitated. Thus, the petition must be granted because there were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or Office of the Solicitor General and no contradicting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. And even if the SC would consider the case based on the merits, the petition would still be granted. The acts presented by Reynaldo are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. The SC also finds the finding of the psychological expert to be insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Nilda. The testimonies presented by people the expert interviewed were not concretely established as the fact as to how those people came up with their respective information was not as well shown. There is no proof as well that Nilda had had sex with different guys – a condition for nymphomia. There being doubt as to Nilda’s psychological incapacity the SC ruled that this case be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.

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29. REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA G. R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 FACTS In 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never hones with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrel between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE Whether or not irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity RULING There is no clear showing that psychological defect spoken of is incapacity. It appears to more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable difference and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological not physical illness. The interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down: 1. burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff 2. root cause of phsychological incapacity must be:a. medically or clinically identified b.alleged in the complaint c. sufficiently proven by experts d.clearly explained in the decision 3.Incapacity must exist at the time of marriage 4. Incapacity must be incurable 5. Gravity of illness disables the party to assume the essential marital obligations. 6.The essential marital obligations are those in Articles 68-71, and Arts. 220,221 and 225 of the Family Code 7.Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church should be given great respect 8.Prosecution and Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State. 30. IMELDA BOBIS VS ISAGANI BOBIS G. R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000 FACTS Petitioner Imelda filed a complaint on bigamy against Isagani Bobis. They were married on January 25, 1996. Unknown to her, he had previous marriage with Maria Dulce Javier on October 21, 1985 without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated. There was also a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Sometime thereafter, 92

respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She argued that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage in as much as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code. ISSUE Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy RULING No. There was clear intent on the part of the respondent to invoke the issue of prejudicial question in order to escape the bigamy case filed against him. Where the law provides that when there are two marriages; a first marriage and a subsequent marriage were it not for the presence of the first marriage, the subsequent marriage could have been valid. Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. When respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his, criminal prosecution. Pursuant Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. 31. VERONICO TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004 93

FACTS Letecia Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against Veronico Tenebro. Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Tenebro countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence, he cannot be charged for bigamy. ISSUES 1. Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. 2. Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of Tenebro's second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity resulted to bigamy as not having been committed RULING Yes. Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. The law penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential and formal. In this case, all the essential and 94

formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. 32. VICTORIA JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009 FACTS In1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy on November 26, 1979. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant annulment of marriage. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy. Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, declaration of nullity of their marriage. On July 9, 2001, the court a quo finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the same court. On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. In the meantime, petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo was declared null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, the CA denied reconsideration. ISSUE Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible in proceeding with the case despite the pendency of a case which is prejudicial to the outcome of the case. RULING It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void; the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. A plain reading of 95

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 33. ARTHUR TE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000 FACTS Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella. Private respondent filed an information charging petitioner with bigamy at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. Petitioner’s motions were denied by the RTC and confirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE Whether or not the criminal and administrative cases filed against Arthur Te be suspended pending the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage. RULING The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to 96

private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 34. SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004 FACTS Salvador married Narcisa Arceno on September 18, 1967. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan to work, while her marriage with Savador still subsisting, the latter contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Biñas before Judge Panontongan in San Mateo , Rizal on January 10, 1989. When she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home, she returned to the Philippines in 1992. An annulment case was filed by Savador against Narcisa and subsequently, a case of bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. The RTC of Makati granted Salvador a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Narcisa. While on May 18, 2001, the RTC of San Mateo , Rizal rendered a decision convicting Salvador for bigamy which on appeal, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE Whether Salvador contracted a subsequent marriage with Zenaida while his first marriage with Narcisa was still subsisting. RULING The subsequent marriage was contracted while the first marriage was still subsisting. It should be noted that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur, two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. For that reason, the petitioner’s assertion that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case, cannot be given due course since it would only delay the prosecution of bigamy. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one 97

which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 35. ANTONIA ARMAS vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO G. R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000 FACTS Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land, survived by his wife, Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James Bounds on January 13, 1946. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later on May 8, 1958, without Marietta having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of the late Teodorico Calisterio filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of Toedorico contending that the marriage between Marietta and Toedorico is null and void being bigamous. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas Jr., be appointed administrator of the estate, and the inheritance be adjudicated to her. RTC declared Antonia Armas as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico. Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Petitioner appealed. CA denied motion for reconsideration. ISSUE Whether or not the marriage of spouses Teodorico Calisterio and Marietta is null and void for being bigamous. RULING The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. 6 Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.

98

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

99

36. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005 FACTS Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. Alan and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, Lea arrived home late in the evening and always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work , Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan went to the house of Lea’s parents, but he was told that she was not there. Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his and Lea’s friends of latter whereabouts but to no avail. Alan left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth, Lea's friend . He decided to work as a part-time taxi driver so that during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed. On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001. After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC. ISSUE Whether or not Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead and failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. RULING Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads: 100

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC. In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead. 37. EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G. R. No.165842 November 29, 2005 FACTS July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City in January 1996. Tina was then twenty one (21) years old a Computer Secretarial student while Eduardo was thirty nine (39). Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. Tina and Eduardo were married on April 22, 1996. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single.” The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support. Tina made inquiries from the NSO in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. For his part, Eduardo testified that Tina is a GRO and he informed her of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was “single” in his 101

marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. The RTC and CA held petitioner guilty of bigamy under Art 349 of the RPC. Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse. ISSUE Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. RULING The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that “in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.” For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. The judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense. In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. 38. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC. vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON G. R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006 102

FACTS April 25, 1955, Clemente Bailon contracted marriage with Alice P. Diaz in Barcelona Sorosogon. October 9, 1970, more than 15 years later, Clemente filed a petition with the RTC to declare Alice presumptively dead, which was granted by the RTC. August 18, 1983, Bailon contracted another marriage with Teresita Jarque the respondent. January 30, 1988, Bailon who was a member and a retiree pensioner died. Teresita filed a claim for funeral benefits and additional death benefits which were granted by the SSS. Cecilia Bailon Yap, who claimed to be the daughter of Bailon and Elisa Jayona contested before SSS the release ti Teresita the funeral and death benefits. Cecilia claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother, and the third with Teresita. Elisa and seven of her children filed claims for death benefits as Bailon's beneficiaries. SSS legal unit recommended the cancellation of payment of death and pension benefit to Teresita. Teresita filed a petition for the restoration of the monthly pension. SSS on its resolution found that the marriage of Bailon to Teresita was void. SSS holds that Teresita is not the legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Bailon. Teresita filed motion for reconsideration having been denied she filed petition for review before CA. CA reversed the order of SSS. SSS and SSC file motion for reconsideration which was denied. ISSUE Whether SSS thru SSC can validly declare the marriage between respondent and Bailon null and void. RULING The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The SSC is empowered to settle the controversy with respect to the SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. But, in exercising such prerogative, it cannot review or reverse the decision rendered by court, as it did in this case. The law does not grant the SSC such power. Furthermore, since the marriages involved in this case were contracted prior to the enactment of the Family Code, the governing law shall be the Civil Code. Under the law, any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than the such first spouse shall be illegal unless the first spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, or if the absentee is generally considered dead an believed to be so by the 103

spouse present at the time of the second marriage or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The subsequent marriage shall be valid until declared null and void by competent court. Thus, where a person has entered two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the person attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved. It bears noting that the voidable marriage can be assailed only by direct proceeding. As such, such marriage can only be assailed during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case, the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify the marriage between the respondent and Bailon prior to the death of the latter, respondent was rightfully the dependent spouse of Bailon and, thus, entitled to all the benefits granted by SSS. 39. ANGELITA VALDEZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009 FACTS Angelita Valdez and Sofio married on January 11, 1971. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect. That was the last time they saw each other, after that she didn't hear any news from Sofio. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.3 Subsequently, however, Virgilio's application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner's marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. The RTC rendered its Decision on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the wellgrounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." Petition filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC denied the motion. ISSUE Whether or not RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove a “well-founded belief” that Sofio was already dead. 104

RULING It can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner's marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner's capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states: "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio's death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid. 40. FEDERICO SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY G. R. No. 132524 December 29, 1988 FACTS On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio allegedly for parricide and in retaliation, Emilio filed before the CFI a complaint for legal separation, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads: 105

WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the record that the question of the case and custody of the three children have been the subject of another case between the same parties in another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case. On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will. Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina Suntay. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld. ISSUES 1. In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail? 2. Was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage? 3. Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child? RULING Petition dismissed . Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void 106

marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”

41. FILIPINA SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000 FACTS Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity and cited as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed 107

from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. The RTC denied the petition. Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner now raises for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. According to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and 2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. RULING A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. As a rule litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of instances, the Court has relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. Certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. This case requires that the court to address the issue of the validity of the marriage between the parties which petitioner claims is void from the 108

beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required is a declaration of their effects according to existing law. Pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent is rendered moot and academic by the court’s conclusion that the marriage is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Note: Habitual alcoholism, refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy one don’t constitute psychological incapacity. It falls short of the quantum of evidence. The petition is GRANTED. The marriage is declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. 42. ANTONIA ARMAS vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO G. R. No. 136467 April6, 2000 FACTS Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land, survived by his wife, Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James Bounds on January 13, 1946. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on February 11, 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later on May 8, 1958, without Marietta having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of the late Teodorico Calisterio filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of Toedorico contending that the marriage between Marietta and Toedorico is null and void being bigamous. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas Jr., be appointed administrator of the estate, and the inheritance be adjudicated to her. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner is considered as the compulsory heir. RULING

109

It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta which would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta , no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. 43. OFELIA P. TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000 FACTS Private respondent seeks for the nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner on the ground that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married Ofelia P. Ty, he has a subsisting marriage with Anna Maria Regina Villanueva. Reyes contracted two marriages. His first marriage Villanueva was on March 29, 1977 thru a civil ceremony and they had their church wedding on August 27 of the same year. Prior to the grant for declaration of nullity for his first marriage, respondent Reyes contracted a subsequent marriage with herein petitioner, Ty, on April 4, 1979 in a civil ceremony and a church wedding on April 4, 1982. It was only on August 4, 1980 wherein the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared the marriage of Reyes and Villanueva as null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. Likewise, their church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. On the other hand, petitioner in her defense, submitted their marriage license 5739990 issued at Rosario , Cavite on April 3, 1979 so as to disprove the contention of Reyes that their marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. She likewise presented the court decision rendering private respondent and Villanueva’s marriage as null and void. ISSUE Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly.

RULING 110

The marriage between herein petitioner and private respondent was celebrated in 1977, whereby the applicable law at that time was Article 83 of the Civil Code. However, as to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting. Nonetheless, since the second marriage of private respondent was entered into 1979, the Court applied the prevailing rule in the cases of Odayat vs. Amante, People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon . The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid. Moreover, the Court held that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. 44. Lucio Morigo vs. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 FACTS Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After that school year of 1977-78, they lost contact with each other. Six years after, Lucio Morigo receive a card from Lucia Barrete. After an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. They maintained constant communication. After six years of becoming sweethearts, both agreed to get married, thus they were married. Lucia reported back to her work abroad leaving appellant Lucio behind. Almost a year after of their marriage, Lucia filed abroad a petition for divorce against petitioner which was granted by the court. Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago. Later, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The complaint seek among others, the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Petitioner was charged with Bigamy. The RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner guilty of bigamy discounting petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio and ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy, that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again and that the court of a country were divorce was obtained by Lucia in which neither of the spouses is domiciled has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties as such, it is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Meanwhile on appeal, 111

declaration of nullity was granted which became final and executory. Despite declaration of nullity, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court ruling that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy. RULING The Court ruled that petitioner did not commit bigamy hence, petition is granted. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. In this case, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete as declared in the trial court that the marriage is void ab initio which means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married . Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Hence, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. There is no marriage ceremony at all was also performed, in the instant case, by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. Thus, petitioner has not committed bigamy.

ii. On Marriages Celebrated Abroad 45. GRACE GARCIA vs. REDERICK RECIO G. R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 FACTS On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce was issued by an Australian family court dissolving the marriage of respondent Rederick Recio, then Filipino and Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. He then married petitioner Grace Garcia, a Filipina on January 12, 1994. On March 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy – 112

that respondent had a subsisting marriage when he married her. In the respondent’s answer, he contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On July 7, 1998, while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia. The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annul. ISSUES 1. Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven and; 2. Whether respondent was legally capacitated to marry petitioner RULING A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. The court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The proof is absent here. 46. WOLFGANG ROEHR vs. MARIA CARMEN RODRIGUEZ G. R. No. 142829 June 20, 2003 FACTS Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. On August 28, 1996, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Pending trial, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. Custody of the children was granted to petitioner. On May 20, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the 113

ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as a decree of annulment has already been promulgated. Motion to Dismiss was granted and respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration for the custody of the children and distribution of the properties. Petitioner contended that there is nothing to be done anymore in the case as there is already a decree of divorce promulgated by German court.

ISSUES Whether the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children, can be determined in our courts. RULING As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody. 47. PAULA T. LLORENTE vs. CA and ALICIA F. LLORENTE G. R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 FACTS Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in Camarines Sur in Feb 22, 1937. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a naturalized US citizen. Lorenzo discovered that petitioner had an adulterous relationship so he filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California and on December 4, 1952, the divorce became final. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente who had no knowledge of the first marriage and they lived together until his death on June 11, 1985. Upon learning of Lorenzo’s death, Paula filed a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favour contending that she is the surviving legitimate spouse. ISSUE 114

Whether the foreign divorce between petitioner Paula and the late Lorenzo is valid and if it capacitated him to remarry. RULING Citing Van Dorn v Romillo, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Also citing Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera, divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. The court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo Llorente from his wife Paula is valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

48. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 FACTS Cipriano Orbecido III married then Filipina, Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981. Cipriano’s wife left for the US and was naturalized as an American citizen after a few years. He then learned that his wife obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry. ISSUE Whether the petition for authority to remarry be granted? RULING When Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. 49. MARIA REBECCA MACAPUGAY BAYOT vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. Nos. 155635 & 163979 November 7, 2008 115

FACTS Vicente married Rebecca, an American Citizen on April 20, 1979, in Mandaluyong City. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic and on February 22, 1996, a decree dissolving their marriage was issued by the Dominican court, leaving them to “remarry after completing the legal requirements”. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca opposed on the motion to dismiss insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. Vicente who had in the interim contracted marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other one of which is the charge of bigamy against Vicente. The RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss and declared among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. CA granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss that Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having been previously dissolved by foreign divorce that Rebecca secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family code, such divorce restored Vicente’s capacity to contract another marriage. ISSUE Whether the divorce granted by the foreign court is valid. RULING Citing Garcia vs Recio, a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. The fact that Rebecca was an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that she presented a duly authenticated copy of the decree are, sufficient proofs for the admission of their divorce in our courts. As to Rebecca’s citizenship, the court can assume that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen but she was not yet a recognized Filipino citizen when she secured the judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic. The court pointed out that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. It is clear that Rebecca lacks a cause of action. With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her, thus there is no more marriage to be annulled.

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50. EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G. R. Nos. 133743 & 134029 February 6, 2007 FACTS Felicisimo contracted three marriages in his lifetime. The first predeceased him and the second, named Merry Lee, was an American citizen who was issued a Decree granting Absolute Divorce. Felicisimo then married respondent Felicidad Sagalongos-San Luis in California. He lived with her for 18 years until his death on December 18, 1992. Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate, alleging that she is widow. She prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children by his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still married to Merry Lee. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Unaware of the dismissal, respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the State of Hawaii to prove that Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. She claimed that Felicisimo had a legal capacity to marry following the decree of divorce. ISSUE Whether the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was valid, giving the respondent the legal capacity to file a petition for letters of administration. RULING The records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of the respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

iii. On Consequences of a Valid Marriage 117

a. On Legal Separation 51. ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ vs. SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ G. R. No. L-19565 January 30, 1968 FACTS The plaintiff, Estrella de la Cruz and the defendant, Severino de la Cruz, were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. The defendant started living in Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office instead of sleeping in the conjugal dwelling – although in the said year, he paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations. After 1955 up to the time of the trial (complaint was filed on July 22, 1958), the defendant had never visited the conjugal abode. In 1949, she began to suspect the existence of illicit relations between defendant and Nenita Hernandez. The defendant denied that he abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support. The defendant denied that he had a mistress. ISSUE Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties? RULING The word “abandon”, in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely. When referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been defined as “the act of a husband in voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake her entirely, never to return to her and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to claim his marital rights. In the case at bar, the court believes that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition for separation of property. This decision may appear to condone the husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of the husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of action. 118

52. CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO G. R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972 FACTS On August 18, 1953, Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio alleging that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman. She prayed among others, that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. In Eufemio’s answer to the petition, he counter-claimed a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with petitioner on the ground of a prior subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion. ISSUES Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action? RULING The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself -actio personalis moritur cum persona. When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead. As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 119

could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant. 53. BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ G. R. No. L-10033 January 31, 1972 FACTS Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there. Benjamin soon began receiving letters alleging acs of infidelity of his wife. On August 1952, he went to Asingan to meet with his wife and stayed with a cousin for 2 nights and 1 day as husbad and wife. The next day, Bugayong tried to verify the truth of the information he received but instead of answering his query, his wife merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of acts of infidelity imputed on her. On November 18, 1952, Bugayong filed a complaint for legel separation against his wife, Ginez, who in an answer, denied the averments of the complaint. The lower court dismissed the action alleging condonation of the charges of adultery. ISSUE Assuming arguendo that truth of the allegations of the commission of “acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery”, has the act charged been condoned by the plaintiff? RULING The act of the plaintiff in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. 120

54. ENRICO L PACETE vs. GLICERIO CARRIAGA G. R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994 FACTS On October 29, 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Enrico Pacete as well as legal separation of their property. She alleged that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato which she learned of only on Aug 1, 1979, and that Pacete fraudulently placed several pieces of property acquired during their marriage to Clarita and other “dummies”. The defendants were served summons but they failed to file a timely Answer. The court declared the defendants in default and ordered the issuance of a decree of legal separation and declared numerous amounts of property as part of the conjugal properties. ISSUE Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the decree of legal separation. RULING The default order unquestionably is not legally sanctioned. The Civil Code provides: Art. 101. “No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.” The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

b. On Rights and Duties of Husband and Wife 55. ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON 121

G. R. No. L-24259

August 30, 1968

FACTS Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married on February 14, 1953. To them were born four children, all alive. Respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed a complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself. However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorney’s succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of their children, support, and separation of property thus, they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding 6978 of the court of first instance. The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying their amicable settlement, read as follows: 4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject to judicial approval as required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines – the particular terms and conditions of their mutual agreement being as follows: (a) There will be separation of property – petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving any and all claims for a share in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since they have acquired no property of any consequence; (c) The custody of the two elder children name Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to petitioner Alfonso Lacson and th custody of the younger children named Gerrard and Ramon shall b awarded to petitioner CarmenSan Jose- Lacson; (d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of P300.00 for the support of the children in her custody. Finding the foregoing joint petition to be “conformable to law” the CFI issued an order rendering judgment approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. Thereafter, respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that she “entered into and signed the Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of the minor children who are all below the age of 7,” and thereafter prayed that she be considered relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children and that since all the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmed pendent lite” but the petitioner spouse opposed the said 122

motion and moved to dismiss the complaint based, among other things, on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens in which the JDRC issued an order dismissing the case. The respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the CA wherein she raised, among others, the issue of validity or legality of the compromise agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor children. CA certified the said appeal to the SC since no hearing on the facts was ever held in the court below – no evidence, testimonial or documentary, presented – only a question of law tends resolution in the appeal.” The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the compromise judgment rendered by the CFI, wherein she also alleged, among others, that she entered into a joint petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of her minor children and to relieve her from the said agreement. The petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and filed a motion for execution of the compromised judgment in which the CFI denied the respondent spouse’s motion for reconsideration and granted the petitioner spouse’s motion for execution. The respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the CA wherein she likewise questioned the validity or legality of her agreement with the petitioner spouse respecting custody of their children. The court of Appeals also certified the said appeal to the SC since no evidence of any kind was introduced before the trial court and appellant did not specifically ask to be allowed to present evidence on her behalf.” The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari proceedings before the CA averring that the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in the excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the compromised judgment, thus in effect depriving her of the right to appeal. She prayed for (1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein and any person acting under them from enforcing, by contempt proceeding and other means, the writ of execution (2) the setting aside, after hearing, of the compromise judgment and (3) the awarding of the custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to her, their mother. As prayed for, the CA issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction and grant the petition for certiorari and declaring null and void both (a) the compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 in so far as it relates to custody and right of visitation over the two children, Enrique and Teresa, and (b) the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of said judgment. The petitioner spouse moved to reconsider, but his motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.

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ISSUE Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law. RULING Supreme Court holds that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus, the new Civil Code provides: In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriages shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art. 190) The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as the conjugal partnership, so that any creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interest. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. (Art. 191, par. 4) In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the said arrangements. It is likewise undisputed that the court have been separated in fact for at least five years – the wife’s residence being in Manila, and the husband’s in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch as the lengthy separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is manifest. However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalized the de facto separation of the spouses, which gain in the language of Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo , is a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. We would like to douse the monetary seething emotions of couples who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquility brought about by mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion” without more would be minded to separate from each other. In this jurisdiction, the husband and 124

wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (art. 109, new civil code). There is therefore, virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples impelled by no better cause than their whims and caprices to abandon each other’s company. 56. CHI MING TSOI vs. CA and GINA LAO-TSOI G. R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 FACTS Herein petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi and herein private respondent Gina Lao-Tsoi got married on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros, Manila. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of the former’s mother where the slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. Thereafter, they went to baguio for four days but still no sexual intercourse transpired between then since the petitioner avoided the respondent, from may 22, 1988 to march 15,1999, the parties slept together in the same room and on the same bed but within the said period of time, there was no attempt of any sexual intercourse between them. In line with the same, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to a urologist where the respondent was found to be healthy, normal and still a virgin while that of her husband’s result were kept confidential. Respondent filed a petition for annulment of their marriage on the ground of Psychological Incapacity. She insist that petitioner is impotent and is a closet homosexual, moreover, she avers that he only married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. With this, she is not willing to reconcile with her husband. ON the other hand, petitioner says that he does not want his marriage with his wife to be annulled, while he admits that since their marriage until their separation, there was no sexual contact between them, he alleges that this was due to the avoidance on the part of his wife, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue as she was young and that there is still a chance for them to overcome their differences. Consequently, the trial court rendered a decision declaring their marriage VOID, the same was affirmed on appeal by the CA and the same goes with that his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not Petitioner and Respondent’s marriage was validly decreed to have been VOID on the ground of Psychological Incapacity. 125

RULING Yes. The declaration of the parties marriage to be Void of the ground of psychological incapacity was valid as the refusal of one of the parties to fulfill their essential marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “ To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. IN the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Moreover, neither the trial court nor the respondent court has made a findings on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial. It shows that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent, which is a shared feeling between husband and wife must be experienced not only having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital Union is two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at the time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. 57. NANCY GO, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 114791 May 29, 19997 FACTS Private respondent spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at the contract price of P 1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private respondent’s return.

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When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. Furious at the loss the tape which was supposed to be only record od their wedding, private respondents a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong. Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. RULING Affirmative. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code ( now Article 73 of the Family code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. IN the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produced effect only as between the parties who execute them. 58. MILAGROS JOAQUINO vs. LOURDES REYES G. R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004 FACTS Petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino had an illicit affair with the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes, with whom she bore three (3) children. The subject property located in Bf Homes, Paranaque was bought by Rodolfo Reyes and the petitioner, while in a common-law relationship, through a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance company payable in ten (10) years. On January 23, 1982, herein respondent Lourdes Reyes filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages before the CFI of Rizal, claiming that as a legitimate spouse of Rodolfo Reyes, the subject property should be declared part of the conjugal property. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Lourdes which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals likewise found that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the 127

filiations and successional rights of petitioner’s children since the complaint was an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and damages. Hence, the present petition where the petitioners avers that the trial court correctly ruled on the issue of filiations of her children, but erred in finding that the subject property was conjugal. ISSUE 1. Whether or not the subject property I conjugal 2. Whether or not the rulings on filiations and successional rights of the petitioner’s children were proper. RULING The petition is Denied. All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal, absent any proof that the same were exclusive properties of the husband or the wife. Matters relating to successional rights of filiations and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. 1. Yes, under Article 145of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and last until the legal union is dissolves by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by owned in common by the husband and wife. As to what constitute such properties are laid down in Articles 153 of the Civil Code which provides : “ (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriages at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one spouse; (2) That which obtained by industry, or work, or as a salary of the spouse, or either of them; (3) the fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.” Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all the properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to husband, or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. 2. No, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiations and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Sustaining the appellate court in Aglipay vs. Palang, this court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property. 59. ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA V. PALANG 128

G. R. No. 116668

July 28, 1997

FACTS Sometime on July 16, 1949, Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with private respondent Carlina Vallesterol at the Pzorrubio Roman Catholic church in Pangasinan. They begot a child named Herminia Palang. A few months after the wedding Miguel left to work in Hawaii and returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. On July 15, 1973, the then 63-year old Miguel contracted his second marriage with a 19-year old Erlinda Agapay herein petitioner. However, two months earlier, on May 17,1973 Miguel and Erlinda, as evidence, of Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 sq.m. Consequently, TCT No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names. A house and lot in Binalonan, pangasnan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT no. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name. Miguel and Erlnda’s cohabitation produced a son Kristopher Palang born on December 6,1977. In 1999 Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Herein private respondent Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Crus, instituted the case at bar an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda Agapay. ISSUE Whether or not Elinda’s ownership of the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation with Miguel is valid. RULING No. While Erlinda and Miguel contracted a marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If 129

the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares. 60. CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL G. R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001 FACTS Francisco Comille and his wife Sozima Montallano become the registered owner of Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Sozima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth of the property to Francisco. On July 26, 1961 Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Francisco and Cirila. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they lept with the same room, while Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francicsco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom only when the old man asks her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. A few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated “ Deed of Donation” Inter vivos in which he ceded a portion of lot 437-A consisting of 150sq.m, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268sq.m in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being in consideration of the faithful services Cirila Arcaba had rendered over the past ten (10) years, and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. ISSUE Whether or not the donation inter vivos made by Francisco to his commonlaw wife Cirila is Void. RULING Yes. In Bitangcor vs. Tan, we held that the term “cohabitation” or “living together as husband and wife” means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means 130

more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children. Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together a husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

c. On Property Relations and Concomitant Shared Obligations 61. LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN, et al. vs. CA, et al. G. R. No. 164401 June 25, 2008 FACTS In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sungga formed a partnership to engage in the marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. For convenience, the business, pursued under the name, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite), was registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto, albeit the partnership arrangement called for equal sharing of the net profit. After Jacinto’s death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sungga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua’s consent Chua’s subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file a complaint for Winding up of a partnership Affairs, Accounting, appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment of the RTC in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment finding for Chua, as plaintiff a quo. The RTC’s decision would subsequently be upheld by the CA. Via an Order dated January16, 2002, the RTC granted Chua’s motion for execution. Over a month later, the RTC acting on another motion of Chua, issued an amended writ of execution. It seems, however, that the amended writ of execution could not be immediately implemented, for, in an omnibus motion, Chua, inter alia, asked 131

the trial court to commission a certified public accountant (CPA) to undertake the accounting work and inventory of the partnership assets if petitioners refuse to do it within the time set by the court. Chua later moved to withdraw his motion and instead ask the admission of an accounting report prepared by CPA Cheryl A. Gahuman. In the report under the heading, Computation of Claims,” Chua’s aggregate claim, arrived at using the compounding-ofinterest method, amounted to Php 14,277,344.94. Subsequently, the RTC admitted and approved the computation of claims in view of petitioner’s failure and refusal, despite notice, to appear and submit an accounting report on winding uo of the partnership on the schedule hearings. After another lengthy proceedings, petitioners submitted their own CPAcertified valuation and accounting report. In it, petitioners limited Chua’s entitlement from winding up partnership affairs to an aggregate amount of PhP 3,154,736.65 only. Chua, on the other hand, submitted a new computation, this time applying simple interest on the various items covered by his claim. Under this methodology, Chua’s aggregate claim went down to PhP 8,733,644.75. The RTC issued a Resolution, rejecting the accounting of report of petitioners submitted, while approving the new computation of claims Chua submitted. ISSUE Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga-Chan with her husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Sunga-Chan. RULING The records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or after the affectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently provides: Art. 94. The absolute community property shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. Absent any indication otherwise, th use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on may 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband’s benefit. 62. CORAZON G. RUIZ vs. CA and CONSUELO TORRES G. R. No. 146942 April 22, 2003 132

FACTS Petitioner Ruiz obtained four loans from private respondent Consuelo Torres on different occasion. Prior to their maturity, the loans were consolidated under one (1) promissory note dated March 22, 1995. The consolidated loan of P750,000.00 was secured by a real estate mortgage and registered in the name of petitioner. The mortgage was signed by Corazon Ruiz for herself as an attorney-in-fact of her husband Rogello. Thereafter, petitioner obtained three (3) more loans from private respondent, under promissory note. From April 1995 to March 1996, petitioner paid the stipulated 3% monthly interest on the 750,000.00 loan, but after March 1996, petitioner was unable to make interest payments. Due to petitioner’s failure to pay the principal loan of 750,000.00 as well as the interest payment, so private respondent demanded payment thereof. But when petitioner failed to pay, private respondent sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the aforementioned real estate mortgage. Now, the public auction was schedule on Oct. 8,1996. One (1) day before the schedule auction sale, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of QC, with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale and to fix her indebtedness to private respondent to P706,000.00. the trial court granted the prayer for the issuance of a TRO, and on 29 October, 1996, issued a preliminary injunction. In its decision dated May 19, 1997, it ordered the Clerk of court and Ex- Officio Sheriff to desist with the foreclosure sale of the subject property, and it made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. It held that the real estate mortgage is unenforceable because of the lack of participation and signature of petitioner’s husband. It noted that although the subject real estate mortgage stated that petitioner was “ attorney-in-fact for herself and her husband, the Special Power of Attorney was never presented in the court during trial. The trial court further held that the promissory note in question is a unilateral contract of adhesion drafted by private respondent. It struck down the contract as repugnant to public policy because it was imposed by a dominant bargaining party (private respondent) on a weaker party (petitioner). Nevertheless, it held that petitioner still has the obligation to pay the private respondent. Private respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated July 21,1997. Private respondent appealed to the CA. The appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the real estate mortgage is valid despite the non-participation of petitioner’s husband in its execution because the land on which it was constituted is paraphernal property of petitioner-wife. Consequently, she may encumber the lot without the consent of her husband. It allowed its foreclosure since the loan its secured was not paid. Nonetheless, the appellate court declared as invalid the 10% compounded monthly interest 133

and the 10% surcharge per month stipulated in the promissory notes, and o too the 1% compounded monthly interest stipulated in the promissory note dated 21 April 1995, for being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and contrary to morals. It held that the legal rate of interest of 12% per annun shall apply the maturity dates of the notes until full payment of the entire amount due and that the only permissible rate of surcharge is 1% per month, without compounding. ISSUE Whether the real property covered by the subject deed of mortgage dated March 20, 1995 is paraphernal property of petitioner. RULING Yes. The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such presumption can apply, it must first be established that the property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar. Thus, on the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that said property was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property. Since there I no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone I determinative of its nature as paraphernal, belonging exclusively to said spouse. 63. JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993 FACTS Sometime on July27, 1927, alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday, with whom he had three (3) children, namely Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home and he forewith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Balcodero. Three years later, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdallena Estate, Inc. In the deed he indicated his civil status as married to Josefa R. Bosing the common-law wife. In a letter in which he addressed to Magdallena Estate, Inc. he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his wife Josefa R. Bosing. The final deed of sale was executed by Magdallena Estate Inc, on October 24, 1959. A few days later TCT No. 48790 was issued in the name of Josefa Bosing.

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On June 6, 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died sometime on March 1967. About three years later Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extra judicial partition and sale of a lot in question, which was there described as “conjugal property of Josefa and deceased Alayo. In the deed Josefa’s supposed onehalf (1/2) interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her ¼ interest as heir was conveyed to Josephine for a consideration, thereby completing for herself, along with her own one-fourth (1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full ownership of property. ISSUE Whether or not the property in question can be reconveyed. RULING Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted. As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code (Margaret Maxey vs. CA). In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry (Jeroniza vs. Jose). The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights(Article 256,FC). 64. MARIANO ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000 FACTS Lucio Adriano, also known as Ambrocio Adriano, married Gliceria Dorado on October 29,1933. Out of their lawful marriage, they had three children, namely Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated and the latter settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968. Also in 1942 or even earlier, Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa, with whom he had eight children. All his children by Vicenta Vila are the named petitioners in the instant case.

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On November 22,1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. Lucio and Vicenta and their children lived in Candelaria, Quezon until spouses separated in 1972. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties, and assigning, among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted in Lucio;s will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will of before the RTC of Lucena City. After due hearing and despite the Opposition filed by Vicenta, the RTC allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to petitioner-executrix Celestina Adriano. While the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the RTC, on August 17, 1988, petitioner’ instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano’s will. In the complaint, plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother Vicenta, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such acquired properties which became the subject inventory and administration in Spec. Pro. No. 4442. Plaintiffs claimed that the properties bequeathed in Lucio’s will are undivided “civil partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano and Vincenta Villa,” and thus, the will sought to be probated should be declared void and ineffective insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or properties of Vicenta. ISSUE Whether or not there exist a co-ownership of property between Lucio and Vicenta during their period of cohabitation before their marriage. RULING Petitioner’s insistence that a co-ownership of properties existed between Lucio and Vicenta during their period of cohabitation before their marriage in 1968 is without lawful basis considering that Lucio’s marriage with Gliceria was still subsisting. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the civil code requires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio’s marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Thus, we ruled in Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar that the prima pacie presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal cannot prevail over a court’s specific finding reached in adversarial proceedings to the contrary. Thus, in Balcodero vs. Court of Appeal, we held that property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the subsistence of his 136

marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in the name of the common-law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to have been created by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage.

65. VICENTE VILLARANDA vs. ANA MARIA VILLARANDA G. R. No. 153447 February 23, 2004 FACTS Vecente (petitioner) and Honorio (private respondent) were brothers. Honorio is the husband of Ana Maria. On July 6, 1976, Vencete and Honorio executed a deed of exchange. Under this instrument, Vecente agreed to convey his 64. 22 sq. meters to Honorio in exchange for a 500 sq. meters property in Cagayan de Oro. After the execution of the instrument, Honorio took possession of the 64.22 sq. meters land and constructed a building thereon. A year later, Honorio filed with RTC for specific performance against Vecente that Honorio could not fully use or identify and delineate his undivided 500 sq. meters portion of the property. He asked the court to compel Vecente to do so, as well as to convey to him the 64.22 sq. m. lot in compliance with his obligations under the deed. During the trial, the petitioner argued that the Deed of Exchange is void as, under the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be disposed of without the consent of the other spouse. Since, Honorio’s wife did not sign the said deed of exchange, the same is null and void. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with SC. ISSUE Whether or not the contention of petitioner is correct. RULING NO. The law which is applicable in the case is the Civil Code and not the Family Code as the contract was executed before the effectivity of the Family Code. The law should be applied prospectively only, unless a legislation to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. Under the Civil Code [art. 166 in relation to art. 173], husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. But an action to annul or alienate or encumber may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction questioned. But the lack of 137

consent on her part will not make the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but voidable. Hence, the deed is valid until annulled. 66. GSIS vs. MELAGROS MONTESCLAROS G. R. No. 146494 July 14, 2004 FACTS Nicolas is a Sangguniang Bayan member. On July 10, 1983, he got married with Milagros. On January 4, 1985, Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement effective February 18, 1985. In his application, he designated Milagros as his sole beneficiary. His application was approved by the GSIS effective January 17, 1984. He was granted a lump sum payment of annuity for the first 5 years and monthly annuity thereafter. However, on April 22, 1992, Nicolas died. Hence, Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. But the GSIS denied this claim on the ground that the law [PD 1146] does not allow a surviving spouse the right to survivorship pension if the marriage was contracted less than 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension. Milagros filed a special civil action for declaratory relief with the RTC. The RTC ruled that: 1. Milagros is eligible for survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including interest. That under article 115 and 117 of the Family Code, retirement benefits are property acquired by the pensioner through labor, such benefits are belonging to the conjugal property; and 2. that the prohibition in section PD 1146 are deemed repealed by the Family Code. GSIS appealed to the CA. But CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, GSIS petition to SC. ISSUE Whether or not the retirement benefits are part of the conjugal property. RULING YES. A widow’s right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband’s contractual compensation. In a pension plan where EE participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that EEs have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to government EEs are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified EEs in the government service.

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67. AYALA INVESTMENT AND DEV’T CORP. vs. CA G. R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 FACTS The private respondent is the executive vice-president of Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (PBMI). The controversy started when PBMI obtained a loan from Ayala. As surety of the loan, private respondent made himself jointly and solidarily liable with PBMI’s indebtedness to Ayala. PBMI failed to pay the loan. Hence, Ayala filed a case of collection of sum of money. The trial court rendered order in favor of Ayala. Hence, the conjugal properties of the private respondent were levied and auctioned. Private respondent filed an injunction to enjoin the auction on the ground that said loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. However, while the case was pending, the public auction was held. The subject property was awarded to Ayala as the highest bidder. And, a certificate of sale was issued to Ayala after the expiration of the redemption period. Hence, Ayala filed a motion to dismiss the said injunction case by private respondent based on moot and academic because of the consummation of the sale. But the trial court denied the motion and declared that sale on execution as null and void. Ayala went to CA. But the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Ayala, now petitioner, went to SC and argued: (1) there is no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the partnership; (2) that the loan procured by private respondent was for the advancement and benefit of the conjugal property because employment of private respondent would be prolong, and his prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be boosted should PBMI survive because of the loan. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner’s contention is correct. RULING NO. For conjugal partnership to be liable, the benefit must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. There must be showing of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the family. However, the petitioner failed to show this. The benefit contemplated by the exception in article 122, FC is the benefit derived from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBMI and not by the private respondent or his family. Hence, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. 139

68. AFREDO CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004 FACTS Alfredo Ching is an executive vice-president of Philippine Blooming Mills Comapany, Inc. [PBMCI]. As a surety for the loan by PBMCI from Allied Banking Corporation [ABC], he executed a promissory note. But PBMCI defaulted in the payment of the loan. Hence, ABC filed a complaint with RTC for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against PBMCI and impleaded Alfredo Ching as co-defendant in his capacity as surety. The RTC granted the prayer for writ of preliminary attachment. Hence, the trial court’s sheriff levied the petitioner Chings 100,000 shares of Citycop stocks which were registered in the name of Alfredo Ching. Enacarncion Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a motion to quash on the levy of attachment on the 100, 000 shares of Citycorp stock. She argued that the said shares were acquired using their conjugal funds, as such it belongs to the conjugal properties. That she has the right to file the motion to quash as co-owner of said shares. The RTC ruled in favor of the Ching’s. Thus, ABC went to CA. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. It ruled that the presumption in article 160 in the New Civil Code shall not apply if the petitioner spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to acquire the shares of stocks. Hence, RTC erred in its ruling as the levied stock belonged to Alfredo as evidence by the fact that the said shares were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp solely in his name. Hence, petitioner spouses to SC. They averred: 1. The source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under article 160, 2. That such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses. ISSUE Whether or not petitioners’ contention is correct. RULING YES. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be 140

conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same. In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. 69. PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA V. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004 FACTS On 1926, Eusebia Retuya was legally married with Nicolas Retuya. During their marriage, they acquired real properties. On 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family. Instead, he cohabited with the petitioner Pacita Villanueva, wherein, Procopio Villanueva is their illegitimate son. From the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, Pacita Villanueva has no occupation. Nicolas then was the only one who received the income of the questioned properties. Nicolas suffered a stroke. He could no longer talk and walk. Hence, Procopio was the one who was receiving the income the questioned properties since then. Eusebia filed a suit for reconveyance of said properties. Petitioner Villanueva argued that the questioned properties are exclusive properties of Nicolas. But the RTC ruled in favor of Eusebia. It ruled that the presumption under article 116 of the Family Code is applicable in the subject properties. Thus the RTC ruled that Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature and ordered Procopio and Pacita Villanueva to transfer the sole administration of conjugal properties of the spouses Esebia and Nicolas according to article 124 of the Family Code. Villanueva appealed to CA. But the CA upheld RTC’s ruling. The CA ruled that under article 116 of the Family Code, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the contrary is proved. ISSUE Whether or not the subject properties are conjugal properties of Eusebia and Nicolas. RULING 141

YES. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the said Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The presumption under article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. This presumption under article 116, which subsists, unless the contrary is proved, stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. 70. G-TRACTORS vs. CA AND SPS. NARCISO G. R. No. 57402 February 28, 1985 FACTS Private respondent is Luis Narciso. He is the husband of Josefa. He is engaged in business as producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession. Petitioner G-tractors is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of leasing heavy equipment such as tractors, bulldozers. Narciso leased the tractors of the petitioner for the purpose of constructing switch roads and hauling felled tress at the jobsite of Narciso’s logging concession. Narciso defaulted in his rental payments. Hence, petitioner instituted an action against him to collect the said rental with interest. Petitioner got a favorable judgment. But Narciso and G-tractor entered into a compromise. Luis should pay it by installment. But again, Narciso failed to pay it. Hence, petitioner filed a motion for execution. The writ of execution was issued. The sheriff levied the properties of Narciso. The properties were awarded to the petitioner. But included in the levied properties was the residential land of the spouses. Hence, Josefa filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy on execution and auction sale of the alleged conjugal property. She argued that the judgment against Narciso is not conjugal as it did not aid the conjugal property. Therefore, their conjugal property cannot be held liable. ISSUE Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the indebtedness incurred by the husband in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession. RULING NO. Josefa is not correct. The record shows that Narciso is a producer and exporter of Philippine Mahogany logs and that the bulldozers leased to him 142

was used for the construction of switch roads for logging. Therefore, that obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership. Under article 161 of the Civil Code, debts contracted by the husband for an in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. If he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family. 71. MILAGROS JOAQUIN vs. LOURDE REYES G. R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004 FACTS Lourdes Reyes is the widow of Rodulfo Reyes. Before Rodolfo died, he was lawfully married to Lourdes. But they separated de facto. Rodolfo, despite the subsistence of his previous marriage, cohabited with Milagros. Rodulfo was receiving a monthly income of 15, 000 as salary. After his retirement he received 315, 011.78 as benefits. But this did not go to Lourdes. Instead, the money went to his paramour, Milagros. The latter, used the said money in buying the questioned property. Lourdes sued Milagrous for reconveyance of the property. But Milagros argued that the funds she used to buy the subject property were her own. Milagros lost in the trial court. She went to CA. But the CA held that the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because it came from the salaries and earnings of Rodolfo. Hence, petitioner to the SC. ISSUE Whether or not a property acquired using the salary and earnings of a husband and the title thereof registered in the name of the husband’s paramour belong to the conjugal parternship. RULING YES. Under article 160, FC, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are personally to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains (CPG). For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage. Under article 145, CIVIL CODE, a CPG is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by DEATH, ANNULMENT, LEGAL SEPARATION or JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY. Conjugal partnership are, by law, owned in common by the husband and wife. As to what constitute such properties are laid out in article 153, FC, these are:

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1. that which acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership or for only one of the spouses; 2. that which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them; 3. the fruits rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse. 72. JADER MANALO vs. SPOUSES CAMAISA G. R. No. 147978 January 23, 2002 FACTS Respondents, spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, advertised in the newspaper for the sale of their 10-door apartment in Makati. Petitioner had read it. As she was interested in buying the 2 properties, she negotiated for the purchase. Hence, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price. The payments were to be paid by installment after a down payment. Because the properties were the conjugal properties of the spouses, Edilberto assured petitioner that his wife would conform and consent to the sale. Hence, after the contract was formally signed by them, petitioner delivered to Edilberto two checks. The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affirming of his wife’s signature. However, when they met again, Norma refused to sign the contract. They backed out at the contract and the checks were returned to the petitioner. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent. In the trial, petitioner argued that the contract of sale was already perfected. Hence, Norma should sign the said contract. But the RTC dismissed the case. Thus, petitioner went to CA. But CA affirmed the RTC. In affirming, it ruled that the subject of the contracts were conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale. Since private respondent Norma refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. And, that the authority of the court to allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. ISSUE Whether or not the Contract to Sell executed between petitioner and respondent spouses had been perfected such that the latter could no longer back out from the agreement. RULING 144

NO. The properties subjects of the contracts in this case were conjugal property. Hence, for the contracts t sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Under article 124 of the Family Code, the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. In the case at bar, respondent Norma Camaisa did not consent her written consent to the sale. But art. 124, FC should only bed resorted to in cases where the spouses who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contract. In the absence of such showing of the wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought. 73. DAVID AND LORENZA PELAYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 141323 June 8, 2005 FACTS David Pelayo and Loreza are husband and wife. Their conjugal properties, the two parcels of agricultural land, were conveyed Perez. In the deed of absolute sale, Lerenza signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses. Hence, Perez’s application for registration of the deed with the office of the Registry of Deeds (ROD) was denied. Perez asked Lorenza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed. But she refused. Hence, Perez instituted a case against Lorenza for specific performance. The spouses Pelayo, in their answer, invoked article 166, FC and argued that there was no marital consent in the conveyance of said properties as Loreza did not give her consent. That it was just a simulated sale. That the deed was just to make it appear that the lots were sold to him (Perez) in order to frighten illegal occupants of the said properties. Lorenza’s signature was intentionally omitted so that the deed could not be registered. Thus, it was a void conveyance. However, Perez argued that the lots were given to him by the spouses as a consideration of his services as attorney-in-fact to make the necessary representation and negotiation with the illegal occupants therein. That after their relationship became sour, Pelayo sent a letter to the ROD requesting not to entertain any transaction concerning the lots title. The trial court ruled that the conveyance was null and void as there was no marital consent. Perez went to CA. CA reversed the trial court’s ruling and ruled that Lorenza, upon signing as witness to the execution of the deed, had knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to have given the consent to the same. Thus, spouse Pelayo went to the SC. ISSUE

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Whether or not the act of Lorenza in signing in the page for the witness sufficient to constitute consent making the conveyance of the conjugal property valid. RULING YES. Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the deed of sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given the implied consent to the contract of sale. Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given. In the case at bar, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrument witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale. 74. HOMEOWNERS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK [HSLB] vs. MIGUELA DAILO G. R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005 FACTS Respondent Miguela Darailo and Marcelino Dailo were married. They did not execute a marriage settlement. During their marriage, they purchased a house and lot. But the absolute sale thereof was executed only in favor of Marcelino as vendee to the exclusion of Miguela. Marcelino died. Before his death, he executed SPA in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner HSLB to be secured by the spouses house and lot. The said SPA was without the knowledge of Miguela. The loan became mature and it remained outstanding. Hence, petitioner HSLB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgage house and lot. A certificate of sale was issued in petitioners favor as the highest bidder. One year lapsed but the property was not redeemed. Thus, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof executing an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent Miguela instituted with the RTC a civil case for the nullity of real mortgage and certificate of sale, and the affidavit of consolidation of ownership and for the reconveyance of consolidation of ownership. The petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the house and lot was the exclusive property of the late Marcilino. But the RTC ruled that the mortgage was void as it was without the consent of the wife.The CA likewise affirmed the RTC’s decision. It ruled that absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to 146

their conjugal partnership. Hence, it was void under article 124 of the Family Code. However, petitioner HSLB to the SC argued that article 124 of the Family Code should be read together with article 493 of the Civil Code that Marcelino had the right to mortgage the said property a co-owner.

ISSUE Whether or not the mortgage over the disputed property is valid. RULING NO. The sale of conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. Under article 124, Family Code, the absence of the consent of other spouse renders the entire sale null and void of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. There is no legal basis to construe article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to article 124 of the Family Code. Respondent and the late Marcelito Dailo, were marred before the effectivity of the Family Code. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. But with the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gain already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules in co-ownership, unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in supplementary manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter on conjugal partnership of gains or the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the Family Code prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership[ apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic established fact is that during the lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of court’s authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

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75. JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORP. AND ROERTO ALEJO, SHERIFF IV, RTC MAKATI CITY G. R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005 FACTS On January 15, 1983, Josefina Castillo was only 24 years of age when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married. Eduardo was then employed as the Vice President in a private corporation. On August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale for 320,000.00 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house then on located at St. Martin de Borres St., San Antonio Valley I, Sucat Paranaque Metro Manila. The purchase price of the property was paid through the Bank by check with a check no. 002334 in the amount of 320,000.00 drawn and issued by the Commercial Bank on Manila , for which the Imus Bank issued official receipt no. 121408 on August 31, 1984. The Register of Deeds issued TCT nos. 87976 and 87977 in the name of Jesefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco. ISSUE Whether or not the two parcel of residential land belongs to the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo? HELD: Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and Josefina, under the normal circumstance the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Art. 144 of the NCC applies only to a relationship between a man and woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to in which the marriage of the parties is void from the very beginning, it does not apply to cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to concubine for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership when there exist a prior conjugal partnership, or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. 76. JESSIE PISUENA vs. UNATING, et al. G. R. No. 132803 August 31, 1999 FACTS The present case is rooted in an action for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land, as well as a sum of money and damages. Before the RTC of Roxas City originally filed against herein petitioner, by herein respondents. The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan , Province 148

of Capiz , is a registered land in the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar under Original Certificate of Title No. 18422, containing an area of 83,536 square meters, more or less. Petra Unating died on October 1, 1948 while Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The spouses had two [legitimate] children, namely Felix Villar and Catalina Villar. Felix Villar died on October 24, 1962, while Catalina Villar died on February 21, 1967. Felix Villar is represented by Dolores Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four children while Catalina Villar is represented by Salvador Villar Upod, the eldest of her three children, all as plaintiffs. Defendant, Jessie Pisueña, is the son-in-law of Agustin Navarra. Plaintiffs contend that during the lifetime of the registered owners, Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, they enjoyed the absolute ownership and possession of Lot No. 1201. However, sometime in 1950 (after the death of Petra Unating on October 1, 1948) Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten (10) years with Agustin Navarra involving the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four hectares. It was agreed that the area of around three hectares shall further be developed into a fishpond while about a hectare shall be converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of Agustin Navarra. The upland portion of the land was not included in the transaction, hence it remained in the possession of the plaintiffs. While alive, Agustin Navarra, who managed the partnership, religiously gave Aquilino Villar and his coheirs their share. until Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership was delivered by Agustin Navarra to Felix Villar and Catalina Villar. Since Agustin Navarra died in 1958, Felix and Catalina Villar repossessed the land in question. They maintained their possession up to the time Felix and Catalina Villar died. Thereafter, the children of Felix and Catalina Villar continued the possession of their predecessor-in-interest until the defendant disturbed their possession sometime in 1974. Defendant counters that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in Spanish captioned “ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA”. On December 31, 1968, which was more than ten years after the death of Agustin Navarra, his heirs executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale of the land in question in favor of the Spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. From the time of the sale up to the present, the fishpond portion was in the possession of the spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. However, the upland portion is in the possession of Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista by mere tolerance of the defendant. On June 24, 1992, the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra could be considered valid. 149

The court, however, ruled that its validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating, considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar was still alive. It likewise held that the respondents, as heirs of Aquilino Villar, were entitled to his one-half share in the disputed lot. Before the Court of Appeals, Dolores Bautista and Salvador Upod assailed the trial court’s ruling upholding the validity of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Jessie Pisueña, on the other hand, questioned the court’s conclusion that the subject lot was conjugal. He claimed that it was paraphernal, and that the Deed of Sale transferred the whole lot to Agustin Navarra, his predecessor-ininterest. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto, holding that the disputed lot belonged to the conjugal partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar. Defendant further argues that the mention of the name Aquilino Villar in the certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Petra Unating and the same could not convert the property into a conjugal one. The Court of appeals agree with the lower court when it held that 'in the absence of any evidence of any system of property relation between Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, it is presumed that it is one of conjugal partnership.' Besides, it appears that Lot 1201 was acquired during the marriage of the Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, since the Original Certificate of Title indicates that Lot 1201 was registered in the name of Petra Unating, married to Aquilino Villar. Thus, the property is presumed conjugal. ISSUE Did the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Lot 1201 belongs to the conjugal [partnership] of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar.? RULING The Supreme Court held that both the CA and the RTC held that the disputed lot was conjugal. Real property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal. Such prima facie presumption, however, can be overturned by a cadastral court’s specific finding, which has long become final, that the lot in question was paraphernal in character. The title to the entire property shall pass by operation of law to the buyer once the seller acquires title over it by hereditary succession, even if at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, the seller owned only a portion of the property. However, as to the efficacy of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta, petitioner and his wife are owners of the disputed lot by virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on 150

February 4, 1949, their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not have disposed of their father’s share in the same property at the time, as they were not yet its owners. At the most, being the only children, they had an inchoate interest in their father’s share. When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third share in the disputed property, Felix and Catalina’s inchoate interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in them the title to their father’s share and, consequently, to the entire lot. Thus, that title passed to Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code, which was already in force at the time of Aquilino’s death in 1953. Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1201 became vested in Jessie Pisueña and his wife. Petition granted. Petitioner Jessie Pisueña and his wife, Rosalie Navarra, are hereby declared the owners of Lot. No. 1201.

77. SPOUSES ONESIFORO AND ROSARIO ALINAS VICTOR AND ELENA ALINAS G. R. No. 158040 April 14, 2008

vs. SPOUSES

FACTS Petitioner spouses separated sometime in 1982 with Rosario moving to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots identified as Lot 896-B-9-A (Lot A) with a bodega standing on it and Lot 896B-9-B (Lot B) with petitioners’ house. Lot A was mortgaged as security for the loan obtained from Rural Bank of Oroquieta (RBO), while Lot B was mortgaged to SSS. Petitioners entrusted said lots to respondents, Victor being the brother of Onesiforo, with the agreement that any rentals from the property will be remitted to RBO and SSS to pay off the loans. Onesifore alleged that he left blank papers with his signatures to facilitate the administration of said property. However, sometime in 1993, the two lots were already titled on the name of respondent spouses. Lot A have been foreclosed by RBO and was later purchased by respondents. Lot B was also foreclosed by SSS, however pursuant to a SPA signed by Onesiforo in favor of Victor, the latter was able to redeem it. Onesiforo’s name also appeared in an Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 selling Lot B to respondent spouses. Records also show a notarized document captioned Agreement whereby petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that Victor used his own money to redeem Lot B from SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner of said lot and 151

waiving whatever rights, claims, and interest petitioners or his heirs or successors and assigns will or may have. ISSUE Whether or not the sale of Lot B by petitioner spouses to respondent spouses was valid. RULING The sale was null and void. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code. Art. 124 of the Code provides, “ The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. xxx In the event that one spouse in incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written authority of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.xxx” In Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo, the court categorically stated thus: “In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both husband and wife. In applying Art. 124 of the Family Code, this court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.” Thus, pursuant to Art. 124 and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners’ conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. The court does not see how applying Art. 124 of the Family Code would lead to injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that Lot B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated and the sale documents do not bear the signature of Rosarion. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale and a notarized Agreement, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. As held in Heirs of Aguilar- Reyes vs. Spouses Mijares, “a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.” Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal property. 78. VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007 152

FACTS Petitioner and private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged. Private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment on Compromise Agreement. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge denied the aforementioned Omnibus Motion. Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the same was denied. The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should not have been given judicial imprimatur since it is against law and public policy; that the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property. ISSUE Whether or not a Compromise Agreement entered into by spouses, one of whom was convicted of adultery, giving the convicted spouse a share in the conjugal property, valid and legal. RULING The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. The crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos. The Compromise Agreement 153

partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. 79. ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR G. R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003 FACTS A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. ISSUE How should the properties acquired by petitioner and respondent be partitioned? RULING In light of these facts, the Supreme Court give more credence to petitioner’s submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides: Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party 154

of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. 80. ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ vs. RTC OF QUEZON CITY G. R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 FACTS Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition,Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The court rendered the assailed judgment, to wit: (1) Declaring their marriage null and void for mutual psychological incapacity; (2) The three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. (3) To start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, she now comes to superiority contending that (I) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated.(II) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the 155

disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.(III) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129. (IV) It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." ISSUE What property relations should govern with regard to void marriages? RULING ORDER AFFIRMED. The court correctly applied the proper property relations with regard to void marriages. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, , the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. 156

It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. 81. NENG “KAGUI KADIGUIA” MALANG vs. COROCOY MOSON G. R. No. 119064 August 22, 2000 FACTS Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula was engaged in tilling the land that was Aida’s dowry. Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second time Jubaida Kado. No child was born out of his second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her. In 1965, Hadji Abdula married Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz and they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng). Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them. Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng “Kagui Kadiguia” Malang. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless. Hadji Abdula acquired land in Cotabato City. He deposited money in United Coconut Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the 157

Shari’a District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban. Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdula’s name “married to Neng P. Malang,” and a pick-up jeepney. On February 7, 1994, the Shari’a District Court ordered the publication of the petition. After such publication or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang, the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged that his father’s surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as “Teng Abdula,” son; (f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as “Keto Abdula,” son, (g) Fatima Malang, also known as “Kueng Malang,” daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped their father in his business, then they were more competent to be administrators of his estate. On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai Malang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of Hadji Mohammad. In a Memorandum that petitioner filed with the Shari’a District Court, she asserted that all of the properties of the decedent located in Cotabato City were conjugal properties while properties located outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the decedent. The oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with petitioner because his having contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship. Second, the decedent adopted a “complete separation of property regime” in his marital relations; while his wives Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedent’s properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent was married to four (4) women. 158

Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled in the name of the decedent “married to Neng Malang” because such description is not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore, because petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the properties belonged “to the estate of decedent,” she was estopped from claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because some of the properties were titled in Hadji Abdula’s name “married to Neng Malang.” Fifth, if it is true that the properties were conjugal properties, then these should have been registered in the names of both petitioner and the decedent. In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Shari’a District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married eight times. The Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more than one wife because “conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law relationship.” The court further found that the decedent was “the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families” and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The description “married to Neng Malang” in the titles to the real properties is no more than that –-- the description of the relationship between petitioner and the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of gains. Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no evidence of such contrary stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it had begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent. Thus, the Shari’a District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula. The Court ordered that the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses and judicial expenses; that the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, be distributed and adjudicated as follows: a) Jubaida Kado Malang

------------------------- 2/64 of the estate

b) Nayo Omar Malang

------------------------- 2/64

- do -

c) Mabai Aziz Malang

------------------------- 2/64

- do -

d) Neng “Kagui Kadiguia” Malang ---------------- 2/64

- do -

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e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang----------------------14/64

- do -

f) Ismael Malindatu Malang-------------------------14/64

- do -

g) Datulna Malang h) Lawanbai Malang

------------------------- 14/64

- do -

------------------------- 7/64

- do -

i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------ 7/64

- do -

Total-------------------- 64/64 ;that the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng “Kagui Kadiguia” Malang by way of advance be charged against her share and if her share is not sufficient, to return the excess; and that the heirs are ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months from receipt of its order. On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration. The oppositors objected. On January 10, 1995, the Shari’a District Court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a notice of appealwhich she subsequently withdrew. On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. ISSUE Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, “P.D. 1083” or “Muslim Code”). The question is raised in connection with the settlement of the estate of the decedent. RULING The Court concludes that the record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must reopen in order to supply the factual gaps. In so ordering, the SC deemed it imperative to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of respondent court. The Court identified the following collateral issues: First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code

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All eight marriages of were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code which governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites by providing that marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92. However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces. Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78. Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo. Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages. The only law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950. The Muslim Code provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its enactment that acts executed prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing therein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby. An apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. “Bigamous or polygamous marriages” are considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance. The Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void. These provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and that 161

subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced. Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage can exist at any given time. In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide, since --(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives and that the deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law, which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide. In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly proved that the alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it appears that the consent of the bride’s father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as Mora Dumpo’s father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy. Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code The validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.

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Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired. Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal. Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property. Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife, With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code are pertinent: Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

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Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs. Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. The Civil Code provides: Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its 164

dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: (1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband. Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the Muslim Code: Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child. Art. 59. Legitimate children. --(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation. (2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of the child. Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the expiration of her ‘idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior 165

marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter. Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth. Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance include: (a) The husband, the wife; (b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother; (c) The daughter and the son’s daughter in the direct line; (d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother. When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedent’s son, she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate. The respective shares of the other sharers are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083. Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in nonChristian provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969. Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969. --------------------------------From the seven collateral issues that have been discussed, four corollary issues are identified as to further situate the points of controversy in the instant case for the guidance of the lower court. 1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was 166

celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the marriages were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. A Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969. 2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law. 3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18, 1993? The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following: a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death. b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code. However, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively. c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during the period from and after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership. d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties. 4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdula’s legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as determined under the second corollary issue. The Muslim Code, which was 167

already in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s death, will govern the determination of their respective shares. The evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence should be received to supply the following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by the first, second, and third collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact periods of actual cohabitation (“common life” under a “common roof”) of each of the marriages during which time the parties lived together; (4) the identification of specific properties acquired during each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus showing the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children (legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs The decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Shari’a District Court of Cotabato is SET ASIDE, and the petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out. 82. CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL G. R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001 FACTS Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside. According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter 168

the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco. ISSUE Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid. RULING The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee. Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. 83. GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs. MARIO FERNANDEZ G. R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000 FACTS 169

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage. ISSUE Whether or not Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148. RULING SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. 84. EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN vs. ELVIRA CASTILLO G. R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000 FACTS Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which 170

petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together. RULING The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case. The case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings. 85. ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO G. R. No. 143958 July 11, 2003 FACTS Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He is an electrical engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce. Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in 171

Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met respondent Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as a masseuse in the King's Cross nightclub. Alfred followed Ederlina to the Philippines where they cohabited together in a common-law relationship. During the period of their common-law relationship, Alfred acquired in the Philippines real and personal properties valued more or less at P724,000.00. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name would appear in the deeds of sale as the buyer of the real properties, as well as in the title covering the same. Alfred and Ederlina's relationship deteriorated. Alfred wrote Ederlina's father complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had "stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture. Alfred filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ederlina. Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, the present petition. ISSUES Whether or not the rule of “in pari delicto” applies in the instant case where an alien petitioner who, knowing the Constitutional prohibition against aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines, willfully funded the purchase of real properties in the name of his Filipina lover who is married to another alien. RULING Petitioner answered during an examination before the trial court: COURT: Q. So you understand that you are a foreigner that you cannot buy land in the Philippines? A. That is correct but as she would eventually be my wife that would be owned by us later on. (tsn, p. 5, September 3, 1986) xxx xxx xxx Q. What happened after that? A. She said you foreigner you are using Filipinos to buy property. Q. And what did you answer? A: I said thank you very much for the property I bought because I gave you a lot of money (tsn, p. 14, ibid.). 172

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. According to the Court, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than the respondent. Petitioner is fully aware that he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even before he purchased the properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, he had the deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee thereof. Being a party to an illegal contract, petitioner cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out because one who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To allow petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy. 86. JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY G. R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003 FACTS Private respondent, a married woman but separated de facto from her husband, cohabited with petitioner. The two were able to acquire properties during their cohabitation. Subsequently, the couple decided to separate. Private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against petitioner. The trial court declared petitioner in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief and decided the case in favor of private respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE What is the property regime of private respondent and petitioner who are not capacitated to marry each other RULING The Court ruled that since the private respondent and the petitioner were not capacitated to marry each other because the former (private respondent) was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter (petitioner), their property regime is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required. In the absence of proof 173

of extent of the parties' respective contributions, their share shall be presumed equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each. The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondent's co-ownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50. 87. LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO G. R. No. 169698 November 29, 2006 FACTS Petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations. The relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together and had two children. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted ways. Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City alleging that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them and that Yolanda used his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolanda's name without his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a co-owner. In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupo's allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman. ISSUES Whether or not petitioner was able to prove his contribution to the subject property he claimed as co-owned by him and respondent during their adulterous cohabitation under Art. 148 of the Family Code; (2) Whether or not Art. 148 applies to adulterous cohabitation prior to August 3, 1988. RULING 174

The instant petition is denied. Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed property, petitioner diverted the burden imposed upon him to respondent by painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any property. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. Surmising that petitioner is financially well heeled than respondent, the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that respondent had taken advantage of petitioner. True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioner's evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial court's finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioner's dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property. Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. 12 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 88. ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, et al. G. R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009 FACTS 175

Navarro entered a Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase with Kargo Enterprises pertaining to two (2) motor vehicles. The Kargo Enterprises is owned by spouses Karen Go and Glenn Go. Glenn Go (not Karen Go) and Roger Navarro signed the said agreement. Navarro’s checks bounced for lack of insufficiency of funds. Karen Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. The RTC issued the writs of replevin for the seizure of the motor vehicles in Navarro's possession. RTC initially dismissed the complaints on the ground that they failed to state a cause of action as Karen Go had no sufficient interest in the case. But in resolving the motion for reconsideration of Karen Go, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest but ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go in the case as required in Sec. 4, Rule 4 of the ROC. In the course of his petitions with the CA and SC, Navarro alleged the following: (1) the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the said Lease Agreements; (2) a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading; and (3) the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed the theory of the complaints, to his great prejudice. ISSUE Are spouses Karen and Glenn Go real parties in interest? RULING The petition is denied. Article 108 of the Family Code provides: “Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements”. In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property". In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf 176

of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouse's consent. Since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a proforma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states: “Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.” 89. MARYWIN ALBANO-SALES vs. MAYOR REYNOLAN T. SALES and CA G. R. No. 174803 July 13, 2009 FACTS Marywin Albano Sales filed a case against her husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties. Mayor Reynolan T. Sales filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage of Marywin and Reynolan void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It also ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. After the decision became final, Marywin filed a motion for execution and a manifestation listing her assets with Reynolan for the purpose of having them partitioned. Reynolan opposed the motion arguing that the RTC Decision had ordered the distribution of their common properties without specifying what they were. He also alleged that Marywin appropriated the rentals of his properties and even disposed one of them without his consent, in violation of Article 147 of the Family Code. Accordingly, he prayed for the deferral of the resolution of the motion for execution, maintaining that no partition of properties can be had until after all the matters he raised are resolved after due notice and hearing. RTC ruled that reception of evidence is no longer necessary because the parties were legally married prior to its nullification and the fact that they begot a son whom they raised together proved that their connubial relations were more than merely transient. The CA ruled in favor of Reynolan.

RULING The instant petition is denied. To emphasize, what is being questioned by respondent was not really the Decision of the RTC declaring their marriage void ab initio on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity, but the Orders of the trial court dividing their common properties in accordance with the proposed project of partition 177

without the benefit of a hearing. The issue on the validity of their marriage has long been settled in the main decision and may no longer be the subject of review. Incidentally, however, there were matters of genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Allegations regarding the collection of rentals without proper accounting, sale of common properties without the husband's consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in order to determine with certainty the fair and reasonable division and distribution of properties due to each party. The extent of properties due to respondent is not yet discernible without further presentation of evidence on the incidental matters he had previously raised before the RTC. 90. SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO vs. CA, et al. G. R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009 FACTS Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda). Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol's civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. The trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages commanding Erlinda to pay P40,000.00 in moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses and exemplary damages and the cost of suit of the plaintiff aside from your lawful fees. Finding Erlinda Nicol's personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds. Almost a year later, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff alleging that petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. ISSUE Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" RULING In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has 178

redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code 16 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtorspouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.

d. On Suing Family Members 91- ROSITO 92. EDWIN N. TRIBIANA vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA G. R. No. 137359 September 13, 2004 FACTS Petitioner Edwin N. Tribiana and Lourdes M. Tribiana are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union only in 1997. Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana. Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwin's mother, Rosalina Tribiana. Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes' petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code. Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin's motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998. The RTC denied Edwin's motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to File Action attached by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach a compromise but failed. Edwin then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari 179

under Rule 65. The appellate court denied Edwin's petition. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE Whether or not a Certificate to File Action attached to respondent’s Opposition to the petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and not to the respondent’s petition for habeas corpus effectively established that there was earnest efforts to settle the controversy amicably and whether or not petitions for habeas corpus are exempt from the barangay conciliation requirement RULING The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Lourdes had complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. While it is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition, however, in her opposition to Edwin's motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. The certification effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. The Court further ruled that the barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is "deprived of personal liberty". In such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties "to go directly to court" without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the "rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto". Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwin's contentions on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.

e. On Family Home 93. rosito 94. rosito 95. PERLA G. PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III G. R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006 FACTS On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. 180

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises. On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their father, hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of. ISSUE Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home. RULING The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. That which is “actual” is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.

181

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. 96. JOSE E. HONRADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G. R. No. 166333 November 25, 2005 FACTS December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. Premium sought to collect the amount ofP240,765.00 representing the total price of veterinary products purchased on credit by Honrado from November 18, 1996 until June 30, 1997. In a separate case and court, Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba City for the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrado’s name located in Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their family house. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment in favor of Premium. Entry of judgment was made on April 26, 2000. A writ of execution was issued on March 29, 2001 followed by the Sheriff’s levying on the parcel of land. 182

In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City rendered a Decision on April 29, 2002, declaring the property a family home. On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under Article 155 of the Family Code of the Philippines. It was alleged therein that the property is exempt from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as such before he incurred his indebtedness with Premium. The petitioner further asserts that he and his family had been occupying the property as their family home as early as 1992. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, his house was constituted as a family home in that year. Thus, even if he failed to contest the levy on his property or move for the lifting thereof, the same cannot be deemed a waiver of his right to claim the exemption of his family home. He avers that his right cannot be waived, for it would be contrary to public policy. The private respondent avers that the petitioner is estopped from claiming that the property is exempt from execution and from assailing the levy of the property, the sale thereof at public auction and the September 18, 2002 and April 14, 2003 Orders of the RTC. It points out that the petitioner agreed to the levy and sale of the property at public auction; he even surrendered the key to the house and vacated the property after it was purchased by the private respondent at the public auction. ISSUE Whether Honrado’s failure to assert his claim for exemption of his family home from execution at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time is fatal to his claim. RULING The petition has no merit. The petitioner admits to having been notified of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction. However, he did not bother to object to the levy and the projected sale on the ground that the property and the house thereon was a family home. The petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property in favor of the private respondent, as the highest bidder. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. 183

97. MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ vs. ROEL STA. INES, et al. G. R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005 FACTS Mary Josephine and Socorro Gomez against Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines (Marietta) alleging that they are the children of the deceased Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez who, during her lifetime, entrusted her rice land to Marietta, for the latter to manage and supervise. They further alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice land while under the management of Marietta, and for the return of the TCT to the property, but the latter refused, thus compelling the sisters to file a civil case before the Pasig RTC. On 24 January 1989, the trial court rendered judgment against Marietta. After said judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, by virtue of which, a parcel of land (with improvements) registered in the name of Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied upon by the Sheriff to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction on 25 August 1992 to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on September 17, 1992. On 12 July 1993, a complaint for annulment of said sale was filed before the RTC by Hinahon Sta. Ines together with Noel, Roel, and Jannette, all named Sta. Ines, husband and children of Marietta, respectively, against Mary Josephine and Sheriff Flaviano Balgos, Jr. on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus exempt from execution under Section 12(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the Family Code. According to respondents, the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied the same as a family residence in 1972 and that under Section 153 of the Family Code, there is no longer any need to constitute the said property as family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, because it became such by operation of law. ISSUE Whether a house and lot may be exempted from writ of execution in satisfaction of debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. RULING 184

Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family home. Neither is it correct to say that the obligation sought to be satisfied by the levy of the property was incurred only upon the issuance of the judgment in the original case in January of 1989. Marietta’s liability, which was the basis of the judgment, arose long before the levied property was constituted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred by Marietta falls squarely under one of the instances when a family home may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as provided for by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to answer for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.

98. VILMA G. ARRIOLA vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA G. R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008 FACTS John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action for judicial partition of properties of decedent Fidel Arriola against Anthony Ronald G. Arriola and Vilma G. Arriola (petitioners). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma. The RTC granted the partition of a parcel of land. As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land, respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. However, it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house (subject house) standing on the subject land, arguing that there’s no mention of the house in the decision of the RTC. Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. The case reaches all the way to the Supreme Court, hence this case. ISSUE 185

Whether the subject house should be included in the public auction of the subject land. RULING The Supreme Court ruled that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition. However, this ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code. Taken together, the averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly Articles 152 and 153, the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.(Emphasis supplied.) Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. The family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the coownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a 186

longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013. It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land, which falls outside the specific area of the family home. The petition was PARTLY GRANTED and the land was DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.

f. On Status and Filiation of Children 99. MACADANGDANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980 FACTS The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang. The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX. The lower court dismissed the complaint. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals which reversed the lower court’s decision. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979. ISSUE Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. 187

RULING Since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other. As has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence, more particularly, that of her husband. The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date. The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband. The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby. The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these: 1. Impotence of the husband; 2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and 3. Serious illness of the husband. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. 100. JINKIE DE JESUS AND JACQUELINE DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA DE JESUS vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON G. R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001 FACTS 188

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City. Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder argued that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. Petitioners assail the order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE Whether recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval. RULING A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the 189

physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. The petition was DENIED. 101. GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005 FACTS Gerardo Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Their relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. 190

Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the above decision “INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which granted to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation rights arguing that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child.” [ She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname. Gerardo objected until the case reached all the way to the Supreme Court, the present case. ISSUE Whether the husband in a second marriage declared to be null and void because of bigamy, can impose his surname to their child. RULING The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled 191

the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.[34] Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. A person’s surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way. 102. JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL G. R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008 FACTS The parents of Juan and Teofilo De Dios Carlos left many parcels of land to the two. When Teofilo died, this issue came out. Petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos filed a civil case asserting that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. 192

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman. ISSUES Whether a bare allegation that the respondent was adopted from an indigent couple is sufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. RULING Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child. Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives. Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. Clearly, the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo. We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit: ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

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It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. The case was remanded to the RTC in regard to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. 103. CAMELO CABATANIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al G. R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004 FACTS This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Florencia was a maid of the petitioner Camelo Cabatania. Cabatania brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Cabatania promised to support Florencia if she got pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Petitioner Camelo Cabatania’s version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia’s counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. The trial court’s finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was based on the testimony of the child’s mother and "the personal appearance of the child." ISSUE Whether or not there’s a paternal relationship between the child and the herein petitioner for the granting of support. 194

RULING The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law. 104. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 FACTS The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna (both were already dead). The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. praying for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, that the decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir. On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She (Benitez-Badua) alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate, relying on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner is a legitimate daughter and sole heir of the deceased spouses. RULING Petition has no merit. Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. 195

A careful reading of the these articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. 105. TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL G. R. No. 138489 June 15, 2000 FACTS Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted "that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged. Hence this petition on the ground that it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera. 196

ISSUE Whether or not Article 171 of the Family Code on impugnity of filiation is applicable in this case. RULING Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

106. WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, et. al. G. R. No. 138961 March 7,2002 FACTS Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital . During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her. All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession 197

and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs The trial court rendered a decision declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao. In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children. The Court of Appeals, reversed the ruling of the trial court ISSUES 1. May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao? 2. Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter? RULING 1. NO. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. 198

This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory. It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. 2. No. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a 199

direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. 107. VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 129163 April 22, 2003 FACTS Spouses Anselmo and Macaria Baloyo, original owners of controverted Lot 323, Ilog Cadastre, had five children. Of the five, Agueda was the first child, who had two children: Antonio Colino and Irene Colinco, the latter predeceasing his three daughters, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina (who with Irene Colinco are the respondents of this case). Second was Catalina, who was married to Juan Arbolario with whom she had one child named Purificacion. Purificacion died a spinster without issue. Records disclose that decedent Purificacion's father (Juan) cohabited with another woman to whom were born petitioners, Voltaire, Fe, Lucena, Exaltacion and Carlos (the Arbolarios) who were all born before 1951. Third and fourth were Eduardo and Gaudencia who each conveyed their interests in the lot, respectively, to their sister Agueda by sale and to their two nieces, Irene and Purificacion. Fifth and last child was Julian, who married but died without issue. All five (who at the time of the filing of this case have already died), executed in 1951 a notarized declaration of heirship as the only heirs of the Baloyo spouses. It is with these foregoing facts that respondents, executed a declaration adjudicating upon themselves their proportionate or ideal shares in the controverted lot and filed a civil case against the Salhay spouses to recover possession of the portion which the Salhays claim to have been purchased by them from Purificacion. Before hearing, the Arbolarios joined the Salhays in contending that the declaration of heirship and partition by the Colincos was defective for having excluded them. They alleged that they were intestate heirs of their half sister Purificacion; that Catalina Baloyo died in 1903 and that the cohabitation between their father and their natural mother was by virtue of a valid subsequent marriage. The RTC found for the Arbolarios holding that they were the brothers and sisters of Purificacion. 200

The CA however, reversed the RTC, holding that the union of Juan with the mother of the Arbolarios' was extramarital, the petitioners having been born before Catalina's death as shown in the 1951 declaration of heirship and absent proof that the prior union of Catalina and Juan Arbolario lawfully ended before the said year. Consequently, the CA ruled the Arbolarios as illegitimate siblings of Purificacion and thus barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children of their father. ISSUE Whether the Arbolarios were illegitimate siblings of Purificacion disqualifying them from being intestate heirs of the latter under the Civil Code. RULING Petition has no merit. First.The 1951 declaration reveals that the year of Catalina's death was intercalated. Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners showed a chronological progression in the heirs' years of death where Catalina's name came after Eduardo Baloyo's who died in 1947; so it would be impossible for Catalina to have died in 1903. Second. There is no solid basis for the argument that the marriage of Juan and petitioners' natural mother was valid. Even granting that Catalina died in 1903, it does not follow that just because a man’s first wife has died, he is conclusively married to the woman who bore his children absent a marriage certificate or a generally accepted proof which is necessary to establish the marriage as an indisputable fact. Third. Clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners that they were preterited from the 1951 declaration. Artice 261 of the New Civil Code provides that there is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or her allegation. It is therefore the Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly contracted subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But they miserably failed to do so. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate. Since petitioners failed to prove the fact of marriage between their parents, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. 108. MA. THERESEA ALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994 201

FACTS On Sept. 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to one Aurora Keniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged Father. On Sept. 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto dide intestate. His widow Yolanda R. Alberto was appointed as the administratrix of the estate of Juan M. Alberto. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix’ Accounting were approved on August 1, 1970 and on April 29, 1971 respectively, the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated. On September 15, 1978, Ma. Therese Alberto filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court. Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence during the trial, the probate court was convinced that indeed, Ma. Theresa Alberto had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child. Thereupon, it rendered a decision compelling the decedent’s heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter and to allow her to participate in the estate proceedings. In her contention in the Court of Appeals, the widow raised that the petitioner was not recognized by the father based on the letter sent by the mother of petitioner, Aurora Reniva, to the deceased, Juan M. Alberto , the putative father of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court. Hence this petition. ISSUE Whether or not the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be ordered to recognize petitioner as the deceased’s natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented presented by petitioner to establish her claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child. RULING YES, the estate and heirs of the deceased can be ordered to recognize the petitioner as the deceased (Juan M. Alberto’s) daughter as it was not only the father that recognized the petitioner but also the siblings and other members of his family as provided in Art. 283 of the Civil Code. In addition, Art. 285 of the Civil Code states that the action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except if the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of the age of majority. This fits squarely on the case of the petitioner because she was still a minor when her father died in 1967, and she reached the age of majority only on Sept. 18, 1974 and when the action 202

was filed by the petitioner, it was still three days before the time to file action had prescribed. 109. CASIMIRO MENDOZA vs. CA AND TEOPISTA T. TUÑACAO G. R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991 FACTS This pertains to a case on compulsory recognition. Casimiro allegedly had an extramarital affair with Brigida Toring, who was then single. Out of that relationship, Teopista was born on 20 August 1930. Teopista maintains that Casimiro acknowledged her as his illegitimate child as shared by her mother to her and by the following circumstances, to wit: she addressed him as “Papa Miroy”; when she got married, he bought a passenger truck and hired her husband to drive it so he could have a livelihood; he gave the sale proceeds of the truck to her and her husband; he also allowed her son, Lolito, to build a house on his lot and gave her money as well to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente; he opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, among others. Teopista presented 3 witnesses to corroborate her testimony. Lolito indicated that he believed that Casimiro is his grandfather because his mother said so and because Casimiro, among others, authorized him to build a house on his (Casimiro) property upon learning that the he lived on a rented lot. The two other witnesses, Gaudencio and Isaac, Casimiro’s relatives, likewise reinforced her claim. Gaudencio served as the intermediary after Casimiro disclosed to him that he was seeing Brigida. He was also tasked several times to deliver money to Brigida. Isaac, meanwhile, testified that his father, Hipolito, Casimiro’s brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro’s mother, informed him that the private respondent is the daughter of Casimiro. Vicente, another illegitimate child of Casimiro, testified to resist Teopista’s claim alleging that he is the only illegitimate child of Casimiro because Teopista’s father is a carpenter named Ondoy who later fled and he also emphasized that she never visited her alleged father in the hospital when he was confined, among others. The other witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro’s niece, corroborated his declaration and posited that she had never met Teopista. The trial court rejected Teopista’s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of her alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family because she never lived with him; her son was only allowed to construct a small house in his property; he never financially supported her; and he did not even permit her to use his surname. 203

The Appellate Court reversed, noting that the witnesses presented by Teopista were disinterested persons with no ax to grind against Casimiro while the latter’s witnesses were an interested person who stood to lose much of his inheritance should Teopista be declared as an illegitimate child and the testimony of the other, seemed incredible as that witness lived in the same barangay as Teopista since birth. ISSUES Did the trial court err in denying Teopista’s claim that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro? Did the testimony of Isaac sufficiently prove such filiation? RULING Under Art. 283(2) of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. Art. 172 of the Family Code states, among others, that legitimate filiation may be established by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Family Code also provides in Art. 175 that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. In establishing "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child", "continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. It means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that Teopista was unable to establish such open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Even so, she was able to establish such status by another method. An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The declaration made by Isaac is in the nature of a declaration about pedigree as provided for in Sec. 39, Rule 130, Rules of Court. 204

In the case at bar, the mother of Casimiro and his brother, both of whom had since passed away, made the declarations about Teopista’s pedigree prior to the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. Casimiro did not disprove such declarations when he could have done so by deposition. Taking into account the declarations and the other circumstances, such as, the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito to build a house on his land when he knew that the latter was living on a rented lot, and the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, the Court ruled that Teopista has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. 110. DOROTEA UYGUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989 FACTS Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. Graciano admitted that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario. These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." Neither could he resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. As stated in ART. 285: The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; 205

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. Petitioners argue that the complaint for partition is actually an action for recognition as an illegitimate child, which, being already barred, is a clear attempt to circumvent the said provisions. The private respondent insists, on the other hand, that he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family." ISSUE Whether Private Respondent be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code. RULING The court ruled that this case must be decided under a new set of rules because the provisions the parties invoked has been superceded by the Family Code. Under the Family Code, it is provided that: Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation: Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents, however he insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation. Since he seeks to prove his filiation under 206

this, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. Article 175 provides: The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation. 111. CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG vs. CA and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN G. R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992 FACTS This is a petition for recognition and claim of inheritance of an illegitimate child Chad Cuyugan represented by his mother and legal guardian Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan against the administratrix Corito Ocampo Tayag of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo’s properties. Cuyugan claims that she and Ocampo had an amorous relationship which bore an illegitimate son named Chad Cuyugan. Cuyugan asserts that the young Cuyugan was recognized by Ocampo and he acted as a putative father during his lifetime as gleaned from indubitable letters and documents. Ocampo died intestate and left several properties in Baguio City, Angeles City and Province of Pampanga. The alleged illegitimate child Cuyugan is survived together with Ocampo’s legitimate children Corito Ocampo Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo. Cuyugan avers that as an illegitimate son of Ocampo the young Cuyugan is entitled for inheritance as one of the surviving heirs. Several verbal and written demands by the plaintiff Cuyugan against defendant Ocampo for the inventory and accounting of properties, delivery of the inheritance and support pendent elite but the defendant Ocampo grossly neglects. Instead, she maintained several affirmative defenses against the claim on the issue of prescription, no legal personality to bring the suit and lack of jurisdiction. Ocampo argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, Cuyugan’s cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. 207

ISSUES 1. Whether there is still a need for an action to establish illegitimate filiation prior to delivery of inheritance to an illegitimate child; 2. Whether there is a prescriptive period for recognition of a natural child.

RULING The court ruled citing the case of in Briz vs. Briz, et al., which elucidates that: The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . . The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. As to the issue of prescription, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed. 112. FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON 208

G. R. No. 124853

February 24, 1998

FACTS In her complaint 4 filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. ISSUE Whether or not MONINA established her filiation as FRANCISCO’S illegitimate daughter? RULING The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts: 1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the employ of the former; 2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus: [L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant's hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to 209

use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA5, W & W-5) . . . 3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly, 35 spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner. 36 Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court . does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA's] logical explanation that she first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. fact, she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse . . .

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At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] of his lawyer to have secured [MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost of P15,000. [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA] . . . Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of the sworn statement in question, hence negating FRANCISCO's theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of MONINA's father. 113. MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON vs. COMELEC G. R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004 FACTS On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, initiated a petition before the Commission on Elections to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when 210

in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of merit. Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied. He brought the case to the SC by virtue of Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court, praying for a TRO, writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin finality/execution of COMELEC resolutions. His petition was consolidated with Tecson & Velez’ cases, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.. ISSUE Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino. RULING Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a natuAral-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. The 1935 Constitution removed doubts as to whether the jus soli principle would still apply. It adopted jus sanguinis (blood relationship) as basis of Filipino citizenship. Sec. 1, Art. III defined citizens as: 1) citizens of Philippine Islands at time of adoption of Constitution, 2) those born in the PI of foreign parents elected to public office in the PI, 3) those whose fathers are citizens of the PI, 211

4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. 5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. The following facts have been established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either in the pleadings and the documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the parties, through their counsels, during the oral arguments 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; 2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; 3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902; and 5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Kelley & Poe and FPJ’s birth certificate are admissible evidence being public documents. Lorenzo Poe was born sometime in 1870 while RP was under Spain. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it will be assumed that his place of residence was his place of residence at the time of his death, which was in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Thus, it will also be assumed that he benefited in the en masse Filipinization under Phil Bill of 1902. Presumption would be that he passed on his Filipino citizenship to his son & later on to his grandson. Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity by judicial (compulsory done during the lifetime of putative parent) or voluntary (record of birth, will or public document) means. No proof of acknowledgment by Allan Poe was shown whether voluntary or judicial. The 1950 Civil Code added additional means of acknowledgment which is legal (acknowledgment of an illegitimate child’s full blood brothers/sisters). The Family Code provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by a record of birth or public document or private handwritten instrument signed by parent concerned. 212

In the absence of such, it can be proven by open & continuous possession of status as legitimate or other means allowed by Rules of Court & special laws. Action may be brought by child during his/her lifetime. Same provisions apply to establish illegitimate filiation. Ruby Kelley Mangahas’ (Bessie Kelley’s sister) declaration might be accepted as proof that Allan Poe recognized his paternal relationship with FPJ. She declared that Allan lived w/ Bessie & their children in one house as one family. The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads: "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae. Making distinctions between illegitimate & legitimate children and between the illegitimate children of Filipino fathers and illegitimate children of Filipino mothers violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him/her for the indiscretion of his/her parents. When the law provided that the illegitimate child will take the citizenship of his/her mother, it was done to help the child & not to prejudice/discriminate against him. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: xxx (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. The provision makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father. Thus, whether legitimate or illegitimate, FPJ may be considered as a natural-born Filipino citizen. 213

114. MILAGROS JOAQUINO petitioner vs. LOURDES REYES G. R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004 FACTS Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on and they have four children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo Jr. Rodolfo died on September 12, 1981. At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes was living with his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino, with whom she begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed Reyes. Rodolfo’s monthly salary at Warner Barnes & Co. was P15, 000.00 and upon his retirement from said company, Rodolfo Reyes received a lump sum of P315, 011.79 in full payment. During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo and Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they decided to buy the house and lot. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of petitioner and TCT No. S-90293 covering the said property was issued in the name of petitioner only. To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the property, petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo for the latter, to secure a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance Company. An application for mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance Company and a Real Estate Mortgage Contract was executed as collateral to the mortgage loan. The monthly amortizations were paid by Rodolfo Reyes and after his death, the balance of P109,797.64 was paid in full to the Commonwealth Insurance by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes. On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the following findings of the trial court: 1) that the house and lot had been paid in full from the proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes obtained from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; 2) that his salaries and earnings, which were his and Lourdes’ conjugal funds, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed property was conjugal; and 3) that petitioner’s illegitimate children, not having been recognized or acknowledged by him in any of the ways provided by law, acquired no successional rights to his estate. The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional rights of petitioner’s children. Such issues, it said, were not properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and damages and were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose. ISSUE 214

Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the issue of filiation? RULING Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Sustaining the appellate court in Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property. Considerations of due process should have likewise deterred the RTC from ruling on the status of petitioner’s children. It is evident from the pleadings of the parties that this issue was not presented in either the original or the Supplemental Complaint for reconveyance of property and damages; that it was not pleaded and specifically prayed for by petitioner in her Answers thereto; and that it was not traversed by respondents’ Reply to the Supplemental Complaint. Neither did petitioner’s Memorandum, which was submitted to the trial court, raise and discuss this issue. In view thereof, the illegitimate filiation of her children could not have been duly established by the proceedings as required by Article 887 of the Civil Code. In view of the foregoing reasons, the CA cannot be faulted for tackling the propriety of the RTC’s ruling on the status of the children of petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as an error. The general rule -- that only errors assigned may be passed upon by an appellate court – admits of exceptions. Even unassigned errors may be taken up by such court if the consideration of those errors would be necessary for arriving at a just decision or for serving the interest of justice.

115. BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA G. R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005 FACTS Respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). She alleges that there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco’s estate and that she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator. 215

Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco’s estate. 3 In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate. In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999, 11 the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to appoint petitioner-appellant Aleli "Corazon" Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. ISSUES Whether or not respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco. RULING Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 216

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the record to support petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938 While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage. Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or required. Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s property, one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. 116. JUAN CASTRO AND FELICIANA CASTRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL AND BENITA C. NAVAL G. R. No. L-50974-75 May 31, 1989 FACTS In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the defendant alleging, among other things that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on May 27, 1923 (p. 6, Record on Appeal). In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for partition of properties against defendant Benita Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on August 24, 1961 and that they are entitled to the partition of the properties of said deceased (p. 32, Record on Appeal). 217

The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of action (p. 25, Record on Appeal). With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended complaints whereby they converted the original action for partition into an action for quieting of title. Defendant's husband Cipriano Naval was forthwith impleaded as partydefendant (p. 32, Record on Appeal). In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for appointment as receiver and for preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 3762. The trial court, however, denied said petition for appointment of receiver, but granted the petition for writ of preliminary injunction and also adjudged Marcelina Bautista who is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P100. 00 (p. 97, Record on Appeal). Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a receiver and preliminary injunction as well as the motion for contempt were related to the merits of the case, the parties stipulated that evidence therein be considered as evidence in the trial on the merits. During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be resolved in this case is as to whether or not defendant Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro. In view of this stipulation, defendant Benita Naval was allowed to introduce evidence to show that she was indeed the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro. The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio Castro who was already dead were the children of the deceased spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago. Marcelina Bautista, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3763, is the surviving spouse of the deceased Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro died on August 23, 1961 and Pricola Maregmen died on September 11, 1924. It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen, was born on March 27, 1919 in San Bartolome, Tarlac (Exhibit A). Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration of said birth gave the date indicated in the civil registry that he was the father. Benita Castro was later baptized in the Roman Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein the baptismal certificate appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen (Exhibit C). When Eustaquio Castro died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the family in mourning were present, among whom was Benita Castro Naval (Exhibits D and D-1). On this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 218

admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is the forced heir of Eustaquio Castro and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro in Civil Case No. 3763. The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the natural mother of Benita C. Naval who was a resident of Mayantoc, Tarlac, was wedded to Felix de Maya of Anoling Canaling, Tarlac against her wishes on May 23, 1913. While the celebration of the wedding in Anong, Camiling, Tarlac was going on, the guests soon found out that Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the party and went to the house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at Barrio Malacampa, also in Anoling Camiling, Tarlac, and there she cried that she did not want to get married to Felix de Maya. That evening Pricola proceeded to Barrio San Bartolome, Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita Castro Naval. Antonio Maregmen, the brother'. of Pricola Maregmen who was then in the wedding party learned of the disappearance of his sister. He finally found her living with Eustaquio Castro. A few days later Eustaquio Castro accompanied by two persons went to the parents of Pricola Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac and informed them that Pricola was already living with him as husband and wife. Pricola's parents merely submitted to their daughter's wishes, so Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen lived as husband and wife until the death of Pricola on September 11, 1924. There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived with Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marry Pricola. As a result of their cohabitation Benita Castro Naval, herein defendant, was born on March 27, 1919. After the death of her mother, when she was only five years old, she continued to live with her father Eustaquio Castro until his death on August 22, 1961 (Exhibit 11). Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval got married to Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she was taken care of by her father. (Rollo, pp. 11-13). The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the partition of the properties left by him. These properties are the subject of the civil cases. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. ISSUE Whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. HELD First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March 27, 1919 until the father's death on 219

August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child. The private respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro. Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita. Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary period to do so. Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death. Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code (Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra; People v. Villeza. 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Capistrano, et al. v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]) but they add to the equities of this case favoring the petitioner. To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear vested rights in their favor. There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime. 117. LIGAYA GAPUSAN-CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROSPERO PARCON G. R. No. L-46746 March 15, 1990 FACTS Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966 in Bacolod City. Neither her surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor her 220

other known relatives — three (3) sisters and a nephew — made any move to settle her estate judicially. It was Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa Gapusan Parcon, who instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate. About a year and eight months after Felisa's demise, or on January 15, 1968, Ligaya filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate and for issuance of letters of administration in her favor. She also sought her designation as Special Administratrix pending her appointment as regular administratrix. The court granted Ligaya’s application and she was designated as the administratrix. The husband Parcon then filed a motion for reconsideration and asked that he be appointed instead alleging that Ligaya's exhibits did not constitute conclusive proof of her claimed status of acknowledged natural child, for the reason that in another document, Felisa's application for membership in Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation (NOTF), merely named Ligaya as her "adopted daughter” and that the same was only sold to Felisa when she was just an infant. ISSUE Whether or not Ligaya is indeed a daughter of Felisa and that she could be appointed as administratrix. RULING It is admitted on all sides that no judicial action or proceeding was ever brought during the lifetime of Felisa to compel her to recognize Ligaya as her daughter. It is also evident that Ligaya's recognition as Felisa's daughter was not made in a record of birth or a will, a circumstance which would have made judicial approval unnecessary, only her own consent to the recognition being required. The acknowledgment was made in authentic writings, and hence, conformably with the legal provisions above cited, judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been executed during Ligaya's minority. 17 In other words, the question of whether or not the absence of judicial approval negated the effect of the writings as a mode of recognition of Ligaya is dependent upon the latter's age at the time the writings were made. Upon the foregoing facts and considerations, Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code, to bear her mother's surname, and to receive the hereditary portion accorded to her by the Code. 118. ROSENDO HERRERA vs. ROSENDO ALBA, et al. G. R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005 FACTS 221

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus: In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals, namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, and to submit the results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties are further reminded of the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of other evidence in support of the petition. On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. ISSUES 222

Whether or not a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit. RULING Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against selfincrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with approval: Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial compulsion."56 The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence. 119. MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR. A. M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995 FACTS The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of 223

respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge." In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years. Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier, respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely: B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970, Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971, Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975 by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. Respondent admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were only three words to choose from, namely: Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose the word "single", it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged. ISSUE Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Gross Immorality and deceitful misconduct by contracting a bigamous marriage. RULING By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and 224

strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690). As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code. With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates (Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides: Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code: (Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus: Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia v. Sempio Diy). 225

It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent. It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled,Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by this Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of his family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. However, respondent was reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live Separately from Bed", with a stipulation that they allow each of the other spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be, without the objection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children. 120. MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES G. R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995 FACTS On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00. On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of 226

her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967. On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the court a quopassed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's order dated January 9, 1992. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters. ISSUE Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized? RULING In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay. It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals 227

principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper (those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other")? A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived by law to simulate a fact or condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what it purports to be. In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter. Does this cluster of rights include the right to be legitimated? Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the basis of rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing the substantive provisions of the law in force. Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the new provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on the classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the corresponding rights they are entitled to under the law. Thus, the title on "Paternity and Filiation" devotes two whole chapters to legitimate children alone, and one chapter on those deemed by law to be possessed of the rights of the former, such as legitimated children, because of their compliance with certain requisites laid down by law; two other chapters deal with illegitimate children composed of recognized natural children, and those other than natural, or spurious, whether recognized or not. The well-ordered delineation of such distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and separate one from the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights accruing to the different categories of children. It must be noted that before said Code was enacted, other classes of illegitimate children were recognized, such as, "manceres" or the offspring of 228

prostitutes and the "sacrilegious" or children of those who had received Holy Orders. Subsequently, the Civil Code, in an effort to keep in step with modern times, limited illegitimate filiation to those which are incestuous, adulterous and illicit. At the core of the institution of legitimacy held sacrosanct by Spanish tradition and culture, lies the "inviolable social institution" known as marriage. This union, absent any formal or substantial defect or of any vice of consent, is virtually adamantine. On the whole, the status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy. Without such marriage, the natural child's rights depend on whether he is acknowledged or recognized by his parents, but he does not rise to the level of a legitimate child in the manner that the legitimated child does. A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is declared a nullity is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is the law which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child. Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or derisively denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There is no marriage — valid or otherwise — which would give any semblance of legality to the child's existence. Nothing links child to parent aside from the information appearing in the birth certificate. When such child is recognized by one or both parents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approaching those of his legitimate counterparts. The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and support. Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. Thus, they "shall principally use the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants and descendants, 4 as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents, 5 and to other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced." Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction shall principally use the surname of the father. 7 If a natural child is recognized by only one parent, the child shall follow the surname of such 229

recognizing parent. 8 Both types of children are entitled to receive support from the parent recognizing them. 9They also cannot be deprived of their legitime equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latter's estate. Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally, take the latter's surname. The only support which they are entitled to is from the recognizing parent, and their legitime, also to be taken from the free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child. It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly secured by law, the legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the free portion of the hereditary estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceed said portion. Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above mentioned. These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditary rights are concerned. It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children. It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal fiction. This conclusion is arrived at through a syllogism as simple as it is deceptive, which runs as follows: The respondent's children are natural children by legal fiction. Therefore, they have the same acknowledged natural children.

status,

rights

and

obligations

Acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated. 230

as

Ergo, respondent's children have the right to be legitimated (as in fact they were "deemed legitimated" by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in 1967). The above line of reasoning follows the Euclidian geometric proposition that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. This may hold true in the realm of instructional, as opposed to descriptive science, where the former calls for the application of absolute, mathematical rules with precision but not to the latter, particularly those which deal with the social sciences where human relationships are central to a study whose main concern is not to leave out anything of significance. The former deals with inanimate things, those which a scientist has described as the "dead aspect of nature," excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining absolute results and nothing more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole truth as with those aspects or parts only through which the inexorable result can be obtained. To apply the strict rules of syllogism, where the basic premise is defective, to the arena of paternity and filiation, especially in the determination of the status and rights of the different kinds of illegitimate children vis-a-vis the legitimate ones, is bound to spawn mischief and results never intended by the framers of the provisions of the law under review. Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it may eventually be postulated that "adulterous children shall enjoy the status, rights and obligations of legitimate children," a doctrine which no moral philosophy under our social and cultural milieu can countenance. This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are "natural" can be legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged natural children (and, consequently, natural children by legal fiction) a "right" to be legitimized when no such right exists. Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege, available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents. The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the second union affected by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wife? Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our archaic law on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to extend, to 231

natural children by legal fiction. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law. Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share. The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple and unmistakable language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all point to the correctness of petitioner's claim. If it should be asserted that we now trench on a gray area of law that calls for interpretation, or a lacuna that cries for filling up, then we have to pierce the shroud unintentionally created by the letter of the law and expose its spirit as evincing intent, in this case one which decidedly favors legitimacy over illegitimacy. The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a valid marriage. Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction. 121. MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, et al. vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, et al. G. R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009 FACTS Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef and Janelle Ann on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo on June 4, 1980.

232

Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City. In the annotation and remarks portion, it was written: Annotation/Rema :Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza rks on January 13, 1997" Remarks :

Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy 7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her copetitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner’s main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. RULING 233

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

g. On the Use of Surnames 122. ELAINE A. MOORE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. L-18407 June 26, 1963 FACTS Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that her child by a former marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read William Michael Velarde Moore. After publishing the petition as required by law, trial was held during which the parties submitted a stipulation of facts. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the petition whereupon petitioner interposed the present appeal. Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an American citizen, out of whose wedlock a child by the name of William Michael Velarde was born. This child, now 14 years old, was born on January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by the Superior Court of the State of California on May 31, 1949. After said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time. He was supported by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were his true father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his family name Velarde. ISSUES 1. Whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother. 234

2. Whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name; and whether petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the authority or personality to ask for such a change. RULING Anent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand for the reason that our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a matter of fact, Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Mention is also made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde. We find tenable this observation of government's counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush aside. Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. Any way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner premature. 123. IN RE: DIONESIO AND BOMBI ROBERTO DIVINAGRACIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. G. R. No. L-55538 March 15, 1982 FACTS Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, 1970. They begot two children named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto who were born on October 23, 1970 and July 22, 1973, respectively.

235

Zosima's husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. He never returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Congressman Maglana in the sum of P50,000.00, one Galagar in the sum of P10,000.00 also Eloy Gallentes and other persons. The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two minor children and their scapegrace father, Zosima, on August 10, 1978, filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname (Special Proceeding No. 768). After due publication and hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. The trial court did not consider as sufficient grounds for change of surname the circumstances that the children's father was a swindler, that he had abandoned them and that his marriage to Zosima was a second marriage which, however, had not been annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the children's adoption of their mother's surname would give a false impression of family relationship. From that decision, Zosima Naldoza appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. Appellant's seven assignments of error may be reduced to the question of whether there is a justification for the two children to drop their father's surname and use their mother's surname only. The minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname (Art. 364, Civil Code). To allow them, at their mother's behest, to bear only their mother's surname (which they are entitled to use together with their father's surname) and to discard altogether their father's surname thus removing the primafacie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. The mother's desire should not be the sole consideration. ISSUE Whether or not two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname. RULING The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court). Where, as in this 236

case, the petitioners are minors, the courts should take into account whether the change of name would redound their welfare or would prejudice them. Where the petitioner, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother and a Japanese, elected Philippine citizenship, and her older brother and sister were using their mother's surname, and the petitioner felt embarrassed in using her Japanese father's surname (Oshita) because of the ill-feeling harbored by some Filipinos against the Japanese, and there was no showing that her desire to use the maternal surname (Bartolome) was motivated by any fraudulent purpose or that the change of surname would prejudice public interest, her petition to change her surname from Oshita to Bartolome was granted (Oshita vs. Republic, L-21180, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 700). Where the petitioner's name in the civil registry is Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte, Duterte being the surname of her father Filomeno, who was married to her mother, Estrella Alfon, but the petitioner since infancy has used the name Estrella S. Alfon, particularly in the school and voting records, there is reasonable ground for allowing her to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon. Such a change would avoid confusion (Alfon vs. Republic, G.R. No. 51201, May 29, 1980,97 SCRA 858). The instant case is easily distinguishable from the Oshita and AIfon cases where the petitioners were already of age. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. The reasons adduced for eliminating the father's surname are not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records (Exh. C and D). As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname. See Anno., 53 ALR2d 914. 124. IN RE: DOLORES GEMORA PADILLA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. L-28274 April 30, 1982 FACTS 237

This is an appeal by the State from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga perfected before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 5440 — granting the petition of Dolores Gemora for change of surname of her minor children: Michael, Abigail, Rafael, Gabriel and Annabelle, from "Copuaco" or "Co" to "Padilla". Dolores Gemora and Vincent Co, a Chinese national, were married on May 5, 1954. This matrimonial union begot five children, namely: Michael Copuaco, Abigail Copuaco, Rafael Copuaco, Gabriel Copuaco, and Annabelle Co. Sometime in November 1960, Vincent Co left the conjugal abode in Caloocan City and has since never returned to, or even visited, his family. It is alleged that he was a fugitive from justice, having been charged with several offenses of estafa before the Court of First Instance of Manila and the City Court of Caloocan City. Because of his continuous absence, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on petition of Dolores Gemora, issued an order dated December 29, 1964 in Sp. Proc. No. 1776, declaring Vincent Co as an absentee. On October 30, 1965, Dolores Gemora contracted a second marriage with Sgt. Edward Padilla, an Americas serviceman stationed at Clark Air Base, Angeles City. The five minor children, who had been living with said spouses, were generously supported by Padilla and were treated by him with affection as if they were his own children. This harmonious relation existing between said minors and their stepfather prompted Dolores Gemora to file the instant petition for change of the minors' surname from "Copuaco" or "Co" to "Padilla", which petition was granted by the lower court after due notice and hearing. ISSUE Whether or not a child could use a surname of a man not his father.

RULING We find merit in the contention of the Solicitor General that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their father. Said minors are the legitimate children of Vincent Co; and Article 364 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "legitimate children ... shall principally use the surname of their father." To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the 238

coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit. The case before Us is not of first impression. In Moore vs. Republic, a case involving the same factual melieu, We held that: Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father. Article 364 of the Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father, and Article 369 of the same Code provides that in case of annulment of a voidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment shall principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it is correctly concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father. If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. While the purpose which may have animated petitioner, the minor's mother, is plausible and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the family of her second husband, there is a legal barrier which cannot at present be overlooked or brushed aside. Apart from the legal obstacles discussed above, We consider the instant action taken by petitioner in behalf of her minor children to be premature. Indeed, the matter of change of their surname should better be left to the judgment and discretion of the children themselves when they reach the age of maturity. If in their adulthood they want to change their surname, then they themselves or any of them may take such appropriate action as the law may permit.

125. HATIMA C. YASIN vs. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT G. R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995 FACTS 239

The summary case filed by the petitioner, a divorcee, to resume the use of her maiden name was denied by the Shari’a Court, holding that said petition needed to go through a judicial process under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name. RULING Rule 103 of the Rules of Court should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorcee woman to reuse her maiden name and surname. A woman marrying a man is not required to seek judicial authority to use her husband’s name. In the same way, when the marriage ties no longer exists, in case of death or divorce, as authorized in the Muslim Code, the widow/divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to reuse her maiden name. Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband’s surname during the marriage (Art. 370), after annulment of the marriage (Art 371), and after the death of the husband (Art. 373), is permissive and not obligatory, except in the case of legal separation (Art. 372). Thus, the Court ruled that women need not undergo a special proceeding to change her name back to her maiden name after a divorce. 126. CONSTANCIA CONSUELO DAVID G. R. No. L-41427

TOLENTINO

vs.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

AND

JUNE 10, 1988

FACTS This case is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1931, respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentiono. That on September 15, 1943, said marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law enforced during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least three (3) continuous years. After obtaining the divorced decree, Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but the latter died soon after the said marriage. Arturo Tolentino, then contracted another marriage with Constancia Tolentino on April 21, 1945, the herein present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino to whom he had three (3) children. Consuelo David on the other hand, continues using the surname Tolentino even after the divorce decree was obtained even up to the filing of the instant complaint. She contended that the usage of Tolentino surname was authorized by the family of Arturo, particularly his brothers and sisters.

240

The Trial Court however, ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname Tolentino, which ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. ISSUES 1. Whether or not petitioner’s cause of action already prescribed. 2. Whether or not, the petitioner an exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced. RULING Article 1150 of the Civil Code states that the time of prescription of all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordain otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Article 1149 further provides for the period of prescription which is five (5) years from the right of action accrues. Thus the action of petitioner has long prescribed because she acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951. But the filing of instant complaint was only lodged on November 23, 1971, 20 years after she acquired the knowledge. On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman may continue using the surname of her former husband, Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. It is significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art. 370 of the Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband's surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it." Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks of annulment while the case before us refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to the petitioner would be an act of serious dislocation to her. She has given proof that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for illegal purposes. The court thus rule that the use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge on the rights of the petitioner. Considering the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent who may be seriously prejudiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to further legal procedures in reconstituting documents and altering legal transactions where she used the surname Tolentino, and the effects on the private respondent who, while still not remarried, will have to use a surname different from the surnames of her 241

own children, we find it just and equitable to leave things as they are, there being no actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for injunctive relief. 127. ZENAIDA F. DAPAR ALIAS ZENAIDA D. BIASCAN vs. GLORIA LOZANO BIASCAN AND MARIO BIASCAN G. R. No. 141880 September 27, 2004 FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV- No. 57306 reversing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 120, in Civil Case No. C-16184 and its Resolution3 denying the motion for the reconsideration thereof. Sometime in 1966, Spouses Gloria and Mario Biascan were married by civil rights in Quezon City. They have four (4) children. Mario Biascan, worked in Saudi Arabia as an overseas contract worker from 1977 to 1981. It was in 1979 when he met Zenaida Dapar, who was then a domestic helper and become Mario’s lover resulting to the latter’s failure to send support to his family. Zenaida returned to the Philippines in 1981. Thereafter, Mario’s returned to the country. He joined Zenaida and both live together in a rented house in Pag-asa Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. They opened a joint account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Later, Mario returned to Saudi Arabia while Zenaida was left behind and was working in a garment factory. Mario then sent his earnings to Zenaida to their PNB joint account. Zenaida’s relatives also sent her money to the same account she has with Mario. On July 8, 1985, a contract to sell was executed by and between State Land Investment Corporation, on the one hand, and "Sps. Mario M. Biascan/ & Zenaida D. Biascan," on the other, over a parcel of land consisting of 150 square meters, described as Lot 11, Block 2, Narra St., Hillcrest Village, Camarin Road, Novaliches, Caloocan City for P177,189.00. A Deed of Sale was, thereafter, executed in favor of the "Sps. Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan” to which the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was based. . Thereafter, on May 3, 1993, the RTC of Caloocan City rendered its Decision14 in Civil Case No. C-259, declaring that Zenaida was a co-owner of the subject lot but which decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the filing of the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE

242

Whether or not there Zenaida Dapar is a co-owner of the property purchased by her and Mario and if there was usurpation on the part of Zenaida in using Mario Biascan’s surname. RULING The trial court ruled that the law on co-ownership governed the property relations of Mario and Zenaida, who were living in an adulterous relationship or in a state of concubinage at the time the house and lot in question was acquired. The trial court further explained that under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money shall be owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions, and in the event that the amount of such contributions could not be determined, as in the present case, they shall be presumed to be equal. The trial court concluded that the shares of Mario and Zenaida as described in TCT No. 207197 was in accordance with the sharing prescribed in Article 148. As such, there was no legal basis to order the reconveyance of the one-half share of the petitioner in favor of Gloria Biascan. The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person. None of the foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. Mario Biascan allowed the petitioner to use his surname. It would appear that the very first time that Zenaida Dapar’s name had the surname Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had executed the affidavit of undertaking in connection with his employment in Saudi Arabia, wherein he designated as his beneficiary Zenaida Dapar Biascan. 128. ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. 18008 October 30, 1962 FACTS The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was 243

claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. ISSUE Whether or not, Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband. RULING In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasions for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. 129. MA. AMELITA VILLAROSA vs. HRET, et al. G. R. No. 143351 September 14, 2000 FACTS This case is an election protest filed by private respondent Ricardo V. Quintos (hereafter QUINTOS) against petitioner Amelita C. Villarosa (hereafter VILLAROSA) before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereafter HRET). VILLAROSA and QUINTOS were the only candidates for the office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 11 May 1998 synchronized national and local elections. On 27 May 1998 the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VILLAROSA as the winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes. On 4 June 1998 QUINTOS filed an election protest against VILLAROSA contesting the results of the election in all the 882 precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro on the following grounds: (1) the ballots were misread and counted in favor of protestee; (2) there was rampant substitute voting, i.e., persons other than the registered voters voted; (3) violence and intimidation were committed by protestee and her followers against known supporters of protestant to enhance protestee’s candidacy; 4) previously prepared ballots for the protestee were deposited in the ballot boxes; and (5) illiterate Mangyan voters voting for protestant were assisted 244

by self-appointed assistors of protestee, who wrote “JTV” on the ballots contrary to the instruction of said illiterate voters. Quintos contested the proclaimation of Amelita Villarosa whether “JTV” vote should be counted in favour of Villarosa. JTV is the nickname of Villarosa’s husband who is the incumbent representative of Occidental Mindoro. ISSUE Whether or not “JTV” vote should be counted in favour Villarosa when said acronym is the nickname of Villarosa’s husband. RULING From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of VILLAROSA was evident when, in her certificate of candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in question whom she wanted to succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose credibility is essential in preserving democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria sua propia. No one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. Howsoever viewed, public respondent HRET did not commit any abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its determination was whether “JTV” votes or variations thereof should be counted in favor of VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes. 130. JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ AND MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ “AQUINO,” et al. vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA G. R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009 FACTS Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz, herein referred to as petitioner, cohabited with Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino, without the benefit of marriage. During the period of the said cohabitation, petitioner got pregnant. Almost two months before the birth of their first born child, Christian Dominique Aquino died. When their child, Christian Dela Cruz Aquino, co-petitioner was born, petitioner applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname Aquino with the Office of the City Registrar, Antipolo City, attaching among others the live birth of the child, an affidavit to use the surname of the father, an affidavit of acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father and an autobiography written by Dominique’s own handwriting which autobiography did not bear Dominique’s signature and which application for registration under the surname Aquino was denied by respondent Ronal Paul Gracia in his capacity as the Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, hence this petition. ISSUE 245

Whether or not an unsigned autobiography personally written by Dominique (deceased) constitutes an admission of paternity in a “private handwritten instrument” that would warrant permission for the child to use the surname of the deceased father. RULING The court via Petition for Review on Certiorari ruled in the affirmative. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. Furthermore, Article 175, Family Code states that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate affiliation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 states that filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or final judgment or secondly by means of an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concern.

h. On Adoption of Children 131. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA G. R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 FACTS On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname. After careful consideration of the trial court, herein petition for adoption was granted and Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an 246

adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, the present petition ISSUE Whether or not, an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. RULING There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child, without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.

132. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS & SPS. JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES G. R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993 FACTS James Anthony Hughes, an American married Lenita Mabuhay Hughes, a Filipina, who was later naturalized as US Citizen. Sometime in 1990, Spouses Hughes filed a petition to adopt three minor children who are minor niece and nephews of Lenita, in the person of Ma. Cecilia, Neil, Mario, all surnamed Mabunay who lived with them even prior to filing of petition. The minors as well as their parents consented to the adoption. The Regional Trial Court of Angeles City granted the petition, which decision was also later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence the filing of this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE Whether or not the spouses Hughes can legally adopt the children. RULING The court ruled that James Anthony Hughes cannot adopt. Under article 184 of the family code, James being an alien cannot adopt and he is not under 247

the exceptions provided for in the law. Lenita on the other hand cannot also adopt being barred under article 185 which states among others that she and her husband must jointly adopt the children not being their illegitimate or legitimate children. James cannot be a nominal party. It must be noted that adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to the legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption such as exercise of parental authority, use of surname of adopter by adoptee, support and successional rights. 133. IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME: JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR G. R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005 FACTS Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. ISSUE Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the cause mentioned? RULING The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 134. ISABELITA LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO 248

G. R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003

FACTS Dr. Diosdado Lahom and his wife Isabelita Lahom, herein referred to as petitioner adopted her nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo at the age of two. The adoption decree was granted on 5 May 1972. However, due to sad turn of events, Mrs. Lahom after the death of her husband commence the filing of a petition to rescind the decree of adoption a December of 1999, before RTC Branch 22 of Naga City, contending among others that respondent refused to use his adopted surname and instead used his surname Sibulo, disregarding the feelings of herein petitioner. Furthermore, respondent remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner and his insensible attitude strained their “parent-child” relationship which caused the petitioner to suffer wounded feelings. Respondent on the other hand moved for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and that petitioner had no cause of action in view of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8552 on March 22, 1998. The Regional Trial Court, having been designated as a Family Court has jurisdiction to try this instant case. As to the matter of no cause of action, the court quoted Art. VI, Section 19 of R.A. No. 8552 which deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code, thus there is lack of cause of action on petitioner’s part. Furthermore, the action to rescind the decree of adoption has long prescribed as provided for under section 5, Rule 100 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, Petitioner’s Petition to rescind the decree of adoption against respondent is hereby dismissed, hence the filing of this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the subject adoption decreed on 5 May 1972, may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R. A. No. 8552? 2. Whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed? RULING The court ruled in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 8552 which took effect on 22 March 1998, secured the rights and privileges of the adopted. Most importantly it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. In the instant case, it was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975 which law has already been abrogated and repealed. Hence, the action for rescission of the adoption decree could no longer be pursued. Futhermore, the action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the 249

Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. 135. HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. RONALD and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO G. R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 FACTS Herbert and Anna Marie Cang were husband and wife who have three children. Later, the spouses were legally separated and the court awarded the custody of the children to Anna Marie. Herbert, on the other hand, went to the United States and got naturalized as an American citizen but continuously supported his children as required by the court. Later on, Anna Marie entrusted the custody of the children to her childless brother and sister-in-law. The latter filed a special proceedings for the adoption of the children. Only Anna Marie’s consent was attached to the petition without including Herbert’s consent. She submits that his consent is not necessary because the latter has abandoned the children. Upon learning such fact, Herbert immediately sent a telegram manifesting his opposition to the adoption proceedings. He presented as evidence the letters of the children to him showing their love and affection and the certification of US banks showing that even prior to the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of the children. Notwithstanding the opposition, the lower court issued the decree of adoption in favor of Anna Marie’s brother and ruled that Herbert’s written consent is not necessary based on the findings that he had abandoned the children. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. RULING While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. 250

The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, the finding of the court a quo on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record. Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry, Adoptionand Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino children. The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible. Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them. 136. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM G. R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009 FACTS Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. She married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children,were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia 251

Ayuban (Ayuban) because their parents were unknown. The couple was so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The y name the children Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, Lim died. Petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption and so is Michael who also gave his consent to his adoption. In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. ISSUE Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt. RULING The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the 252

application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.

i. On Support 137. PERLA PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO DARIO III. et al. G. R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006 FACTS Marcelino Dario died intestate and leaving a parcel of land with residential house and pre- school building. He was survived by his wife Perla Patricio, the petitioner and sons namely, Marcelino Marc Dario and herein respondent, Marcelino Dario IIII who has a minor child named as Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV living with them. Thereafter, the heirs agreed to extrajudicially settled the estate of the deceased and accordingly, the Transfer Certificate Title was issued in the names of the herein parties. The petitioner and Marcelino Marc then asked the respondent to partition the property left but respondent refused to do so. As such, petitioner and Marcelino Marc filed an action for partition before Regional Trial Court (RTC). Respondent asserted that the family home cannot be partitioned while his minor son who is the grandson of the decedent is still living therein. He insisted that as long as his son is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. 253

Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the property remained as family home of the surviving heirs of the decedent only up to the 10th year from the death of the latter. She argued that since the children of the decedent were already of age at the time of the death of their father, there is no minor beneficiary to speak of. RTC rendered its decision ordering that the property be divided: 4/6 for the petitioner and 1/6 for Marcelino Marc as well as for the respondent. Respondent appealed the decision of RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA) which was denied by the latter. However, on Motion for Reconsideration, the CA dismissed the complaint for partition contending that the family home should continue despite the death of the one or both of the spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The CA considered Marcelino Lorenzo as the minor beneficiary of the family home. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUES 1. Whether the family home be partitioned despite the refusal of the respondent on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home? 2. Whether Marcelino Lorenzo can be considered as a beneficiary of the family home? RULING 1. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of the one or both of the spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reason therefore. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. As such, if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until the beneficiary becomes of age. The minor child of the respondent is not considered as the beneficiary of the family home as to bar its partition for reasons subsequently explain in the next paragraph. Thus, the subject property could be partitioned since there are no longer minor beneficiaries of the family home and no persons can be compelled to stay in a co- ownership indefinitely. 2. Anent to the 2nd issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Family Code provides that the beneficiaries of the family home are: husband and wife, or unmarried person who is the head of the family; and the 254

parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters whether legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. Thus, it is required inorder for the descendant to become a beneficiary of the family home that he is living in the family home and he is dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. In the instant case, although, Marcelino Lorenzo is the descendant of the decedent and living in the property in issue, he is not dependent for support upon the decedent or the head of the family because the legal support he needed is given by his father, the herein respondent. Thus, not all the requisites are present inorder for Marcelino Lorenzo to be treated as minor beneficiary of the family home. Consequently, the property in issue could be partitioned since Marcelino Lorenzo is not among the beneficiaries of the family home. 138. CARMEN QUIMIGUING vs. FELIX ICAO G. R. No. L-26795 July 31, 1970 FACTS Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, filed a complaint for support and damages against Felix Icao in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte. She averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court. ISSUE Whether or not an unborn child is entitled to support or damages? RULING A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, 255

has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendantappellee even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code). A married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. “Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage(Article 21, Civil Code).” Furthermore, under paragraph 3 of Art. 2219 moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction, abduction, rape and other lascivious acts. Independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error. 139. CECILIO MENDOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUISA MENDOZA G. R. No. L-23102 April 27, 1967 FACTS Cecilio and Luisa were married; the former went to United State to pursue his studies, Cecilio also works in a hospital and he was earning $200 a month. The wife filed an action for support against the husband on the ground that she was neglected and abandoned without means of sustenance taking into consideration that she is also pregnant. The husband filed a motion to dismiss for failure to observed earnest effort toward a compromise before filing a complaint against member of a family under Art 222 of the civil code (now article 151 Family Code). ISSUE Whether or not support may be subject of a valid compromise. RULING A future support cannot be a subject of a valid compromise this is an exception to the general rule that “no suit between members of the family shall prosper unless earnest efforts toward a compromise have been previously exerted.”

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140. FELICIANO SANCHEZ vs. FRANCISCO ZULUETA G. R. No. 45616 May 16, 1939 FACTS In civil case of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, wherein Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez are plaintiffs and Feliciano Sanchez is defendant, the plaintiffs ask that the defendant be sentenced to pay them a monthly allowance for support. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the wife and child, respectively, of the defendant; that the latter, since 1932, refused and still refuses to support the plaintiffs; that the latter have no means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the United States Army a monthly pension of P174.20; that the defendant abandoned the plaintiffs without any justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The defendant alleges, as special defense, that the plaintiff Josefa Diego abandoned without his knowledge or consent and committed adultery which she had a child as a result of the illicit relations, which is the other plaintiff Mario Sanchez. The lower court granted the prayer of the plaintiff by way of allowance pendente lite, In opposition to his petition, the defendant alleged that Mario Sanchez is not his legitimate child but is the adulterous child and he asked for an oppurtunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense. The court, without acceding to this petition of the defendant to adduce evidence, favorably acted upon the application of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to pay a monthly allowance pendente lite. In view of these facts, the defendant filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals against the judge of the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the defendant comes to this court on certiorari. ISSUES 1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing the defendant to present evidence? 2. Whether or not the proof of adulterous child is a valid ground not to give support? RULING The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support. Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, 257

for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. The failure to accompany the opposition therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to present evidence has been asked. It may be that the defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his opposition, but he may have on hand other evidence of greater weight. If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity.al law library The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite, to the extent which the court determine, without special pronouncement as to the costs. 141. MARIA QUINTANA vs. GELASIO LERMA G. R. No. L-7426 February 5, 1913 FACTS This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a sum of money due upon a contract between the plaintiff and defendant husband and wife, for support. The action is by a wife against her husband for support. It is based upon a written contract. The evidence shows that the parties were lawfully married in 1901 and that in February, 1905, they entered into a written agreement of separation whereby each renounced certain rights as against the other and divided the conjugal property between them, the defendant undertaking in consideration of the premises to pay the plaintiff within the first three days of each month the sum of P20 for her support and maintenance. In the original answer, the defendant set up as a special defense that the wife had forfeited her right to support by committing adultery. This allegation was stricken out by the court on motion, upon the ground that under the provisions of article 152 of the Civil Code the commission of adultery is not recognized as a ground upon which the obligation to support ceases. Notwithstanding that such special defense was stricken out by order of the court, the defendant, after plaintiff had filed an amended complaint, inserted 258

the same defense in his answer to the amended complaint. The court upon the trial, however, refused to recognize such defense or to permit any evidence to be introduced in support thereof, to which the defendant duly excepted. ISSUE Is the the special defense of the defendant that the wife had forfeited her right to support by committing adultery tenable? RULING Article 1432 of the Civil Code provides: "In default of express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case provided by article 50." Under this article the agreement in suit is void. The wife, however, has a right of action against her husband for support under the provisions of the Civil Code and, although the contract in question is void, her right of action does not for that reason fail. The special defense of adultery set up by the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action. The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, with instructions to permit the interposition of the special defense of adultery and such amendments of the complaint and answer as may be necessary to carry this judgment into effect. 142. JOSE LAM vs. ADRIANA CHUA G. R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004 FACTS Adriana Chua filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose Lam.Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul. Based on the allegations and evidence presented by the petitioner, the court (RTC) granted the petition and ruled that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was null and void for being bigamous by nature. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision for support of the child as 259

embodied in the decision dated February 28, 1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child. On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam’s motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision rendered by RTC. ISSUE Whether or not, the compromise agreement between petitioner and respondent where they bound themselves to contribute the amount of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (p250,000.00) to a common fund for the benefit of their child does not bar the trial court in annulment case to again award support in favor of the child. RULING The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula, we held that another action for support could be filed again by the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We further held in said case that: . . .”Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.” Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support. 260

143. DOLORES MONTEFALCON, et al. vs. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ G. R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008 FACTS In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint [4] for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. . Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to copetitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.[5] According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur. Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons. Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for lack of proper service of summons. In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at "10 Int. President Garcia St., Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila" upon petitioners' motion. Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted service on Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's surname. On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned as he had allegedly moved to another place and left no new address In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers, explaining that they had no ill-motive and that Dolores gave a truthful testimony. The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations by his silence. It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth, being a public document, is irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was granted by the court. [13] Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as in 261

awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly "excessive and exorbitant." The appellate court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was "defective" as there was no explanation of impossibility of personal service. ISSUES 1. Whether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction over his person. 2. Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence. RULING Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service[24] had Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It was only when a judgment against him was rendered by the trial court that he questioned the validity of service of summons before the appellate court. Such failure to appear, and then later to question the court's jurisdiction over his person, should not be taken against herein petitioners. Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only came to know of the case when his mother told him about the trial court's decision and the sheriff's return on the substituted service which carries a presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of more faith and credit. The sheriff's certificate of service of summons isprima facie evidence of the facts set out in it. Under Article 195 (4).of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family..Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant. In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the substituted service of summons and remanding the case. As there was valid substituted service of summons under the circumstances of this case, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over his person and correctly ordered him to pay past and present monthly support to his illegitimate child as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses to petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 262

144. EDWARD V. LACSON vs. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON G. R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006 FACTS Petitioner husband left the conjugal home. Since their separation, wife did not ask the husband for support, relying initially on a note of commitment by the husband to give support. Wife, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against husband for support RTC when first child was about to graduate from college. Husband contends that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. Petitioner claims that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, since no previous extrajudicial nor judicial demand have been made by the respondents. ISSUE Whether or not the husband is liable for support. RULING SC held that requisite demand for support appears to have been already been made through the note that husband left in his wife Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less than a demand because it came by way of a request or plea. Any third person may furnish support to a needy individual with the right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. Amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.

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