Latest Constitutional Law Cases

NO. 04

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF. LAURO D. GACAYAN

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Bill of Rights)

January, 2018 Edition By:

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN Professor of Law, College of Law UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS Baguio City

BAR REVIEWER IN CONSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL LAW

VILLASIS LAW CENTER Quezon City and Manila (And other Bar Review Centers)

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS THE HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AND MASS AT THE JUSTICE HALL OF QUEZON CITY VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE OR AN ACT FAVORING A SPECIFIC RELIGION?

In re: LETTER OF TONY VALENCIANO TO CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO REGARDING THE REGULAR HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE OF QUEZON CITY, A. M. No. 10-4-19 SC, March 7, 2017 The facts: Tony Valenciano wrote then Chief Justice Reynato Puno complaining tha the basement of Quezon City Justice Hall had been Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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converted into a Roman Catholice Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of Roman Catholic icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He claims that the said practice violates the sepatation of church and state provision of the Constitution as well as the prohibition embodied under Section 29 [2] of the Constitution prohibiting the appropriation of public money or property in support of any religion, sect or denomination. He claims that the said act clearly favors Roman Litigants and the rehearsal of the choir caused great disturbance to other employees. Held: The holding of religious rituals in the Halls of Justice does not amount to a union of church and state. It is just an “accomodation” by the State. This is just a way where the Roman Catholics express their worship through the Holy Mass and to stop them would tantamount to regressing to the free exercise of religion which is prohibited by Section 5, Article III of the Constitution. Please take note that our Muslim Brethren who are government employees are allowed to worship their Allah even during office hours inside their government offices and they are not prohibited. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. All these are deemed in respect to the worker’s right to the free exercise of their religion. Since the masses are being conducted only during noon braks and were not disruptive of public services, it is valid. No court proceedings were being distracted or interrupted and the judiciary employees are not being adversely affected. It is a simple case of accomodation by the government, not establishment of religion as held in the landmark case of Estrada vs. Escritur. Read: Estrada vs. Escritur, 408 SCRA 1 Estrada vs. Escritur, 492 SCRA 1 May the Municipal Trial Court issue a Search Warrant in connection with a crime which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court like violation of RA No. 9165 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act or where the place to be searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. EDMAR P. CASTILLO, SR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI, CAGAYAN AND Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y TALOZA, G.R. No. 204419, November 07, 2016 The Facts:

1. On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45, against private respondent because “there is probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A. 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and is being committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura, Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; 2. Thereafter, elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) enforced the same yielding one (1) sachet containing residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan. 3. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Hanroblesla 4. Thus, an Information dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165; 5. Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private respondent Rabino filed before the respondent judge a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence on the ground that the issuing Court does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched. 6. The respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which reads: It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of six (6) years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and void. [Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 45 is hereby ordered QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution of Search Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Warrant No. 45 are likewise ordered SUPPRESSED. There being no more evidence to support them, the Informations in the abovecaptioned cases are hereby dismissed.

7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same court in its Joint Order7dated September 24, 2012. Hence, the present petition. Issue: May the MTC validly issue a search warrant in a place outside its territorial jurisdiction as well as the crime involved is outside the jurisdiction of the MTC to try and decide? Held: Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and eventually dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan, proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting. Note that the Constitution used the qualification.

word “judge” without

Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.

If the testimony of the rape victim is unbelievable and contrary to common human experience, the accused is entitled to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC Y MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017 The facts: 1. The accused-appellant was convicted by the RTC of Manila, Branch 37, for Rape; 2. That at the time the alleged rape took place, the accused was 18 years old why the victim was 24 years old; 3. The information alleges:

That on or about September 29, 2008 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, commit sexual abuse upon the person of "AAA" by then and there making her drink liquor which made her dizzy and drunk, Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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depriving her of reason or otherwise unconsciousness, bringing her to a room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will. 4. The complainant testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she was having a drinking session with appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At around 11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to cut hotdog and now lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted. 5. Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition her body. She then left appellant's house and immediately returned to the house she shared with her live-in partner. Issue: Is the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the testimony of the rape victim, enough to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favour of the accused? Held: In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause. Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind. It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18year old man who had sexual intercourse with the complainant, a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual congress with the complainant. She testified that appellant and Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of appellant. At around 7:00 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of appellant and chatted with him and Meneses while drinking liquor.

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Her testimony is unbelievable and contrary to common human experience and could not overcome the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused under the Constitution. After Meneses has sexual intercourse with her, the accused asked her to have sex with him also. She did not resist. She could have resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was only in the middle of their sexual congress when she tried to move which can hardly be considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or rejection of appellant's sexual advances. After the sexual intercourse, she immediately returned to the house she shared with her live-in partner.

Finally, she insinuates that she fell was shivering after Meneses had sexual intercourse with her that is why she did not resist accused’s advances at the beginning. However, their age gap negates force, threat or intimidation; he was only 18 while she was already 24, not to mention that they were friends. In addition, per her own declaration, Meneses and appellant did not also utter threatening words or perform any act of intimidation against her. Her testimony is unbelievable and contrary to common human experience and could not overcome the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused under the Constitution. It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal based on his presumption of innocence under the Constitution. When bail is allowed in a non-bailable case like Plunder. SENATOR JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 THE FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). In accordance with the Plunder Law, no bail was recommended for his provisional liberty

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his (d) age and physical condition must further be seriously considered. Senator Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder, “the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua.” He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. “Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.” On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, where it held: x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail. To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.

ISSUE: MAY THE COURT GRANT BAIL IN A NONBAILABLE OFFENSE WITHOUT THE PROSECUTION GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG? HELD: Yes, in the present case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.

Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused. It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions: (1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following: a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease; b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring; (4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome (5) Ophthalmology: a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

.

a. b c. d. e.

High blood sugar/diabetes on medications; High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia; Alpha thalassemia; Gait/balance disorder; Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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f.

Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD. Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special medical attention. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. The Supreme Court therefore granted bail to Senator Enrile in the amount of P1,000,000.00. Bail is now allowed in Malversation through falsification of public documents cases even though the same is punishable by reclusion perpetua as maximum. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015

THE FACTS: The cases stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod City, particularly: 1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00; Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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2. D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to P68,000.00; 3. D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to P19,350.00; and 4. D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to P111,800.00 for Cash Slip No. 193402. Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate over-claim of P274,306.75. Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Since the amount involved is over P22,000.00 in the case of Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents, no bail was recommended applying Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code. She filed a “Motion to Fix Bail” before the Sandiganbayan which granted it in the amount of P200,000.00. Hence, this petition by the prosecution. I S S U E: IS MALVERSATION THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS INVOLVING OVER P22,000.00 WHICH IS PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA A BAILABLE OFFENSE?

HELD: Yes. The trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven. At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial. It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently grievous, odious and hateful. Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru falsification of official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been contemplated by the law. The judge is correct in granting bail to an accused charged of Murder if after the prosecution presented its evidence, only the crime of Homicide was proven. There is no need for the accused to file a petition for bail or for the court to conduct a separate hearing for the Petition for Bail filed by the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BONCALON G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009 CARPIO MORALES, J.: Raising only questions of law, the People’s petition for review on certiorari assails the January 31, 2007 Decision] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the November 12, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br. 29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the case) fixing Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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bail for the temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza alias Loloy Plaza (respondent) who was indicted for Murder. The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by Judge Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser). After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence.The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by Order of March 14, 2002, the pertinent portion of which reads: The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated in this case. The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge Buyser’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte. In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond the prosecution contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already waived his right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that Judge Buyser’s March 14, 2002 Order, being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive part thereof, produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter outside the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case. During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buyser’s impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit himself and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings. Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond. By Order of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of Judge Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied bail. He accordingly granted respondent’s Motion and fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan was denied for lack of merit . Respondent was subsequently released after he posted a P40,000 bond. Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victim’s brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner, assailed the trial court’s orders via petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not the prosecution’s evidence is strong. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Roberto’s argument that the grant of bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the allegations in respondent’s Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an application for bail, dismissed Roberto’s petition and affirmed Judge Tan’s orders . In its present petition, the People contends that THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE HEARING CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL . (Underscoring supplied) Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.” Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Stressing this point, this Court held: . . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as “such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.” On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary . examination and cross examination (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latter’s statement that the evidence was sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution. The People’s recourse to Section 5 , ] Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial court. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE OMBUDSMAN REFUSED TO FURNISH HER A COPY OF THE SWORN STATEMENT OF HER CO-RESPONDENT, RUBY TUASON, WHO WAS LATER ON ADMITTED AS STATE WITNESS.

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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JESSICA LUCILA REYES VS. OMBUDSMAN, G. R. No. 212593-94, March 15, 2016 JESSICA LUCILA REYES VS. SANDIGANABAYN 3rd DIVISION, G. R. No. 213475-76, March 15, 2016

The petitioner was charged of Plunder and/or violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. {RA) 30197 together with Janet Lim Napoles, and others, including one Ruby Tuazon, as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fµnd (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Sufias (Sufias), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of Pl 72,834,500.00. Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this case, was charged for fraudulently processing the release of Senator Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements - through: (1) project identification and cost projection; (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters, project reports, and pertinent documents addressed to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Implementing Agencies and (3) endorsement of the preferred JLN23-controlled Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) to undertake the PDAF-funded project - and for personally receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds representing Senator Enrile 's "share," "commissions," or "kickbacks" therefrom, as well as her own. Ruby Tuason executed a Sworn Statement implicating the petitioner. Thereafter, Tuazon was officially declared a state witness and granted immunity from criminal prosecution for the PDAF scam-related cases. Thereafter, Reyes wrote a letter to the Ombudsman requesting for a copy of the Sworn Statement of Tuazon but was denied. Again, in a letter dated May 7, 2014 to the Ombudsman, requested for a copy of the immunity agreement that it entered into with Tuason. Again, the Ombudsman denied Reyes's request for the reason that 'the immunity agreement is a "privileged communication which is considered confidential under Section 3, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing [RA] 6713," 101 otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees." The Sworn Statement of Ruby Tuazon was one of the documents relied upon by the Ombudsman in declaring the existence of probable to charge the petitioner of Plunder and violation of Section 3 [e] of RA No. 3019. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Hence, this petition. I S S U E: 1 MAY THE SUPREME COURT INTERFERE WITH THE FINDING OF PROBALE CAUSE BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN? 2 WAS THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW VIOLATED WHEN THE OMBUDSMAN DID NOT FURNISH HER OF A COPY OF THE SWORN STATEMENT OF HER CO-RESPONDENT, RUBY TUAZON? H E L D: It is the consistent policy of the Supreme Court to maintain noninterference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. "A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." "[P]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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As held in the case of SENATOR JINGGOY ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, failure to furnish a respondent in a criminal case with the Counter-Affidavit of his or her co-respondent does not violate the right of the former to due process of law, unlike in an administrative case. Due process: May a respondent in a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman or Prosecutor’s Office entitled to be furnished copies of the Counter-Affidavits of his corespondents to be able to answer and/or comment on it?

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015

The Facts 1. On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by the NBI and Atty. Levito Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted against Sen. Estrada.; 2. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014. On 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014. 3. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. 4. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313. Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman). 5. On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313. The pertinent portions of the assailed Order read: This Office finds however finds [sic] that the foregoing provisions [pertaining to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada] to be furnished all the filings of the respondents. Rule 112 (3) (a) & (c) of the Rules of Court provides [sic]: n(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause … 6. On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint Resolution9 which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014 Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order. I S S U E: Sen. Estrada raised the following ground in his Petition:

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27 MARCH 2014, ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW . Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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HELD: The Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estrada’s Request did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process. First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents. Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, “[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x.” At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request. Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent “shall have access to the evidence on record,” this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that “the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint.” The “supporting witnesses” are the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents. Second, Section 4(b) states that “the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the respondent” to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have “access to the evidence on record” does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of Section 4(a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the “affidavits and other supporting documents” submitted by “the complainant or supporting witnesses.” Thus, a respondent’s “access to evidence on record” in Section 4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting documents of “the complainant or supporting witnesses” in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II. Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense.” A respondent’s right to examine refers only to “the evidence submitted by the complainant.” Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the correspondents should be furnished to a respondent. Justice Velasco’s dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case), an administrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and standards apply. Sen. Estrada’s Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estrada’s Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character or by analogy. In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counteraffidavits happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits, which resulted in Reyes’ dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of his Request happened during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counteraffidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial. We should remember to consider the differences in adjudicating cases, particularly an administrative case and a criminal case: Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quantum of proof and adjective rules vary depending on whether the cases to which they are meant to apply are criminal, civil or administrative in character. In criminal actions, Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction; in civil actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a judgment; and in administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication. It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound, clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the witnesses against him. A preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. Ref: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES, 658 SCRA 626 (October 5, 2011) The right of the accused to due process of law and impartial trial are violated if the Prosecutor who handled his case will be the Judge to decide the same---regardless of the extent of his participation as the Public Prosecutor. NELSON LAI Y BILBAO v. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175999, July 01, 2015

THE

THE FACTS:

1. The petitioner was accused of the crime of Homicide which was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental and docketed as Criminal Case No. 17446 and raffled at RTC Branch 42; 2. That at that time, the Public Prosecutor assigned to the said sala was Prosecutor Fernando Elumba; 3. Thereafter, Prosecutor Elumba was appointed as the Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 42, Bacolod City, and heard the petitioner’s case; 4. After trial, the petitioner was convicted by Judge Elumba of Homicide; 5. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration pointing out the said anomalous situation where he was the prosecutor handling his case and yet he decided it but still, the Judge denied his Motion for Reconsideration; 6. His Appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL WERE VIOLATED SINCE THE PROSECUTOR WHO HANDLED HIS CASE IS ALSO THE JUDGE DECIDING THE SAME. HELD: As the records indicate, Judge Elumba had been assigned on March 23, 1998 as the public prosecutor in Branch 42 of the RTC in Negros Occidental to replace the previous public prosecutor, but became the Presiding Judge of Branch 42 on April 27, 2000. Branch 42 was the trial court hearing and ultimately deciding Criminal Case No. 17446 against the petitioner. As such, Judge Elumba should have disqualified himself from Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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having anything to do with the case once he became the trial judge because he was compulsorily disqualified. The petitioner pointed to the need for Judge Elumba's disqualification in his Motion for Reconsideration, but the latter ignored his concerns upon the excuse that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 only after the Prosecution had rested its case. Judge Elumba argued that he did not personally prosecute the case, and that, at any rate, the petitioner should have sought his disqualification prior to the rendition of the judgment of conviction. The appellant claims that he was denied due process because the judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public prosecutor of the instant case. It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be denied to any accused. The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due process. The Court has said: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. Reprising Section 1 of Rule 137 is Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which pertinently Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously served as a lawyer of any of the parties. To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge's degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must be reminded that the same compulsory disqualification that applied to him could similarly be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of them should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the accused should be conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice Moreover, to say that Judge Elumba did not personally prosecute or supervise the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 17446 is to ignore that all criminal actions were prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. That a private prosecutor had appeared in the case was of no consequence, for such private prosecutor still came under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor. Finally, had the Court of Appeals had thoroughly sift and scrutinize the records of the trial court to search for errors that would reverse or modify the judgment in favor of the accused, it would have quickly noticed a hard indication existing in the trial records of Criminal Case No. 17446 exposing Judge Elumba to have actually taken an active participation in the trial. The indication was in the form of the Motion to Present Rebuttal Evidence that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had filed on January 25, 2000, the text of which is reproduced herein: MOTION TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE x x x That, however, after going over the records of the case, the prosecution feels that there is a need to present rebuttal evidence. (Emphasis supplied) Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the prosecution be allowed to present rebuttal evidence to refute the evidence presented by the accused. (Sgd.) FERNANDO R. ELUMBA Trial Prosecutor The text of the motion disclosed that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had come to the conclusion that "there is a need to present rebuttal evidence" after his having gone over the records of the case. Clearly, he had formed an opinion that was absolutely adverse to the interest of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not be expected to render impartial, independent and objective judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His nondisqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as the accused. To restore the right to the petitioner, the proceedings held against him before Judge Elumba and his ensuing conviction have to be nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case No. 17446 should be remanded to the RTC for a partial new trial to remove any of the prejudicial consequences of the violation of the right to due process. The case shall be raffled to a Judge who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners were deprived of their right to due process when they were found guilty of direct contempt by respondent judge himself who is the complainant against them. ALLEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR TULALI VS. JUDGE BIENVINIDO BLANCAFLOR, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011 Allen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali), is a Prosecutor I of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor) is the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court, Palawan (RTC). In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor but under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case thereby impliedly implicating the judge. On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson. In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office as lawyers on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte Manifestation. On October 13, 2009 after the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued his Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt and imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each. Held: The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. Neither should Provincial Prosecutor Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan and signed by Prosecutor Rodriguez was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC so it could not be the basis of a contempt charge. In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing. He was the complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one. Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a magistrate. He had clearly prejudged petitioners. Due Process; Right to counsel; Accused was represented by a fake lawyer when the prosecution presented its evidence although he was assisted by a lawyer when he presented his evidence.

PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009 The petitioner, who was charged of Robbery before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, was represented by “Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes” from arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of evidence by the prosecution. Before he presented his evidence, petitioner replaced “Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes”. Since she “seems not a lawyer” and indeed, she was not a member of the bar. Thereafter, petitioner was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defender’s (Attorney’s) Office of Makati City. He was convicted by the RTC. On Appeal, he claims that his right to due process was violated because he was not represented by counsel when the prosecution presented his evidence. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar but he was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the presentation of his evidence which satisfies the requirements of due process before a judicial tribunal. Re-trial is not justified. Compare with: EMMA DELGADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, November 10, 1986 Whether the rights to due process and impartial trial was violated by reason of the comments made by the judge in the course of the trial; Extent of questions that judges may ask by way of clarificatory questions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENANCIO MORTERA, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010 During the pre-trial of the murder case against the accused, he was asked by the Judge what is his defense. After talking to the accused, his lawyer manifested that it is DENIAL or that he is interposing a negative defense. When the accused was testifying on direct examination, it was very apparent that he changed his defense of denial to self-defense. As a result of that, the judge commented: “Well, if he had nothing to do with the death of said person, negative defense. So, if you are not telling the truth to your lawyer, how would I know now that you are telling the truth?… Anyway if you killed a person you will have to pay for it Mr. Mortera, do you agree also? You are just making a story.”

After trial, he was convicted of murder. On appeal, he claimed that his rights to due process and impartial trial were violated as a result of the “prosecutor-like conduct” of the judge. He was allegedly denied “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge”. He further claimed that the judge had allied himself to the prosecution as shown by his comments. As such, he prays for his acquittal like in the case of People vs. Opida. Held: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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In the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that: The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of trial… hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta…. The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate… A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on “numbers” alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from the common standard of fairness and impartiality. (emphasis added) The situation in the case at bench is, however, different. Although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense. The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could have proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the killing was justified should have been his. The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to conclude that the trial judge “had taken the cudgels for the prosecution.” Compare with: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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1. PEOPLE VS. OPIDA, June 13, 1987 2. IMELDA MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6, 1998 The right to Due Process of Mayor Maliksi was violated when he was not notified of the dates when the COMELEC conducted decryption and printing of the ballot images

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013 During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit. On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor . Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this case. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision. In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi insisted that his right to due process was violated by the COMELEC. Held: By the same vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court reversed itself in a period of one (1) month. Indeed, Mayor Maliksi was furnished copies of the Orders of the COMELEC directing Saguilayan to post cash deposit for the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images and later on to augment the earlier cash deposit for the decryption and printing of the ballot images BUT NO DATES WERE MENTIONED THEREIN SO THAT HE COULD HAVE PARTICIPATED. The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images. It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials, not in cases of appeals. We should not ignore that the parties’ participation during the revision and recount proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELEC’s proceedings attain credibility as to the result. The parties’ presence would have ensured that the requisite procedures have been followed, including the required authentication and certification that the images to be printed are genuine. The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system. WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; and DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Banc to conduct proceedings for the decryption of the picture images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.

Due process: Is there violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law if he did not present evidence in his behalf in the Sandiganbayan but merely “adopted” the evidence presented by his co-accused therein based on the advise of his lawyer?

EDELBERT C. UYBOCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014

THE FACTS: On January 9, 2014, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, together with his co-accused, Governor RODOLFO G. VALENCIA. His Motion for Reconsideration was Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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denied by the Sandiganbayan on March 14, 2014. Hence, this Petition before the Supreme Court claiming violation of his right to due process because “insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer”. ISSUE: Was he denied due process of law because of “insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer” who advised him just to adopt the evidence of his co-accused and not to present his own evidence? HELD: Petitioner was not denied due process of law. According to petitioner, he was “accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer” who informed him that “there was no necessity to present any evidence.” His former counsel also “failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was inexplicably absent on the trial date” and even “failed to prepare and file a memorandum” and “merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner’s defense.” Thus, petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and of law and to competent counsel were violated. In its Comment dated September 30, 2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed petitioner’s plea to reopen the case on the ground of denial of due process. In citing Lagua v. CA, they claim there is no basis to set aside the assailed decision and resolution since “a client is bound by the action of his counsel.” The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process. While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he had expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel “failed to prepare and file a memorandum for him” since the records show that petitioner’s former counsel had belatedly filed a memorandum on his behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Ref: TAN VS. TAN, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010 DBP VS. COURT OF APPEALS, January 29, 1999 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY and ENGR. CHRISTINE O. BAUTISTA vs. WINSTON JOSEPH Z. CORDERO and SPS. LUCIO CORDERO, and EVELYN CORDERO, G.R. No. 144118, July 21, 2004.

Due process: Failure to present evidence by the lawyer is not gross negligence which results in violation of the client’s right to due process of law. ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. vs. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015. . THE FACTS: The petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first and second letters reads as follows: This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS "DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office, mandates or functions. x x x. Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis “Dodong” C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my father, the late Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family when he filed cases against us: his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own mother. I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official functions is malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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part of a larger plan of harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic and evil objectives. May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives. These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner, assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City. In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his Answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. The trial court thus submitted the case for decision, and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed. For the sufferings, social ridicule, defamation and dishonor caused by petitioner’s letters, respondent was awarded damages, as follows: “P5,000,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and attorney’s fees in the amount of 25% of whatever amounts actually received by plaintiff for this judgment.” Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial court. He appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming violation of his right to due process of law. The CA, however, ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner was given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings by merely absenting himself from trials without valid excuses. The appellate court also ruled that the letters were not privileged communications, since petitioner was not acting as a member of the Congress when he sent them. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process; xxx HELD: Petition denied. Petitioner anchors his appeal on the ground that his letters are covered by privileged communications. He insists that he has the legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, being then a Congressman duty-bound to insulate his office and his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful pursuits of his elder brother. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Moreover, the letters were also not meant to be circulated or published. They were sent merely to warn the individuals of respondent’s nefarious activities, and made in good faith and without any actual malice. Respondent’s testimony that he learned the existence of the letter from others cannot be countenanced, as no witness corroborated this. At best, it is only hearsay. On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his own counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioner’s ailment and thus did not make the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the hearing was not of his own volition, but because of his doctor’s strict advice since he earlier underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St. Luke’s Medical Center-Heart Institute in Quezon City on 16 July 2001, just a day before the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While his counsel represents him, the latter’s mistakes should not deprive him of his day in court to present his side. Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only exception is when the negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence. However, perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule. Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a pending case in court. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although he rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative “of making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case.” For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. Presumption of innocence: Failure of the apprehending policemen to comply with the “chain of evidence rule” under Section 21 of RA No. 9165, including the 24-hour period to turn over to the Crime Laboratory an Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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alleged confiscated prohibited drugs against a suspect, entitles the latter to acquittal based on presumption of innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS SUMILI, G.R. No. 212160, February 4, 2015 The Facts On June 30, 2006, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Sumili of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 stating that “That, on or about June 7, 2006, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1) sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly known as Shabu for the amount of P200.00…” According to the prosecution, on June 7, 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Iligan City Sub-Office received a report from a confidential informant that Sumili was selling shabu. Acting on the same, SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera (SPO2 Englatiera) dispatched SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug (SPO2 Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumili, which confirmed the truth and veracity of the aforesaid report. Consequently, SPO2 Englatiera organized a team divided into two (2) groups and briefed them on the buy-bust operation. He also prepared the marked money, consisting of one (1) two hundred peso (P200.00) bill, with serial number L507313. At around 5:10 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team headed to the target area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached Sumili’s house to buy shabu. After Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale has been consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumili escaped by jumping through the window, throwing the marked money at the roof beside his house. The poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2 Englatiera, who marked the same with “DC-1,” representing the initials of SPO2 Cabahug. SPO2 Englatiera then prepared a request for laboratory examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel Carlito Ong (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed. It was only on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong was able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Upon examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. The Issue The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sumili’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld. The Ruling The appeal is meritorious. In order to convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Note that what remains material for conviction is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. It is also important that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items be preserved. Simply put, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement removes any unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence. As held in People v. Viterbo: In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the corresponding payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. Elucidating on the custodial chain process, the Court, in the case of People v. Cervantes [(600 Phil. 819, 836 [2009])], held:

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As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. x x x. The chain of custody requirement “ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.” (Emphases and underscoring supplied) To expand, Section 2129 of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule” outlining the procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP CrimeLaboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes. After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As may be gleaned from the established facts, the buy-bust operation was conducted on June 7, 2006. When SPO2 Englatiera seized the sachet from Sumili, he marked the same with the initials “DC-1” and, later, he returned to the police station to prepare the request for the examination of the sachet’s contents. Thereafter, he ordered NUP Ong to bring the sachet as well as the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so within 24 hours after the buy-bust operation as he only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation. Undoubtedly, Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as a consequence of his right to be presumed innocent. Ref: IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 21, RA 9165, ENTITLES THE ACCUSED OF ACQUITTAL. •

PEOPLE VS. NACUA, January 2013….marking was done at the police station

•

PEOPLE VS. SAMMY ABDUL UMAPING, April 25, 2012…The marking were obviously made at the police station because it was there that the police learned of the complete initial of the accused as “SAU” which was the markings in the seized shabu.

30,

•

PEOPLE VS. MARAORAO, June 20 2012…a maroon bag was confiscated by the police when one of two (2) persons allegedly selling shabu escaped. There is doubt on who of the 2 men was holding it because 1 policeman testified it was dropped by the man who was able to escape while another policeman testified that it was dropped by Maraorao. • PEOPLE VS. KIMURA, April 27, 2004…the shabu was marked at the police station; •

PEOPLE VS. ALCUIZAR, April 6, 2011…The accused was arrested in a buy-bust operation in the street. After his arrest, the police searched his house revealing more shabu. The shabu was marked only in the police station;

•

PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN, January 12, 2011…it was marked by the police investigator to Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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whom the seized shabu was turned over. Obviously, it was marked at the police station; •

PEOPLE VS. ULAT, October 5, 2011---the private poseur buyer said he affixed his signature to the sachet of shabu upon seizure but the policeman claims it was he who marked the same..

•

ULEP VS. PEOPLE, June 11, 2011…RTC Laoag City…The Police Chief Inspector claimed that he received the tip from an asset so that they went to arrest the accused. Another policeman claims that he received the tip from the asset then they went to arrest the accused;

•

PEOPLE VS. GARRY DE LA CRUZ, June 8, 2011 no photographs submitted as evidence; no inventory;

•

BONDAD VS. PEOPLE, 2008…No pictures

•

PEOPLE VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, June 29, 2010…only one sachet of shabu taken from the alleged shabu queen. Unbelievable and contrary to common human experience.

•

JULIUS CACAO VS. PEOPLE, January 20, 2010. One policeman claimed in his testimony that he was the one who delivered a single sachet of shabu recovered from the accused to the evidence custodian. Then, another policeman claimed that it was he who delivered it.

December 10,

The Reproductive Health Law is Partly Constitutional and Partly Unconstitutional. The Constitutional Rights involved in the Reproductive Health Law are the Right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, right to privacy, family, etc.

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JAMES IMBONG, ET AL VS. HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, ET AL., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 and 13 companion cases Perez, J. These fourteen (14) cases question the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, RA No. 10354, known as the RH Law because it allegedly violates several constitutional provisions.

ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS AND HOW THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVED THEM

1. The right to life (Section 12, Art. II, Constitution) because of its declared policy allowing the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives despite the policy of the law against abortion. The petitioners claim that though the law prohibits abortion, it allows contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb thus sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life. The respondents are of the view that life begins upon “implantation” of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. Majority of the members of the Supreme Court are of the view that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided though the ponente is of the belief that life begins at “fertilization” or when there is union between the male sperm and the female ovum.. Based from the deliberation of the framers of the Constitution, life begins at “conception” under Art. II, Section 12. The Constitution, however, did not ban contraceptives. Contraceptives that kill or destroy a fertilized ovum should be deemed abortive but contraceptives that prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum which takes place before fertilization SHOULD NOT BE DEEMED ABORTIVE AND THUS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE. What the RH Law prohibits are abortifacients.

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2. The right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products because contraceptives are hazardous to one’s health as it causes cancer and other health problems; The petitioners claim that the law is unconstitutional because it allows the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intraurine devices, injectables, and family products and supplies though the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. Section 15, Art. II, Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Art. XIII as well as Section 9 of Art. XVI of the Constitution all deals with the right to health of the citizen and these provisions are all self-executory. There exists adequate safeguards in the RH Law to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public because the distribution and dispensation of contraceptives shall still require the prescription of a physician. 3. The right to equal protection is violated because it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The argument has no basis. There is real and substantial distinction. In fact, Section 11, Art. XIII of the Constitution recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. 4. The right to free speech and religious freedom are violated because the law requires a conscientious objector [to the RH Law] to refer a patient to another who is willing to do a particular procedure if it is against his belief and it also uses government money to procure contraceptives. The Supreme Court held that the provision which states that the conscientious objector to the RH procedure sought (who could be a physician) has the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services and information to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient’s needs is unconstitutional. It amounts to requiring a conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do thereby violating his or her religious beliefs. Section 5 of Art. III provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The first “principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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religion as against other religions”. It mandates strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestation of one’s belief and faith. In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. As held in Estrada vs. Escritur, “benevolent neutralityaccommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution. In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the “cpompelling state interest test” is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test s the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court held that IT IS NOT WITHIN ITS PROVINCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES OR ONE’S PARTICIPATION IN THE SUPPORT OF MODERN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MEASURES IS MORAL FROM A RELIGIOUS STANDPOINT OR WHETHER THE SAME IS RIGHT OR WRONG ACCORDING TO ONE’S DOGMA OR BELIEF. The SC declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of civil courts. Finally, the provision which punishes a health care service provider who fails or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient due to his religious beliefs is unconstitutional for it violates his freedom of religion. 5. It violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude because medical practitioners are compelled to provide 48 hours of pro bono services to indigent women to be accredited under the PHILHEALTH Program, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. The argument has no merit because the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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practitioners with PhilHealth being a mere privilege and not a right. The practice of medicine is imbued with public interest and it is both a power and duty of the State to control and regulate such profession in order to protect and promote public health as it directly involves the life of the people. 6. It violates the equal protection of the law because it discriminates against the poor as it makes them the target of the RH Law that promotes contraceptive use. Likewise, the IRR which provides that provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospitals, head nurses…who by virtue of their offices are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of this act CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS is unconstitutional for violative of the equal protection clause. Such provision is indeed unconstitutional. There is no real and substantial distinction why medical practitioners are allowed to refuse to perform a procedure because it violates their religious beliefs but the foregoing officials are not allowed to follow their religious beliefs on the matter. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR MAY BE FORCED TO PERFORM A REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROCEDURE EVEN IF IT IS AGAINST HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN LIFE-THREATENING CASES. THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE MOTHER SHALL BE GIVEN PREFERENCE CONSIDERING THAT REFERRAL TO ANOTHER MEDICAL PRACTITIONER WOULD AMOUNT TO DENIAL OF MEDICAL SERVICE WHICH WOULD UNNECESARILY PLACE THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER IN GRAVE DANGER. 7. The RH Law is avoid for vagueness in violation of the due process clause because the law suffers from vagueness when it mentions “private health service provider” who could be held liable but the same was not defined by the law. The argument lacks merit since the law defines a public health care service provider and “private health care service provider”. The fact that “private health service provider” was used in Section 7 should not be a cause of confusion since it is definitely analogous to “private health care service provider”. 8. The RH Law violates the constitutional provisions on the family when it allows a spouse, without the knowledge and consent of the other, in undergoing a procedure like vasectomy or tubal ligation.

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The SC held this is indeed unconstitutional. This is so because “family” is shared by both spouses. One person cannot found a family. There should be “mutual decision-making.” The provision which allows minors or minors who are already parents or has had miscarriage to undergo a procedure without the consent of the parents is also unconstitutional. It is precisely in these situations when the minor needs the comfort, care, advice and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. This is based from the constitutional provision giving the parents the natural and primary rights and rearing their children for civic efficiency under Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution. BUT ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY A MINOR ON MATTERS OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROCEDURES WITHOUT THE PARENTS’ CONSENT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL BUT NOT ACCESS TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROCEDURES AND MODERN FAMILY PLANNING METHODS THEMSELVES WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE PARENTS. 9. The law violates academic freedom when Section 24 mandates the teaching of age-and development appropriate reproductive health education under threat of fine and imprisonment. This is so because it effectively forces educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. The Supreme Court held that this attack on the said provision of the RH Law is premature considering that the Dep Ed has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. 10. The RH Law violates the non-delegation of legislative power; It does not because the law is already complete in itself and that no other act is to be done except to implement it. 11. The Implementing Rules and Regulations is invalid as it changes the definition of “abortifacient” which is “any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” as defined in the law to “any drug or device that PRIMARILY INDUCES ABORTION OR THE DESTRUCTION OF A FETUS INSIDE THE MOTHER’S WOMB or the prevention of the Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” as per said IRR. The argument if valid. The IRR is invalid. The inclusion of the word “primarily” is ultra vires. 12. The RH Law violates the ONE SUBJECT rule under Section 26 [1], Art. VI of the Constitution; The petitioners claim that while the subject of the law in its title is REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RESPONSIBLE PARENTHOOD, but its true intent is to act as a population control measure in violation of due process. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that the whole idea of contraception pervades in the entire RH Law because it provides for a full range of family planning products and methods but also has provisions on pre-natal and post natal care. Be that as it may, the same does not violate the one subject rule citing CAWALING, JR. VS. COMELEC AND REP. FRANCIS JOSEPH ESCUDERO where the Supreme Court held that “the one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the eneactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. THE RULE IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IF THE TITLE IS COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH AS TO INCLUDE THE GENERAL OBJECT WHICH THE STATUTE SEEKS TO EFFECT, AND WHERE, AS HERE, THE PERSONS INTERESTED ARE INFORMED OF THE NATURE, SCOPE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED LAW AND ITS OPERATION.” As such, “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth in achieving sustainable human development. 13.

The RH Law violates the Natural law.

The Supreme Court held that the court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Its only guidepost is the Constitution. 14. The RH Law violates the autonomy of local government and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao because they are also tasked to implement the RH Law. The said contention has no merit. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government has still the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law. Congress cannot be Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.

Most provisions of the “Online Libel Law” are constitutional and not violative of the freedom of expression. Other provisions are violative of the freedom of expression, right to privacy and search and seizure provisions of the Constitution.

JESUS DISINI ET AL. VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, and companion cases Abad, J. THE FACTS: The above cases seek to declare as unconstitutional the following provisions of RA No. 10175, the Cybercrime prevention Act of 2012: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Section 4 [a] (1) on Illegal Access; Section 4 [a] (3) on Data interference; Section 4 [a] (6) on Cyber-squatting; Section 4 [b] (3) on Identity Theft; Section 4 [c] (1) on Cybersex; Section 4 [c] (2) on Pornography; Section 4 [c] (3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; 8. Section 4 [c] (4) on Libel; 9. Section 5 on Aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes; 10. Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher; 11. Section 7 on the prosecution both under the Revised Penal Code and RA No. 10175; 12. Section 8 on penalties; 13. Section 12 on real-time collection of traffic data; 14. Section 13 on preservation of computer data; 15. Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data; 16. Section 17 on destruction of computer data; Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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17. Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data; 18. Section 20 on Obstruction of justice; 19. Section 24 on cybercrime investigation and coordinating center (CICC); and 20. Section 26 [a] on CICC’s powers on the crime of Libel. 21. Some petitioners likewise raised the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of Libel. Held: 1. Section 4 [a] (1) on Illegal Access provides that it is an “offense against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data systems” for “the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right”. The said provision is CONSTITUTIONAL. The SC held that nothing in the said Section calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom like speech is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act--accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. [NOTE: The strict scrutiny standard deals with the test on the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden, in these cases, is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later on, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. (WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, 576 SCRA 416)]

2. Section 4 [a] (3) provides that it is an “offense against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data systems” for “the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion, or deterioration of computer data, electronic document or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses. The petitioners claims that this section suffers from “overbreadth” in that while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedom. Under the “overbreadth doctrine”, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject BROADLY , thereby invading the area of protected freedoms (SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, 632 SCRA 146). Section 4 [a] (3) does not encroach on these freedoms because it SIMPLY PUNISHES WHAT ESSENTIALLY IS A FORM OF VANDALISM, THE ACT OF WILLFULLY DESTROYING WITHOUT RIGHT THE THINGS THAT BELONGS TO OTHERS, IN THIS CASE, THEIR COMPUTER DATA, ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT, OR LECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE. SUCH ACT HAS NO CONNECTION TO GUARANTEED FREEDOMS. THERE IS NO FREEDOM TO DESTROY OTHER PEOPLE’S COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS. Of course, all penal laws have an inherent chilling effect on the citizens. But to prevent the State from enacting laws of this nature would render the State powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. 3. Section 4 [a] (6) or “cyber-squatting” provides that it is an “offense against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data systems” for “the acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation and deprive others from registering the same, if such domain is: [i] similar, identical or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration; [ii] identical or in any way similar to the name of the person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and [iii] acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.” The petitioners claim that the said provision violates the equal protection clause because it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody or any other literary device. The law is constitutional because the law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge based on equal protection is baseless. 4. Section 4 [a] (6) on “Identity theft” punishes the “intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right; Provided, that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one degree lower. The petitioners claim that this provision violates the due process, privacy of correspondence and freedom of the press provisions of the Constitution. The right to privacy or the right to be let alone, is created by the constitutional provisions on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In this case, the right to privacy is not violated. The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without the right, implicitly to cause damage. The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, citizenship, his residence address, hisa contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse, if any, his occupation, and similar data. The claim that the same is overbreadth will not hold water since the specific conducts prohibited do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. It simply regulates acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of personal identification data of another. THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ACQUIRE ANOTHER’S PERSONAL DATA. 5. Section 4 [c] (1) on Cybersex or the “wilful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.” The petitioner claims that the above section violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution because they fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace. The said section is not unconstitutional where it stands a construction that it applies only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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This is based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress which show a lack of intent to penalize a “private showing between and among two private persons…although that may be a form of obscenity to some. The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in a business” is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex.” The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, pornography for favor and consideration which includes interactive prostitution and pornography via the Webcam. 6. Section 4 [c] (2) on Pornography or the pornography described in RA No. 9775 committed through a computer system provided that the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in RA No. 9775. This is constitutional because of the “potential uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable. 7. Section 4 © (3) on unsolicited commercial communication or “spam” is constitutional though transmitting spam amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spam enters the recipient’s domain without permission. But these spam do not reduce the efficiency of computers. They can be read or deleted outright by the recipient. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expressions and do not violate the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. 8. Whether the Libel provisions of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4 © 4 of the Cyber Crime Law are unconstitutional. The SC held that these are constitutional because freedom of expression is not absolute and the government has the right to protect the citizens from defamation. 9. Section 5 which deals with “aiding or abetting in the commission of cybercrime” is valid but unconstitutional if it is to be applied to people who “Like”, “share” or “Comment” to a post. This is so because they are not the “author” of the libellous articles. 10. Section 6 and Section 8 which imposes a stiffer penalty on cyber Libel is constitutional. Fixing of penalties for crimes is a legislative prerogative. Further, the offender in using the internet often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. As such, the higher penalties appear to be proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes. It Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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does not violate the equal protection clause by reason of the graver penalty. If the same article, however, was published in print and also posted online or vice versa, CHARGING THE OFFENDER UNDER BOTH LAWS WOULD BE A BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. Likewise, charging the offender under Section 4 © 2 and the Anti-Child Pornography Act separately would likewise be tantamount to double jeopardy. 11. Section 12 which allows law enforcement authorities, WITH DUE CAUSE, to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time which includes the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of underlying service, BUT NOT ITS CONTENT NOR IDENTITIES, The said provision IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The authority given to the authorities is too sweeping and lacks restraint. Nothing can prevent law enforcement authorities holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information, or worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies. The power is virtually limitless enabling the authorities to engage in fishing expedition choosing whatever communication they want based on “due cause”. This provision violates a person’s right to privacy. In WHALEN VS. ROES, 429 US 589, the United States Supreme Court classified PRIVACY into two categories: [1] decisional privacy and [2] informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Informational privacy is violated by Section 12. Further, informational privacy has two aspects: [1] the right not to have private information disclosed, and [2] the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, the Supreme Court had laid down a two-fold test. The first is the subjective test where one claiming the right have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 12. Section 13 on preservation of computer data for a minimum period of 6 months by the service provider is constitutional because the service provider has no obligation from keeping said data forever, The user ought to have a copy of the said data and he could keep it. No violation of his right.

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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13. Section 14 which allows disclosure of a data obtained through a search warrant is constitutional since it does not violate the search and seizure provision nor the privacy of communication since the same is done only after JUDICIAL INTERVENTION. 14. Section 15 which provides for securing a computer system, make and retain a copy of the computer data, and maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data AFTER THE SEIZURE BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT is constitutional. It merely enumerates the duties of the law enforcement authorities to ensure the preservation of computer system or data after seizure based from a search warrant. 15. Section 17 which provides for the destruction of computer data under preservation and examination obtained by means of a search warrant is valid in order to prevent the storage system of the service provider for overloading. Such destruction of computer data does not violate the right of a person to due process of law for deprivation of property because if wants to preserve the same, he could save them in his computer. 16. Section 19 which authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL for it violates the search and seizure provision and freedom of expression. This would in effect allows the government to seize and places a computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The DOJ Order could not supplant a judicial search warrant. It would make the government the judge, jury and executioner rolled into one. It also restrains free speech. 17. Sections 24 and 26 (a) on the creation of a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) is not a undue delegation of legislative power because the law is already complete in itself. It is just mandated to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. LITO BAUTISTA vs. SHARON CUNETAPANGILINAN, G. R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012 The petitioners who are editor and assistant editor of the tabloid Bandera were charged of two (2) counts of Libel before the RTC of Mandaluyong City based on the complaint of actress Sharon CunetaPangilinan. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads: That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together with x x x with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which among others have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit: MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON! Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singeractress, I’d like to believe, is really braindead. Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya. Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo. xxx Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about her katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good reviews we’ve done on her. xxx In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads: That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officers of Bandera Publishing x x x with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETAPANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Metro Manila, which, among others, have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:

“She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens, mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya,” our caller opines. Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp. “In public,” our source goes on tartly, “pa kisskiss siya. Pa embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa [na] lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.” My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears to be brain dead most of the time. Upon arraignment, petitioners each entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the cases ensued. On November 14, 2006, after the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence. In their Demurrer to Evidence, which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera; that that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of malice. On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the above criminal cases. On August 19, 2008, respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against them. In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008 and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009. Hence, petitioners filed this petition claiming that the petition for Certiorari filed by Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan violated their right against double jeopardy. Held: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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The petition is impressed with merit. Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA. At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government. To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal. In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Finally, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC. The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.

May an accused charged of “selling” marijuana in the criminal information be convicted of “possession” of marijuana without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHAD MANANANSALA, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013 The information filed on October 20, 1994 against the accused alleges: “That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less 750 grams or ¾ kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control. CONTRARY TO LAW. “ To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed that on October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of Manansala’s house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test buy. After trial, accused was convicted of “possession” of marijuana only under Section 8 of RA No. 6425 instead of Section 4. The said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Was his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause accusation against him violated when he was charged of “sale” marijuana under Section 4 of RA No. 6425 but was convicted “possession under Section 8 of the same law--- which entitles him acquittal?

of of of to

Held: The crime charged in the information was clearly for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 or “sale” of prohibited drugs, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The accused now questions said conviction based on the alleged violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In this case , it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in convicting the accusedappellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against him. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. Non-compliance of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 entitles the accused to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMMY UMIPANG, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a ₱500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the length of the street while the other members of the team Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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strategically positioned themselves. The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said “Sam, pa-iskor kami.” Sam replied “Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?” The confidential informant said “Five hundred pesos.” Sam took out three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price tags–500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked ₱500.00 to Sam who received the same. Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team joined them. PO1 Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials “SAU” [which stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and identified as accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as “shabu,” a dangerous drug. THERE WAS NO INVENTORY NOR PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BEFORE THE CONFISCATED ITEMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE CRIME LABORATORY FOR TESTING. Despite the above lapses, accused was convicted by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Before the Supreme Court, accused moves for his acquittal because said non-compliance of Section 21, RA No. 9165 is fatal and in furtherance of his constitutional presumption of innocence. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC Joint Decision in all respects because there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and credence. Held: At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF. Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. Otherwise, “the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service.” The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items from accused-appellant. First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items. According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete name, including the middle initial, of accusedappellant in order to mark the confiscated sachets. The marking was done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latter’s full name, was not clearly established. Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of the complete name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled the former to mark the seized items with the latter’s complete initials. This suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to the latter’s statements at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where the marking really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who asked accused-appellant about the latter’s personal circumstances, including his true identity, and that the questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at the police station. Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-party representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted in the presence of a representative from the media, from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official. Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient time from the moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest. Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable – without so much Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial, the Certificate of Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the arresting officer who prepared the certificate – thus making the certificate defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do so. We reiterate that these requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted especially true when the lapses in procedure were “recognized and explained in terms of justifiable grounds.” There must also be a showing “that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason.” However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties. As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused which entitles him to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence. When the evidence is susceptible to two (2) interpretations, one consistent with the guilt of the accused and the other, his innocence, the presumption of innocence was not overcome and the accused is entitled to acquittal as a matter of right. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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PEOPLE VS. ZAFRA MARAORAO, G.R. NO. 174369, June 20, 2012 Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4, 2001 filed before the RTC of Manila for illegal possession of shabu. On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged against him. Thereafter, trial ensued. For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they received reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that an undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2 Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center. While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to apprehend him. Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He was about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance, which they suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic sachet “ZM-1” in the presence of the police officers. The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory chemical analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. Her findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D1121-00 . In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his mother. He went there early because he had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at 8:00 a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down. When they turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out that they were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away, the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of what was inside the bag . Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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He was convicted by the RTC of illegal possession of shabu which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Held: Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, or the shabu in this case, the prosecution evidence must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the appellant was in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug. In this case, the fact of possession by appellant of the bag containing the shabu was not established in the first place. The testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a glaring discrepancy which both the trial and the appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit, arresting officers PO3 Vigilla, PO2 Abella, PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1 Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified persons standing and seemingly conversing a few meters ahead of them. “However, when one of them noticed our presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading towards the Muslim Center leaving behind the other person and a maroon colored bag with ‘Adidas’ marking in the pavement.” In other words, the maroon bag was left behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3 Vigilla testified during direct examination that they spotted two persons talking to each other, and upon noticing them, “one of them scampered away and was chased by my companions while the other one dropped a bag, sir . Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by the one who did not run away referring to the accused-appellant. Later, in another part of his testimony, he again changed this material fact. When he was asked by Prosecutor Senados as to who between the two persons they saw talking to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla categorically answered, “[t]he one who is holding a bag, sir . Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the credibility of the prosecution’s principal witness and casts reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt for it renders questionable whether he in fact held the bag with intention to possess it and its contents. In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. While a lone witness’ testimony is sufficient to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must be clear, consistent, and credible—qualities we cannot ascribe to this Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must both come from a credible witness and be credible in itself – tested by human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct that has evolved through the years. Clearly from the foregoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely and consciously possessed the same. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence is susceptible to two (2) interpretations, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence, the prosecution’s evidence failed to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal. Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right .

Private complainant could not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court Decision acquitting the accused based on misappreciation of facts without violating the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864, January 18, 2011 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011 On December 14, 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and RTC of Paranaque and acquitted the accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it “denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses.” But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that: Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight. As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan: [A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws. Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed. Double jeopardy has set in. State’s right to due process of law; when the State may validly question by Certiorari under Rule 65 a decision acquitting and accused or to increase the penalty without violating the rule against Double jeopardy PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO BENITEZ and GILBERT DULAY, G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012

The private respondents were the accused in two criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging them with the crime of malversation of public funds, defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The charges arose from the transactions that the respondents participated in, in their official capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) under the MHS’ Kabisig Program. After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The prosecution’s chief evidence was based on the lone testimony of Commission of Audit (COA) Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary evidence used in the audit examination of the subject funds. COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a physical inventory of these motor vehicles; it based its report on the information given by the Presidential Task Force. She emphasized that the audit team found it highly irregular that the motor vehicles were registered in the name of University of Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this reason, she believed that no proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS. After COA Auditor Cortez’ testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of evidence and rested its case. Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to evidence, were filed by Zagala and the respondents on November 15, 1997, January 5, 1998 and January 28, 1998; on January Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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27, 1998, the prosecution filed a Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the demurrers to evidence. The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22, 2002. In dismissing these criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in the two criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report. The Issues 1.

Whether the prosecutor’s actions and/or omissions (of not presenting other witnesses and for not opposing the Demurrer to Evidence of the accused) in these cases effectively deprived the State of its right to due process; and

2.

Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the demurrers to evidence of the respondents [and as such, double jeopardy has not set in] for a review by the Supreme Court of the guilt or innocence of the private respondents.

Held: The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because of the nonfeasance committed by the special prosecutor in failing to present sufficient evidence to prove its case. It claims that the prosecutor failed to protect the State’s interest in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To support its position, petitioner cites the case of Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345, where the Court nullified the dismissal of the criminal cases due to the serious nonfeasance committed by the public prosecutor. The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the State’s interest when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds involved and the special prosecutor’s failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy (PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 559 SCRA 449). Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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of jurisdiction, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491 SCRA 185, June 16, 2000; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s due process rights, PEOPLE VS. VELASCO, 340 SCRA 207, SEPTEMBER 13, 2000. A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case. Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the presentation of additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant traceable to the special prosecutor’s conduct. The special prosecutor’s conduct allegedly also violated the State’s due process rights. The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents, citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals where we considered the following factual circumstances - (1) the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence when the demurrer to evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial court’s failure to require the presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the State’s right to due process, attributable to the inaction of the public prosecutor and/or the trial court. In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be secured.

We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is as much a judge in behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the State, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society. Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates, through evidence and records, that its case falls within the Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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narrow exceptions from the criminal protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the finality-of-acquittal rule. Double jeopardy when not applicable in a petition under Rule 65 to increase the penalty as a result of grave abuse of discretion by the trial court. ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 AND people of the Philippines vs. THE HOMORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 154954, February 1, 2012 [THE LENNY VILLA HAZING CASE]

FACTS In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar “Bogs” Asuncion, Samuel “Sam” Belleza, Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III, Roberto Francis “Bert” Navera, Geronimo “Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo “Lenny” Villa (neophytes). On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites.” These rites included the “Indian Run,” which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the “Bicol Express,” which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the “Rounds,” in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the “auxiliaries” (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the “Auxies’ Privilege Round,” in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) arrived and demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans After trial, the court held that: 1.

Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.

3.

Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

The People of the Philippines filed a Petition under Rule 65 questioning the acquittal and the lower penalty on the four (4) accused and also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime. Held: The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in any other Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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manner without the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the State from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant’s express consent. This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial, People vs. COURT OF APPEALS & GALICIA, 516 SCRA 383 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing. In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity members. The assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug – the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries has to be modified. In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus: Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. xxx And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries. Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. The CA Decision was therefore MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson were found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. The Decision of acquittal could not be reviewed for it would violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy since it was not done with grave abused of discretion nor violated the State’s right to due process of law. A case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, slight physical injuries and damage to property may not be the subject of more than one information. Acquittal or conviction in either bars prosecution in the other based on the right against double j e opa r dy .

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTOSAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Deputy Executive Secretary Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. Issue: Is the right against double jeopardy violated? Held: Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 . Double jeopardy has set in. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be “twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense” protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the “same offense.” Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property “as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. As held by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for “serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence” because of the accused’s prior acquittal of “slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,” with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but “the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,” a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Equal protection clause was violated when the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 singled out only the officials and employees of the “previous administration” to be investigated for graft and corruption and other crimes committed by public officers. LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 192935 : December 7, 2010 President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor. The Philippine Truth Commission’s (PTC) primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. The petitioner claims that Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional for violative of the equal protection clause as it discriminates the public officials under the administration of former President Gloria Arroyo even though there are reports of corruptions also in the administrations before that of Pres. Arroyo. Held: Executive Order No. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration of former President Gloria Arroyo is plain, patent and manifest. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. “The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.” Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Whether the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause. VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ, et al vs. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010

Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation particularly those in the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police. Issue: Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause. Held: Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other national government officials does run afoul the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other national government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the maintenance of internal peace and Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas. Is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code declaring appointive officials deemed resigned from their positions upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy while elected officials are not violative of the equal protection clause? ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO TOLENTINO, JR. VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010 The main issue in this case is whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, providing that appointive officials are deemed automatically resigned from their jobs upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy (while the elected officials are not) violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court through Justice Antonio Nachura held that the questioned provisions of the above-mentioned laws are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. The COMELEC moved for a reconsideration of the said Decision. Held: The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Accused are entitled to acquittal despite the positive identification of a witness who is not credible and whose testimony is full of inconsistencies and contrary to common human experience

PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010 and LEJANO VS. PEOPLE, G. R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010 On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio “Dong” Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio “Pyke” Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony. But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada and convicted all the accused.. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Held: Since Jessica Alfaro’s testimony is contrary to common human experience and full of inconsistencies, her positive identification could not prevail over the documented alibis of Hubert Webb. Positive identification to be superior over denial and alibi, it should come from a credible witness. Inconsistent testimonies of prosecution’s witnesses on material points entitles the accused of acquittal based on his constitutional right to be presumed innocent. ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008 On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to P600,000.00 . The Cabugao Police applied for a search warrant which was granted by the MTC One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime. On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC. The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house. In particular, SPO1 Cabaya testified that while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower shelf. The gun is a .38 caliber revolver with five live ammunitions which he immediately turned over to his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino. Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun Lorna testified that she saw a “military” man planting the gun. After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated July 7, 1999, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in giving little credence to his defense that the firearm found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges material inconsistencies in the Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to failure by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and therefore entitled to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence. HELD: The accused should be acquitted. In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SPO1 Cabaya, who testified that he discovered the subject firearm in a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside petitioner's defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to Cabaya's testimony on the principles that the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties regularly; that he had no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his affirmative testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative testimony. The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and conducted the search, who “discovered” the gun, and who witnessed the “discovery” are material matters because they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses. Especially damaged is the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on material points jibes with those of the other prosecution witnesses. The inconsistencies are material as they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not SPO1 Cabaya really found a firearm in the house of petitioner. SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen, among whom were SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he does not remember. While searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the door. He said that SPO1 Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he (Cabaya) saw the firearm and that he picked up the gun, held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara. He asserted that SPO2 Renon was not one of those who went inside the house. However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony, related a different story as to the circumstances of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the house. SPO1 Jara testified that he remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was seven to eight meters away from him. He could not see the inside of the house and could see Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Cabaya only from his chest up. He did not see the firearm at the place where it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to show the gun, which was a revolver. He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the latter discovered the firearm. He further testified that SPO3 Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those near him when he (Cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house. While the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him. In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that where there was material and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal prosecution witness. The Court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is more plausible. In such a situation, both testimonies lose their probative value. Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the same sale transaction, which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the same occasion? In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses generate serious doubt as to whether a firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he was with. Accused in a rape case is entitled to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence when the rape victim failed to immediately or spontaneously identify the alleged attacker when presented to her.

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TUMAMBING, G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011

JENNY

THE FACTS: The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in Criminal Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. DK, the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousin’s rented room. She was startled when somebody entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DK’s clothes and undressed himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her rapist. On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any sign of resistance on her body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals. Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at the house of his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that he never left his employer’s house that night. Ledesma corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that it had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked, however, when he learned that he had been suspected of having committed rape. When the accused was summoned by the Barangay Captain, the complainant did not spontaneously identify the former. HELD: A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offender’s identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties. DK’s identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. A reading of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually pointed to him when it was suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested to DK’s uncertainties Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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regarding the rapist’s identity when the barangay chairman arranged for her to meet Tumambing. DK’s above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the Court no confidence that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her rapist because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her cousin’s rented room many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would have been one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite the barangay chairman’s assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing the testimony of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value. There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt. But this is inconsistent with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, “bigla na lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin.” Since DK did not say that the man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for the first time, she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so certain that he wore a yellow shirt? With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DK’s rapist, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing as a result of the accused’s constitutional presumption of innocence. Delay in complaining of the alleged rape coupled with the fact that the alleged rape victim visited the accused in jail six (6) times entitles the accused to an acquittal based on the constitutional presumption of innocence.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERWIN QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y ABARQUEZ and LARRY PANTI y JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 184170, February 2, 2011 PEREZ, J.: On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo (Jerwin), 16-year old Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were charged in an Information for Rape allegedly committed as follows: That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in barangay [XXX], municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another for a common purpose, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA], a minor 16 years of age, against her will and without her consent. That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating circumstance of minority, the fact that [AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when she was raped by the hereinnamed four (4) accused. On Appeal, the Supreme Court based on the accused’s constitutional presumption of innocence, brought about by doubts as to the credibility of the testimony of the alleged rape victim, the accused are acquitted. This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAA’s testimony, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod and barangay kagawad, the purported confession put into writing and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent incidents relating to the case. First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when the two allegedly invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went with them. Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico. Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was very dark. And yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her. Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a “round-the-clock abrasion in the labia minora.” This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. At most, this indicates that AAA had sexual intercourse, not raped. Fourth, AAA’s belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially when it appears that she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked her why she was walking in an unusual manner. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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xxx Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six (6) times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and which was not refuted by the prosecution. Right to cross examine; effect of the death of a witness before she could be cross-examined through no fault of the adverse party SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND MINERVA DELA CRUZ vs. RAMON PAPA IV, G.R. No. 185899, December 8, 2010 ABAD, J. This case is about the plaintiff’s lone witness who passed away due to illness before the adverse party could cross-examine him. In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for cancellation of titles, recovery of properties worth millions of pesos, and damages against several defendants, including petitioner spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela Cruzes) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Civil Cases 94-3447 and 953816. On October 21, 1999 the Estate presented Myron C. Papa , its executor, to testify on the substance of the complaint. At the conclusion of Myron’s testimony on that day, the RTC required the Estate and the latter agreed to present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing to identify the originals of certain exhibits, after which counsels for the defendants, would begin to cross-examine him. But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand. He was taken ill and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting respondent Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estate’s co-administrator, to seek repeated postponements of hearings in the case to allow Myron undergo intensive treatment. Later, the Estate filed a motion for leave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron by deposition at the hospital where he was confined. The RTC granted the motion on February 22, 2001 and eventually set the deposition-taking on September 7, 2001 but Myron passed away on August 16, 2001. On November 15, 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge Myron’s direct testimony which the RTC granted. The Issue: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myron’s testimony after the RTC ordered the same stricken off the record for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine him. Held: But having their turn to cross-examine Myron is different from their being accorded an opportunity to cross-examine him. The RTC set the deposition taking on September 7, 2001 but Myron died before that date, on August 16, 2001. Consequently, it was not the defendants’ fault that they were unable to cross-examine him. Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated through Myron’s testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latter’s testimony altogether wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible unless the RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate to rectify its mistakes. Ref: PEOPLE VS. JUDGE SENERIS, 99 SCRA 92 ORTIGAS VS. LUFTHANSA, 64 SCRA 610 Right to information; right of an examinee in the CPA Board examination to look at her answer sheet, questionnaire and answer sheets HAZEL MA. ANTOLIN VS. ABELARDO DOMONDON, ET AL., G.R. No. 165036 & 175705, July 5, 2010 Facts: Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA] Board Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997. The examination results were released on October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects. Subject Theory of Accounts Business Law Management Services Auditing Theory

Petitioner’s Grade 65 % 66 % 69 % 82 %

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Auditing Problems Practical Accounting I Practical Accounting II

70 % 68 % 77 %

Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon (Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected. On November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam. Thus, on November 10, 1997, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers). Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner’s request on two grounds: first, that Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only permitted access to the petitioner’s answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that reconsideration of her examination result was only proper under the grounds stated therein: Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or to go over his/her test papers or answer sheets on a date not later than thirty (30) days from the official release of the results of the examination. Within ten (10) days from such date, he/she may file his/her request for reconsideration of ratings. Reconsideration of rating shall be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/her test papers or answer sheets, or malfeasance. Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than petitioner’s answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, which provides: Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional Acts – The hereunder acts shall constitute prejudicial, illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional conduct: A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or reproducing questions xxxx 3.

that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for the subject has on deposit at least two thousand (2,000) questions.

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After a further exchange of correspondence, the Board informed petitioner that an investigation was conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers. Undeterred, on January 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against the Board of Accountancy and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 33, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-86881. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Board of Accountancy and its members (the respondents) to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers. Petitioner also prayed that final judgment be issued ordering respondents to furnish petitioner with all documents and other materials as would enable her to determine whether respondents fairly administered the examinations and correctly graded petitioner’s performance therein, and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. On February 5, 1998, respondents filed their Opposition to the Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and argued, inter alia, that petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought, that the respondents did not have the duty to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers, and that petitioner had other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, namely, recourse to the PRC. Respondents also filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the main case, which asked that the Petition for Mandamus with Damages be dismissed for lack of merit on the following grounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the petition stated no cause of action because there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded; and (3) the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law, including Section 20, Article IV, of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Petition (which was admitted by the RTC), where she included the following allegation in the body of her petition: The allegations in this amended petition are meant only to plead a cause of action for access to the documents requested, not for re-correction which petitioner shall assert in the proper forum depending on, among others, whether she finds sufficient error in the documents to warrant such or any other relief. None of the allegations in this amended petition, including those in the following paragraphs, is made to assert a cause of action for re-correction. If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a re-checking of her exam, the following prayer for relief was deleted from the Amended Petition: “and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA.” On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken and passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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and had taken her oath as a CPA. Petitioner filed her Opposition on July 8, 1998. Subsequently, on October 29, 1998, respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim to the amended petition. They reiterated their original allegations and further alleged that there was no cause of action because at the time the Amended Petition was admitted, they had ceased to be members of the Board of Accountancy and they were not in possession of the documents sought by the petitioner. Issues The petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can determine for herself why and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its duties. She argues that the Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees support her right to demand access to the Examination Papers. Furthermore, she claims that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies, since no recourse to the PRC was available, and only a pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims that her demand for access to documents was not rendered moot by her passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exams. Held: Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. This much was made evident by the doctrine laid down in Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval: After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other pleadings filed in the proceedings at bar, the Court resolved to DENY said petition for lack of merit. The petition at bar prays for the setting aside of the Order of respondent Judge dismissing petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the other respondents (Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission) “to reconsider, recorrect and/or rectify the board ratings of the petitioners from their present failing grades to higher or passing marks.” The function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of mandamus. The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the adverse judgment by the Medical Board of Examiners was an appeal to the Professional Regulation Commission itself, and thence to the Court of Appeals. The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the Examination Documents through mandamus. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7, Article III provides: Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full disclosure and transparency in government, viz: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law". The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern." As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: In determining whether x x x a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters. We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further proceedings. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation; Civil liability imposed despite acquittal of the accused-when it is proper and when it is not. FELIXBERTO ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174654, August 17, 2011 Facts: The petitioner was charged before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 13, of Estafa through falsification of a public document but was convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by a private individual. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ACQUITTED the accused for he was convicted of a crime he was not charged of in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. However, the Court of Appeals SUSTAINED the RTC Decision imposing civil liability on the petitioner despite his acquittal. Issue: The only issue therefore is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal. Held: The petition is meritorious. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.” Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of an offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall, petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same. In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his exoneration in this wise: While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. x x x Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto. First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged. Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’ transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. “To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be upheld.” And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto. Presumption of innocence vs. presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties; non-compliance of the police of section 21 of RA No. 9165 in drugs cases

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, G.R. No. 184595, June 29, 2010 Accused was allegedly arrested in a buy-bus operation in Manila particularly in Abad Santos Avenue along Bambang Street, a street with many people at that time, at around 7:50 p.m. of June 25, 2004. She allegedly sold shabu worth P500.00 for one (1) sachet containing 0.146 Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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grams . No other sachet of shabu was confiscated on her person though she allegedly a drug dealer. HELD: The chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not shown to have been substantially complied with. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties could not prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly known drugpeddler to be standing at a corner of a street at 7:50 in the evening instead of plying her trade secretly, and with only a 0.146-gram sachet worth P500.00 of prohibited drugs in her possession the value of which happens to be what a poseur-buyer wants to buy. Whether the COMELEC was correct in denying Ang Ladlad as a party-list group on moral grounds; freedom of expression and right to religion. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 7, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which: x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.” This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah). Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation. ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning. Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows: Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon: 1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals; When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration to the COMELEC EN BANC, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that: Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole. Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. The COMELEC likewise used the Holy Bible and the Koran in denying Ladlad’s application. On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010. HELD: The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration. Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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Custodial investigation conducted by “Bantay Bayan” groups or Barangay tanods; whether the right of the suspect to be informed of his expanded Miranda Rights is already applicable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO LAUGA, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010 PEREZ, J.: Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision. The Facts In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will. On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan” in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following: The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and (3) AAA’s accusation was ill-motivated. Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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HELD Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a “bantay bayan” and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a “Bantay Bayan” Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus: Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accusedappellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x. [But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant]. (Emphasis supplied) Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “bantay bayan” may be deemed a law Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a “bantay bayan,” that is, “a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.” This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but “from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”

Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street) * www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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