Statcon Digest

People v Delantar G.R. No. 169143 | February 2, 2007 J. Tinga FACTS In August 1996, accused Simplicio Delantar was indicted for violating RA 7610 for selling in prostitution his putative daughter, AAA, to an Arab national and for pimping and delivering AAA, who was then 11 years of age to Congressman Jalosjos. He entered a plea of not guilty and trial proceeded in due course. The RTC found accused guilty, for two counts, of violation of RA 7610. The CA upheld the decision except that the appellate court ruled Delantar should be convicted for one count only. The case reached the SC where accused appellant decried the imposition of the maximum penalty when in fact there was no showing of the qualifying circumstance of filial relationship between him and AAA. ISSUE WON there is a filial relationship between Delantar and AAA HELD No. The SC held that the birth certificate of AAA, which did not contained Delantar’s signature, is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s biological father. Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated 87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in

the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp v CIR GR. No 147749 | June 22, 2006 J. Corona FACTS San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the assessments. The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for review. docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from the miller’s tax.

ISSUE Whether or not SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s task. HELD Yes. The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority. People v Tamani GR Nos. L-22160-61 | January 31, 1974 J. Aquino FACTS On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of consummated and attempted murder. On February 25, 1963, Tamani’s counsel received a copy of the decision and consequently filed for a motion for reconsideration on March

1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the lower court sent a denial order to the counsel through his wife via registered mail. On September 10, 1963, the said counsel appealed the lower court’s decision. Then, the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contending that the appeal should have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day period of appeal from the date of notice and not from the date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47 days late. ISSUE Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation or from the date of notice of the decision. HELD No. The 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides, “an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.” The assumption that the fifteenday period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively". Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file his notice of appeal and not 11 days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58 days late.