Constitutional Law Cases 4

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES – CHAPTER 5 Jann Claudine M. Amago 4 – B

parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.

ARTICLE 2 – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

12.ID.; ID.—The true principle should be that if the respondent is

Section 1 – Republicanism

within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court, and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.

A.

13.ID.; ID.—Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has

Nemo est supra leges

1. Villavicencio vs. Lukban Facts: Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes. Issue: Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men. Ruling:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT OF DOMICILE; LlBERTY; HABEAS CORpus; CONTEMPT.—One hundred and seventy women,

who had lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to comply with the order of the court.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The remedies of the unhappy victims of official

oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was never intended effectively and promptly to meet a situation in which there is restraint of liberty. That the act may be a crime and that the person may be proceeded against is also no bar to the institution of habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles, but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.

4.ID.; ID.—The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in American jurisprudence.

11.ID.; ID.—The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved

illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ, is no reason why the writ should not issue.

14.ID. ; ID.—The place of confinement is not important to the relief if the guilty party is within the reach of process so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp.

15.ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT.—For respondents to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas corpus, three courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these ,persons could not safely be brought before the Court; or (3) they could have. presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.)

16.CONTEMPT OF COURT.—The power to punish for contempt of

court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. . Only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. 17.ID.—When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. 18.ID.—An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ -of habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.

19.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS.—The Government of the Philippine Islands is a. government of laws. The court will assist in retaining it as a government of laws and not of men. 20.ID, ; ID.—No official, however high, is above the law. 21.ID.; ID.—The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official. Principle of Checks and Balances 2.

Senate vs. Ermita

Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; In light of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege, though she may authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her.—In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is

1

not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.—When an official is being summoned by Congress on a

Issue: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464; Section 3 of E.O. 464 is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated— that such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.—The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure “respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.” That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that “[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself. Facts: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation

Ruling: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may

2

only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. 3.

In re: Manzano It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary). Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that— Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: 2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less. This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. 4.

Angara vs Electoral Commission *Check Judge A Consti notes

5.

Casibang vs. Aquino Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang,his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

Constitutional Law; Elections; The 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic election protest cases that were pending.—Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases.

Same; Same; Security of Tenure; Grant to continue in office cannot be applied to incumbents whose election is under protest or contest.—The constitutional grant of privilege to continue

in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidateelect’s right to the contested office. x x x The Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot.

Same; Same; Same; Right of incumbent to continue holding office indefinitely under Sec. 9, Article XVII of the new Constitution is based on a proclamation that he has been duly elected.—The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue

in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legality of the election is a requisite for indefinite incumbency in office.—Until a subsequent law or

presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution:

Same; Same; Same; “Term of Office” distinguished from “Right to hold office.”—There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A ‘term’ of office is the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. x x x Although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their respective offices.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction to try of Election Contests.—While

under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (Par. 2 of. Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions. 6.

Tanada vs. Cuenco*Check Judge A Consti notes

7.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC

3

Facts:

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendumplebiscite of October 16. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the ReferendumPlebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. Issue: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution. Ruling: YES. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature. 8. Daza vs. Singson Facts: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Issue: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s expanded jurisdiction includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the goverment; Case at bar.—To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing consideration, that the issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same maybe brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised maybe addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. Non – delegation of powers 9.

Philippine InterIsland Shipping Association vs. CA It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for an increase in pilotagerates was given by the then President Marcos through the issuance of an E.O No. 1088 “PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICESRENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLICPORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.” During that time the President was exercising legislative power and was authorized

4

However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued hastily and it was just an Administrative Order whereby PPA has the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and evenentirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to acontract.. Actually Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines is just an intervenor in the factual milieu that lead us to this issue. For Purposes of Admin Law we should not care about it. Issue: Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA has the powerto modify the same.Held: EO 1088 is a law. The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to revise the ratespreviously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could inturn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 4386,which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid forpilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issuedby the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in theexercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law,as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statutebecause that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determineswhether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature.Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services,including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As then President Marcos in the exercise of legislative powers could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857.—Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fix rates. On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. No. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, §20(a) in the PPA “to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees . . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot be denied that Congress may intervene anytime despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with wagefixing powers, by virtue of the former’s plenary power of legislation, and when Congress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative lawmaking in an area where initiative and expertise are required.—The case presented is similar to the fixing of wages under the Wage Rationalization Act (R.A. No. 6727) whereby minimum wages are determined by Congress and provided by law, subject to revision by Wage Boards should later conditions warrant their revision. It cannot be denied that Congress may intervene anytime despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with wagefixing powers, by virtue of the former’s plenary power of legislation. When Congress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative lawmaking in an area where initiative and expertise are required.

Power of Subordinate Legislation 10. Miners Association vs. Factoran Facts: Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. Issue: Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid? Ruling: YES. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on nonimpairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

5

Legislative Standard need not be expressed 11. Chionbian vs. Orbos Facts: Pursuant To The Constitution, Congress Passed R.A 6734, The Organic Act For The Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao Calling For A Plebiscite To Create An Autonomous Region. The Provinces Of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu And Tawi-Tawi, Which Voted For The Creation Of Such Region Were Later On Known As The Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao. Consistent With The Authority Granted By Article XIX, Section 13 Of RA 6734 Which Authorizes The Pres ident To Merg e The Exis ting Reg ions, Pres ide nt Cor azon Aquino Issued E.O No. 429 Provid ing For The Reorganization Of The Administrative Regions In Mindanao. Petitioners Contend That Art. XIX , Section 13 Of R.A. No. 6734 Is Unconstitutional Beca use I t Unduly De lega te s Legislative Power To The President By Authorizing Him To Merge By Administrative Determination The Existing Regions Or At Any Ra te Provides No Stand ard For T he Exercise Of T he Powe r De lega ted A nd That T he Pow er Granted Is Not Expressed In The Title Of The Law.Aw They Also Challenge The Validity Of E.O. No. 429 On The Ground That The Power Granted By RA 6734 To The President Is Only To Merge Regions IX And XII But Not To Reorganize The Entire Administrative Regions In Mindanao And Certainly Not To Transfer The Regional Center Of Region IX From Zamboanga City To Pagadian City. Issue: Whether Or Not The R.A 6734 Is Invalid Because It Contains No Standard To Guide The President’s Discretion. Ruling: NO. In Conferring On The President The Power To Merge By Administrative Determination The Existing Regions Following The Establishment Of The Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao, Congress Merely Followed The Pattern Set In Previous Legislation Dating Back To The Initial Organization Of Administrative Regions In 1972. The Choice Of The President As Delegate Is Logical Because The Division Of The Country Into Regions Is Intended To Facilitate Not Only The Administration Of Local Governments But Also The Direction Of Executive Departments Which The Law Requires Should Have Regional Offices. While The Power To Merge Administrative Regions Is Not Expressly Provided For In The Constitution, It Is A Power Which Has Traditionally Been Lodged With The President To Facilitate The Exercise Of The Power Of General Supervision Over Local Governments. (Abbas V. COMELEC) The Regions Themselves Are Not Territorial And Political Divisions Like Provinces, Cities, Municipalities And Barangays But Are "Mere Groupings Of Contiguous Provinces For Administrative Purposes. The Power Conferred On The President Is Similar To The Power To Adjust Municipal Boundaries Which Has Been Described As "Administrative In Nature.” (Pelaez V. Auditor General)Thus, The Regrouping Is Done Only On Paper. It Involves No More Than Are Definition Or Redrawing Of The Lines Separating Administrative Regions For The Purpose Of Facilitating The Administrative Supervision Of Local Government Units By The President And Insuring The Efficient Delivery Of Essential Services 12. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary Facts: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional. Ruling:

Constitutional Law; Tariff & Customs; The President may increase tariff rates when authorized by Congress.—Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: “(2) The Congress may,by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.” There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates x x x and other duties or imposts x x x.”

Same; Same; President may increase tariff rates as authorized by law even for revenue purposes solely.—In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that “customs duties” is “the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country.” The levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries___where such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds—have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some “protective” impact upon indigenous oil production. For the effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.

Same; Same; Same.—In the fourth place, petitioner’s concept which

he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code estabishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in “the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security.” Petitioner, however, insiststhat the “protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore “protection of local industries” is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of “the national economy, general welfare and/or national security.” We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of “the national ecomony, general welfare and national security” as the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy

6

quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community. 13. People vs. Vera Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. Issues: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws Discussions: An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Rulings: The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it

has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. 14. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power Facts: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers Ruling: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. GENERAL

RULE:

Non-delegation

of

powers;

exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Two

Tests

of

Valid

Delegation

of

Legislative

Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

7

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception. Rationale

for

Delegation

of

Legislative

Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields. Power

of

Subordinate

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. 15. USA vs. Ang Tang Ho Facts: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6thof August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. Ruling: 1. ORGANIC LAW.—By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States, all powers are. vested in the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law; the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law; and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.

3.

4.

No CRIME TO SELL.—After the passage of Act No. 2868, and

5.

CRIME BY PROCLAMATION.—When Act No. 2868 is analyzed,

6.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.—In so far as Act No. 2868 undertakes to

7.

CONSTITUTION.—The

8.

PRIVATE RIGHTS.—In the instant case, the law was not dealing

9.

PRIVATE PROPERTY.—In the instant case, the rice was the

Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

2.

the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-Geheral, the act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

POWER.—Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each

branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.

THE POWER TO DELEGATE.—The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing mor£ than to authorize

without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at, any price and he would not commit a crime. There was no legislative act which made it a crime to sell rice at any price. it is the violation of the Proclamatlon of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because of the Proclamation by the Governor-General.

authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime, it is unconstitutional and void. Constitution is something solid, permanent and substantial. Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and its construction ought not to change with emergencies or conditions. with Government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights which are sacred under the Constitution. personal, private property of the defendant. The Government had not bought it, did not claim to own it, or have any interest in it at the time the defendant sold it to one of his customers.

10. POWER VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE.—By the organic act and subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislature, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. 11. OPINION LIMITED.—This opinion is confined to the right of the Governor-General to issue a proclamation fixing the maximum price at which rice should be sold, and to make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and to that extent holds that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of Act No. 2868. United States vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, No. 17122 February 27, 1922 16. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: "SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a)

8

the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: "(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; x

x

x

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;” Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: "Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.” MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges. Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. Ruling: YES. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and nonwaivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety

of

the

public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission testlike the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. Section 3 – Civilian Supremacy 17. IBP vs. Zamora Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. Issue: 1. Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review. 2. Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military. Ruling: 1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render

9

logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. Section 4 – Government to serve and protect the people/ People to defend the State 18. People vs. Lagman Facts: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. Issue: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. Ruling: YES. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.” Section 10 – Social Justice 19. Calalang vs. Williams Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic: 1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and 2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuanc e of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animaldrawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an

unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Ruling: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” 20. Tanada vs. Angara 21. Garcia vs. BOI Facts: The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original and amended application documents. The BoI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to the release of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these documents absent consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.

10

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have access to information on matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe” The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held. Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that “all applications and their supporting documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application, amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions. The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the Constitution does not open every door to any and all information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny”. Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security” from its order. The Court did not provide a test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its ruling. Section 12&13 – Family&Youth 22. Meyer vs. Nebraska On May 25, 1920, Robert T. Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, a one-room schoolhouse in Hampton, Nebraska, taught the subject of reading in the German language to 10-year-old Raymond Parpart, a fourth-grader. The Hamilton County Attorney entered the classroom and discovered Parpart reading from the Bible in German. He charged Meyer with violating the Siman Act.[3] Meyer was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska, and fined $25 (about $305 in 2017 dollars). The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his conviction by a vote of 4 to 2. The majority thought the law a proper response to "the baneful effects" of allowing immigrants to educate their children in their mother tongue, with results "inimical to our own safety." The dissent called the Siman Act the work of "crowd psychology."[3] Meyer appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. His lead attorney was Arthur Mullen, an Irish Catholic and a prominent Democrat, who had earlier failed in his attempt to obtain an injunction against enforcement of the Siman Act from the Nebraska State Supreme Court. Oral arguments expressed conflicting interpretations of the World War I experience. Mullen attributed the law to "hatred, national bigotry and racial prejudice engendered by the World War." Opposing counsel countered that "it is the ambition of the State to have its entire population 100 per cent. American." Ruling: Liberty" protected by the Due Process clause "[w]ithout doubt...denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Analyzing in that context the liberty of the teacher and of parents with respect to their children, McReynolds wrote: "Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public

welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the amendment." And further: "Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own." And finally: "That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution—a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means." He allowed that wartime circumstances might justify a different understanding, but that Nebraska had not demonstrated sufficient need "in time of peace and domestic tranquility" to justify "the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed." 23. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters A law prohibiting the establishment of private schools and in effect confing the education youth to public institutions of learning was likewise annulled because it would standardize the thinking of children, who according to the court, wer not mere creatures of the state. 24. Wisconsin vs. Yoder U.S. Supreme Court on May 15, 1972, ruled (7–0) that Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law was unconstitutional when applied to the Amish, because it violated their rights under the First Amendment, which guaranteed the free exercise of religion. The case involved three Amish fathers—Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy—who, in accordance with their religion, refused to enroll their children, aged 14 and 15, in public or private schools after they had completed the eighth grade. The state of Wisconsin required, pursuant to its compulsory attendance law, that children attend school to the age of 16. The fathers were found guilty of violating the law, and each was fined $5. A trial and circuit court upheld the convictions, concluding that the state law was a “reasonable and constitutional” use of government power. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, found that the application of the law to the Amish violated the First Amendment’s free exercise of religion provision. On May 15, 1972, the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court; William Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., did not participate in the consideration or decision. In a comprehensive examination of the Amish, the court found their religious beliefs and way of life to be “inseparable and interdependent” and to not have been “altered in fundamentals for centuries.” The court went on to conclude that secondary schooling would expose Amish children to attitudes and values that ran counter to their beliefs and would interfere with both the child’s religious development and his or her integration into the Amish lifestyle. According to the court, to compel Amish children to enroll in public or private high schools past the eighth grade would have mandated that they “either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.” The court rejected Wisconsin’s argument that “its interest in its system of compulsory education is so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must give way,” finding instead that the absence of one or two additional years of education would neither make the children burdens on society nor impair their health or safety. During these years the Amish children were not inactive, and the court remarked favorably on the Amish “alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education.” On the basis of these findings, the court ruled that the Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law was not applicable to the Amish under the free-exercise clause.

11

Section 16 – Promotion of health and ecology 25. Oposa va. Factoran Facts: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question. The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Issues: (1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action. (2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue. (3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts. Ruling: First Issue: Cause of Action. Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. Second Issue: Political Issue. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause. The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE. Section 19 – Self – reliant and independent national economy 26. Tanada vs. Angara 27. Garcia vs. BOI Section 21 – Land Reform 28. Association of Small Land Owners vs. Juico *Check Judge A notes 29. Hacienda Luisita vs. PARC Facts: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.” The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision. Issues: (1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

12

(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP? (4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP? (5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered? Ruling:

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.] 1.

YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.] 2.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.] 3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP. [Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.] 4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP. [For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.] 5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties. [Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.] 6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

13

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.] Section 22 – Indigenous Cultural Community 30. Cruz vs. DENR Secretary Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Issue: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? Ruling: NO. The provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution. Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of selfgovernment given to the autonomous governments of Region XII? Ruling: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This

Section 25 – Local Government 31. Limbonas vs. Mangelin Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC

case

involves

the

application

of

a

most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to

14

this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

33. Disomangcop vs. DPWH Secretary

32. Basco vs. PAGCOR Facts: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

34. Pamatong vs. COMELEC

Section 26 – Equal Opportunities

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid. Ruling: 1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.” The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. 2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling. 3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government. 4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869. Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution: “Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.” SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state. Autonomous Region

15