Digest Statcon

Imbong vs. Comelec Facts: A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS: • The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35 • The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36 • The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37

Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40 It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41 While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42 • The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43 The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague

because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46 In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment. • The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48 • The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49 It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50 • The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of nondelegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51 • The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53 • The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54

Issue: WON RH bill violates the constitutional mandate prescribing one subject one title rule.

One Subject-One Title The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123 To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125 Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancypreventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide prenatal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129 Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written: It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied] In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their

Aquino vs Comelec Facts: Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4 Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. Issue:

entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26 Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

Ruling: Southern Hemisphere vs. Terrorism Act We deny the petition. We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain. 25 There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is

Facts: Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1[1] signed into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, 2[2] petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a nongovernment organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers3[3] who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554. Issue: WON the petitioners remedy is proper?

1 2 3

Ruling: The petitions fail.Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper

Petitioners locus standi

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.5[11]

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

lack

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary6[12] summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.4[10]

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.

5

4

6

subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

While Chavez v. PCGG7[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.

7

G.R. No. 203335 Facts: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The Facts and the Case The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to: 1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity; 2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them; 3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments; 4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and 5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone. This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the

reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read. And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of voidfor-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon.

Issue: WON vagueness and over breadth doctrine is applicable to penal statutes.

Sandiganbayan9[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.10[48]

Ruling: Petitioners

assail

for

being

intrinsically

vague

and

The Court clarifies.

8

impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism [46] under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law

9 8

10

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the 11

word intervene in Section 5 [49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.12[50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.13[51]

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an as-applied challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada

While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on

decision, reads:

14

Elections, [52] the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election 15

offense [53] under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.16[54]

The

two

Romualdez

cases

rely

heavily

on

the

Separate

17

Opinion [55] of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080)

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,

the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

petitioner's claim that this Court review the AntiPlunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required lineby-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.18[56] (Underscoring supplied.)

18

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth

the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or

doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute

as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of

prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even

violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a

though some of it is protected.21[59]

claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. Distinguished

from

an

as-applied

challenge

which

considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it

invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its

lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence

flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to

must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very

application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it

existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from

violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the

constitutionally protected speech or activities.22[60]

parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.19[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental

purpose

to

control

or

prevent

activities

constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.20[58]

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle 23[61] in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against

a

criminal

overbreadth grounds.

21 19

22

20

23

statute

on

either

vagueness

or

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified

the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. 27[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. 24[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.25[63]

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a

and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,

criminal statute may be challenged and underscored that an on-its-

applicable only to free speech cases.

26

face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed. [64]

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily [T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force

apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional

24 25 26

27

aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. 28 [66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)

that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.33[71]

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the

preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder

Court, in at least two cases, [67] observed that the US Supreme

Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that

Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the

there was no basis to review the law on its face and in its entirety. 34

limited context of the First Amendment, 30[68] and that claims of

[72] It stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due

facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving

process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular

statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken

defendant.35[73]

29

words.31[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,32[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation

28 29 30

33

31

34

32

35

American jurisprudence36[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most important guarantees of liberty under law.37[75]

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, 38[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.

36 37 38