Statcon Case Digest

Construction of the Statute as a Whole, Its Part & Other Statutes Aboitiz Shipping V. City of Cebu, G.R. NO. 14526, March 21, 1965 FACTS: Ordinance No. 207 was passed by the Municipal Board of Cebu, requiring the shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government to pay for wharfage. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation paid the wharfage charges under protest. The petitioner questioned the validity of the said ordinance contending that the said ordinance could not have been enacted because the right to collect wharfage in question belongs to the National Government. Respondent on the other hand cited Sec 17 (w) of the Charter of Cebu which gives the Municipal Board the power “ xxx To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places”. They further contest that the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the National Government and those owned by the City of Cebu. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not under its charter, the City of Cebu may provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government. HELD: The City of Cebu may not provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government because Sec 17 (w) of the Charter of Cebu as cited by the respondent in consonance with its preceding section, would refer only to those public wharves or landing places owned by the City of Cebu and not to those owned by the National Government under the exclusive supervision of the Bureau of Customs, according to section 1142 of the Revised Administrative Code. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. Araneta V. Conception, G.R. No. 9667, July 31, 1956 Magtajas & City of Cagayan de Ora V. Pryce Properties Corp. & PAGCOR, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994 Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review. Issue:

Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid Held: No Ratio: Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: ***Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Laguna Lake Development Authority V. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995 Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency was supposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of EO 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages occupied almost one-third the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost 21,000 ha in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that: 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal. 2.All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing. 3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court. All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled. One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to

dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CA dismissed the LLDA’s consolidated petitions. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective local government units concerned. Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region - should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Held: LLDA. Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are enviromental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the 8 major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource-a very limited one-which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its

ecological integrity and balance. Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.” On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. U.P. Board of Regents V. Aud. General, G.R. No. 19617, October 31, 1969 National Tobacco Administration V. Comm. On Audit, G.R. No. 119385, August 5, 1999 Facts: Sometime in February 1994, the Resident Auditor of the COA in the NTA, Dalisay E. Aracan, issued a Notice of Disallowance of the payment of the Educational Assistance Incentive Bonus (EAIB) for the calendar year 1993 and 1994 stating that the NTA had no statutory authority to grant the incentive. The COA, in its Decision dated February 7, 1995, affirmed the disallowance of the EAIB. Consequently, the NTA, then as the petitioner and through its then Administrator Amante Siapno and other employees, filed with the Court who granted the petition to nullify the COA Decision disallowing the EAIB. But relying on the second sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758, COA contends that the legislative intent was to limit such additional compensation to the incumbents, as of July 1, 1989 only which the company applied. The Act states that: “Such

other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.” Issues: Whether or not the COA gravely abused its discretion in disallowing the payment of the EAIB to the employees of the NTA who were non-incumbents of the positions as of July 1, 1989, the date when R.A. No. 6758 took effect. Held: No. Again citing the second sentence (first paragraph) of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758, the Court, in the said case, took into consideration the intent of Congress to prevent any diminution of the pay and benefits being received by the incumbents at the time of the enactment of R.A. No. 6758. It, however, opined that the petitioners, non-incumbent employees, therein could not claim that they had acquired a vested right over the EAIB because the same was always subject to availability of funds. The petitioners are, in effect, invoking the principle of equal protection of the law embodied in the Constitution. The second sentence (first paragraph) of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it is based on reasonable classification intended to protect the right of the incumbents against diminution of their pay and benefits. The petitioners in the present case, who are admittedly non-incumbent employees of the NTA as of July 1, 1989, cannot, therefore, claim similar treatment as the incumbents as of the said date, with respect to the grant of the EAIB. Petition is dismissed. Tan Co V. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004 FACTS: HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was born May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977. On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff. grounds: a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant; **Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only; c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270; d) Application of pari material rule of construction is misplaced. ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng.

HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff. material allegations in their petition: 1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; 2) They were born in the Philippines; 3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen. Bangus Fry Fisherfolk et. Al. V. Lanzanas, G.R. No. 131442, July 10, 2003 MMDA V. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. No. 171947-48, December 18, 2008 FACTS: The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation. ISSUES: (1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents; (2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay. APPLICABLE LAWS: PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.–– Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution. HELD: (1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. (2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by

mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. Dele Cruz V. Paras, G.R. Nos. 42571-72, July 25, 1983 Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. 4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such

grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. 3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Nitafan V. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987 Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987. Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes. Held: NO. Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to members of Judiciary The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David. The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article XV)” which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased), negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers.

Equality of branches of government effected by modifications in provision. The term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the words “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. A period (.) after “decreased” was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. With the period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is understood not to apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees. Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people adopting the law. The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. Cordillera Broad Coalition V. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 79958 & 82217, January 29, 1990 Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states that they are to: Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policymaking and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras. Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order. Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue: Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional Ruling: The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners are unfounded. E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. At this time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet convened. Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of government in the autonomous region),the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution. Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Ordillo V. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990 Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and KalingaApayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.”The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

Issue:

The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region. Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .”From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. Calderon V. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992 Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: “The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor.” Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. Petitioner questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC, without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to RA 6715 as amended. Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity and which he contends that the law is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive as provided for in the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers, in addition to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. Held: No. The provisions of first paragraph Art. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution is exclusive and cannot be expanded by mere act of legislation. Even the Solicitor-General stated that the provision of that law appertaining to the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments transgresses the Constitution and is therefore, without any legal basis. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of RA 6715, Sec. 13 is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. The Court further stated that “the legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.” Thus, the Supreme Court said the appointment to NLRC positions do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as the provision in RA 6715 is declared unconstitutional. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners are among those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Manila Prince Hotel V. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 FACTS The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check. The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution “Filipino first policy” and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-

owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. ISSUE Whether or not the provisions of Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing or non self executing If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy (Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution) and is therefore null and void. HELD As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision. The Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self executing rather than non self executing. Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino”. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question. Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term patrimony pertains to heritage . the constitution speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used the term natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners, and this is not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too. Central Bank Employees Association V. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004 Facts: RA 7653 – otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and

below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and –file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the “fiscal and administrative autonomy” of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to “establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.” Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence unconstitutional. Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso. Province of Rizal V. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 129549, December 13, 2005 Facts: This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635. At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation. Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was reopened. A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure. Issue: Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..

Ruling: The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living." Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular community implementing the project. Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province. Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.” These include: (1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)] (2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)] (3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, … providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest development projects ….and, subject to

existing laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)] Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and (2)prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.