Ltd Compilation 2

LTD Digests Part 2 Vda de Barroga v Albano - Shei Pascual-Pranada Director of Lands v Benitez - Tanya Mia Perez Valismo v Plan - Patrixia Santos Duran v Oliva - Ronald Sarcaoga Republic v Director of Lands (Estenzo) - Jet Siang Merced v CA - Santiago Tiongco Republic v Vera - Aaron Valdez Windows and Orphans Association v CA - Reinier Jeffrey Abdon Gabriel v CA - Maya Abdullah Republic v Abacite - Victoria Buenaventura PNB v Mallorca - Calvin Patrick Domingo Avila v Tapucar - John Raymund Fullecido Heirs of Cornelio Labrada v Monsanto - Carlos S. Hernandez Jr. Llaban v CA - Ayesha Alonto Mambuay Ylarde v Lichauca - Lawi Manalo Gomez v CA - Idel Monfort Verastigue v CA - Shei Pascual-Pranada Kabayan v Republic- Tanya Mia Perez Agura v Serfino - Patrixia Santos Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association v CA - Ronald Sarcaoga Ortegas v Hidalgo - Jet Siang Franco v ES - Santiago Tiongco Heirs of Tengco v Aliwalas - Aaron Valdez Gonzaga v CA - Reinier Jeffrey Abdon Decolongon v CA - Maya Abdullah Gayappanao v IAC - Victoria Buenaventura Homera v Casa - Calvin Patrick Domingo Santana v Marinas - John Raymund Fullecido Vallangca v CA - Carlos S. Hernandez Jr. Rural Bank of Davao City v CA - Kevin Hernandez Sucaldito v Montejo - Kevin Hernandez Belisario v IAC - Ayesha Alonto Mambuay PNB v De Los Reyes - Lawi Manalo

vs. ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, assisted by her husband, JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, assisted by her husband, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO, and PEDRO ALBANO, petitioners-appellees. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in his capacity as Judge of Sala I, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent. Facts: In a Cadastral Proceeding of the CFI Ilocos Norte, a decision was rendered adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants, the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of 14 years or so, or in 1955; and it was only after 24 years had passed, or in 1979, that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina Aquino's name. In 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual — appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same CFI against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino — appellees Angel Albano, et al. Said appellants alleged that they, and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a new title be made out in their names. It appears that Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4 sq.m. portion of an adjoining lot, No. 9822, belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of court, a complaint in intervention for the recovery thereof. After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4-squaremeter portion overlapped by Delfina Aquino's title. The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken therefrom to the CA by Barroga and Padaca having been dismissed and SC having refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari. At the instance of defendants Angel Albano, et al., the CFI ordered execution of the judgment. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca moved to quash the writ of execution. They argued that there was nothing to execute since the verdict was simply one of dismissal of the complaint. Cadastral Court promulgated an Order, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ of possession dated was issued.

Vda de Barroga v Albano - Shei Pascual-Pranada G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988 EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE PACADA, oppositors-appellants,

1

LTD Digests Part 2 Again Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano, et al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued ". Their argument was that as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession. The motion was heard and was thereafter denied by the Court a quo. The Court stated that the writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot, It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which was the appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga and Padaca moved for reconsideration. When this proved unavailing, they appealed to the SC.





Issue: WON the issuance of writ of possession was proper - yes

answered); and (3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding execution of judgments, since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed. "The fundamental rule," the Court said some 43 years later, "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot some months later and took occasion to stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, the Court had gone "so far as to hold that if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective."

Held: 



Angel Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so. The Court in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., ruled that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act 496), or his successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its possession;" (2) he has the right, too, under Sec. 17 of the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been served with process therein but had not appeared nor

Director of Lands v Benitez 31 March 1966 Bautista Angelo, J. Facts: 1. In a cadastral proceeding, spouses Emilio Bentiez and Eulalia Brillo were declared owners of a land. The Original Certificate of Title was issued. 2. 26 years later,, Benitez and Brillo filed a petition for reopening of the cadastral proceedings under RA 931 claiming that through oversight, inadvertence and excusable negligence, a portion of the lot has not been included. 3. The cadastral court declared Benitez and Brillo owners of the additional portion. The decision having become final, the spouses moved for a writ of execution. 4. 62 adverse claimants who were the occupying the additional portion by virtue of permits granted by the Director of Lands opposed. 5. A motion to set aside the judgement was filed by the Director of Lands on the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction for lack of publication and notice.

2

LTD Digests Part 2 6. The opposition and motion to set aside were denied by the cadastral court.

 

Issue/Held: 1. WON the denial of the opposition and motion to set aside by the cadastral court was valid. NO Ratio: 1. RA 931 grants to a person claiming title that has been subject of a cadastral proceedings who at the time of the survey was in actual possession but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file his claim during the time limit established by law, the right to claim such land within a period of 10 years by filing a petition for reopening. Notice to persons with adverse interest and to the general public by publication is necessary. The right of a claimant to have an additional portion can only be ascertained if it does not refer to such parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or authorized provisionally or permanently disposed of by the government. Additional portion of land claimed by respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to be entitled to it by virtue of lease applications or permits granted to them by the Bureau of Lands.

 





Because of these adverse claimants, there is need that the matter be threshed out in an appropriate action with due notice. Such matter cannot be looked into in the present proceeding because of the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court.

  

Valismo v Plan - Patrixia Santos



Flordeliza L. Valisno v Judge Andres B. Plan, GR No. L-55152 August 19, 1986



FACTS:  Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house thereon.  Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and

constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles 433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC. With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant to the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner? HELD: 

3

The Land Registration Act does not provide for pleading similar to a motion to dismiss but the Rules of Court allows its application in land

LTD Digests Part 2





registration proceeding as only suppletory when it is practicable and convenient. o Therefore, the court may sustain a motion to dismiss in land registration proceeding as the case at bar. o Noted by the court in the ordinary civil case, the counterclaim can be taken as a complaint where the defendant becomes the plaintiff. o The original plaintiff thus becomes defendant in the counterclaim and he may choose to answer the counterclaim or be declared in default or file a motion to dismiss the same. The respondent clearly opted for the last choice. The SC held that res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. o One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. o Although the first action was captioned for the recovery of possession, possession is sought based on ownership, thus the action was one in the nature of accion reinvidicatoria. o The second action is for registration of title where the registration is sought based on one’s ownership over the property. o The difference between the two is that the plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from ownership over the property in the first action while it seeks to exclude the whole world in the second action. The cause of action however remains the same. o The employment of two different actions does not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and the same cause of action cannot be litigated twice. o Although the first action was litigated before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a registration court is of no significance since that both courts should be of equal jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. o For convenience, the SC should decide whether to dismiss the application for registration or the opposition thereto. Because

the conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed the petition. Duran v Oliva - Ronald Sarcaoga Duran v. Olivia (1961) Topic: Motion to dismiss petition (Cadastral Proceeding (before judgment) Doctrine: Rules of Court is applicable in a suppletory character in land registration cases. Therefore, a motion to dismiss, which allows the court to expeditiously resolve cases, is available to the parties even though it is not one of the pleadings specified in the Land Registration Act (Act 496) Jose Duran and Teresa Diaz Vda de Duran vs. Bernabe Olivia, Fe Almazan, Heirs of Vicente Godesano, Manuel Arce and Esperanza Salud FACTS: Jose and Tereza Duran filed an application for registration in their names of 16 lots (Lots 1-16) under Plan PSU-128386 in the CFI of Camarines Sur. Oppositors filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots because the lots were already registered and certificates were issued to them (Olivia, Almazan, Godesano, Arce and Salud – all had lots assigned to them and evidenced by certificates of title to their names). Applicants however contend that the court has jurisdiction to consider the application even though the certificates of title have already been issued. The CFI dismissed the case (two successive orders of dismissal). Applicants appeal. ISSUE #1: WON motion to dismiss available in a land registration case Applicant Durans: Motion to dismiss not available in Land Registration Act SC: Rules of Court applied in suppletory character whenever practicable and convenient. While the Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar to a Motion to Dismiss, applying the Rules of Court in land registration

4

LTD Digests Part 2 cases is necessary to expedite resolution of LR cases. ISSUE #2: WON oppositors failed to prove similar identities of the lots covered by their titles and the ones applied for

Republic v Director of Lands (Estenzo) - Jet Siang Republic vs Hon. Estenzo

De Castro, J.

SC: we find no reason to overturn the trial court's findings that indeed the lots are similar.

Facts: In September 1940, the Cadastral Court of Ormoc declared Lot No. 4273 as public land. In February 1972, private respondents Aotes filed with the CFI of Leyte a petition to reopen the aforesaid decision. Respondent Aotes (in the CFI proceeding): They are the owners and possessors by virtue of hereditary succession. Due to their non-appearance in the cadastral proceedings, albeit due to ignorance and excusable neglect, the property was declared public land. They had been in adverse, peaceful and notorious possession of the said parcel of land since the time immemorial, paying all the taxes, interests and penalties. Petitioners (in the CFI proceedings): Opposed the petition. It is barred by the expiration of the period for reopening cadastral proceedings under Rep. Act 931 which expired on December 31, 1968 and this period has not been extended under the provisions of Rep. Act 6236 because the latter applies only to the extensions of time limit for the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. CFI: set aside the decision of the cadastral court and adjudicated the land to private respondents. Issue: W/N the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening of Cadastral Proceedings. YES. Held: There are 3 laws involved in this case: Rep. Act 931 granted a right within 5 years from June 20, 1953 to petition for a reopening of cadastral proceedings. Rep. Act 2061 fixed a new time limit which is up to December 31, 1968 to file applications for 1) free patents, 2) for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and for 3) the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared public land. Rep. Act 6236 extended the time limit which is up to December 31, 1976 for the filing of applications for 1) free patents and 2) for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Rep. Act 6236, the very law

ISSUE #3: WON certificate of title based on mere homestead, sales, or free patent covering private land is null and void; that it is the decree of registration, not the certificate which confers the character of inconstestability of title (and that applicants were deprived of due process...etc) SC: no merit. A patent once registered becomes indefeasible as a Torrens title (S 122 of Act 496). SC discussed purpose of Torrens System. Homestead patent, once registered under LRA, cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued thereon is null and void. Same thing for sales patent. Since the respondents already held indefeasible certificates of title under the LRA, the CFI was without jurisdiction to entertain the application of the Durans (long line of decisions have upheld this principle).

In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void.1 This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the later applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.

5

LTD Digests Part 2 on which respondents Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents' contention. If Rep. Act 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep. Act 6236 which is the sole basis for filing the respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from "filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles."

6. On August 6, 1957, the CFI amended its original decision, thus: Lot No. 395 was declared a public land and was the object of a homestead application by the Merceds. 7. How Merced got the OCT: While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendant (Merced) had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to have acquired the right over the same by prescription. 8. (Santos) Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants (Santos), holding that upon the finality of the decree by the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title thereto becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by prescription. And, as the land was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead patent was obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can not prevail over the cadastral court's decree of registration of Lot No. 395 in favor of appellant Santos' predecessor. In short: Merced lost.

Merced v CA - Santiago Tiongco MAMERTA DE LA MERCED vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and AMPARO MACAPAGAL

Facts: 1. Santos filed a case for recovery of ownership and possession, against Merced, at CFI of Nueva Ecija.

9. Side note: the cadastral court that ruled in favor of Santos asked the Chief of the Gneeral Land Registration Office to issue a certificate of title to Santos, but the office never managed to actually do that.

2. 3. Merced resisted the claim by presenting OCT issued to Juan de la Merced, and by virtue of their continuous possession.

ISSUE:

4. CFI: ruled in favor of Santos, holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land, as such, Merced's title is null and void.

What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?

5. Upon Merced's motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of the decision was ordered suspended and the case was re-set for hearing for reception of additional evidence.

6

LTD Digests Part 2 6. But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect to lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes under SEC. 11 that “All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees,

HOLDING: 1. There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act 496). In other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished.

when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of title in favor of said persons which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under the Land Registration Act xxx”

2. With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 are:

7. Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case ofGovernment of the Philippine Islands v. Abural said that 3 actions are taken:

3. SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exception stated in the following section. xxx. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every

(a) The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. (b) The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.

decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. 4. SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year,

hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of titles hereinafter mentioned.

(c) The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land."

5. It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.

8. As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal

7

LTD Digests Part 2 from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.

Republic and the Province of Bataan. The Republic opposed the application alleging the land was part of the public domain. The lower court issued an order declaring the land was part of Lot No. 626 in a cadastral proceeding, by virtue of the testimony of the provincial forester. Martinez presented three witnesses with their respective testimonies: 1. Martinez himself (62 y/o) a. He owns the land by virtue of inheritance from his parents, consisting of 32 ha; b. He started possessing the land in 1938; c. He planted palay on 8 ha, which grew along with 42 mango trees and kamoteng kahoy; d. He declared the land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war; e. He had OCEAN possession 2. Antonio Reyes (67 y/o; overseer of Martinez) a. Area is 32 ha, more or less; b. Since 1938, Martinez possessed the land; c. Palay grew on 8 ha of the land; d. His son and a Silvestre Garcia are tilling the land; e. Harvest is shared between Martinez and himself, along with the tillers f. Vegetables were grown in 18 ha 3. Silvestre Garcia (60 y/o, tiller) a. He worked on the land of the applicant since 1932 b. Plants palay on only 4 ha; c. Mango trees totalling 42 grew in the parcel of land. Second case: Thelma Tanalega filed an application under Act 496 over two parcels of land in Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan, worth 443,297 square meters and 378,506 square meters, respectively. They were also part of Lot 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre. The Chief Surveyor of the LRC filed a report, as required by the CFI, to the effect that the parcels of land applied for registration do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Sec. 1858 of the RAC and that the parcels of land do not overlap other titled property under Act 496.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.

Republic v Vera - Aaron Valdez REPUBLIC and the DIRECTOR of LANDS v. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA J. De Castro | January 27, 1983 DOCTRINE(S): 1. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 2. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. Possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. FACTS: The case is a consolidation of two cases titled Republic of the Philippines and Director of Lands v. Vera and Luisito Martinez and Republic of the Philippines and Director of Lands v. Vera and Thelma Tanalega.

The Republic opposed the application on the ground that the parcels were part of the public domain. Tanalega also had three witnesses: 1. Tanalega herself (27 y/o) a. She had OCEAN possession in the concept of owner since February 2, 1970;

First case: Martinez filed an application for registration under Act 496 of one parcel of land in Mariveles, Bataan, with an area of 323,093 square meters in 1972. The lower court issued an order of general default except as to the

8

LTD Digests Part 2 b. Elisa Llamas sold this parcel to her, with the former owning the property since 1935; c. 16 ha of land is devoted to palay and others were pasture land 2. Miguel Ocampo a. His parents were working the land since 1935; b. He became overseer of the land until 1970; c. 16 ha were devoted to palay and others were pasture land 3. Agapito del Rosario a. Since childhood, he knew Llamas owned the parcel of land, as well as the one managing the planting and tilling thereof; b. He and Leopoldo de Guzman used to work the land The Fiscal submitted a certification to the effect that the land was found to be alienable and disposable. Tanalega however failed to present Llamas, her overseer, or any of her tenants to prove she possessed the land as an owner.

b. Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be; c. Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in which the lots are situated; d. Names of the owners of adjoining lots; e. If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession; f. If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; g. If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and h. Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.

In both cases, the CFI confirmed the titles in favor of the applicants. The Solicitor General filed petitions for review, arguing (1) Lot 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937, depriving the lower court of jurisdiction to confirm the titles in favor of the applicants; (2) The parcels of land cannot be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings because they have already been subject to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act

1. The private respondents either did not file their answers in the cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive. 2. Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment. 3. Granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the same must fail. Here, evidence for the respondents tends to show only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. Possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the

ISSUE(S): Whether or not public respondent erred in confirming the titles of private respondents (YES, because these lands were already subject of cadastral proceedings, and the decision in those proceedings bar further litigation on the matter by virtue of res judicata. Further, only portions of the subject parcels of land were cultivated and the survey plans submitted by respondents were not approved by the Director of Lands.) Procedure for Persons Claiming Any Interest in Land Under Cadastral Proceedings: Any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: a. Age of the claimant;

9

LTD Digests Part 2 occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 4. The survey plans submitted were not approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.

the land is covered by valid titles in the name of Ortigas, and that previous cases have sustained Ortigas' title. The MR was denied but the MTD was reset for hearing at 18 and 19 Oct. The MTD was later denied by the RTC, holding that TCT 77652 and 77653 show that they were derived from OCTs 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425, and that Decree 1425 shows that it only covers 17 hectares in Sta. Ana, Manila, four kilometers away from the QC land. MR for the denial was also denied. Instead of appealing, Ortigas filed for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA questioning the order denying his MTD. The CA granted the petition, holding that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, albeit reflecting their origins as OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No. 351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT 351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or produced, does not mean that Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 was not issued.

Windows and Orphans Association v CA - Reinier Jeffrey Abdon

Widows and Orphans Association v. CA FACTS Widows and Orphans Association (Widora) filed LRC Case no. Q-336 before the QC RTC in 1974. It alleged that the land, situated at MalilitUoogong, QC, had an area of 156 hectares and was covered by Titulo de Propriedad 4136 from 1894 issued in the name of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. It acquired the land from the heirs of Don Mariano in 1954.

Petition for review on certiorari to the SC. ISSUE [Evidence] W/N Respondent Ortigas proved Decree 1425. NO [LTD] W/N the CA properly made factual findings. NO. W/N the SC decision in Ortigas & Co. v. Ruiz recognized that TCT 227758 from which TCTs 77652 and 77653 were issued are covered by Decree 1425. NO

Dolores Molina (not a party to the SC case, but party to the RTC proceedings) filed an opposition, claiming ownership of 12 to 14 hectares of the lot. Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court since the land was already registered under TCT 77652 and 77653 under the name of Ortigas. The RTC issued an order directing Ortigas to prove its contention that 77652 and 77653 are not proper derivatives of the OCTs from which they were previously issued. It set the case for hearing on 28 Jun 1979. One day before, on 27 Jun, Ortigas filed an MR against the order, alleging that a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after a year and is conclusive upon the whole world, and the LRC has advised the court that

HELD a. Ortigas did not properly prove Decree 1425, although it did allege that OCT 351 is a copy of the decree. The evidence submitted was merely secondary (plan submitted by Ortigas, testimony of the

10

LTD Digests Part 2 surveyor and OCT 351). Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be proof of 1) execution of the original writing and 2) that it has been destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in the possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable notice.

of title if it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed by law. a. The decision in Ortigas v. Ruiz does not apply here. Nowhere in the decision, is a pronouncement that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued from TCT No. 227758. On the contrary, it is not disputed by the parties that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 themselves show that they were derived from OCT No. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 or TCT 227758. If indeed, the real origin thereof is OCT No. 351, what Ortigas should have done was to file a petition for the correction of the TCTs in question as stated earlier.

a. Futhermore, the CA should not have substituted its own findings of fact on the coverage of the land included in TCTs 77652 and 77653. This matter is for the land registration court and only for a full fledged trial on the merits. The parties have yet to present fully their evidence with the trial court, and the TC actually set the case for hearing on the merits on 19 May 1989. It also covers a huge tract of land covering 156 hectares in both Sta. Ana and QC. The disputed facts necessitate a trial.

a. Although a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, the rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the certificate's authenticity vis-à-vis the land covered therein. The parties here admit that the TCTs do not show they are derivatives of OCT 351, as claimed by Ortigas. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included

Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the LRC which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land. Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and void. a. Ortigas should also not have appealed the interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss. The proper remedy is to appeal after trial and judgment on the merits and not a writ of prohibition.

Gabriel v CA - Maya Abdullah

a. CA also committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged errors in the question TCTs. A certificate of title cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Also, no correction of certificate of title shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. While the law fixes no prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate

FACTS - 12 April 1909 – a survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a parcel of land in Orani, Bataan. The parcel of land was then registered on 18 September 1909, and OCT No. 46 was issued in favor of Quimson. A cadastral survey was made from February 1919 to March 1920, which increased the area of the said land. After hearing, the Cadastral Court confirmed the title of Quimson and issued TCT No. 723 in lieu of OCT No. 46. The lot was subdivided into two, one

GABRIEL vs. CA G.R. No. L-26348 – 30 March 1988 – Paras

11

LTD Digests Part 2 of which was acquired by Eligio Naval (Lot 363-B) and for which TCT No. 787 was issued in his name. - December 1916 – a parcel of land in Hermosa, Bataan, was surveyed for Potenciano Gabriel. Gabriel’s resulting (and approved) survey plan was subsequently amended (1st reduction) because it was found that certain portions of the land in Quimson’s survey plan (later transferred to Naval) were included. OCT No. 1264 was issued on 1 November 1918 to Gabriel. A cadastral survey was also made of Hermosa, Bataan, and Gabriel’s land was further reduced (Lot No. 557 - 2nd reduction). No new certificate of title was issued, so said OCT subsisted with the area before the 2nd reduction. The partition of Gabriel’s estate was based on the plan with only the 1st reduction. - COMPLAINT: The heirs of Gabriel and alleged joint co-owners of a fishpond in Hermosa, Bataan, filed a complaint in the CFI against Petrita Pascual and Rudyardo Santiago, joint administratrix and administrator of the estate of Eligio Naval, wanting the latter to vacate the premises. They claimed that the land was loaned to Naval for dike and water control purposes and that Pascual and Santiago, despite repeated demands, refused to vacate and return possession to the Gabriels. - There is no controversy that Naval’s Lot 363-B, which embraces the portion in question, has always been in the possession of Naval in the concept of owner. The Gabriels’ claim that the same was merely loaned to Naval was not properly supported by evidence. - TRIAL COURT DECISION: The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the right of the plaintiffs to the land in question, if any, was lost by prescription and that the plaintiffs are also guilty of laches in failing to prosecute their claim within a reasonable time. The dispositive portion ordered the plaintiffs to surrender the owners’ copies of the certificates of title issued pursuant to the Gabriel’s survey plan with only the first reduction—until OCT No. 1264 could be made to conform to Cadastral Lot No. 557 (the area after the second reduction) - The COURT OF APPEALS affirmed the decision of the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied. - A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the SC. Because of a transfer by absolute sale by Pascual, the SC authorized the inclusion of new parties Florencio Lucio and Constancio Lucio. - Petitioners contend that the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision would amount to a reopening of a decree of title after the lapse of the one-year statutory period or the granting of an entirely new decree to a land already registered under Act No. 496, now P.D. No. 1529. Furthermore, such procedure is tantamount to a collateral attack on the title.

ISSUE - W/N courts have the authority to order the necessary correction of an erroneous technical description and make it conform to the correct area - Yes HELD/RATIO - It has long been settled that in cadastral cases, the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. However, in a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and amplified to the effect that the above proposition does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the priority of overlapping or over-lying registered titles. This power is necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be considered as within the jurisdiction of the courts in such proceedings. - What the lower court did was merely to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Gabriel's amended survey plan to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 and Lot No. 363. Thus, the respondent appellate court stressed that this is not a reopening of the decree of registration for the land covered by the certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel because that title stands and its existence remains unaffected. The action therefore of the trial court is well within its jurisdiction. - Potenciano Gabriel himself did not take the necessary action to recover said lot during his lifetime. After the discovery of its occupation in March 1933, by the late Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued use and occupation of the same. - There is no impairment of substantial right or the deprivation of the title of a registered owner sought to be guarded against. The heirs of Potenciano Gabriel are not deprived of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1264, nor are they unjustly deprived of the portion in question because on the basis of the correct technical description, that portion is not a part of their property but a part of the property of the late Eligio Naval under TCT No. 797. - Finally, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners, for failing to prosecute their claims for twenty years, have lost by laches their right to recover their property.

Republic v Abacite - Victoria Buenaventura

12

LTD Digests Part 2 REPUBLIC v. PEDRO ABACITE and DBP J. Barrera | April 26, 1961

of title. Though the original certificate of title was issued pursuant to a homestead patent, such a patent once registered under the Land Registration Act becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title, especially in the absence of any private third party claiming the land against the Government. b. Therefore, the cadastral proceeding would no longer be for the purpose of ownership thereof to its claimant because that was already accomplished in a previous appropriate proceeding, but for the substitution the old certificate of title issued in the prior proceeding with a new one. The cadastral court would have no jurisdiction to diminish nor enlarge the area of the property already decreed. 3. Though DBP erroneously referred to its property as Lot No. 1676, it has sufficiently identified it to be the lot covered by TCT No. T-4629. Even the State acknowledged appellant's right over portion of Lot No. 1674 and manifested its conformity to the amendment prayed for by DBP. 4. The correction sought by DBP will not amount to a reopening of the original decree. The petition to include in the new certificate of title that portion of Lot No. 1674 originally covered by TCT No. T-4629 would give effect and make the later decree conform with the original adjudication. 5. The amendment of the new certificate will cause no prejudice to any third party. The Government, in whose favor the entire Lot No. 1674 has been decreed, recognizes the right of DBP of the portion in question and agrees to the amendment prayed for.

DOCTRINE(S): 5. Under Section 112 of Act 496, alteration, amendment or correction of a certificate of title may be allowed where there has been error, omission, or mistake in its issuance, provided (1) the amendment, alteration, or erasure would not amount to a reopening of the original decree of registration; and (2) the "title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith" will not be impaired FACTS: DBP filed a petition for amendment of OCT No. 0-117 with the Davao CFI sitting as a cadastral court, after the court failed to include 63,680 sq m in earlier cadastral proceedings. The petition stated DBP owned a parcel of land in Malagos, Davao City, with an area of 15.6882 ha, previously covered by TCT No T-4629. When the State initiated cadastral proceedings which included the said parcel of land, DBP filed an answer citing ownership of the parcel of land, and when the RD issued the certificate of title, it contained only 92,052 square meters and was short of the 15.6882 ha it owned by 68,830 square meters. It appears that in the cadastral proceedings, the parcel of land subject of the proceedings was subdivided into two lots, one measuring 92,052 sq m, which was Lot No. 1676 (OCT No. 0-117), and the other measuring 68,830 sq m, which was included in Lot No. 1674 (land sought to be included in OCT No. 0117). Lot No. 1674 described the exact same lot also originally covered by TCT No. T-4629 (the 15 ha lot). The CFI denied the petition for amendment on the ground that the petition only indicated Lot No. 1676 and did not indicate the portion of Lot No. 1674. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the certificate of title could be altered, amended, or corrected (Yes, the reason for amending the certificate of title satisfies the requisites provided by Act No. 496.) 2. Under Section 112 of Act 496, alteration, amendment or correction of a certificate of title may be allowed where there has been, among others, error, omission, or mistake in its issuance, provided the amendment, alteration, or erasure would not amount to a reopening of the original decree of registration and the "title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith" will not be impaired a. Prior to the institution of the cadastral proceedings, the 15.6882 hectares was already covered by a Torrens certificate

PNB v Mallorca - Calvin Patrick Domingo PNB v. Mallorca Facts:

- in 1950, Ruperta Lavilles mortgaged a 48.965 square meter-parcel of land situated in Passi, Iloilo to the PNB as security for a loan of P1,800.00.

- On January 12, 1958, while the mortgage above-described was in full force and effect, and without PNB's knowledge and consent, Ruperta Lavilles sold the appellant Primitiva Mallorca 20,000 square meters of the mortgaged land.

13

LTD Digests Part 2 Held:

- On January 17, 1958, Mallorca moved the Iloilo cadastral court to have the

- No. Under Article 2126 of the Civil Code, a "mortgage directly and

sale to her duly annotated on the title, and, for the purpose, to require PNB to surrender the owner's copy of TCT 27070 to the Register of Deeds.

immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted." Sale or transfer cannot affect or release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance to which is subjected the purchased thing and which is at the disposal of the creditor "in order that he, under the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his credit therefrom."

- The court order of February 3, 1958 directed PNB to deliver said TCT 27070 to the Register of Deeds.

- The Register of Deeds then cancelled TCT 27070, issued a new one, TCT 24256, making two co-owner's copies of the title — one each for Ruperta Lavilles and for Primitiva Mallorca. PNB's mortgage lien was annotated on both copies.

- For, a recorded real estate is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever

- Ruperta Lavilles failed to pay her mortgage debt. PNB, on April 16, 1958

its owner may be. Because the personality of the owner is disregarded; the mortgage subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as much of a debtor as the first one; and this, independent of whether the transferee knows or not the person of the mortgagee. So it is, that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property mortgaged. All subsequent purchasers thereof, must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharge, follows the property.

foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially. On May 12, 1958, a certificate of sale was issued to PNB as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale.

- In March, 1959 Mallorca sued PNB to enforce her right of redemption with damages.

- On February 9, 1960, judgment was rendered in the case just stated, dismissing the claim for damages but declaring Mallorca "entitled to exercise her right of redemption with respect to the 20,000 square meters sold to her by Ruperta Lavilles within the period specified by law."

- Also, militating against appellant's cause is one other special feature of a real mortgage — its indivisibility. This Court has understood mortgage indivisibility in the sense that each and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt.

- Mallorca's appeal from this judgment was, on June 18, 1960, denied by the lower court — it was filed out of time. Her move to reconsider was rejected. She then went to the Court of Appeals on mandamus. On January 14, 1961, the appellate court denied the same for lack of merit.

- Finally, militating against appellant's cause is one other special feature of a real mortgage — its indivisibility. This Court has understood mortgage indivisibility in the sense that each and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt.

- Primitiva Mallorca failed to exercise her right of redemption as decreed by the court.

- Thus, the final deed of sale in favor of PNB, dated February 19, 1962, was presented to the Register of Deeds on April 10, for registration. The latter refused to register without Mallorca's co-owner's copy of TCT 24256. By letter of May 18, 1962, the Register of Deeds required Mallorca to surrender said copy. She did not comply.

Avila v Tapucar - John Raymund Fullecido Avila v Tapucar

- Hence, the bank prayed that Mallorca's co-owner's copy of TCT 24256 be declared null and void, and that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the same and to issue a new title in the name of PNB, upon payment of the legal fees. Mallorca appealed to the CA.

Facts 7. In 1918, spouses Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte 8. In 1965, said property was inherited by private respondents Julito Bahan, Cristina Bahan-Panis, Lucita Carters, Boy Cartera and Candelaria Bahan-Mendoza as successors-in-interest. 9. On October 11, 1960, petitioner Magdalena Avila (then Mrs. Magdalena R. Vda. de Leon) bought a parcel of land situated at Tabangao, Victory,

Issue:

- WON the undivided interest consisting of 20,000 square meters of the mortgaged lot, remained unaffected by the foreclosure and subsequent sale to PNB.

14

LTD Digests Part 2 Tubay, Agusan del Norte, containing an area of 4,371 square meters more or less from Luis Cabalan and his wife under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land and under Tax Declaration No. 3055. 10. On November 3, 1971, the heirs of Pedro Bahan, represented by Julito Bahan filed Free Patent Application 11. The Deputy Public Land Inspector Francisco stated that the heirs of Pedro Bahan have cultivated only 2.2500 hectares of land applied for and consequently, he did not recommend the issuance of the patent. Said report was erroneously forwarded to the Bureau of Lands by then Acting Assistant District Land Officer of Butuan City dated December 23, 1971, recommending the issuance of patent therefor 12. In May 1973, private respondent Julito Bahan together with ten persons gathered coconuts from the land purchased by petitioner Magdalena Avila but was intercepted by the Chief of Police 13. Private respondents Bahans filed an action for quieting of title and damages with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City a. He alleged that he discovered that the northwestern portion of said land containing an area of about 1/3 of a hectare was already in the possession of the Avilas; and the latter were harvesting the fruits of about 40 coconut trees found therein. 14. Petitioners Avila argued that Magdalena Avila purchased a parcel of land situated from Luis Cabalan and from then on has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the same. 15. Subsequently, private respondents Bahans took advantage of the Avilas' absence in the premises and was able to gather 354 fruits of the coconut trees on the disputed land which produce costs about P300.00 more or less. 16. Thus, Avilas filed a motion for a preliminary writ of injunction 17. In the meantime, private respondents Bahans' application for free patent was approved 18. Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. granted Avilas' motion for writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and ordering the Bahans to refrain and desist from gathering or continue harvesting the fruits 19. On March 13, 1974, O.C.T. No. P-8424 issued to the Bahans was transcribed in the registration book for the Province of Agusan del Norte 20. Avilas then filed an administrative protest against the Bahans before the Bureau of Lands for having erroneously included their land under the issued free patent and Original Certificate of Title, which protest

21. 22. 23. 24.

was filed 11 months after the issuance of the patent and 7 months and 3 days after the registration of the Certificate of Title Bureau of Lands issued an Order in favor of Avilas and that the lot rightfully belong to the Avilas Due to this favorable judgment, Avilas filed an opposition to the motion for dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction. However, Judge Lauro L. Tapucar issued an Order Dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction. The MR filed by Avilas was subsequently denied by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent judge is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction? SC: 25. Admittedly, the Bahans are the successors-in-interest of a parcel of coconut land containing an area of about 1,8340 square meters situated at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. 26. On the other hand, the Avilas are the purchasers for value of a 4,371 square meters lot situated in the same place and are in possession of aforesaid property since 1960. 27. The Order of January 14, 1974 granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued for the purpose of enjoining the Bahans to cease and desist from harvesting the fruits on the land possessed by the Avilas until the final determination of the suit for quieting of title between the parties. 28. The subsequent erroneous approval of the application for free patent for 6.9027 hectares in favor of the Bahans (the land which rightfully pertains to the Avilas being embraced and included therein), the issuance of Free Patent No. 552571 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-8424 in favor of the Bahans during the pendency of the case for quieting of title does not call for dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction since the property in the possession of the Avilas would be placed in the hands of the Bahans, pending final outcome of the action between them. Such transfer of property in litigation from the possession of one party having possession asserting ownership thereto would be pre-determinative of the main case.

15

LTD Digests Part 2 29. Dissolution of the writ due to mere presentation by the Bahans of an Original Certificate of Title in their names while the case is on going is erroneous 30. The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. 31. The argument that the Bahans' title to the property has become indefeasible and incontestable is a prejudgment and uncalled for inasmuch as the parties have not as yet finally rested their cases and the trial is still in progress. 32. While land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein. 33. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included" 34.

H. Labrada had moved in 1973 for the case to be heard by the now defunct CFI-Samar. The conflicting parties presented both their oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over the lot. RTC 1983 RULING: in favor of H. Yboa H. Labarada filed their appeal on August 6, 1983 by filing a notice of appeal with a prayer that the records be elevated to the Intermediate Appellate Court, pursuant to the new Interim Rules of Court. Respondents H. Yboa filed their motion for the issuance of a decree contending that petitioners had failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to file a record on appeal. RTC granted H. Yboa's motion for the issuance of a decree. RATIO: an appeal taken in a cadastral case involves "multiple appeals," for which the filing of the record on appeal was required. DISPOSITIVE: issue decree for the registration. H. Labrada filed an MR; MR was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not a the filing of a record on appeal is necessary to perfect an appeal in a cadastral proceedings HELD: No. Filing of a record on appeal is not necessary in cadastral proceedings. RATIO: 35. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, provides for a 15-day period within which to take an appeal and expressly abolished the need of a record on appeal, as follows: "SEC. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. "No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu therefor, the entire original record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof." 36. H. Labrada’s appeal must be given due course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title were prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court and must be set aside. 37. All that RTC had to do was to transmit the original record consisting of the pleadings of the parties and its decision and orders, which petitioners have in effect so elevated with their petition at bar together with the transcripts and exhibits. 38. PURPOSE OF THE RULE which dispenses with the filing of a record on appeal and the filing of an appeal bond: to simplify appellate court procedure by doing away with the tedious and expensive requirement

Heirs of Cornelio Labrada v Monsanto - Carlos S. Hernandez Jr. The HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA v. RTC Judge MONSANTO and the HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA FACTS: The lot involved is Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral Survey. It is contested by petitioners, heirs of Cornelio Labrada (H. Labrada) and by respondents-heirs of Isabel Yboa (H. Yboa). Said predecessors-in-interest (Cornelio Labrada and Isabel Yboa) had filed their respective answers in the cadastral proceedings in June, 1932. Cornelio Labrada - deforested the area (now Lot No. 1910); had already been in continuous possession for more 43 years when he filed his answer in 1932, or at least from 1894; and that he continued his possession until 1943 when he died. His son, Meliton, succeeded in possessing the land. Immediately after his demise, Meliton Labrada was succeeded in the possession of said land until he himself died sometime in 1976; possession of the property passed to Meliton's direct heirs, who until the present are still in possession thereof. None of the heirs of Isabel Yboa is in possession of any portion of the questioned lot.

16

LTD Digests Part 2 of reproducing practically the entire original record of the case in the record on appeal in the trial court. This old requirement of a record on appeal by itself laid the appellate procedure open to a number of dilatory and vexing questions of clerical errors and claims of omitted pleadings and orders which in turn required the filing of an amended record on appeal. Such record on appeal under the Rules still had to be printed, mimeographed or typed in 12 copies resulting many times in typographical errors and adding needless expense and additional burden on litigants. 39. Cadastral proceedings involve contest over specific lots which may be claimed by parties who have timely filed their respective answers, failing which the land is declared to belong to the State. Upon the trial court's rendering of its judgment as to such specific lot(s), then the original records pertaining to such lot(s) may be readily elevated, leaving with the lower court the records or pleadings referring to disputed lots not covered by said court's adjudication. 40. In this particular cadastral proceeding, there remain only "around 8 contested ones [lots] which have not yet been adjudicated not counting the 180 lots which were 'archived' by a predecessor of the presiding judge." This readily shows the lack of any difficulty to keep separate records for specific lots claimed by conflicting parties, and elevating only the particular record for the specific lot, subject of judgment and appeal. DISPOSITIVE: (a) setting aside the questioned orders which denied due course to petitioners' appeal and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration; (b) annulling any certificate of title which may have been issued to respondents pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering respondent court to give due course to petitioners' appeal from its decision of July 11, 1983 and to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the records of the case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral Survey, together with the oral and documentary evidence as hereinabove indicated. No costs.



Llaban v CA - Ayesha Alonto Mambuay 40 Llaban v CA Davide, Jr., J| December 20, 1991





FACTS:

[“1916 and 1932 orders’’]

17

In a decision rendered on 13 September 1916 in Cadastral Case, CFI Cebu rendered a decision adjudicating Lot 6017 to named person therein o In its Auto of 3 March 1925, the cadastral reinstated the above decision Upon motions of the spouses Filemon Sotto and Carmen Rallos de Sotto, who claimed to have purchased the shares of some of the adjudicatees of the lot or their heirs, the cadastral court, on 1 March 1932, issued an Auto o [A/N it was in Spanish but basically the lot was divided and inherited (or sold, it wasn’t clear) to a number of people by the parties named in the abovementioned decision in whose favour the land was adjudicated; spouses Sotto bought the lots from those people] No party appealed from the decision as modified by the above Auto of 1 March 1932. Neither was any decree issued pursuant thereto.



42 years later, March 1974, some claimants (respondents herein), represented by Atty. Paul Gorres, filed a petition for the issuance of a decree of registration o vacation Judge Burgos issued an Order directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue a decree in favor of the adjudicatees based on the dispositive portions of the 1916



14 May 1979, respondent Jose G. Paulin, one of the claimants, in his own behalf and on behalf of his co-claimants, filed a petition which sought to submit to the court a certified xerox copy of Subdivision Plan of the Lot which indicates subdivision Lots Nos. 6017-A to 6017-H, inclusive, pursuant to the request of the Land Registration Commission. o Claimants Paulin, et al., then prayed that the court issue an order approving Psd-17733 and its technical description as recommended by the Land Registration Commission and directing the latter to issue the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 6017 pursuant to the 1916 and 1932



July 1979, Eugenia Llaban y Catalan, one of the heirs of the adjudicatees, filed through Atty. Bienvenido P. Jaban a petition for the issuance of a decree registration for Lot No. 6017 on the basis of the 13 September 1916 decision

and 1932 orders

orders

LTD Digests Part 2 petition enumerates the legal heirs of the adjudicatees of the lot who have not sold, relinquished or transferred their rights, interests and participation therein to the parties. o granted by the court, per Judge Jose Ramolete, in its Order of 7 August 1979; the Commissioner of Land Registration was then directed to issue a decree of registration on the basis of the Order of March 1925 and the decision of 13 September 1916 in favor of the adjudicatees and/or their legal heirs May 1980, Jose G. Paulin filed another petition wherein he attached a certified micro-film copy of Plan Psd-17733; the technical descriptions of the subdivision lots and certified true copy of a deed of absolute sale executed in Paulin's favor o Atty. Jaban filed an opposition alleging the 7 August 1979 order directing the issuance of a decree based on the 16 September 1916 decision and the 3 March 1925 Order had already become final and that the Paulin, et al. claims can be ventilated only upon the partition of the lot by the heirs of the adjudicatees and the issuance of the certificate of title since Paulin, et al., are not themselves adjudicatees or heirs of the latter. o Paulin, et al., contend that the decision of 13 September 1916 was amended by the 1 March 1932 order, and hence prays that the Order of 7 August 1979 should be set aside. o Atty. Jaban, in a rejoinder, insists that since the 13 September 1916 decision, as reinstated by the order of 3 March 1925, had long become final, the court has no jurisdiction to set it aside. No hearing was had on the aforesaid Paulin petitions and the opposition thereto. court, through Judge Jose Ramolete, ruled: The order of March 1, 1932 which is (sic) never questioned up to the present, superseded and/or amended the decision of September 13, 1916 as reinstated in the order of March 3, 1925. o There being transfers of ownership by way of sales by the adjudicatees or their heirs of their participations in Lot 6017 awarded to them in the decision dated September 13, 1916 as reinstated in the order of March 3, 1925, the Court acted well within its jurisdiction as a Cadastral Court to issue (sic) the order of March 1, 1932 to the changes of ownership in the participations of the adjudicatees in favor of the vendee-spouses pending the issuance of the decree of registration. The petition of the claimants at o





o



bar who acquired their respective interest in or portions of Lot 6017 subsequent to the order of March 1, 1932 while the issuance of the decree still pends must necessarily be also in order. granted the Paulin petitions by approving the subdivision plan and the technical descriptions of Lots Nos. 6017-A to 6017-H, inclusive, ordering that the subdivided lots be respectively awarded to the parties enumerated in the 14 May 1979 petition and directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue, upon the finality of the Order, a decree of registration of the subdivision lots in favor of each of the claimants enumerated in said petition.

oppositors filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging lack of jurisdiction and/or GAD on the part of Judge Ramolete; CA denied without prejudice to the filing of the proper remedy

ISSUE: WoN CFI sitting as a cadastral court has jurisdiction to modify or amend a decision in a cadastral case by directing the issuance of a final decree in the names of parties who are not the original adjudicatees of a cadastral lot (NO) HELD: CA/CFI reversed  The 13 September 1916 decision, as amended by the Auto of 1 March 1932, had long become final as there is no showing at all that any affected party appealed therefrom within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days prescribed by the then governing law on procedure, Act No. 190. o titles to property would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future. o The failure to issue a final decree does not, as seems to be the suggestion of the lower court and the theory presented by the private respondents, prevent the decision from attaining finality. Precisely, the final decree can only issue after the decision shall have become final.  From the Paulin petition of 14 May 1979, it is quite clear that, except for the spouses Filemon Sotto and Carmen Rallos, the alleged claimants in whose favor the subdivided lots are to be adjudicated are not the adjudicatees in the 13 September 1916 decision, as amended by the 1 March 1932 Auto. And, except in the case of Paulin himself, who claims to be a vendee, there is no indication whatsoever of the relationships

18

LTD Digests Part 2





of the claimants with the original adjudicatees that could serve as basis for their claims. o In reality then, the petition is not just for the issuance of a final decree, but for the amendment or modification of the final decision. In light of the above disquisition, the lower court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief and Judge Ramolete clearly acted without any jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the petition o Aggravating such action is his obvious disregard for due process. There was no formal hearing on the Paulin petition. o Until Identified, formally offered in evidence and admitted by the court, the annexes were but mere scraps of paper. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is quite explicit: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." from the allegations in the questioned Paulin petition that Subdivision Plan was executed by a private land surveyor and that the same was approved by the Director of Lands. These suggest that there was an attempt to partition Lot No. 6017. Such partition was allowed under the Cadastral Law, provided that there was compliance with Sections 6 and 19 to 24 thereof. Unfortunately, Paulin, et al., failed to explore and raise this matter.

were based on a plan prepared by Aurelio Rocafull. 4. The Director of Lands found it impossible to properly locate the properties covered by the OCT. The descriptions and surveys were of doubtful accuracy. The owners were required to point out to the surveyor on the ground the actual boundaries of their lands. 5. A new survey of the land was made by an authorized private surveyor Garcia. The court approved the new plan but later on set aside the approval for lack of publication and notice. 6. Government and oppositors: The Garcia plan included lands of public domain covered by free patent application. 7. The court rejected the opposition and approved the Garcia plan. 8. The records of the case were destroyed as a result of the battles for liberation. 9. The lower court ordered the Director of Lands to resurvey in accordance with the Rocafull plan. 10. The survey was executed by surveyor Llobera of the Bureau of Lands whose plan was approved. The petitioners did not appeal. 11. Petitioners filed a motion to proceed with the hearing of the registration case on the merits on the ground that the approval of the Llobera relocation survey plan did not necessarily adjudicate or vest upon the applicants the title to the land or bring to an end the litigation. The lower court denied the motion

Ylarde v Lichauca - Lawi Manalo

Ylarde v Lichauco 29 December 1971 Zaldivar, J.

Issue/Held: 1. WON the lower court erred in issuing the orders which denied the motion of petitioners to proceed with the hearing on the merits that would require the applicants to prove their title to the land subject of the registration proceedings and the petitioners to present evidence of their claims to certain portions of the land. NO.

Facts: 1. Crisanto Lichauco and the Nable Jose sisters filed in the Court of Land Registration an application for registration of lands in hacienda El Porvenir in Pangasinan. 2. Oppositions were filed by 150 individuals. 3. The SC granted the registration. The Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Lichauco and Noble Jose sisters. Both the decree of registration and the original certificate of title (OCT)

Ratio: 19

LTD Digests Part 2 1.

directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration.

First, the Hacienda “El Porvenir” is covered by the Decree of Registration which binds the land, quiets title, is conclusive upon all persons, and cannot be reopened or reviewed after the lapse of 1 year after entry of the decree. Second, petitioners are the heirs of the original private oppositors whose claims and rights had been foreclosed by the decree of registration. It follows that the present oppositors’ pretended rights have also been barred. The motion of herein petitioners for hearing on the merits is based on their erroneous conception of the nature of the Llobrera survey and the proceedings in the lower court. The Llobrera survey was not really a new survey but only a relocation survey that should follow the old corners used in the former survey in order to approach the same area and configuration. The Llobera Plan was more or less a reproduction of the Rocafull plan.

Respondent Silverio Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, now known as the NLTDRA, submitted a report to the CFI that certain of the lots were already covered by homestead patents and he recommended that the decision and order be set aside. CFI set aside the decision and order. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge. The CA dismissed the petition, saying that prior to the issuance of the decree, the respondent judge has still the power and control over the decision he rendered. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court. ISSUES WON respondent judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision which set aside the lower court's earlier decision and order. YES. WON the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and Perez have no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration, their duty to do so being purely ministerial. YES, BUT. WON "the law of the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran, which held that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion were not public lands. NO.

Gomez v CA - Idel Monfort Gomez v. CA Padilla | Dec. 15, 1988 | In division

SC denied the petition and affirmed the appealed decision of the CA. 1. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of 1 year after the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission and the period of 1 year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

FACTS Petitioners filed in the CFI an application for registration of several lots in Pangasinan, which were among those involved in the case of Government vs. Abran, where the SC declared Consolacion Gomez owner of certain lots. Petitioners are heirs of Teodoro Gomez, father of Consolacion, who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her parcels of land when Consolacion died intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by virtue of a quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis.

2. The duty of the respondent land registration officials is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon

The CFI rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor and later issued another order stating that the decision had become final and

20

LTD Digests Part 2 

any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.”

CA denied.

Issue: 1. whether the respondent Court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the writ of possession 2. Won there was denial of due process.

3. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the decision will show that the lots in question earlier covered by homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion. It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding. The aforecited case is not "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not private lands of Consolacion when homestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929.

Held: The court of first instance sitting as a cadastral court was empowered to issue a writ of possession. Nor was there a failure to accord petitioners procedural due process. Ratio: 1. In Abellera v. De Guzman, we left no doubt about the power of the cadastral court to issue a writ of possession. Thus: "After hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff." As a matter of fact, the Abellera doctrine has its roots in our opinion rendered 22 years earlier in 1928 in Director of Lands v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The language used by Justice Laurel in Corders v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, a 1939 decision, would, if carefully analyzed, likewise yield an affirmative answer to the question of whether or not a cadastral court may issue a writ of possession. In a recent decision, where the party adversely affected did not even bother to assail the legality of an order of a writ of possession coming from a cadastral court, we pointed out, in an opinion through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, how broad and extensive is the scope of such an authority. Thus: "Neither do respondents dispute the propriety and validity of the order of the cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in favor of petitioners as well as its enforcement. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Order, dated March 20, 1962, of the cadastral court, granting petitioners' motion to compel respondents to remove their respective houses from the disputed lot, is valid and enforceable against respondents. In the case of Marcelo v. Mencias, etc., et al., this Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or authority of the court of first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order, as a consequence of the writ of possession issued by it, the demolition of improvements introduced by the

Verastigue v CA - Shei Pascual-Pranada

G.R. No. L-23973 April 29, 1969 CIPRIANO VERASTIGUE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. CA, CARMEN VERDAGUER, EMILIO VILLASIN, Et. Al, respondents. Facts (actually talaga masyadong facts sa case)  The private respondents moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession to place them in possession of the land in controversy. The said Motion was heard on 27 March, 1961 and was, granted on the same day but a copy thereof was received by the undersigned only on 28 March 1961, or the following day after it had heard and granted.  After petitioner’s MR of the Order of 27 March 1961, granting the issuance of a Writ of Possession, was denied in the Order of 27 September 1961, the Trial Court issued such writ  the herein petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA. petitioners stressed the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court of first instance acting as a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession and the alleged denial of procedural due process.

21

LTD Digests Part 2 successor-in-interest of a defeated oppositor in the land registration case." The confidence with which therefore petitioners asserted such lack of jurisdiction in a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession is clearly unjustified.

Kayaban v Republic 30 August 1973 Makalintal, Actg. CJ.

2. Petitioners in their brief would argue thus: "The herein petitioners had no chance to object to the private respondents' Motion for Writ of Possession because, as hereinbefore discussed, they received a copy thereof only on 28 March 1961, or on the following day that it was heard and granted by the Court on 27 March 1961." Petitioners did admit, that they had a motion to reconsider such order of March 27, 1961 which was denied in an order of September 27 of the same year. Only then, as admitted by them likewise, did the lower court issue such a writ of possession. Where then is the denial of due process? Our ruling in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Cadiao would dispel any doubt that the answer to the above due process question must be in the negative. As far back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.' There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party was heard on a motion for reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision, what 'due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount', the conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process."

Facts: 41. Lands covered by two titles were inherited by Vicente Kayaban and his co-heirs from their father and common predecessor-in-interest. Vicente acquired the shares of his co-heirs and afterwards applied for and obtained the two free patent titles in 1956. 42. In 1967, Vicente and his wife filed an action for illegal detainer against spouses Orpindo. Just before the illegal detainer case was terminated. Orpindo spouses filed a complaint against Kayaban for reconveyance (Case #1). 43. The illegal detainer case was decided adversely against Vicente. Vicente appealed (Case #2). 44. Upon a letter-complaint to the OSG by the Orpindos, the OSG filed an action for annulment of the two free patent titles (Case #3). 45. Case #1 was dismissed; #2 was decided in favor of Vicente.

46. As to Case #3, the CFI recognized and declared Vicente and his wife to be the rightful and exclusive owners, but declared the titles null and void on the ground that since the owners acquired the properties partly by inheritance and by purchase from the co-heirs, the lands were no longer public and hence not subject to disposition by the government. The procedure that should have been followed was judicial confirmation and not administrative legalization through patent application.

Issue/Held: 2. WON the CFI was correct in declaring the titles null and void. NO. Ratio: 2. The remedy in applying for free patents instead of the remedy of obtaining a judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles involves a technicality that is of no material consequence now in view of the declaration of the same court that the Kayabans are the rightful and exclusive owners. Both remedies refer to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes; both require continuous occupation and cultivation either by the applicant himself or through his predecessors-in-interest for a certain length of time; and both are modes of confirming an imperfect or

Kabayan v Republic- Tanya Mia Perez

22

LTD Digests Part 2 incomplete title – one judicially and the other administratively. The fact that appellants inherited and purchased the rest from their co-heirs does not necessarily imply that they had become private lands no longer subject to the disposition under the Public Land Act. In connection with their free patent applications, the Kayabans and the Director of Lands considered the lands as still part of the public domain. It was Vicente’s privilege to rely or not to rely on his claim of private ownership. He decided not to rely on them and instead consider the property as still part of the public domain.





Agura v Serfino - Patrixia Santos ROBERTO AGURA vs. FEDERICO SERFINO | G.R. No. L-50685 December 4, 1991 FACTS:   





Serfino, Sr.'s bid-P20,860.00 and Serfino, Jr.'s bid-P6,790.00. Both paid the required 10% of their respective bids. Purchase price and the corresponding annual real estate taxes have already been fully paid… Bureau of Lands yet to issue an Order awarding the lots in question to them. District Land Officer Reyes ordered an investigation of an alleged conflict between ONE: Serfino, Sr.'s MSA and that of an unnumbered Revocable Permit Application (VRAP) of a certain Primitive Donozo AND TWO: between Serfino, Jr.'s MSA and RPAs of Agura, Alib, and Sta. Rita and a certain Domingo Natividad. Land Investigator Ernesto Siriban conducted a preliminary investigation: o land subject hereof used to be foreshore but is now dryland and is being used for residential purposes by the party litigants and their respective tenants and relatives o verified: the area applied for and occupied by the ApplicantsContestants are inside the area applied for and surveyed for the Applicant-Respondent o no mention of conflict for Serfino Sr.’s land o advised the contending parties to submit to a formal investigation Formal investigation by Bacolod City District Land Office: o Three (3) formal hearings were held (May, June and 19 September 1969) o BUT: Villamarzo failed to submit either the stenographic notes or the report on what transpired except for the one held on 19 September 1969 (hearings were reset for failure of respondents to appear) Meanwhile, petitioners Agura, Alib, Sta. Rita and 106 others sent to the President of the Philippines a petition o requesting that the small parcels of land located in the areas covered by MSAs which they have been occupying for thirty (30) years be awarded to them. Regional Land Officer Cipriano Zabala of Region V, Iloilo City conducted an investigation: o land is now a dry land which has been formed by accretions from the sea (Guimaras strait) for many, many years. It could not be reached anymore by sea water during ordinary high tide. (located between the Bacolod Cadastre on the east and foreshore area on the west) o About 314 of the land in question extending towards the south was surveyed under approved survey plans in the name of Federico Serfino, Sr. and Serfino, Jr. o

December 10, 1965: Federico Serfino, Sr., filed with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) over a 4,172 sqm land in San Patricia Bacolod City February 18 1966: his son, Serfino, Jr., filed MSA over an adjoining lot with an area of 1,358 sqm. The Director of Lands approved the survey plans of these two (2) MSAs, and then Land Investigator Rodolfo Magbanua conducted a preliminary investigation of the parcels of land covered by the above MSAs. His reported that: o Serfino, Sr. had introduced improvements consisting of a residential house, a piggery house and a bodega all valued at P25,500.00 o Serfino, Jr. had introduced an improvement consisting of a residential house valued at P15,000.00; and that they have been occupying the parcels applied for since 1947. o Recommended that the MSAs be given further due course.







MSAs were referred to the Director of Public Works, the Commissioner of Public Highways, the Bacolod City Engineer and the Bacolod City Collector of Customs. (no objections from them)…The Director of Lands approved the surveys of the lots. Then notices for the sale through public auction of the lots in question were posted at the required places and published in the Official Gazette. PRICE: P5.00 per square meter. Serfinos were the .

23

LTD Digests Part 2 The remaining 1/4 portion of the land in question is not covered by an approved survey plan and is being claimed by Mr. Serfino, Sr. o The Serfinos have houses on the land in question. Likewise, all other portions are covered with houses mostly of nipa roofing and of light materials belonging to the petitioners. There is a well now being used by the people. Several old coconut trees are found in the area and the consensus is that these coconut trees have been planted by Candido Cordova and/or his predecessors, owners of a cadastral lot not very far south of the land in question. 3 December 1969 FINAL report: o the fint lot on the south is that covered by MSA of Federico Serfim, Jr. with an area of 1,358 sqm. 34 persons (petitioners) with houses therein very close to each other occupying the area. o The sand lot (4,172 sqm) is applied for by Serfino, Sr.  Aside from the residential house of the Serfinos and the bodega (of) the West Visayan Shipping Co., there are thirty-eight (38) houses also close to each other of the petitioners. o The 3rd lot on the north is not covered by any public land application by the Serfinos (3,650 sqm). There are 58 houses of the petitioner(s) within the lot all close to each other. o 3 ejectment cases (Civil Cages Nos. 6633, 6534, and 6674) were filed with the City Court of Bacolod by private respondents against certain individuals including petitioners herein. o Recommendation: in view of these pending cases, further action on private respondents MSAs be held in abeyance. City Court of Bacolod: ejectment of the defendants from the lots in question for "failure to pay rentals." o Civil Cases Nos. 6534 and 6674 dismissed: question of who has a better right to the areas claimed will be determined by the Bureau of Lands who has charge of the disposal of public lands. Land Investigator Villamarzo recommended that petitioners be given "preferential right" over the portions occupied by them.  Director of Lands issued Order: Pederico Serfino, Sr. and Federico Serfino, Jr., MSAs amended- exclude portions occupied by the petitioners o The excluded portions shall be subdivided into home-sized lots in accordance with the actual occupation of the petitioners who file appropriate public land applications MR (for being unable to introduce evidence in their behalf) was denied: o proceedings in the City Court-Bacolod were adopted during the investigation of the case conducted by a representative of o













24

Director of lands. (records of the transcript of stenographic notes taken down during the hearing in the 2 civil cases dismissed are attached to the record of the case) o Petitioner-claimants are in actual possession of the portions claimed by them. It was clearly established that they have preferential right to the portions they actually occupy. Secretary of Natural Resources SET ASIDE Director of lands: o petitioners ordered to vacate the two lots in question w/n 30 days and leave the appellants in peaceful possession--- MSA Applications shall be given due course. o Sales of the lots in question in favor of the appellants (private respondents) should NOT be revoked in view of the alleged conflicts and adverse claims of the appellees (petitioners).  Appellees failed to :  protest when the appellants filed their respective sales applications.  protest when the land was surveyed nor did they contest or participate in the public bidding.  They took nearly 2years after the bidding to file their alleged adverse claims. o Bureau decided to sell the contested lots through public auction. And the public bidding was indeed held. Prior possession is immaterial. In proceedings for the sale of public lands for residential purposes, adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. o Appellants have substantially complied with the sales provisions of the Public Land Act, whereas the appellees failed to exercise their rights when they did not participate in the public bidding. o They cannot invoke preferential right over the contested lots under Section 95 of the Public Land Act since the lots were already regularly sold at public auction Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs affirmed SoNR: o DoLands characterized the land as having been formed by accretion from the sea, so it is not foreshore land. The sales in question were perfected by public auction, as per Sec 60, in rel. to Sec 26 of the Public Land Act, and not through private sales; hence, R.A. No. 730 has no application. o Petitioners were able to enter the land after the Serfinos purchased it by public bidding. The social justice policy of the New Society does not condone, much less countenance, entry upon public lands already applied for and purchased at public

LTD Digests Part 2

 

auction; otherwise, it would be placing a premium on squatting () MR denied so they filed special civil action for certiorari and asked for the nullification of the decisions of the PALA and the SoNR at CFI MANILA. Trial Court dismissed their petition. Petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari with SC.



ISSUES: W/N Sec. 1 Of Ra. No. 730 Has Amended The Provisions Of Secs. 61 And 67 Of The Public Land Act Regarding The Sale Of Public Lands For Residential Purposes To Bona Fide Occupants- NOOO! W/N Sale To The Serfinos At Public Auction Of More Than 1,000 Square Meters Of Residential Public Land Violated The Provisions Of R.A. No. 730 And Is Therefore Void—NOOOO!



HELD: Petition has NO MERIT. 

Both the Secretary of Natural Resources and the Office of the President made a thorough and painstaking analysis and evaluation of the facts and their respective decisions are clearly supported by substantial evidence. There is nothing in their actuations that would bring their findings and decisions within the above exceptions to the principle of conclusiveness of finding of facts of administrative bodies.



R.A. No. 730 does not repeal or amend Sections 61 and 67 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public Land Act); it merely establishes an exception to said sections. o The contention of the petitioners that the sale to the Serfinos is void because under Rep. Act No. 730 public land for residential purposes must be sold by private sale and for not more than 1,000 square meters is WRONG. o Sec. 59 of commonwealth Act No. 141 has classified public lands which can be sold for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes into: (a) lands reclaimed by the government; (b) foreshore; (c) marshy lands; and (d) lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. o Under Sec. 60 of the Act, these public lands may be leased or sold to any person qualified to purchase public lands for agricultural purposes, provided that the area shall not exceed 144 hectares, as may be determined by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Under Sec. 61, the lands under (a), (b) and (c) classifications can be disposed of-by lease only, while those under (d) classification may either be leased or sold o The land in question belongs to class (d) o Sec. 67 provides that the lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding to the highest bidder. Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 730 then shows that sale of public lands for residential purposes has been limited to 1,000 square meters only, and that the sale must be effected by private sale only IF conditions specified are present, i.e., that preference shall be given to the applicant if he is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which he resides; if he has established his residence in good faith on a parcel of public land, which is not needed for the public services; and if the area applied for does not exceed one thousand square meters. In short, R.A. No. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general rule that it should be by bidding, if the area applied for does not exceed 1,000 square meters, and that the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified for in Section 1 thereof. Hence, if the area applied for is in excess of 1,000 square meters, as in the instant case, the sale must be done only through bidding. o

Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association v CA - Ronald Sarcaoga

G.R. No. 106043 March 4, 1996 Hermosisima, J CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC. (COCLAI) vs. CA, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

Topic: Special Patent (Administrative mode; Land patents) Doctrine: An OCT issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to a Special Patent is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued 25

LTD Digests Part 2 under a judicial registration proceeding as the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.

A day after COCLAI moved for execution, NHA filed quieting of title with preliminary injunction. COCLAI moved to dismiss (ground was res judicata – NHA filed an injunction suit before).

(This case is a convoluted mess. The italicized portion is the best way I can summarize it.)

RTC denied COCLAI’s motion to dismiss but also denied NHA’s prayer for preliminary injunction (to stop COCLAI’s motion for execution of the forcible entry case judgment). So NHA went to CA, CA reversed RTC saying that the injunction must issue. Hence, the case at bar.

SHORT FACTS: The lot in question was occupied by COCLAI members by virtue of a grant by the Bureau of Lands to survey the land for subdivision purposes (and only to survey.) But COCLAI did subsequently apply for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the land but this wasn’t acted upon.

MORE DETAILED FACTS: Lot 1982 located at Cagayan de Oro City was formerly a timberland block until in 1956 when the Bureau of Forestry declared it as alienable and disposable public land.

The NHA wanted to expropriate the land and award COCLAI members 300,000 instead of the lots but the members wanted the lots. The expropriation was halted anyway because a case was pending (annulment of OCT in the name of Salcedo covering the land in question – the result of this case was the land was declared by the SC as public land.)

In 1964, the Bureau of Lands granted COCLAI authority to survey the land for purposes of subdivision into residential lots. COCLAI engaged the services of a geodetic engineer. The Bureau of lands, after conducting an ocular survey, required COCLAI (in behalf of its members) to file a miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. COCLAI filed the application in 1970.

The President then issued a Proclamation authorizing NHA to develop, administer, and dispose of the lands. The President also issued a Special Patent in favor of NHA over the lands and the NHA subsequently obtained OCT in its name. But before the Special Patent and OCT were issued, COCLAI filed a forcible entry case against the NHA claiming that they were being ousted from their lawful possession of the lots by the NHA agents and policemen (NHA itself was not a defendant, only its employees and policemen). They won this case and so they moved for execution. It was then that the Special Patent was issued and based thereon, the OCT in the name of NHA thereafter.

However, the application was held in abeyance by the Bureau of Lands pending the final outcome of the civil case filed by the Republic and CDOC before the Supreme Court against Benedicta Salcedo for the annulment of OCT 0-257 covering the land in question. In such case, COCLAI intervened. In 1979, the NHA filed an expropriation proceeding before the CFI of Misamis Oriental at CDOC to acquire Cadastral Lot no. 1982 (total area of 224K sqm which includes the land involved in this case). COCLAI intervened claiming that they wanted the 26

LTD Digests Part 2 residential lots instead of being paid P300,000. Upon learning of the pending suit against Salcedo, the NHA sought suspension of the expropriation proceedings.

The MTCC ruled to restore COCLAI members in their actual possession but dismissed the claim for damages. The RTC affirmed. Thus the members of COCLAI moved for execution.

In 1982, the Supreme Court decided to annul OCT 0-257 and declared the lot as public land.

While the case in the MTC was pending, the President of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1988 Special Patent No. 3551 covering the entire CL No. 1982. By virtue of the special patent, the Register of Deeds of CDOC issued an OCT in the name of NHA.

A month after, the SolGen gave the Bureau of Lands in Manila a copy of the decision. BOL Manila ordered the District Land Officer in CDOC to inventory the lots. The Regional Land Director of Region 10 informed them, however, that members of COCLAI occupied portions of the lot by virtue of the Survey Authority granted to COCLAi in 1964 by the Bureau of Lands.

So a day after COCLAI moved for execution, the NHA filed a complaint for Quieting of title with injunction against COCLAI with the RTC of CDOC.

In 1983, the President of the Philippines issued a Proclamation reserving the entire area of Cadastral Lot 1982 for the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Project to be implemented by the NHA. Under the said proclamation, the NHA was granted the authority "to develop, administer and dispose of lot No. 1982 located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, in accordance with the guidelines of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program.

The NHA alleged that the decision in the forcible entry case could not be enforced against it because it was not a party to said case, that COCLAI's claim is anchored upon the fact that the lot was declared public land, that NHA became the absolute owner of the lot by virtue of the Special Patent issued by the President, that COCLAI's claim created a cloud on plaintiff's title. The RTC issued a restraining order against COCLAI to stop enforcement of the judgment in the forcible entry case until the RTC resolves the quieting of title complaint by NHA.

Thus the Bureau of Lands, through its Regional Director, issued an order rejecting the subdivision survey previously submitted by the COCLAI.

COCLAI moved to dismiss the quieting of title complaint by NHA on the grounds that the action is barred by prior judgment (Apparently, the NHA has filed an action for "Injunction with Damages" against COCLAI before the RTC of CDOC to prevent the MTCC from executing its decision in the forcible entry case, but this was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court – RTC said that

In 1986, the NHA through agents and with the help of policemen, claiming authority under PD 1472, sought to demolish the structures erected by COCLAI members. COCLAI filed a forcible entry suit against NHA employees and the policemen (but not against NHA itself).

27

LTD Digests Part 2 if NHA believes that it is the owner of the property, it should ventilate its claim in some other case, not in a simple case of injunction).

had already been issued to NHA. In view of this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court, where Civil Case No. 90-337 was pending, to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a material change in the status of the parties with regard to the said land. Clearly, the government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their respective possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.

In 1990, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. But it also denied the motion for preliminary injunction sought for by the NHA (MR also denied.) NHA appealed to the CA and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and the CA ordered the RTC judge to issue a writ of preliminary injunction (to respect the possession of the NHA over the land). ISSUE #1: WON NHA entitled to injunction (YES) Purpose of injunction is to preserve status quo and to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. The requisites for the issuance of injunction are:

ISSUE #2: WON NHA has a better right to possession of Lot 1982 as a necessary consequence of ownership (YES)

1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected

COCLAI arguments:

2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

1. Special Patent 3351 issued by Pres. Aquino on July 1, 1988 and the OCT issued based thereon in the name of the NHA had entrusted only the administration of said lot but not ownership.

The Court of Appeals was justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction because while Civil Case No. 11204 for forcible entry was pending on appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino which covered the lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof, an Original Certificate of Title in the name of NHA was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. So, when petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990, a certificate of title

2. Proclamation no. 2290 declared the land as Slum Improvement Settlement, so it is illegal for NHA to claim ownership over said land. 3. The CA overlooked the fact that the issues on ownership and possession are sub-judice before the RTC of CDOC in Civil Case No. 90337, so the CA cannot pass upon these issues.

28

LTD Digests Part 2 Note: the SC only discussed argument #1 in resolving the issue of possession and ownership.

assigns forever, subject to private rights, if any there be. 14

NHA’s OCT is concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the property. Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens systems and the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed, without said decree being controverted by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned

Clearly, the certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot but also the right of possession as a necessary consequence of the right of ownership.

Furthermore, in the case at bench, the original certificate of title was issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding pursuant to Special Patent No. 3551. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding as the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law. 12 Moreover, the said certificate of title was not controverted by petitioner in a proper proceeding nor did it show that the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad faith or fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of having been issued by the register of deeds in the regular performance of its official duty. 13

In contrast, COCLAI’s only basis for its claims is lawful entry and possession for an extended period of time. It had an judgment in its favor in its case for forcible entry, but that case did not resolve ownership, only possession (mere physical possession, not juridical possession – possession de facto vs possession de jure).

NHA is not merely the administrator, it owned the lot. The Proclamation granted NHA the power not only to develop and administer, but also to dispose of the lot.

Its Miscellaneous Sales Application was never acted upon by the Bureau of Lands. So COCLAI’s occupation of the land has subsequently become illegal. Its members have become squatters possessing the land in bad faith. Although as a general rule, a court should not transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another in an injunction suit, this rule admits exceptions – such as when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land on property covered by a Torrens title.

Also OCT No. P-3324 issued in the name of respondent NHA, clearly states: TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the said parcel of land with all the appurtenances thereunto of right of belonging unto the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY and to its successors-in-interest or

Petition by COCLAI dismissed, the CA decision is affirmed. Injunction issued.

29

LTD Digests Part 2 prevailing circumstances In the case at bar, the Court finds that by virtue of the decision of the Director of Lands rejecting the claim of the estate of Villa and giving due course to the claims of petitioners, the situation of the parties has substantially changed from private land dwellers to public land settlers. In view thereof, the execution of the assailed judgment must therefore be stayed. Also, private respondent (estate of Villa) is not the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land as found by the Director of Lands. Assuming arguendo that respondent had been granted a patent to the land in question, the same has never been registered with the Registry of Deeds of the province where the property is located. Indeed, respondent could offer no proof to show that the same was registered. All patents that may be granted must be registered since the conveyance of the land covered thereby is effective only upon such registration which shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land Registration is mandatory under the law to affect third parties. Thus, paragraph of Sec. 51 of PD 1529 provides: "The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the of office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies."

Ortegas v Hidalgo - Jet Siang Ortegas vs Hidalgo

Bidin, J.

Facts: In 1968 petitioners occupied the contested property in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. They paid rentals to the estate of Villa on the belief that the latter was the owner of said property. In 1974, petitioners stopped paying rentals to private respondent upon learning that the disputed lot is a public land and since then claimed ownership over said property. Petitioners with other occupants of the lot totaling around 72 families, filed a petition with the Office of the President praying that the respective portions occupied by them be subdivided and awarded to them. In 1981, Petitioners, at the instance of private respondent, were charged with violation of the Anti-Squatting Law (PD 772) for alleged squatting on the lot allegedly owned by the Estate of Villa. In 1986, judgment was rendered by respondent judge convicting petitioners of the crime of squatting. In 1987, the Director of Lands declared the disputed property as public land and giving due course to the claim of petitioners. Also, in 1987, respondent judge issued an order of demolition directing the provincial sheriff to demolish the houses of petitioners for failure to vacate the premises. MR was filed by petitioners to lift order demolition using as basis the 1987 decision of the Director of Lands. This was denied. Issue: W/N there has been a change in the situation of the parties to warrant a stay of the execution of the judgment. YES. It is a settled rule that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is incumbent upon the judge to issue a writ of execution. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. 47. When certain facts and circumstances transpire or supervene after the judgment has become final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust. 48. When there has been a change in the situation of the parties which make such execution inequitable 49. When it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the judgment of the court 50. When it appears that the writ has been issued improvidently or without authority or against the wrong party 51. That the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied 52. Where it becomes imperative, in the higher interests of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the

Absent the fact of registration of a patent, title to the land covered thereby, whether it be by sales or homestead, may not be said to have been perfected and, therefore, not indefeasible. A patent becomes indefeasible as a Torrens Title only when said patent is registered with the Register of Deeds pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act Franco v ES - Santiago Tiongco

Heirs of Tengco v Aliwalas - Aaron Valdez HEIRS of TENGCO v. HEIRS of ALIWALAS and COURT of APPEALS J. Cortes | November 29, 1988 DOCTRINE(S): (3) The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is

30

LTD Digests Part 2 really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. (4) While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. (5) If there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy. (6) Title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner.

remedies, seeing the case should have been filed before the Bureau of Lands (WRONG); (2) Whether or not the Heirs of Aliwalas had a better title, since Dr. Aliwalas was a rich man who was not entitled to a homestead patent and that his heirs failed to prove possession of the parcel of land, as testified to by a hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands (ALSO WRONG); (3) Whether or not private respondents have lost their title to the property through laches and prescription because of their failure to prove possession (STILL WRONG) ISSUE(S): Whether or not the RTC should have taken cognizance of the case on the ground of the Heirs of Aliwalas’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Yes, the RTC had jurisdiction over the case because a homestead produces the effect of a title procured by a judicial proceeding) 3. The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent. 4. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title. 5. While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.

FACTS: Petitioners’ claim is anchored on an application in 1933 with the Bureau of Lands a homestead patent covering Lot Number 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre by Dr. Jose Aliwalas, which was granted, prompting the RD of Pampanga to issue an OCT to that effect. Aliwalas had the property fenced and planted with vegetables, while paying the taxes thereon. After the war, Aliwalas’s tenants paid him through his overseer and planted palay, mango trees, and ipil-ipil trees on the property. The property passed to his heirs, who had the property partitioned, and several TCTs were issued to that effect. Respondents’ claim is anchored on a free patent application in 1973 by Gregorio Tengco with the District Land Office in San Fernando, Pampanga. The Public Land Inspector found Tengco and his family having planted several trees, rice, and corn. In rebuttal, the Heirs of Aliwalas adduced evidence showing prewar records of the Bureau of Lands having been burnt, as certified by the Chief of the Records Management Division of the Bureau of Lands, explaining why the Bureau had no more records as to the homestead patent issued in favor of Dr. Aliwalas in 1936, which gave rise to the OCT held by the Heirs of Aliwalas. The RTC decided in favor of the Heirs of Tengco and the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Whether or not the Heirs of Aliwalas had a better title (YES, because the private respondents’ title is incontrovertible by virtue of being a homestead patent) Dr. Aliwalas' title to the property having become incontrovertible, it may no longer be collaterally attacked. If there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy

The Heirs of Tengco appealed the CA decision on the following grounds: (1) Whether or not the RTC should have taken cognizance of the case on the ground of the Heirs of Aliwalas’ failure to exhaust administrative

31

LTD Digests Part 2 Whether or not private respondents have lost their title to the property through laches and prescription because of their failure to prove possession (NO, because a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible.)

relinquished and transferred all his rights to the homestead unto her in consideration of P1,000, so Gregorio had transferred all his rights therein in her favor, except that the sale was subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. - The Cuenca siblings (except Natividad) sued Andrea Cuenca and Federico Decolongon for reconveyance and damages. - The CFI of Negros Occidental decided in favor of the Decolongons, and the CA decided the appeal in favor of the Cuenca siblings. - The Decolongons filed a motion for reconsideration and, when it was denied, filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. They contend that before a patent is issued on public lands, the ownership of the same remains with the government, and homestead applicants occupying the public lands are considered mere caretakers. And since the ownership of the public land in this case was still with the government the alienation or transfer made by the applicant to third persons was void. - Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456 provides: Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvement or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations or corporations. (Sec. 118, Com. Act No. 141). No alienation transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty five years after issuance of title shall be valid without approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied, except on Constitutional and legal grounds (Sec. 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended by Com. Act No. 456).

4. Title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner. 5. The facts in the proceedings below provide the Aliwalases have always made sure they were occupying and tilling the land. Their overseer, Rommel Casus, planted vegetables and tilled the land. After the war, the land was fraught with palay, mango trees, and ipil-ipil trees. Only in 1974 did the Tengcos wrest possession from Aliwalases’ caretaker and deprived the latter of their produce.

Gonzaga v CA - Reinier Jeffrey Abdon

Decolongon v CA - Maya Abdullah DECOLONGON vs. CA G.R. No. L-46495 – 24 June 1983 – Gutierrez, Jr. FACTS - Gregorio Cuenca, married to Aurelia Cuenca, applied for homestead of land in Silay City, Negros Occidental. On 10 October 1951, the order for the issuance of the patent was promulgated, but it was 20 years later, or on 12 October 1971, that the patent was issued by the president and the land was registered. OCT No. P-41 was issued in Gregorio’s name. - Gregorio died on 3 January 1971; Aurelia died on 14 April 1971. - 24 January 1972 - Andrea Cuenca (married to Federico Decolongon), stating that she was the only child and legal heir of said spouses, executed a declaration of heirship in her own favor. The title was cancelled and placed in her name. - Gregorio had left brothers and sisters—Felicidad, Bonifacio, Amado, Alfredo, Leonor, and Natividad—all of whom, except for Natividad, disputed the paternity and filiation of Andrea. - Felicidad also contended that on 16 May 1966, Gregorio had already

ISSUES (1) W/N the deed of relinquishment which conveyed the land to the private respondents was executed within the prohibited five-year period – No (2) W/N the transfer or the date of conveyance is null and void because it was executed without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources – No HELD/RATIO (1) The patent is considered issued once the order for its issuance is promulgated and, therefore, the five-year period is computed from

32

LTD Digests Part 2 this date. The order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent was dated October 10, 1951, but the patent itself was issued only twenty (20) years later on October 12, 1971, while the Deed of Relinquishment in favor of private respondents was executed on May 16, 1966. Clearly, the Deed of Relinquishment was executed more than five (5) years from the order for the issuance of patent. In fact, fourteen (1 4) years, seven (7) months, and six (6) days had already elapsed from the order for the issuance of patent. Under the facts of this case and the rule applicable to those facts the material date is the promulgation of the order. (2) The fact that the deed of relinquishment may not have been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is not fatal. We have already held in several cases that it is only directory.

void for having been executed within the five-year prohibitory period provided by Section 118 of the Public Land Law. The IAC reversed the IAC and found the sale completely valid (ground not mentioned). ISSUE(S): Whether or not the sale between Constantino and Simeona was valid (NO, because the sale was executed within the five-year prohibitory period provided by the Public Land Act.) 6. Section 118 of the Public Land Law provides: “Except in favor of the government or any of its branches, units or institutions land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations or corporations.” 7. The provision of law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant is mandatory. From the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five (5) years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions cannot be subject to encumbrance or alienation, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period. a. The only exception mentioned by the law is the sale or encumbrance in favor of the government or any of its branches, units or institutions. 8. In the case of Arsenal vs. IAC, the Court said that a contract which purports to alienate, transfer, convey or encumber any homestead within the prohibitory period of five (5) years from the date of issuance of the patent is void from its execution. 9. It is dangerous precedent to allow the sale of a homestead during the five-year prohibition to anyone, even to the homesteader's own son or daughter. A clever homesteader who wants to circumvent the ban may simply sell the lot to his descendant and the latter after registering the same in his name would sell it to a third person. This way, public policy would not be subserved. 10. The sale to a descendant is not one of the exceptions contemplated by law. Only the government or any of its branches, units or institutions is given the right to acquire homestead by purchase at any time and even

Gayappanao v IAC - Victoria Buenaventura GAYAPANAO et al v. IAC and SIMEONA GAYAPANAO-NOVENARIO C.J. Fernan | July 17, 1991 DOCTRINE(S): 6. The provision of law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant is mandatory. From the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five (5) years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions cannot be subject to encumbrance or alienation, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period. 7. The only exception mentioned by the law is the sale or encumbrance in favor of the government or any of its branches, units or institutions. FACTS: Constantino Gayapanao applied for a homestead patent, which was approved and issued on December 19, 1937. On November 15, 1938, Constantino sold it to his daughter Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario and her husband through a Kasulatan ng Bilihan, which indicated sale of 20,000 sq m of the homestead land to private respondents. On January 2, 1974, petitioners, the rest of Constantino’s nine children or the heirs thereof filed a Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Prayer for Appointment of Receiver against Simeona with the Oriental Mindoro CFI. The CFI declared the sale contract between Constantino and Simeona as null and

33

LTD Digests Part 2 during the five-year prohibitory period. To hold valid the sale at bar would be to throw the door open to schemes and subterfuges which would defeat the law prohibiting the alienation of homestead within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent.

d. the property in question now a residential area with real estate subdivisions 56. The trial court ruled out private respondent’s right to repurchase the property and dismissed the complaint 57. The CA reversed trial court decision of dismissal and ordered petitioners to reconvey the land to private respondent upon payment to the former of "the repurchase price thereof in the amount of P4,128.60, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Homera v Casa - Calvin Patrick Domingo

ISSUE: 3. W/N there is bad faith on the sale ? None 4. W/N the reconveyance is valid? No

Santana v Marinas - John Raymund Fullecido Santana v Marinas Facts

SC:

53. On April 21, 1960, private respondent Sotero Mariñas — as plaintiff — filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint to recover a real property arguing that a. he acquired, on May 22, 1929, under free patent and covered by Original Certificate of Title b. he sold the above parcel of land to petitioner Francisco Santana — one of the defendants below — for a sum of P4,128.60 c. Jose H. Panganiban is a subsequent lienholder and/or encumbrancer, the property having been sold to him by Santana 54. Marinas prays that the court allows him to repurchase the property for the sum of P4,128,60 and (b) awarding to him P400.00 annually from date of filing of the complaint until the property is delivered to him, with costs 55. The petitioner interposed the following affirmative defenses: a. That at the time the absolute sales were entered into, they were totally ignorant of and had no knowledge whatsoever to any encumbrance or right to repurchase by private respondent b. that they have always been of the honest belief that they acquired absolute ownership of the property, free from any lien or encumbrances whatsoever and, hence, are purchasers in good faith c. being innocent purchasers for value, they acquired absolute ownership over the property

3. None, this raises a question of fact which this Court is not at liberty to review at this stage 58. no point in the argument of petitioners. a free patent or a homestead patent must be registered under the Land Registration Act in order that the land covered thereby is brought under the operation of the Torrens system and thus becomes a registered land. 59. Neither did respondent Mariñas misrepresent that the land is not subject to redemption, because the right of the patentee and his heirs to effect such redemption is statutory and, therefore, the law allowing it formed part of and was deemed incorporated in the deed of conveyance 60. It is settled that an existing law enters into and forms part of a valid contract without the need for the parties expressly making reference to it 4. Section 119 of the Public Land Law, Com. Act No. 141 provides that "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance." 61. Petitioners’ specific contention that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to subject to the right of repurchase a free patent or homestead conveyed 25 years

34

LTD Digests Part 2 after the issuance of the title is without legal basis and is contrary to jurisprudence laid down on the matter. 62. in Isaac, Et. Al. v. Tan Chuan Leong, Et. Al. 20 the sale took place more than 27 years after the issuance of the original title while in Francisco v. Certeza, Sr., 21 one of the 2 lots was sold more than 41 years after it was acquired. 63. HOWEVER, The findings of fact of the trial court — the then CFI Judge, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, later a member of this Court, presiding — are clear and duly supported by the evidence a. Evidence has been adduced by the defendants that this property of Sotero Mariñas has ceased to be in the nature of a homestead, and that instead it has been transformed into a growing commercial and residential area b. It is evident that to grant plaintiff the right to repurchase the property at this time would be not for the purpose of giving him back the land for his house and cultivation but for him to exploit it for business purposes at the expense of the defendants who are innocent purchaser(s) in good faith and for value

Rabanes' place for the purpose of redeeming the land and actually tendered to him the loan amount of P800.00, this time, in genuine and legal Philippine currency. However, Rabanes told them that the land could no longer be redeemed and he drove them out of his house. Rabanes filed before the CFI: 64. An injunction suit (Civil Case No. II-14). CFI held: injunction was not the proper cause of action, because injunction was merely an ancillary or provisional remedy to a main action. Action for injunction was ordered dismissed 65. Another complaint entitled "Recovery of Possession" (Civil Case No. II39) CFI: Rendered judgment declaring plaintiff Rabanes (herein respondent) as the rightful owner of the land and ordered the defendants (herein petitioners) to vacate the same RATIO: Witness of Vallangca is Benjamin Vallangca, son of Ana Villena. He was only 14 years old when his mother signed the document under the alleged influence of the plaintiff. He also signed it as a witness. With that tender age, we doubt if he understood the meaning or difference between a mortgage and a sale of real property, so how can he say now that his mother was influenced into signing Exhibit 'F'. He did not say how Nazario Rabanes influenced his mother. CA affirmed in toto CFI’s judgment. Petitioners Vallangca’s argument before the SC: 5. Res judicata. The dismissal of the "Injunction" case filed by Rabanes against them, barred the filing by Rabanes against them of the second action for "Recovery of Possession." The first suit, although styled as for "Injunction", had for its actual primary purpose the recovery of the land in dispute and, therefore, after its dismissal, no other action for recovery of possession of the same land and against the same parties (herein petitioners) could be pursued by the same complainant (Rabanes). 6. Respondent's complaint for injunction had already prescribed, before its filing on 7 July 1971, under Section 40 of Act 190: “An action for recovery of title to, or possession of real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within 10 years after the cause of such action accrues." From the date private respondent claims to have bought the land, that is, 2 February 1946, more than ten (10) years had elapsed when Rabanes filed on 7 July 1971 his action for injunction which, in effect, was an action for recovery of possession of the disputed land. Hence, the action was barred by prescription. 7. It was not likely that their mother Ana Billena would consent to sell the

Vallangca v CA - Carlos S. Hernandez Jr. VALLANGCA v. CA and RABANES FACTS: Ana Billena, together with her eldest son Benjamin, went to Centro, Buguey, Cagayan and mortgaged the land in dispute to her cousin Nazario Rabanes (private respondent herein) for P800.00 in Japanese war notes, to cover the burial expenses of her deceased husband Fortunato Vallangca. There being no notary public in the place at the time, the agreement was not reduced to writing. After the Pacific war, Nazario Rabanes went to the residence of Ana Billena on 2 February 1946 and made the latter sign a document which Rabanes represented to Ana Billena as a mortgage contract written in the Ilocano dialect. Billena, being an illiterate and trusting in her cousin (Rabanes), affixed her signature on the document in the space indicated to her. In that same year, 1946, Billena was informed by a cousin of Rabanes and another witness to the document that the alleged mortgage contract which she had signed was actually a deed of absolute sale to Rabanes of the land covered by TCT No. 1005. Ana Billena and her son Benjamin, thereupon, went to

35

LTD Digests Part 2 land to Rabanes for only Eight Hundred (P800.00) Pesos, for the entire eleven (11) hectares, forty one (41) acres and thirty three (33) centares comprising its total area, considering that the land was then assessed already at Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty (P2,620.00). 8. (RELEVANT) Even assuming arguendo that there was indeed a sale, petitioners postulate that since the land is registered in the name of both Maximiniana Crisostomo and Ana Billena, the latter could not outrightly dispose of the undivided one-half share of the former (Crisostomo), without first accomplishing an affidavit of adjudication of Crisostomo's interest or share, and registering said affidavit of adjudication.

continued such possession till 1962, when they were allegedly dispossessed by the petitioners, one nevertheless can not ignore the unrefuted fact that, from 1962 until the filing of said injunction case in 1971, it was the petitioners Vallangcas who were in actual and physical possession of the property. RATIO 3 (RELEVANT): Assuming then that what Ana Billena and Nazario Rabanes actually agreed upon in 1944 was indeed a sale of the land, which transaction was formally put in writing on 2 February 1946, the said sale, while valid — because it occurred after the period of five (5) years when sale was prohibited — yet, the sale was subject to Billena's right to repurchase within five (5) years from 2 February 1946.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid sale HELD: There was no valid sale. It was an equitable mortgage. But even ifthere was a valid deed of sale, Ana Billena was able to redeem the land within the 5year redemption period. Note: The trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at the conclusion that the deed of sale of 2 February 1946 was indeed one of sale and not of mortgage.

Notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of sale of the vendor's right to repurchase the land, Billena or her heirs are granted such right by operation of law. The restrictions and qualifications attached to every alienation of these lands are mandatory, with the primordial aim to preserve land grants to the family of the applicant for free patent.

RATIO 1: Under Art. 1602 and Art. 1604 of the Civil Code, a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases: "Art. 1602 1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; 2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; xxx xxx xxx "Art. 1604. — The provisions of Art. 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale."

By Ana Billena's act of tendering to Rabanes the P800.00, she had in effect exercised her right to repurchase Since the Public Land Law is silent as to the form and manner in which the right to repurchase a homestead or land acquired under a free patent may be exercised, any act which amounts to a demand for reconveyance should be sufficient. In effect, if the 2 February 1946 deed was actually intended to evidence a sale of the disputed land, made by Ana Billena to Nazario Rabanes, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, it was a sale with pacto de retro wherein title of the vendees-Rabanes to the property was to become absolute and irrevocable only upon the failure of Billena or her heirs to repurchase the same within five (5) years from 2 February 1946. Billena exercised her right to repurchase the land, also in 1946, and her heirs are up to the present time in actual and physical possession of the land. With these as premises, it can be said that Rabanes' title to the property remains to this date revocable and unconsolidated.

There was gross inadequacy of price, because the land was sold for P800.00 in Japanese war notes at that, or for barely thirty percent (30%) of its total assessed value of P2,620.00. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that real estate, including agricultural land, usually commands a market value much higher than assessed value. o There is continuous physical possession by the petitioners Billena of the property for almost nine (9) long years, or from 1962 to the filing of the injunction case by respondent Rabanes in 1971. Even assuming for the sake of argument, as the Court of Appeals believed, that Rabanes acquired possession of the land thru his tenants in 1946 and o

Petitioners Villangca may redeem the property covered by TCT No. 1005 upon the return of the amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00) to private respondents, with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 1 January 1962 until fully paid.

36

LTD Digests Part 2 

Other Issues: 5. Res judicata is not applicable. RATIO: The prior injunction suit, which was dismissed, was merely an ancillary and not a main action. A writ of injunction presupposes the pendency of a principal or main action. There being no main action when the 7 July 1971 suit for injunction was filed, the latter was correctly dismissed. Accordingly, there could be no prior judgment on the merits to speak of that resulted in res judicata, from such dismissal of the injunction suit on 13 September 1972. A dismissal order is generally deemed to be without prejudice to the filing of another action. The only instance when dismissal of an action is with prejudice is, when the order itself so states. Stated differently, when the court issues, upon the plaintiff's instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to whether it is with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar, the presumption is, that it is without prejudice. 6. The action for recovery of possession of the land in question was timely filed. RATIO: Art. 1141 of the Civil Code: real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty (30) years. Here, the Court of Appeals found that Rabanes was dispossessed by the petitioners in 1962, and the action for recovery of possession was filed on 11 September 1972, or more or less ten (10) years after dispossession.

on the strength of an SPA executed by some of the petitioners in favor of petitioner Benjamin Belisario, land was mortgaged to PNB o petitioners-mortgagors defaulted; mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed; land was sold in 1963 for P3,134.76 with respondent PNB as the highest bidder  April 1971, petitioners wrote to PNB making known their "desire to redeem and/or repurchase the said property for P3,134.76," and enclosed therein a postal money order of P630 as partial payment, balance to be paid in 12 equal monthly instalments o Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was not yet registered; PNB on July 22, 1971 caused the registration of such with the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon and TCT was later issued in the name of bank  August 1971 PNB sent a reply letter to petitioners, refusing the tender; under existing regulations of the bank, payment by way of redemption must be paid in full and not by installments  PNB sold the land to respondent Cabrera for P5k and the corresponding TCT was issued in his name  respondent Cabrera filed an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against herein petitioners, together with their tenants, who were actual possessors of the land, with CFI Bukidnon o January 1975, Petitioners also filed an action for Repurchase of Homestead against PNB and Cabrera with CFI Bukidnon  Cabrera filed a MTD petitioners' action for Repurchase of Homestead on 2 grounds: 1. No tender of payment of the redemption price and/or consignation of the redemption was made by plaintiff. 2. Complaint states no cause of action.  petitioners herein opposed contending that they offered to repurchase the property from PNB within the 5-year redemption period and tendered payment which was, however, refused o manifested that on August 1 and 4, 1917, they consigned with the Clerk of Court of Bukidnon P5k as repurchase price  CFI granted the MTD  IAC (now CA) affirmed the lower court's decision in toto

Rural Bank of Davao City v CA - Kevin Hernandez Sucaldito v Montejo - Kevin Hernandez

Belisario v IAC - Ayesha Alonto Mambuay 58 Belisario v IAC (now CA) Medialdea, J | August 30, 1988 FACTS:  piece of land originally covered by OCT 366, pursuant to Homestead Patent 45183 issued in the names of Rufino Belisario and Felipa Lauga located in Valencia, Bukidnon, 23, 2210 hectares o upon the death of Rufino, land was extra-judicially settled among his children (7 petitioners herein) and his widow, Felipa in whose names TCT was issued

ISSUE: WoN the filing of judicial action to redeem preserved the petitioner’s right to redeem (YES, also w/in 5-year period)

37

LTD Digests Part 2 HELD: CA reversed; petitioners to redeem within 30 days from entry of judgment; Cabrera to execute a deed of absolute conveyance in favor of the petitioners upon payment of the purchase price thereof at the auction sale, with 1% per month interest up to the time of redemption, plus any taxes or assessments which Cabrera may have paid, minus the P5k consigned 









land was sold on January 31, 1963 but Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered only on July 22, 1971 o The redemption period should be reckoned from the date of the registration o under Act 3135, petitioners may redeem until July 22, 1972 In addition, Sec 119 of CA 141 provides that every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead patent provisions of the Public Land Act, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, within the period of five years from the date of conveyance. o 5-year period of redemption fixed begins to run from the day after the expiration of the 1-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure o Hence, petitioners still had 5 years from July 22, 1972 (expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135) within which to exercise their right to repurchase GENERAL RULE in redemption: in making a repurchase, it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem makes manifestation of his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment, which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase o tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support is civil law. Articles 1616 of the Civil Code, in the absence of an applicable provision in CA 141, furnishes the guide: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right to



For purposes of determining whether petitioners exercised their right to repurchase effectively, We have only to consider their filing of the action for Repurchase of Homestead on January 9, 1975, against PNB and Cabrera, which was filed well within the 5-year period to repurchase. o The question of timeliness of the tender of payment by petitioners on August 1 and 4, 1977 of the amount of P5k had become insignificant in view of the filing of the action.



different from Uy Lee vs. CA: action to compel redemption was filed after the lapse of the period of redemption. Mere sending of letters by vendor expressing his desire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory 5-year period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period o same factual antecedent in Conejero, et al. vs. CA o What was proper for determination in said cases was WoN the right of redemption sans judicial action was validly exercised. In said cases, the Court applied the general rule that bona fide redemption necessarily imports a reasonable and valid tender of the entire purchase price. CA erred in holding that the action is barred by long inaction. The right of redemption under CA 141 legally began to accrue only on June 22, 1972. An action for Repurchase of Homestead filed on January 9, 1975 cannot be held to be barred.



PNB v De Los Reyes - Lawi Manalo Summary: Respondent spouses contracted a loan from PNB secured by mortgages over several parcels of property including 4 unregistered parcels of land. It was held that these cannot be mortgaged because 1) they were not yet the owners when the contract was executed, and 2) Public Land Act disallows the taking of such lands for satisfaction of debts for 5 years. Facts: On August 30, 1966, respondent spouses mortgaged 6 parcels of land located at Cantilla, Sorsogon to PNB to secure the payment of a loan of

repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale ... "

The filing of a complaint to enforce repurchase within the period for redemption is equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to redemption.

38

LTD Digests Part 2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

P10,000.00. 2 of the 6 parcels of land are covered by free patent titles while the other 4 are untitled and covered only by tax declarations. For failure of respondent spouses to pay the loan after its maturity, PNB, pursuant to a special power of attorney in the mortgage deed, effected the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and purchased the same at public auction for P12,735.30 (which amount included the expenses of sale, interest and attorney's fees). The certificate of sale was duly registered with the Register of Deeds. After the one-year redemption period expired without respondent spouses having exercised their right of redemption, PNB executed and registered an affidavit of consolidation of ownership over the 6 parcels of land on July 9, 1970 and new titles were issued in its name for the 2 parcels covered by free patent titles and the corresponding tax declarations for the 4 parcels were placed in its name. On May 9, 1972, PNB entered into a contract to sell the 6 parcels of land to one Gerardo Badong. PNB informed respondent spouses of the transaction in a letter dated May 31, 1972. On July 12, 1972, respondent spouses instituted Civil Case No. 2677 for legal redemption of the 6 parcels of land, invoking Section 119 of the Public Land Act, with damages. PNB filed its answer on August 15, 1972, conceding to respondent spouses the right to repurchase the 2 parcels of land covered by free patent titles, but refused the redemption of the other 4 lots covered by tax declarations. Gerardo Badong, on the other hand, could not take possession of the 2 lots covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 7245 and 7246 as respondent spouses refused to surrender possession of the premises. On July 24, 1972, PNB filed an ex parte petition (Special Proceeding No. 2679) for the issuance of a writ of possession over the aforesaid 2 lots, which was granted. Due to the refusal of respondent spouses to relinquish possession of the 2 lots in defiance of the writ of possession by the court, PNB filed in Special Proceeding No. 2679 a motion to cite respondent spouses in contempt. Civil Case 2677 and SP 2697 were heard jointly. Among the stipulated facts were: o That parcels 1 and 2 in the complaint are title lands and bear Free Patent Titles P-123 and P-130

That parcels 3, 4, 5, and 6 are not titled but plaintiffs have filed the proper application for the issuance of free patent titles to the lands The RTC initially ruled that the respondent spouses are entitled to redeem the 6 parcels of land based on the theory of indivisibility of mortgage. SP 2697 was dismissed. Acting on PNB’s MR, the RTC modified its earlier decision by ruling that the applicability of the doctrine of "indivisibility of mortgage" was deemed to have been waived by PNB when it agreed to the redemption of the 2 titled lots, and holding that the period of redemption for the 4 untitled parcels of land is 1 year, not 5 years. However, it allowed the redemption of said 4 lots by reason of equity. o

-

-

Issue: W/N respondent spouses are entitled to redeem the untitled lands? NO. Mutual restitution. Ratio: The SC ruled that the indivisibility of mortgage rule does not apply in this case since the aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. This specifically refers to the release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing. Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to secure. However, the SC noted that applications for free patent covering the 4 unregistered parcels of land had been filed by respondent spouses, and were then still pending action, which thus gives rise to the admission that said properties involved in the aforestated cases were public lands. Hence, the right of PNB to foreclose its mortgage on the subject properties virtually depends on whether the deed of mortgage is at all valid and enforceable since the 4 lots mortgaged apparently still formed part of the public domain when the mortgage thereon was constituted. At most, what respondents had was a mere right of expectancy dependent on the continuance of the circumstances then existing or a contingent right dependent on the performance of some conditions, BUT WHICH COULD NOT BE THE PROPER OBJECT OF A VALID MORTGAGE CONTRACT. Since THE MORTGAGE IS ABSOLUTELY

39

LTD Digests Part 2

-

NULL AND VOID AND INEFFECTIVE FROM ITS INCEPTION, PNB, as mortgagee, acquires no better rights, the registration of the mortgage notwithstanding. Nor would the subsequent acquisition by the mortgagor of title over said properties through the issuance of free patents thereover validate and legalize the mortgage thereon under the doctrine of estoppel, since upon the issuance of said patents, the lots in question are thereby brought under the operation of the Public Land Act which prohibits the taking of said properties for the satisfaction of debts contracted prior to the expiration of 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patents. Under the Public Land Act, the prohibition to alienate is predicated on the fundamental policy of the State to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him, and recovery is allowed even where the land acquired under the Public Land Act was sold and not merely encumbered, within the prohibited period.

40